A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Hi all One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this: "The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!" There were some sub-themes to this concern: - the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had. That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all. [The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.] So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers. *Here is a suggestion.* *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?* This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through. This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem. It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way. I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer. cheers Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *
Thanks Jordan. I have also been wondering what sort of “checks and balances” could be placed on a Sole Member that does not consist of active participation of all SOs and ACs. I was curious to know from the attorneys whether actions of the Sole Member could be subject to an IRP, for example, in relation to removal of a director for cause – if cause were linked to the attached ICANN Director Code of Conduct. I do think the removal would have to stand (or at least the director should not be allowed to vote) pending Independent Review. ( Maybe this was already covered in discussions before I joined this group. If so, I apologize.) Anne [cid:image001.gif@01D0FADB.2490DE00] Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@lrrlaw.com<mailto:AAikman@lrrlaw.com> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2015 5:15 PM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Hi all One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this: "The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!" There were some sub-themes to this concern: - the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had. That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all. [The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.] So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers. Here is a suggestion. For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them? This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through. This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem. It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way. I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer. cheers Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet ________________________________ This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. If the reader of this message or an attachment is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message or attachment to the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the sender. The information transmitted in this message and any attachments may be privileged, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the intended recipients, and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-2521.
Good idea to start this thread, Jordan. I learned in Los Angeles that Jones Day had not noticed how CCWG proposed to restrict the single member’s ability to exercise some statutory powers (such as dissolving the corporation or forcing a new bylaw). So, first step is hear whether Jones Day now supports our notion of using bylaws to require an extraordinary level of consensus in the community before such powers could be used. I appreciate your idea of adding the Board to the other AC/SO community who would have to approve the Single Member exercising those extreme powers. But I think we should start by requiring unanimous consent of the ACs and SOs defined in ICANN bylaws. Then, if Jones Day says THAT'S not enough, we could add the board too. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Jordan Carter Date: Tuesday, September 29, 2015 at 8:15 PM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Hi all One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this: "The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!" There were some sub-themes to this concern: - the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had. That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all. [The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.] So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers. Here is a suggestion. For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them? This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through. This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem. It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way. I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer. cheers Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet
Agree. I think the level of consent ultimately reduces to whatever consent is needed to amend the bylaw, however. From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Steve DelBianco Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2015 8:29 PM To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Good idea to start this thread, Jordan. I learned in Los Angeles that Jones Day had not noticed how CCWG proposed to restrict the single member’s ability to exercise some statutory powers (such as dissolving the corporation or forcing a new bylaw). So, first step is hear whether Jones Day now supports our notion of using bylaws to require an extraordinary level of consensus in the community before such powers could be used. I appreciate your idea of adding the Board to the other AC/SO community who would have to approve the Single Member exercising those extreme powers. But I think we should start by requiring unanimous consent of the ACs and SOs defined in ICANN bylaws. Then, if Jones Day says THAT'S not enough, we could add the board too. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Jordan Carter Date: Tuesday, September 29, 2015 at 8:15 PM To: Accountability Cross Community Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Hi all One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this: "The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!" There were some sub-themes to this concern: - the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had. That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all. [The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.] So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers. Here is a suggestion. For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them? This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through. This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem. It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way. I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer. cheers Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet
It is surprising to hear that Quote " *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have* * (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus toexercise them?"* Unquote The above proposal is mixing the mandate of executive power with legislative power in the sense that the Board will seat on the same boat as the SOs and ACs and participate in voting relating to accountability of ICANN This means that ICANN decides on accountability of itself.? How people comes with such an strange idea>? No .It does not work as it totally against the very principle of separation of powers that we discussed and Mathieu put it in his Slides in CCWG Webinar Regards Kavouss 2015-09-30 8:44 GMT+02:00 Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com>:
Agree.
I think the level of consent ultimately reduces to whatever consent is needed to amend the bylaw, however.
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Steve DelBianco *Sent:* Tuesday, September 29, 2015 8:29 PM *To:* Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Good idea to start this thread, Jordan.
I learned in Los Angeles that Jones Day had not noticed how CCWG proposed to restrict the single member’s ability to exercise some statutory powers (such as dissolving the corporation or forcing a new bylaw).
So, first step is hear whether Jones Day now supports our notion of using bylaws to require an extraordinary level of consensus in the community before such powers could be used.
I appreciate your idea of adding the Board to the other AC/SO community who would have to approve the Single Member exercising those extreme powers.
But I think we should start by requiring unanimous consent of the ACs and SOs defined in ICANN bylaws. Then, if Jones Day says THAT'S not enough, we could add the board too.
*From: *<accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jordan Carter *Date: *Tuesday, September 29, 2015 at 8:15 PM *To: *Accountability Cross Community *Subject: *[CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM
- the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions
- the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers
Jordan
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear All, Every day , a new novel idea such as Quote *"Aside from the five( SIX OR SEVEN ???) community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."* The dissolution of the company is a new brand and novel idea which strikes a lot. What we intend to do ? to increase and increase the Community power for which we have serious difficulties on how to exercise that power? This is a disturbing bream storming? Kavouss Unquote 2015-09-30 9:29 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:
It is surprising to hear that Quote " *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have*
* (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus toexercise them?"*Unquote The above proposal is mixing the mandate of executive power with legislative power in the sense that the Board will seat on the same boat as the SOs and ACs and participate in voting relating to accountability of ICANN This means that ICANN decides on accountability of itself.? How people comes with such an strange idea>? No .It does not work as it totally against the very principle of separation of powers that we discussed and Mathieu put it in his Slides in CCWG Webinar Regards Kavouss
2015-09-30 8:44 GMT+02:00 Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com>:
Agree.
I think the level of consent ultimately reduces to whatever consent is needed to amend the bylaw, however.
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Steve DelBianco *Sent:* Tuesday, September 29, 2015 8:29 PM *To:* Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Good idea to start this thread, Jordan.
I learned in Los Angeles that Jones Day had not noticed how CCWG proposed to restrict the single member’s ability to exercise some statutory powers (such as dissolving the corporation or forcing a new bylaw).
So, first step is hear whether Jones Day now supports our notion of using bylaws to require an extraordinary level of consensus in the community before such powers could be used.
I appreciate your idea of adding the Board to the other AC/SO community who would have to approve the Single Member exercising those extreme powers.
But I think we should start by requiring unanimous consent of the ACs and SOs defined in ICANN bylaws. Then, if Jones Day says THAT'S not enough, we could add the board too.
*From: *<accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jordan Carter *Date: *Tuesday, September 29, 2015 at 8:15 PM *To: *Accountability Cross Community *Subject: *[CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM
- the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions
- the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers
Jordan
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
hi Kavouss, all I would like to very clearly note that the people who raised the idea of "dissolving the corporation" at the LA meeting who I heard were Chris Disspain and George Sadowsky, both Board members. I am not brainstorming here. The list of statutory powers relevant to the CMSM were set out by our legal advisors in late July: < https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52896826&preview=/5...
If we do have a membership model, I am confident we need bulletproof clarity about how every single one of these powers would / could be exercised, or locked away. best Jordan On 30 September 2015 at 20:36, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear All, Every day , a new novel idea such as Quote *"Aside from the five( SIX OR SEVEN ???) community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."* The dissolution of the company is a new brand and novel idea which strikes a lot. What we intend to do ? to increase and increase the Community power for which we have serious difficulties on how to exercise that power? This is a disturbing bream storming? Kavouss
Unquote
2015-09-30 9:29 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:
It is surprising to hear that Quote " *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have*
* (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus toexercise them?"*Unquote The above proposal is mixing the mandate of executive power with legislative power in the sense that the Board will seat on the same boat as the SOs and ACs and participate in voting relating to accountability of ICANN This means that ICANN decides on accountability of itself.? How people comes with such an strange idea>? No .It does not work as it totally against the very principle of separation of powers that we discussed and Mathieu put it in his Slides in CCWG Webinar Regards Kavouss
2015-09-30 8:44 GMT+02:00 Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com>:
Agree.
I think the level of consent ultimately reduces to whatever consent is needed to amend the bylaw, however.
*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Steve DelBianco *Sent:* Tuesday, September 29, 2015 8:29 PM *To:* Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Good idea to start this thread, Jordan.
I learned in Los Angeles that Jones Day had not noticed how CCWG proposed to restrict the single member’s ability to exercise some statutory powers (such as dissolving the corporation or forcing a new bylaw).
So, first step is hear whether Jones Day now supports our notion of using bylaws to require an extraordinary level of consensus in the community before such powers could be used.
I appreciate your idea of adding the Board to the other AC/SO community who would have to approve the Single Member exercising those extreme powers.
But I think we should start by requiring unanimous consent of the ACs and SOs defined in ICANN bylaws. Then, if Jones Day says THAT'S not enough, we could add the board too.
*From: *<accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Jordan Carter *Date: *Tuesday, September 29, 2015 at 8:15 PM *To: *Accountability Cross Community *Subject: *[CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM
- the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions
- the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers
Jordan
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *
"the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all." Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my take on it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested. Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the legal minds.. RD On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with document inspection? After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN. Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what bad could result from document inspection power of the member? -- Tapani Tarvainen On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com) wrote:
"the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."
Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my take on it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the legal minds.. RD On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, as Ed has argued. To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, impossible-to-avoid, last-resort for powers that AREN'T about accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it as one. To put it another way: *some* of the powers of a Member in the law of California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at some point] are clearly about accountability. *Some* of them aren't. The ones that *aren't* about accountability, the ones that pose some kind of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board as a participant for any decision to use them. All food for thought. best Jordan On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen <ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info> wrote:
This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with document inspection?
After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN.
Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what bad could result from document inspection power of the member?
-- Tapani Tarvainen
On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com) wrote:
"the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."
Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my take on it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the legal minds.. RD On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *
Dear All, I also understood Fadi in LA expressing a concern on how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested. Let us take a scenario as follows There is a potion to reject the Budget. Petition is agreed ( not voted ) in the petition SO Then it is discussed at Forum Then put it for voting SAS,RSSAC and very likely GAC do not participate in voting Very probably all 3 OCs participate in voting . ALAC may or may not to do so if three OCs vote ,the super majority would be 2/3 thus out of 15 votes currently foreseen 10 is enough to reset or ,at extreme, veto the budget . Then out of 29 overall weighted /weighting votes 10 succeeded to veto the budget and start an unnecessary process of back and fort of the Budget for months Is that a right process? However, if we first establish a quorum for decision making with fairly high threshold ( 3/4 or 4/5 of the 7 SOs and ACs ) which means 5 SOs and ACs or 4 SOs and ACs are the minimum requirement of quorum to decide on the matter . Then we have to apply the super majority of votes which means 2/3 of 25 or 2/3 of 22 or 2/3 of 19 , depending on the SOs and ACs participating which becomes 17, 14 and 12 votes out of 29 votes are sufficient to reject the budget .This would result in a real capture of the community by a small number of subset of that community. Consequently, should we replace the voting by consensus then we are better saved . In view of the above the decision making process voting versus consensus building needs to be seriously re-examined Kavouss 2015-09-30 9:40 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>: > Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of > the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There > might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, > as Ed has argued. > > To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I > would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have > suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, > impossible-to-avoid, last-resort for powers that AREN'T about > accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by > Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it > as one. > > To put it another way: *some* of the powers of a Member in the law of > California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at > some point] are clearly about accountability. > > *Some* of them aren't. > > The ones that *aren't* about accountability, the ones that pose some kind > of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible > to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board > as a participant for any decision to use them. > > > All food for thought. > > > best > Jordan > > On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen < > ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info> wrote: > >> This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about >> things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with >> document inspection? >> >> After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, >> and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN. >> >> Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what >> bad could result from document inspection power of the member? >> >> -- >> Tapani Tarvainen >> >> On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com) wrote: >> >> > "the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document >> > inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high >> thresholds to >> > action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all." >> > >> > Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my >> take on >> > it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have >> > inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community >> to >> > exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and >> that >> > can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress >> > tested. >> > >> > Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the >> > legal minds.. >> > RD >> > On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> >> wrote: >> > >> > > Hi all >> > > >> > > One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a >> > > concern that basically goes like this: >> > > >> > > "The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible >> powers >> > > it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve >> ICANN!" >> > > >> > > There were some sub-themes to this concern: >> > > >> > > - the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers >> intended for >> > > the CMSM >> > > - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its >> > > decisions >> > > - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time >> > > >> > > >> > > Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's >> Second >> > > Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from >> exercising >> > > any of the powers the community didn't propose it had. >> > > >> > > That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to >> enforce >> > > the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law >> grants to >> > > member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should >> face such >> > > high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never >> be >> > > actioned at all. >> > > >> > > [The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about >> this, >> > > but that's what it was driving at.] >> > > >> > > >> > > So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member >> (following >> > > its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability >> > > requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the >> > > community to have these other powers. >> > > >> > > *Here is a suggestion.* >> > > >> > > *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >> (beyond >> > > those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as >> one of >> > > the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?* >> > > >> > > This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through. >> > > >> > > This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem. >> > > >> > > It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and >> can't >> > > be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that >> member is >> > > able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about >> constraining the >> > > possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be >> > > solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, >> > > "multistakeholder" way. >> > > >> > > I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about >> > > this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't >> work in >> > > law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But >> - I Am >> > > Not A Lawyer. >> > > >> > > >> > > cheers >> > > Jordan >> > > >> > > -- >> > > Jordan Carter >> > > >> > > Chief Executive >> > > *InternetNZ* >> > > >> > > +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) >> > > Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz >> > > Skype: jordancarter >> > > Web: www.internetnz.nz >> > > >> > > *A better world through a better Internet * >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > > > > -- > Jordan Carter > > Chief Executive > *InternetNZ* > > +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) > Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz > Skype: jordancarter > Web: www.internetnz.nz > > *A better world through a better Internet * > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >
Kavouss makes a vital point here. Any decision-making process needs to be absolutely capture-proof and respect the diversity of the ICANN community. Hence, large supermajorities and/or consensus might be required for such important decisions. This means that those large supermajorities have to be measured against the community as a whole (i.e. the seven SO/AC). Regards Jorge Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Im Auftrag von Kavouss Arasteh Gesendet: Mittwoch, 30. September 2015 10:15 An: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Dear All, I also understood Fadi in LA expressing a concern on how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested. Let us take a scenario as follows There is a potion to reject the Budget. Petition is agreed ( not voted ) in the petition SO Then it is discussed at Forum Then put it for voting SAS,RSSAC and very likely GAC do not participate in voting Very probably all 3 OCs participate in voting . ALAC may or may not to do so if three OCs vote ,the super majority would be 2/3 thus out of 15 votes currently foreseen 10 is enough to reset or ,at extreme, veto the budget . Then out of 29 overall weighted /weighting votes 10 succeeded to veto the budget and start an unnecessary process of back and fort of the Budget for months Is that a right process? However, if we first establish a quorum for decision making with fairly high threshold ( 3/4 or 4/5 of the 7 SOs and ACs ) which means 5 SOs and ACs or 4 SOs and ACs are the minimum requirement of quorum to decide on the matter . Then we have to apply the super majority of votes which means 2/3 of 25 or 2/3 of 22 or 2/3 of 19 , depending on the SOs and ACs participating which becomes 17, 14 and 12 votes out of 29 votes are sufficient to reject the budget .This would result in a real capture of the community by a small number of subset of that community. Consequently, should we replace the voting by consensus then we are better saved . In view of the above the decision making process voting versus consensus building needs to be seriously re-examined Kavouss 2015-09-30 9:40 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>>: Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, as Ed has argued. To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, impossible-to-avoid, last-resort for powers that AREN'T about accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it as one. To put it another way: some of the powers of a Member in the law of California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at some point] are clearly about accountability. Some of them aren't. The ones that aren't about accountability, the ones that pose some kind of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board as a participant for any decision to use them. All food for thought. best Jordan On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen <ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info<mailto:ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info>> wrote: This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with document inspection? After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN. Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what bad could result from document inspection power of the member? -- Tapani Tarvainen On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>) wrote:
"the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."
Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my take on it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the legal minds.. RD On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz>
*A better world through a better Internet *
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I have said it before and will repeat it here again, it is not our place to force parts of the community into exercising a vote, our voting thresholds should reflect variable participation to allow groups such as the SSAC and RSSAC to participate when they feel the need to, but we should not be forcing any part of our community into a role that they do not wish to have. To do so is in my mind autocratic and does not reflect the wishes of these groups as expressed through the bottom up multistakeholder process. -James From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of "Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>" Date: Wednesday 30 September 2015 09:22 To: "kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>", "jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>" Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Kavouss makes a vital point here. Any decision-making process needs to be absolutely capture-proof and respect the diversity of the ICANN community. Hence, large supermajorities and/or consensus might be required for such important decisions. This means that those large supermajorities have to be measured against the community as a whole (i.e. the seven SO/AC). Regards Jorge Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Im Auftrag von Kavouss Arasteh Gesendet: Mittwoch, 30. September 2015 10:15 An: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Dear All, I also understood Fadi in LA expressing a concern on how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested. Let us take a scenario as follows There is a potion to reject the Budget. Petition is agreed ( not voted ) in the petition SO Then it is discussed at Forum Then put it for voting SAS,RSSAC and very likely GAC do not participate in voting Very probably all 3 OCs participate in voting . ALAC may or may not to do so if three OCs vote ,the super majority would be 2/3 thus out of 15 votes currently foreseen 10 is enough to reset or ,at extreme, veto the budget . Then out of 29 overall weighted /weighting votes 10 succeeded to veto the budget and start an unnecessary process of back and fort of the Budget for months Is that a right process? However, if we first establish a quorum for decision making with fairly high threshold ( 3/4 or 4/5 of the 7 SOs and ACs ) which means 5 SOs and ACs or 4 SOs and ACs are the minimum requirement of quorum to decide on the matter . Then we have to apply the super majority of votes which means 2/3 of 25 or 2/3 of 22 or 2/3 of 19 , depending on the SOs and ACs participating which becomes 17, 14 and 12 votes out of 29 votes are sufficient to reject the budget .This would result in a real capture of the community by a small number of subset of that community. Consequently, should we replace the voting by consensus then we are better saved . In view of the above the decision making process voting versus consensus building needs to be seriously re-examined Kavouss 2015-09-30 9:40 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>>: Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, as Ed has argued. To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, impossible-to-avoid, last-resort for powers that AREN'T about accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it as one. To put it another way: some of the powers of a Member in the law of California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at some point] are clearly about accountability. Some of them aren't. The ones that aren't about accountability, the ones that pose some kind of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board as a participant for any decision to use them. All food for thought. best Jordan On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen <ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info<mailto:ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info>> wrote: This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with document inspection? After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN. Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what bad could result from document inspection power of the member? -- Tapani Tarvainen On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>) wrote:
"the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."
Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my take on it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the legal minds.. RD On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz>
*A better world through a better Internet *
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Community powers only are meaningful if they represent the “community” as a whole, which is the collective we want to empower to check the power exercised by the executive power designated to represent that same community. That’s the key point. And I would beg you to avoid qualifying opinions different to yours as “autocratic” or the like. Regards Jorge Von: James Gannon [mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net] Gesendet: Mittwoch, 30. September 2015 10:36 An: Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>; kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com; jordan@internetnz.net.nz Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem I have said it before and will repeat it here again, it is not our place to force parts of the community into exercising a vote, our voting thresholds should reflect variable participation to allow groups such as the SSAC and RSSAC to participate when they feel the need to, but we should not be forcing any part of our community into a role that they do not wish to have. To do so is in my mind autocratic and does not reflect the wishes of these groups as expressed through the bottom up multistakeholder process. -James From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of "Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>" Date: Wednesday 30 September 2015 09:22 To: "kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>", "jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>" Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Kavouss makes a vital point here. Any decision-making process needs to be absolutely capture-proof and respect the diversity of the ICANN community. Hence, large supermajorities and/or consensus might be required for such important decisions. This means that those large supermajorities have to be measured against the community as a whole (i.e. the seven SO/AC). Regards Jorge Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Im Auftrag von Kavouss Arasteh Gesendet: Mittwoch, 30. September 2015 10:15 An: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Dear All, I also understood Fadi in LA expressing a concern on how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested. Let us take a scenario as follows There is a potion to reject the Budget. Petition is agreed ( not voted ) in the petition SO Then it is discussed at Forum Then put it for voting SAS,RSSAC and very likely GAC do not participate in voting Very probably all 3 OCs participate in voting . ALAC may or may not to do so if three OCs vote ,the super majority would be 2/3 thus out of 15 votes currently foreseen 10 is enough to reset or ,at extreme, veto the budget . Then out of 29 overall weighted /weighting votes 10 succeeded to veto the budget and start an unnecessary process of back and fort of the Budget for months Is that a right process? However, if we first establish a quorum for decision making with fairly high threshold ( 3/4 or 4/5 of the 7 SOs and ACs ) which means 5 SOs and ACs or 4 SOs and ACs are the minimum requirement of quorum to decide on the matter . Then we have to apply the super majority of votes which means 2/3 of 25 or 2/3 of 22 or 2/3 of 19 , depending on the SOs and ACs participating which becomes 17, 14 and 12 votes out of 29 votes are sufficient to reject the budget .This would result in a real capture of the community by a small number of subset of that community. Consequently, should we replace the voting by consensus then we are better saved . In view of the above the decision making process voting versus consensus building needs to be seriously re-examined Kavouss 2015-09-30 9:40 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>>: Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, as Ed has argued. To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, impossible-to-avoid, last-resort for powers that AREN'T about accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it as one. To put it another way: some of the powers of a Member in the law of California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at some point] are clearly about accountability. Some of them aren't. The ones that aren't about accountability, the ones that pose some kind of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board as a participant for any decision to use them. All food for thought. best Jordan On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen <ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info<mailto:ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info>> wrote: This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with document inspection? After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN. Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what bad could result from document inspection power of the member? -- Tapani Tarvainen On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>) wrote:
"the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."
Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my take on it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the legal minds.. RD On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz>
*A better world through a better Internet *
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Jordan and colleagues. I also agree with Kavouss on the capture risk. In the scenario he has described I would expect that the non-voting GAC would wish to provide formal advice as a component of the community-wide consensus. Ordinarily I would not expect the GAC to become heavily engaged in ICANN budget negotiations. However, maintaining overall financial stability relating to IANA operations and more broadly for the entire corporation is a global public interest objective. Furthermore, there may well be specific budget lines of direct interest for governments such as travel support for GAC representatives from developing countries and small island states, and more substantial periodic items such as funding the convening of the biennial High Level Governmental Meetings. The GAC would need to react with formal advice if this funding provision were to come under pressure and be threatened with cut backs which would impair the global and economic diversity of participation by governments in the ICANN multi-stakeholder model. Kind regards Mark Mark Carvell United Kingdom Representative on the GAC Global Internet Governance Policy Department for Culture, Media and Sport mark.carvell@culture.gov.uk tel +44 (0) 20 7211 6062 On 30 September 2015 at 09:22, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Kavouss makes a vital point here.
Any decision-making process needs to be absolutely capture-proof and respect the diversity of the ICANN community.
Hence, large supermajorities and/or consensus might be required for such important decisions. This means that those large supermajorities have to be measured against the community as a whole (i.e. the seven SO/AC).
Regards
Jorge
*Von:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *Im Auftrag von *Kavouss Arasteh *Gesendet:* Mittwoch, 30. September 2015 10:15 *An:* Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Betreff:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Dear All,
I also understood Fadi in LA expressing a concern on how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Let us take a scenario as follows
There is a potion to reject the Budget.
Petition is agreed ( not voted ) in the petition SO
Then it is discussed at Forum
Then put it for voting
SAS,RSSAC and very likely GAC do not participate in voting
Very probably all 3 OCs participate in voting .
ALAC may or may not to do so
if three OCs vote ,the super majority would be 2/3 thus out of 15 votes currently foreseen 10 is enough to reset or ,at extreme, veto the budget .
Then out of 29 overall weighted /weighting votes 10 succeeded to veto the budget and start an unnecessary process of back and fort of the Budget for months
Is that a right process?
However, if we first establish a quorum for decision making with fairly high threshold ( 3/4 or 4/5 of the 7 SOs and ACs ) which means 5 SOs and ACs or 4 SOs and ACs are the minimum requirement of quorum to decide on the matter .
Then we have to apply the super majority of votes which means 2/3 of 25 or 2/3 of 22 or 2/3 of 19 , depending on the SOs and ACs participating which becomes 17, 14 and 12 votes out of 29 votes are sufficient to reject the budget .This would result in a real capture of the community by a small number of subset of that community.
Consequently, should we replace the voting by consensus then we are better saved .
In view of the above the decision making process voting versus consensus building needs to be seriously re-examined
Kavouss
2015-09-30 9:40 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>:
Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, as Ed has argued.
To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, impossible-to-avoid, last-resort for powers that AREN'T about accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it as one.
To put it another way: *some* of the powers of a Member in the law of California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at some point] are clearly about accountability.
*Some* of them aren't.
The ones that *aren't* about accountability, the ones that pose some kind of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board as a participant for any decision to use them.
All food for thought.
best
Jordan
On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen < ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info> wrote:
This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with document inspection?
After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN.
Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what bad could result from document inspection power of the member?
-- Tapani Tarvainen
On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com) wrote:
"the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."
Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my take on it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the legal minds.. RD On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I should like to add my 100% backing to the following submission . . On 30/09/15 09:49, Mark Carvell wrote:
Ordinarily I would not expect the GAC to become heavily engaged in ICANN budget negotiations. However, maintaining overall financial stability relating to IANA operations and more broadly for the entire corporation is a global public interest objective.
Furthermore, there may well be specific budget lines of direct interest for governments such as travel support for GAC representatives from developing countries and small island states, and more substantial periodic items such as funding the convening of the biennial High Level Governmental Meetings. The GAC would need to react with formal advice if this funding provision were to come under pressure and be threatened with cut backs which would impair the global and economic diversity of participation by governments in the ICANN multi-stakeholder model.
Kind regards
Mark
Mark Carvell United Kingdom Representative on the GAC
Mark While Your current judgements about participation of GAC in budget indue seems to make sense but is entirely different from what you said when Jorge first reaction was made about providing comments to CCWG? ! Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 11:51, Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:
I should like to add my 100% backing to the following submission . .
On 30/09/15 09:49, Mark Carvell wrote:
Ordinarily I would not expect the GAC to become heavily engaged in ICANN budget negotiations. However, maintaining overall financial stability relating to IANA operations and more broadly for the entire corporation is a global public interest objective.
Furthermore, there may well be specific budget lines of direct interest for governments such as travel support for GAC representatives from developing countries and small island states, and more substantial periodic items such as funding the convening of the biennial High Level Governmental Meetings. The GAC would need to react with formal advice if this funding provision were to come under pressure and be threatened with cut backs which would impair the global and economic diversity of participation by governments in the ICANN multi-stakeholder model.
Kind regards
Mark
Mark Carvell United Kingdom Representative on the GAC
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
....and I hope we will apply such community wide consensus (or super majority voting) in any exercise of community powers including removal of individual board member. Regards On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 9:22 AM, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Kavouss makes a vital point here.
Any decision-making process needs to be absolutely capture-proof and respect the diversity of the ICANN community.
Hence, large supermajorities and/or consensus might be required for such important decisions. This means that those large supermajorities have to be measured against the community as a whole (i.e. the seven SO/AC).
Regards
Jorge
*Von:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *Im Auftrag von *Kavouss Arasteh *Gesendet:* Mittwoch, 30. September 2015 10:15 *An:* Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Betreff:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Dear All,
I also understood Fadi in LA expressing a concern on how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Let us take a scenario as follows
There is a potion to reject the Budget.
Petition is agreed ( not voted ) in the petition SO
Then it is discussed at Forum
Then put it for voting
SAS,RSSAC and very likely GAC do not participate in voting
Very probably all 3 OCs participate in voting .
ALAC may or may not to do so
if three OCs vote ,the super majority would be 2/3 thus out of 15 votes currently foreseen 10 is enough to reset or ,at extreme, veto the budget .
Then out of 29 overall weighted /weighting votes 10 succeeded to veto the budget and start an unnecessary process of back and fort of the Budget for months
Is that a right process?
However, if we first establish a quorum for decision making with fairly high threshold ( 3/4 or 4/5 of the 7 SOs and ACs ) which means 5 SOs and ACs or 4 SOs and ACs are the minimum requirement of quorum to decide on the matter .
Then we have to apply the super majority of votes which means 2/3 of 25 or 2/3 of 22 or 2/3 of 19 , depending on the SOs and ACs participating which becomes 17, 14 and 12 votes out of 29 votes are sufficient to reject the budget .This would result in a real capture of the community by a small number of subset of that community.
Consequently, should we replace the voting by consensus then we are better saved .
In view of the above the decision making process voting versus consensus building needs to be seriously re-examined
Kavouss
2015-09-30 9:40 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>:
Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, as Ed has argued.
To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, impossible-to-avoid, last-resort for powers that AREN'T about accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it as one.
To put it another way: *some* of the powers of a Member in the law of California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at some point] are clearly about accountability.
*Some* of them aren't.
The ones that *aren't* about accountability, the ones that pose some kind of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board as a participant for any decision to use them.
All food for thought.
best
Jordan
On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen < ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info> wrote:
This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with document inspection?
After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN.
Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what bad could result from document inspection power of the member?
-- Tapani Tarvainen
On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com) wrote:
"the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."
Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my take on it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the legal minds.. RD On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
Consensus is totally different from voting . Regards Kavousd Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 11:05, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
....and I hope we will apply such community wide consensus (or super majority voting) in any exercise of community powers including removal of individual board member.
Regards
On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 9:22 AM, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote: Kavouss makes a vital point here.
Any decision-making process needs to be absolutely capture-proof and respect the diversity of the ICANN community.
Hence, large supermajorities and/or consensus might be required for such important decisions. This means that those large supermajorities have to be measured against the community as a whole (i.e. the seven SO/AC).
Regards
Jorge
Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Im Auftrag von Kavouss Arasteh Gesendet: Mittwoch, 30. September 2015 10:15 An: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Dear All,
I also understood Fadi in LA expressing a concern on how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Let us take a scenario as follows
There is a potion to reject the Budget.
Petition is agreed ( not voted ) in the petition SO
Then it is discussed at Forum
Then put it for voting
SAS,RSSAC and very likely GAC do not participate in voting
Very probably all 3 OCs participate in voting .
ALAC may or may not to do so
if three OCs vote ,the super majority would be 2/3 thus out of 15 votes currently foreseen 10 is enough to reset or ,at extreme, veto the budget .
Then out of 29 overall weighted /weighting votes 10 succeeded to veto the budget and start an unnecessary process of back and fort of the Budget for months
Is that a right process?
However, if we first establish a quorum for decision making with fairly high threshold ( 3/4 or 4/5 of the 7 SOs and ACs ) which means 5 SOs and ACs or 4 SOs and ACs are the minimum requirement of quorum to decide on the matter .
Then we have to apply the super majority of votes which means 2/3 of 25 or 2/3 of 22 or 2/3 of 19 , depending on the SOs and ACs participating which becomes 17, 14 and 12 votes out of 29 votes are sufficient to reject the budget .This would result in a real capture of the community by a small number of subset of that community.
Consequently, should we replace the voting by consensus then we are better saved .
In view of the above the decision making process voting versus consensus building needs to be seriously re-examined
Kavouss
2015-09-30 9:40 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>:
Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, as Ed has argued.
To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, impossible-to-avoid, last-resort for powers that AREN'T about accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it as one.
To put it another way: some of the powers of a Member in the law of California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at some point] are clearly about accountability.
Some of them aren't.
The ones that aren't about accountability, the ones that pose some kind of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board as a participant for any decision to use them.
All food for thought.
best
Jordan
On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen <ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info> wrote:
This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with document inspection?
After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN.
Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what bad could result from document inspection power of the member?
-- Tapani Tarvainen
On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com) wrote:
"the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."
Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my take on it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the legal minds.. RD On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email: seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng
Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
Seun +1 Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 11:05, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
....and I hope we will apply such community wide consensus (or super majority voting) in any exercise of community powers including removal of individual board member.
Regards
On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 9:22 AM, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote: Kavouss makes a vital point here.
Any decision-making process needs to be absolutely capture-proof and respect the diversity of the ICANN community.
Hence, large supermajorities and/or consensus might be required for such important decisions. This means that those large supermajorities have to be measured against the community as a whole (i.e. the seven SO/AC).
Regards
Jorge
Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Im Auftrag von Kavouss Arasteh Gesendet: Mittwoch, 30. September 2015 10:15 An: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Dear All,
I also understood Fadi in LA expressing a concern on how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Let us take a scenario as follows
There is a potion to reject the Budget.
Petition is agreed ( not voted ) in the petition SO
Then it is discussed at Forum
Then put it for voting
SAS,RSSAC and very likely GAC do not participate in voting
Very probably all 3 OCs participate in voting .
ALAC may or may not to do so
if three OCs vote ,the super majority would be 2/3 thus out of 15 votes currently foreseen 10 is enough to reset or ,at extreme, veto the budget .
Then out of 29 overall weighted /weighting votes 10 succeeded to veto the budget and start an unnecessary process of back and fort of the Budget for months
Is that a right process?
However, if we first establish a quorum for decision making with fairly high threshold ( 3/4 or 4/5 of the 7 SOs and ACs ) which means 5 SOs and ACs or 4 SOs and ACs are the minimum requirement of quorum to decide on the matter .
Then we have to apply the super majority of votes which means 2/3 of 25 or 2/3 of 22 or 2/3 of 19 , depending on the SOs and ACs participating which becomes 17, 14 and 12 votes out of 29 votes are sufficient to reject the budget .This would result in a real capture of the community by a small number of subset of that community.
Consequently, should we replace the voting by consensus then we are better saved .
In view of the above the decision making process voting versus consensus building needs to be seriously re-examined
Kavouss
2015-09-30 9:40 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>:
Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, as Ed has argued.
To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, impossible-to-avoid, last-resort for powers that AREN'T about accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it as one.
To put it another way: some of the powers of a Member in the law of California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at some point] are clearly about accountability.
Some of them aren't.
The ones that aren't about accountability, the ones that pose some kind of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board as a participant for any decision to use them.
All food for thought.
best
Jordan
On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen <ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info> wrote:
This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with document inspection?
After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN.
Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what bad could result from document inspection power of the member?
-- Tapani Tarvainen
On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com) wrote:
"the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."
Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my take on it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the legal minds.. RD On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email: seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng
Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
I agree with Ed and Tapani, the right to document inspection is important. I also don't understand how the right to document inspection can affect ICANN or lead to its dissolution or affect the multistakeholder participation! I am sure there are legal restrictions on the right of document inspection. Why don't we just look at the law first, get some legal advice on how the right to document inspection can affect the multistakeholder participation or whatever other concern and then come up with solutions? I agree with Jordan that we need to look at the exercise of the powers and the limitations. It seems to me that we are being criticized on our risk analysis. It might be better to do a complete risk analysis as well considering how the powers can be legally exercised. On 30 September 2015 at 09:40, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote: > Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of > the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There > might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, > as Ed has argued. > > To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I > would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have > suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, > impossible-to-avoid, last-resort for powers that AREN'T about > accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by > Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it > as one. > > To put it another way: *some* of the powers of a Member in the law of > California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at > some point] are clearly about accountability. > > *Some* of them aren't. > > The ones that *aren't* about accountability, the ones that pose some kind > of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible > to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board > as a participant for any decision to use them. > > > All food for thought. > > > best > Jordan > > On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen < > ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info> wrote: > >> This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about >> things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with >> document inspection? >> >> After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, >> and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN. >> >> Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what >> bad could result from document inspection power of the member? >> >> -- >> Tapani Tarvainen >> >> On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com) wrote: >> >> > "the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document >> > inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high >> thresholds to >> > action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all." >> > >> > Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my >> take on >> > it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have >> > inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community >> to >> > exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and >> that >> > can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress >> > tested. >> > >> > Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the >> > legal minds.. >> > RD >> > On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> >> wrote: >> > >> > > Hi all >> > > >> > > One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a >> > > concern that basically goes like this: >> > > >> > > "The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible >> powers >> > > it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve >> ICANN!" >> > > >> > > There were some sub-themes to this concern: >> > > >> > > - the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers >> intended for >> > > the CMSM >> > > - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its >> > > decisions >> > > - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time >> > > >> > > >> > > Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's >> Second >> > > Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from >> exercising >> > > any of the powers the community didn't propose it had. >> > > >> > > That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to >> enforce >> > > the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law >> grants to >> > > member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should >> face such >> > > high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never >> be >> > > actioned at all. >> > > >> > > [The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about >> this, >> > > but that's what it was driving at.] >> > > >> > > >> > > So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member >> (following >> > > its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability >> > > requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the >> > > community to have these other powers. >> > > >> > > *Here is a suggestion.* >> > > >> > > *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >> (beyond >> > > those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as >> one of >> > > the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?* >> > > >> > > This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through. >> > > >> > > This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem. >> > > >> > > It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and >> can't >> > > be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that >> member is >> > > able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about >> constraining the >> > > possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be >> > > solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, >> > > "multistakeholder" way. >> > > >> > > I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about >> > > this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't >> work in >> > > law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But >> - I Am >> > > Not A Lawyer. >> > > >> > > >> > > cheers >> > > Jordan >> > > >> > > -- >> > > Jordan Carter >> > > >> > > Chief Executive >> > > *InternetNZ* >> > > >> > > +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) >> > > Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz >> > > Skype: jordancarter >> > > Web: www.internetnz.nz >> > > >> > > *A better world through a better Internet * >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > > > > -- > Jordan Carter > > Chief Executive > *InternetNZ* > > +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) > Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz > Skype: jordancarter > Web: www.internetnz.nz > > *A better world through a better Internet * > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > -- Farzaneh
On Sep 29, 2015, at 9:15 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
I don't see a problem per se to this... if dissolving ICANN is the best response for a scenario, why not ?
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM
Which is a real issue, indeed.
- the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions
Not an issue if the Single Member serves the best interest of the Internet as a whole and not the fiduciary interests of the corporation, if they go apart.
- the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Also a real issue.
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
I'm not sure that the board agree with all five community powers, so my suggestion is not to take that for granted. Single director removal doesn't like an agreement for now, for instance.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
Here is a suggestion.
For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
This sounds good to me. Rubens
Hi, Interesting thought One note, I have been given to understand that 5 members of the board (majority of a quorum) could even dissolve ICANN. Can this be confirmed? avri On 29-Sep-15 20:15, Jordan Carter wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.* * * *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz <http://www.internetnz.nz>
/A better world through a better Internet /
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Someone mentioned that to me as well. It is incorrect. But I am not absolutely sure what the correct number is. To amend the Articles of Incorporation or the Bylaws takes a 2/3 vote of the entire Board - 11 presuming all seats are filled. I would have thought that the threshold to dissolve is as high as that to amend the AoI. But I couldn't find that written anywhere. According to the California Corporation Law, dissolution requires a majority of Directors to sign the certificate of dissolution, so presuming a full complement of directors, that would be 9. So the correct answer is probably 9, but it could be 11. Alan At 29/09/2015 11:44 PM, Avri Doria wrote:
One note, I have been given to understand that 5 members of the board (majority of a quorum) could even dissolve ICANN.
Can this be confirmed?
avri
I do not know whether to dissolve ICANN is simple majority (9) would form the ?Quorum? Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 06:39, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
Someone mentioned that to me as well. It is incorrect. But I am not absolutely sure what the correct number is.
To amend the Articles of Incorporation or the Bylaws takes a 2/3 vote of the entire Board - 11 presuming all seats are filled. I would have thought that the threshold to dissolve is as high as that to amend the AoI. But I couldn't find that written anywhere.
According to the California Corporation Law, dissolution requires a majority of Directors to sign the certificate of dissolution, so presuming a full complement of directors, that would be 9.
So the correct answer is probably 9, but it could be 11.
Alan
At 29/09/2015 11:44 PM, Avri Doria wrote:
One note, I have been given to understand that 5 members of the board (majority of a quorum) could even dissolve ICANN.
Can this be confirmed?
avri
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Quorum is not used for votes such as these. The threshold is a majority or 2/3 of all directors. Alan At 30/09/2015 01:40 AM, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
I do not know whether to dissolve ICANN is simple majority (9) would form the ?Quorum? Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 06:39, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
Someone mentioned that to me as well. It is incorrect. But I am not absolutely sure what the correct number is.
To amend the Articles of Incorporation or the Bylaws takes a 2/3 vote of the entire Board - 11 presuming all seats are filled. I would have thought that the threshold to dissolve is as high as that to amend the AoI. But I couldn't find that written anywhere.
According to the California Corporation Law, dissolution requires a majority of Directors to sign the certificate of dissolution, so presuming a full complement of directors, that would be 9.
So the correct answer is probably 9, but it could be 11.
Alan
At 29/09/2015 11:44 PM, Avri Doria wrote:
One note, I have been given to understand that 5 members of the board (majority of a quorum) could even dissolve ICANN.
Can this be confirmed?
avri
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote:
*Here is a suggestion.* * * *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion. Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call. Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member. It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly. *For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.* It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit. Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected. It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements. Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined. I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board. -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote:
*Here is a suggestion.* * * *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion. Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call. Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member. It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly. *For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.* It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit. Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected. It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements. Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined. I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear mike Thank you for the message. May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? Tks Cheers Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: *Here is a suggestion.* * * *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion.
Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call.
Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member.
It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly.
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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You're welcome. They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board.
On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear mike Thank you for the message. May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? Tks Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: *Here is a suggestion.* * * *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion.
Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call.
Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member.
It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly.
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Mike, I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect Cheers Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
You're welcome. They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board.
On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear mike Thank you for the message. May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? Tks Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: *Here is a suggestion.* * * *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion.
Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call.
Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member.
It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly.
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? Is this a GAC position or? -jg On 30/09/2015 14:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Mike, I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
You're welcome. They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board.
On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear mike Thank you for the message. May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? Tks Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: *Here is a suggestion.* * * *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion.
Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call.
Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member.
It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly.
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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Dear All, We discussed the issue of GAC Advice to other entities than ICANN Board and we ( GAC) concluded that duie to the specific coonnotation of the term " ADVICE" of GAC in the Bylaws we must avoid to use that term else where . Now if it is proposed to creat a siomilar ADVICE with identical effect to that currently exist in the Bylaws, that is another matter yet to be examined, analysed and agreed upon. Regards Kavouss 2015-09-30 15:19 GMT+02:00 James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net>:
So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? Is this a GAC position or?
-jg
On 30/09/2015 14:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" < accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Mike, I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
You're welcome. They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board.
On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear mike Thank you for the message. May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? Tks Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: *Here is a suggestion.* * * *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion.
Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call.
Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member.
It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly.
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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Thanks Kavouss for clarifying much appreciated! I think the proposal was advice in laymans terms as opposed to formal GAC advice. -jg From: Kavouss Arasteh Date: Wednesday 30 September 2015 14:33 To: James Gannon Cc: "Chartier, Mike S", Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem We discussed the issue of GAC Advice to other entities than ICANN Board and we ( GAC) concluded that duie to the specific coonnotation of the term " ADVICE" of GAC in the Bylaws we must avoid to use that term else where .
Tks James In our earlier e- mail discussion in GAC we opted fir term " recommendation" which gas optional nature to avoid misunderstanding with " ADVICE" as currently referred yo in Article XI of Bylaws Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:35, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
Thanks Kavouss for clarifying much appreciated! I think the proposal was advice in laymans terms as opposed to formal GAC advice.
-jg
From: Kavouss Arasteh Date: Wednesday 30 September 2015 14:33 To: James Gannon Cc: "Chartier, Mike S", Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
We discussed the issue of GAC Advice to other entities than ICANN Board and we ( GAC) concluded that duie to the specific coonnotation of the term " ADVICE" of GAC in the Bylaws we must avoid to use that term else where .
James If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? Is this a GAC position or?
-jg
On 30/09/2015 14:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Mike, I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
You're welcome. They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board.
On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear mike Thank you for the message. May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? Tks Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: *Here is a suggestion.* * * *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion.
Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call.
Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member.
It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly.
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Well if GAC would indeed want that why not. GAC advice remains an advice so if GAC does not want to be part of exercising the community powers then so be it. @Kavouss I hope you appreciate the implication of that option, it simply means that any power that brings the community to a point of voting to determine consensus would leave out GAC's participation, as advice does NOT imply voting. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 30 Sep 2015 15:59, "Kavouss Arasteh" <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
James If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? Is this a GAC position or?
-jg
On 30/09/2015 14:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" < accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Mike, I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
You're welcome. They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board.
On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear mike Thank you for the message. May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? Tks Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S < mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
> On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: > *Here is a suggestion.* > * > * > *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have > (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN > Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to > exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion.
Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call.
Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member.
It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly.
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Dear Seun I can not speak for GAC but but investigate options to facilitate the CCWG works Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 17:05, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
Well if GAC would indeed want that why not. GAC advice remains an advice so if GAC does not want to be part of exercising the community powers then so be it. @Kavouss I hope you appreciate the implication of that option, it simply means that any power that brings the community to a point of voting to determine consensus would leave out GAC's participation, as advice does NOT imply voting.
Regards
Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 30 Sep 2015 15:59, "Kavouss Arasteh" <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: James If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? Is this a GAC position or?
-jg
On 30/09/2015 14:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Mike, I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
You're welcome. They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board.
On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear mike Thank you for the message. May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? Tks Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: > > I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board. > > -----Original Message----- > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty > Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM > To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem > > > >> On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: >> *Here is a suggestion.* >> * >> * >> *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >> (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN >> Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to >> exercise them?* > > Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion. > > Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call. > > Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member. > > It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly. > > *For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.* > > It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and > (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit. > > Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected. > > It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements. > > Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined. > > I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress. > > -- > Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 > Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ > > London Internet Exchange Ltd > 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY > > Company Registered in England No. 3137929 > Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions: 1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community. Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this? That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM To: James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem James If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? Is this a GAC position or?
-jg
On 30/09/2015 14:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Mike, I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
You're welcome. They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board.
On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear mike Thank you for the message. May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? Tks Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: *Here is a suggestion.* * * *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion.
Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call.
Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member.
It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly.
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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agree -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 12:38 PM To: Kavouss Arasteh; James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions: 1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community. Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this? That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM To: James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem James If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? Is this a GAC position or?
-jg
On 30/09/2015 14:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Mike, I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
You're welcome. They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board.
On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear mike Thank you for the message. May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? Tks Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: *Here is a suggestion.* * * *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion.
Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call.
Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member.
It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly.
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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Let's be Frank, here. I'm not entirely unreceptive to the view expressed to me by at least one Board member regarding the idea of a quick win. HOWEVER, despite the fairly emphatic nature of the Board's objection to membership model, I do not believe I have read or heard any rationale or reasons for their, apparently unanimous, position. Personally I have serious doubts about the Single Member model, although, probably, they are not the same doubts as the Board's. But that is the outcome of this WG, and it should not tear up months of work without a rationale. This is simply the IFWP and history repeating itself, otherwise. Apparently there is some legal difference of opinion between Sidleys and Jones Day on the technicalities. But I do not beleive that can be the only reason. So, can someone please explain, in simply, preferable non legalistic terms why (a) the CCWG proposal is unsuitable (b) the Board's proposal is more suitable.
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
Hi, You may also want to want to interchange CCWG and board in a and b, as response to that would also be helpful. Both question scenario should be answered putting the agreed community powers in perspective. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 30 Sep 2015 17:45, "Nigel Roberts" <nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:
Let's be Frank, here.
I'm not entirely unreceptive to the view expressed to me by at least one Board member regarding the idea of a quick win.
HOWEVER, despite the fairly emphatic nature of the Board's objection to membership model, I do not believe I have read or heard any rationale or reasons for their, apparently unanimous, position.
Personally I have serious doubts about the Single Member model, although, probably, they are not the same doubts as the Board's.
But that is the outcome of this WG, and it should not tear up months of work without a rationale. This is simply the IFWP and history repeating itself, otherwise.
Apparently there is some legal difference of opinion between Sidleys and Jones Day on the technicalities. But I do not beleive that can be the only reason.
So, can someone please explain, in simply, preferable non legalistic terms why
(a) the CCWG proposal is unsuitable (b) the Board's proposal is more suitable.
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with
membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
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Thanks Nigel. In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is: -- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date. -- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time. -- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time. -- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic. -- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory. -- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model. -- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood. -- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition. I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base. That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b). Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Nigel Roberts Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 12:46 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Let's be Frank, here. I'm not entirely unreceptive to the view expressed to me by at least one Board member regarding the idea of a quick win. HOWEVER, despite the fairly emphatic nature of the Board's objection to membership model, I do not believe I have read or heard any rationale or reasons for their, apparently unanimous, position. Personally I have serious doubts about the Single Member model, although, probably, they are not the same doubts as the Board's. But that is the outcome of this WG, and it should not tear up months of work without a rationale. This is simply the IFWP and history repeating itself, otherwise. Apparently there is some legal difference of opinion between Sidleys and Jones Day on the technicalities. But I do not beleive that can be the only reason. So, can someone please explain, in simply, preferable non legalistic terms why (a) the CCWG proposal is unsuitable (b) the Board's proposal is more suitable.
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
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Thanks for this, and just for record, the list below is what I can naturally add my +1 to in its entirety. Every points are critical and the last is even more critical than any other one. Cheers! Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 30 Sep 2015 18:15, "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek@verisign.com> wrote:
Thanks Nigel.
In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is:
-- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date. -- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time. -- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time. -- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic. -- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory. -- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model. -- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood. -- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition.
I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base.
That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b).
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Nigel Roberts Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 12:46 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Let's be Frank, here.
I'm not entirely unreceptive to the view expressed to me by at least one Board member regarding the idea of a quick win.
HOWEVER, despite the fairly emphatic nature of the Board's objection to membership model, I do not believe I have read or heard any rationale or reasons for their, apparently unanimous, position.
Personally I have serious doubts about the Single Member model, although, probably, they are not the same doubts as the Board's.
But that is the outcome of this WG, and it should not tear up months of work without a rationale. This is simply the IFWP and history repeating itself, otherwise.
Apparently there is some legal difference of opinion between Sidleys and Jones Day on the technicalities. But I do not beleive that can be the only reason.
So, can someone please explain, in simply, preferable non legalistic terms why
(a) the CCWG proposal is unsuitable (b) the Board's proposal is more suitable.
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
And just for the record, I was not advocating or supporting the points, just pointing out what will need to be addressed and/or resolved in the next iteration of our proposal. Keith From: Seun Ojedeji [mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 1:25 PM To: Drazek, Keith Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org; Nigel Roberts Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Thanks for this, and just for record, the list below is what I can naturally add my +1 to in its entirety. Every points are critical and the last is even more critical than any other one. Cheers! Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 30 Sep 2015 18:15, "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> wrote: Thanks Nigel. In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is: -- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date. -- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time. -- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time. -- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic. -- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory. -- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model. -- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood. -- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition. I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base. That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b). Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Nigel Roberts Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 12:46 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Let's be Frank, here. I'm not entirely unreceptive to the view expressed to me by at least one Board member regarding the idea of a quick win. HOWEVER, despite the fairly emphatic nature of the Board's objection to membership model, I do not believe I have read or heard any rationale or reasons for their, apparently unanimous, position. Personally I have serious doubts about the Single Member model, although, probably, they are not the same doubts as the Board's. But that is the outcome of this WG, and it should not tear up months of work without a rationale. This is simply the IFWP and history repeating itself, otherwise. Apparently there is some legal difference of opinion between Sidleys and Jones Day on the technicalities. But I do not beleive that can be the only reason. So, can someone please explain, in simply, preferable non legalistic terms why (a) the CCWG proposal is unsuitable (b) the Board's proposal is more suitable.
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Thank you again Keith for the clear structure of your points. Very useful to read again and I agree I heard basically the same arguments. But I consistently missed (and keep missing in this thread) the RATIONALE of the proposals for the single model and counterarguments of power concentration, etc. I recall the objective as ".......to REPLACE the stewardship of the USG trough the IANA contract and the AoC". It is not against the Boards model, but against those independent standards that the proposals that the effectiveness of each proposals has to be measured. I don't see a need for compromise. The best model to replace the " backstop" wins. Or not? Maybe I still miss something (or even a lot). Best CRG On Sep 30, 2015 11:16 AM, "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek@verisign.com> wrote:
Thanks Nigel.
In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is:
-- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date. -- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time. -- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time. -- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic. -- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory. -- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model. -- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood. -- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition.
I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base.
That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b).
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Nigel Roberts Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 12:46 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Let's be Frank, here.
I'm not entirely unreceptive to the view expressed to me by at least one Board member regarding the idea of a quick win.
HOWEVER, despite the fairly emphatic nature of the Board's objection to membership model, I do not believe I have read or heard any rationale or reasons for their, apparently unanimous, position.
Personally I have serious doubts about the Single Member model, although, probably, they are not the same doubts as the Board's.
But that is the outcome of this WG, and it should not tear up months of work without a rationale. This is simply the IFWP and history repeating itself, otherwise.
Apparently there is some legal difference of opinion between Sidleys and Jones Day on the technicalities. But I do not beleive that can be the only reason.
So, can someone please explain, in simply, preferable non legalistic terms why
(a) the CCWG proposal is unsuitable (b) the Board's proposal is more suitable.
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I'm a little confused as to why people are confused. I think many of the SOs and ACs have been quite clear in how they view things. Both the RSSAC and SSAC have been quite explicit: we are not keen at all on being expected to vote on ICANN issues, especially since the issues that have been repeatedly raised do not interest us. The ASO is very similar. It's not at all sure it wants a vote because it doesn't want to get sucked into ICANN politics. But if it impacts numbers or ICANN as an entity it would want to be involved. The GAC is more complex but still understandable: we are willing to express an opinion on many matters but we feel it is best to avoid a vote if at all possible. It strikes me that any decision by the internet community to challenge the Board would have to account for each group's perspective. Put simply, the powers under consideration - getting rid of the Board, vetoing the budget and so on - should require having pretty much the whole internet community on board. And that will not be achieved by trying to force the less political parts of the organization into having to respond. Trying to tell the RSSAC and SSAC that they will want a vote is entirely the wrong way to get them on board with a solution. What they want to know is that their views will be sought out and taken seriously on matters that are likely to concern them. And that they will be left out of it the rest of the time. Their fear is that they will have to constantly follow ICANN shenanigans to make sure that a big decision isn't made in their name. My suggestion based on having watched the internet community work for many years is to create a system that only involves the more technical parts of ICANN once broad agreement has been reached in the rest of the community. By then, the arguments should have been thrashed out sufficiently and turned into a clear statement of concerns with a proposed solution. It should then be a requirement that the other groups need to express a view before it can move forward. Once you have made the argument and got those groups on board and agreeing informally with a proposal, then they are far more likely to be willing to vote if indeed a vote is required to make it official. My bet would be that if things got that far, the Board would rather find a compromise than risk having the entire internet community rebuke them. Using voting as a way to bring matters to a head works for some groups but is the opposite of how others like to work. You can't impose your own culture on others. Kieren On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 10:15 AM, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com> wrote:
Thanks Nigel.
In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is:
-- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date. -- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time. -- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time. -- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic. -- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory. -- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model. -- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood. -- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition.
I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base.
That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b).
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Nigel Roberts Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 12:46 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Let's be Frank, here.
I'm not entirely unreceptive to the view expressed to me by at least one Board member regarding the idea of a quick win.
HOWEVER, despite the fairly emphatic nature of the Board's objection to membership model, I do not believe I have read or heard any rationale or reasons for their, apparently unanimous, position.
Personally I have serious doubts about the Single Member model, although, probably, they are not the same doubts as the Board's.
But that is the outcome of this WG, and it should not tear up months of work without a rationale. This is simply the IFWP and history repeating itself, otherwise.
Apparently there is some legal difference of opinion between Sidleys and Jones Day on the technicalities. But I do not beleive that can be the only reason.
So, can someone please explain, in simply, preferable non legalistic terms why
(a) the CCWG proposal is unsuitable (b) the Board's proposal is more suitable.
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Kieren I strongly suspect this would very probably sum up the views of ccTLDs collectively (members and non-members of the ccNSO alike). Nigel
What they want to know is that their views will be sought out and taken seriously on matters that are likely to concern them. And that they will be left out of it the rest of the time.
Their fear is that they will have to constantly follow ICANN shenanigans to make sure that a big decision isn't made in their name.
Hello Keith, That is a good summary of some of the issues that have been discussed by Board members. When I get some time over the weekend - I will post some relevant extracts from the Board's public comments, and also offer some of my own personal thoughts on the single member model. Regards, Bruce Tonkin -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith Sent: Thursday, 1 October 2015 3:16 AM To: Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Thanks Nigel. In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is: -- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date. -- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time. -- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time. -- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic. -- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory. -- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model. -- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood. -- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition. I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base. That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b). Regards, Keith
Dear Bruce, To bring us back to Jordan's initial suggestion, if the Board were to play some role in the Single Member model - with the form of decision-making and areas of decision making clearly specified -- what would the Board's take be? Would it still oppose the SMCM? Arun On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Bruce Tonkin < Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
Hello Keith,
That is a good summary of some of the issues that have been discussed by Board members.
When I get some time over the weekend - I will post some relevant extracts from the Board's public comments, and also offer some of my own personal thoughts on the single member model.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith Sent: Thursday, 1 October 2015 3:16 AM To: Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Thanks Nigel.
In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is:
-- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date.
-- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time.
-- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time.
-- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic.
-- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory.
-- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
-- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood.
-- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition.
I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base.
That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b).
Regards, Keith _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- - @arunmsukumar <http://www.twitter.com/arunmsukumar> Senior Fellow, Centre for Communication Governance <http://www.ccgdelhi.org> National Law University, New Delhi Ph: +91-9871943272
Dear All Jordan proposal contradict the concept of separation of power. Board ad an executive entity shall not participate in voting together with SOs and ACs as these two entities are legislative entities. We can not invent a new procedure mixing the two powers. Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 1 Oct 2015, at 12:36, Arun Sukumar <arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in> wrote:
Dear Bruce,
To bring us back to Jordan's initial suggestion, if the Board were to play some role in the Single Member model - with the form of decision-making and areas of decision making clearly specified -- what would the Board's take be? Would it still oppose the SMCM?
Arun
On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote: Hello Keith,
That is a good summary of some of the issues that have been discussed by Board members.
When I get some time over the weekend - I will post some relevant extracts from the Board's public comments, and also offer some of my own personal thoughts on the single member model.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith Sent: Thursday, 1 October 2015 3:16 AM To: Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Thanks Nigel.
In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is:
-- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date.
-- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time.
-- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time.
-- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic.
-- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory.
-- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
-- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood.
-- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition.
I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base.
That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b).
Regards, Keith _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- - @arunmsukumar Senior Fellow, Centre for Communication Governance National Law University, New Delhi Ph: +91-9871943272 _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Agree From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2015 8:05 AM To: Arun Sukumar Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Dear All Jordan proposal contradict the concept of separation of power. Board ad an executive entity shall not participate in voting together with SOs and ACs as these two entities are legislative entities. We can not invent a new procedure mixing the two powers. Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone On 1 Oct 2015, at 12:36, Arun Sukumar <arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in<mailto:arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in>> wrote: Dear Bruce, To bring us back to Jordan's initial suggestion, if the Board were to play some role in the Single Member model - with the form of decision-making and areas of decision making clearly specified -- what would the Board's take be? Would it still oppose the SMCM? Arun On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> wrote: Hello Keith, That is a good summary of some of the issues that have been discussed by Board members. When I get some time over the weekend - I will post some relevant extracts from the Board's public comments, and also offer some of my own personal thoughts on the single member model. Regards, Bruce Tonkin -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith Sent: Thursday, 1 October 2015 3:16 AM To: Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net<mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Thanks Nigel. In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is: -- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date. -- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time. -- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time. -- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic. -- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory. -- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model. -- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood. -- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition. I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base. That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b). Regards, Keith _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- - @arunmsukumar<http://www.twitter.com/arunmsukumar> Senior Fellow, Centre for Communication Governance<http://www.ccgdelhi.org> National Law University, New Delhi Ph: +91-9871943272 _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Kavouss, you're right: no one should be a judge of their own cause. But equally important is the requirement to hear all parties. Let us not get into the voting/consensus debate right away. If the Board is willing to go with some involvement in the SMCM, we may have a modus vivendi to work with. On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 5:34 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear All Jordan proposal contradict the concept of separation of power. Board ad an executive entity shall not participate in voting together with SOs and ACs as these two entities are legislative entities. We can not invent a new procedure mixing the two powers. Regards Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 1 Oct 2015, at 12:36, Arun Sukumar <arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in> wrote:
Dear Bruce,
To bring us back to Jordan's initial suggestion, if the Board were to play some role in the Single Member model - with the form of decision-making and areas of decision making clearly specified -- what would the Board's take be? Would it still oppose the SMCM?
Arun
On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Bruce Tonkin < Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
Hello Keith,
That is a good summary of some of the issues that have been discussed by Board members.
When I get some time over the weekend - I will post some relevant extracts from the Board's public comments, and also offer some of my own personal thoughts on the single member model.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith Sent: Thursday, 1 October 2015 3:16 AM To: Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Thanks Nigel.
In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is:
-- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date.
-- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time.
-- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time.
-- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic.
-- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory.
-- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
-- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood.
-- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition.
I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base.
That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b).
Regards, Keith _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Hello Arun, What involvement will that be? Literally speaking the outcome of community forum would/should be implemented by board, if board have reasons not to implement then they communicate back to the community with rationale and then the process continues. I don't think it will be healthy to keep having back and fourth discussion with board. It will be good to have a consensus view from the community and then have board address those. I am concerned with the way we are trying to diminish the status of board. There is a reason they are called directors and we can't just have community and board together act in such status. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 1 Oct 2015 13:11, "Arun Sukumar" <arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in> wrote:
Kavouss, you're right: no one should be a judge of their own cause. But equally important is the requirement to hear all parties. Let us not get into the voting/consensus debate right away. If the Board is willing to go with some involvement in the SMCM, we may have a modus vivendi to work with.
On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 5:34 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com
wrote:
Dear All Jordan proposal contradict the concept of separation of power. Board ad an executive entity shall not participate in voting together with SOs and ACs as these two entities are legislative entities. We can not invent a new procedure mixing the two powers. Regards Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 1 Oct 2015, at 12:36, Arun Sukumar <arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in> wrote:
Dear Bruce,
To bring us back to Jordan's initial suggestion, if the Board were to play some role in the Single Member model - with the form of decision-making and areas of decision making clearly specified -- what would the Board's take be? Would it still oppose the SMCM?
Arun
On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Bruce Tonkin < Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
Hello Keith,
That is a good summary of some of the issues that have been discussed by Board members.
When I get some time over the weekend - I will post some relevant extracts from the Board's public comments, and also offer some of my own personal thoughts on the single member model.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith Sent: Thursday, 1 October 2015 3:16 AM To: Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Thanks Nigel.
In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is:
-- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date.
-- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time.
-- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time.
-- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic.
-- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory.
-- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
-- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood.
-- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition.
I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base.
That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b).
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Mark,$ I have to do some other job now I will reply to your question tomorrow Cheers Kavouss 2015-10-01 18:11 GMT+02:00 Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>:
Hello Arun,
What involvement will that be? Literally speaking the outcome of community forum would/should be implemented by board, if board have reasons not to implement then they communicate back to the community with rationale and then the process continues. I don't think it will be healthy to keep having back and fourth discussion with board. It will be good to have a consensus view from the community and then have board address those.
I am concerned with the way we are trying to diminish the status of board. There is a reason they are called directors and we can't just have community and board together act in such status.
Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 1 Oct 2015 13:11, "Arun Sukumar" <arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in> wrote:
Kavouss, you're right: no one should be a judge of their own cause. But equally important is the requirement to hear all parties. Let us not get into the voting/consensus debate right away. If the Board is willing to go with some involvement in the SMCM, we may have a modus vivendi to work with.
On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 5:34 PM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear All Jordan proposal contradict the concept of separation of power. Board ad an executive entity shall not participate in voting together with SOs and ACs as these two entities are legislative entities. We can not invent a new procedure mixing the two powers. Regards Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 1 Oct 2015, at 12:36, Arun Sukumar <arun.sukumar@nludelhi.ac.in> wrote:
Dear Bruce,
To bring us back to Jordan's initial suggestion, if the Board were to play some role in the Single Member model - with the form of decision-making and areas of decision making clearly specified -- what would the Board's take be? Would it still oppose the SMCM?
Arun
On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Bruce Tonkin < Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
Hello Keith,
That is a good summary of some of the issues that have been discussed by Board members.
When I get some time over the weekend - I will post some relevant extracts from the Board's public comments, and also offer some of my own personal thoughts on the single member model.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith Sent: Thursday, 1 October 2015 3:16 AM To: Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Thanks Nigel.
In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is:
-- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date.
-- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time.
-- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time.
-- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic.
-- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory.
-- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
-- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood.
-- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition.
I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base.
That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b).
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Hello Arun,
To bring us back to Jordan's initial suggestion, if the Board were to play some role in the Single Member model - with the form of decision-making and areas of decision making clearly specified -- what would the Board's take be? Would it still oppose the SMCM?
That sounds a bit circular. i.e. the Board is a member of the member that is a member of ICANN. I guess an individual could be a Board director, and a member of the single member. Note though that in general if you are a Board director the bylaws don’t allow you to also be a Council member to keep a clear separation of roles. It is currently possible to be a member of an Advisory Committee and be a Board director. I used to be a member of SSAC, and also a director on the board. However after discussion with Paul Vixie - I came to the conclusion that it was better not to be a member of both to avoid perceptions of conflict of interest. So for at least a year I ceased being active in SSAC, and elected not to put my name forward for re-appointment to SSAC. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
Dear Bruce What you said is right. I fully agree with you. Pls read my earléier message that the Board as an executive body shall not participate in nlegistative body ( Sole Mmember ) due to the fact that the begining of CCWG was Separation of Powers e.g. in a democratic Approach , the Hose Speaker can not be the prime Minister or a deputy can not be a Minister Regards Kavouss 2015-10-02 10:02 GMT+02:00 Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>:
Hello Arun,
To bring us back to Jordan's initial suggestion, if the Board were to play some role in the Single Member model - with the form of decision-making and areas of decision making clearly specified -- what would the Board's take be? Would it still oppose the SMCM?
That sounds a bit circular. i.e. the Board is a member of the member that is a member of ICANN. I guess an individual could be a Board director, and a member of the single member. Note though that in general if you are a Board director the bylaws don’t allow you to also be a Council member to keep a clear separation of roles.
It is currently possible to be a member of an Advisory Committee and be a Board director. I used to be a member of SSAC, and also a director on the board. However after discussion with Paul Vixie - I came to the conclusion that it was better not to be a member of both to avoid perceptions of conflict of interest. So for at least a year I ceased being active in SSAC, and elected not to put my name forward for re-appointment to SSAC.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
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Thanks for that clarification Bruce. On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 1:32 PM, Bruce Tonkin < Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
Hello Arun,
To bring us back to Jordan's initial suggestion, if the Board were to play some role in the Single Member model - with the form of decision-making and areas of decision making clearly specified -- what would the Board's take be? Would it still oppose the SMCM?
That sounds a bit circular. i.e. the Board is a member of the member that is a member of ICANN. I guess an individual could be a Board director, and a member of the single member. Note though that in general if you are a Board director the bylaws don’t allow you to also be a Council member to keep a clear separation of roles.
It is currently possible to be a member of an Advisory Committee and be a Board director. I used to be a member of SSAC, and also a director on the board. However after discussion with Paul Vixie - I came to the conclusion that it was better not to be a member of both to avoid perceptions of conflict of interest. So for at least a year I ceased being active in SSAC, and elected not to put my name forward for re-appointment to SSAC.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin
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On 30/09/2015 18:15, Drazek, Keith wrote:
Thanks Nigel.
In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is:
Thank you Keith. I think it helps to bring those together. It may also help to provide a "ready-reference" list of the leading counter-arguments to each of these objections. So in the same spirit (and with apologies if I misattribute or missummarise some of the leading arguments I have heard), I offer this "handy checklist". :-)
-- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date.
Sidley: The Board's alternative is equally new and untested.
-- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time.
As above. "No change" is not on the table, unless you wish to oppose transition; the NTIA is proposing to change the structure by withdrawing. The only question is "what change should we introduce in response to this" - and that question was explicitly proposed by NTIA in asking for a transition proposal.
-- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time.
Roberts and Doria? : Continuous improvement in the inclusiveness and representativeness of the SOs and ACs is of course agreed as a goal by all. But saying that their current status is so inadequate that they cannot be trusted with even participating in a jointly shared authority betrays a fundamental lack of confidence in the multistakeholder model.
-- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic.
This is a restatement of the previous; and the answer is the same.
-- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory.
Hutty: All elements are (or should be) invited to participate in the sole membership model. They don't need to all participate in the voting though, if they don't wish to: denying that participating in a purely advisory capacity qualifies as meaningful participation would be equally inconsistent with the Board's claim to represent the fullcommunity, since the GAC, SSAC and RSSAC don't have votes on the Board either.
-- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
Carter? and others: i) Firstly, we are not shifting the basis for existing decision-making; the areas where we currently have consensus-based decision-making (i.e. all the ordinary, day-to-day business of policy and operational work) are entirely untouched by this proposal. All we are talking about is the use of certain rare, backstop powers. ii) ... even to the extent that it is true that SOs currently make decisions without a vote iii) ... or for that matter the Board: the Bylaws provide for voting on the Board, yet it is usually able to come to a consensus position. Why would you expect the Single Member to be any different? iv) ... and, as with the Board, the Bylaws must provide for resolving a lack of consensus somehow. As with the Board, we have chosen a vote. Why is this any less consistent with the multi-stakeholder model in the case of the Single Member than it is with the Board?
-- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood.
McCarthy: The *explanation* of the CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, and must be improved. This doesn't require rewriting the CCWG proposal. Several: The proposal should drive the communications plan, not the other way around. Making it easier to conduct PR is a poor reason for adopting a sub-optimal plan. Zuck, Shatan: "Incremental" changes are a mirage. What is not done now will never be done.
-- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition.
Carter, Hutty: This is not a substantial governance restructuring; almost the entire structure is left untouched. This is a discrete addition of a modest set of new safeguards for rare and exceptional events.
I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base.
That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b).
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Nigel Roberts Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 12:46 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Let's be Frank, here.
I'm not entirely unreceptive to the view expressed to me by at least one Board member regarding the idea of a quick win.
HOWEVER, despite the fairly emphatic nature of the Board's objection to membership model, I do not believe I have read or heard any rationale or reasons for their, apparently unanimous, position.
Personally I have serious doubts about the Single Member model, although, probably, they are not the same doubts as the Board's.
But that is the outcome of this WG, and it should not tear up months of work without a rationale. This is simply the IFWP and history repeating itself, otherwise.
Apparently there is some legal difference of opinion between Sidleys and Jones Day on the technicalities. But I do not beleive that can be the only reason.
So, can someone please explain, in simply, preferable non legalistic terms why
(a) the CCWG proposal is unsuitable (b) the Board's proposal is more suitable.
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
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Thanks Keith and Malcolm, very useful. On the "response" as to whether or not the proposal is a substantial governance restructuring: This is a discrete addition of a modest set of new safeguards for rare and exceptional events. Yes, but that is not the perception and our discussions have always focused on the use of the powers rather than the escalation paths, decision-making flows and exhaustion of recourse options that would get us to the point of using those powers in those rare and exceptional instances. We need to more clearly show and demonstrate that these are a "modest set of safeguards". Matthew On 01/10/2015 12:02, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 30/09/2015 18:15, Drazek, Keith wrote:
Thanks Nigel.
In no particular order, my interpretation of the Board's written comments, what we heard in Los Angeles and from Fadi yesterday is:
Thank you Keith. I think it helps to bring those together.
It may also help to provide a "ready-reference" list of the leading counter-arguments to each of these objections. So in the same spirit (and with apologies if I misattribute or missummarise some of the leading arguments I have heard), I offer this "handy checklist". :-)
-- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time available to meet the September 2016 date. Sidley: The Board's alternative is equally new and untested.
-- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time. As above. "No change" is not on the table, unless you wish to oppose transition; the NTIA is proposing to change the structure by withdrawing.
The only question is "what change should we introduce in response to this" - and that question was explicitly proposed by NTIA in asking for a transition proposal.
-- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient accountability at this time. Roberts and Doria? : Continuous improvement in the inclusiveness and representativeness of the SOs and ACs is of course agreed as a goal by all. But saying that their current status is so inadequate that they cannot be trusted with even participating in a jointly shared authority betrays a fundamental lack of confidence in the multistakeholder model.
-- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is problematic. This is a restatement of the previous; and the answer is the same.
-- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and RSSAC) have said they want to remain advisory. Hutty: All elements are (or should be) invited to participate in the sole membership model. They don't need to all participate in the voting though, if they don't wish to: denying that participating in a purely advisory capacity qualifies as meaningful participation would be equally inconsistent with the Board's claim to represent the fullcommunity, since the GAC, SSAC and RSSAC don't have votes on the Board either.
-- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
Carter? and others: i) Firstly, we are not shifting the basis for existing decision-making; the areas where we currently have consensus-based decision-making (i.e. all the ordinary, day-to-day business of policy and operational work) are entirely untouched by this proposal. All we are talking about is the use of certain rare, backstop powers. ii) ... even to the extent that it is true that SOs currently make decisions without a vote iii) ... or for that matter the Board: the Bylaws provide for voting on the Board, yet it is usually able to come to a consensus position. Why would you expect the Single Member to be any different? iv) ... and, as with the Board, the Bylaws must provide for resolving a lack of consensus somehow. As with the Board, we have chosen a vote. Why is this any less consistent with the multi-stakeholder model in the case of the Single Member than it is with the Board?
-- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes that are more easily implemented and understood. McCarthy: The *explanation* of the CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to explain/understand, and must be improved. This doesn't require rewriting the CCWG proposal.
Several: The proposal should drive the communications plan, not the other way around. Making it easier to conduct PR is a poor reason for adopting a sub-optimal plan.
Zuck, Shatan: "Incremental" changes are a mirage. What is not done now will never be done.
-- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message going into the transition. Carter, Hutty: This is not a substantial governance restructuring; almost the entire structure is left untouched. This is a discrete addition of a modest set of new safeguards for rare and exceptional events.
I'm obviously not in a position to speak for the Board, but that's my non-legalistic reading of the concerns. I'd be happy to be corrected if my interpretation is off-base.
That was a reply to your question (a). I can't respond to question (b).
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Nigel Roberts Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 12:46 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Let's be Frank, here.
I'm not entirely unreceptive to the view expressed to me by at least one Board member regarding the idea of a quick win.
HOWEVER, despite the fairly emphatic nature of the Board's objection to membership model, I do not believe I have read or heard any rationale or reasons for their, apparently unanimous, position.
Personally I have serious doubts about the Single Member model, although, probably, they are not the same doubts as the Board's.
But that is the outcome of this WG, and it should not tear up months of work without a rationale. This is simply the IFWP and history repeating itself, otherwise.
Apparently there is some legal difference of opinion between Sidleys and Jones Day on the technicalities. But I do not beleive that can be the only reason.
So, can someone please explain, in simply, preferable non legalistic terms why
(a) the CCWG proposal is unsuitable (b) the Board's proposal is more suitable.
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
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Keith Your suggestion that 1. The GAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. is indeed very balanced and constructive and something that DK fully can support! Best Finn -----Oprindelig meddelelse----- Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] På vegne af Drazek, Keith Sendt: 30. september 2015 18:38 Til: Kavouss Arasteh; James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Emne: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions: 1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community. Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this? That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM To: James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem James If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? Is this a GAC position or?
-jg
On 30/09/2015 14:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Mike, I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
You're welcome. They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board.
On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear mike Thank you for the message. May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? Tks Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: *Here is a suggestion.* * * *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion.
Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call.
Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member.
It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly.
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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As a matter of principle I object to any group, including the GAC, having special status of any kind. It distorts the multi-stakeholder model. As a practical matter, this is a compromise solution that I could reluctantly accept. Compromise never feels good, but it is the only way to move things forward. Props to Keith for suggesting this and to my Danish colleague for agreeing to it. Best, Ed Morris Sent from my iPhone
On Oct 2, 2015, at 11:21 AM, Finn Petersen <FinPet@erst.dk> wrote:
Keith
Your suggestion that
1. The GAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board.
is indeed very balanced and constructive and something that DK fully can support!
Best
Finn
-----Oprindelig meddelelse----- Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] På vegne af Drazek, Keith Sendt: 30. september 2015 18:38 Til: Kavouss Arasteh; James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Emne: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions:
1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board.
This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community.
Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this?
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM To: James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
James If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? Is this a GAC position or?
-jg
On 30/09/2015 14:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Mike, I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
You're welcome. They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board.
On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear mike Thank you for the message. May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? Tks Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board.
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
> On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: > *Here is a suggestion.* > * > * > *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have > (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the > ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to > consensus to exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion.
Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call.
Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member.
It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly.
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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I think this is a reasonable suggestion. A "one-size-fits-all" (or don't wear it) approach was not really working for us. The SO/ACs may be equal (though some would argue otherwise) but they are not identical, and a system that accounts for those differences, without giving an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC, would seem to be warranted. Greg On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 6:50 AM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote:
As a matter of principle I object to any group, including the GAC, having special status of any kind. It distorts the multi-stakeholder model. As a practical matter, this is a compromise solution that I could reluctantly accept. Compromise never feels good, but it is the only way to move things forward. Props to Keith for suggesting this and to my Danish colleague for agreeing to it.
Best,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On Oct 2, 2015, at 11:21 AM, Finn Petersen <FinPet@erst.dk> wrote:
Keith
Your suggestion that
1. The GAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board.
is indeed very balanced and constructive and something that DK fully can support!
Best
Finn
-----Oprindelig meddelelse----- Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] På vegne af Drazek, Keith Sendt: 30. september 2015 18:38 Til: Kavouss Arasteh; James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Emne: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions:
1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board.
This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community.
Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this?
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM To: James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
James If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? Is this a GAC position or?
-jg
On 30/09/2015 14:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" < accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Mike, I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
You're welcome. They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board.
On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear mike Thank you for the message. May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? Tks Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S < mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: > > I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board. > > -----Original Message----- > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org > [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On > Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty > Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM > To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can > Do Anything!' problem > > > >> On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: >> *Here is a suggestion.* >> * >> * >> *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >> (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the >> ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to >> consensus to exercise them?* > > Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion. > > Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call. > > Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member. > > It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly. > > *For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report > to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in > the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the > Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide > advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as > already defined.* > > It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, > RSSAC and > (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit. > > Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected. > > It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements. > > Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined. > > I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress. > > -- > Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public > Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet > Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ > > London Internet Exchange Ltd > 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY > > Company Registered in England No. 3137929 > Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi > ty _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi > ty
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.... And you think that suggestion does not give an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC. It is my hope that this is not a consensus call we are making here so I think I will try to pause from writing for now as it seem there is no intention to address the fundamental issue but we are instead plastering the house wall even though the foundation architecture is still being fundamentally disagreed upon. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 2 Oct 2015 22:57, "Greg Shatan" <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think this is a reasonable suggestion. A "one-size-fits-all" (or don't wear it) approach was not really working for us. The SO/ACs may be equal (though some would argue otherwise) but they are not identical, and a system that accounts for those differences, without giving an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC, would seem to be warranted.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 6:50 AM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote:
As a matter of principle I object to any group, including the GAC, having special status of any kind. It distorts the multi-stakeholder model. As a practical matter, this is a compromise solution that I could reluctantly accept. Compromise never feels good, but it is the only way to move things forward. Props to Keith for suggesting this and to my Danish colleague for agreeing to it.
Best,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On Oct 2, 2015, at 11:21 AM, Finn Petersen <FinPet@erst.dk> wrote:
Keith
Your suggestion that
1. The GAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board.
is indeed very balanced and constructive and something that DK fully can support!
Best
Finn
-----Oprindelig meddelelse----- Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] På vegne af Drazek, Keith Sendt: 30. september 2015 18:38 Til: Kavouss Arasteh; James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Emne: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions:
1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board.
This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community.
Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this?
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM To: James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
James If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? Is this a GAC position or?
-jg
On 30/09/2015 14:06, " accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Mike, I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S < mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
You're welcome. They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board.
> On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: > > Dear mike > Thank you for the message. > May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? > Tks > Cheers > Kavouss > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S < mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >> >> I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board. >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org >> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On >> Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty >> Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM >> To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community >> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can >> Do Anything!' problem >> >> >> >>> On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: >>> *Here is a suggestion.* >>> * >>> * >>> *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >>> (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the >>> ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to >>> consensus to exercise them?* >> >> Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion. >> >> Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call. >> >> Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member. >> >> It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly. >> >> *For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report >> to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in >> the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the >> Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide >> advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as >> already defined.* >> >> It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, >> RSSAC and >> (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit. >> >> Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected. >> >> It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements. >> >> Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined. >> >> I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress. >> >> -- >> Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public >> Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet >> Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ >> >> London Internet Exchange Ltd >> 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY >> >> Company Registered in England No. 3137929 >> Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >> ty _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >> ty
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Seun, No, I do not think that this suggestion gives an elevated or special status to any one SO/AC. At least, it doesn't have to. It all depends on how the input from that SO/AC is handled in relation to the input from other SO/ACs. Some care must be taken to provide an equal level of influence on the outcome, whether the view is expressed as advice or a vote. I'm not sure why you say "there is no intention to address the fundamental issue." What do you believe that "fundamental issue" is? You do not favor the membership model, so I assume you mean considering whether to discard the membership model in favor of the Board's model. I see active discussion of that very point on this board. At the same time, it's also highly appropriate to consider ways in which the member model can be improved in response to the Public Comments (including the Board's comments). Isn't that what the public comment analysis is for? Greg On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 7:26 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
.... And you think that suggestion does not give an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC.
It is my hope that this is not a consensus call we are making here so I think I will try to pause from writing for now as it seem there is no intention to address the fundamental issue but we are instead plastering the house wall even though the foundation architecture is still being fundamentally disagreed upon.
Regards
Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 2 Oct 2015 22:57, "Greg Shatan" <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think this is a reasonable suggestion. A "one-size-fits-all" (or don't wear it) approach was not really working for us. The SO/ACs may be equal (though some would argue otherwise) but they are not identical, and a system that accounts for those differences, without giving an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC, would seem to be warranted.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 6:50 AM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote:
As a matter of principle I object to any group, including the GAC, having special status of any kind. It distorts the multi-stakeholder model. As a practical matter, this is a compromise solution that I could reluctantly accept. Compromise never feels good, but it is the only way to move things forward. Props to Keith for suggesting this and to my Danish colleague for agreeing to it.
Best,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On Oct 2, 2015, at 11:21 AM, Finn Petersen <FinPet@erst.dk> wrote:
Keith
Your suggestion that
1. The GAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board.
is indeed very balanced and constructive and something that DK fully can support!
Best
Finn
-----Oprindelig meddelelse----- Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] På vegne af Drazek, Keith Sendt: 30. september 2015 18:38 Til: Kavouss Arasteh; James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Emne: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions:
1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board.
This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community.
Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this?
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM To: James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
James If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? Is this a GAC position or?
-jg
On 30/09/2015 14:06, " accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Mike, I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect Cheers Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S < mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: > > You're welcome. > They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board. > > > >> On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Dear mike >> Thank you for the message. >> May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? >> Tks >> Cheers >> Kavouss >> >> Sent from my iPhone >> >>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S < mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >>> >>> I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board. >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org >>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On >>> Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty >>> Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM >>> To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community >>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can >>> Do Anything!' problem >>> >>> >>> >>>> On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: >>>> *Here is a suggestion.* >>>> * >>>> * >>>> *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >>>> (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the >>>> ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to >>>> consensus to exercise them?* >>> >>> Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion. >>> >>> Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call. >>> >>> Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member. >>> >>> It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly. >>> >>> *For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report >>> to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in >>> the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the >>> Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide >>> advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as >>> already defined.* >>> >>> It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, >>> RSSAC and >>> (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit. >>> >>> Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected. >>> >>> It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements. >>> >>> Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined. >>> >>> I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress. >>> >>> -- >>> Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public >>> Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet >>> Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ >>> >>> London Internet Exchange Ltd >>> 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY >>> >>> Company Registered in England No. 3137929 >>> Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>> ty _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>> ty _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Pedro, What you said is exactly what I replied to Jorge few weeks ago . Now the situation is changed Ir might be good to retain the rights of ACs as consensus advice which would be effective if it is in favour of or against of an outcome. What you are describing is something that was prevail about one month ago. The situation is rapidly changing/ developing and we need to adjust ourselev to the prevailing coircumstances . Regards Kavouss 2015-10-05 18:16 GMT+02:00 Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com>:
Seun,
No, I do not think that this suggestion gives an elevated or special status to any one SO/AC. At least, it doesn't have to. It all depends on how the input from that SO/AC is handled in relation to the input from other SO/ACs. Some care must be taken to provide an equal level of influence on the outcome, whether the view is expressed as advice or a vote.
I'm not sure why you say "there is no intention to address the fundamental issue." What do you believe that "fundamental issue" is? You do not favor the membership model, so I assume you mean considering whether to discard the membership model in favor of the Board's model. I see active discussion of that very point on this board. At the same time, it's also highly appropriate to consider ways in which the member model can be improved in response to the Public Comments (including the Board's comments). Isn't that what the public comment analysis is for?
Greg
On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 7:26 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
.... And you think that suggestion does not give an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC.
It is my hope that this is not a consensus call we are making here so I think I will try to pause from writing for now as it seem there is no intention to address the fundamental issue but we are instead plastering the house wall even though the foundation architecture is still being fundamentally disagreed upon.
Regards
Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 2 Oct 2015 22:57, "Greg Shatan" <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think this is a reasonable suggestion. A "one-size-fits-all" (or don't wear it) approach was not really working for us. The SO/ACs may be equal (though some would argue otherwise) but they are not identical, and a system that accounts for those differences, without giving an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC, would seem to be warranted.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 6:50 AM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote:
As a matter of principle I object to any group, including the GAC, having special status of any kind. It distorts the multi-stakeholder model. As a practical matter, this is a compromise solution that I could reluctantly accept. Compromise never feels good, but it is the only way to move things forward. Props to Keith for suggesting this and to my Danish colleague for agreeing to it.
Best,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On Oct 2, 2015, at 11:21 AM, Finn Petersen <FinPet@erst.dk> wrote:
Keith
Your suggestion that
1. The GAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board.
is indeed very balanced and constructive and something that DK fully can support!
Best
Finn
-----Oprindelig meddelelse----- Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] På vegne af Drazek, Keith Sendt: 30. september 2015 18:38 Til: Kavouss Arasteh; James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Emne: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions:
1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board.
This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community.
Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this?
That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM To: James Gannon Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
James If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? Is this a GAC position or?
-jg
> On 30/09/2015 14:06, " accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: > > Mike, > I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect > Cheers > Kavouss > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S < mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >> >> You're welcome. >> They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board. >> >> >> >>> On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Dear mike >>> Thank you for the message. >>> May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? >>> Tks >>> Cheers >>> Kavouss >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S < mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board. >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org >>>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On >>>> Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty >>>> Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM >>>> To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community >>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can >>>> Do Anything!' problem >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: >>>>> *Here is a suggestion.* >>>>> * >>>>> * >>>>> *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >>>>> (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the >>>>> ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to >>>>> consensus to exercise them?* >>>> >>>> Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion. >>>> >>>> Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call. >>>> >>>> Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member. >>>> >>>> It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly. >>>> >>>> *For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report >>>> to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in >>>> the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the >>>> Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide >>>> advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as >>>> already defined.* >>>> >>>> It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, >>>> RSSAC and >>>> (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit. >>>> >>>> Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected. >>>> >>>> It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements. >>>> >>>> Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined. >>>> >>>> I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public >>>> Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet >>>> Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ >>>> >>>> London Internet Exchange Ltd >>>> 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY >>>> >>>> Company Registered in England No. 3137929 >>>> Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>> ty _______________________________________________ >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>> ty > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Dear Kavouss, Thank you for your comment. Despite the fact that the CCWG is refining its recommendations in the light of the comments received and of the discussions in Los Angeles, in my email I wanted simply to remind that the GAC had supported a previous CCWG recommendation by consensus and that any change to that would need to be revisited in order to have a formal GAC position on it. Moreover, given the suggestion of some colleagues (made last week), I wanted to emphasize the principle that it is up to each stakeholder - including the GAC - to determine its involvement in the proposed accountability mechanisms. In the light of the recent email exchange in the CCWG-Accountability list, I thought it was important to recall these two points. Regards, Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 -----Mensagem original----- De: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Enviada em: segunda-feira, 5 de outubro de 2015 15:42 Para: Greg Shatan; Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Cc: Seun Ojedeji; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Pedro, What you said is exactly what I replied to Jorge few weeks ago . Now the situation is changed Ir might be good to retain the rights of ACs as consensus advice which would be effective if it is in favour of or against of an outcome. What you are describing is something that was prevail about one month ago. The situation is rapidly changing/ developing and we need to adjust ourselev to the prevailing coircumstances . Regards Kavouss 2015-10-05 18:16 GMT+02:00 Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com>: Seun, No, I do not think that this suggestion gives an elevated or special status to any one SO/AC. At least, it doesn't have to. It all depends on how the input from that SO/AC is handled in relation to the input from other SO/ACs. Some care must be taken to provide an equal level of influence on the outcome, whether the view is expressed as advice or a vote. I'm not sure why you say "there is no intention to address the fundamental issue." What do you believe that "fundamental issue" is? You do not favor the membership model, so I assume you mean considering whether to discard the membership model in favor of the Board's model. I see active discussion of that very point on this board. At the same time, it's also highly appropriate to consider ways in which the member model can be improved in response to the Public Comments (including the Board's comments). Isn't that what the public comment analysis is for? Greg On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 7:26 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote: .... And you think that suggestion does not give an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC. It is my hope that this is not a consensus call we are making here so I think I will try to pause from writing for now as it seem there is no intention to address the fundamental issue but we are instead plastering the house wall even though the foundation architecture is still being fundamentally disagreed upon. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 2 Oct 2015 22:57, "Greg Shatan" <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote: I think this is a reasonable suggestion. A "one-size-fits-all" (or don't wear it) approach was not really working for us. The SO/ACs may be equal (though some would argue otherwise) but they are not identical, and a system that accounts for those differences, without giving an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC, would seem to be warranted. Greg On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 6:50 AM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote: As a matter of principle I object to any group, including the GAC, having special status of any kind. It distorts the multi-stakeholder model. As a practical matter, this is a compromise solution that I could reluctantly accept. Compromise never feels good, but it is the only way to move things forward. Props to Keith for suggesting this and to my Danish colleague for agreeing to it. Best, Ed Morris Sent from my iPhone > On Oct 2, 2015, at 11:21 AM, Finn Petersen <FinPet@erst.dk> wrote: > > Keith > > Your suggestion that > > 1. The GAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. > 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. > > is indeed very balanced and constructive and something that DK fully can support! > > Best > > Finn > > > -----Oprindelig meddelelse----- > Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] På vegne af Drazek, Keith > Sendt: 30. september 2015 18:38 > Til: Kavouss Arasteh; James Gannon > Cc: Accountability Cross Community > Emne: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem > > In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions: > > 1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. > 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. > > This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community. > > Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this? > > That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation. > > Regards, > Keith > > > -----Original Message----- > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh > Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM > To: James Gannon > Cc: Accountability Cross Community > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem > > James > If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote: >> >> So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? >> Is this a GAC position or? >> >> -jg >> >> >> >> >>> On 30/09/2015 14:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Mike, >>> I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect >>> Cheers >>> Kavouss >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> You're welcome. >>>> They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Dear mike >>>>> Thank you for the message. >>>>> May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? >>>>> Tks >>>>> Cheers >>>>> Kavouss >>>>> >>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>> >>>>>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board. >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org >>>>>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On >>>>>> Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty >>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM >>>>>> To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community >>>>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can >>>>>> Do Anything!' problem >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: >>>>>>> *Here is a suggestion.* >>>>>>> * >>>>>>> * >>>>>>> *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >>>>>>> (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the >>>>>>> ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to >>>>>>> consensus to exercise them?* >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call. >>>>>> >>>>>> Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member. >>>>>> >>>>>> It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly. >>>>>> >>>>>> *For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report >>>>>> to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in >>>>>> the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the >>>>>> Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide >>>>>> advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as >>>>>> already defined.* >>>>>> >>>>>> It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, >>>>>> RSSAC and >>>>>> (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit. >>>>>> >>>>>> Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected. >>>>>> >>>>>> It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements. >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined. >>>>>> >>>>>> I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 <tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public >>>>>> Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet >>>>>> Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ >>>>>> >>>>>> London Internet Exchange Ltd >>>>>> 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY >>>>>> >>>>>> Company Registered in England No. 3137929 >>>>>> Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>>>> ty _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>>>> ty >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Pedro, I do not recall that GAC had agreed to CCWG Proposal as it was published on 03 August wuith the deadline for comments till 12 September, Perhaps you referred to CWG which we agreed ojn by consensus with a statement Pls be so kind and .... Kavouss 2015-10-05 21:04 GMT+02:00 Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva < pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>:
Dear Kavouss,
Thank you for your comment.
Despite the fact that the CCWG is refining its recommendations in the light of the comments received and of the discussions in Los Angeles, in my email I wanted simply to remind that the GAC had supported a previous CCWG recommendation by consensus and that any change to that would need to be revisited in order to have a formal GAC position on it.
Moreover, given the suggestion of some colleagues (made last week), I wanted to emphasize the principle that it is up to each stakeholder - including the GAC - to determine its involvement in the proposed accountability mechanisms.
In the light of the recent email exchange in the CCWG-Accountability list, I thought it was important to recall these two points.
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
-----Mensagem original----- De: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Enviada em: segunda-feira, 5 de outubro de 2015 15:42 Para: Greg Shatan; Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Cc: Seun Ojedeji; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Pedro, What you said is exactly what I replied to Jorge few weeks ago . Now the situation is changed Ir might be good to retain the rights of ACs as consensus advice which would be effective if it is in favour of or against of an outcome. What you are describing is something that was prevail about one month ago. The situation is rapidly changing/ developing and we need to adjust ourselev to the prevailing coircumstances . Regards Kavouss
2015-10-05 18:16 GMT+02:00 Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com>:
Seun,
No, I do not think that this suggestion gives an elevated or special status to any one SO/AC. At least, it doesn't have to. It all depends on how the input from that SO/AC is handled in relation to the input from other SO/ACs. Some care must be taken to provide an equal level of influence on the outcome, whether the view is expressed as advice or a vote.
I'm not sure why you say "there is no intention to address the fundamental issue." What do you believe that "fundamental issue" is? You do not favor the membership model, so I assume you mean considering whether to discard the membership model in favor of the Board's model. I see active discussion of that very point on this board. At the same time, it's also highly appropriate to consider ways in which the member model can be improved in response to the Public Comments (including the Board's comments). Isn't that what the public comment analysis is for?
Greg
On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 7:26 PM, Seun Ojedeji < seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
.... And you think that suggestion does not give an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC.
It is my hope that this is not a consensus call we are making here so I think I will try to pause from writing for now as it seem there is no intention to address the fundamental issue but we are instead plastering the house wall even though the foundation architecture is still being fundamentally disagreed upon.
Regards
Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 2 Oct 2015 22:57, "Greg Shatan" < gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think this is a reasonable suggestion. A "one-size-fits-all" (or don't wear it) approach was not really working for us. The SO/ACs may be equal (though some would argue otherwise) but they are not identical, and a system that accounts for those differences, without giving an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC, would seem to be warranted.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 6:50 AM, Edward Morris < egmorris1@toast.net> wrote:
As a matter of principle I object to any group, including the GAC, having special status of any kind. It distorts the multi-stakeholder model. As a practical matter, this is a compromise solution that I could reluctantly accept. Compromise never feels good, but it is the only way to move things forward. Props to Keith for suggesting this and to my Danish colleague for agreeing to it.
Best,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
> On Oct 2, 2015, at 11:21 AM, Finn Petersen <FinPet@erst.dk> wrote: > > Keith > > Your suggestion that > > 1. The GAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. > 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. > > is indeed very balanced and constructive and something that DK fully can support! > > Best > > Finn > > > -----Oprindelig meddelelse----- > Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] På vegne af Drazek, Keith > Sendt: 30. september 2015 18:38 > Til: Kavouss Arasteh; James Gannon > Cc: Accountability Cross Community > Emne: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem > > In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions: > > 1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. > 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. > > This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community. > > Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this? > > That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation. > > Regards, > Keith > > > -----Original Message----- > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh > Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM > To: James Gannon > Cc: Accountability Cross Community > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem > > James > If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon < james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote: >> >> So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? >> Is this a GAC position or? >> >> -jg >> >> >> >> >>> On 30/09/2015 14:06, " accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Mike, >>> I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect >>> Cheers >>> Kavouss >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> You're welcome. >>>> They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Dear mike >>>>> Thank you for the message. >>>>> May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? >>>>> Tks >>>>> Cheers >>>>> Kavouss >>>>> >>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>> >>>>>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board. >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org >>>>>> [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On >>>>>> Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty >>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM >>>>>> To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community >>>>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can >>>>>> Do Anything!' problem >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: >>>>>>> *Here is a suggestion.* >>>>>>> * >>>>>>> * >>>>>>> *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >>>>>>> (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the >>>>>>> ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to >>>>>>> consensus to exercise them?* >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call. >>>>>> >>>>>> Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member. >>>>>> >>>>>> It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly. >>>>>> >>>>>> *For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report >>>>>> to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in >>>>>> the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the >>>>>> Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide >>>>>> advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as >>>>>> already defined.* >>>>>> >>>>>> It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, >>>>>> RSSAC and >>>>>> (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit. >>>>>> >>>>>> Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected. >>>>>> >>>>>> It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements. >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined. >>>>>> >>>>>> I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 <tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public >>>>>> Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet >>>>>> Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ >>>>>> >>>>>> London Internet Exchange Ltd >>>>>> 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY >>>>>> >>>>>> Company Registered in England No. 3137929 >>>>>> Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>>>> ty _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>>>> ty >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org
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Dear Perdo , in regard with your last paragraph Quote *" Moreover, given the suggestion of some colleagues (made last week), I wanted to emphasize the principle that it is up to each stakeholder - including the GAC - to determine its involvement in the proposed accountability mechanisms"* *Unquote* *While it is true that it is up to each stakeholder to decide how to act, but we are working together and need to coordinate our wishes and our involvement.* *This is a collaborative team working * *Regards* *Kavouss * 2015-10-05 21:15 GMT+02:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:
Dear Pedro, I do not recall that GAC had agreed to CCWG Proposal as it was published on 03 August wuith the deadline for comments till 12 September, Perhaps you referred to CWG which we agreed ojn by consensus with a statement Pls be so kind and .... Kavouss
2015-10-05 21:04 GMT+02:00 Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva < pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>:
Dear Kavouss,
Thank you for your comment.
Despite the fact that the CCWG is refining its recommendations in the light of the comments received and of the discussions in Los Angeles, in my email I wanted simply to remind that the GAC had supported a previous CCWG recommendation by consensus and that any change to that would need to be revisited in order to have a formal GAC position on it.
Moreover, given the suggestion of some colleagues (made last week), I wanted to emphasize the principle that it is up to each stakeholder - including the GAC - to determine its involvement in the proposed accountability mechanisms.
In the light of the recent email exchange in the CCWG-Accountability list, I thought it was important to recall these two points.
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
-----Mensagem original----- De: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Enviada em: segunda-feira, 5 de outubro de 2015 15:42 Para: Greg Shatan; Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Cc: Seun Ojedeji; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Pedro, What you said is exactly what I replied to Jorge few weeks ago . Now the situation is changed Ir might be good to retain the rights of ACs as consensus advice which would be effective if it is in favour of or against of an outcome. What you are describing is something that was prevail about one month ago. The situation is rapidly changing/ developing and we need to adjust ourselev to the prevailing coircumstances . Regards Kavouss
2015-10-05 18:16 GMT+02:00 Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com>:
Seun,
No, I do not think that this suggestion gives an elevated or special status to any one SO/AC. At least, it doesn't have to. It all depends on how the input from that SO/AC is handled in relation to the input from other SO/ACs. Some care must be taken to provide an equal level of influence on the outcome, whether the view is expressed as advice or a vote.
I'm not sure why you say "there is no intention to address the fundamental issue." What do you believe that "fundamental issue" is? You do not favor the membership model, so I assume you mean considering whether to discard the membership model in favor of the Board's model. I see active discussion of that very point on this board. At the same time, it's also highly appropriate to consider ways in which the member model can be improved in response to the Public Comments (including the Board's comments). Isn't that what the public comment analysis is for?
Greg
On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 7:26 PM, Seun Ojedeji < seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
.... And you think that suggestion does not give an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC.
It is my hope that this is not a consensus call we are making here so I think I will try to pause from writing for now as it seem there is no intention to address the fundamental issue but we are instead plastering the house wall even though the foundation architecture is still being fundamentally disagreed upon.
Regards
Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 2 Oct 2015 22:57, "Greg Shatan" < gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think this is a reasonable suggestion. A "one-size-fits-all" (or don't wear it) approach was not really working for us. The SO/ACs may be equal (though some would argue otherwise) but they are not identical, and a system that accounts for those differences, without giving an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC, would seem to be warranted.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 6:50 AM, Edward Morris < egmorris1@toast.net> wrote:
As a matter of principle I object to any group, including the GAC, having special status of any kind. It distorts the multi-stakeholder model. As a practical matter, this is a compromise solution that I could reluctantly accept. Compromise never feels good, but it is the only way to move things forward. Props to Keith for suggesting this and to my Danish colleague for agreeing to it.
Best,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
> On Oct 2, 2015, at 11:21 AM, Finn Petersen <FinPet@erst.dk> wrote: > > Keith > > Your suggestion that > > 1. The GAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. > 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. > > is indeed very balanced and constructive and something that DK fully can support! > > Best > > Finn > > > -----Oprindelig meddelelse----- > Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] På vegne af Drazek, Keith > Sendt: 30. september 2015 18:38 > Til: Kavouss Arasteh; James Gannon > Cc: Accountability Cross Community > Emne: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem > > In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions: > > 1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. > 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. > > This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community. > > Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this? > > That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation. > > Regards, > Keith > > > -----Original Message----- > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh > Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM > To: James Gannon > Cc: Accountability Cross Community > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem > > James > If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote: >> >> So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? >> Is this a GAC position or? >> >> -jg >> >> >> >> >>> On 30/09/2015 14:06, " accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Mike, >>> I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect >>> Cheers >>> Kavouss >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> You're welcome. >>>> They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Dear mike >>>>> Thank you for the message. >>>>> May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? >>>>> Tks >>>>> Cheers >>>>> Kavouss >>>>> >>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>> >>>>>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board. >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org >>>>>> [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On >>>>>> Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty >>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM >>>>>> To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community >>>>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can >>>>>> Do Anything!' problem >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: >>>>>>> *Here is a suggestion.* >>>>>>> * >>>>>>> * >>>>>>> *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >>>>>>> (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the >>>>>>> ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to >>>>>>> consensus to exercise them?* >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call. >>>>>> >>>>>> Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member. >>>>>> >>>>>> It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly. >>>>>> >>>>>> *For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report >>>>>> to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in >>>>>> the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the >>>>>> Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide >>>>>> advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as >>>>>> already defined.* >>>>>> >>>>>> It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, >>>>>> RSSAC and >>>>>> (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit. >>>>>> >>>>>> Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected. >>>>>> >>>>>> It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements. >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined. >>>>>> >>>>>> I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 <tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public >>>>>> Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet >>>>>> Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ >>>>>> >>>>>> London Internet Exchange Ltd >>>>>> 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY >>>>>> >>>>>> Company Registered in England No. 3137929 >>>>>> Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>>>> ty _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>>>> ty >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Hi, Any change that is substantive, i.e more than clarification, will, I believe, require another comment period. But after that 'final' comment period, it might be advisable to go directly to the chartering organizations for formal approval. And if they reject it, then we could go back to the drawing board. Otherwise we could tweak and comment forever. avri On 05-Oct-15 15:04, Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva wrote:
Dear Kavouss,
Thank you for your comment.
Despite the fact that the CCWG is refining its recommendations in the light of the comments received and of the discussions in Los Angeles, in my email I wanted simply to remind that the GAC had supported a previous CCWG recommendation by consensus and that any change to that would need to be revisited in order to have a formal GAC position on it.
Moreover, given the suggestion of some colleagues (made last week), I wanted to emphasize the principle that it is up to each stakeholder - including the GAC - to determine its involvement in the proposed accountability mechanisms.
In the light of the recent email exchange in the CCWG-Accountability list, I thought it was important to recall these two points.
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
-----Mensagem original----- De: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Enviada em: segunda-feira, 5 de outubro de 2015 15:42 Para: Greg Shatan; Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Cc: Seun Ojedeji; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Pedro, What you said is exactly what I replied to Jorge few weeks ago . Now the situation is changed Ir might be good to retain the rights of ACs as consensus advice which would be effective if it is in favour of or against of an outcome. What you are describing is something that was prevail about one month ago. The situation is rapidly changing/ developing and we need to adjust ourselev to the prevailing coircumstances . Regards Kavouss
2015-10-05 18:16 GMT+02:00 Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com>:
Seun,
No, I do not think that this suggestion gives an elevated or special status to any one SO/AC. At least, it doesn't have to. It all depends on how the input from that SO/AC is handled in relation to the input from other SO/ACs. Some care must be taken to provide an equal level of influence on the outcome, whether the view is expressed as advice or a vote.
I'm not sure why you say "there is no intention to address the fundamental issue." What do you believe that "fundamental issue" is? You do not favor the membership model, so I assume you mean considering whether to discard the membership model in favor of the Board's model. I see active discussion of that very point on this board. At the same time, it's also highly appropriate to consider ways in which the member model can be improved in response to the Public Comments (including the Board's comments). Isn't that what the public comment analysis is for?
Greg
On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 7:26 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
.... And you think that suggestion does not give an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC.
It is my hope that this is not a consensus call we are making here so I think I will try to pause from writing for now as it seem there is no intention to address the fundamental issue but we are instead plastering the house wall even though the foundation architecture is still being fundamentally disagreed upon.
Regards
Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 2 Oct 2015 22:57, "Greg Shatan" <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I think this is a reasonable suggestion. A "one-size-fits-all" (or don't wear it) approach was not really working for us. The SO/ACs may be equal (though some would argue otherwise) but they are not identical, and a system that accounts for those differences, without giving an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC, would seem to be warranted.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 6:50 AM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote:
As a matter of principle I object to any group, including the GAC, having special status of any kind. It distorts the multi-stakeholder model. As a practical matter, this is a compromise solution that I could reluctantly accept. Compromise never feels good, but it is the only way to move things forward. Props to Keith for suggesting this and to my Danish colleague for agreeing to it.
Best,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
> On Oct 2, 2015, at 11:21 AM, Finn Petersen <FinPet@erst.dk> wrote: > > Keith > > Your suggestion that > > 1. The GAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. > 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. > > is indeed very balanced and constructive and something that DK fully can support! > > Best > > Finn > > > -----Oprindelig meddelelse----- > Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] På vegne af Drazek, Keith > Sendt: 30. september 2015 18:38 > Til: Kavouss Arasteh; James Gannon > Cc: Accountability Cross Community > Emne: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem > > In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions: > > 1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. > 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. > > This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community. > > Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this? > > That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation. > > Regards, > Keith > > > -----Original Message----- > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh > Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM > To: James Gannon > Cc: Accountability Cross Community > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem > > James > If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote: >> >> So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? >> Is this a GAC position or? >> >> -jg >> >> >> >> >>> On 30/09/2015 14:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Mike, >>> I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect >>> Cheers >>> Kavouss >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> You're welcome. >>>> They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Dear mike >>>>> Thank you for the message. >>>>> May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? >>>>> Tks >>>>> Cheers >>>>> Kavouss >>>>> >>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>> >>>>>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board. >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org >>>>>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On >>>>>> Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty >>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM >>>>>> To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community >>>>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can >>>>>> Do Anything!' problem >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: >>>>>>> *Here is a suggestion.* >>>>>>> * >>>>>>> * >>>>>>> *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >>>>>>> (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the >>>>>>> ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to >>>>>>> consensus to exercise them?* >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call. >>>>>> >>>>>> Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member. >>>>>> >>>>>> It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly. >>>>>> >>>>>> *For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report >>>>>> to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in >>>>>> the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the >>>>>> Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide >>>>>> advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as >>>>>> already defined.* >>>>>> >>>>>> It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, >>>>>> RSSAC and >>>>>> (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit. >>>>>> >>>>>> Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected. >>>>>> >>>>>> It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements. >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined. >>>>>> >>>>>> I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 <tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public >>>>>> Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet >>>>>> Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ >>>>>> >>>>>> London Internet Exchange Ltd >>>>>> 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY >>>>>> >>>>>> Company Registered in England No. 3137929 >>>>>> Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>>>> ty _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>>>> ty >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Agree that it merits further consideration. On 02/10/2015 22:56, Greg Shatan wrote:
I think this is a reasonable suggestion. A "one-size-fits-all" (or don't wear it) approach was not really working for us. The SO/ACs may be equal (though some would argue otherwise) but they are not identical, and a system that accounts for those differences, without giving an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC, would seem to be warranted.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 6:50 AM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>> wrote:
As a matter of principle I object to any group, including the GAC, having special status of any kind. It distorts the multi-stakeholder model. As a practical matter, this is a compromise solution that I could reluctantly accept. Compromise never feels good, but it is the only way to move things forward. Props to Keith for suggesting this and to my Danish colleague for agreeing to it.
Best,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
> On Oct 2, 2015, at 11:21 AM, Finn Petersen <FinPet@erst.dk <mailto:FinPet@erst.dk>> wrote: > > Keith > > Your suggestion that > > 1. The GAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. > 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. > > is indeed very balanced and constructive and something that DK fully can support! > > Best > > Finn > > > -----Oprindelig meddelelse----- > Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] På vegne af Drazek, Keith > Sendt: 30. september 2015 18:38 > Til: Kavouss Arasteh; James Gannon > Cc: Accountability Cross Community > Emne: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem > > In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions: > > 1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. > 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. > > This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community. > > Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this? > > That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation. > > Regards, > Keith > > > -----Original Message----- > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh > Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM > To: James Gannon > Cc: Accountability Cross Community > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem > > James > If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net <mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net>> wrote: >> >> So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? >> Is this a GAC position or? >> >> -jg >> >> >> >> >>> On 30/09/2015 14:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> >>> Mike, >>> I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect >>> Cheers >>> Kavouss >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com <mailto:mike.s.chartier@intel.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>> You're welcome. >>>> They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Dear mike >>>>> Thank you for the message. >>>>> May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? >>>>> Tks >>>>> Cheers >>>>> Kavouss >>>>> >>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>> >>>>>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com <mailto:mike.s.chartier@intel.com>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board. >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> >>>>>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On >>>>>> Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty >>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM >>>>>> To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community >>>>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can >>>>>> Do Anything!' problem >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: >>>>>>> *Here is a suggestion.* >>>>>>> * >>>>>>> * >>>>>>> *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >>>>>>> (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the >>>>>>> ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to >>>>>>> consensus to exercise them?* >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call. >>>>>> >>>>>> Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member. >>>>>> >>>>>> It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly. >>>>>> >>>>>> *For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report >>>>>> to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in >>>>>> the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the >>>>>> Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide >>>>>> advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as >>>>>> already defined.* >>>>>> >>>>>> It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, >>>>>> RSSAC and >>>>>> (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit. >>>>>> >>>>>> Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected. >>>>>> >>>>>> It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements. >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined. >>>>>> >>>>>> I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 <tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public >>>>>> Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet >>>>>> Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ >>>>>> >>>>>> London Internet Exchange Ltd >>>>>> 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY >>>>>> >>>>>> Company Registered in England No. 3137929 >>>>>> Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>>>> ty _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>>>> ty >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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-- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology mshears@cdt.org + 44 771 247 2987 --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus
Dear CCWG-Colleagues, I realize that this email chain has split into different parallel discussions about various subjects, but with respect to the suggestion of imposing on the ACs an advisory role, I think it is worth reminding that the GAC, after a long internal discussion, has submitted a consensus paper on the matter, in which it states that: - the "GAC has not determined whether to participate or not in the 'Community Mechanism' as a voting entity". - "However, the possibility that the GAC may, in the future and upon its sole decision, fully participate in the 'Community Mechanism' as an entity entitled to 5 votes (on equal terms with the Supporting Organizations - SOs - and the At Large Advisory Committee - ALAC) should be included in the Final report of the CCWG in line with what is contained in Section 6.2 of the CCWG 2nd Draft Proposal." - "In case the GAC were to decide in the future to participate as a voting entity it would follow its own processes and the procedure foreseen under Section 6.2 of the CCWG 2nd Draft Proposal, especially paragraphs 337 and following." That being said, I believe it is important that we abide by the principle that it is up to each stakeholder to determine its involvement in the proposed accountability mechanisms. Paragraph 6.2 of the 2nd Draft version of the CCWG-Accountability report respects this notion and that is why the Brazilian Government expressed support for it. Foreclosing the participation of any interested party in the new accountability structure is not only contrary to the aforementioned principle, but contradicts the very concept of "multistakeholderism". Furthermore, I think it is erroneous to think about the powers to be exercised by the Community Mechanism as a subset of the Board's power. They are simply different powers - different in essence-, such as it happens in states where the principles of "separation of powers" or "balance of power" are adopted. It is important to bear in mind that this CCWG has been elaborating its recommendations based on this "separation" model and it is quintessential to retain that in the upcoming phases of our work." Finally, I believe it is important to note that if changes are made to the recommendations in Section 6.2, it is difficult to foresee, solely based on the expression of individual GAC members/participants in the CCWG, what a consensus GAC position will be on this matter. It would obviously need to be revaluated by the whole GAC. Kind regards, Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 -----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Em nome de Matthew Shears Enviada em: sábado, 3 de outubro de 2015 06:32 Para: Greg Shatan; Edward Morris Cc: Accountability Cross Community Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Agree that it merits further consideration. On 02/10/2015 22:56, Greg Shatan wrote: I think this is a reasonable suggestion. A "one-size-fits-all" (or don't wear it) approach was not really working for us. The SO/ACs may be equal (though some would argue otherwise) but they are not identical, and a system that accounts for those differences, without giving an elevated (or "special") status to any one SO/AC, would seem to be warranted. Greg On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 6:50 AM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote: As a matter of principle I object to any group, including the GAC, having special status of any kind. It distorts the multi-stakeholder model. As a practical matter, this is a compromise solution that I could reluctantly accept. Compromise never feels good, but it is the only way to move things forward. Props to Keith for suggesting this and to my Danish colleague for agreeing to it. Best, Ed Morris Sent from my iPhone > On Oct 2, 2015, at 11:21 AM, Finn Petersen < <mailto:FinPet@erst.dk> FinPet@erst.dk> wrote: > > Keith > > Your suggestion that > > 1. The GAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. > 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. > > is indeed very balanced and constructive and something that DK fully can support! > > Best > > Finn > > > -----Oprindelig meddelelse----- > Fra: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] På vegne af Drazek, Keith > Sendt: 30. september 2015 18:38 > Til: Kavouss Arasteh; James Gannon > Cc: Accountability Cross Community > Emne: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem > > In my view, a balanced and constructive solution would be to blend James' and Kavouss' suggestions: > > 1. The GAC, SSAC and RSSAC remain advisory (no voting), but otherwise participate actively in the Single Member body/forum, etc. > 2. The GAC could also have special advisory status within the Single Member body/forum, etc. similar to that of its relationship to the Board. > > This would mirror the current structure, ensure full participation, and not erode the GAC's important role and function in the community. > > Might the GAC support this? Could the GAC formally propose this? > > That said, I'm not confident this would resolve the Board's concerns with membership, so we will need to consider all options available to deliver community empowerment, including variations of the sole designator implementation. > > Regards, > Keith > > > -----Original Message----- > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh > Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 10:59 AM > To: James Gannon > Cc: Accountability Cross Community > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem > > James > If really the community wishes to properly treat GAC, another type if GAC advice should be included in the Bylaws with the sane objectives as that of GAC advice to ICANN Kavouss > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On 30 Sep 2015, at 15:19, James Gannon < <mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net> james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote: >> >> So in order for the GAC to to happy to advise the SMCM there would need to be another GAC special advice bylaw, or am I misinterpreting? >> Is this a GAC position or? >> >> -jg >> >> >> >> >>> On 30/09/2015 14:06, " <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Kavouss Arasteh" < <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Mike, >>> I an sorry to say that your analysis of the GAC Advice to the community to be similar to the GAC Advice to the Board dies not seem to be legally valid since the latter has a specific implementation nature where the firmer has not since there Would be nothing in the future Bylaws to that effect >>> Cheers >>> Kavouss >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:59, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> You're welcome. >>>> They should not vote, they should just advise the single member the same way they advise the board. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Dear mike >>>>> Thank you for the message. >>>>> May you please provide legal arguments why an AC should be pushed to vote.? >>>>> Tks >>>>> Cheers >>>>> Kavouss >>>>> >>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>> >>>>>> On 30 Sep 2015, at 14:02, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I think Malcolm has it exactly right. The powers that the Single Member would be exercising are a subset of the Board's today. So the the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC should participate in the Single Member as they do on the Board. >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org >>>>>> [mailto: <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On >>>>>> Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty >>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 5:04 AM >>>>>> To: Jordan Carter; Accountability Cross Community >>>>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can >>>>>> Do Anything!' problem >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote: >>>>>>> *Here is a suggestion.* >>>>>>> * >>>>>>> * >>>>>>> *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have >>>>>>> (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the >>>>>>> ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to >>>>>>> consensus to exercise them?* >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call. >>>>>> >>>>>> Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member. >>>>>> >>>>>> It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly. >>>>>> >>>>>> *For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report >>>>>> to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in >>>>>> the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the >>>>>> Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide >>>>>> advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as >>>>>> already defined.* >>>>>> >>>>>> It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, >>>>>> RSSAC and >>>>>> (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit. >>>>>> >>>>>> Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected. >>>>>> >>>>>> It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements. >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined. >>>>>> >>>>>> I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 <tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public >>>>>> Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet >>>>>> Exchange | <http://publicaffairs.linx.net/> http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ >>>>>> >>>>>> London Internet Exchange Ltd >>>>>> 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY >>>>>> >>>>>> Company Registered in England No. 3137929 >>>>>> Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>>>> ty _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>>>> ty >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology mshears@cdt.org + 44 771 247 2987 ________________________________ Avast logo <https://www.avast.com/antivirus> This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. www.avast.com <https://www.avast.com/antivirus>
Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 30 Sep 2015 10:04, "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote:
*Here is a suggestion.* * *
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
SO: Interesting that you think what you've proposed above ensures exercise of power by the entire community. So GAC et all should continue talking under the community forum while other part of the community continue to use the power to direct ICANN through their votes under the same community forum. That's interesting way to ensure capture. We just have to balance up accountability on both sides of the community by going the sole designator route and ensuring that NO community power will be exercised by a section of the community! Even though that would not have been my preference on a normal day but it can be a compromise that one can live with. Regards
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
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Regardless of the structure we end up with, we are still going to have deal with the issue of providing an opportunity for all of the SO/AC's to engage (on terms suitable to that SO/AC) in the decision-making process (whatever that process may be). Our structure and method should be designed for total participation. If any group abstains or opts out of a specific decision opportunity, that is fine. But a seat at the (virtual) table and the ability to participate should be our goal. Greg On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 9:57 AM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 30 Sep 2015 10:04, "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote:
*Here is a suggestion.* * *
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
SO: Interesting that you think what you've proposed above ensures exercise of power by the entire community. So GAC et all should continue talking under the community forum while other part of the community continue to use the power to direct ICANN through their votes under the same community forum. That's interesting way to ensure capture.
We just have to balance up accountability on both sides of the community by going the sole designator route and ensuring that NO community power will be exercised by a section of the community! Even though that would not have been my preference on a normal day but it can be a compromise that one can live with.
Regards
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
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I agree with your analysis Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Sep 2015, at 16:35, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
Regardless of the structure we end up with, we are still going to have deal with the issue of providing an opportunity for all of the SO/AC's to engage (on terms suitable to that SO/AC) in the decision-making process (whatever that process may be). Our structure and method should be designed for total participation. If any group abstains or opts out of a specific decision opportunity, that is fine. But a seat at the (virtual) table and the ability to participate should be our goal.
Greg
On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 9:57 AM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote: Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 30 Sep 2015 10:04, "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote:
*Here is a suggestion.* * *
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
SO: Interesting that you think what you've proposed above ensures exercise of power by the entire community. So GAC et all should continue talking under the community forum while other part of the community continue to use the power to direct ICANN through their votes under the same community forum. That's interesting way to ensure capture.
We just have to balance up accountability on both sides of the community by going the sole designator route and ensuring that NO community power will be exercised by a section of the community! Even though that would not have been my preference on a normal day but it can be a compromise that one can live with.
Regards
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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I support Malcolm's suggestion that we explore this alteration of the model to reflect the current "board model" in which GAC, SSAC, and RSAC provide advice, but will not vote in the community mechanism. This could be reasonable path to the resolution of one of the key outstanding issues in our report. Thanks, Robin On Sep 30, 2015, at 2:03 AM, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 30/09/2015 01:15, Jordan Carter wrote:
*Here is a suggestion.* * * *For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
Thank you Jordan, that's a very interesting suggestion.
Let me suggest another, along similar lines, that occurred to me on last night's call.
Fadi said that he would be very happy for the Single Member to have the ultimate power in ICANN if it reflected the entire community, but was concerned about "concentrating power" in it as it did not reflect the whole community, as some parts of the community had said they could not participate in the Single Member.
It is possible Fadi misspoke. Perhaps he was not really offering a reason for objecting to our proposal, but was simply trotting out a debating point to cover his fundamental opposition to giving up power. I know some here will suspect him of such intransigence, and counsel that the only way forward is for us to bend to the Board's will. But I think it is better, and more productive, not to mention more respectful, to treat Fadi as sincere, and to address his stated concern directly.
*For that reason, I would like to propose that we amend our Report to state explicitly that GAC, RSSAC and SSAC will participate in the Single Member in an advisory capacity, as they do on the Board. The mechanism and procedure for these bodies to provide advice to the Single Member will be the Community Forum, as already defined.*
It now strikes me that we may have erred in saying that SSAC, RSSAC and (possibly) GAC would/might not participate in the Single Member. The only thing in which they may not participate is the vote that directs how the Single Member acts. It is entirely possible for them participate fully in the deliberations the Single Member undertakes prior to taking a decision, giving their advice as they see fit.
Of course, I understand that we never intended to exclude these bodies from giving their advice in the Community Forum. In the "reality" of our intentions, the change I propose is no change at all. On the other hand, Fadi expressly stated that he saw the non-participation of the bodies in the Single Member as a real problem. In choosing to express ourselves as saying that these bodies are unable to participate in the Single Member we have invited that criticism; an outcome that can be readily corrected.
It should be noted that this would exactly mirror the current position of these bodies on the Board: they participate in the Board by means of giving advice, but do not participate in votes. So it would be no more true to say that what I propose does not count as real participation in the Single Member than that it would be true to say that they do not participate in the current governance arrangements.
Perhaps this will resolve it. If not, if the Board say that "non-voting is not sufficient, they must be voting too for the SMM to reflect the whole community", then they must explain why they apply a different standard to the SMM than to the Board. I think they would find hard to justify to the community, to NTIA, to Congress that they were withholding their support for a community proposal that would mirror their own makeup, on the grounds that the require voting power to be given to entities that have been offered it and declined.
I understand that there may be further, separate objections. But if we are to find a way forward, we must consider each of them. If this is one that can be crossed off the list, I would count that as progress.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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participants (28)
-
Aikman-Scalese, Anne -
Alan Greenberg -
Arun Sukumar -
Avri Doria -
Bruce Tonkin -
Carlos Raul -
Chartier, Mike S -
Drazek, Keith -
Edward Morris -
farzaneh badii -
Finn Petersen -
Greg Shatan -
James Gannon -
Jordan Carter -
Jorge.Cancio＠bakom.admin.ch -
Kavouss Arasteh -
Kieren McCarthy -
Malcolm Hutty -
Mark Carvell -
Matthew Shears -
Nigel Roberts -
Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva -
Robin Gross -
Rubens Kuhl -
Rudolph Daniel -
Seun Ojedeji -
Steve DelBianco -
Tapani Tarvainen