They confirmed to co-chairs when we met them in BA. Pls work on the assumption they will not vote. Do not exclude them from joining discussions, though. Same for SSAC. Thomas ======== rickert.net PS - Sent from my cell. Please excuse typos and brevity.

Am 26.07.2015 um 21:23 schrieb Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>:

Do we have formal confirmation from the RSSAC that they are happy with being excluded. The last I heard, Lyman said he was pretty sure that was their position, but that he could not formally speak on their behalf.

Simlarly, we should have formal confirmation from the other groups that they are prepared to participate. I can give that on behalf of the ALAC.

Alan

At 26/07/2015 01:24 AM, Jordan Carter wrote:

...

Hi everyone

Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven’t got tracked changes to show you - it’s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn’t actually been finished).

We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.

This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.

best Jordan

-- Jordan Carter

Chief Executive InternetNZ

04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter

To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential.

---

Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it. GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes. Thanks, Robin On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote:

Hi everybody,

In reviewing document 5A2 I’ve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I’m referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized:

-----

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

-----

The description of ALAC is simply not true.

I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states:

-----

The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.

----

ALAC was structurally designed to “consider and provide advice” on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users”. It was NOT “structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN”.

Two inaccuracies:

1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to be the “home” of any of them, it’s structural remit being limited to individual Internet users;

2. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to represent anyone. It was “structurally designed” to “consider and provide advice” to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users.

To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads:

----

The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains.

---

The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was “structurally designed” to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it’s designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC.

As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC’s function is to “consider and provide advice”. The NCSG’s function is to “represent”. They are different.

We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort.

I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A:

---

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

---

I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not.

I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I’m just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration.

Thanks for considering,

Ed

From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: wp1@icann.org, accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

Hi everyone

Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven’t got tracked changes to show you - it’s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn’t actually been finished).

We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.

This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.

best Jordan

-- Jordan Carter

Chief Executive InternetNZ

04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter

To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

Agree with Robin and Ed on the issue of equal representation to ALAC. If at-large is designed to represent internet users, are we really suggesting that 5 votes will do justice to the diversity of views in this wide constituency? ALAC, in my personal opinion, should remain an advisory entity. Sent from my iPad

On 27 Jul 2015, at 07:53, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:

Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission.

Alan

At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote:

...

Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it.

GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes.

Thanks, Robin

...

On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote:

Hi everybody,

In reviewing document 5A2 I’ve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I’m referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized:

-----

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

-----

The description of ALAC is simply not true.

I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states:

-----

The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.

----

ALAC was structurally designed to “consider and provide advice” on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users”. It was NOT “structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN”.

Two inaccuracies:

1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to be the “home” of any of them, it’s structural remit being limited to individual Internet users;

2. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to represent anyone. It was “structurally designed” to “consider and provide advice” to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users.

To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads:

----

The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains.

---

The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was “structurally designed” to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it’s designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC.

As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC’s function is to “consider and provide advice”. The NCSG’s function is to “represent”. They are different.

We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort.

I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A:

---

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

---

I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not.

I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I’m just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration.

Thanks for considering,

Ed

From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: wp1@icann.org, accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

Hi everyone

Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven’t got tracked changes to show you - it’s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn’t actually been finished).

We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.

This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.

best Jordan

-- Jordan Carter

Chief Executive InternetNZ

04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter

To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

_______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1

---

Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

All, I have followed the development of this issue over the last few weeks and felt a degree of confidence in the mechanisms Jordan had outlined. However, given the very recent consternation over the issue, I would like to propose a procedural solution / question. Would it not be possible for us to separate the definition of voting structures from the timing of participation? In other words – could we agree upon the voting weights for SOs and ACs (5,5,5,5,5,2,2) as a matter of principle and also agree that each can join at a time of their choosing? Such a mechanism would require certain caveats – such as a three month notice period for engagement, for example. Just an idea. Regards, Paul Paul Szyndler | General Manager, International and Government Affairs .au Domain Administration Limited T: +61 2 6292 5034 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 | M: +61 402 250 389 E: <mailto:paul.szyndler@auda.org.au> paul.szyndler@auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au <http://www.auda.org.au/> Twitter: <http://twitter.com/auda> @auda | Blog: www.auda.org.au/blog/ <http://www.auda.org.au/blog/> auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator Important Notice This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. <http://www.igf.org.au/> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, 27 July 2015 1:43 PM To: Arun Sukumar Cc: <wp1@icann.org>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism Hi everyone We did have a great chance to discuss the voting weights question in our two days of face to face time in Paris a week or so ago. This issue of representation was scoped out in our first PC report, which you'll recall had: Five votes each for: - ASO - ccNSO - GNSO - GAC - At Large Two votes each for: - RSSAC - SSAC We have clear advice that the last-mentioned ACs do not want to participate at this time, and I have an impression that GAC is still discussing its participation. [We are, by the by, going to have to set out how the remaining ACs will be able to opt in at a future point, presumably on the same basis in terms of # of votes as set out above.] In the public comments that came in on the voting weights, there was no overwhelming feedback to suggest that the ALAC numbers were a problem. How can we workably get this matter resolved? What is a compromise that can be lived with - is a referral of this question to WS2 in a suitable way possible? I don't think we should leave the matter of votes open, and I don't think we should provide options again. We did that last time, and the feedback was happy enough with what we had proposed. Robin, Ed, Arun, Alan, all: what can we do to get this working? cheers Jordan On 27 July 2015 at 15:25, Arun Sukumar <arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in <mailto:arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in> > wrote: Agree with Robin and Ed on the issue of equal representation to ALAC. If at-large is designed to represent internet users, are we really suggesting that 5 votes will do justice to the diversity of views in this wide constituency? ALAC, in my personal opinion, should remain an advisory entity. Sent from my iPad On 27 Jul 2015, at 07:53, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> > wrote: Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission. Alan At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote: Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it. GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes. Thanks, Robin On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote: Hi everybody, In reviewing document 5A2 I’ve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I’m referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized: ----- The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes. ----- The description of ALAC is simply not true. I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states: ----- The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users. ---- ALAC was structurally designed to “consider and provide advice” on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users”. It was NOT “structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN”. Two inaccuracies: 1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to be the “home” of any of them, it’s structural remit being limited to individual Internet users; 2. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to represent anyone. It was “structurally designed” to “consider and provide advice” to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users. To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads: ---- The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains. --- The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was “structurally designed” to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it’s designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC. As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC’s function is to “consider and provide advice”. The NCSG’s function is to “represent”. They are different. We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort. I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A: --- The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes. --- I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not. I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I’m just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration. Thanks for considering, Ed _____ From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> , accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism Hi everyone Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven’t got tracked changes to show you - it’s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn’t actually been finished). We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week. This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July. best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ 04 495 2118 <tel:04%20495%202118> (office) | +64 21 442 649 <tel:%2B64%2021%20442%20649> (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org <mailto:WP1@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter A better world through a better Internet

All, Might I suggest that as a potential middle ground for everyone that we agree that we all thing that the current mechanism is good and will provide the foundations for accountability that we require, but that given this is essentially setting up the structure for the future of ICANN that we will agree to assess the relative voting weights and the status of the AC’s as part of WS2. WS” will allow us to have a full and complete conversation on a number of issues that will be intertwined and I would suggest that this may be one of them that requires further assessment. This seems broadly in line with some members of the GAC also who wish to examine their role and would give SSAC and RSSAC the requisite time they need to formulate their own positions for the long term. -James From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul Szyndler Sent: Monday, July 27, 2015 4:58 AM To: Jordan Carter; Arun Sukumar Cc: wp1@icann.org; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism All, I have followed the development of this issue over the last few weeks and felt a degree of confidence in the mechanisms Jordan had outlined. However, given the very recent consternation over the issue, I would like to propose a procedural solution / question. Would it not be possible for us to separate the definition of voting structures from the timing of participation? In other words – could we agree upon the voting weights for SOs and ACs (5,5,5,5,5,2,2) as a matter of principle and also agree that each can join at a time of their choosing? Such a mechanism would require certain caveats – such as a three month notice period for engagement, for example. Just an idea. Regards, Paul Paul Szyndler | General Manager, International and Government Affairs .au Domain Administration Limited T: +61 2 6292 5034 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 | M: +61 402 250 389 E: paul.szyndler@auda.org.au<mailto:paul.szyndler@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au/> Twitter: @auda<http://twitter.com/auda> | Blog: www.auda.org.au/blog/<http://www.auda.org.au/blog/> auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator Important Notice This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. [X]<http://www.igf.org.au/> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Monday, 27 July 2015 1:43 PM To: Arun Sukumar Cc: <wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism Hi everyone We did have a great chance to discuss the voting weights question in our two days of face to face time in Paris a week or so ago. This issue of representation was scoped out in our first PC report, which you'll recall had: Five votes each for: - ASO - ccNSO - GNSO - GAC - At Large Two votes each for: - RSSAC - SSAC We have clear advice that the last-mentioned ACs do not want to participate at this time, and I have an impression that GAC is still discussing its participation. [We are, by the by, going to have to set out how the remaining ACs will be able to opt in at a future point, presumably on the same basis in terms of # of votes as set out above.] In the public comments that came in on the voting weights, there was no overwhelming feedback to suggest that the ALAC numbers were a problem. How can we workably get this matter resolved? What is a compromise that can be lived with - is a referral of this question to WS2 in a suitable way possible? I don't think we should leave the matter of votes open, and I don't think we should provide options again. We did that last time, and the feedback was happy enough with what we had proposed. Robin, Ed, Arun, Alan, all: what can we do to get this working? cheers Jordan On 27 July 2015 at 15:25, Arun Sukumar <arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in<mailto:arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in>> wrote: Agree with Robin and Ed on the issue of equal representation to ALAC. If at-large is designed to represent internet users, are we really suggesting that 5 votes will do justice to the diversity of views in this wide constituency? ALAC, in my personal opinion, should remain an advisory entity. Sent from my iPad On 27 Jul 2015, at 07:53, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>> wrote: Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission. Alan At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote: Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it. GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes. Thanks, Robin On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote: Hi everybody, In reviewing document 5A2 I’ve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I’m referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized: ----- The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes. ----- The description of ALAC is simply not true. I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states: ----- The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users. ---- ALAC was structurally designed to “consider and provide advice” on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users”. It was NOT “structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN”. Two inaccuracies: 1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to be the “home” of any of them, it’s structural remit being limited to individual Internet users; 2. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to represent anyone. It was “structurally designed” to “consider and provide advice” to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users. To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads: ---- The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains. --- The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was “structurally designed” to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it’s designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC. As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC’s function is to “consider and provide advice”. The NCSG’s function is to “represent”. They are different. We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort. I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A: --- The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes. --- I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not. I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I’m just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration. Thanks for considering, Ed ________________________________ From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>, accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism Hi everyone Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven’t got tracked changes to show you - it’s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn’t actually been finished). We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week. This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July. best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ 04 495 2118<tel:04%20495%202118> (office) | +64 21 442 649<tel:%2B64%2021%20442%20649> (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org<mailto:WP1@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter A better world through a better Internet

On 27 Jul 2015 4:25 am, "Arun Sukumar" <arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in> wrote:

Agree with Robin and Ed on the issue of equal representation to ALAC. If

at-large is designed to represent internet users, are we really suggesting that 5 votes will do justice to the diversity of views in this wide constituency?

Are you really suggesting that 5 votes will do justice at the GNSO level as well? I don't think the number of votes is the issue as infact, Atlarge has the best setup in ICANN that will ensure diversity in those 5 votes.

ALAC, in my personal opinion, should remain an advisory entity.

Well to the extent that it does not reduce its number of votes. It seem that we are seeing this accountability process as names only thing. This is the entire organisation accountability and equal footing is just so important. Regards

Sent from my iPad

On 27 Jul 2015, at 07:53, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:

...

Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission.

Alan

At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote:

...

Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting

that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it.

...

GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I

understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes.

...

Thanks, Robin

On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote:

...

Hi everybody,

In reviewing document 5A2 I’ve come across what I believe is an

inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I’m referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized:

...

...

-----

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis

between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

...

-----

The description of ALAC is simply not true.

I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which

states:

...

-----

The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational

home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.

...

----

ALAC was structurally designed to “consider and provide advice” on the

activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users”. It was NOT “structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN”.

...

Two inaccuracies:

1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users.

Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to be the “home” of any of them, it’s structural remit being limited to individual Internet users;

...

2. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to represent anyone. It was

“structurally designed” to “consider and provide advice” to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users.

...

To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of

the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads:

...

----

The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to

represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains.

...

---

The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is

accurate to state that the NCSG was “structurally designed” to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it’s designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC.

...

As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design

as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC’s function is to “consider and provide advice”. The NCSG’s function is to “represent”. They are different.

...

We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we

are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort.

...

I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A:

---

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis

between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

...

---

I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from

the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not.

...

I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question

the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I’m just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration.

...

Thanks for considering,

Ed

________________________________ From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: wp1@icann.org, accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community

mechanism

...

Hi everyone

Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting

weights. I am sorry that I haven’t got tracked changes to show you - it’s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn’t actually been finished).

...

We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe

Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.

...

This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.

best Jordan

-- Jordan Carter

Chief Executive InternetNZ

04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter

To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

_______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

The problem with our proposal is that it doesn't take into account the different roles of the various stakeholders at ICANN. It also leads to double-representation of certain users who participate in both the GNSO and the ALAC. These are not insignificant concerns, but major holes in the proposal that will need to be dealt with in the interests of organizational accountability. Perhaps we need to move this issue to WS2, where we can have a meaningful discussion of the appropriate roles of stakeholders in this new model, relative weights, and participation rights. Thanks, Robin On Jul 27, 2015, at 7:49 AM, Alan Greenberg wrote:

If you are saying that 5 votes is insufficient to represent the views of those charged with supporting the 3 billion Internet users, we will gladly accept more votes. ;-)

Alan

At 26/07/2015 11:25 PM, Arun Sukumar wrote:

...

Agree with Robin and Ed on the issue of equal representation to ALAC. If at-large is designed to represent internet users, are we really suggesting that 5 votes will do justice to the diversity of views in this wide constituency? ALAC, in my personal opinion, should remain an advisory entity.

Sent from my iPad

On 27 Jul 2015, at 07:53, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca > wrote:

...

Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission.

Alan

At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote:

...

Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it.

GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes.

Thanks, Robin

On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote:

...

Hi everybody,

In reviewing document 5A2 I’ve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I’m referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized:

-----

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

-----

The description of ALAC is simply not true.

I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states:

-----

The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.

----

ALAC was structurally designed to “consider and provide advice” on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users”. It was NOT “structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN”.

Two inaccuracies:

1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to be the “home” of any of them, it’s structural remit being limited to individual Internet users;

2. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to represent anyone. It was “structurally designed” to “consider and provide advice” to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users.

To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads:

----

The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains.

---

The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was “structurally designed” to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it’s designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC.

As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC’s function is to “consider and provide advice”. The NCSG’s function is to “represent”. They are different.

We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort.

I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A:

---

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

---

I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not.

I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I’m just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration.

Thanks for considering,

Ed

From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: wp1@icann.org, accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

Hi everyone

Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven’t got tracked changes to show you - it’s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn’t actually been finished).

We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.

This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.

best Jordan

-- Jordan Carter

Chief Executive InternetNZ

04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter

To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

_______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1

---

Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

Hi everyone, My initial post didn't say anything about the quality or content of our proposal. I was merely trying to correct some inaccurate language that was being used. Sometimes, as here, when you reflect reality in what you write you stimulate thoughts and discussion that otherwise would not have taken place. These issues are complex. As the selector of Board seat 15 ALAC does have a role to play in some of our community powers. I'm not sure I agree that role does extend or should extend beyond powers related to the selection and removal of their Board member. Powers over the budget and the strategic plan, for example, do seem to me to be in the remit of groups such as the GNSO which are charged with being a "policy development body" yet are perhaps beyond ALAC's limited remit to "consider and provide advice". Double dipping, both by ALAC as a whole (advise and develop?) and by individuals, as mentioned by Robin and James, is also a concern. That said, I'm willing to listen to arguments to the contrary but that process is going to take time that we just don't have right now. I'd suggest that we label our current model as being a transitionary mechanism (that's often happened in ICANN when new groups have been formed) and set up a member based (to guard against packing of the group by interested parties) WS2 group to consider all of these rather complex issues. The group should have a hard deadline to produce recommendations. This would also give those parts of our community who are uncertain about how they want to participate in the powers going forward more time to consider their options. I think this would be a positive way forward on several levels. One other note: in recent weeks the issues highlighted in this conversation have dominated the accountability discussion within the stakeholder group, the NCSG, that I represent on the GNSO Council. I have to vote on Council in a way that I believe reflects the interests, values and opinions of my Members. Opposition to this voting model is so strong amongst those who elect me that if I were to have to vote today on an accountability package that includes this voting model I would with a very sad heart be forced to vote "no". I certainly have no desire to do that. Let's give all of this some more thought so we can all proceed with the transition together. Kind Regards, Ed Morris ---------------------------------------- From: "Robin Gross" <robin@ipjustice.org> Sent: Monday, July 27, 2015 4:05 PM To: wp1@icann.org, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org Community" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism The problem with our proposal is that it doesn't take into account the different roles of the various stakeholders at ICANN. It also leads to double-representation of certain users who participate in both the GNSO and the ALAC. These are not insignificant concerns, but major holes in the proposal that will need to be dealt with in the interests of organizational accountability. Perhaps we need to move this issue to WS2, where we can have a meaningful discussion of the appropriate roles of stakeholders in this new model, relative weights, and participation rights. Thanks, Robin On Jul 27, 2015, at 7:49 AM, Alan Greenberg wrote: If you are saying that 5 votes is insufficient to represent the views of those charged with supporting the 3 billion Internet users, we will gladly accept more votes. ;-) Alan At 26/07/2015 11:25 PM, Arun Sukumar wrote: Agree with Robin and Ed on the issue of equal representation to ALAC. If at-large is designed to represent internet users, are we really suggesting that 5 votes will do justice to the diversity of views in this wide constituency? ALAC, in my personal opinion, should remain an advisory entity. Sent from my iPad On 27 Jul 2015, at 07:53, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca > wrote: Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission. Alan At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote: Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it. GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes. Thanks, Robin On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote: Hi everybody, In reviewing document 5A2 I've come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I'm referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized: ----- The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes. ----- The description of ALAC is simply not true. I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states: ----- The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users. ---- ALAC was structurally designed to "consider and provide advice" on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users". It was NOT "structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN". Two inaccuracies: 1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not "structurally designed" to be the "home" of any of them, it's structural remit being limited to individual Internet users; 2. ALAC was not "structurally designed" to represent anyone. It was "structurally designed" to "consider and provide advice" to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users. To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads: ---- The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains. --- The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was "structurally designed" to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it's designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC. As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC's function is to "consider and provide advice". The NCSG's function is to "represent". They are different. We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort. I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A: --- The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes. --- I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not. I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I'm just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration. Thanks for considering, Ed ---------------------------------------- From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: wp1@icann.org, accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism Hi everyone Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven't got tracked changes to show you - it's not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn't actually been finished). We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week. This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July. best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

Dear Co-Chairs, I was previously unaware that the below was the ALAC's role, in particular the "charged with" part. I thought At-Large was the name for the community of individual Internet users who participate in the policy development work of ICANN. el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini

On Jul 27, 2015, at 15:49, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:

[...]

the views of those charged with supporting the 3 billion Internet users,

[...]

I was just quoting from the first sentence on the ALAC web site defining what At-Large is. el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini

On Jul 27, 2015, at 17:09, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:

[...]

Insofar as they advise on policy development activities to the board as part of their role yes, but the ALAC is not directly responsible for policy development, that role is for the supporting organizations the ASO, ccNSO and GNSO.

-James

[...]

Hi Alan - I don’t see the equivalency between ALAC and GAC on the issue of Public Interest. Agree with Robin & ED that there is significant overlap between ALAC and the NCSG, CSG, and even the customers served by contracted parties, and that both ACs should retain their “advisory” roles. Thanks— J. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>> Date: Sunday, July 26, 2015 at 21:23 To: Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org<mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>>, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net<mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>>, "wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Community" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission. Alan At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote: Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it. GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes. Thanks, Robin On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote: Hi everybody, In reviewing document 5A2 I?ve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I?m referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized: ----- The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes. ----- The description of ALAC is simply not true. I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states: ----- The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users. ---- ALAC was structurally designed to ?consider and provide advice? on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users?. It was NOT ?structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN?. Two inaccuracies: 1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to be the ?home? of any of them, it?s structural remit being limited to individual Internet users; 2. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to represent anyone. It was ?structurally designed? to ?consider and provide advice? to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users. To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads: ---- The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains. --- The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was ?structurally designed? to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it?s designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC. As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC?s function is to ?consider and provide advice?. The NCSG?s function is to ?represent?. They are different. We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort. I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A: --- The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes. --- I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not. I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I?m just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration. Thanks for considering, Ed ________________________________ From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: wp1@icann.org<mailto:wp1@icann.org>, accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism Hi everyone Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven?t got tracked changes to show you - it?s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn?t actually been finished). We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week. This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July. best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org<mailto:WP1@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1

Matt, James, Robin and all, I guess I have trouble understanding how organisations that were created to provide advice under the current proposal now combined have a greater ultimate say in the final determination of policy matters, such as the budget and strategic plan, than those organisations created to develop policy. The uncertainty of which groups will in the end will be involved is also unsettling. I guess like the rest of the world I'll just have to wait until representatives of ICANN appear before Senator Ed Markey and other members of the United States Congress and explain why a complete reorganisation of the function, purpose and relative standing of components of the ICANN community was necessary to achieve accountability within ICANN if, in fact, the proposed model actually does that. Best, Ed ---------------------------------------- From: "Matthew Shears" <mshears@cdt.org> Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2015 11:01 AM To: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "Alan Greenberg" <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>, "Robin Gross" <robin@ipjustice.org>, "Edward Morris" <egmorris1@toast.net>, "wp1@icann.org" <wp1@icann.org>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org Community" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism James, all I have to say that the more that this conversation on voting in the community mechanism persists the more I am convinced that the ACs should remain in an advisory capacity (and the fact that the weighting changed again yesterday is not encouraging). I also suspect that uncertainty over whether or not certain ACs are going to exercise their right to vote could be an unacceptable unknown in an otherwise relatively solid proposal. Matthew On 7/27/2015 3:19 PM, James M. Bladel wrote: Hi Alan - I don't see the equivalency between ALAC and GAC on the issue of Public Interest. Agree with Robin & ED that there is significant overlap between ALAC and the NCSG, CSG, and even the customers served by contracted parties, and that both ACs should retain their "advisory" roles. Thanks- J. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> Date: Sunday, July 26, 2015 at 21:23 To: Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org>, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>, "wp1@icann.org" <wp1@icann.org>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org Community" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission. Alan At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote: Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it. GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes. Thanks, Robin On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote: Hi everybody, In reviewing document 5A2 I?ve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I?m referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized: ----- The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes. ----- The description of ALAC is simply not true. I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states: ----- The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users. ---- ALAC was structurally designed to ?consider and provide advice? on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users?. It was NOT ?structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN?. Two inaccuracies: 1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to be the ?home? of any of them, it?s structural remit being limited to individual Internet users; 2. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to represent anyone. It was ?structurally designed? to ?consider and provide advice? to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users. To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads: ---- The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains. --- The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was ?structurally designed? to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it?s designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC. As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC?s function is to ?consider and provide advice?. The NCSG?s function is to ?represent?. They are different. We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort. I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A: --- The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes. --- I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not. I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I?m just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration. Thanks for considering, Ed ---------------------------------------- From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: wp1@icann.org, accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism Hi everyone Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven?t got tracked changes to show you - it?s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn?t actually been finished). We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week. This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July. best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list WP1@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987

You are conflating ccTLD, gTLD and addressing "policy matters" with overall administration of the name and address space. I guess I have trouble understanding how organisations that were created solely to provide recommendations on gTLD, ccTLD and addressing policy under the current proposal now may combined have a greater ultimate say in the final determination of administrative matters, such as the budget and strategic plan, than those organisations that are responsible for ensuring that ICANN is a names and numbers good custodian overseeing the stability, security of the DNS and ensuring that the public interest is preserved. Alan At 28/07/2015 06:49 AM, Edward Morris wrote:

Matt, James, Robin and all,

I guess I have trouble understanding how organisations that were created to provide advice under the current proposal now combined have a greater ultimate say in the final determination of policy matters, such as the budget and strategic plan, than those organisations created to develop policy. The uncertainty of which groups will in the end will be involved is also unsettling. I guess like the rest of the world I'll just have to wait until representatives of ICANN appear before Senator Ed Markey and other members of the United States Congress and explain why a complete reorganisation of the function, purpose and relative standing of components of the ICANN community was necessary to achieve accountability within ICANN if, in fact, the proposed model actually does that.

Best,

Ed

---------- From: "Matthew Shears" <mshears@cdt.org> Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2015 11:01 AM To: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "Alan Greenberg" <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>, "Robin Gross" <robin@ipjustice.org>, "Edward Morris" <egmorris1@toast.net>, "wp1@icann.org" <wp1@icann.org>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org Community" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

James, all

I have to say that the more that this conversation on voting in the community mechanism persists the more I am convinced that the ACs should remain in an advisory capacity (and the fact that the weighting changed again yesterday is not encouraging). I also suspect that uncertainty over whether or not certain ACs are going to exercise their right to vote could be an unacceptable unknown in an otherwise relatively solid proposal.

Matthew

On 7/27/2015 3:19 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:

...

Hi Alan -

I don’t see the equivalency between ALAC and GAC on the issue of Public Interest. Agree with Robin & ED that there is significant overlap between ALAC and the NCSG, CSG, and even the customers served by contracted parties, and that both ACs should retain their “advisory” roles.

Thanks­

J.

From: <<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Alan Greenberg <<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> Date: Sunday, July 26, 2015 at 21:23 To: Robin Gross <<mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>robin@ipjustice.org>, Edward Morris <<mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>egmorris1@toast.net>, "<mailto:wp1@icann.org>wp1@icann.org" <<mailto:wp1@icann.org>wp1@icann.org>, "<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>accountability-cross-community@icann.org Community" <<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission.

Alan

At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote:

...

Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it.

GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes.

Thanks, Robin

On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote:

...

Hi everybody,

In reviewing document 5A2 I?ve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I?m referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized:

-----

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

-----

The description of ALAC is simply not true.

I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states:

-----

The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.

----

ALAC was structurally designed to ?consider and provide advice? on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users?. It was NOT ?structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN?.

Two inaccuracies:

1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to be the ?home? of any of them, it?s structural remit being limited to individual Internet users;

2. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to represent anyone. It was ?structurally designed? to ?consider and provide advice? to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users.

To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads:

----

The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains.

---

The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was ?structurally designed? to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it?s designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC.

As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC?s function is to ?consider and provide advice?. The NCSG?s function is to ?represent?. They are different.

We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort.

I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A:

---

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

---

I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not.

I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I?m just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration.

Thanks for considering,

Ed

---------- From: "Jordan Carter" <<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan@internetnz.net.nz > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: <mailto:wp1@icann.org>wp1@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>, <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

Hi everyone

Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven?t got tracked changes to show you - it?s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn?t actually been finished).

We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.

This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.

best Jordan

-- Jordan Carter

Chief Executive InternetNZ

04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter

To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

_______________________________________________ WP1 mailing list <mailto:WP1@icann.org>WP1@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

-- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987

Hello All, Ed said:

...

...

I guess I have trouble understanding how organisations that were created to provide advice under the current proposal now combined have a greater ultimate say in the final determination of policy matters, such as the budget and strategic plan, than those organisations created to develop policy.

I agree with Alan that the community powers we are discussing go beyond ‘mere’ policy matters and that matters such as the budget and strategic plan are essentially administrative. However, we should also be very clear that the community powers we are considering putting in place will also provide the power to block policy arising from one of the SOs especially where the policy concerned requires there to be a by-law change. The GNSO could complete a PDP and recommend POLICY X and the Board decide to proceed to change the by-laws BUT all of that would be trumped if the by-law change were blocked by 'the community'. And whether the GNSO could ‘block' the block depends entirely on the voting thresholds we put in place. So, for example, with 20 votes and 75% required to vote to block, the gNSO cannot, alone, block the block. Cheers, Chris

On Jul 28, 2015, at 3:27 PM, Alan Greenberg wrote:

...

You are conflating ccTLD, gTLD and addressing "policy matters" with overall administration of the name and address space.

I guess I have trouble understanding how organisations that were created solely to provide recommendations on gTLD, ccTLD and addressing policy under the current proposal now may combined have a greater ultimate say in the final determination of administrative matters, such as the budget and strategic plan, than those organisations that are responsible for ensuring that ICANN is a names and numbers good custodian overseeing the stability, security of the DNS and ensuring that the public interest is preserved.

Alan

At 28/07/2015 06:49 AM, Edward Morris wrote:

...

Matt, James, Robin and all,

I guess I have trouble understanding how organisations that were created to provide advice under the current proposal now combined have a greater ultimate say in the final determination of policy matters, such as the budget and strategic plan, than those organisations created to develop policy. The uncertainty of which groups will in the end will be involved is also unsettling. I guess like the rest of the world I'll just have to wait until representatives of ICANN appear before Senator Ed Markey and other members of the United States Congress and explain why a complete reorganisation of the function, purpose and relative standing of components of the ICANN community was necessary to achieve accountability within ICANN if, in fact, the proposed model actually does that.

Best,

Ed

From: "Matthew Shears" <mshears@cdt.org <mailto:mshears@cdt.org>> Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2015 11:01 AM To: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com <mailto:jbladel@godaddy.com>>, "Alan Greenberg" <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>>, "Robin Gross" <robin@ipjustice.org <mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>>, "Edward Morris" <egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>>, "wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Community" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

James, all

I have to say that the more that this conversation on voting in the community mechanism persists the more I am convinced that the ACs should remain in an advisory capacity (and the fact that the weighting changed again yesterday is not encouraging). I also suspect that uncertainty over whether or not certain ACs are going to exercise their right to vote could be an unacceptable unknown in an otherwise relatively solid proposal.

Matthew

On 7/27/2015 3:19 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:

...

Hi Alan -

I don’t see the equivalency between ALAC and GAC on the issue of Public Interest. Agree with Robin & ED that there is significant overlap between ALAC and the NCSG, CSG, and even the customers served by contracted parties, and that both ACs should retain their “advisory” roles.

Thanks­

J.

From: < accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> > Date: Sunday, July 26, 2015 at 21:23 To: Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org <mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>>, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>>, "wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>>, " accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Community" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission.

Alan

At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote:

...

Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it.

GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes.

Thanks, Robin

On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote:

...

Hi everybody,

In reviewing document 5A2 I?ve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I?m referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized:

-----

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

-----

The description of ALAC is simply not true.

I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states:

-----

The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.

----

ALAC was structurally designed to ?consider and provide advice? on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users?. It was NOT ?structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN?.

Two inaccuracies:

1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to be the ?home? of any of them, it?s structural remit being limited to individual Internet users;

2. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to represent anyone. It was ?structurally designed? to ?consider and provide advice? to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users.

To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads:

----

The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains.

---

The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was ?structurally designed? to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it?s designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC.

As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC?s function is to ?consider and provide advice?. The NCSG?s function is to ?represent?. They are different.

We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort.

I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A:

---

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

---

I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not.

I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I?m just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration.

Thanks for considering,

Ed

From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> , <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

Hi everyone

Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven?t got tracked changes to show you - it?s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn?t actually been finished).

We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.

This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.

best Jordan

-- Jordan Carter

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Hi Mathieu,


> 1) that the policy proposal requires a Bylaw change

Acknowledged. Or, the adoption of the policy might require some by-law changes in order for implementation to be carried out. This has the same effect I think. 


> 2) (in the scenario described earlier) that 2/3 of the community reject the Bylaw change. In the scenario you described (4x5 votes), that means 14 votes against out of 20, while 5 votes come from the gNSO. 

Yes. Your 2/3 example makes it easier to block the by-law change not harder. In other words all 5 GNSO votes could vote against blocking the by-law change and 1 vote from the ccNSO could also vote against blocking the by-law change but the by-law change would still be blocked. 

> Once again, it's useful (but subjective) to ask whether that's a useful safeguard or an undue interference with the policy making role of the gNSO. 

Well, here I am prepared to express an opinion. The ccNSO policy by-law is clearly written and sets out the basis upon which ccNSO policy can be dealt with by the Board. There is a requirement for the ccNSO to involve the other relevant ICANN bodies in its policy making. The idea that the extremely narrow band of global policies for ccTLDs that may be undertaken by the ccNSO in accordance with the carefully crafted and politically balanced methodologies that have been created could, in essence, be blocked by other SOs and ACs is totally unacceptable to auDA and I suspect would be unacceptable to a number of my ccTLD colleagues.


Cheers,

Chris

> On 29 Jul 2015, at 19:38 , Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> wrote:
> 
> Hi Chris, All,
> 
> Another very good example of scenario, so I Cc Hillary. 
> 
> Le 29/07/2015 07:24, Chris Disspain a écrit :
>> However, we should also be very clear that the community powers we are considering putting in place will also provide the power to block policy arising from one of the SOs especially where the policy concerned requires there to be a by-law change. The GNSO could complete a PDP and recommend POLICY X and the Board decide to proceed to change the by-laws BUT all of that would be trumped if the by-law change were blocked by 'the community'. And whether the GNSO could ‘block' the block depends entirely on the voting thresholds we put in place. So, for example, with 20 votes and 75% required to vote to block, the gNSO cannot, alone, block the block. 
> As you rightly point out Chris, two cumulative conditions are needed for a gNSO policy proposal to get blocked with the new powers : 
> 1) that the policy proposal requires a Bylaw change
> 2) (in the scenario described earlier) that 2/3 of the community reject the Bylaw change. In the scenario you described (4x5 votes), that means 14 votes against out of 20, while 5 votes come from the gNSO. 
> 
> Once again, it's useful (but subjective) to ask whether that's a useful safeguard or an undue interference with the policy making role of the gNSO. 
> -- 
> *****************************
> Mathieu WEILL
> AFNIC - directeur général
> Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06
> mathieu.weill@afnic.fr <mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>
> Twitter : @mathieuweill
> *****************************

I too think this is a very important question and would like to understand what policies are in the bylaws. It seems to me that policies are NOT bylaws material. Quite the opposite. Policies are the living body of work that ICANN is about. The bylaws are about the frameworks within which policy is made. That said I am still one of the newer participants in this environment, and so wonder if there is some part of the bylaws I am missing. Jordan On 30 July 2015 at 01:52, Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> wrote:

Thank you Chris, that's very useful and I can understand.

However that veto on the "extremely narrow band of global policies for ccTLDs" would only be possible if the policy also implied a Bylaw change. Did that ever happen or is that even conceivable ? IDN ccTLD Fast track or Framework of Interpretation did not I believe.

You have more experience than me on that.

Best Mathieu

Le 29/07/2015 14:38, Chris Disspain a écrit :

Well, here I am prepared to express an opinion. The ccNSO policy by-law is clearly written and sets out the basis upon which ccNSO policy can be dealt with by the Board. There is a requirement for the ccNSO to involve the other relevant ICANN bodies in its policy making. The idea that the extremely narrow band of global policies for ccTLDs that may be undertaken by the ccNSO in accordance with the carefully crafted and politically balanced methodologies that have been created could, in essence, be blocked by other SOs and ACs is totally unacceptable to auDA and I suspect would be unacceptable to a number of my ccTLD colleagues.

-- Jordan Carter

Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter *A better world through a better Internet *

Thanks Mathieu.

Did that ever happen or is that even conceivable ?

I don’t think it has happened but it’s not inconceivable and we need to allow for the possibility IMO. Also, note that a block may be achieved by blocking a by-law change that is necessary for the implementation of policy. Further, under the current plans there is nothing to prevent the other SOs/ACs blocking a change to the by-law under which each of the SOs and ACs operates. I’d argue that a change to the ccNSO by-law as a result, for example, of a review of the ccNSO would be a matter for ‘approval’ by the ccNSO and not something that should be blockable by the other SOs or ACs. To avoid any misunderstanding, I am NOT attempting to use this as way of hi-jacking the concept of blocking by-law changes but rather raising the matter to ensure we cover all bases. Are the SOs and ACs happy to have changes to the by-laws(s) by which they operate open to block by others ? If yes, so be it. If no, then we need a way around that. Cheers, Chris

On 29 Jul 2015, at 23:52 , Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> wrote:

Thank you Chris, that's very useful and I can understand.

However that veto on the "extremely narrow band of global policies for ccTLDs" would only be possible if the policy also implied a Bylaw change. Did that ever happen or is that even conceivable ? IDN ccTLD Fast track or Framework of Interpretation did not I believe.

You have more experience than me on that.

Best Mathieu

Le 29/07/2015 14:38, Chris Disspain a écrit :

...

Well, here I am prepared to express an opinion. The ccNSO policy by-law is clearly written and sets out the basis upon which ccNSO policy can be dealt with by the Board. There is a requirement for the ccNSO to involve the other relevant ICANN bodies in its policy making. The idea that the extremely narrow band of global policies for ccTLDs that may be undertaken by the ccNSO in accordance with the carefully crafted and politically balanced methodologies that have been created could, in essence, be blocked by other SOs and ACs is totally unacceptable to auDA and I suspect would be unacceptable to a number of my ccTLD colleagues.

-- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill@afnic.fr <mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************

On 29/07/2015 06:24, Chris Disspain wrote:

However, we should also be very clear that the community powers we are considering putting in place will also provide the power to block policy arising from one of the SOs especially where the policy concerned requires there to be a by-law change.

What kind of policy arising from one of the SOs do you envisage that might require a bylaws change? -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA

On 29/07/2015 15:17, Dr Eberhard Lisse wrote:

What does it matter what he envisages?

Well, I would find it useful in helping me to understand whether what he describes is an outrageous limitation on the prerogatives of my SO that fundamentally threatens the bottom-up multistakeholder system we all love and cherish, or a vital check on a potential loophole that would enable the unlimited expansion of ICANN's mission, without which safeguard we risk the death of the diverse, polycentric multistakeholder system we all love and cherish.

But, for the thousand's time, NOBODY other than the Board can "block" ccNSO policy. And, NOBODY, other than an individual ccTLD Manager can speak for that ccTLD. Whether a member of ccNSO or not.

I heard your view before. If the policy requires a bylaws change however (and I can't imagine why it would, which is why I'm asking) then surely it's at least possible that the rest of the community have an interest in that aspect of it? Depending on the nature of the bylaws change, I suppose. I'll suspect I'll know more clearly what I think when Chris explains what's on his mind.

el

On 2015-07-29 15:12, Malcolm Hutty wrote:

...

On 29/07/2015 06:24, Chris Disspain wrote:

...

However, we should also be very clear that the community powers we are considering putting in place will also provide the power to block policy arising from one of the SOs especially where the policy concerned requires there to be a by-law change.

What kind of policy arising from one of the SOs do you envisage that might require a bylaws change?

-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA

Greetings All, Robin said:

You are not correct in saying the GNSO was created solely to provide recommendations on gTLD policy.

I disagree -the bylaws make a clear statement. "There shall be a policy-development body known as the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO), which shall be responsible for developing and recommending to the ICANN Board substantive policies relating to generic top-level domains.” That is the purpose of the GNSO and its reason for existing.

One of the most important things the GNSO does is appoint board members to the ICANN Board of Directors to oversee the entire operation of ICANN. The SOs are responsible for this to a much greater extent as there is only a single AC board member and two from each of the SO's.

Well, yes, the GNSO does appoint 2 board members but that is not its purpose. I don’t think it is fair to characterise the SOs as having a greater responsibility for overseeing the entire operation of ICANN because they appoint 2 Board members each. The Nom Comm appoints 8 board members and has no responsibility whatsoever for overseeing ICANN’s operations.

So attempts to pigeon hole the SOs into narrow and inaccurate definitions in order to take greater power in the overall ICANN structure is very disappointing

I think we have all agreed that the purpose of the increased accountability in the ICANN structure is to enhance the power of the community. I’m concerned that we have still not agreed on what ‘the community’ is and that, now that we are finally getting into the detail, that devil we have constantly referred to is rearing his ugly head. Cheers, Chris

On 29 Jul 2015, at 10:26 , Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org> wrote:

You are not correct in saying the GNSO was created solely to provide recommendations on gTLD policy. One of the most important things the GNSO does is appoint board members to the ICANN Board of Directors to oversee the entire operation of ICANN. The SOs are responsible for this to a much greater extent as there is only a single AC board member and two from each of the SO's. So attempts to pigeon hole the SOs into narrow and inaccurate definitions in order to take greater power in the overall ICANN structure is very disappointing (and not in line with facts of what the GNSO actually does).

Robin

On Jul 28, 2015, at 3:27 PM, Alan Greenberg wrote:

...

You are conflating ccTLD, gTLD and addressing "policy matters" with overall administration of the name and address space.

I guess I have trouble understanding how organisations that were created solely to provide recommendations on gTLD, ccTLD and addressing policy under the current proposal now may combined have a greater ultimate say in the final determination of administrative matters, such as the budget and strategic plan, than those organisations that are responsible for ensuring that ICANN is a names and numbers good custodian overseeing the stability, security of the DNS and ensuring that the public interest is preserved.

Alan

At 28/07/2015 06:49 AM, Edward Morris wrote:

...

Matt, James, Robin and all,

I guess I have trouble understanding how organisations that were created to provide advice under the current proposal now combined have a greater ultimate say in the final determination of policy matters, such as the budget and strategic plan, than those organisations created to develop policy. The uncertainty of which groups will in the end will be involved is also unsettling. I guess like the rest of the world I'll just have to wait until representatives of ICANN appear before Senator Ed Markey and other members of the United States Congress and explain why a complete reorganisation of the function, purpose and relative standing of components of the ICANN community was necessary to achieve accountability within ICANN if, in fact, the proposed model actually does that.

Best,

Ed

From: "Matthew Shears" <mshears@cdt.org <mailto:mshears@cdt.org>> Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2015 11:01 AM To: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com <mailto:jbladel@godaddy.com>>, "Alan Greenberg" <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>>, "Robin Gross" <robin@ipjustice.org <mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>>, "Edward Morris" <egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>>, "wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Community" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

James, all

I have to say that the more that this conversation on voting in the community mechanism persists the more I am convinced that the ACs should remain in an advisory capacity (and the fact that the weighting changed again yesterday is not encouraging). I also suspect that uncertainty over whether or not certain ACs are going to exercise their right to vote could be an unacceptable unknown in an otherwise relatively solid proposal.

Matthew

On 7/27/2015 3:19 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:

...

Hi Alan -

I don’t see the equivalency between ALAC and GAC on the issue of Public Interest. Agree with Robin & ED that there is significant overlap between ALAC and the NCSG, CSG, and even the customers served by contracted parties, and that both ACs should retain their “advisory” roles.

Thanks­

J.

From: < accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> > Date: Sunday, July 26, 2015 at 21:23 To: Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org <mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>>, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>>, "wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>" <wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org>>, " accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Community" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission.

Alan

At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote:

...

Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it.

GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes.

Thanks, Robin

On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote:

...

Hi everybody,

In reviewing document 5A2 I?ve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I?m referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized:

-----

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

-----

The description of ALAC is simply not true.

I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states:

-----

The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.

----

ALAC was structurally designed to ?consider and provide advice? on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users?. It was NOT ?structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN?.

Two inaccuracies:

1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to be the ?home? of any of them, it?s structural remit being limited to individual Internet users;

2. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to represent anyone. It was ?structurally designed? to ?consider and provide advice? to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users.

To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads:

----

The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains.

---

The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was ?structurally designed? to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it?s designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC.

As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC?s function is to ?consider and provide advice?. The NCSG?s function is to ?represent?. They are different.

We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort.

I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A:

---

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

---

I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not.

I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I?m just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration.

Thanks for considering,

Ed

From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: wp1@icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> , <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

Hi everyone

Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven?t got tracked changes to show you - it?s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn?t actually been finished).

We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.

This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.

best Jordan

-- Jordan Carter

Chief Executive InternetNZ

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Ed (and others), You quoted the Bylaws and I will repeat it here. From Article XI, Section 2.4a The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users. https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en/#XI-2.4a Regardless of whether Alan Greenberg or Ed Morris think that budget and strategic plans are policy or administrative issues, The ALAC mandate INCLUDES but is not limited to advising on SO policy. Moreover, it EXPLICITLY is a part of ICANN's accountability mechanisms. I don't think you will find such a reference in the GNSO section of the Bylaws. My reference to the other sspects such as security and stability was to include all of the ACs, which some are saying should have little or no influence in accountability mechanisms. Alan At 29/07/2015 05:33 AM, Edward Morris wrote:

Hi Alan,

----------

I guess I have trouble understanding how organisations that were created solely to provide recommendations on gTLD, ccTLD and addressing policy under the current proposal now may combined have a greater ultimate say in the final determination of administrative matters, such as the budget and strategic plan,

-I guess we see some of the basis of our disagreement: you seem to believe that budgets and strategic plans are merely administrative matters. I believe they are fundamental policy concerns. I would be very happy if our discussion would focus on this apparent disagreement.

than those organisations that are responsible for ensuring that ICANN is a names and numbers good custodian overseeing the stability, security of the DNS and ensuring that the public interest is preserved.

- If you are speaking of ALAC you have no such charge in the Bylaws, which state:

"The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users."

Would you please be so kind as to point me to your responsibility for, as you state, "ensuring that ICANN is a names and numbers good custodian overseeing the stability, security of the DNS and ensuring that the public interest is preserved ". I must have missed it..

Thanks,

Ed

Alan

At 28/07/2015 06:49 AM, Edward Morris wrote:

...

Matt, James, Robin and all,

I guess I have trouble understanding how organisations that were created to provide advice under the current proposal now combined have a greater ultimate say in the final determination of policy matters, such as the budget and strategic plan, than those organisations created to develop policy. The uncertainty of which groups will in the end will be involved is also unsettling. I guess like the rest of the world I'll just have to wait until representatives of ICANN appear before Senator Ed Markey and other members of the United States Congress and explain why a complete reorganisation of the function, purpose and relative standing of components of the ICANN community was necessary to achieve accountability within ICANN if, in fact, the proposed model actually does that.

Best,

Ed

---------- From: "Matthew Shears" <mshears@cdt.org> Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2015 11:01 AM To: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel@godaddy.com>, "Alan Greenberg" <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>, "Robin Gross" <robin@ipjustice.org>, "Edward Morris" <egmorris1@toast.net>, "wp1@icann.org" <wp1@icann.org>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org Community" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

James, all

I have to say that the more that this conversation on voting in the community mechanism persists the more I am convinced that the ACs should remain in an advisory capacity (and the fact that the weighting changed again yesterday is not encouraging). I also suspect that uncertainty over whether or not certain ACs are going to exercise their right to vote could be an unacceptable unknown in an otherwise relatively solid proposal.

Matthew

On 7/27/2015 3:19 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:

...

Hi Alan -

I don’t see the equivalency between ALAC and GAC on the issue of Public Interest. Agree with Robin & ED that there is significant overlap between ALAC and the NCSG, CSG, and even the customers served by contracted parties, and that both ACs should retain their “advisory” roles.

Thanks­

J.

From: <<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.or g> on behalf of Alan Greenberg <<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca > Date: Sunday, July 26, 2015 at 21:23 To: Robin Gross <<mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>robin@ipjustice.org>, Edward Morris <<mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>egmorris1@toast.net>, "<mailto:wp1@icann.org>wp1@icann.org" <<mailto:wp1@icann.org>wp1@icann.org>, "<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> accountability-cross-community@icann.org Community" <<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission.

Alan

At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote:

...

Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it.

GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes.

Thanks, Robin

On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote:

...

Hi everybody,

In reviewing document 5A2 I?ve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I?m referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized:

-----

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

-----

The description of ALAC is simply not true.

I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states:

-----

The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.

----

ALAC was structurally designed to ?consider and provide advice? on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users?. It was NOT ?structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN?.

Two inaccuracies:

1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to be the ?home? of any of them, it?s structural remit being limited to individual Internet users;

2. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to represent anyone. It was ?structurally designed? to ?consider and provide advice? to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users.

To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads:

----

The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains.

---

The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was ?structurally designed? to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it?s designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC.

As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC?s function is to ?consider and provide advice?. The NCSG?s function is to ?represent?. They are different.

We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort.

I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A:

---

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

---

I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not.

I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I?m just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration.

Thanks for considering,

Ed

---------- From: "Jordan Carter" <<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan@internetnz.net.nz > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM To: <mailto:wp1@icann.org>wp1@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>, <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

Hi everyone

Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven?t got tracked changes to show you - it?s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn?t actually been finished).

We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.

This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.

best Jordan

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