This would have been my alternative as well (although with 5 votes all across). My understanding however, is that the position of SSAC is that they did not want the ABILITY to exercise a vote and that putting it in the Bylaws as you suggest would be problematic. But I will let Julie/Lyman speak for themselves. Alan At 26/07/2015 11:58 PM, Paul Szyndler wrote:
All,
I have followed the development of this issue over the last few weeks and felt a degree of confidence in the mechanisms Jordan had outlined. However, given the very recent consternation over the issue, I would like to propose a procedural solution / question.
Would it not be possible for us to separate the definition of voting structures from the timing of participation? In other words couldd we agree upon the voting weights for SOs and ACs (5,5,5,5,5,2,2) as a matter of principle and also agree that each can join at a time of their choosing? Such a mechanism would require certain caveats succh as a three month notice period for engagement, for example.
Just an idea.
Regards,
Paul
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From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, 27 July 2015 1:43 PM To: Arun Sukumar Cc: <wp1@icann.org>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism
Hi everyone
We did have a great chance to discuss the voting weights question in our two days of face to face time in Paris a week or so ago.
This issue of representation was scoped out in our first PC report, which you'll recall had:
Five votes each for: - ASO - ccNSO - GNSO - GAC - At Large
Two votes each for: - RSSAC - SSAC
We have clear advice that the last-mentioned ACs do not want to participate at this time, and I have an impression that GAC is still discussing its participation.
[We are, by the by, going to have to set out how the remaining ACs will be able to opt in at a future point, presumably on the same basis in terms of # of votes as set out above.]
In the public comments that came in on the voting weights, there was no overwhelming feedback to suggest that the ALAC numbers were a problem.
How can we workably get this matter resolved?
What is a compromise that can be lived with - is a referral of this question to WS2 in a suitable way possible?
I don't think we should leave the matter of votes open, and I don't think we should provide options again. We did that last time, and the feedback was happy enough with what we had proposed.
Robin, Ed, Arun, Alan, all:
what can we do to get this working?
cheers Jordan
On 27 July 2015 at 15:25, Arun Sukumar <<mailto:arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in>arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in> wrote: Agree with Robin and Ed on the issue of equal representation to ALAC. If at-large is designed to represent internet users, are we really suggesting that 5 votes will do justice to the diversity of views in this wide constituency? ALAC, in my personal opinion, should remain an advisory entity. Sent from my iPad
On 27 Jul 2015, at 07:53, Alan Greenberg <<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote: Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission.
Alan
At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote:
Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it.
GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes.
Thanks, Robin
On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote:
Hi everybody,
In reviewing document 5A2 Iâve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. Iâm referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized:
-----
The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.
-----
The description of ALAC is simply not true.
I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states:
-----
The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.
----
ALAC was structurally designed to âconsider and provide adviceâ on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet usersâ. It was NOT âstructurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANNâ.
Two inaccuracies:
1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not âstructurally designedâ to be the âhomeâ of any of them, itâs structural remit being limited to individual Internet users;
2. ALAC was not âstructurally designedâ to represent anyone. It was âstructurally designedâ to âconsider and provide adviceâ to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users.
To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads:
----
The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains.
---
The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was âstructurally designedâ to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for itâs designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC.
As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALACâs function is to âconsider and provide adviceâ. The NCSGâs function is to ârepresentâ. They are different.
We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort.
I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A:
---
The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.
---
I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not.
I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, Iâm just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration.
Thanks for considering,
Ed
---------- From: "Jordan Carter" <<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan@internetnz.net.nz > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: <mailto:wp1@icann.org>wp1@icann.org, <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism
Hi everyone
Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I havenât got tracked changes to show you - itâs not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadnât actually been finished).
We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.
This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.
best Jordan
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