Sept. 30, 2015
8:15 a.m.
Dear All, I also understood Fadi in LA expressing a concern on how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested. Let us take a scenario as follows There is a potion to reject the Budget. Petition is agreed ( not voted ) in the petition SO Then it is discussed at Forum Then put it for voting SAS,RSSAC and very likely GAC do not participate in voting Very probably all 3 OCs participate in voting . ALAC may or may not to do so if three OCs vote ,the super majority would be 2/3 thus out of 15 votes currently foreseen 10 is enough to reset or ,at extreme, veto the budget . Then out of 29 overall weighted /weighting votes 10 succeeded to veto the budget and start an unnecessary process of back and fort of the Budget for months Is that a right process? However, if we first establish a quorum for decision making with fairly high threshold ( 3/4 or 4/5 of the 7 SOs and ACs ) which means 5 SOs and ACs or 4 SOs and ACs are the minimum requirement of quorum to decide on the matter . Then we have to apply the super majority of votes which means 2/3 of 25 or 2/3 of 22 or 2/3 of 19 , depending on the SOs and ACs participating which becomes 17, 14 and 12 votes out of 29 votes are sufficient to reject the budget .This would result in a real capture of the community by a small number of subset of that community. Consequently, should we replace the voting by consensus then we are better saved . In view of the above the decision making process voting versus consensus building needs to be seriously re-examined Kavouss 2015-09-30 9:40 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>: > Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of > the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There > might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, > as Ed has argued. > > To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I > would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have > suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, > impossible-to-avoid, last-resort for powers that AREN'T about > accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by > Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it > as one. > > To put it another way: *some* of the powers of a Member in the law of > California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at > some point] are clearly about accountability. > > *Some* of them aren't. > > The ones that *aren't* about accountability, the ones that pose some kind > of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible > to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board > as a participant for any decision to use them. > > > All food for thought. > > > best > Jordan > > On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen < > ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info> wrote: > >> This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about >> things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with >> document inspection? >> >> After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, >> and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN. >> >> Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what >> bad could result from document inspection power of the member? >> >> -- >> Tapani Tarvainen >> >> On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com) wrote: >> >> > "the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document >> > inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high >> thresholds to >> > action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all." >> > >> > Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my >> take on >> > it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have >> > inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community >> to >> > exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and >> that >> > can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress >> > tested. >> > >> > Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the >> > legal minds.. >> > RD >> > On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> >> wrote: >> > >> > > Hi all >> > > >> > > One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a >> > > concern that basically goes like this: >> > > >> > > "The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible >> powers >> > > it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve >> ICANN!" >> > > >> > > There were some sub-themes to this concern: >> > > >> > > - the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers >> intended for >> > > the CMSM >> > > - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its >> > > decisions >> > > - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time >> > > >> > > >> > > Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's >> Second >> > > Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from >> exercising >> > > any of the powers the community didn't propose it had. >> > > >> > > That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to >> enforce >> > > the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law >> grants to >> > > member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should >> face such >> > > high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never >> be >> > > actioned at all. >> > > >> > > [The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about >> this, >> > > but that's what it was driving at.] >> > > >> > > >> > > So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member >> (following >> > > its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability >> > > requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the >> > > community to have these other powers. >> > > >> > > *Here is a suggestion.* >> > > >> > > *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >> (beyond >> > > those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as >> one of >> > > the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?* >> > > >> > > This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through. >> > > >> > > This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem. >> > > >> > > It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and >> can't >> > > be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that >> member is >> > > able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about >> constraining the >> > > possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be >> > > solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, >> > > "multistakeholder" way. >> > > >> > > I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about >> > > this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't >> work in >> > > law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But >> - I Am >> > > Not A Lawyer. >> > > >> > > >> > > cheers >> > > Jordan >> > > >> > > -- >> > > Jordan Carter >> > > >> > > Chief Executive >> > > *InternetNZ* >> > > >> > > +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) >> > > Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz >> > > Skype: jordancarter >> > > Web: www.internetnz.nz >> > > >> > > *A better world through a better Internet * >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > > > > -- > Jordan Carter > > Chief Executive > *InternetNZ* > > +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) > Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz > Skype: jordancarter > Web: www.internetnz.nz > > *A better world through a better Internet * > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >