It is neither impressive nor unprecedented and hence rather not unexpected. I am in fact on record with some of my colleagues (reading this) before the start of the deliberations that (something like) this would happen. I however would put any blame squarely on our inept Co-Chairs, who have put the CCWG into a poor negotiation position instead of developing a proposal that has "room". Fortunately it doesn't affect me much as there is nothing in the proposals for ccTLD Managers, and as such I refuse to be bound by any of it anyway, never mind the fundamental question touched on by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Alberta), what it is we are dealing with. greetings, el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini

On Sep 5, 2015, at 07:17, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

...

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable

While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

...

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote: Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>, notes around 10 points <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

One of the main reasons we got to where we are (had to create a CCWG Accountability at all), is because for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last. It is precisely this kind of "operationalism" that the community seeks to curb in the CCWG report, so for the board to fail to see this, and come at us with the Jones Day wish list for retaining control is rather astonishing. It is time the board wrapped its mind around the fact that times *are* changing at ICANN, and efforts to stop that reform will not help the board achieve the kind of legitimacy to govern that ICANN so desperately needs. Robin On Sep 5, 2015, at 6:46 AM, Paul Rosenzweig wrote:

I agree with Avri completely. And I, for one, do not want the transition badly enough that I would capitulate to the Board's effort to completely distort the proposed process. Candidly, I find it challenging to respond to this blog post as it seems to so manifestly confuse ends and means and to treat the question of means as trivial.

I am delighted that the Board professes to share our end goal of accountability. But characterizing its disagreement over how to achieve that as merely technical is, with due respect, sophistry. Everyone supports world peace - but there is a world of difference between those who think it may be achieved through military deterrence and those who think it should be accomplished through diplomacy.

The difference in proposed means could not be more stark. The CCWG views the Single Member as a way of the community exercising direct control over the Board, with the IRP (and courts in California) as rare, infrequent backups to that relationship and with the community as the entity that has pre-eminence. I support that vision.

The Board's proposal sees the IRP and courts as the resolvers of dispute with the Board retaining its preeminent position and the community reduced to an (as yet ill defined) role as complainant. Anyone who has ever done litigation knows that being the supplicant makes you subservient - and that is the position the Board's proposal would put the community in. The difference is not quite as stark as the one between realpolitik and diplomacy, but it is both substantial and transformative. Any effort to paint agreement on the "ends" as "really near complete agreement" on the whole of the transition is misleading.

I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is precisely why it must.

Paul

Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066

-----Original Message----- From: Avri Doria [mailto:avri@acm.org] Sent: Saturday, September 5, 2015 2:17 AM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile

Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

...

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable

While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

...

Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mil e#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last- mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-la st-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the -last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through- the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-throu gh-the-last-mile#>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Sep tember/005160.html>, notes around 10 points <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Sep tember/005161.html>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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@Paul +1 Furthermore, we are locked into a purely vertical approach to the balance of power. It is my view that in absence of the special role of the USG, we have to move on and also take a horizontal approach (Checks and balances) between the public interest and the business realities of the DNS after the new GTLD developments. And it is precisely there where a 2 layered approach to Corporate oversight has been a model well developed in the norther European countries Policy Development & Compliance (Public Interest) Operations (Security, Stability and Internet GROWTH) Community Oversight: Advisory Board (SOs/ACs) Different representation models GNSO Contract Compliance Operations oversight: Executive Board NomCom elected Board members IANA Functions GDD Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez _____________________ email: crg@isoc-cr.org Skype: carlos.raulg +506 8837 7173 (cel) +506 4000 2000 (home) +506 2290 3678 (fax) _____________________ Apartado 1571-1000 San Jose, COSTA RICA

On Sep 5, 2015, at 7:46 AM, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:

I agree with Avri completely. And I, for one, do not want the transition badly enough that I would capitulate to the Board's effort to completely distort the proposed process. Candidly, I find it challenging to respond to this blog post as it seems to so manifestly confuse ends and means and to treat the question of means as trivial.

I am delighted that the Board professes to share our end goal of accountability. But characterizing its disagreement over how to achieve that as merely technical is, with due respect, sophistry. Everyone supports world peace - but there is a world of difference between those who think it may be achieved through military deterrence and those who think it should be accomplished through diplomacy.

The difference in proposed means could not be more stark. The CCWG views the Single Member as a way of the community exercising direct control over the Board, with the IRP (and courts in California) as rare, infrequent backups to that relationship and with the community as the entity that has pre-eminence. I support that vision.

The Board's proposal sees the IRP and courts as the resolvers of dispute with the Board retaining its preeminent position and the community reduced to an (as yet ill defined) role as complainant. Anyone who has ever done litigation knows that being the supplicant makes you subservient - and that is the position the Board's proposal would put the community in. The difference is not quite as stark as the one between realpolitik and diplomacy, but it is both substantial and transformative. Any effort to paint agreement on the "ends" as "really near complete agreement" on the whole of the transition is misleading.

I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is precisely why it must.

Paul

Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066

-----Original Message----- From: Avri Doria [mailto:avri@acm.org] Sent: Saturday, September 5, 2015 2:17 AM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile

Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

...

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable

While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

...

Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mil e#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last- mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-la st-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the -last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through- the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-throu gh-the-last-mile#>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Sep tember/005160.html>, notes around 10 points <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Sep tember/005161.html>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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Jordan, all, I do not support Jordan’s assessment as copied below at all. In fact, I consider it to be completely uncalled for, unfounded, offensive and as such far less constructive (or: far more destructive) than any reaction we have received from the board and ICANN staff so far. This is a fine example of the things that truly frustrate me in this process, not the many and seemingly endless calls at unholy hours. And, by the way, I do not like being lectured by “experts" Roelof Meijer From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Date: maandag 7 september 2015 00:51 To: Carlos Gutierrez <crg@isoc-cr.org<mailto:crg@isoc-cr.org>> Cc: "avri@acm.org<mailto:avri@acm.org> (avri@acm.org<mailto:avri@acm.org>)" <avri@acm.org<mailto:avri@acm.org>>, Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a very natural human reaction.

Hi Avri, it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust? What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: • Community empowerment (Agreeement) • Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications) • Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement) • Operational Plan (Agreement) • Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions) • Enforceability (Agreement) • IRP (Agreement) • Ombudsman (Agreement) We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model. For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision. This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York. The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects. I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions. The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing. It is not yet ready for adoption. It needs a lot of more work. There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos. My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable. My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this “WS 3” and “ICANN 2020”. And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps. More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on. And here is a final observation. To put it – like Greg – as a conflict as “Board on Top” vs. “Community on Top” is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system. Wolfgang -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile Hi, The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive. I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely. Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable

While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail. I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward. We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully. avri On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>, notes around 10 points <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

--- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

Hi Parminder, here is a proposal: Please come in. This is not a "revolving door", this is an "open door". Wolfgang -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org im Auftrag von parminder Gesendet: Mo 07.09.2015 12:16 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile "And here is a final observation. To put it - like Greg - as a conflict as "Board on Top" vs. "Community on Top" is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system. " (Wolfgang) This is the only part in which I agree with Wofgang, the people inside the ICANN and those outside who are supposed to exercise "community power" (though the boundaries of what is claimed to be ICANN is never clear to me - with all this business of ICANN community and stuff) constitute a single group, as you say all 'sitting in the same boat', with very well-greased revolving doors between them. It is the people outside the boat - with its connotation of floating or sinking together, those standing on the shore who need to have the oversight over ICANN, not the insiders just trying to balance their mutual powers as is happening currently . It is for this reason that the IANA transition fails on the the most important political imperative in the current context whereby key technical functions need to be accountable to the global public. It even fails the key NTIA criterion of transition of oversight to 'global multistakeholder community'. No one has explained to me how is this narrow community coexistent with the global public or global multistakeholder community, and thereby how is the NTIA creteria met. Just Net Coalition has therefore rejected both the outcome and the process of the IANA transition proposals as per below submissions to the public comments process... https://comments.ianacg.org/pdf/submission/submission19.pdf https://comments.ianacg.org/pdf/submission/submission18.pdf parminder On Monday 07 September 2015 01:52 PM, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:

Hi Avri,

it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?

What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: . Community empowerment (Agreeement) . Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications) . Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement) . Operational Plan (Agreement) . Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions) . Enforceability (Agreement) . IRP (Agreement) . Ombudsman (Agreement)

We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model. For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision.

This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York.

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects. I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing. It is not yet ready for adoption. It needs a lot of more work. There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.

My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable.

My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this "WS 3" and "ICANN 2020". And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.

More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on.

And here is a final observation. To put it - like Greg - as a conflict as "Board on Top" vs. "Community on Top" is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.

Wolfgang

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile

Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

...

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

...

Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>, notes around 10 points <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

--- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

Parminder, You are part of this "narrow community".... Greg On Mon, Sep 7, 2015 at 6:16 AM, parminder <parminder@itforchange.net> wrote:

"And here is a final observation. To put it – like Greg – as a conflict as “Board on Top” vs. “Community on Top” is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system. " (Wolfgang)

This is the only part in which I agree with Wofgang, the people inside the ICANN and those outside who are supposed to exercise "community power" (though the boundaries of what is claimed to be ICANN is never clear to me - with all this business of ICANN community and stuff) constitute a single group, as you say all 'sitting in the same boat', with very well-greased revolving doors between them. It is the people outside the boat - with its connotation of floating or sinking together, those standing on the shore who need to have the oversight over ICANN, not the insiders just trying to balance their mutual powers as is happening currently . It is for this reason that the IANA transition fails on the the most important political imperative in the current context whereby key technical functions need to be accountable to the global public. It even fails the key NTIA criterion of transition of oversight to 'global multistakeholder community'. No one has explained to me how is this narrow community coexistent with the global public or global multistakeholder community, and thereby how is the NTIA creteria met.

Just Net Coalition has therefore rejected both the outcome and the process of the IANA transition proposals as per below submissions to the public comments process...

https://comments.ianacg.org/pdf/submission/submission19.pdf

https://comments.ianacg.org/pdf/submission/submission18.pdf

parminder

On Monday 07 September 2015 01:52 PM, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:

Hi Avri,

it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?

What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: • Community empowerment (Agreeement) • Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications) • Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement) • Operational Plan (Agreement) • Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions) • Enforceability (Agreement) • IRP (Agreement) • Ombudsman (Agreement)

We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model. For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision.

This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York.

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects. I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing. It is not yet ready for adoption. It needs a lot of more work. There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.

My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable.

My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this “WS 3” and “ICANN 2020”. And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.

More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on.

And here is a final observation. To put it – like Greg – as a conflict as “Board on Top” vs. “Community on Top” is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.

Wolfgang

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile

Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable

While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

Working Together Through The Last Mile <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981> <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316> <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...> <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>, notes around 10 points<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...> <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing listAccountability-Cross-Community@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

--- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.https://www.avast.com/antivirus

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing listAccountability-Cross-Community@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing listAccountability-Cross-Community@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

Hello Malcolm, "because we understand that the community is not happy with the current situation we would suggest that we roll back the modification of the standard of review to where it was before 2013, and that there is a commitment that the revised standard of review standing panel and procedural improvements will be part of the next phase of work on the IRP enhancements."

...

Reverting to 2013 rules and the promising to come back and look at it later, after transition is not at all what we proposed. So I don't think we do have agreement yet.

Yes - We are working on a set of comments that addresses each section of the CCWG proposal to make our position clear. There is still quite a wide range of views amongst the Board and staff on some items in the CCWG proposal - so some of the vagueness in replies is because there is not clarity yet within the Board on some items. Hopefully that will emerge in a day or so. Speaking personally - my perspective is most of what is in the CCWG proposal for workstream 1 is fine by me with respect to the IRP. I think the exact rules of procedure need some refinement - so our statement that we can at least roll back the most recent change was simply to gain some time to work on those rules - I am thinking a 3 months for a focussed group not years.

...

Perhaps when we use the word "enforceability" we simply mean different things?

...

When I talk about a decision that is enforceable against ICANN, I mean one which ICANN has to comply with. In the final analysis, that would mean the ability to go to court and get an order.

Yes - I think the Board shares that understanding as well. We are advised that there is an alternative to the sole member model - once the details are available the CCWG and Board members can form their own view.

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects. I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

...

If that is the limit of your problems with the Sole Membership Model, there is scope for dialogue and collaborative working.

Speaking personally - if the model being proposed by the ICAMNN legal team is not viable - then I also agree that the sole member model could be refined to deal with some of the concerns that have been raised. As has been noted - there is no legal issue with the sole member model, it is a matter of how the balance of power is implemented in the model - particularly between Governments, industry and civil society. .

...

In many important respects the Board is wholly unaccountable. That is not intended as a personal slight; it is an assessment of the current structure.

I don't think that is true. I agree that you can make it more accountable - but I disagree that it is unaccountable. For example, the community elects/appoints Board members - for fixed three year terms. In any given year - 1/3 of the Board can be changed, and in two years, 2/3 of the Board can be changed. A new Board presumably can change back anything that the community does like. The Board also is legally accountable for managing the organization in accordance with the law. Directors can feel the full force of the law, and have personally legal liability in this regard. Just some examples - I fully accept the need for more accountability - as does the whole board. I am just reacting to blanket statements that I don't believe are correct. I assume the current accountability for SO and AC leaders is much the same. Ie many have fixed appointments and go through some form of election/selection process. So if the Board is so unaccountable - doesn't the same apply to everyone else as well? All the proposals seem to rely on decisions made by SO and ACs that consist of the same sort of people that make up the Board. Regards, Bruce Tonkin

Great response Bruce, thanks for the open mindedness in all your engagement with this group. Speaking as a participant of this working group, who did not commit as much working hours like others, I can imagine how painful it can be to be hearing something quite contrary to membership route at this stage. However, it is my hope that the WG will have an open mind towards this as well, just as Bruce said, the board legal seem to have found a way around this so let's hear it and weigh the options. There is no doubt in me that even the strong supporters of the sole member model knows there are a number of loose end that is yet to be tightened in that model, while some critical ones may never get a fitting bolt at this pace. Hopefully board is expediting it's process in producing more details on its proposal in a timely fashion. I like the last paragraph of Bruce response; we need to recognise that one way or the other a group of people ultimately makes the decision(including within the SO/AC). There is existing community vs board mindset, as fun as it could be, I fear that is not helping much in this process. Regards Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 7 Sep 2015 23:48, "Bruce Tonkin" <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:

Hello Malcolm,

"because we understand that the community is not happy with the current situation we would suggest that we roll back the modification of the standard of review to where it was before 2013, and that there is a commitment that the revised standard of review standing panel and procedural improvements will be part of the next phase of work on the IRP enhancements."

...

...

Reverting to 2013 rules and the promising to come back and look at it later, after transition is not at all what we proposed. So I don't think we do have agreement yet.

Yes - We are working on a set of comments that addresses each section of the CCWG proposal to make our position clear. There is still quite a wide range of views amongst the Board and staff on some items in the CCWG proposal - so some of the vagueness in replies is because there is not clarity yet within the Board on some items. Hopefully that will emerge in a day or so.

Speaking personally - my perspective is most of what is in the CCWG proposal for workstream 1 is fine by me with respect to the IRP. I think the exact rules of procedure need some refinement - so our statement that we can at least roll back the most recent change was simply to gain some time to work on those rules - I am thinking a 3 months for a focussed group not years.

...

...

Perhaps when we use the word "enforceability" we simply mean different things?

...

...

When I talk about a decision that is enforceable against ICANN, I mean one which ICANN has to comply with. In the final analysis, that would mean the ability to go to court and get an order.

Yes - I think the Board shares that understanding as well. We are advised that there is an alternative to the sole member model - once the details are available the CCWG and Board members can form their own view.

...

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects. I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

...

...

If that is the limit of your problems with the Sole Membership Model, there is scope for dialogue and collaborative working.

Speaking personally - if the model being proposed by the ICAMNN legal team is not viable - then I also agree that the sole member model could be refined to deal with some of the concerns that have been raised. As has been noted - there is no legal issue with the sole member model, it is a matter of how the balance of power is implemented in the model - particularly between Governments, industry and civil society. .

...

...

In many important respects the Board is wholly unaccountable. That is not intended as a personal slight; it is an assessment of the current structure.

I don't think that is true. I agree that you can make it more accountable - but I disagree that it is unaccountable.

For example, the community elects/appoints Board members - for fixed three year terms. In any given year - 1/3 of the Board can be changed, and in two years, 2/3 of the Board can be changed. A new Board presumably can change back anything that the community does like.

The Board also is legally accountable for managing the organization in accordance with the law. Directors can feel the full force of the law, and have personally legal liability in this regard.

Just some examples - I fully accept the need for more accountability - as does the whole board. I am just reacting to blanket statements that I don't believe are correct.

I assume the current accountability for SO and AC leaders is much the same. Ie many have fixed appointments and go through some form of election/selection process. So if the Board is so unaccountable - doesn't the same apply to everyone else as well? All the proposals seem to rely on decisions made by SO and ACs that consist of the same sort of people that make up the Board.

Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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+1 David W. Maher Senior Vice President ­ Law & Policy Public Interest Registry 312 375 4849 On 9/7/15 11:20 AM, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Phil Corwin" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of psc@vlaw-dc.com> wrote:

Wolfgang:

With all respect, you say, " For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement... We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model". But that seriously overstates the present degree of agreement, especially at the granular level.

Because when I read Chairman Crocker's "Last Mile" blog I read, " We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal... We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way... Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized."

So it is clear from those words that at present there is not just remaining disagreement on the Sole Membership Model but operational gaps on all eight key concepts listed in the blog post, with details yet to be provided on the Board's ideas on bridging the gap. And the devil will be in those details.

Going further, while the Board has yet to articulate which of the critiques and counterproposals contained in the Jones Day analysis it agrees with, those 42 pages add up to a broad prescription of "dilute and defer" on almost every point contained in the CCWG proposal.

Of course we all await the Board's detailed suggestions, as well its reasons for believing that "the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable", and that key elements of the CCWG proposal will lead to instability and capture. The CCWG will undoubtedly evaluate them in objective good faith, just as it will weight all the other input that the community will be submitting between now and September 12th.

While the Board's input must be given serious consideration, the question arises as to whether its views should be accorded more or less weight than that of other stakeholders. Some may say that it is entitled to more because these are the people selected to oversee ICANN the corporation and charged with its best interests; and that as a political reality the US is unlikely to accept a proposal from which the Board broadly dissents. Others might reply that it is entitled to less weight because the accountability plan is all about making ICANN the corporation, including its Board, more accountable to the community -- and the Board's response, to the extent we can presently discern, is based upon the same general critique that Jones Day has supplied with regularity for a decade and a half. Given all the Board's concern about "untested" proposals, we must keep in mind that the present model has been tested since ICANN's inception and has been found in need of significant revamping by a majority of the community acting within the CCWG, and that there is broad agreement that key elements of this revamping must be agreed upon and implemented before the IANA stewardship transition can be allowed to proceed. Let's also not forget that it is the multistakeholder community that has produced the accountability plan, and this entire transition exercise is in supposed defense and perpetuation of that the much vaunted MSM.

Whatever weight the CCWG accords to the Board's detailed input once it is received, the remaining issue is whether to accept the Board's suggestion of a late September F2F in LA. You assert that " the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members". I would submit that any such intensification should await careful analysis of all the comments filed on the CCWG proposal, not only that submitted by the Board. It is doubtful that such input can be fully assimilated and a constructive meeting blueprint can be assembled between September 12th and the final week of September -- and any further postponement would bring the F2F dialogue so close to Dublin that it would be best to have it there, especially considering the time and travel burden on CCWG members already stretched thin.

Further, I have yet to see an answer on how an LA F2F meeting could be successfully integrated into the normal process for a WG's consideration of all comments, especially when the comments on the CCWG proposal can be expected to be voluminous in both number and content. There is substantial danger that an ad hoc LA meeting will be perceived as, if not become, a bilateral negotiation between the CCWG and Board. Bruce Tonkin has suggested, in response to my original airing of these concerns, that other ICANN internal entities can present as well, but this may be a distinction without a difference as all those entities are already actively participating within the CCWG. Indeed, the very proposal that the Board is critiquing represents the consensus among those groups after taking under advisement all comments received on the original proposal, as well as the expert and independent legal advice of the Sidley and Adler law firms. I do not see any way that a F2F meeting in the near term could do anything but elevate the Board's feedback over that of all other parties submitting comments on the proposal.

There is also a danger that an LA F2F will be perceived as a "Summit" meeting, and that it will be a Summit set up for failure. In the world of diplomacy Summits that seek to hammer out agreements are nearly always failures, whereas the successful Summits are those that are held to ratify agreements already reached in quiet back rooms over substantial time. It is extremely doubtful that the foundation for a successful Summit -- one that agrees at least on clear principles for resolving a narrow remaining list of issues, if not on a final agreement itself -- can be laid in the two weeks between the comment period close and any meeting in LA. We all saw on Wednesday evening how a lack of adequate preparation can lead to undesirable and counterproductive confusion and discord. The results of a premature F2F in LA could be substantially worse if it results in a sharpening rather than a narrowing of differences between the Board and CCWG, and that is likely to happen if the basis for resolving remaining differences has not been achieved in advance. Driving the process forward based upon self-imposed and artificial deadlines could result in a train wreck.

Thus, my own view is that it would be best to shelve the idea of an LA F2F and use the time between September 12th and Dublin for careful analysis and quiet, constructive dialogue.

So let us all be honest that the areas of disagreement between the Board and CCWG are multiple and that no further progress can be made until the Board better articulates both its reasons for concern and its proposed operational details -- and that once that occurs its views must be measured within the context of the input submitted by all other stakeholder groups.

Thanks to all who have read this far, and with best regards, Philip

Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell

Twitter: @VlawDC

"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey

-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" Sent: Monday, September 07, 2015 4:22 AM To: avri@acm.org; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile

Hi Avri,

it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?

What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: . Community empowerment (Agreeement) . Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications) . Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement) . Operational Plan (Agreement) . Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions) . Enforceability (Agreement) . IRP (Agreement) . Ombudsman (Agreement)

We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model. For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision.

This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York.

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects. I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing. It is not yet ready for adoption. It needs a lot of more work. There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.

My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable.

My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this "WS 3" and "ICANN 2020". And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.

More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on.

And here is a final observation. To put it - like Greg - as a conflict as "Board on Top" vs. "Community on Top" is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.

Wolfgang

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile

Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

...

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable

While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

...

Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mil e#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last- mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-la st-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the -last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through- the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-throu gh-the-last-mile#>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Sep tember/005160.html>, notes around 10 points <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Sep tember/005161.html>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

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Avri has expressed my thoughts more clearly than I could after a number of attempted drafts, so I will express my +1 to everything Avri has said. -James On 7 Sep 2015, at 19:14, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org<mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote: Hi, First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board and I trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the best you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior motive of personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my trust of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a Board member would ever take a position just because it would help him get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board member would change her position due to a concern with being removed from the Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign from the Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and the Internet. My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from the Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes to become empowered, at leas to a degree. While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal. I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I think this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to the current impasse. Some inset comments below. On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote: Hi Avri, it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust? What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: • Community empowerment (Agreeement) I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe it is a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a lower extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by other, you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on some fundamental issues the community requires decision making empowerment. The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in any straightforward definition of the term.. • Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications) Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture on the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you fear us so? • Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement) Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a direct say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation. Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals. • Operational Plan (Agreement) • Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions) How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting was that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually based on fundamental disagreements. • Enforceability (Agreement) I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume that we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing could be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make going to court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not be necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG plan balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of the Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new participant in the checks and balances. • IRP (Agreement) Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called agreement. • Ombudsman (Agreement) We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model. Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other parts of the solution would work. For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision. The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was that ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community been making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG process. Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the implementation phase. This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York. If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I would be able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM and the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To me, this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a century* or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that. (*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little better) The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects. Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a good start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations sometimes get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that made the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2 recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the rainbow. As people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2 recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting." You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested is the current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending exuberance of the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate oversight somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free from government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the community, one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the SMCM in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a transition to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is something that the CWG proposal requires. I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions. In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want its structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in the ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major opportunity for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less chance there will be for capture and other shenanigans. The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing. I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope and functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an implementation detail. It is not yet ready for adoption. We disagree on this. It needs a lot of more work. We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact of an SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to claim, but its implementation modalities may be. There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos. I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the weaknesses of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will help us with that. My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable. Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in this system construction. Removing it requires going back to the beginning as it holds everything together. As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed at ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in it is redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP, ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this proposal. I have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN. My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this “WS 3” and “ICANN 2020”. And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps. Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed. but we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time, and leave the future to necessary tweaking. I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and then to WS3... More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on. I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the best example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is preferable, but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond the stumbling phase. As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.' For others it is much longer. But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for transition until we are ready. And here is a final observation. To put it – like Greg – as a conflict as “Board on Top” vs. “Community on Top” is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system. The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is real mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the community does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of the community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed by the Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored by a pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to capture and game. Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the Board another part of the community while not representing the community. For a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can check and balance the Board's unilateral power. The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as the best solution for replacing NTIA oversight. avri Wolfgang -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile Hi, The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive. I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely. Additionally, I do not understand this statement: where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail. I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward. We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully. avri On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote: Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile Working Together Through The Last Mile <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition. */We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./* As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example: * Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws. We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances. Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences. During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>, notes around 10 points <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details. It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

+1 David W. Maher Senior Vice President ­ Law & Policy Public Interest Registry 312 375 4849 On 9/7/15 1:14 PM, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board and I trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the best you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior motive of personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my trust of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a Board member would ever take a position just because it would help him get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board member would change her position due to a concern with being removed from the Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign from the Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and the Internet.

My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from the Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes to become empowered, at leas to a degree.

While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal.

I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I think this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to the current impasse.

Some inset comments below.

On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:

...

Hi Avri,

it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?

What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: € Community empowerment (Agreeement)

I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe it is a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a lower extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by other, you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on some fundamental issues the community requires decision making empowerment. The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in any straightforward definition of the term..

...

€ Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)

Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture on the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you fear us so?

...

€ Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)

Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a direct say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation. Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.

...

€ Operational Plan (Agreement) € Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)

How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting was that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually based on fundamental disagreements.

...

€ Enforceability (Agreement)

I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume that we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing could be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make going to court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not be necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG plan balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of the Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new participant in the checks and balances.

...

€ IRP (Agreement)

Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called agreement.

...

€ Ombudsman (Agreement)

We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.

Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other parts of the solution would work.

...

For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision.

The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was that ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community been making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG process. Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the implementation phase.

...

This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York.

If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I would be able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM and the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To me, this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a century* or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.

(*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little better)

...

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.

Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a good start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations sometimes get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that made the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2 recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the rainbow. As people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2 recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."

You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested is the current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending exuberance of the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate oversight somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free from government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the community, one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the SMCM in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a transition to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is something that the CWG proposal requires.

...

I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want its structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in the ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major opportunity for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less chance there will be for capture and other shenanigans.

...

The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.

I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope and functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an implementation detail.

...

It is not yet ready for adoption.

We disagree on this.

...

It needs a lot of more work.

We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact of an SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to claim, but its implementation modalities may be.

...

There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.

I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the weaknesses of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will help us with that.

...

My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable.

Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in this system construction. Removing it requires going back to the beginning as it holds everything together.

As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed at ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in it is redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP, ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this proposal. I have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.

...

My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this ³WS 3² and ³ICANN 2020². And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.

Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed. but we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time, and leave the future to necessary tweaking.

I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and then to WS3...

...

More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on.

I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the best example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is preferable, but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond the stumbling phase.

As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.' For others it is much longer.

But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for transition until we are ready.

...

And here is a final observation. To put it ­ like Greg ­ as a conflict as ³Board on Top² vs. ³Community on Top² is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.

The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is real mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the community does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of the community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed by the Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored by a pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to capture and game.

Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the Board another part of the community while not representing the community. For a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can check and balance the Board's unilateral power.

The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as the best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.

avri

...

Wolfgang

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile

Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

...

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

...

Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#

...

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile #><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mi le#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last- mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-las t-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-l ast-mile#>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septe mber/005160.html>, notes around 10 points

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septe mber/005161.html>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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All, Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder. What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a “yes, perfect, let’s implement this straight away”? But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven’s sake, do we see the board as a unity of ill-doers? The board members that have participated in our work are individuals that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago. They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas. And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal sacrifice and join ICANN's board. In my opinion, there’s no collective single opinion in any wrong direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does not mean that we cannot have different opinions. When Steve Crocker writes: "We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements.” he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily receive, as he commits the board. Let’s await the promised details of their ideas and keep engaged. Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt? Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or heard: as in “while you say, …. I see…”, “when you say, … you mean.." "While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal." "I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check" "It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a very natural human reaction." "for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last" "When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice." "And I, for one, do not want the transition badly enough that I would capitulate to the Board's effort to completely distort the proposed process." "I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is precisely why it must." "The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive." "not surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again" Let’s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselves… Cheers, Roelof Meijer SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl<http://www.sidn.nl/> On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of avri@acm.org<mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote: Hi, First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board and I trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the best you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior motive of personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my trust of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a Board member would ever take a position just because it would help him get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board member would change her position due to a concern with being removed from the Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign from the Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and the Internet. My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from the Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes to become empowered, at leas to a degree. While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal. I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I think this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to the current impasse. Some inset comments below. On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote: Hi Avri, it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust? What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: • Community empowerment (Agreeement) I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe it is a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a lower extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by other, you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on some fundamental issues the community requires decision making empowerment. The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in any straightforward definition of the term.. • Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications) Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture on the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you fear us so? • Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement) Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a direct say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation. Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals. • Operational Plan (Agreement) • Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions) How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting was that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually based on fundamental disagreements. • Enforceability (Agreement) I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume that we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing could be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make going to court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not be necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG plan balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of the Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new participant in the checks and balances. • IRP (Agreement) Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called agreement. • Ombudsman (Agreement) We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model. Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other parts of the solution would work. For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision. The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was that ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community been making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG process. Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the implementation phase. This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York. If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I would be able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM and the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To me, this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a century* or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that. (*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little better) The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects. Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a good start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations sometimes get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that made the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2 recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the rainbow. As people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2 recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting." You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested is the current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending exuberance of the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate oversight somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free from government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the community, one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the SMCM in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a transition to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is something that the CWG proposal requires. I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions. In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want its structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in the ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major opportunity for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less chance there will be for capture and other shenanigans. The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing. I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope and functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an implementation detail. It is not yet ready for adoption. We disagree on this. It needs a lot of more work. We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact of an SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to claim, but its implementation modalities may be. There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos. I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the weaknesses of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will help us with that. My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable. Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in this system construction. Removing it requires going back to the beginning as it holds everything together. As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed at ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in it is redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP, ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this proposal. I have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN. My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this “WS 3” and “ICANN 2020”. And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps. Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed. but we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time, and leave the future to necessary tweaking. I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and then to WS3... More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on. I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the best example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is preferable, but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond the stumbling phase. As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.' For others it is much longer. But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for transition until we are ready. And here is a final observation. To put it – like Greg – as a conflict as “Board on Top” vs. “Community on Top” is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system. The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is real mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the community does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of the community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed by the Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored by a pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to capture and game. Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the Board another part of the community while not representing the community. For a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can check and balance the Board's unilateral power. The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as the best solution for replacing NTIA oversight. avri Wolfgang -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile Hi, The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive. I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely. Additionally, I do not understand this statement: where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail. I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward. We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully. avri On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote: Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile Working Together Through The Last Mile <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition. */We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./* As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example: * Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws. We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances. Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences. During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>, notes around 10 points <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details. It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

Disagree, Nigel. It¹s not about the past, but rather an effort to future-proof the organization against individuals & groups we haven¹t event met yet. Thanks‹ J. On 9/8/15, 11:59 , "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Nigel Roberts" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:

Roelof

You are a smart guy. You are open and ready to trust. These are admirable qualities.

But ICANN, as a collective entity, to those of us who were there at its beginnings needs to continually prove it is worthy of trust.

Because back then, it wasn't.

And some of us remember.

On 08/09/15 17:53, Roelof Meijer wrote:

...

All,

Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder. What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a ³yes, perfect, let¹s implement this straight away²? But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven¹s sake, do we see the board as a unity of ill-doers?

The board members that have participated in our work are individuals that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago. They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas. And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal sacrifice and join ICANN's board.

In my opinion, there¹s no collective single opinion in any wrong direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does not mean that we cannot have different opinions.

When Steve Crocker writes:

/"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements.²/

he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily receive, as he commits the board. Let¹s await the promised details of their ideas and keep engaged. Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt? Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or heard: as in ³while you say, Š. I seeŠ², ³when you say, Š you mean.."

/"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I //see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the //keystone of the CCWG proposal."/

//

/"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the //bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"/

//

/"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a very natural human reaction."/

//

/"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last" /

//

/"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."/

//

/"And I, for one, do not want the transition //badly enough that I would capitulate to the Board's effort to completely //distort the proposed process."/

//

/"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is precisely //why it must."/

//

/"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just //operationalization is impressive."/

//

/"not surrender and let the Board have complete control //without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"/

Let¹s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselvesŠ

Cheers,

Roelof Meijer

SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl <http://www.sidn.nl/>

On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of avri@acm.org <mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote:

Hi,

First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board and I trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the best you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior motive of personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my trust of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a Board member would ever take a position just because it would help him get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board member would change her position due to a concern with being removed from the Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign from the Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and the Internet.

My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from the Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes to become empowered, at leas to a degree.

While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal.

I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I think this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to the current impasse.

Some inset comments below.

On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:

Hi Avri,

it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?

What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: €Community empowerment (Agreeement)

I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe it is a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a lower extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by other, you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on some fundamental issues the community requires decision making empowerment. The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in any straightforward definition of the term..

€Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)

Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture on the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you fear us so?

€Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)

Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a direct say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation. Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.

€Operational Plan (Agreement) €Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)

How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting was that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually based on fundamental disagreements.

€Enforceability (Agreement)

I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume that we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing could be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make going to court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not be necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG plan balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of the Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new participant in the checks and balances.

€IRP (Agreement)

Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called agreement.

€Ombudsman (Agreement)

We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.

Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other parts of the solution would work.

For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision.

The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was that ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community been making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG process. Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the implementation phase.

This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York.

If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I would be able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM and the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To me, this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a century* or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.

(*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little better)

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.

Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a good start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations sometimes get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that made the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2 recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the rainbow. As people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2 recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."

You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested is the current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending exuberance of the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate oversight somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free from government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the community, one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the SMCM in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a transition to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is something that the CWG proposal requires.

I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want its structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in the ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major opportunity for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less chance there will be for capture and other shenanigans.

The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.

I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope and functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an implementation detail.

It is not yet ready for adoption.

We disagree on this.

It needs a lot of more work.

We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact of an SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to claim, but its implementation modalities may be.

There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.

I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the weaknesses of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will help us with that.

My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable.

Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in this system construction. Removing it requires going back to the beginning as it holds everything together.

As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed at ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in it is redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP, ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this proposal. I have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.

My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this ³WS 3² and ³ICANN 2020². And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.

Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed. but we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time, and leave the future to necessary tweaking.

I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and then to WS3...

More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on.

I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the best example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is preferable, but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond the stumbling phase.

As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.' For others it is much longer.

But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for transition until we are ready.

And here is a final observation. To put it ­ like Greg ­ as a conflict as ³Board on Top² vs. ³Community on Top² is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.

The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is real mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the community does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of the community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed by the Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored by a pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to capture and game.

Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the Board another part of the community while not representing the community. For a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can check and balance the Board's unilateral power.

The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as the best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.

avri

Wolfgang

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable

While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

Original link:

https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#% 3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mi le#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-las t-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the -last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through -the-last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-thr ough-the-last-mile#>>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board

<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue

<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005160.html>, notes around 10 points

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005161.html>

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005161.html%3E>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>

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Hi, And I think it has more to do with establishing checks and balances that take into account the loss of the NTIA backstop/oversight. avri On 08-Sep-15 13:48, Jonathan Zuck wrote:

Exactly

On 9/8/15, 1:31 PM, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of James M. Bladel" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of jbladel@godaddy.com> wrote:

...

Disagree, Nigel. It¹s not about the past, but rather an effort to future-proof the organization against individuals & groups we haven¹t event met yet.

Thanks‹

J.

On 9/8/15, 11:59 , "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Nigel Roberts" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:

...

Roelof

You are a smart guy. You are open and ready to trust. These are admirable qualities.

But ICANN, as a collective entity, to those of us who were there at its beginnings needs to continually prove it is worthy of trust.

Because back then, it wasn't.

And some of us remember.

On 08/09/15 17:53, Roelof Meijer wrote:

...

All,

Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder. What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a ³yes, perfect, let¹s implement this straight away²? But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven¹s sake, do we see the board as a unity of ill-doers?

The board members that have participated in our work are individuals that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago. They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas. And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal sacrifice and join ICANN's board.

In my opinion, there¹s no collective single opinion in any wrong direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does not mean that we cannot have different opinions.

When Steve Crocker writes:

/"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements.²/

he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily receive, as he commits the board. Let¹s await the promised details of their ideas and keep engaged. Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt? Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or heard: as in ³while you say, Š. I seeŠ², ³when you say, Š you mean.."

/"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I //see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the //keystone of the CCWG proposal."/

//

/"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the //bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"/

//

/"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a very natural human reaction."/

//

/"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last" /

//

/"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."/

//

/"And I, for one, do not want the transition //badly enough that I would capitulate to the Board's effort to completely //distort the proposed process."/

//

/"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is precisely //why it must."/

//

/"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just //operationalization is impressive."/

//

/"not surrender and let the Board have complete control //without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"/

Let¹s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselvesŠ

Cheers,

Roelof Meijer

SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl <http://www.sidn.nl/>

On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of avri@acm.org <mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote:

Hi,

First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board and I trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the best you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior motive of personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my trust of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a Board member would ever take a position just because it would help him get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board member would change her position due to a concern with being removed from the Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign from the Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and the Internet.

My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from the Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes to become empowered, at leas to a degree.

While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal.

I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I think this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to the current impasse.

Some inset comments below.

On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:

Hi Avri,

it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?

What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: €Community empowerment (Agreeement)

I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe it is a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a lower extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by other, you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on some fundamental issues the community requires decision making empowerment. The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in any straightforward definition of the term..

€Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)

Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture on the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you fear us so?

€Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)

Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a direct say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation. Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.

€Operational Plan (Agreement) €Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)

How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting was that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually based on fundamental disagreements.

€Enforceability (Agreement)

I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume that we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing could be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make going to court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not be necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG plan balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of the Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new participant in the checks and balances.

€IRP (Agreement)

Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called agreement.

€Ombudsman (Agreement)

We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.

Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other parts of the solution would work.

For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision.

The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was that ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community been making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG process. Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the implementation phase.

This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York.

If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I would be able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM and the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To me, this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a century* or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.

(*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little better)

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.

Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a good start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations sometimes get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that made the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2 recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the rainbow. As people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2 recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."

You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested is the current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending exuberance of the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate oversight somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free from government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the community, one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the SMCM in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a transition to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is something that the CWG proposal requires.

I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want its structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in the ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major opportunity for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less chance there will be for capture and other shenanigans.

The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.

I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope and functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an implementation detail.

It is not yet ready for adoption.

We disagree on this.

It needs a lot of more work.

We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact of an SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to claim, but its implementation modalities may be.

There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.

I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the weaknesses of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will help us with that.

My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable.

Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in this system construction. Removing it requires going back to the beginning as it holds everything together.

As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed at ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in it is redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP, ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this proposal. I have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.

My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this ³WS 3² and ³ICANN 2020². And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.

Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed. but we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time, and leave the future to necessary tweaking.

I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and then to WS3...

More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on.

I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the best example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is preferable, but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond the stumbling phase.

As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.' For others it is much longer.

But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for transition until we are ready.

And here is a final observation. To put it ­ like Greg ­ as a conflict as ³Board on Top² vs. ³Community on Top² is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.

The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is real mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the community does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of the community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed by the Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored by a pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to capture and game.

Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the Board another part of the community while not representing the community. For a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can check and balance the Board's unilateral power.

The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as the best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.

avri

Wolfgang

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable

While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

Original link:

https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#% 3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mi le#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-las t-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the -last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through -the-last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-thr ough-the-last-mile#>>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board

<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue

<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005160.html>, notes around 10 points

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005161.html>

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005161.html%3E>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>

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Having belatedly fought my way through this entire thread, I want to thank Jordan, Avri, Phil and Malcolm for so ably, eloquently and comprehensively expressing so many concerns and reactions that I share. Greg On Wed, Sep 9, 2015 at 12:01 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:

And here is a final observation. To put it – like Greg – as a conflict as

...

“Board on Top” vs. “Community on Top” is misleading.

Wolfgang,

You have misstated, and thus significantly mischaracterized, my point. Though I am sure it was inadvertent, it nonetheless obscures the point I was making.

I did not say there was a "conflict" between "Board on Top" and "Community on Top." What I said was:

"Board on Top" survives, and "Member on Top" (as membership organizations

...

are constituted under US nonprofit law) is eliminated.

These characterizations are rooted in the basic difference, under US non-profit corporations law, between a membership non-profit corporation and a non-profit corporation without members. This is a generic distinction -- not specific to ICANN. It is not a "conflict" -- but it is a fundamental difference between a "membership model" and a "non-membership model."

In a membership corporation, the membership (whether a single member or many members) outranks the Board in certain limited but significant ways. In a non-membership corporation, the Board has ultimate authority. While somewhat simplified, it is neither "wrong" nor "misleading" to characterize the distinction between these two models as "Board on Top" and "Member on Top." Indeed, it's really quite accurate.

One thing I was NOT saying was that there was a dichotomy between the Board and the Community. It's quite fascinating that you would have chosen to re-cast it in that fashion. While I'm a lawyer, I'm no psychiatrist (though my father was, and my wife, sister and brother-in-law are all psychologists), so I'll leave it to others to analyze that.

Greg

Greg

On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 at 2:17 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:

...

Hi,

And I think it has more to do with establishing checks and balances that take into account the loss of the NTIA backstop/oversight.

avri

On 08-Sep-15 13:48, Jonathan Zuck wrote:

...

Exactly

On 9/8/15, 1:31 PM, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of James M. Bladel" < accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of jbladel@godaddy.com> wrote:

...

Disagree, Nigel. It¹s not about the past, but rather an effort to future-proof the organization against individuals & groups we haven¹t event met yet.

Thanks‹

J.

On 9/8/15, 11:59 , "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Nigel Roberts" < accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:

...

Roelof

You are a smart guy. You are open and ready to trust. These are admirable qualities.

But ICANN, as a collective entity, to those of us who were there at its beginnings needs to continually prove it is worthy of trust.

Because back then, it wasn't.

And some of us remember.

On 08/09/15 17:53, Roelof Meijer wrote:

...

All,

Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder. What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a ³yes, perfect, let¹s implement this straight away²? But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven¹s sake, do we see the board as a unity of ill-doers?

The board members that have participated in our work are individuals that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago. They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas. And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal sacrifice and join ICANN's board.

In my opinion, there¹s no collective single opinion in any wrong direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does not mean that we cannot have different opinions.

When Steve Crocker writes:

/"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements.²/

he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily receive, as he commits the board. Let¹s await the promised details of their ideas and keep engaged. Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt? Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or heard: as in ³while you say, Š. I seeŠ², ³when you say, Š you mean.."

/"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I //see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the //keystone of the CCWG proposal."/

//

/"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the //bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"/

//

/"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a very natural human reaction."/

//

/"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last" /

//

/"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."/

//

/"And I, for one, do not want the transition //badly enough that I would capitulate to the Board's effort to completely //distort the proposed process."/

//

/"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is precisely //why it must."/

//

/"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just //operationalization is impressive."/

//

/"not surrender and let the Board have complete control //without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"/

Let¹s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselvesŠ

Cheers,

Roelof Meijer

SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl <http://www.sidn.nl/>

On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of avri@acm.org <mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote:

Hi,

First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board and I trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the best you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior motive of personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my trust of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a Board member would ever take a position just because it would help him get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board member would change her position due to a concern with being removed from the Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign from the Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and the Internet.

My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from the Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes to become empowered, at leas to a degree.

While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal.

I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I think this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to the current impasse.

Some inset comments below.

On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:

Hi Avri,

it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?

What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: €Community empowerment (Agreeement)

I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe it is a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a lower extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by other, you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on some fundamental issues the community requires decision making empowerment. The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in any straightforward definition of the term..

€Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)

Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture on the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you fear us so?

€Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)

Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a direct say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation. Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.

€Operational Plan (Agreement) €Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)

How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting was that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually based on fundamental disagreements.

€Enforceability (Agreement)

I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume that we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing could be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make going to court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not be necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG plan balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of the Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new participant in the checks and balances.

€IRP (Agreement)

Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called agreement.

€Ombudsman (Agreement)

We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.

Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other parts of the solution would work.

For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision.

The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was that ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community been making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG process. Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the implementation phase.

This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York.

If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I would be able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM and the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To me, this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a century* or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.

(*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little better)

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.

Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a good start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations sometimes get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that made the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2 recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the rainbow. As people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2 recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."

You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested is the current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending exuberance of the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate oversight somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free from government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the community, one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the SMCM in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a transition to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is something that the CWG proposal requires.

I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want its structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in the ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major opportunity for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less chance there will be for capture and other shenanigans.

The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.

I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope and functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an implementation detail.

It is not yet ready for adoption.

We disagree on this.

It needs a lot of more work.

We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact of an SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to claim, but its implementation modalities may be.

There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.

I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the weaknesses of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will help us with that.

My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable.

Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in this system construction. Removing it requires going back to the beginning as it holds everything together.

As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed at ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in it is redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP, ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this proposal. I have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.

My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this ³WS 3² and ³ICANN 2020². And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.

Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed. but we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time, and leave the future to necessary tweaking.

I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and then to WS3...

More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on.

I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the best example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is preferable, but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond the stumbling phase.

As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.' For others it is much longer.

But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for transition until we are ready.

And here is a final observation. To put it ­ like Greg ­ as a conflict as ³Board on Top² vs. ³Community on Top² is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.

The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is real mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the community does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of the community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed by the Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored by a pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to capture and game.

Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the Board another part of the community while not representing the community. For a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can check and balance the Board's unilateral power.

The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as the best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.

avri

Wolfgang

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable

While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

Original link:

https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

...

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<

https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>

...

< https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> < https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> < https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> < https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> < https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#

< https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#% 3E%3Chttps:// www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mi le#%3E%3Chttps:// www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-las t-mile#%3E%3Chttps:// www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the -last-mile#%3E%3Chttps:// www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through -the-last-mile#%3E%3Chttps:// www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-thr ough-the-last-mile#>>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board

<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue

<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks

< http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005160.html>, notes around 10 points

< http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005161.html>

< http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005161.html%3E>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>

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Oh that too. 100%. We are not in disagreement - that's the main reason I'm here. But I was simply setting out why some of us (Mr Deerhake called me as being a dinosaur, but I prefer the term 'revenant') whilst totally trusting individuals comprising the Board of ICANN find it hard to trust the Board or corporate organisation collectively. Those of us who were part of the IFWP, as I was, would commend the wise words of George Santanyana: 'Those who cannot remember <https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Remember> the past <https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Past> are condemned to repeat it.' So on that basis perhaps I should be expecting NTIA and ICANN to go off in a huddle in a week or two and do a bilateral deal which has much of the appearance but little of the substance of the stated goal??? Now, that would be just too cynical of me, wouldn't it? On 08/09/15 18:31, James M. Bladel wrote:

Disagree, Nigel. It¹s not about the past, but rather an effort to future-proof the organization against individuals & groups we haven¹t event met yet.

Thanks‹

J.

On 9/8/15, 11:59 , "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Nigel Roberts" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:

...

Roelof

You are a smart guy. You are open and ready to trust. These are admirable qualities.

But ICANN, as a collective entity, to those of us who were there at its beginnings needs to continually prove it is worthy of trust.

Because back then, it wasn't.

And some of us remember.

On 08/09/15 17:53, Roelof Meijer wrote:

...

All,

Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder. What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a ³yes, perfect, let¹s implement this straight away²? But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven¹s sake, do we see the board as a unity of ill-doers?

The board members that have participated in our work are individuals that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago. They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas. And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal sacrifice and join ICANN's board.

In my opinion, there¹s no collective single opinion in any wrong direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does not mean that we cannot have different opinions.

When Steve Crocker writes:

/"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements.²/

he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily receive, as he commits the board. Let¹s await the promised details of their ideas and keep engaged. Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt? Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or heard: as in ³while you say, Š. I seeŠ², ³when you say, Š you mean.."

/"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I //see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the //keystone of the CCWG proposal."/

//

/"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the //bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"/

//

/"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a very natural human reaction."/

//

/"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last" /

//

/"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."/

//

/"And I, for one, do not want the transition //badly enough that I would capitulate to the Board's effort to completely //distort the proposed process."/

//

/"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is precisely //why it must."/

//

/"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just //operationalization is impressive."/

//

/"not surrender and let the Board have complete control //without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"/

Let¹s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselvesŠ

Cheers,

Roelof Meijer

SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl <http://www.sidn.nl/>

On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of avri@acm.org <mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote:

Hi,

First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board and I trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the best you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior motive of personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my trust of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a Board member would ever take a position just because it would help him get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board member would change her position due to a concern with being removed from the Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign from the Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and the Internet.

My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from the Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes to become empowered, at leas to a degree.

While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal.

I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I think this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to the current impasse.

Some inset comments below.

On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:

Hi Avri,

it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?

What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: €Community empowerment (Agreeement)

I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe it is a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a lower extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by other, you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on some fundamental issues the community requires decision making empowerment. The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in any straightforward definition of the term..

€Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)

Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture on the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you fear us so?

€Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)

Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a direct say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation. Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.

€Operational Plan (Agreement) €Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)

How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting was that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually based on fundamental disagreements.

€Enforceability (Agreement)

I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume that we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing could be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make going to court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not be necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG plan balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of the Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new participant in the checks and balances.

€IRP (Agreement)

Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called agreement.

€Ombudsman (Agreement)

We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.

Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other parts of the solution would work.

For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision.

The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was that ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community been making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG process. Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the implementation phase.

This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York.

If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I would be able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM and the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To me, this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a century* or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.

(*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little better)

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.

Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a good start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations sometimes get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that made the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2 recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the rainbow. As people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2 recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."

You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested is the current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending exuberance of the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate oversight somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free from government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the community, one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the SMCM in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a transition to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is something that the CWG proposal requires.

I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want its structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in the ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major opportunity for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less chance there will be for capture and other shenanigans.

The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.

I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope and functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an implementation detail.

It is not yet ready for adoption.

We disagree on this.

It needs a lot of more work.

We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact of an SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to claim, but its implementation modalities may be.

There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.

I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the weaknesses of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will help us with that.

My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable.

Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in this system construction. Removing it requires going back to the beginning as it holds everything together.

As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed at ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in it is redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP, ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this proposal. I have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.

My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this ³WS 3² and ³ICANN 2020². And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.

Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed. but we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time, and leave the future to necessary tweaking.

I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and then to WS3...

More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on.

I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the best example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is preferable, but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond the stumbling phase.

As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.' For others it is much longer.

But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for transition until we are ready.

And here is a final observation. To put it ­ like Greg ­ as a conflict as ³Board on Top² vs. ³Community on Top² is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.

The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is real mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the community does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of the community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed by the Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored by a pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to capture and game.

Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the Board another part of the community while not representing the community. For a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can check and balance the Board's unilateral power.

The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as the best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.

avri

Wolfgang

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable

While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

Original link:

https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#% 3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mi le#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-las t-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the -last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through -the-last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-thr ough-the-last-mile#>>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board

<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue

<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005160.html>, notes around 10 points

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005161.html>

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005161.html%3E>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>

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Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 8 Sep 2015 18:00, "Nigel Roberts" <nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:

But ICANN, as a collective entity, to those of us who were there at its

beginnings needs to continually prove it is worthy of trust.

SO: Holding on to the "collective" word used seem to be an indication that the entire entity does needs to prove its worthiness. I definitely agree to that and deep down, I hope we can put the question to ourselves asking whether the current CCWG proposal meets that requirement OR whether it just an attempt to transfer power from one side to the other.

Because back then, it wasn't.

SO: Does this mean it is now?

And some of us remember.

SO: Perhaps this is one of the reason we are where we are at the moment. Someone once joked that it was a good thing that Fadi did not have enough time to transition from his predecessor. I guess the other side of that is happening here where too much history seem to be affecting the judgement of the present/future. Everytime I hear people(including myself) complain about ICANN board, it's said that they acted in the interest of the cooperation. None has however said they acted in their personal individual interest which IMO is still a predictable stand. Do I want the board to be unaccountable, absolutely not (and I don't think the board is asking for that as well) neither do I want to community to be unaccountable. This WG have taken time to attempt "fixing" board loop holes, it is just rational for the board to help in suggesting fixes for ours as well. There is a saying that spectators in a football match seem to know about a match more than the players, but wait until such spectator wears the Jessy Regards

On 08/09/15 17:53, Roelof Meijer wrote:

...

All,

Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder. What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a “yes, perfect, let’s implement this straight away”? But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven’s sake, do we see the board as a unity of ill-doers?

The board members that have participated in our work are individuals that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago. They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas. And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal sacrifice and join ICANN's board.

In my opinion, there’s no collective single opinion in any wrong direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does not mean that we cannot have different opinions.

When Steve Crocker writes:

/"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability

contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements.”/

he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily receive, as he commits the board. Let’s await the promised details of their ideas and keep engaged. Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt? Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or heard: as in “while you say, …. I see…”, “when you say, … you mean.."

/"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I //see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the //keystone of the CCWG proposal."/

//

/"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the //bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"/

//

/"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does

not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a very natural human reaction."/

//

/"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the

priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last" /

//

/"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."/

//

/"And I, for one, do not want the transition //badly enough that I would capitulate to the Board's effort to completely //distort the proposed process."/

//

/"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is precisely //why it must."/

//

/"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just //operationalization is impressive."/

//

/"not surrender and let the Board have complete control //without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"/

Let’s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselves…

Cheers,

Roelof Meijer

SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl <http://www.sidn.nl/>

On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of

avri@acm.org <mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote:

Hi,

First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board

and I

...

trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the best you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior

motive of

...

personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my

trust

...

of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a Board member would ever take a position just because it would help

him

...

get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board member would change her position due to a concern with being removed from

the

...

Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign from

the

...

Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and the Internet.

My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from

the

...

Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes to become empowered, at leas to a degree.

While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal.

I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all

the

...

bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I think this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to the current impasse.

Some inset comments below.

On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:

Hi Avri,

it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?

What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: •Community empowerment (Agreeement)

I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe

it is

...

a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a

lower

...

extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by

other,

...

you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on

some

...

fundamental issues the community requires decision making

empowerment.

...

The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in any straightforward definition of the term..

•Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)

Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture on the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you fear us so?

•Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)

Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a

direct

...

say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation. Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.

•Operational Plan (Agreement) •Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)

How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting was that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually

based on

...

fundamental disagreements.

•Enforceability (Agreement)

I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume

that

...

we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing

could

...

be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make

going to

...

court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not

be

...

necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG

plan

...

balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of the Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new

participant

...

in the checks and balances.

•IRP (Agreement)

Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called agreement.

•Ombudsman (Agreement)

We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.

Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other parts of the solution would work.

For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision.

The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was

that

...

ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community been making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG

process.

...

Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the implementation phase.

This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York.

If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I would

be

...

able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM and the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To me, this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a

century*

...

or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.

(*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little better)

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.

Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a good start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations

sometimes

...

get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that made the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2 recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the

rainbow. As

...

people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2 recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."

You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested is

the

...

current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending exuberance

of

...

the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate

oversight

...

somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free

from

...

government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the

community,

...

one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the

SMCM

...

in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a

transition

...

to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is something that the CWG proposal requires.

I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want its structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in

the

...

ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major

opportunity

...

for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less chance there will be for capture and other shenanigans.

The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.

I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope

and

...

functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an

implementation

...

detail.

It is not yet ready for adoption.

We disagree on this.

It needs a lot of more work.

We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact

of an

...

SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to claim, but its implementation modalities may be.

There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.

I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the

weaknesses

...

of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will

help

...

us with that.

My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable.

Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in

this

...

system construction. Removing it requires going back to the

beginning

...

as it holds everything together.

As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed at ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in

it is

...

redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP, ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this

proposal. I

...

have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.

My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this “WS 3” and “ICANN 2020”. And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.

Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed.

but

...

we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time,

and

...

leave the future to necessary tweaking.

I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and

then to

...

WS3...

More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on.

I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the best example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is

preferable,

...

but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond

the

...

stumbling phase.

As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.'

For

...

others it is much longer.

But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for transition until we are ready.

And here is a final observation. To put it – like Greg – as a conflict as “Board on Top” vs. “Community on Top” is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.

The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is real mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the community does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of

the

...

community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed by

the

...

Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored

by a

...

pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to

capture

...

and game.

Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the

Board

...

another part of the community while not representing the community.

For

...

a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can

check

...

and balance the Board's unilateral power.

The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as

the

...

best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.

avri

Wolfgang

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im

Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>

Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to

share my

...

power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable

While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete

control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

Original link:

https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

...

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<

https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><; https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><; https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><; https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><; https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><; https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#

...

<

https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#%3E%3...

...

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the

CCWG

...

briefing to the ICANN Board <

https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>,

...

and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue <

https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>.

...

All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's

accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of

the

...

proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized.

With

...

regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable

way, as

...

increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for

the

...

transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening

remarks

...

<

http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/... ,

...

notes around 10 points <

http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...

...

<

http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/005161.html%3E ),

...

and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>

https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

...

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software.

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Yeah, I know. The last bit, I mean. But things change, and have changed. The organization has developed and this is a completely different board (and CEO) from the one(s) from those days. Remembering is useful, but observing and keeping an open mind is crucial. Otherwise, we¹ll just be stuck in the past. Which seems to be in conflict with this innovative thingy called the internet or something (Apologies if this comes across as a lecture or being smart-ass) Cheers, Roelof On 08-09-15 18:59, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Nigel Roberts" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:

Roelof

You are a smart guy. You are open and ready to trust. These are admirable qualities.

But ICANN, as a collective entity, to those of us who were there at its beginnings needs to continually prove it is worthy of trust.

Because back then, it wasn't.

And some of us remember.

On 08/09/15 17:53, Roelof Meijer wrote:

...

All,

Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder. What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a ³yes, perfect, let¹s implement this straight away²? But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven¹s sake, do we see the board as a unity of ill-doers?

The board members that have participated in our work are individuals that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago. They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas. And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal sacrifice and join ICANN's board.

In my opinion, there¹s no collective single opinion in any wrong direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does not mean that we cannot have different opinions.

When Steve Crocker writes:

/"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements.²/

he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily receive, as he commits the board. Let¹s await the promised details of their ideas and keep engaged. Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt? Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or heard: as in ³while you say, Š. I seeŠ², ³when you say, Š you mean.."

/"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I //see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the //keystone of the CCWG proposal."/

//

/"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the //bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"/

//

/"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a very natural human reaction."/

//

/"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last" /

//

/"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."/

//

/"And I, for one, do not want the transition //badly enough that I would capitulate to the Board's effort to completely //distort the proposed process."/

//

/"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is precisely //why it must."/

//

/"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just //operationalization is impressive."/

//

/"not surrender and let the Board have complete control //without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"/

Let¹s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselvesŠ

Cheers,

Roelof Meijer

SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl <http://www.sidn.nl/>

On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of avri@acm.org <mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote:

Hi,

First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board and I trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the best you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior motive of personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my trust of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a Board member would ever take a position just because it would help him get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board member would change her position due to a concern with being removed from the Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign from the Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and the Internet.

My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from the Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes to become empowered, at leas to a degree.

While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal.

I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I think this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to the current impasse.

Some inset comments below.

On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:

Hi Avri,

it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?

What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: €Community empowerment (Agreeement)

I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe it is a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a lower extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by other, you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on some fundamental issues the community requires decision making empowerment. The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in any straightforward definition of the term..

€Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)

Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture on the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you fear us so?

€Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)

Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a direct say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation. Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.

€Operational Plan (Agreement) €Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)

How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting was that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually based on fundamental disagreements.

€Enforceability (Agreement)

I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume that we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing could be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make going to court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not be necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG plan balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of the Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new participant in the checks and balances.

€IRP (Agreement)

Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called agreement.

€Ombudsman (Agreement)

We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.

Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other parts of the solution would work.

For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision.

The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was that ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community been making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG process. Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the implementation phase.

This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York.

If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I would be able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM and the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To me, this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a century* or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.

(*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little better)

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.

Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a good start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations sometimes get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that made the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2 recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the rainbow. As people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2 recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."

You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested is the current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending exuberance of the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate oversight somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free from government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the community, one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the SMCM in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a transition to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is something that the CWG proposal requires.

I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want its structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in the ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major opportunity for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less chance there will be for capture and other shenanigans.

The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.

I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope and functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an implementation detail.

It is not yet ready for adoption.

We disagree on this.

It needs a lot of more work.

We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact of an SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to claim, but its implementation modalities may be.

There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.

I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the weaknesses of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will help us with that.

My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable.

Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in this system construction. Removing it requires going back to the beginning as it holds everything together.

As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed at ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in it is redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP, ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this proposal. I have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.

My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this ³WS 3² and ³ICANN 2020². And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.

Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed. but we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time, and leave the future to necessary tweaking.

I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and then to WS3...

More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on.

I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the best example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is preferable, but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond the stumbling phase.

As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.' For others it is much longer.

But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for transition until we are ready.

And here is a final observation. To put it ­ like Greg ­ as a conflict as ³Board on Top² vs. ³Community on Top² is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.

The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is real mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the community does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of the community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed by the Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored by a pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to capture and game.

Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the Board another part of the community while not representing the community. For a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can check and balance the Board's unilateral power.

The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as the best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.

avri

Wolfgang

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable

While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

Original link:

https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#% 3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mi le#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-las t-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the -last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through -the-last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-thr ough-the-last-mile#>>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board

<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue

<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005160.html>, notes around 10 points

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005161.html>

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005161.html%3E>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

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No smart-ass needs to apologise for that. Trust me, I know ;-)

(Apologies if this comes across as a lecture or being smart-ass)

Cheers,

Roelof

On 08-09-15 18:59, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Nigel Roberts" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:

...

Roelof

You are a smart guy. You are open and ready to trust. These are admirable qualities.

But ICANN, as a collective entity, to those of us who were there at its beginnings needs to continually prove it is worthy of trust.

Because back then, it wasn't.

And some of us remember.

On 08/09/15 17:53, Roelof Meijer wrote:

...

All,

Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder. What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a ³yes, perfect, let¹s implement this straight away²? But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven¹s sake, do we see the board as a unity of ill-doers?

The board members that have participated in our work are individuals that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago. They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas. And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal sacrifice and join ICANN's board.

In my opinion, there¹s no collective single opinion in any wrong direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does not mean that we cannot have different opinions.

When Steve Crocker writes:

/"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements.²/

he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily receive, as he commits the board. Let¹s await the promised details of their ideas and keep engaged. Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt? Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or heard: as in ³while you say, Š. I seeŠ², ³when you say, Š you mean.."

/"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I //see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the //keystone of the CCWG proposal."/

//

/"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the //bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"/

//

/"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a very natural human reaction."/

//

/"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last" /

//

/"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."/

//

/"And I, for one, do not want the transition //badly enough that I would capitulate to the Board's effort to completely //distort the proposed process."/

//

/"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is precisely //why it must."/

//

/"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just //operationalization is impressive."/

//

/"not surrender and let the Board have complete control //without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"/

Let¹s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselvesŠ

Cheers,

Roelof Meijer

SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl <http://www.sidn.nl/>

On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of avri@acm.org <mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote:

Hi,

First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board and I trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the best you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior motive of personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my trust of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a Board member would ever take a position just because it would help him get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board member would change her position due to a concern with being removed from the Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign from the Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and the Internet.

My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from the Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes to become empowered, at leas to a degree.

While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal.

I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I think this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to the current impasse.

Some inset comments below.

On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:

Hi Avri,

it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?

What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: €Community empowerment (Agreeement)

I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe it is a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a lower extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by other, you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on some fundamental issues the community requires decision making empowerment. The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in any straightforward definition of the term..

€Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)

Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture on the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you fear us so?

€Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)

Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a direct say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation. Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.

€Operational Plan (Agreement) €Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)

How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting was that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually based on fundamental disagreements.

€Enforceability (Agreement)

I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume that we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing could be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make going to court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not be necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG plan balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of the Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new participant in the checks and balances.

€IRP (Agreement)

Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called agreement.

€Ombudsman (Agreement)

We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.

Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other parts of the solution would work.

For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision.

The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was that ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community been making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG process. Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the implementation phase.

This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York.

If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I would be able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM and the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To me, this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a century* or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.

(*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little better)

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.

Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a good start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations sometimes get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that made the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2 recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the rainbow. As people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2 recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."

You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested is the current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending exuberance of the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate oversight somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free from government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the community, one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the SMCM in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a transition to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is something that the CWG proposal requires.

I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want its structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in the ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major opportunity for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less chance there will be for capture and other shenanigans.

The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.

I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope and functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an implementation detail.

It is not yet ready for adoption.

We disagree on this.

It needs a lot of more work.

We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact of an SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to claim, but its implementation modalities may be.

There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.

I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the weaknesses of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will help us with that.

My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable.

Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in this system construction. Removing it requires going back to the beginning as it holds everything together.

As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed at ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in it is redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP, ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this proposal. I have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.

My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this ³WS 3² and ³ICANN 2020². And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.

Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed. but we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time, and leave the future to necessary tweaking.

I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and then to WS3...

More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on.

I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the best example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is preferable, but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond the stumbling phase.

As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.' For others it is much longer.

But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for transition until we are ready.

And here is a final observation. To put it ­ like Greg ­ as a conflict as ³Board on Top² vs. ³Community on Top² is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.

The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is real mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the community does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of the community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed by the Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored by a pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to capture and game.

Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the Board another part of the community while not representing the community. For a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can check and balance the Board's unilateral power.

The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as the best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.

avri

Wolfgang

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable

While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

Original link:

https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#% 3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mi le#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-las t-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the -last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through -the-last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-thr ough-the-last-mile#>>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board

<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue

<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005160.html>, notes around 10 points

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005161.html>

<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem ber/005161.html%3E>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>

https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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All, I think Roelof makes some good points but then I would wouldn’t I. I have been speaking to a number of CCWG folks to try to at least bridge the gap between the perceptions of the Board and the perceptions of the CCWG. If anyone has any ideas how we can do more of that I think it would be most helpful. I note for example Greg’s email on response to Roelof about participation. I’m clear that the Board is participating and not intervening. What would help to delver that message to the CCWG? Cheers, Chris

On 9 Sep 2015, at 02:53 , Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:

All,

Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder. What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a “yes, perfect, let’s implement this straight away”? But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven’s sake, do we see the board as a unity of ill-doers?

The board members that have participated in our work are individuals that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago. They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas. And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal sacrifice and join ICANN's board.

In my opinion, there’s no collective single opinion in any wrong direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does not mean that we cannot have different opinions.

When Steve Crocker writes:

"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements.”

he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily receive, as he commits the board. Let’s await the promised details of their ideas and keep engaged. Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt? Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or heard: as in “while you say, …. I see…”, “when you say, … you mean.."

"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal."

"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"

"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a very natural human reaction."

"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last"

"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."

"And I, for one, do not want the transition badly enough that I would capitulate to the Board's effort to completely distort the proposed process."

"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is precisely why it must."

"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive."

"not surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"

Let’s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselves…

Cheers,

Roelof Meijer

SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl <http://www.sidn.nl/>

On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of avri@acm.org <mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote:

...

Hi,

First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board and I trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the best you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior motive of personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my trust of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a Board member would ever take a position just because it would help him get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board member would change her position due to a concern with being removed from the Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign from the Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and the Internet.

My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from the Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes to become empowered, at leas to a degree.

While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal.

I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I think this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to the current impasse.

Some inset comments below.

On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:

...

Hi Avri,

it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?

What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: • Community empowerment (Agreeement)

I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe it is a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a lower extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by other, you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on some fundamental issues the community requires decision making empowerment. The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in any straightforward definition of the term..

...

• Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)

Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture on the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you fear us so?

...

• Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)

Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a direct say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation. Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.

...

• Operational Plan (Agreement) • Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)

How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting was that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually based on fundamental disagreements.

...

• Enforceability (Agreement)

I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume that we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing could be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make going to court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not be necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG plan balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of the Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new participant in the checks and balances.

...

• IRP (Agreement)

Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called agreement.

...

• Ombudsman (Agreement)

We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.

Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other parts of the solution would work.

...

For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision.

The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was that ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community been making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG process. Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the implementation phase.

...

This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York.

If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I would be able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM and the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To me, this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a century* or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.

(*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little better)

...

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.

Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a good start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations sometimes get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that made the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2 recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the rainbow. As people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2 recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."

You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested is the current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending exuberance of the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate oversight somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free from government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the community, one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the SMCM in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a transition to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is something that the CWG proposal requires.

...

I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want its structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in the ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major opportunity for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less chance there will be for capture and other shenanigans.

...

The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.

I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope and functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an implementation detail.

...

It is not yet ready for adoption.

We disagree on this.

...

It needs a lot of more work.

We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact of an SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to claim, but its implementation modalities may be.

...

There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.

I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the weaknesses of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will help us with that.

...

My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable.

Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in this system construction. Removing it requires going back to the beginning as it holds everything together.

As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed at ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in it is redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP, ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this proposal. I have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.

...

My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this “WS 3” and “ICANN 2020”. And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.

Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed. but we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time, and leave the future to necessary tweaking.

I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and then to WS3...

...

More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on.

I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the best example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is preferable, but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond the stumbling phase.

As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.' For others it is much longer.

But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for transition until we are ready.

...

And here is a final observation. To put it – like Greg – as a conflict as “Board on Top” vs. “Community on Top” is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.

The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is real mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the community does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of the community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed by the Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored by a pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to capture and game.

Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the Board another part of the community while not representing the community. For a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can check and balance the Board's unilateral power.

The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as the best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.

avri

...

Wolfgang

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile

Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

...

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

...

Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile>

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile# <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981 <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316 <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/... <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/005160.html>>, notes around 10 points <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...> <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

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I think so Jordan. But I think the Board need to finalise its input to the CCWG first. We are working on that now. We have numerous call scheduled before the deadline. Cheers, Chris

On 9 Sep 2015, at 07:49 , Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:

Would the smaller group chats on specific topics help, as suggested on the call today?

J

On Wednesday, 9 September 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> wrote: All,

I think Roelof makes some good points but then I would wouldn’t I. I have been speaking to a number of CCWG folks to try to at least bridge the gap between the perceptions of the Board and the perceptions of the CCWG. If anyone has any ideas how we can do more of that I think it would be most helpful.

I note for example Greg’s email on response to Roelof about participation. I’m clear that the Board is participating and not intervening. What would help to delver that message to the CCWG?

Cheers,

Chris

...

On 9 Sep 2015, at 02:53 , Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl');>> wrote:

All,

Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder. What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a “yes, perfect, let’s implement this straight away”? But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven’s sake, do we see the board as a unity of ill-doers?

The board members that have participated in our work are individuals that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago. They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas. And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal sacrifice and join ICANN's board.

In my opinion, there’s no collective single opinion in any wrong direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does not mean that we cannot have different opinions.

When Steve Crocker writes:

"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements.”

he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily receive, as he commits the board. Let’s await the promised details of their ideas and keep engaged. Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt? Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or heard: as in “while you say, …. I see…”, “when you say, … you mean.."

"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal."

"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"

"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a very natural human reaction."

"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last"

"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."

"And I, for one, do not want the transition badly enough that I would capitulate to the Board's effort to completely distort the proposed process."

"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is precisely why it must."

"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive."

"not surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"

Let’s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselves…

Cheers,

Roelof Meijer

SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','roelof.meijer@sidn.nl');> | www.sidn.nl <http://www.sidn.nl/>

On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');> on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');> on behalf of avri@acm.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','avri@acm.org');>> wrote:

...

Hi,

First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board and I trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the best you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior motive of personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my trust of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a Board member would ever take a position just because it would help him get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board member would change her position due to a concern with being removed from the Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign from the Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and the Internet.

My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from the Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes to become empowered, at leas to a degree.

While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the keystone of the CCWG proposal.

I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all the bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I think this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to the current impasse.

Some inset comments below.

On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:

...

Hi Avri,

it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas where we work together we have consensus or rough consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?

What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have an agreement: • Community empowerment (Agreeement)

I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe it is a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a lower extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by other, you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on some fundamental issues the community requires decision making empowerment. The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in any straightforward definition of the term..

...

• Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)

Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture on the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you fear us so?

...

• Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)

Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a direct say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation. Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.

...

• Operational Plan (Agreement) • Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)

How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting was that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually based on fundamental disagreements.

...

• Enforceability (Agreement)

I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume that we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing could be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make going to court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not be necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG plan balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of the Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new participant in the checks and balances.

...

• IRP (Agreement)

Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called agreement.

...

• Ombudsman (Agreement)

We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.

Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other parts of the solution would work.

...

For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further intensification of the dialogue within the community including CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the decision.

The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was that ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community been making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG process. Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the implementation phase.

...

This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a complicated transition in the final stage there are some remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its members and to the input from the broader community. The whole process is a very encouraging example which shows how the multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New York.

If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I would be able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM and the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To me, this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a century* or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.

(*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little better)

...

The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.

Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a good start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations sometimes get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that made the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2 recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the rainbow. As people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2 recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."

You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested is the current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending exuberance of the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate oversight somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free from government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the community, one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the SMCM in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a transition to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is something that the CWG proposal requires.

...

I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the well designed balance between governments and the non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there are other detailed questions.

In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want its structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in the ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major opportunity for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less chance there will be for capture and other shenanigans.

...

The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.

I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope and functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an implementation detail.

...

It is not yet ready for adoption.

We disagree on this.

...

It needs a lot of more work.

We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact of an SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to claim, but its implementation modalities may be.

...

There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.

I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the weaknesses of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will help us with that.

...

My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is unstoppable.

Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in this system construction. Removing it requires going back to the beginning as it holds everything together.

As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed at ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in it is redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP, ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this proposal. I have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.

...

My impression is that the majority in the community sees this indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a changing environment. I did call this “WS 3” and “ICANN 2020”. And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.

Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed. but we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time, and leave the future to necessary tweaking.

I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and then to WS3...

...

More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the end of the story. It will go on.

I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the best example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is preferable, but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond the stumbling phase.

As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.' For others it is much longer.

But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for transition until we are ready.

...

And here is a final observation. To put it – like Greg – as a conflict as “Board on Top” vs. “Community on Top” is misleading. Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are selected by the community. Both are accountable to the community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.

The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is real mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the community does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of the community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed by the Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored by a pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to capture and game.

Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the Board another part of the community while not representing the community. For a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can check and balance the Board's unilateral power.

The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as the best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.

avri

...

Wolfgang

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');> im Auftrag von Avri Doria Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17 An: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile

Hi,

The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just operationalization is impressive.

I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean capture by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their perspective the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it gives the community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I think any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an analysis who who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to share my power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power anlaysi, current, potential and likely.

Additionally, I do not understand this statement:

...

where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps much less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton, it is not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate level of detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone does not wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.

I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where we, as a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition so badly that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete control without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again. The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to community oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition should not go forward.

We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.

avri

On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:

...

Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile>

Working Together Through The Last Mile

<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile# <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile%23%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile%23%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile%23%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile%23%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile%23>>

I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the CCWG briefing to the ICANN Board <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981 <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>>, and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316 <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>>. All of our dialogues over the past months have been illuminating, challenging and in my opinion, an important and true testament to the multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA Stewardship Transition.

*/We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA requirements./*

As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the Board wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in agreement on key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for example:

* Fundamental bylaws. * Specific requirements for empowering the community into the bylaws adoption process. * IRP enhancements. * Board and director removal. * ICANN's mission and core values. * Strengthening requirements for empowering the community in the budget, operational and strategic planning process. * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments Reviews intoICANN bylaws. * Community ability to enforce the accountability mechanisms in the bylaws.

We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized. With regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability, where the current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be achievable we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable way, as increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for example, capture or diminishing of checks and balances.

Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles on which we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more detail on how these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be implemented within the community identified time frame for the transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not result in unintended consequences.

During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It was a lot of information to digest in a call (notes around opening remarks <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/... <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/005160.html>>, notes around 10 points <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...> <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/...>), and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration. We are committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment process in the next few days, and we look forward to the working with the community on further details.

It is critical that we work together to build enhanced accountability forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the impressive work already done by the community and complete the IANAStewardship Transition.

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-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive, InternetNZ +64-21-442-649 | jordan@internetnz.net.nz <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Sent on the run, apologies for brevity

:-) Thanks El.

Deliver a well thought-out, well structured paper with small, digestable chunks that the CCWG can easily work of off top to bottom well prior to the F2F, as in, like, yesterday…

That is what the Board is currently working on.

Have the meeting itself chaired by the CCWG and the agenda agreed upon well in advance.

There does seem to be a fair amount of misunderstanding about this. All the Board has done is to suggest that the CCWG hold a face to face before Dublin. It was not intended to be some sort of special meeting with the Board where there would be negotiation. If the CCWG agrees to have the meeting then a) a venue is available on the dates suggested in LA and b) having it at that time in LA would mean that the majority of there board would be able to be there because our retreat is on the 26th, 27th and 28th September. So were such a meeting to take place it would be chaired and run by the CCWG with its own agenda etc. Cheers, Chris

On 9 Sep 2015, at 08:40 , Dr Eberhard W Lisse <epilisse@gmail.com> wrote:

Chris,

Though I am hardly speaking for the CCWG, I personally would find the below helpful:

Deliver a well thought-out, well structured paper with small, digestable chunks that the CCWG can easily work of off top to bottom well prior to the F2F, as in, like, yesterday...

Have the meeting itself chaired by the CCWG and the agenda agreed upon well in advance.

Scribe the meeting in real-time locally and remotely and make the transcripts public as a matter of urgency.

Have real-time audio and video streams running.

Accept whatever the CCWG comes up with (even if I don't :-)-O)

And as a personal favor, whether I myself make it there or not, keep that Chehade waffler out of the building.

greetings, el

-- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPhone 6

On Sep 8, 2015, 23:45 +0200, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>, wrote:

...

All,

I think Roelof makes some good points but then I would wouldn’t I. I have been speaking to a number of CCWG folks to try to at least bridge the gap between the perceptions of the Board and the perceptions of the CCWG. If anyone has any ideas how we can do more of that I think it would be most helpful.

I note for example Greg’s email on response to Roelof about participation. I’m clear that the Board is participating and not intervening. What would help to delver that message to the CCWG?

Cheers,

Chris [...]

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Chris I consulted 'Ruling The Root' (Mueller) to remind myself of how the IFWP ended. (Milton, my doing that just earned you another royalty fee from a Kindle Edition purchase) Chapter 8 is fascinating. In my view, it documents exactly how the intention of the IFWP was subverted into the ICANN we have today despite the concessions made to the multistakeholder community at the time (though, admittedly, it took Stuart Lynn's regime several years later to excise the troublesome inconvenience of global membership and direct elections). The quote ". . . (and the tight time line they imposed) made it difficult to rectify the situation" (8.2.5) is one of particular note, I feel. There's an old saying in Tennessee apparently . . . https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKgPY1adc0A On 08/09/15 23:51, Chris Disspain wrote:

. It was not intended to be some sort of special meeting with the Board where there would be negotiation.