proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement
In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use the Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to address this concern: ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and balance (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, etc.) is a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. J. Beckwith Burr Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer
Becky, "shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers" -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... well ... to court risk of repetition. Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative nameserver for Egypt running after its data expires? Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises delegated rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, does that authority revert to the delegating agency? If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of delegated name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and vastly narrower, than "services that use ..." Eric On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use the Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to address this concern:
ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and balance (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, etc.) is a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed.
J. Beckwith Burr Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Eric There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was corporate overreach. I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with economic regulation. On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Becky,
"shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers" -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... well ... to court risk of repetition.
Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative nameserver for Egypt running after its data expires?
Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises delegated rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, does that authority revert to the delegating agency?
If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of delegated name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and vastly narrower, than "services that use ..."
Eric
On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use the Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to address this concern:
ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and balance (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, etc.) is a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed.
J. Beckwith Burr Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Nigel, I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of it? You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, then "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of association of names and addresses. Eric On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Eric
There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was corporate overreach.
I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with economic regulation.
On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Becky,
"shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers" -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... well ... to court risk of repetition.
Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative nameserver for Egypt running after its data expires?
Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises delegated rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, does that authority revert to the delegating agency?
If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of delegated name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and vastly narrower, than "services that use ..."
Eric
On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use the Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to address this concern:
ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and balance (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, etc.) is a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed.
J. Beckwith Burr Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver. I could make MICROSOFT.COM resolve to SEX.COM on my network if I chose so to do (obviously I don't). On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of it?
You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, then "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of association of names and addresses.
Eric
On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Eric
There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was corporate overreach.
I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with economic regulation.
On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Becky,
"shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers" -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... well ... to court risk of repetition.
Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative nameserver for Egypt running after its data expires?
Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises delegated rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, does that authority revert to the delegating agency?
If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of delegated name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and vastly narrower, than "services that use ..."
Eric
On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use the Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to address this concern:
ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and balance (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, etc.) is a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed.
J. Beckwith Burr Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Nigel, Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..." I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..." Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected. Eric On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver.
I could make MICROSOFT.COM resolve to SEX.COM on my network if I chose so to do (obviously I don't).
On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of it?
You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, then "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of association of names and addresses.
Eric
On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Eric
There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was corporate overreach.
I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with economic regulation.
On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Becky,
"shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers" -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... well ... to court risk of repetition.
Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative nameserver for Egypt running after its data expires?
Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises delegated rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, does that authority revert to the delegating agency?
If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of delegated name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and vastly narrower, than "services that use ..."
Eric
On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use the Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to address this concern:
ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and balance (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, etc.) is a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed.
J. Beckwith Burr Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Articulation? "I submit that for ICANN to regulate the behaviour of DNS resolvers is overreaching its limited mission" Happy now? On 10/30/2015 06:21 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..."
I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..."
Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected.
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver.
I could make MICROSOFT.COM resolve to SEX.COM on my network if I chose so to do (obviously I don't).
On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of it?
You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, then "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of association of names and addresses.
Eric
On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Eric
There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was corporate overreach.
I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with economic regulation.
On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Becky,
"shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers" -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... well ... to court risk of repetition.
Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative nameserver for Egypt running after its data expires?
Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises delegated rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, does that authority revert to the delegating agency?
If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of delegated name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and vastly narrower, than "services that use ..."
Eric
On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use the Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to address this concern:
ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and balance (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, etc.) is a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed.
J. Beckwith Burr Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Nigel, If your "strong argument that 'addressing the wildcard problem' was corporate overreach" comes down to "because I said so", then I'm satisfied that I've gotten all the information available. So, yes, marvelously happy now, thanks! Eric On 10/30/15 11:27 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Articulation?
"I submit that for ICANN to regulate the behaviour of DNS resolvers is overreaching its limited mission"
Happy now?
On 10/30/2015 06:21 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..."
I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..."
Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected.
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver.
I could make MICROSOFT.COM resolve to SEX.COM on my network if I chose so to do (obviously I don't).
On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of it?
You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, then "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of association of names and addresses.
Eric
On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Eric
There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was corporate overreach.
I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with economic regulation.
On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Becky,
"shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers" -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... well ... to court risk of repetition.
Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative nameserver for Egypt running after its data expires?
Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises delegated rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, does that authority revert to the delegating agency?
If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of delegated name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and vastly narrower, than "services that use ..."
Eric
On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: > > In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two > brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the > Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use > the > Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services > carry > or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to > address > this concern: > > ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, > and as > reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way > limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not > regulate > services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content > that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, > ICANN > shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted > parties, > subject to established means of community input on those agreements > and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose > obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. > > What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and > balance > (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, > etc.) is > a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to > sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they > intend to > challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on > the > grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s > Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. > > > > > J. Beckwith Burr > Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >
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Nigel, don't worry he'll loose interest in the WG again soon. As usual. el On 2015-10-30 19:31 , Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
If your "strong argument that 'addressing the wildcard problem' was corporate overreach" comes down to "because I said so", then I'm satisfied that I've gotten all the information available.
So, yes, marvelously happy now, thanks!
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:27 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Articulation?
"I submit that for ICANN to regulate the behaviour of DNS resolvers is overreaching its limited mission"
Happy now?
On 10/30/2015 06:21 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..."
I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..."
Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected.
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver.
I could make MICROSOFT.COM resolve to SEX.COM on my network if I chose so to do (obviously I don't).
On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of it?
You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, then "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of association of names and addresses.
Eric
On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Eric
There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was corporate overreach.
I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with economic regulation.
On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: > Becky, > > "shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique > identifiers" > -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the > corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the > regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that > actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... > well > ... to court risk of repetition. > > Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive > service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next > withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative > nameserver for > Egypt running after its data expires? > > Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises > delegated > rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, > does > that authority revert to the delegating agency? > > If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and > authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of > delegated > name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and > vastly > narrower, than "services that use ..." > > Eric > > On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: >> >> In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two >> brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the >> Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use >> the >> Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services >> carry >> or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to >> address >> this concern: >> >> ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, >> and as >> reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way >> limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not >> regulate >> services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content >> that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, >> ICANN >> shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted >> parties, >> subject to established means of community input on those agreements >> and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose >> obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. >> >> What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and >> balance >> (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, >> etc.) is >> a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to >> sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they >> intend to >> challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on >> the >> grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s >> Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. >> >> >> >> >> J. Beckwith Burr >> Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Becky and all, I think the language proposed (in blue) meets some, but not all of the concerns expressed in Dublin. Specifically, it does, as you state, state the stage for "a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission." In order to meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, I would propose the following further addition (in red) ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. ICANN and contracted parties entering into, complying with and enforcing agreements does not constitute regulation. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. I think this should meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, but look forward to further comments. Greg On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 2:45 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote:
Nigel,
don't worry he'll loose interest in the WG again soon. As usual.
el
On 2015-10-30 19:31 , Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
If your "strong argument that 'addressing the wildcard problem' was corporate overreach" comes down to "because I said so", then I'm satisfied that I've gotten all the information available.
So, yes, marvelously happy now, thanks!
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:27 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Articulation?
"I submit that for ICANN to regulate the behaviour of DNS resolvers is overreaching its limited mission"
Happy now?
On 10/30/2015 06:21 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..."
I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..."
Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected.
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver.
I could make MICROSOFT.COM resolve to SEX.COM on my network if I chose so to do (obviously I don't).
On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of it?
You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, then "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of association of names and addresses.
Eric
On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote: > Eric > > There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was > corporate overreach. > > I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical > co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with > economic regulation. > > > > On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: >> Becky, >> >> "shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique >> identifiers" >> -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the >> corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the >> regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that >> actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... >> well >> ... to court risk of repetition. >> >> Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive >> service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next >> withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative >> nameserver for >> Egypt running after its data expires? >> >> Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises >> delegated >> rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, >> does >> that authority revert to the delegating agency? >> >> If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and >> authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of >> delegated >> name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and >> vastly >> narrower, than "services that use ..." >> >> Eric >> >> On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: >>> >>> In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two >>> brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the >>> Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use >>> the >>> Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services >>> carry >>> or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to >>> address >>> this concern: >>> >>> ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, >>> and as >>> reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way >>> limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not >>> regulate >>> services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content >>> that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, >>> ICANN >>> shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted >>> parties, >>> subject to established means of community input on those agreements >>> and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose >>> obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. >>> >>> What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and >>> balance >>> (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, >>> etc.) is >>> a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to >>> sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they >>> intend to >>> challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on >>> the >>> grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s >>> Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> J. Beckwith Burr >>> Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > >
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This wouldn’t solve the concerns that many of us have Greg about the potential misuse of ICANNs compliance role to enforce content regulation, something that the CEO and staff are now fully in agreement with the parts of the community that have been expressing this risk for years with, as we discussed in Dublin. This merely adds the problem back into the text. -jg From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Date: Monday 2 November 2015 at 5:11 p.m. To: Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> Cc: Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net>>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement Becky and all, I think the language proposed (in blue) meets some, but not all of the concerns expressed in Dublin. Specifically, it does, as you state, state the stage for "a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission." In order to meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, I would propose the following further addition (in red) ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. ICANN and contracted parties entering into, complying with and enforcing agreements does not constitute regulation. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. I think this should meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, but look forward to further comments. Greg On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 2:45 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> wrote: Nigel, don't worry he'll loose interest in the WG again soon. As usual. el On 2015-10-30 19:31 , Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
If your "strong argument that 'addressing the wildcard problem' was corporate overreach" comes down to "because I said so", then I'm satisfied that I've gotten all the information available.
So, yes, marvelously happy now, thanks!
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:27 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Articulation?
"I submit that for ICANN to regulate the behaviour of DNS resolvers is overreaching its limited mission"
Happy now?
On 10/30/2015 06:21 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..."
I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..."
Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected.
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver.
I could make MICROSOFT.COM<http://MICROSOFT.COM> resolve to SEX.COM<http://SEX.COM> on my network if I chose so to do (obviously I don't).
On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of it?
You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, then "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of association of names and addresses.
Eric
On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Eric
There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was corporate overreach.
I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with economic regulation.
On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: > Becky, > > "shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique > identifiers" > -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the > corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the > regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that > actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... > well > ... to court risk of repetition. > > Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive > service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next > withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative > nameserver for > Egypt running after its data expires? > > Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises > delegated > rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, > does > that authority revert to the delegating agency? > > If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and > authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of > delegated > name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and > vastly > narrower, than "services that use ..." > > Eric > > On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: >> >> In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two >> brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the >> Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use >> the >> Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services >> carry >> or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to >> address >> this concern: >> >> ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, >> and as >> reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way >> limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not >> regulate >> services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content >> that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, >> ICANN >> shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted >> parties, >> subject to established means of community input on those agreements >> and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose >> obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. >> >> What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and >> balance >> (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, >> etc.) is >> a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to >> sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they >> intend to >> challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on >> the >> grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s >> Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. >> >> >> >> >> J. Beckwith Burr >> Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Well, Greg, whether or not compliance and enforcement constitute 'regulation' depends on what is in the contract. For instance, the WHOIS requirements definitely constitute regulation (inappropriate in my view), but the alternative would also constitute regulation ('better regulation' in my view.) Regards CW On 02 Nov 2015, at 18:14, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
This wouldn’t solve the concerns that many of us have Greg about the potential misuse of ICANNs compliance role to enforce content regulation, something that the CEO and staff are now fully in agreement with the parts of the community that have been expressing this risk for years with, as we discussed in Dublin. This merely adds the problem back into the text.
-jg
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Date: Monday 2 November 2015 at 5:11 p.m. To: Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> Cc: Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.net>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement
Becky and all,
I think the language proposed (in blue) meets some, but not all of the concerns expressed in Dublin. Specifically, it does, as you state, state the stage for "a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission."
In order to meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, I would propose the following further addition (in red)
ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. ICANN and contracted parties entering into, complying with and enforcing agreements does not constitute regulation. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
I think this should meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, but look forward to further comments.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 2:45 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote: Nigel,
don't worry he'll loose interest in the WG again soon. As usual.
el
On 2015-10-30 19:31 , Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
If your "strong argument that 'addressing the wildcard problem' was corporate overreach" comes down to "because I said so", then I'm satisfied that I've gotten all the information available.
So, yes, marvelously happy now, thanks!
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:27 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Articulation?
"I submit that for ICANN to regulate the behaviour of DNS resolvers is overreaching its limited mission"
Happy now?
On 10/30/2015 06:21 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..."
I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..."
Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected.
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver.
I could make MICROSOFT.COM resolve to SEX.COM on my network if I chose so to do (obviously I don't).
On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of it?
You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, then "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of association of names and addresses.
Eric
On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote: > Eric > > There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was > corporate overreach. > > I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical > co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with > economic regulation. > > > > On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: >> Becky, >> >> "shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique >> identifiers" >> -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the >> corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the >> regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that >> actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... >> well >> ... to court risk of repetition. >> >> Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive >> service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next >> withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative >> nameserver for >> Egypt running after its data expires? >> >> Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises >> delegated >> rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, >> does >> that authority revert to the delegating agency? >> >> If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and >> authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of >> delegated >> name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and >> vastly >> narrower, than "services that use ..." >> >> Eric >> >> On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: >>> >>> In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two >>> brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the >>> Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use >>> the >>> Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services >>> carry >>> or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to >>> address >>> this concern: >>> >>> ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, >>> and as >>> reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way >>> limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not >>> regulate >>> services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content >>> that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, >>> ICANN >>> shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted >>> parties, >>> subject to established means of community input on those agreements >>> and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose >>> obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. >>> >>> What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and >>> balance >>> (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, >>> etc.) is >>> a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to >>> sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they >>> intend to >>> challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on >>> the >>> grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s >>> Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> J. Beckwith Burr >>> Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > >
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Christopher, My point is that "regulation" is the unilateral establishment of rules imposed by a regulator -- and thus mutually exclusive of matters that are agreed to in contracts between parties. You raise an interesting point though. Do you think that Whois policy would violate a Bylaw that says that "ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers"? (Assuming that consensus policy is not per se exempt from being deemed "regulation...") Greg On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 12:33 PM, Christopher Wilkinson < lists@christopherwilkinson.eu> wrote:
Well, Greg, whether or not compliance and enforcement constitute 'regulation' depends on what is in the contract.
For instance, the WHOIS requirements definitely constitute regulation (inappropriate in my view), but the alternative would also constitute regulation ('better regulation' in my view.)
Regards
CW
On 02 Nov 2015, at 18:14, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
This wouldn’t solve the concerns that many of us have Greg about the potential misuse of ICANNs compliance role to enforce content regulation, something that the CEO and staff are now fully in agreement with the parts of the community that have been expressing this risk for years with, as we discussed in Dublin. This merely adds the problem back into the text.
-jg
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Date: Monday 2 November 2015 at 5:11 p.m. To: Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> Cc: Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.net>, " accountability-cross-community@icann.org" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement
Becky and all,
I think the language proposed (in blue) meets some, but not all of the concerns expressed in Dublin. Specifically, it does, as you state, state the stage for "a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission."
In order to meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, I would propose the following further addition (in red)
ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. ICANN and contracted parties entering into, complying with and enforcing agreements does not constitute regulation. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
I think this should meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, but look forward to further comments.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 2:45 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote:
Nigel,
don't worry he'll loose interest in the WG again soon. As usual.
el
On 2015-10-30 19:31 , Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
If your "strong argument that 'addressing the wildcard problem' was corporate overreach" comes down to "because I said so", then I'm satisfied that I've gotten all the information available.
So, yes, marvelously happy now, thanks!
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:27 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Articulation?
"I submit that for ICANN to regulate the behaviour of DNS resolvers is overreaching its limited mission"
Happy now?
On 10/30/2015 06:21 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..."
I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..."
Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected.
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver.
I could make MICROSOFT.COM <http://microsoft.com/> resolve to SEX.COM <http://sex.com/> on my network if I chose so to do (obviously I don't).
On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: > Nigel, > > I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of > it? > > You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, > associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, > then > "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names > and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of > association of names and addresses. > > Eric > > On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote: >> Eric >> >> There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was >> corporate overreach. >> >> I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical >> co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with >> economic regulation. >> >> >> >> On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: >>> Becky, >>> >>> "shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique >>> identifiers" >>> -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the >>> corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the >>> regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that >>> actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... >>> well >>> ... to court risk of repetition. >>> >>> Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive >>> service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next >>> withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative >>> nameserver for >>> Egypt running after its data expires? >>> >>> Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises >>> delegated >>> rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, >>> does >>> that authority revert to the delegating agency? >>> >>> If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and >>> authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of >>> delegated >>> name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and >>> vastly >>> narrower, than "services that use ..." >>> >>> Eric >>> >>> On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: >>>> >>>> In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two >>>> brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the >>>> Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use >>>> the >>>> Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services >>>> carry >>>> or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to >>>> address >>>> this concern: >>>> >>>> ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, >>>> and as >>>> reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way >>>> limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not >>>> regulate >>>> services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content >>>> that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, >>>> ICANN >>>> shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted >>>> parties, >>>> subject to established means of community input on those agreements >>>> and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose >>>> obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. >>>> >>>> What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and >>>> balance >>>> (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, >>>> etc.) is >>>> a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to >>>> sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they >>>> intend to >>>> challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on >>>> the >>>> grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s >>>> Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> J. Beckwith Burr >>>> Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Greg: We are discussing in the context of self-regulation by the industry and its users. Thus most of the economic and moral constraints of regulation fall to ICANN. Including anti-trust/competition policy. Unless the entity and its appurtenances (e.g. SD etc.) can be seen to abide by that principle, it will loose credibility and acceptance beyond the narrow confines of the SO/AC 'community' as presently defined. Article 4 of the Articles of Incorporation takes precedence over the Bylaws. Whois policy conflict with the Articles of Incorporation. Regards Christopher On 03 Nov 2015, at 05:14, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
Christopher,
My point is that "regulation" is the unilateral establishment of rules imposed by a regulator -- and thus mutually exclusive of matters that are agreed to in contracts between parties.
You raise an interesting point though. Do you think that Whois policy would violate a Bylaw that says that "ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers"? (Assuming that consensus policy is not per se exempt from being deemed "regulation...")
Greg
On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 12:33 PM, Christopher Wilkinson <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu> wrote: Well, Greg, whether or not compliance and enforcement constitute 'regulation' depends on what is in the contract.
For instance, the WHOIS requirements definitely constitute regulation (inappropriate in my view), but the alternative would also constitute regulation ('better regulation' in my view.)
Regards
CW
On 02 Nov 2015, at 18:14, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
This wouldn’t solve the concerns that many of us have Greg about the potential misuse of ICANNs compliance role to enforce content regulation, something that the CEO and staff are now fully in agreement with the parts of the community that have been expressing this risk for years with, as we discussed in Dublin. This merely adds the problem back into the text.
-jg
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Date: Monday 2 November 2015 at 5:11 p.m. To: Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> Cc: Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.net>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement
Becky and all,
I think the language proposed (in blue) meets some, but not all of the concerns expressed in Dublin. Specifically, it does, as you state, state the stage for "a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission."
In order to meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, I would propose the following further addition (in red)
ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. ICANN and contracted parties entering into, complying with and enforcing agreements does not constitute regulation. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
I think this should meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, but look forward to further comments.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 2:45 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote: Nigel,
don't worry he'll loose interest in the WG again soon. As usual.
el
On 2015-10-30 19:31 , Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
If your "strong argument that 'addressing the wildcard problem' was corporate overreach" comes down to "because I said so", then I'm satisfied that I've gotten all the information available.
So, yes, marvelously happy now, thanks!
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:27 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Articulation?
"I submit that for ICANN to regulate the behaviour of DNS resolvers is overreaching its limited mission"
Happy now?
On 10/30/2015 06:21 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..."
I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..."
Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected.
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver.
I could make MICROSOFT.COM resolve to SEX.COM on my network if I chose so to do (obviously I don't).
On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: > Nigel, > > I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of > it? > > You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, > associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, > then > "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names > and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of > association of names and addresses. > > Eric > > On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote: >> Eric >> >> There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was >> corporate overreach. >> >> I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical >> co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with >> economic regulation. >> >> >> >> On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: >>> Becky, >>> >>> "shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique >>> identifiers" >>> -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the >>> corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the >>> regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that >>> actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... >>> well >>> ... to court risk of repetition. >>> >>> Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive >>> service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next >>> withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative >>> nameserver for >>> Egypt running after its data expires? >>> >>> Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises >>> delegated >>> rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, >>> does >>> that authority revert to the delegating agency? >>> >>> If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and >>> authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of >>> delegated >>> name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and >>> vastly >>> narrower, than "services that use ..." >>> >>> Eric >>> >>> On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: >>>> >>>> In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two >>>> brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the >>>> Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use >>>> the >>>> Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services >>>> carry >>>> or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to >>>> address >>>> this concern: >>>> >>>> ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, >>>> and as >>>> reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way >>>> limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not >>>> regulate >>>> services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content >>>> that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, >>>> ICANN >>>> shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted >>>> parties, >>>> subject to established means of community input on those agreements >>>> and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose >>>> obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. >>>> >>>> What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and >>>> balance >>>> (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, >>>> etc.) is >>>> a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to >>>> sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they >>>> intend to >>>> challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on >>>> the >>>> grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s >>>> Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> J. Beckwith Burr >>>> Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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I don't disagree with you Christopher. But some people would like to avoid considering ICANN a regulator or self-regulator more broadly, which I think it can be classified as. On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 1:14 AM, Christopher Wilkinson < lists@christopherwilkinson.eu> wrote:
Greg:
We are discussing in the context of self-regulation by the industry and its users. Thus most of the economic and moral constraints of regulation fall to ICANN. Including anti-trust/competition policy. Unless the entity and its appurtenances (e.g. SD etc.) can be seen to abide by that principle, it will loose credibility and acceptance beyond the narrow confines of the SO/AC 'community' as presently defined.
Article 4 of the Articles of Incorporation takes precedence over the Bylaws. Whois policy conflict with the Articles of Incorporation.
Regards
Christopher
On 03 Nov 2015, at 05:14, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
Christopher,
My point is that "regulation" is the unilateral establishment of rules imposed by a regulator -- and thus mutually exclusive of matters that are agreed to in contracts between parties.
You raise an interesting point though. Do you think that Whois policy would violate a Bylaw that says that "ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers"? (Assuming that consensus policy is not per se exempt from being deemed "regulation...")
Greg
On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 12:33 PM, Christopher Wilkinson < lists@christopherwilkinson.eu> wrote:
Well, Greg, whether or not compliance and enforcement constitute 'regulation' depends on what is in the contract.
For instance, the WHOIS requirements definitely constitute regulation (inappropriate in my view), but the alternative would also constitute regulation ('better regulation' in my view.)
Regards
CW
On 02 Nov 2015, at 18:14, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
This wouldn’t solve the concerns that many of us have Greg about the potential misuse of ICANNs compliance role to enforce content regulation, something that the CEO and staff are now fully in agreement with the parts of the community that have been expressing this risk for years with, as we discussed in Dublin. This merely adds the problem back into the text.
-jg
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Date: Monday 2 November 2015 at 5:11 p.m. To: Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> Cc: Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.net>, " accountability-cross-community@icann.org" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement
Becky and all,
I think the language proposed (in blue) meets some, but not all of the concerns expressed in Dublin. Specifically, it does, as you state, state the stage for "a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission."
In order to meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, I would propose the following further addition (in red)
ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. ICANN and contracted parties entering into, complying with and enforcing agreements does not constitute regulation. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
I think this should meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, but look forward to further comments.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 2:45 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote:
Nigel,
don't worry he'll loose interest in the WG again soon. As usual.
el
On 2015-10-30 19:31 , Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
If your "strong argument that 'addressing the wildcard problem' was corporate overreach" comes down to "because I said so", then I'm satisfied that I've gotten all the information available.
So, yes, marvelously happy now, thanks!
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:27 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Articulation?
"I submit that for ICANN to regulate the behaviour of DNS resolvers is overreaching its limited mission"
Happy now?
On 10/30/2015 06:21 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..."
I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..."
Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected.
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote: > You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver. > > I could make MICROSOFT.COM <http://microsoft.com/> resolve to SEX.COM <http://sex.com/> on my network if I chose > so to do (obviously I don't). > > > > On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: >> Nigel, >> >> I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of >> it? >> >> You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, >> associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, >> then >> "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names >> and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of >> association of names and addresses. >> >> Eric >> >> On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote: >>> Eric >>> >>> There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was >>> corporate overreach. >>> >>> I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical >>> co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with >>> economic regulation. >>> >>> >>> >>> On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: >>>> Becky, >>>> >>>> "shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique >>>> identifiers" >>>> -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the >>>> corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the >>>> regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that >>>> actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... >>>> well >>>> ... to court risk of repetition. >>>> >>>> Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive >>>> service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next >>>> withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative >>>> nameserver for >>>> Egypt running after its data expires? >>>> >>>> Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises >>>> delegated >>>> rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, >>>> does >>>> that authority revert to the delegating agency? >>>> >>>> If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and >>>> authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of >>>> delegated >>>> name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and >>>> vastly >>>> narrower, than "services that use ..." >>>> >>>> Eric >>>> >>>> On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: >>>>> >>>>> In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two >>>>> brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the >>>>> Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use >>>>> the >>>>> Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services >>>>> carry >>>>> or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to >>>>> address >>>>> this concern: >>>>> >>>>> ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, >>>>> and as >>>>> reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way >>>>> limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not >>>>> regulate >>>>> services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content >>>>> that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, >>>>> ICANN >>>>> shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted >>>>> parties, >>>>> subject to established means of community input on those agreements >>>>> and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose >>>>> obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. >>>>> >>>>> What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and >>>>> balance >>>>> (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, >>>>> etc.) is >>>>> a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to >>>>> sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they >>>>> intend to >>>>> challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on >>>>> the >>>>> grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s >>>>> Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> J. Beckwith Burr >>>>> Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>> >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > >
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Well, they are entitled to their opinion, but historically, they are mistaken. That was the basis on which the EU bought into the ICANN concept in the first place. Also there is clear precedent that ICANN has acted as a 'regulator' of the DNS market. e.g. structural separation, price cap, conditions of Registrar competition, etc. CW On 03 Nov 2015, at 07:18, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I don't disagree with you Christopher.
But some people would like to avoid considering ICANN a regulator or self-regulator more broadly, which I think it can be classified as.
On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 1:14 AM, Christopher Wilkinson <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu> wrote: Greg:
We are discussing in the context of self-regulation by the industry and its users. Thus most of the economic and moral constraints of regulation fall to ICANN. Including anti-trust/competition policy. Unless the entity and its appurtenances (e.g. SD etc.) can be seen to abide by that principle, it will loose credibility and acceptance beyond the narrow confines of the SO/AC 'community' as presently defined.
Article 4 of the Articles of Incorporation takes precedence over the Bylaws. Whois policy conflict with the Articles of Incorporation.
Regards
Christopher
On 03 Nov 2015, at 05:14, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
Christopher,
My point is that "regulation" is the unilateral establishment of rules imposed by a regulator -- and thus mutually exclusive of matters that are agreed to in contracts between parties.
You raise an interesting point though. Do you think that Whois policy would violate a Bylaw that says that "ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers"? (Assuming that consensus policy is not per se exempt from being deemed "regulation...")
Greg
On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 12:33 PM, Christopher Wilkinson <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu> wrote: Well, Greg, whether or not compliance and enforcement constitute 'regulation' depends on what is in the contract.
For instance, the WHOIS requirements definitely constitute regulation (inappropriate in my view), but the alternative would also constitute regulation ('better regulation' in my view.)
Regards
CW
On 02 Nov 2015, at 18:14, James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> wrote:
This wouldn’t solve the concerns that many of us have Greg about the potential misuse of ICANNs compliance role to enforce content regulation, something that the CEO and staff are now fully in agreement with the parts of the community that have been expressing this risk for years with, as we discussed in Dublin. This merely adds the problem back into the text.
-jg
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Date: Monday 2 November 2015 at 5:11 p.m. To: Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> Cc: Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.net>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement
Becky and all,
I think the language proposed (in blue) meets some, but not all of the concerns expressed in Dublin. Specifically, it does, as you state, state the stage for "a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission."
In order to meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, I would propose the following further addition (in red)
ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. ICANN and contracted parties entering into, complying with and enforcing agreements does not constitute regulation. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
I think this should meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, but look forward to further comments.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 2:45 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote: Nigel,
don't worry he'll loose interest in the WG again soon. As usual.
el
On 2015-10-30 19:31 , Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
If your "strong argument that 'addressing the wildcard problem' was corporate overreach" comes down to "because I said so", then I'm satisfied that I've gotten all the information available.
So, yes, marvelously happy now, thanks!
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:27 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Articulation?
"I submit that for ICANN to regulate the behaviour of DNS resolvers is overreaching its limited mission"
Happy now?
On 10/30/2015 06:21 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..."
I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..."
Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected.
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote: > You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver. > > I could make MICROSOFT.COM resolve to SEX.COM on my network if I chose > so to do (obviously I don't). > > > > On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: >> Nigel, >> >> I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of >> it? >> >> You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, >> associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, >> then >> "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names >> and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of >> association of names and addresses. >> >> Eric >> >> On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote: >>> Eric >>> >>> There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was >>> corporate overreach. >>> >>> I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical >>> co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with >>> economic regulation. >>> >>> >>> >>> On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: >>>> Becky, >>>> >>>> "shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique >>>> identifiers" >>>> -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the >>>> corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the >>>> regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that >>>> actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... >>>> well >>>> ... to court risk of repetition. >>>> >>>> Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive >>>> service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next >>>> withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative >>>> nameserver for >>>> Egypt running after its data expires? >>>> >>>> Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises >>>> delegated >>>> rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, >>>> does >>>> that authority revert to the delegating agency? >>>> >>>> If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and >>>> authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of >>>> delegated >>>> name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and >>>> vastly >>>> narrower, than "services that use ..." >>>> >>>> Eric >>>> >>>> On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: >>>>> >>>>> In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two >>>>> brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the >>>>> Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use >>>>> the >>>>> Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services >>>>> carry >>>>> or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to >>>>> address >>>>> this concern: >>>>> >>>>> ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, >>>>> and as >>>>> reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way >>>>> limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not >>>>> regulate >>>>> services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content >>>>> that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, >>>>> ICANN >>>>> shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted >>>>> parties, >>>>> subject to established means of community input on those agreements >>>>> and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose >>>>> obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. >>>>> >>>>> What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and >>>>> balance >>>>> (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, >>>>> etc.) is >>>>> a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to >>>>> sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they >>>>> intend to >>>>> challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on >>>>> the >>>>> grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s >>>>> Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> J. Beckwith Burr >>>>> Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>> >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > >
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I too seem to recall seeing in early NTIA (or other) documents somewhere that ICANN was to be considered a regulator. el On 2015-11-03 08:37, Christopher Wilkinson wrote:
Well, they are entitled to their opinion, but historically, they are mistaken.
That was the basis on which the EU bought into the ICANN concept in the first place. Also there is clear precedent that ICANN has acted as a 'regulator' of the DNS market. e.g. structural separation, price cap, conditions of Registrar competition, etc.
CW
On 03 Nov 2015, at 07:18, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> wrote:
I don't disagree with you Christopher.
But some people would like to avoid considering ICANN a regulator or self-regulator more broadly, which I think it can be classified as.
[...]
Certainly! this is another memorable piece on regulation by some At large members back in the times of ATRT2 http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-atrt2-02apr13/msg00004.html <http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-atrt2-02apr13/msg00004.html> Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez _____________________ email: carlosraulg@gmail.com Skype: carlos.raulg +506 8837 7176 (cel) +506 4000 2000 (home) +506 2290 3678 (fax) _____________________ Apartado 1571-1000 San Jose, COSTA RICA
On Nov 3, 2015, at 2:15 AM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote:
I too seem to recall seeing in early NTIA (or other) documents somewhere that ICANN was to be considered a regulator.
el
On 2015-11-03 08:37, Christopher Wilkinson wrote:
Well, they are entitled to their opinion, but historically, they are mistaken.
That was the basis on which the EU bought into the ICANN concept in the first place. Also there is clear precedent that ICANN has acted as a 'regulator' of the DNS market. e.g. structural separation, price cap, conditions of Registrar competition, etc.
CW
On 03 Nov 2015, at 07:18, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> wrote:
I don't disagree with you Christopher.
But some people would like to avoid considering ICANN a regulator or self-regulator more broadly, which I think it can be classified as.
[...]
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Agree with James. Furthermore, it is a bit of a stretch to think bylaws language is able to define the legal term "regulation" - that is something courts and legislatures do. While we at ICANN often make-up new definitions of words to suit various objectives, that doesn't mean those definitions have any binding power on a court. If a court or legislature finds this to be a form of regulation, all of our saying it isn't in ICANN-sacred texts does not change the fact that it is. Robin On Nov 2, 2015, at 9:14 AM, James Gannon wrote:
This wouldn’t solve the concerns that many of us have Greg about the potential misuse of ICANNs compliance role to enforce content regulation, something that the CEO and staff are now fully in agreement with the parts of the community that have been expressing this risk for years with, as we discussed in Dublin. This merely adds the problem back into the text.
-jg
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Date: Monday 2 November 2015 at 5:11 p.m. To: Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> Cc: Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.net>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement
Becky and all,
I think the language proposed (in blue) meets some, but not all of the concerns expressed in Dublin. Specifically, it does, as you state, state the stage for "a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission."
In order to meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, I would propose the following further addition (in red)
ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. ICANN and contracted parties entering into, complying with and enforcing agreements does not constitute regulation. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
I think this should meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, but look forward to further comments.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 2:45 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote: Nigel,
don't worry he'll loose interest in the WG again soon. As usual.
el
On 2015-10-30 19:31 , Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
If your "strong argument that 'addressing the wildcard problem' was corporate overreach" comes down to "because I said so", then I'm satisfied that I've gotten all the information available.
So, yes, marvelously happy now, thanks!
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:27 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Articulation?
"I submit that for ICANN to regulate the behaviour of DNS resolvers is overreaching its limited mission"
Happy now?
On 10/30/2015 06:21 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..."
I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..."
Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected.
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver.
I could make MICROSOFT.COM resolve to SEX.COM on my network if I chose so to do (obviously I don't).
On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of it?
You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, then "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of association of names and addresses.
Eric
On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote: > Eric > > There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was > corporate overreach. > > I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical > co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with > economic regulation. > > > > On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: >> Becky, >> >> "shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique >> identifiers" >> -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the >> corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the >> regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that >> actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... >> well >> ... to court risk of repetition. >> >> Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive >> service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next >> withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative >> nameserver for >> Egypt running after its data expires? >> >> Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises >> delegated >> rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, >> does >> that authority revert to the delegating agency? >> >> If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and >> authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of >> delegated >> name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and >> vastly >> narrower, than "services that use ..." >> >> Eric >> >> On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: >>> >>> In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two >>> brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the >>> Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use >>> the >>> Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services >>> carry >>> or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to >>> address >>> this concern: >>> >>> ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, >>> and as >>> reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way >>> limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not >>> regulate >>> services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content >>> that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, >>> ICANN >>> shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted >>> parties, >>> subject to established means of community input on those agreements >>> and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose >>> obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. >>> >>> What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and >>> balance >>> (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, >>> etc.) is >>> a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to >>> sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they >>> intend to >>> challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on >>> the >>> grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s >>> Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> J. Beckwith Burr >>> Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > >
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Greg, that definitely takes us away from the brown bag discussion where we specifically identified the need for a workable mechanism for responding to ICANN imposing last minute obligations on contracted parties in a “take it or don’t play” manner. I would be willing to say “complying with and enforcing the terms of agreements that constitute Consensus Policies and Temporary Specifications, as defined in agreements with registries and registrars, does not constitute regulation.” (and I really wish people would actually examine Specification 1 …) J. Beckwith Burr Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer From: Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org<mailto:robin@ipjustice.org>> Date: Monday, November 2, 2015 at 12:34 PM To: James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net<mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net>> Cc: Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>, Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement Agree with James. Furthermore, it is a bit of a stretch to think bylaws language is able to define the legal term "regulation" - that is something courts and legislatures do. While we at ICANN often make-up new definitions of words to suit various objectives, that doesn't mean those definitions have any binding power on a court. If a court or legislature finds this to be a form of regulation, all of our saying it isn't in ICANN-sacred texts does not change the fact that it is. Robin On Nov 2, 2015, at 9:14 AM, James Gannon wrote: This wouldn’t solve the concerns that many of us have Greg about the potential misuse of ICANNs compliance role to enforce content regulation, something that the CEO and staff are now fully in agreement with the parts of the community that have been expressing this risk for years with, as we discussed in Dublin. This merely adds the problem back into the text. -jg From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Date: Monday 2 November 2015 at 5:11 p.m. To: Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> Cc: Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.net<mailto:directors@omadhina.net>>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement Becky and all, I think the language proposed (in blue) meets some, but not all of the concerns expressed in Dublin. Specifically, it does, as you state, state the stage for "a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission." In order to meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, I would propose the following further addition (in red) ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. ICANN and contracted parties entering into, complying with and enforcing agreements does not constitute regulation. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. I think this should meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, but look forward to further comments. Greg On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 2:45 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>> wrote: Nigel, don't worry he'll loose interest in the WG again soon. As usual. el On 2015-10-30 19:31 , Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
If your "strong argument that 'addressing the wildcard problem' was corporate overreach" comes down to "because I said so", then I'm satisfied that I've gotten all the information available.
So, yes, marvelously happy now, thanks!
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:27 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Articulation?
"I submit that for ICANN to regulate the behaviour of DNS resolvers is overreaching its limited mission"
Happy now?
On 10/30/2015 06:21 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..."
I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..."
Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected.
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver.
I could make MICROSOFT.COM<http://MICROSOFT.COM/> resolve to SEX.COM<http://SEX.COM/> on my network if I chose so to do (obviously I don't).
On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of it?
You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, then "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of association of names and addresses.
Eric
On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Eric
There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was corporate overreach.
I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with economic regulation.
On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: > Becky, > > "shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique > identifiers" > -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the > corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the > regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that > actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... > well > ... to court risk of repetition. > > Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive > service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next > withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative > nameserver for > Egypt running after its data expires? > > Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises > delegated > rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, > does > that authority revert to the delegating agency? > > If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and > authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of > delegated > name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and > vastly > narrower, than "services that use ..." > > Eric > > On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: >> >> In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two >> brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the >> Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use >> the >> Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services >> carry >> or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to >> address >> this concern: >> >> ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, >> and as >> reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way >> limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not >> regulate >> services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content >> that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, >> ICANN >> shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted >> parties, >> subject to established means of community input on those agreements >> and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose >> obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. >> >> What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and >> balance >> (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, >> etc.) is >> a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to >> sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they >> intend to >> challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on >> the >> grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s >> Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. >> >> >> >> >> J. Beckwith Burr >> Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Becky, The "take it or don't play issue" was definitely discussed, but that wasn't the only issue. At the second brown bag, we had a substantial discussion of the concern that the prohibition on "regulation" could be used to nullify sections of agreements, particularly those relating to abuse issues. I appreciate your revisions, but I will have to go back and look at the definitions and specifications you cite to see whether the changes you suggest meet these concerns. Thanks! Greg On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 1:14 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
Greg, that definitely takes us away from the brown bag discussion where we specifically identified the need for a workable mechanism for responding to ICANN imposing last minute obligations on contracted parties in a “take it or don’t play” manner. I would be willing to say “complying with and enforcing the terms of agreements that constitute Consensus Policies and Temporary Specifications, as defined in agreements with registries and registrars*, does not constitute regulation.” (and I really wish people would actually examine Specification 1 **…)*
J. Beckwith Burr Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer
From: Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org> Date: Monday, November 2, 2015 at 12:34 PM To: James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net> Cc: Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org>, Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.net>
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement
Agree with James. Furthermore, it is a bit of a stretch to think bylaws language is able to define the legal term "regulation" - that is something courts and legislatures do. While we at ICANN often make-up new definitions of words to suit various objectives, that doesn't mean those definitions have any binding power on a court. If a court or legislature finds this to be a form of regulation, all of our saying it isn't in ICANN-sacred texts does not change the fact that it is.
Robin
On Nov 2, 2015, at 9:14 AM, James Gannon wrote:
This wouldn’t solve the concerns that many of us have Greg about the potential misuse of ICANNs compliance role to enforce content regulation, something that the CEO and staff are now fully in agreement with the parts of the community that have been expressing this risk for years with, as we discussed in Dublin. This merely adds the problem back into the text.
-jg
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Date: Monday 2 November 2015 at 5:11 p.m. To: Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> Cc: Lisse Eberhard <directors@omadhina.net>, " accountability-cross-community@icann.org" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement
Becky and all,
I think the language proposed (in blue) meets some, but not all of the concerns expressed in Dublin. Specifically, it does, as you state, state the stage for "a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission."
In order to meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, I would propose the following further addition (in red)
ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. ICANN and contracted parties entering into, complying with and enforcing agreements does not constitute regulation. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars.
I think this should meet the remaining concerns expressed in Dublin, but look forward to further comments.
Greg
On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 2:45 PM, Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote:
Nigel,
don't worry he'll loose interest in the WG again soon. As usual.
el
On 2015-10-30 19:31 , Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
If your "strong argument that 'addressing the wildcard problem' was corporate overreach" comes down to "because I said so", then I'm satisfied that I've gotten all the information available.
So, yes, marvelously happy now, thanks!
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:27 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
Articulation?
"I submit that for ICANN to regulate the behaviour of DNS resolvers is overreaching its limited mission"
Happy now?
On 10/30/2015 06:21 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Nigel,
Um, you alluded to "a strong argument that ..."
I asked for an articulation of that "strong argument that ..."
Your own resolver and your own network aren't quite what I expected.
Eric
On 10/30/15 11:07 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote:
You can't guarantee uniqueness if I run my own resolver.
I could make MICROSOFT.COM resolve to SEX.COM on my network if I chose so to do (obviously I don't).
On 10/30/2015 05:32 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: > Nigel, > > I'm unaware of that argument. Could you point to an articulation of > it? > > You do appreciate that if resolver return values -- that is, > associations between names and addresses -- are ... unpredictable, > then > "technical co-ordination" may reasonably include allocations, of names > and addresses, with uniqueness guaranteed, but not the means of > association of names and addresses. > > Eric > > On 10/30/15 9:35 AM, Nigel Roberts wrote: >> Eric >> >> There's a strong argument that "addressing the wildcard problem" was >> corporate overreach. >> >> I know some will disagree, but it's nothing to do with the technical >> co-ordination of internet identifies, and everything to do with >> economic regulation. >> >> >> >> On 30/10/15 16:31, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: >>> Becky, >>> >>> "shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique >>> identifiers" >>> -- had this language been in place a decade ago how could the >>> corporation have addressed the wildcard problem? Who would be the >>> regulator(s) of monitized synthetic returns? These are things that >>> actually broke the net, and an appeal to Vixie's patch seems ... >>> well >>> ... to court risk of repetition. >>> >>> Where do we go in the future when VGRS initiates another disruptive >>> service unforeseen in contract? When the Egyptian government next >>> withdraws all prefixes can we keep the last authoritative >>> nameserver for >>> Egypt running after its data expires? >>> >>> Also, assuming for the moment that ICANN currently exercises >>> delegated >>> rule making authority, if ICANN explicitly abandons this authority, >>> does >>> that authority revert to the delegating agency? >>> >>> If I may, to regulate, or not regulate, stub-, recursive- and >>> authoritative-resolvers and their resolutions via port 53 of >>> delegated >>> name spaces to allocated address spaces, is more on-point, and >>> vastly >>> narrower, than "services that use ..." >>> >>> Eric >>> >>> On 10/30/15 6:19 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: >>>> >>>> In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two >>>> brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the >>>> Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use >>>> the >>>> Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services >>>> carry >>>> or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to >>>> address >>>> this concern: >>>> >>>> ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, >>>> and as >>>> reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way >>>> limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not >>>> regulate >>>> services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content >>>> that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, >>>> ICANN >>>> shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted >>>> parties, >>>> subject to established means of community input on those agreements >>>> and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose >>>> obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. >>>> >>>> What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and >>>> balance >>>> (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, >>>> etc.) is >>>> a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to >>>> sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they >>>> intend to >>>> challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on >>>> the >>>> grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s >>>> Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> J. Beckwith Burr >>>> Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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participants (9)
-
Burr, Becky -
Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez -
Christopher Wilkinson -
Dr Eberhard W Lisse -
Eric Brunner-Williams -
Greg Shatan -
James Gannon -
Nigel Roberts -
Robin Gross