Your concept makes sense, Bruce. Is the threshhold of ‘supermajority’ 75% ? From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Bruce Tonkin Date: Saturday, July 18, 2015 at 2:12 PM To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Removal of an individual Board director by an SO or ALAC Hello All, (Disclaimer: my note below is my personal view and not that of the Board or other Board members) I noted that the CCWG has suggested a 75% threshold of the SO/AC structure to spill the whole Board. It seems there is less certainty about the process for an SO or ALAC to remove the director that it has appointed. There was some discussion about defining the reasons in advance for when an individual director can be removed, as well as some discussions for the thresholds. I think it is OK not to have to define all the reasons in advance provided that there is a sufficiently high threshold to remove a director. I believe Jordan noted that the voting threshold to remove a director should be higher than the threshold used to appoint the director – which seems like a reasonable principle. I would like to see some general principle agreed that could apply across the SOs and ALAC. Perhaps something along the lines of at least a super-majority or at least 75% voting threshold for removal. The details will then depend on the processes for each SO and ALAC. Using the GNSO as an example. Currently the GNSO has two houses, and each house votes to appoint one director. I would like to see at least a super-majority threshold across the GNSO Council to remove one of these directors. Regards, Bruce Tonkin