hi Paul, hi all On 30 July 2015 at 18:33, Paul Szyndler <paul.szyndler@auda.org.au> wrote:

Hi Jordan,

Thanks for the time and effort that you have contributed to refining this document.

I have a handful of comments / questions that we may wish to address before we reach the public comment phase.

Many of these are about improving clarity and minimising the risk of ambiguity.

The drafting quality reflects the time available, unfortunately. Worth saying that up front.

· Getting language right about “petitioning” is important because it is the first step toward community “action”. So this (page 2) is confusing: *“To trigger community consideration for the use of a community power, an SO or AC has to agree by a resolution of its governing body that the power should be used. A simple majority is sufficient to support a petition for any power so it can proceed to the discussion stage”. *What “simple majority” are we referring to? Of the ccNSO Council? ccNSO membership? Of SOs and ACs? I assume you are referring to a “simple majority” of the governing body…..but we should be extremely precise. Also, are we intending to mandate how each SO/AC will execute its own processes for reaching agreement / consensus, or can each develop their own methodologies? Once again, clarity is vital.

I thought "by a resolution of its governing body" and then specifying the threshold was fairly precise...? If the petitioning threshold was right beside those words would it be clearer? My view of where the CCWG is at is that there is no desire to manage the affairs of SOs or ACs so long as they are complying with the rules that do get set out. So a simple majority does not preclude consensus approaches, or engagement with membership, but it does not require anything other than a vote. Do you think we should regulate things further? Do others? · Under 5B.1 (Reconsider budget or strategy/operating plans) is

there a need for overtly negative language regarding ICANN putting budgets and plans to the community “without sufficient detail to facilitate thoughtful consideration”? I would propose highlighting the subsequent paragraph (04) about greater transparency and community involvement as a preferred introductory statement. Similarly, Para 18 on changes to ICANN Standard Bylaws is, once again, negative in tone. Can we craft these in a more diplomatic tone? Further, the examples in Para 18 of the ccNSO’s PDP and GNSO Stakeholder Groups are problematic for reasons that I believe Chris has discussed with you recently.

On tone - I'd have no problem doing this, but I frankly don't know if I will be allowed to (or when it would be possible to fit it in). We are entirely out of time. The examples in the Standard Bylaws paper are deliberately chosen, since they are ones that are pertinent to the power & to significant constituents of the organisation. Do you have ones you would have preferred to see used? There are, of course, a very large set of possibilities to choose from. :-) · Para 15 on budget / plan veto: *“A 2/3 level of support in the

mechanism would be required in the mechanism to reject the ICANN or IANA budget or an operating/strategic plan the first time: a 3/4 level of support is required for a second rejection.” *Aside from drafting errors, we need to be clearer as to who “2/3” or “3/4” refers to.

Thanks for picking this up. "In the mechanism" is too shorthand. In English, it means: Votes of the CMSM, with the participating SOs and ACs. The drafting error in terms of repetition needs to be fixed - the para should read (taking into account better language from elsewhere): "To succeed, a veto would require a *2/3* level of support in the Community Mechanism. A *3/4* level of support is required for a second veto on the same budget or plan."

· Para 29 on removing Directors: *“It is expected that this power would only be exercised is cases of serious difficulty with a particular director”. *I don’t wish to head further down the rabbit hole of detail, but in drafting this document, we are talking about nuclear options for the community. Would you expect that terms such as “serious difficulty” will be more fully defined?

No, I would not. Since the power is unlimited as a matter of law, we have carefully only given the vaguest of examples. It was a difficult conversation to agree to a work item for WS2 in developing a statement of reasonable community expectations that would be useful in guiding board members (and the community for that matter). Objective standards are off the table in the bylaws framework for this power. As, indeed, they are for the current power for the Board to remove directors. Hope this helps. cheers Jordan

Catch you on the upcoming calls,

Paul

*From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Jordan Carter *Sent:* Thursday, 30 July 2015 9:51 AM *To:* wp1@icann.org; Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] Section 5B - community powers - consolidated draft

Hi all

Attached are the community powers papers combined into one document, and benefiting from the latest legal review and updates following our last call. This is for discussion in our next CCWG call/s.

*I draw your attention in particular to two points:*

** in the *"removing individual ICANN directors"* paper (section 5B.3) there was no limit on the number of times people could seek the removal of a director: if a vote failed, a new petition could happen immediately. *I have suggested there should be a standdown period of six months - if a vote to remove an individual director fails, a new petition could not be lodged.* It doesn't seem fair to allow the community to simply wear down an elected director by attrition like this.

** in *"recall of the ICANN Board" *paper (section 5B.4), there was a weirdness in the *petitioning*. We agreed that two SOs or ACs must petition to trigger this, at least one of which needed to be an SO, but the paper had a legacy oddness that 2/3 of the SOs and ACs would have to sign on to the petition. This was the same threshold as the actual decision. *So I have deleted it.*

The changes to the Budget paper also clarify the separateness of decisions re IANA budget and ICANN budget.

Redline and clean versions attached. Please treat the clean version as the authoritative one. The redline includes all changes other than formatting and minor word changes that don't change substance, as far as I know.

cheers

Jordan

--

Jordan Carter

Chief Executive *InternetNZ*

+64-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter

*A better world through a better Internet *

-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter *A better world through a better Internet *