Your public comment re replacement of IANA provider
Avri, I was very interested in your comment regarding the need to amend to provide for a community power to allow approval of any replacement IANA provider in the event of separation. This seems to very directly concern the IANA transition itself and the prospect of securing certification of the proposal by the NTIA to Congress. Could you please explain this a bit further in simple language? Are you saying that ICG or Stewardship has specified that in the event it becomes necessary to replace PTI, then approval (or veto) of that choice should be a listed community power of the Sole Member? Just seeking to understand this issue more clearly. Thank you, Anne [cid:image001.gif@01D0EFD3.01B37360] Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP | One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@LRRLaw.com<mailto:AAikman@LRRLaw.com> | www.LRRLaw.com<http://www.lrrlaw.com/> ________________________________ This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. If the reader of this message or an attachment is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message or attachment to the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the sender. The information transmitted in this message and any attachments may be privileged, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the intended recipients, and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-2521.
Hi, I think it was just oversight on our part. At one point I was supposed to track these things for the CWG in the CCWG, but once the chairs took over the liaison role with their frequent joint leadership meetings, I admit I fell asleep on the task and it was only when doing the review of both documents that the gap became obvious. So, I started talking it up and decided to put a comment on it. Part of the CWG requirement on the CCWG was a mechanism to insure that the ICANN Names Operational Community would have the same power that the IETF has to replace its IANA function operator defined in an ironclad manner under the new accountability mechanisms. Not only did the CWG recommend that a fundamental bylaw be created that covered the Separation Cross Community WG (SCWG), but it included the requirement for the outcome of this group to be approved both by the Board " *and a community mechanism derived from the CCWG-Accountability**process." *T*he CWG was not determining the CCWG outcome of a *SM*, but indicated that whatever Community Mechanism we create, have the power to approve, or disapprove, the recommendation of the SCWG along with the Boar*d.****Similar to the CCWG WS1 recommendation itself, it is a decision that the community and the Board would need to come to together. ****While not an issue in the CWG comment on CCWG Draft 2, I believe there is an inconsistency between the CWG report as included in the ICG aggregated proposal and CCWG Draft 2. The CWG comment on CCWG indicates that this may no longer be necessary as the other mechanisms somehow make up for the absence of this direct power. This may indeed end up the result, but I believe that at the issue needs to be discussed, and a change needs to be made either in the ICG report, backing off on the explicit requirement, or in the CCWG's list of community powers. Of course if we go with the MEM, this may all be moot as far as the CCWG is concerned, as there would be no community powers as conceived in Draft 2. Though I expect we would need to then change the CWG's explicit requirements as defined in the ICG aggregated proposal. As far as NTIA is concerned, I just think they will be looking for consistency in our recommendations. I do not believe they care about such details, as long as we find general agreement on them. thanks avri
Avri,
I was very interested in your comment regarding the need to amend to provide for a community power to allow approval of any replacement IANA provider in the event of separation. This seems to very directly concern the IANA transition itself and the prospect of securing certification of the proposal by the NTIA to Congress.
Could you please explain this a bit further in simple language? Are you saying that ICG or Stewardship has specified that in the event it becomes necessary to replace PTI, then approval (or veto) of that choice should be a listed community power of the Sole Member?
Just seeking to understand this issue more clearly.
Thank you,
Anne
**
*Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel*
*Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP | *
*One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611*
*(T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725*
*_AAikman@LRRLaw.com <mailto:AAikman@LRRLaw.com>_**| www.LRRLaw.com <http://www.lrrlaw.com/>*
**
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Dear Avri, Good Catch Thank you very much for the clear description of the case .I have raised this point togetjher with few other interdependece of the CWG/ICG and CCWG accountabilty mechanism. I will raise it again wiith clear emphasis at the next ICG meeting 18-19 Sept. Regards Kavouss 2015-09-16 7:19 GMT+02:00 Avri Doria <avri@acm.org>:
Hi,
I think it was just oversight on our part. At one point I was supposed to track these things for the CWG in the CCWG, but once the chairs took over the liaison role with their frequent joint leadership meetings, I admit I fell asleep on the task and it was only when doing the review of both documents that the gap became obvious. So, I started talking it up and decided to put a comment on it.
Part of the CWG requirement on the CCWG was a mechanism to insure that the ICANN Names Operational Community would have the same power that the IETF has to replace its IANA function operator defined in an ironclad manner under the new accountability mechanisms. Not only did the CWG recommend that a fundamental bylaw be created that covered the Separation Cross Community WG (SCWG), but it included the requirement for the outcome of this group to be approved both by the Board " *and a community mechanism derived from the CCWG-Accountability**process." *T*he CWG was not determining the CCWG outcome of a *SM*, but indicated that whatever Community Mechanism we create, have the power to approve, or disapprove, the recommendation of the SCWG along with the Boar*d.****Similar to the CCWG WS1 recommendation itself, it is a decision that the community and the Board would need to come to together. ****While not an issue in the CWG comment on CCWG Draft 2, I believe there is an inconsistency between the CWG report as included in the ICG aggregated proposal and CCWG Draft 2. The CWG comment on CCWG indicates that this may no longer be necessary as the other mechanisms somehow make up for the absence of this direct power. This may indeed end up the result, but I believe that at the issue needs to be discussed, and a change needs to be made either in the ICG report, backing off on the explicit requirement, or in the CCWG's list of community powers. Of course if we go with the MEM, this may all be moot as far as the CCWG is concerned, as there would be no community powers as conceived in Draft 2. Though I expect we would need to then change the CWG's explicit requirements as defined in the ICG aggregated proposal. As far as NTIA is concerned, I just think they will be looking for consistency in our recommendations. I do not believe they care about such details, as long as we find general agreement on them. thanks avri
Avri,
I was very interested in your comment regarding the need to amend to provide for a community power to allow approval of any replacement IANA provider in the event of separation. This seems to very directly concern the IANA transition itself and the prospect of securing certification of the proposal by the NTIA to Congress.
Could you please explain this a bit further in simple language? Are you saying that ICG or Stewardship has specified that in the event it becomes necessary to replace PTI, then approval (or veto) of that choice should be a listed community power of the Sole Member?
Just seeking to understand this issue more clearly.
Thank you,
Anne
**
*Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel*
*Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP | *
*One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611*
*(T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725*
*_AAikman@LRRLaw.com <mailto:AAikman@LRRLaw.com>_**| www.LRRLaw.com <http://www.lrrlaw.com/>*
**
* *
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Thanks Avri. Very important to track in terms of consistency of coordination between and among CCWG- ACCT, Stewardship, and ICG. In this regard, I noted Jonathan's comments on behalf of Stewardship and found myself wondering how the conditions listed in their recommendations (especially as to the budget) are met by the MEM proposal. I think it is likely the Board looked at the Stewardship conditions as to budget before filing its comments and alternate proposal so I assume that question will be answered in LA if not before. I'm pretty sure Greg was on Stewardship. He may have an opinion on whether the MEM proposal meets the Stewardship assumptions re Accountability that are listed in the comment letter signed by Jonathan Robinson. Anne Anne E. Aikman-Scalese Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP | One South Church Avenue Suite 700 Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@LRRLaw.com | www.LRRLaw.com -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2015 10:20 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Your public comment re replacement of IANA provider Hi, I think it was just oversight on our part. At one point I was supposed to track these things for the CWG in the CCWG, but once the chairs took over the liaison role with their frequent joint leadership meetings, I admit I fell asleep on the task and it was only when doing the review of both documents that the gap became obvious. So, I started talking it up and decided to put a comment on it. Part of the CWG requirement on the CCWG was a mechanism to insure that the ICANN Names Operational Community would have the same power that the IETF has to replace its IANA function operator defined in an ironclad manner under the new accountability mechanisms. Not only did the CWG recommend that a fundamental bylaw be created that covered the Separation Cross Community WG (SCWG), but it included the requirement for the outcome of this group to be approved both by the Board " *and a community mechanism derived from the CCWG-Accountability**process." *T*he CWG was not determining the CCWG outcome of a *SM*, but indicated that whatever Community Mechanism we create, have the power to approve, or disapprove, the recommendation of the SCWG along with the Boar*d.****Similar to the CCWG WS1 recommendation itself, it is a decision that the community and the Board would need to come to together. ****While not an issue in the CWG comment on CCWG Draft 2, I believe there is an inconsistency between the CWG report as included in the ICG aggregated proposal and CCWG Draft 2. The CWG comment on CCWG indicates that this may no longer be necessary as the other mechanisms somehow make up for the absence of this direct power. This may indeed end up the result, but I believe that at the issue needs to be discussed, and a change needs to be made either in the ICG report, backing off on the explicit requirement, or in the CCWG's list of community powers. Of course if we go with the MEM, this may all be moot as far as the CCWG is concerned, as there would be no community powers as conceived in Draft 2. Though I expect we would need to then change the CWG's explicit requirements as defined in the ICG aggregated proposal. As far as NTIA is concerned, I just think they will be looking for consistency in our recommendations. I do not believe they care about such details, as long as we find general agreement on them. thanks avri
Avri,
I was very interested in your comment regarding the need to amend to provide for a community power to allow approval of any replacement IANA provider in the event of separation. This seems to very directly concern the IANA transition itself and the prospect of securing certification of the proposal by the NTIA to Congress.
Could you please explain this a bit further in simple language? Are you saying that ICG or Stewardship has specified that in the event it becomes necessary to replace PTI, then approval (or veto) of that choice should be a listed community power of the Sole Member?
Just seeking to understand this issue more clearly.
Thank you,
Anne
**
*Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel*
*Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP | *
*One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611*
*(T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725*
*_AAikman@LRRLaw.com <mailto:AAikman@LRRLaw.com>_**| www.LRRLaw.com <http://www.lrrlaw.com/>*
**
* *
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Dear All, The Budget issue as required by CWG will NOT be met by MEM Moreover, the removal of Individual Board Members will not also be exercised in MEM The issue raised by AVri will neither be addressed through MEM : Kavouss 2015-09-16 21:06 GMT+02:00 Aikman-Scalese, Anne <AAikman@lrrlaw.com>:
Thanks Avri. Very important to track in terms of consistency of coordination between and among CCWG- ACCT, Stewardship, and ICG. In this regard, I noted Jonathan's comments on behalf of Stewardship and found myself wondering how the conditions listed in their recommendations (especially as to the budget) are met by the MEM proposal.
I think it is likely the Board looked at the Stewardship conditions as to budget before filing its comments and alternate proposal so I assume that question will be answered in LA if not before.
I'm pretty sure Greg was on Stewardship. He may have an opinion on whether the MEM proposal meets the Stewardship assumptions re Accountability that are listed in the comment letter signed by Jonathan Robinson. Anne
Anne E. Aikman-Scalese Of Counsel Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP | One South Church Avenue Suite 700 Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611 (T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725 AAikman@LRRLaw.com | www.LRRLaw.com -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2015 10:20 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Your public comment re replacement of IANA provider
Hi,
I think it was just oversight on our part. At one point I was supposed to track these things for the CWG in the CCWG, but once the chairs took over the liaison role with their frequent joint leadership meetings, I admit I fell asleep on the task and it was only when doing the review of both documents that the gap became obvious. So, I started talking it up and decided to put a comment on it.
Part of the CWG requirement on the CCWG was a mechanism to insure that the ICANN Names Operational Community would have the same power that the IETF has to replace its IANA function operator defined in an ironclad manner under the new accountability mechanisms. Not only did the CWG recommend that a fundamental bylaw be created that covered the Separation Cross Community WG (SCWG), but it included the requirement for the outcome of this group to be approved both by the Board " *and a community mechanism derived from the CCWG-Accountability**process." *T*he CWG was not determining the CCWG outcome of a *SM*, but indicated that whatever Community Mechanism we create, have the power to approve, or disapprove, the recommendation of the SCWG along with the Boar*d.****Similar to the CCWG WS1 recommendation itself, it is a decision that the community and the Board would need to come to together. ****While not an issue in the CWG comment on CCWG Draft 2, I believe there is an inconsistency between the CWG report as included in the ICG aggregated proposal and CCWG Draft 2. The CWG comment on CCWG indicates that this may no longer be necessary as the other mechanisms somehow make up for the absence of this direct power. This may indeed end up the result, but I believe that at the issue needs to be discussed, and a change needs to be made either in the ICG report, backing off on the explicit requirement, or in the CCWG's list of community powers. Of course if we go with the MEM, this may all be moot as far as the CCWG is concerned, as there would be no community powers as conceived in Draft 2. Though I expect we would need to then change the CWG's explicit requirements as defined in the ICG aggregated proposal. As far as NTIA is concerned, I just think they will be looking for consistency in our recommendations. I do not believe they care about such details, as long as we find general agreement on them. thanks avri
Avri,
I was very interested in your comment regarding the need to amend to provide for a community power to allow approval of any replacement IANA provider in the event of separation. This seems to very directly concern the IANA transition itself and the prospect of securing certification of the proposal by the NTIA to Congress.
Could you please explain this a bit further in simple language? Are you saying that ICG or Stewardship has specified that in the event it becomes necessary to replace PTI, then approval (or veto) of that choice should be a listed community power of the Sole Member?
Just seeking to understand this issue more clearly.
Thank you,
Anne
**
*Anne E. Aikman-Scalese, Of Counsel*
*Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP | *
*One South Church Avenue Suite 700 | Tucson, Arizona 85701-1611*
*(T) 520.629.4428 | (F) 520.879.4725*
*_AAikman@LRRLaw.com <mailto:AAikman@LRRLaw.com>_**| www.LRRLaw.com <http://www.lrrlaw.com/>*
**
* *
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Hello Anne,
In this regard, I noted Jonathan's comments on behalf of Stewardship and found myself wondering how the conditions listed in their recommendations (especially as to the budget) are met by the MEM proposal.
The Board proposes introducing a community approval process to the budget approval process into the fundamental bylaws. The MEM proposal allows the community to ensure the Board is following the bylaws, and that the decision of an independent panel becomes binding. With respect to bylaws changes for the Budget, the Board suggested the following process: - the community should have a maximum of two opportunities to reject the budget - the Board in both cases would work with the community to resolve the concerns of the community - if after two rejections the Budget cannot be adjusted to take into account the community’s view, the Board may proceed to approve a Budget, but the budget may not include new, substantial items not accepted by the community, and may not represent an increase of more than 10% over the previous year’s Budget (taking into account any inflation at the time). - This would allow ICANN to continue its operations with Budgets/Plans more appropriately allocated for its current operating/fiscal year than would be possible under a requirement that ICANN simply maintain an historical Budget/Plan. I am not sure how this would not meet the budget requirements regarding the IANA function. ie the IANA function would essentially continue on its previous budget with an increase up to 10%. I guess the community could reject an increase in the IANA budget beyond that - but not sure that is a concern of the CWG. The budget approval process is certainly a topic of interest to the Board - and the Board's is trying to support the concept of the community being able to reject a budget, but didn’t want to get into a budget paralysis situation. The Board also wanted a little flexibility to be able to go up by up to 10% if there were increases in costs e.g. data centre costs, etc. The intent though was that the Board couldn't add a new substantial item without community approval - e.g. to buy an office building etc. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
participants (4)
-
Aikman-Scalese, Anne -
Avri Doria -
Bruce Tonkin -
Kavouss Arasteh