Thanks for the share Jordan. Could you kindly confirm if any of the following is not correct: - The community forum will allow for any member of SO/AC to participate and not selected few - That the SO/AC intending to remove its board member would not only use the community forum as announcement formality but rather state convincing rationale to the community - That the community forum could serve as an opportunity to convince the petitioning SO/AC to desist from(or encourage) proceeding with the removal - That the community forum will be held in a most efficient manner; for instance, it would make no economic sense to have multiple community forums in a year as a result of varying times of petition from the SO/AC (although I read that community forum will hold during the 3rd ICANN meeting but sections as quoted below creates the confusion: "Where such a call to remove a director meets the required threshold is announced, within fifteen days a meeting of the ICANN community forum.... will be convened" So how will this workout if a petition is made the February for instance, considering 3rd ICANN meeting is around October. Regards On 30 Jul 2015 12:51 am, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:

Hi all

Attached are the community powers papers combined into one document, and benefiting from the latest legal review and updates following our last call. This is for discussion in our next CCWG call/s.

*I draw your attention in particular to two points:*

** in the *"removing individual ICANN directors"* paper (section 5B.3) there was no limit on the number of times people could seek the removal of a director: if a vote failed, a new petition could happen immediately. *I have suggested there should be a standdown period of six months - if a vote to remove an individual director fails, a new petition could not be lodged.* It doesn't seem fair to allow the community to simply wear down an elected director by attrition like this.

** in *"recall of the ICANN Board" *paper (section 5B.4), there was a weirdness in the *petitioning*. We agreed that two SOs or ACs must petition to trigger this, at least one of which needed to be an SO, but the paper had a legacy oddness that 2/3 of the SOs and ACs would have to sign on to the petition. This was the same threshold as the actual decision. *So I have deleted it.*

The changes to the Budget paper also clarify the separateness of decisions re IANA budget and ICANN budget.

Redline and clean versions attached. Please treat the clean version as the authoritative one. The redline includes all changes other than formatting and minor word changes that don't change substance, as far as I know.

cheers Jordan

-- Jordan Carter

Chief Executive *InternetNZ*

+64-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter

*A better world through a better Internet *

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Hello all, Below are a few comments I have just sent to Jordan about the most recent Community Powers draft. I am happy to help undertake the drafting changes as I feel these are important points to address before the next round of public commentary. Regards, Paul Hi Jordan, Thanks for the time and effort that you have contributed to refining this document. I have a handful of comments / questions that we may wish to address before we reach the public comment phase. Many of these are about improving clarity and minimising the risk of ambiguity. * Getting language right about “petitioning” is important because it is the first step toward community “action”. So this (page 2) is confusing: “To trigger community consideration for the use of a community power, an SO or AC has to agree by a resolution of its governing body that the power should be used. A simple majority is sufficient to support a petition for any power so it can proceed to the discussion stage”. What “simple majority” are we referring to? Of the ccNSO Council? ccNSO membership? Of SOs and ACs? I assume you are referring to a “simple majority” of the governing body…..but we should be extremely precise. Also, are we intending to mandate how each SO/AC will execute its own processes for reaching agreement / consensus, or can each develop their own methodologies? Once again, clarity is vital. * Under 5B.1 (Reconsider budget or strategy/operating plans) is there a need for overtly negative language regarding ICANN putting budgets and plans to the community “without sufficient detail to facilitate thoughtful consideration”? I would propose highlighting the subsequent paragraph (04) about greater transparency and community involvement as a preferred introductory statement. Similarly, Para 18 on changes to ICANN Standard Bylaws is, once again, negative in tone. Can we craft these in a more diplomatic tone? Further, the examples in Para 18 of the ccNSO’s PDP and GNSO Stakeholder Groups are problematic for reasons that I believe Chris has discussed with you recently. * Para 15 on budget / plan veto: “A 2/3 level of support in the mechanism would be required in the mechanism to reject the ICANN or IANA budget or an operating/strategic plan the first time: a 3/4 level of support is required for a second rejection.” Aside from drafting errors, we need to be clearer as to who “2/3” or “3/4” refers to. * Para 29 on removing Directors: “It is expected that this power would only be exercised is cases of serious difficulty with a particular director”. I don’t wish to head further down the rabbit hole of detail, but in drafting this document, we are talking about nuclear options for the community. Would you expect that terms such as “serious difficulty” will be more fully defined? Catch you on the upcoming calls, Paul From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Thursday, 30 July 2015 9:51 AM To: wp1@icann.org; Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Section 5B - community powers - consolidated draft Hi all Attached are the community powers papers combined into one document, and benefiting from the latest legal review and updates following our last call. This is for discussion in our next CCWG call/s. I draw your attention in particular to two points: ** in the "removing individual ICANN directors" paper (section 5B.3) there was no limit on the number of times people could seek the removal of a director: if a vote failed, a new petition could happen immediately. I have suggested there should be a standdown period of six months - if a vote to remove an individual director fails, a new petition could not be lodged. It doesn't seem fair to allow the community to simply wear down an elected director by attrition like this. ** in "recall of the ICANN Board" paper (section 5B.4), there was a weirdness in the petitioning. We agreed that two SOs or ACs must petition to trigger this, at least one of which needed to be an SO, but the paper had a legacy oddness that 2/3 of the SOs and ACs would have to sign on to the petition. This was the same threshold as the actual decision. So I have deleted it. The changes to the Budget paper also clarify the separateness of decisions re IANA budget and ICANN budget. Redline and clean versions attached. Please treat the clean version as the authoritative one. The redline includes all changes other than formatting and minor word changes that don't change substance, as far as I know. cheers Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter A better world through a better Internet