Board comments on Board removal in the context of GAC advice
Hello All, The Board has been following the work of the CCWG and appreciates the enormous effort over the past weeks, and especially in closing on the last few outstanding issues. Since the GAC Advice compromise has been reached this week, we are concerned over the lower threshold for Board removal reflected in Recommendation 2, paragraph 51, in the exceptional situation of GAC advice. As the Board has previously noted, the threshold of 4 SO/ACs is an important safeguard to ensure full support across the ICANN community in the event of an entire Board recall. To mitigate the Board's concerns with this new compromise, we suggest that this new lower threshold only applies when BOTH of the following occurs: - The Board decides to accept GAC advice, and hence the GAC cannot participate in a decision to remove the Board over this decision and - An IRP raised by the community has found that the Board acted inconsistently with its bylaws (which includes the mission). This would mitigate our concern of going directly to a board removal process with a lower threshold. To outline this further, below are a few scenarios: 1. GAC provides the Board with a consensus advice. 2. Board accepts the advice 3. Community believes the Board acted outside its mission in accepting GAC advice. 4. Community raises an IRP. Scenario 1: 5. IRP finds that the Board acted outside its mission in acting on the GAC advice. 6. Board accepts IRP finding and acts in alignment with the IRP decision 7. Case closed. The Community cannot exercise its power to remove the Board using a reduced threshold of three SOs/ACs. Scenario 2: 5. IRP finds that the Board acted outside its mission in acting on the GAC advice. 6. Board does not accept IRP finding and does not act in alignment with the decision 7. The community can base its power to remove the Board on the failure to follow the IRP decision, and may do so with a reduced threshold of three SO/ACs in support and no more than one objection Scenario 3: 5. IRP finds that the Board did not act outside its mission in accepting the GAC advice. 6. Case closed. The Community cannot exercise its power to remove the Board using a reduced threshold of three SOs/ACs. Regards, Bruce Tonkin ICANN Board Liaison to the CCWG
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On 13 Feb 2016, at 06:51, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
To mitigate the Board's concerns with this new compromise, we suggest that this new lower threshold only applies when BOTH of the following occurs:
- The Board decides to accept GAC advice, and hence the GAC cannot participate in a decision to remove the Board over this decision
and
- An IRP raised by the community has found that the Board acted inconsistently with its bylaws (which includes the mission).
A community IRP requires an action of the empowered community to bring the challenge to the Board's action before the IRP. The current compromise text would, I think, prevent the GAC from participating in a decision to bring that challenge in the case where the action challenged is the Board's implementation of what the GAC has asked for. What you are proposing would allow the GAC to participate in that decision, which is an essential step in the process from which you appear to accept the GAC ought to be excluded. This does not seem consistent. Malcolm.
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On 13 Feb 2016, at 16:12, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
What you are proposing would allow the GAC to participate in that decision
Or have I misunderstood? Was your proposed qualification limited only to qualifying Board removal power, not the other community powers?
No Malcolm The Board just reminding that for the removal of the entire Board consensus agreement of 4 SO/AC is required . However, for cases that Board removal is invoked as results of action taken in regard with GAC advice and based in the recent compromise GAC is excluded from exercising its community power then there would remain 4 SO/AC for decision making then either 4 must agree or one objection criteria is used only 3 agreement would remain which does not meet the criteria of 4 in favour and not more than against That is all Regards Kavousd Sent from my iPhone
On 13 Feb 2016, at 17:17, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
Sent from my iPhone
On 13 Feb 2016, at 16:12, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
What you are proposing would allow the GAC to participate in that decision
Or have I misunderstood? Was your proposed qualification limited only to qualifying Board removal power, not the other community powers? _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Malcolm, As I read it, and please, Bruce, correct me if I’m wrong, this only refers to whole Board removal power and not the rest of community powers so it would leave compromise language intact but clarifying the point in Rec 2 to this end. Best regards, León
El 13/02/2016, a las 10:17 a.m., Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> escribió:
Sent from my iPhone
On 13 Feb 2016, at 16:12, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
What you are proposing would allow the GAC to participate in that decision
Or have I misunderstood? Was your proposed qualification limited only to qualifying Board removal power, not the other community powers? _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Bruce, So in the case of an EC challenge of a Board decision based on consensus GAC advice, the thresholds would remain at three for the IRP and dismissal of the Board and the GAC could not participate as a decision also participant for either? The only change is that the EC would be required to go to an IRP process first before moving to spill the Board? Thanks for the clarification. Best, Brett __________ ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> On Feb 13, 2016, at 2:40 PM, León Felipe Sánchez Ambía <leonfelipe@sanchez.mx<mailto:leonfelipe@sanchez.mx>> wrote: Dear Malcolm, As I read it, and please, Bruce, correct me if I’m wrong, this only refers to whole Board removal power and not the rest of community powers so it would leave compromise language intact but clarifying the point in Rec 2 to this end. Best regards, León
El 13/02/2016, a las 10:17 a.m., Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net<mailto:malcolm@linx.net>> escribió:
Sent from my iPhone
On 13 Feb 2016, at 16:12, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net<mailto:malcolm@linx.net>> wrote:
What you are proposing would allow the GAC to participate in that decision
Or have I misunderstood? Was your proposed qualification limited only to qualifying Board removal power, not the other community powers? _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Bruce, Thinking this through led me to another question. What if the Board decision, based on consensus GAC advice, is not necessarily against the outside of the scope or mission of ICANN (thus an IRP would not reverse it) but it is opposed by 3 or 4 SOACs? What recourse would they have under your proposal? Thanks, Brett __________ ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> On Feb 13, 2016, at 3:15 PM, Schaefer, Brett <Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org<mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> wrote: Bruce, So in the case of an EC challenge of a Board decision based on consensus GAC advice, the thresholds would remain at three for the IRP and dismissal of the Board and the GAC could not participate as a decision also participant for either? The only change is that the EC would be required to go to an IRP process first before moving to spill the Board? Thanks for the clarification. Best, Brett __________ ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org><http://heritage.org/> On Feb 13, 2016, at 2:40 PM, León Felipe Sánchez Ambía <leonfelipe@sanchez.mx<mailto:leonfelipe@sanchez.mx><mailto:leonfelipe@sanchez.mx>> wrote: Dear Malcolm, As I read it, and please, Bruce, correct me if I’m wrong, this only refers to whole Board removal power and not the rest of community powers so it would leave compromise language intact but clarifying the point in Rec 2 to this end. Best regards, León
El 13/02/2016, a las 10:17 a.m., Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net<mailto:malcolm@linx.net><mailto:malcolm@linx.net>> escribió:
Sent from my iPhone
On 13 Feb 2016, at 16:12, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net<mailto:malcolm@linx.net><mailto:malcolm@linx.net>> wrote:
What you are proposing would allow the GAC to participate in that decision
Or have I misunderstood? Was your proposed qualification limited only to qualifying Board removal power, not the other community powers? _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community><https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>>
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Hello Brett,
What if the Board decision, based on consensus GAC advice, is not necessarily against the outside of the scope or mission of ICANN (thus an IRP would not reverse it) but it is opposed by 3 or 4 SOACs? What recourse would they have under your proposal?
For matters where the Board is operating within the mission and bylaws, our view is that the 4 SOs/ACs threshold should apply to recall the whole Board. From reading the discussion on this list though, I think the more common scenario is that the community feels that the Board has stepped outside of the scope of its mission in accepting a participial piece of GAC advice. Thus I think the IRP would normally be the most common way of dealing with such cases. Other than that there are a range of other community powers that may apply in other circumstances that don’t have such a high threshold. For example if the Board accepted GAC advice to spend lots of money in a particular area which is within ICANN's mission, but the rest of the community objected, then community powers related to budget etc would apply. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
Bruce, Thanks for the clarification. Your three scenarios implied that if the IRP failed, the EC could not move to remove the Board. I'm glad that would not be the case. Getting back to the thresholds, I do not agree that the EC should have to act unanimously to exercise any of its powers. Best, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> On Feb 13, 2016, at 7:37 PM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> wrote: Hello Brett,
What if the Board decision, based on consensus GAC advice, is not necessarily against the outside of the scope or mission of ICANN (thus an IRP would not reverse it) but it is opposed by 3 or 4 SOACs? What recourse would they have under your proposal?
For matters where the Board is operating within the mission and bylaws, our view is that the 4 SOs/ACs threshold should apply to recall the whole Board. From reading the discussion on this list though, I think the more common scenario is that the community feels that the Board has stepped outside of the scope of its mission in accepting a participial piece of GAC advice. Thus I think the IRP would normally be the most common way of dealing with such cases. Other than that there are a range of other community powers that may apply in other circumstances that don’t have such a high threshold. For example if the Board accepted GAC advice to spend lots of money in a particular area which is within ICANN's mission, but the rest of the community objected, then community powers related to budget etc would apply. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
Dear All, May we understand how 3/4 SO/AC could opppose to the Board's decision taken on GAC CONSENSUS ADVICE without recoures to IRP ? Under which course of action and what Community power ( which Recommendation) that action could be taken Regards Kavouss 2016-02-14 2:45 GMT+01:00 Schaefer, Brett <Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>:
Bruce,
Thanks for the clarification. Your three scenarios implied that if the IRP failed, the EC could not move to remove the Board. I'm glad that would not be the case.
Getting back to the thresholds, I do not agree that the EC should have to act unanimously to exercise any of its powers.
Best,
Brett
________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/>
On Feb 13, 2016, at 7:37 PM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au <mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> wrote:
Hello Brett,
What if the Board decision, based on consensus GAC advice, is not necessarily against the outside of the scope or mission of ICANN (thus an IRP would not reverse it) but it is opposed by 3 or 4 SOACs? What recourse would they have under your proposal?
For matters where the Board is operating within the mission and bylaws, our view is that the 4 SOs/ACs threshold should apply to recall the whole Board.
From reading the discussion on this list though, I think the more common scenario is that the community feels that the Board has stepped outside of the scope of its mission in accepting a participial piece of GAC advice. Thus I think the IRP would normally be the most common way of dealing with such cases.
Other than that there are a range of other community powers that may apply in other circumstances that don’t have such a high threshold. For example if the Board accepted GAC advice to spend lots of money in a particular area which is within ICANN's mission, but the rest of the community objected, then community powers related to budget etc would apply.
Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto: Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<; https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hello Brett,
The only change is that the EC would be required to go to an IRP process first before moving to spill the Board?
That is correct, and only in the case of the GAC-carve out scenario. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
On 14/02/2016 00:26, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
Hello Brett,
The only change is that the EC would be required to go to an IRP process first before moving to spill the Board?
That is correct, and only in the case of the GAC-carve out scenario.
Bruce, Leon, Kavouss, Thank you all for your clarifications. Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
Dear Brett Pls carefully read that Regards Hello All, From Bruce$ The Board has been following the work of the CCWG and appreciates the enormous effort over the past weeks, and especially in closing on the last few outstanding issues. Since the GAC Advice compromise has been reached this week, we are concerned over the lower threshold for Board removal reflected in Recommendation 2, paragraph 51, in the exceptional situation of GAC advice. As the Board has previously noted, the threshold of 4 SO/ACs is an important safeguard to ensure full support across the ICANN community in the event of an entire Board recall. To mitigate the Board's concerns with this new compromise, we suggest that this new lower threshold only applies when BOTH of the following occurs: - The Board decides to accept GAC advice, and hence the GAC cannot participate in a decision to remove the Board over this decision and - An IRP raised by the community has found that the Board acted inconsistently with its bylaws (which includes the mission). This would mitigate our concern of going directly to a board removal process with a lower threshold. To outline this further, below are a few scenarios: 1. GAC provides the Board with a consensus advice. 2. Board accepts the advice 3. Community believes the Board acted outside its mission in accepting GAC advice. 4. Community raises an IRP. Scenario 1: 5. IRP finds that the Board acted outside its mission in acting on the GAC advice. 6. Board accepts IRP finding and acts in alignment with the IRP decision 7. Case closed. The Community cannot exercise its power to remove the Board using a reduced threshold of three SOs/ACs. Scenario 2: 5. IRP finds that the Board acted outside its mission in acting on the GAC advice. 6. Board does not accept IRP finding and does not act in alignment with the decision 7. The community can base its power to remove the Board on the failure to follow the IRP decision, and may do so with a reduced threshold of three SO/ACs in support and no more than one objection Scenario 3: 5. IRP finds that the Board did not act outside its mission in accepting the GAC advice. 6. Case closed. The Community cannot exercise its power to remove the Board using a reduced threshold of three SOs/ACs. Regards, Bruce Tonkin ICANN Board Liaison to the CCWG ______________________________ 2016-02-14 13:07 GMT+01:00 Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>:
On 14/02/2016 00:26, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
Hello Brett,
The only change is that the EC would be required to go to an IRP process first before moving to spill the Board?
That is correct, and only in the case of the GAC-carve out scenario.
Bruce, Leon, Kavouss,
Thank you all for your clarifications.
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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Kavouss, Thank you, I did read it. It was why I raised my question in the first place. Best, Brett From: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, February 16, 2016 4:02 PM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Bruce Tonkin; Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Board comments on Board removal in the context of GAC advice Dear Brett Pls carefully read that Regards Hello All, From Bruce$ The Board has been following the work of the CCWG and appreciates the enormous effort over the past weeks, and especially in closing on the last few outstanding issues. Since the GAC Advice compromise has been reached this week, we are concerned over the lower threshold for Board removal reflected in Recommendation 2, paragraph 51, in the exceptional situation of GAC advice. As the Board has previously noted, the threshold of 4 SO/ACs is an important safeguard to ensure full support across the ICANN community in the event of an entire Board recall. To mitigate the Board's concerns with this new compromise, we suggest that this new lower threshold only applies when BOTH of the following occurs: - The Board decides to accept GAC advice, and hence the GAC cannot participate in a decision to remove the Board over this decision and - An IRP raised by the community has found that the Board acted inconsistently with its bylaws (which includes the mission). This would mitigate our concern of going directly to a board removal process with a lower threshold. To outline this further, below are a few scenarios: 1. GAC provides the Board with a consensus advice. 2. Board accepts the advice 3. Community believes the Board acted outside its mission in accepting GAC advice. 4. Community raises an IRP. Scenario 1: 5. IRP finds that the Board acted outside its mission in acting on the GAC advice. 6. Board accepts IRP finding and acts in alignment with the IRP decision 7. Case closed. The Community cannot exercise its power to remove the Board using a reduced threshold of three SOs/ACs. Scenario 2: 5. IRP finds that the Board acted outside its mission in acting on the GAC advice. 6. Board does not accept IRP finding and does not act in alignment with the decision 7. The community can base its power to remove the Board on the failure to follow the IRP decision, and may do so with a reduced threshold of three SO/ACs in support and no more than one objection Scenario 3: 5. IRP finds that the Board did not act outside its mission in accepting the GAC advice. 6. Case closed. The Community cannot exercise its power to remove the Board using a reduced threshold of three SOs/ACs. Regards, Bruce Tonkin ICANN Board Liaison to the CCWG ______________________________ 2016-02-14 13:07 GMT+01:00 Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net<mailto:malcolm@linx.net>>: On 14/02/2016 00:26, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
Hello Brett,
The only change is that the EC would be required to go to an IRP process first before moving to spill the Board?
That is correct, and only in the case of the GAC-carve out scenario.
Bruce, Leon, Kavouss, Thank you all for your clarifications. Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523<tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/<http://publicaffairs.linx.net/> London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
2016-02-16 22:04 GMT+01:00 Schaefer, Brett <Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>:
Kavouss,
Thank you, I did read it. It was why I raised my question in the first place.
Best,
Brett
*From:* Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] *Sent:* Tuesday, February 16, 2016 4:02 PM *To:* Schaefer, Brett *Cc:* Bruce Tonkin; Accountability Cross Community *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Board comments on Board removal in the context of GAC advice
Dear Brett
Pls carefully read that
Regards
Hello All,
From Bruce$
The Board has been following the work of the CCWG and appreciates the enormous effort over the past weeks, and especially in closing on the last few outstanding issues.
Since the GAC Advice compromise has been reached this week, we are concerned over the lower threshold for Board removal reflected in Recommendation 2, paragraph 51, in the exceptional situation of GAC advice. As the Board has previously noted, the threshold of 4 SO/ACs is an important safeguard to ensure full support across the ICANN community in the event of an entire Board recall.
To mitigate the Board's concerns with this new compromise, we suggest that this new lower threshold only applies when BOTH of the following occurs:
- The Board decides to accept GAC advice, and hence the GAC cannot participate in a decision to remove the Board over this decision
and
- An IRP raised by the community has found that the Board acted inconsistently with its bylaws (which includes the mission).
This would mitigate our concern of going directly to a board removal process with a lower threshold.
To outline this further, below are a few scenarios:
1. GAC provides the Board with a consensus advice.
2. Board accepts the advice
3. Community believes the Board acted outside its mission in accepting GAC advice.
4. Community raises an IRP.
Scenario 1:
5. IRP finds that the Board acted outside its mission in acting on the GAC advice.
6. Board accepts IRP finding and acts in alignment with the IRP decision
7. Case closed. The Community cannot exercise its power to remove the Board using a reduced threshold of three SOs/ACs.
Scenario 2:
5. IRP finds that the Board acted outside its mission in acting on the GAC advice.
6. Board does not accept IRP finding and does not act in alignment with the decision
7. The community can base its power to remove the Board on the failure to follow the IRP decision, and may do so with a reduced threshold of three SO/ACs in support and no more than one objection
Scenario 3:
5. IRP finds that the Board did not act outside its mission in accepting the GAC advice.
6. Case closed. The Community cannot exercise its power to remove the Board using a reduced threshold of three SOs/ACs.
Regards,
Bruce Tonkin
ICANN Board Liaison to the CCWG ______________________________
2016-02-14 13:07 GMT+01:00 Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>:
On 14/02/2016 00:26, Bruce Tonkin wrote:
Hello Brett,
The only change is that the EC would be required to go to an IRP process first before moving to spill the Board?
That is correct, and only in the case of the GAC-carve out scenario.
Bruce, Leon, Kavouss,
Thank you all for your clarifications.
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
------------------------------ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hi, I guess paragraph 23 and 24 of REC2 is what probably created the confusion that the community could go directly to exercise community power to remove a/entire board member(s) without going through IRP by making it look like they are 2 path options to exercise the community power. It's good this was clarified and I expect it will be minor edit to remove paragraph 24 and update paragraph 23 not to reflect as option 1 because that is indeed the only path to take. That said, as you indicated I believe the required threshold for IRP remains 3 and its only that of removal that will reduce to 3 in this context (Paragraph 51). Regards On 13 Feb 2016 21:14, "Schaefer, Brett" <Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org> wrote:
Bruce,
So in the case of an EC challenge of a Board decision based on consensus GAC advice, the thresholds would remain at three for the IRP and dismissal of the Board and the GAC could not participate as a decision also participant for either?
The only change is that the EC would be required to go to an IRP process first before moving to spill the Board?
Thanks for the clarification.
Best,
Brett
__________
________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/>
On Feb 13, 2016, at 2:40 PM, León Felipe Sánchez Ambía < leonfelipe@sanchez.mx<mailto:leonfelipe@sanchez.mx>> wrote:
Dear Malcolm,
As I read it, and please, Bruce, correct me if I’m wrong, this only refers to whole Board removal power and not the rest of community powers so it would leave compromise language intact but clarifying the point in Rec 2 to this end.
Best regards,
León
El 13/02/2016, a las 10:17 a.m., Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net<mailto: malcolm@linx.net>> escribió:
Sent from my iPhone
On 13 Feb 2016, at 16:12, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net<mailto: malcolm@linx.net>> wrote:
What you are proposing would allow the GAC to participate in that decision
Or have I misunderstood? Was your proposed qualification limited only to qualifying Board removal power, not the other community powers? _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto: Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<; https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto: Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Leon Yes, everybody understood it as you did Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 13 Feb 2016, at 20:37, León Felipe Sánchez Ambía <leonfelipe@sanchez.mx> wrote:
Dear Malcolm,
As I read it, and please, Bruce, correct me if I’m wrong, this only refers to whole Board removal power and not the rest of community powers so it would leave compromise language intact but clarifying the point in Rec 2 to this end.
Best regards,
León
El 13/02/2016, a las 10:17 a.m., Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> escribió:
Sent from my iPhone
On 13 Feb 2016, at 16:12, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
What you are proposing would allow the GAC to participate in that decision
Or have I misunderstood? Was your proposed qualification limited only to qualifying Board removal power, not the other community powers? _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Yes that is right León. -----Original Message----- From: León Felipe Sánchez Ambía [mailto:leonfelipe@sanchez.mx] Sent: Sunday, 14 February 2016 6:38 AM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> Cc: Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>; Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Board comments on Board removal in the context of GAC advice Dear Malcolm, As I read it, and please, Bruce, correct me if I’m wrong, this only refers to whole Board removal power and not the rest of community powers so it would leave compromise language intact but clarifying the point in Rec 2 to this end. Best regards, León
El 13/02/2016, a las 10:17 a.m., Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> escribió:
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On 13 Feb 2016, at 16:12, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
What you are proposing would allow the GAC to participate in that decision
Or have I misunderstood? Was your proposed qualification limited only to qualifying Board removal power, not the other community powers? _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hello Malcolm,
What you are proposing would allow the GAC to participate in that decision, which is an essential step in the process from which you appear to accept the GAC ought to be excluded. This does not seem consistent.
From: "The GAC may not participate as a decision-maker in the Empowered Community's exercise of a Community Power to challenge the ICANN Board (referred to as the "GAC carve-out"). In such cases, the GAC will still be entitled to participate in the Empowered Community in an advisory capacity in all other aspects of the escalation process, but its views will not count towards or against the thresholds needed to initiate a conference call, convene a Community Forum, or exercise the Community Power. It is clear that the GAC would not be entitled to participate as a decision-maker to exercise a Community Power including initiating a Community IRP with respect to GAC advice. Regards, Bruce Tonkin Malcolm.
participants (6)
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Bruce Tonkin -
Kavouss Arasteh -
León Felipe Sánchez Ambía -
Malcolm Hutty -
Schaefer, Brett -
Seun Ojedeji