All, Where indeed? I'd like to contribute some thoughts, with a view toward helping the process toward closure, if possible. My goal is to try to find a way through the issues that appear to separate us, and to look for areas in which agreement might be able to be reached, and reasonably soon. By "us" in the previous sentence, I mean all of the people who have been involved in the CCWG deliberations in any way whatsoever, including Board members in their individual capacity. This is not an "us" versus "them" discussion; there are a lot of different opinions among this larger group of involved people, not to mention the larger ICANN community that has been rather silent but nevertheless observing. This entire message represents only my own personal opinions and concerns. I would like to make a contribution into resolving the apparent stumbling blocks that impede our progress on the accountability issue. This is the purpose of this message. I've now followed and occasionally contributed to this discussion for over two months. It has been difficult following the various discussions on the list because of the multiple issues that are threaded and intermingled. The descent of the discussion into opposing and apparently irreconcilable legal views has not assisted my understanding much and, perhaps naïvely, I had hoped for a clearer set of answers that would provide resolution on certain aspect. With respect to clarity of legal opinions and options, I understand that sometimes what is allowed is based on precedent, and where there is no precedent, it may be impossible to say with certainty what is allowed and what is not. Given the level of uncertainty that this introduces, I'd settle for 'relative certainty' if appropriately qualified. I'd like to provide two lists: (1) those things that guide my own thinking regarding acceptable solutions, and (2) questions that I wish could be answered with short, definitive and useful responses and that might contribute to some convergence in thinking. In my view, her are some of the issues that concern me in my attempt to think through the issues that we have been discussing: 1. ICANN does have responsibility for more than just being a secretariat for the ACs and the SOs, i.e. what I think of as the inner ICANN community. I put this in the category of the global public interest. It doesn't dominate our responsibilities, and in general it may only be a sliver of what we think about, but it exists. The ACs and the SOs may also reflect and respond to their notion of the public interest, but they are by their nature sectoral, and I don't expect them to be totally neutral in their thoughts or actions. They represent their constituencies. Perhaps in theory, the varied stakeholders cover the complete spectrum of interests and balance each other out, but there is no guarantee of this. The overriding responsibility for balance and interpretation for that sliver, even if it just a very very small part of what comes up at ICANN, is the Board's role and responsibility. Any changes in structure that have the possibility of the ICANN inner community totally capturing the Board are therefore not acceptable. 2. I understand and accept that there needs to be an equilibration of power and authority in any change in ICANN's structure. However, the change should result in a balance, and not in a reversal of what people believe is the current situation, i.e.that the Board has all of the power and the community has no recourse. Such a reversal would be equally bad. This is what causes me to discount any model that can lead to capture. The statutory powers of the member or designator appear to be powerful, and even if some are severely limited, I worry that these limitations can be overcome, and the Board will be disenfranchised. This amounts to capture. I know that there is disagreement about the nature an extent of such statutory powers and the extent to which they can be limited, temporarily or permanently and, among other things, this uncertainty translates for me into the possibility of capture. 3. Replacement of the entire Board, if it occurs, is a very serious event, It will have significant repercussions not only within ICANN but internationally with respect to competing venues for so-called Internet governance. For this reason, we need both a very high bar to it occurring, and we need to ensure that there are very good reasons for the action to be taken. For example, if every AC ad SO in the inner community decided that the Board should be replaced, that would be a signal that something was seriously wrong, and the Board should be replaced. However,if there were any significant part of the inner community that disagreed with replacing the Board, then initiating the action to replace would be seen as a dispute between parts of that community, taking the Board as hostage and employing a Draconian procedure to force a majority opinion on a minority of the community. If this happens, it will turn ICANN into a battleground, and we won't have to worry about being taken seriously; we won't. The bar should be high enough so that if this action is taken, fit should be quite clear that no significant part of the community is against it. 4. I agree with the implication of Cherine's argument that removal of any director should be based upon a public rationale, an appropriate due process, and should be the result of broader community action, rather than that of a single AC or SO. The counter argument that I've heard is that other not-for-profit organizations can replace their directors if they want, so why can't we? My response is that ICANN is not an ordinary not-forprofit. On the contrary, the totality of our membership consists of stakeholder groups with different and often competing goals, and under the currently proposed plan the manipulation of Board representation therefore can reflect attempts at control through the Board. Such a change of behavior would contradict current bylaws in ways that have been articulated by Cherine and others. Most other not-for-profits are considerably more homogeneous and have shared goals, and the Board is generally not an arbiter of long run competing sectoral goals. 5. The models that we have been talking about are legal constructs, and we will need to respect their existence as frameworks for governance. But we need to remember that are the means to the ends that we want to achieve. I would rather prefer to define the goals precisely -- both the powers given to the actors as well as the constraints on their activities, and then see which model fits best. To do that, we need to understand well the differences between what the models offer, but first we need to agree upon the goals in terms of scope of authority, power and constraints. Sometimes it seems we mix them up in ways that obscure and even retard progress. progress. 6. I watch in horror the multi-million dollar duel of lawyers that has been going on for some time and appears to have no end. Why is it not possible to give them free rein to discuss the issue more dispassionately and come up with common positions with the possibility of deviations? I fear that a need to win may be transforming this part of our discussion into a lose-lose scenario. If so, the lawyers will still get rich, but ICANN, the community, and the whole world will lose. Can't we lock them in a room and not let them out until we see the white smoke coming from the chimney? (:-) In order to assist in resolving our current difficulties, here are some issues that I believe are pertinent. I raise them in the form of questions., for I believe that there is not a common precise understanding of them. Is it possible to provide simple and direct answers to them that might be useful for establishing greater understanding of the differences that still exist and beginning to bridge them? That would be helpful. A. It appears that the single designator model is very much the same as the single member mode, but with the only statutory power being to select or remove directors. In general, is this correct? In brief, what are the other differences? To establish any new structure the community still needs to address a range of open topics to ensure ICANN’s stability and freedom from capture: • which SO and AC will participate in the decision-making mechanism (which SOs and ACs will opt-in)? For dismissal of the entire Board, why should it not require active assent of all ACs and SOs? • what will be the Decision basis among participating SOs and ACs by _____ % of all SOs and ACs?? • how will advice from those SOs and ACs opting-out of the decision-making mechanism (similar to GAC/Board advice?) be taken into consideration? • how will will conflicts of interest and fiduciary or other responsibilities (such as public interest) will be factored into overall decision-making ? B. In Buenos Aires, there was discussion and convergence (I thought) on an "empowered AC/SO" model. Does this model offer any initial point for movement to convergence of opinion? C. The Board proposal calls for each AC/SO to decide if they are for or against and issue instead of possibly dividing its "vote". Is this a show-stopper? D. The Board proposal allows any AC/SO to weigh in on a particular issue (and decide to exercise or oppose the use of one of the powers. The CCWG proposal requires and AC/SO to decide ahead of time whether it will participate in future uses of the powers. Is this a show-stopper? E. What would the community take as evidence in the short term that the Board is acting in good faith? I'm concerned by what appears to be Board bashing on the list, wherein many things that any of us say or do are interpreted negatively and perhaps conspiratorially. I realize that the great majority of people involved int he CCSG process do not have such attitudes, but predictably it only takes a very few individuals to sour and confuse a discussion and lessen its utility. I'm sure that these questions reflect my limited and imperfect understanding of the situation, and perhaps some naïveté also, but there aren't many other ways to gain a productive understanding of it. Comments welcome. George
George, Thank you for your thoughts. One question that comes to mind is how then does the board reconcile the issue of current consensus policy as defined through the bottom up multistakeholder process in the ASO, GNSO and ccNSO with its apparent mistrust and concerns over the governance an structure of the current SO's. Jeff Neuman touched on this in his email to the list last week, some selected quotes below (Links to his full post below). " If the ICANN Board is basically saying that the community is not sufficiently representative for purposes of holding ICANN accountable, then how can they ever argue that the community is sufficiently representative to produce a consensus of Internet stakeholders for the purpose of developing Consensus Policies. I have never heard the Board before make that argument...that it could not take a proposed policy and impose it on the contracted parties because they did not believe the community was sufficiently representative. ... You shouldn't be able to argue that the community is sufficiently representative for one purpose (Consensus Policies), but not for the purposes of holding itself accountable " If this is the position of the board then we are opening serious and dangerous debate. https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-October/0... -jg ________________________________ From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of George Sadowsky <george.sadowsky@gmail.com> Sent: 12 October 2015 08:33:13 To: CCWG Accountability; Icann-board ICANN Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Where do we stand? All, Where indeed? I'd like to contribute some thoughts, with a view toward helping the process toward closure, if possible. My goal is to try to find a way through the issues that appear to separate us, and to look for areas in which agreement might be able to be reached, and reasonably soon. By "us" in the previous sentence, I mean all of the people who have been involved in the CCWG deliberations in any way whatsoever, including Board members in their individual capacity. This is not an "us" versus "them" discussion; there are a lot of different opinions among this larger group of involved people, not to mention the larger ICANN community that has been rather silent but nevertheless observing. This entire message represents only my own personal opinions and concerns. I would like to make a contribution into resolving the apparent stumbling blocks that impede our progress on the accountability issue. This is the purpose of this message. I've now followed and occasionally contributed to this discussion for over two months. It has been difficult following the various discussions on the list because of the multiple issues that are threaded and intermingled. The descent of the discussion into opposing and apparently irreconcilable legal views has not assisted my understanding much and, perhaps naïvely, I had hoped for a clearer set of answers that would provide resolution on certain aspect. With respect to clarity of legal opinions and options, I understand that sometimes what is allowed is based on precedent, and where there is no precedent, it may be impossible to say with certainty what is allowed and what is not. Given the level of uncertainty that this introduces, I'd settle for 'relative certainty' if appropriately qualified. I'd like to provide two lists: (1) those things that guide my own thinking regarding acceptable solutions, and (2) questions that I wish could be answered with short, definitive and useful responses and that might contribute to some convergence in thinking. In my view, her are some of the issues that concern me in my attempt to think through the issues that we have been discussing: 1. ICANN does have responsibility for more than just being a secretariat for the ACs and the SOs, i.e. what I think of as the inner ICANN community. I put this in the category of the global public interest. It doesn't dominate our responsibilities, and in general it may only be a sliver of what we think about, but it exists. The ACs and the SOs may also reflect and respond to their notion of the public interest, but they are by their nature sectoral, and I don't expect them to be totally neutral in their thoughts or actions. They represent their constituencies. Perhaps in theory, the varied stakeholders cover the complete spectrum of interests and balance each other out, but there is no guarantee of this. The overriding responsibility for balance and interpretation for that sliver, even if it just a very very small part of what comes up at ICANN, is the Board's role and responsibility. Any changes in structure that have the possibility of the ICANN inner community totally capturing the Board are therefore not acceptable. 2. I understand and accept that there needs to be an equilibration of power and authority in any change in ICANN's structure. However, the change should result in a balance, and not in a reversal of what people believe is the current situation, i.e.that the Board has all of the power and the community has no recourse. Such a reversal would be equally bad. This is what causes me to discount any model that can lead to capture. The statutory powers of the member or designator appear to be powerful, and even if some are severely limited, I worry that these limitations can be overcome, and the Board will be disenfranchised. This amounts to capture. I know that there is disagreement about the nature an extent of such statutory powers and the extent to which they can be limited, temporarily or permanently and, among other things, this uncertainty translates for me into the possibility of capture. 3. Replacement of the entire Board, if it occurs, is a very serious event, It will have significant repercussions not only within ICANN but internationally with respect to competing venues for so-called Internet governance. For this reason, we need both a very high bar to it occurring, and we need to ensure that there are very good reasons for the action to be taken. For example, if every AC ad SO in the inner community decided that the Board should be replaced, that would be a signal that something was seriously wrong, and the Board should be replaced. However,if there were any significant part of the inner community that disagreed with replacing the Board, then initiating the action to replace would be seen as a dispute between parts of that community, taking the Board as hostage and employing a Draconian procedure to force a majority opinion on a minority of the community. If this happens, it will turn ICANN into a battleground, and we won't have to worry about being taken seriously; we won't. The bar should be high enough so that if this action is taken, fit should be quite clear that no significant part of the community is against it. 4. I agree with the implication of Cherine's argument that removal of any director should be based upon a public rationale, an appropriate due process, and should be the result of broader community action, rather than that of a single AC or SO. The counter argument that I've heard is that other not-for-profit organizations can replace their directors if they want, so why can't we? My response is that ICANN is not an ordinary not-forprofit. On the contrary, the totality of our membership consists of stakeholder groups with different and often competing goals, and under the currently proposed plan the manipulation of Board representation therefore can reflect attempts at control through the Board. Such a change of behavior would contradict current bylaws in ways that have been articulated by Cherine and others. Most other not-for-profits are considerably more homogeneous and have shared goals, and the Board is generally not an arbiter of long run competing sectoral goals. 5. The models that we have been talking about are legal constructs, and we will need to respect their existence as frameworks for governance. But we need to remember that are the means to the ends that we want to achieve. I would rather prefer to define the goals precisely -- both the powers given to the actors as well as the constraints on their activities, and then see which model fits best. To do that, we need to understand well the differences between what the models offer, but first we need to agree upon the goals in terms of scope of authority, power and constraints. Sometimes it seems we mix them up in ways that obscure and even retard progress. progress. 6. I watch in horror the multi-million dollar duel of lawyers that has been going on for some time and appears to have no end. Why is it not possible to give them free rein to discuss the issue more dispassionately and come up with common positions with the possibility of deviations? I fear that a need to win may be transforming this part of our discussion into a lose-lose scenario. If so, the lawyers will still get rich, but ICANN, the community, and the whole world will lose. Can't we lock them in a room and not let them out until we see the white smoke coming from the chimney? (:-) In order to assist in resolving our current difficulties, here are some issues that I believe are pertinent. I raise them in the form of questions., for I believe that there is not a common precise understanding of them. Is it possible to provide simple and direct answers to them that might be useful for establishing greater understanding of the differences that still exist and beginning to bridge them? That would be helpful. A. It appears that the single designator model is very much the same as the single member mode, but with the only statutory power being to select or remove directors. In general, is this correct? In brief, what are the other differences? To establish any new structure the community still needs to address a range of open topics to ensure ICANN’s stability and freedom from capture: * • which SO and AC will participate in the decision-making mechanism (which SOs and ACs will opt-in)? For dismissal of the entire Board, why should it not require active assent of all ACs and SOs? * • what will be the Decision basis among participating SOs and ACs by _____ % of all SOs and ACs?? * • how will advice from those SOs and ACs opting-out of the decision-making mechanism (similar to GAC/Board advice?) be taken into consideration? * • how will will conflicts of interest and fiduciary or other responsibilities (such as public interest) will be factored into overall decision-making ? B. In Buenos Aires, there was discussion and convergence (I thought) on an "empowered AC/SO" model. Does this model offer any initial point for movement to convergence of opinion? C. The Board proposal calls for each AC/SO to decide if they are for or against and issue instead of possibly dividing its "vote". Is this a show-stopper? D. The Board proposal allows any AC/SO to weigh in on a particular issue (and decide to exercise or oppose the use of one of the powers. The CCWG proposal requires and AC/SO to decide ahead of time whether it will participate in future uses of the powers. Is this a show-stopper? E. What would the community take as evidence in the short term that the Board is acting in good faith? I'm concerned by what appears to be Board bashing on the list, wherein many things that any of us say or do are interpreted negatively and perhaps conspiratorially. I realize that the great majority of people involved int he CCSG process do not have such attitudes, but predictably it only takes a very few individuals to sour and confuse a discussion and lessen its utility. I'm sure that these questions reflect my limited and imperfect understanding of the situation, and perhaps some naïveté also, but there aren't many other ways to gain a productive understanding of it. Comments welcome. George
James, you may have point here. In the ccNSO there is no multi-stakeholder process nor a bottom up process. Nor can there be, nor should it. There is only a finite number of ccTLDs which can at the most double with the IDN and not all of them (or rather their Managers) are members of the ccNSO. So that part of the process would be stakeholder (and not multi-stakeholder). And as all ccTLD Managers are all equal in the ccNSO it's not a bottom-up process. But then there is hardly any process in the ccNSO anyway. The Board also may have a point about representation, when I for example look at the CCWG's inner workings (or failings). Very few individuals participating and of those few many participate a lot.
From where I am sitting, industry is calling the shots. From the bottom-up. All the way.
el On 2015-10-12 13:21, James Gannon wrote:
George,
Thank you for your thoughts. One question that comes to mind is how then does the board reconcile the issue of current consensus policy as defined through the bottom up multistakeholder process in the ASO, GNSO and ccNSO with its apparent mistrust and concerns over the governance an structure of the current SO's.
Jeff Neuman touched on this in his email to the list last week, some selected quotes below (Links to his full post below).
"
If the ICANN Board is basically saying that the community is not sufficiently representative for purposes of holding ICANN accountable, then how can they ever argue that the community is sufficiently representative to produce a consensus of Internet stakeholders for the purpose of developing Consensus Policies. I have never heard the Board before make that argument...that it could not take a proposed policy and impose it on the contracted parties because they did not believe the community was sufficiently representative.
...
You shouldn't be able to argue that the community is sufficiently representative for one purpose (Consensus Policies), but not for the purposes of holding itself accountable
"
If this is the position of the board then we are opening serious and dangerous debate.
https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-October/0...
-jg [...]
-- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
Thoose of you who have known me since before the days that ICANN was incorporated, and sicne the IFWP know that I have participated all along, and that I continue to particpate. Yet even I feel excluded from the accountability work. And that despite the fact I have voluntarily restricted myself to a small subset of the work (principally the goal of incorporating a human rights committment into the eventual ICANN bylaws). How am I excluded? By the volume and frequency of the expected interactions. As the director of a small ccTLD organisation, I have limited time and resources. Yet, at the moment, the CCWG work seems to demand more time and effort than even being a member of the Board of ICANN would! Accordingly, those who are paid to do this, have a distinct advantages, and their views, whether representative of consensus or not, naturally predominate. But it's all academic, since no matter what the consensus outcome, the Board reserves the right to reject it anyway.
Very few individuals participating and of those few many participate a lot.
From where I am sitting, industry is calling the shots. From the bottom-up. All the way.
el
Nigel, I don't see it like this. At the moment they want us to blink first. And if we do not, they either are going to pass forward unmodified (with whatever comments they like, of course), or, overturn themselves by resolution (which I would see as the nuclear option at the moment). greetings, el On 2015-10-12 14:09, Nigel Roberts wrote: [...]
But it's all academic, since no matter what the consensus outcome, the Board reserves the right to reject it anyway. [...]
-- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
"E. What would the community take as evidence in the short term that the Board is acting in good faith? I'm concerned by what appears to be Board bashing on the list, wherein many things that any of us say or do are interpreted negatively and perhaps conspiratorially. I realize that the great majority of people involved int he CCSG process do not have such attitudes, but predictably it only takes a very few individuals to sour and confuse a discussion and lessen its utility." In my opinion, an agreement to the development of an external whistleblower process to protect the post-tranaition process from bad actor government and corporate agents' influence. No reason to waste time on anything before knowing the post-transition process won't be a facade of multistakeholder democracy. The moment the public finds out from "wikileaks" etc, that nefarious activity occurred the internet will become a 100% circus show, and that means conhressional hearings. Ron
Ron This is a Workstream 2 issue. Please give it a rest. On 12/10/15 19:47, Ron Baione wrote:
"E. What would the community take as evidence in the short term that the Board is acting in good faith? I'm concerned by what appears to be Board bashing on the list, wherein many things that any of us say or do are interpreted negatively and perhaps conspiratorially. I realize that the great majority of people involved int he CCSG process do not have such attitudes, but predictably it only takes a very few individuals to sour and confuse a discussion and lessen its utility."
In my opinion, an agreement to the development of an external whistleblower process to protect the post-tranaition process from bad actor government and corporate agents' influence. No reason to waste time on anything before knowing the post-transition process won't be a facade of multistakeholder democracy. The moment the public finds out from "wikileaks" etc, that nefarious activity occurred the internet will become a 100% circus show, and that means conhressional hearings.
Ron
------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From: * Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.NA>; *To: * <nigel@channelisles.net>; <accountability-cross-community@icann.org>; *Cc: * <directors@omadhina.net>; *Subject: * Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Where do we stand? *Sent: * Mon, Oct 12, 2015 12:28:48 PM
Nigel,
I don't see it like this.
At the moment they want us to blink first.
And if we do not, they either are going to pass forward unmodified (with whatever comments they like, of course), or, overturn themselves by resolution (which I would see as the nuclear option at the moment).
greetings, el
On 2015-10-12 14:09, Nigel Roberts wrote: [...]
But it's all academic, since no matter what the consensus outcome, the Board reserves the right to reject it anyway. [...]
-- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA <javascript:return> / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <javascript:return> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Nigel, The question was postualted, I answered it. Everytime the question is repostulated, I will reanswer it. We can all see what the strategy is, re-ask the same question until those who aren't "corporate enough" are shouted down. Declare the results of consensus that were never asked for. Delay tactics and consensus pushing are amateur hour, not going to work on me. Ron
(If you think I'm from the Corporate Dark Side, you've clearly never been to an ICANN meeting -- and the public forum in particular -- at any time between 1998 and the present day) On 12/10/15 20:01, Ron Baione wrote:
Nigel, The question was postualted, I answered it. Everytime the question is repostulated, I will reanswer it.
We can all see what the strategy is, re-ask the same question until those who aren't "corporate enough" are shouted down. Declare the results of consensus that were never asked for. Delay tactics and consensus pushing are amateur hour, not going to work on me.
Ron
------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From: * Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net>; *To: * Ron Baione <ron.baione@yahoo.com>; <el@lisse.NA>; <accountability-cross-community@icann.org>; *Cc: * <directors@omadhina.net>; *Subject: * Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Where do we stand? *Sent: * Mon, Oct 12, 2015 6:55:01 PM
Ron
This is a Workstream 2 issue.
Please give it a rest.
On 12/10/15 19:47, Ron Baione wrote:
"E. What would the community take as evidence in the short term that the Board is acting in good faith? I'm concerned by what appears to be Board bashing on the list, wherein many things that any of us say or do are interpreted negatively and perhaps conspiratorially. I realize that the great majority of people involved int he CCSG process do not have such attitudes, but predictably it only takes a very few individuals to sour and confuse a discussion and lessen its utility."
In my opinion, an agreement to the development of an external whistleblower process to protect the post-tranaition process from bad actor government and corporate agents' influence. No reason to waste time on anything before knowing the post-transition process won't be a facade of multistakeholder democracy. The moment the public finds out from "wikileaks" etc, that nefarious activity occurred the internet will become a 100% circus show, and that means conhressional hearings.
Ron
------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From: * Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.NA <javascript:return>>; *To: * <nigel@channelisles.net <javascript:return>>; <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:return>>; *Cc: * <directors@omadhina.net <javascript:return>>; *Subject: * Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Where do we stand? *Sent: * Mon, Oct 12, 2015 12:28:48 PM
Nigel,
I don't see it like this.
At the moment they want us to blink first.
And if we do not, they either are going to pass forward unmodified (with whatever comments they like, of course), or, overturn themselves by resolution (which I would see as the nuclear option at the moment).
greetings, el
On 2015-10-12 14:09, Nigel Roberts wrote: [...]
But it's all academic, since no matter what the consensus outcome, the Board reserves the right to reject it anyway. [...]
-- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA <javascript:return> <javascript:return> / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <javascript:return> <javascript:return>
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I don't think you are anything, in fact my original response didn't quote you and I don't understand why you responded in that hostile way. If someone asked a question and another person answers it, who are you to tell someone to not do so? Seriously, I want to know who you think you are. Ron
I know who I am. Seriously. On 12/10/15 20:12, Ron Baione wrote:
I don't think you are anything, in fact my original response didn't quote you and I don't understand why you responded in that hostile way. If someone asked a question and another person answers it, who are you to tell someone to not do so? Seriously, I want to know who you think you are.
Ron
------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From: * Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net>; *To: * Ron Baione <ron.baione@yahoo.com>; <el@lisse.NA>; <accountability-cross-community@icann.org>; *Cc: * <directors@omadhina.net>; *Subject: * Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Where do we stand? *Sent: * Mon, Oct 12, 2015 7:06:45 PM
(If you think I'm from the Corporate Dark Side, you've clearly never been to an ICANN meeting -- and the public forum in particular -- at any time between 1998 and the present day)
On 12/10/15 20:01, Ron Baione wrote:
Nigel, The question was postualted, I answered it. Everytime the question is repostulated, I will reanswer it.
We can all see what the strategy is, re-ask the same question until those who aren't "corporate enough" are shouted down. Declare the results of consensus that were never asked for. Delay tactics and consensus pushing are amateur hour, not going to work on me.
Ron
------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From: * Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net <javascript:return>>; *To: * Ron Baione <ron.baione@yahoo.com <javascript:return>>; <el@lisse.NA <javascript:return>>; <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:return>>; *Cc: * <directors@omadhina.net <javascript:return>>; *Subject: * Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Where do we stand? *Sent: * Mon, Oct 12, 2015 6:55:01 PM
Ron
This is a Workstream 2 issue.
Please give it a rest.
On 12/10/15 19:47, Ron Baione wrote:
"E. What would the community take as evidence in the short term that the Board is acting in good faith? I'm concerned by what appears to be Board bashing on the list, wherein many things that any of us say or do are interpreted negatively and perhaps conspiratorially. I realize that the great majority of people involved int he CCSG process do not have such attitudes, but predictably it only takes a very few individuals to sour and confuse a discussion and lessen its utility."
In my opinion, an agreement to the development of an external whistleblower process to protect the post-tranaition process from bad actor government and corporate agents' influence. No reason to waste time on anything before knowing the post-transition process won't be a facade of multistakeholder democracy. The moment the public finds out from "wikileaks" etc, that nefarious activity occurred the internet will become a 100% circus show, and that means conhressional hearings.
Ron
*From: * Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.NA <javascript:return> <javascript:return>>; *To: * <nigel@channelisles.net <javascript:return> <javascript:return>>; <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:return> <javascript:return>>; *Cc: * <directors@omadhina.net <javascript:return> <javascript:return>>; *Subject: * Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Where do we stand? *Sent: * Mon, Oct 12, 2015 12:28:48 PM
Nigel,
I don't see it like this.
At the moment they want us to blink first.
And if we do not, they either are going to pass forward unmodified (with whatever comments they like, of course), or, overturn themselves by resolution (which I would see as the nuclear option at the moment).
greetings, el
On 2015-10-12 14:09, Nigel Roberts wrote: [...]
But it's all academic, since no matter what the consensus outcome, the Board reserves the right to reject it anyway. [...]
-- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA <javascript:return> <javascript:return> <javascript:return> / *
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Cool, I am aware you are not the CEO of CCWG-accountability, this is a collaborative process where questions are asked and answered. Please refrain from telling me what to do in the future, thanks. Ron
Edited for spelling: "E. What would the community take as evidence in the short term that the Board is acting in good faith? I'm concerned by what appears to be Board bashing on the list, wherein many things that any of us say or do are interpreted negatively and perhaps conspiratorially. I realize that the great majority of people involved int he CCSG process do not have such attitudes, but predictably it only takes a very few individuals to sour and confuse a discussion and lessen its utility." In my opinion, an agreement to the development of an external whistleblower process to protect the post-transition process from bad actor government and corporate agents' influence. No reason to waste time on anything before knowing the post-transition process won't be a facade of multistakeholder democracy. The moment the public finds out from "wikileaks" etc, that nefarious activity occurred the internet will become a 100% circus show, and that means congressional hearings. Ron
George, I find this a thoughtful message and it deserve answers. As you, I am only speaking on my own behalf, although I suspect that much (but not all) would be supported by my At-Large colleagues. I am short on time, so forgive any typos... Perhaps this will prompt others to answer your questions. At 12/10/2015 03:33 AM, George Sadowsky wrote:
<6 concerns>
I share many of these feelings, but must comment on two of them: Removal of Directors by AC/SO vs overall community: My personal position is that if a group can select a Board member, then they should be able to change their mind and remove as well, but I can live with community removal as well. But I think the Board concern has little merit. Given the frequency of AC/SO directors being renewed, I cannot see this happening all that often, and if it does, there may well be good cause. Perhaps there is an edge case of a good director being removed frivolously. But we also have no way to guarantee that no appointed director will be a dud. But we live with the uncertainty with the hope and intent that it is not a frequent occasion. On the last point, I will point out that Cardinals do not bill by the hour at the rates our attorneys do!
In order to assist in resolving our current difficulties, here are some issues that I believe are pertinent. I raise them in the form of questions., for I believe that there is not a common precise understanding of them. Is it possible to provide simple and direct answers to them that might be useful for establishing greater understanding of the differences that still exist and beginning to bridge them? That would be helpful.
A. It appears that the single designator model is very much the same as the single member mode, but with the only statutory power being to select or remove directors. In general, is this correct? In brief, what are the other differences?
To establish any new structure the community still needs to address a range of open topics to ensure ICANNâs stability and freedom from capture: * ⢠which SO and AC will participate in the decision-making mechanism (which SOs and ACs will opt-in)? For dismissal of the entire Board, why should it not require active assent of all ACs and SOs? * what will be the Decision basis among participating SOs and ACs by _____ % of all SOs and ACs?? * how will advice from those SOs and ACs opting-out of the decision-making mechanism (similar to GAC/Board advice?) be taken into consideration? * how will will conflicts of interest and fiduciary or other responsibilities (such as public interest) will be factored into overall decision-making ?
As I understand it, the ONLY statutory power that a designator has is to appoint and remove directors. Any other powers it may be given will need to be spelled out in the Bylaws. My personal feeling is that we don't even need designators. We could have a Community Mechanism as a Single Widget and grant that entity the Bylaw power to appoint/remove directors. It may be a de facto designator under the California code, just as the SOs and At-Large is now, but if the name is a problem, let's ditch it. I note that to make the MEM work, we will probably need just such an entity to allow a group of SO/ACs to take IPR or other action.
B. In Buenos Aires, there was discussion and convergence (I thought) on an "empowered AC/SO" model. Does this model offer any initial point for movement to convergence of opinion?
It died an un-natural death when the CMSM was born...
C. The Board proposal calls for each AC/SO to decide if they are for or against and issue instead of possibly dividing its "vote". Is this a show-stopper?
Not for me. Each AC/SO must already decide, AS A UNIT, whether it will participate in the CMSM and whether to launch or support a petition to exercise some power. It would be natural to use the same mechanism to actually exercise the power.
D. The Board proposal allows any AC/SO to weigh in on a particular issue (and decide to exercise or oppose the use of one of the powers. The CCWG proposal requires and AC/SO to decide ahead of time whether it will participate in future uses of the powers. Is this a show-stopper?
It seemed a natural way to do things when we invented the community powers. I see no problem with leaving it open until a need to decide on exercising a particular power.
E. What would the community take as evidence in the short term that the Board is acting in good faith? I'm concerned by what appears to be Board bashing on the list, wherein many things that any of us say or do are interpreted negatively and perhaps conspiratorially. I realize that the great majority of people involved int he CCSG process do not have such attitudes, but predictably it only takes a very few individuals to sour and confuse a discussion and lessen its utility.
If you are talking short term, as in days or weeks, then it needs to be something that does not need a lot of investigation or preparation. The one thing that has been talked about for YEARS that fits this description is make all Board meetings and Board Committee meeting open. Yes, it will likely force SOME discussions offline, but it will also give AC/SO and the NomCom SOME insight as to how their appointed directors act. Why would that be bad? Alan
I'm sure that these questions reflect my limited and imperfect understanding of the situation, and perhaps some naïveté also, but there aren't many other ways to gain a productive understanding of it.
Comments welcome.
George
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participants (6)
-
Alan Greenberg -
Dr Eberhard W Lisse -
George Sadowsky -
James Gannon -
Nigel Roberts -
Ron Baione