Voting weights in community mechanism
Dear Colleagues, You will remember that our Initial Report Reference Model on voting weights was 5 votes for ccNSO, gNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC, 2 for SSAC and RSSAC. During the public comment period, we have received some comments (largely debated since on the list) with regards to the respective number of votes of gNSO and ALAC, and these are well noted. During our call on Tuesday we discussed the voting weight section of the community mechanism proposal and asked for WP1 to refine its proposal accordingly. The topic was then discussed again during the WP1 call that followed a few hours later. WP1 agreed to submit to our group a proposal with 5 votes for each SO or AC, pending intentions from GAC, SSAC and RSSAC to joint the mechanism as voting members. (see latest doc here : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/5A2-Community-Mech...) A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest. We discussed this between co-chairs and with Jordan as WP1 rapporteurs, and as a consequence would like to suggest we go back to the initial Reference model (5x5 and 2x2 votes) as a basis for our public comment document. This proposal will be on our agenda for Thursday's calls but we wanted to provide this heads-up in advance in order to facilitate an informed discussion. Best regards, Thomas, Leon & Mathieu Co-chairs
On 29 Jul 2015, at 20:37, Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> wrote:
A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
It's not just that. If we go with the algorithm that an abstention has the same effect as a vote against (as discussed on the call yesterday) then they will be certain to block recall, since these two organisations have made it abundantly clear that they do not wish to vote, do not consider it appropriate to their mandate, and have no intention of doing so under any circumstances.
On 29 Jul 2015 9:14 pm, "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 29 Jul 2015, at 20:37, Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> wrote:
A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If
SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
It's not just that. If we go with the algorithm that an abstention has
the same effect as a vote against (as discussed on the call yesterday) then they will be certain to block recall,
SO: I think it may be good to distinct the type of abstentions; Abstention of participating SO/AC would be different from Abstention of non-participating SO/AC. I expect the later will not affect/impact the votes in any way.
since these two organisations have made it abundantly clear that they do not wish to vote, do not consider it appropriate to their mandate, and have no intention of doing so under any circumstances.
SO: Well that could be a view of the present but the proposal we are developing now is for the future. One of the duo did formerly join this working group recently (which I think was a good thing) even though there were indication of not joining at the earlier stage of this process. So things can change and those stress tests needs to be done and sufficiently catered for in the ccwg report/proposal Regards _______________________________________________
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Dear All I do not understand what legally means the abstention of non participation . The voting results is always counted based on those who participate in voting . Those who do not participate SHALL NOT be counted as Abstention. This is alphabet of voting and the issue must be mentioned in each of voting procedure as follows: X% of those participating in voting and Vote. Last night I verified more than 20 convention, constitution,charter , agreement ,covenant and ..... All do not count non voters as abstention Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jul 2015, at 05:31, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
On 29 Jul 2015 9:14 pm, "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 29 Jul 2015, at 20:37, Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> wrote:
A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
It's not just that. If we go with the algorithm that an abstention has the same effect as a vote against (as discussed on the call yesterday) then they will be certain to block recall,
SO: I think it may be good to distinct the type of abstentions; Abstention of participating SO/AC would be different from Abstention of non-participating SO/AC. I expect the later will not affect/impact the votes in any way.
since these two organisations have made it abundantly clear that they do not wish to vote, do not consider it appropriate to their mandate, and have no intention of doing so under any circumstances.
SO: Well that could be a view of the present but the proposal we are developing now is for the future. One of the duo did formerly join this working group recently (which I think was a good thing) even though there were indication of not joining at the earlier stage of this process. So things can change and those stress tests needs to be done and sufficiently catered for in the ccwg report/proposal
Regards _______________________________________________
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Dear Kavouss, You are right. If SOs and ACs are not participating as voters, then they do not vote. They do not abstain or do anything else. They can *advise* whatever they like. But they cast no votes, have no ballots, etc. bests, Jordan On 30 July 2015 at 10:18, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear All I do not understand what legally means the abstention of non participation . The voting results is always counted based on those who participate in voting . Those who do not participate SHALL NOT be counted as Abstention. This is alphabet of voting and the issue must be mentioned in each of voting procedure as follows: X% of those participating in voting and Vote. Last night I verified more than 20 convention, constitution,charter , agreement ,covenant and ..... All do not count non voters as abstention Regards Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jul 2015, at 05:31, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
On 29 Jul 2015 9:14 pm, "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 29 Jul 2015, at 20:37, Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr>
wrote:
A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal.
If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
It's not just that. If we go with the algorithm that an abstention has the same effect as a vote against (as discussed on the call yesterday) then they will be certain to block recall,
SO: I think it may be good to distinct the type of abstentions; Abstention of participating SO/AC would be different from Abstention of non-participating SO/AC. I expect the later will not affect/impact the votes in any way.
since these two organisations have made it abundantly clear that they do not wish to vote, do not consider it appropriate to their mandate, and have no intention of doing so under any circumstances.
SO: Well that could be a view of the present but the proposal we are developing now is for the future. One of the duo did formerly join this working group recently (which I think was a good thing) even though there were indication of not joining at the earlier stage of this process. So things can change and those stress tests needs to be done and sufficiently catered for in the ccwg report/proposal
Regards _______________________________________________
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On 07/29/2015 11:18 PM, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:> Dear All
I do not understand what legally means the abstention of non participation . The voting results is always counted based on those who participate in voting . Those who do not participate SHALL NOT be counted as Abstention.
Dear Kavouss Just as a little light relief from all the heavy lifting going on at ridiculously short notices . . I just want to mention, in passing that requiring someone to "vote their abstention" is one of those cross-cultural issues that can cause immense (though usually harmless and amusing) misunderstandings. Just like "to table an item". (Anyone who was at the first ever meeting of what became the GNSO/ccNSO will remember this). In accepted electoral practice, at least in the Commonwealth, it is NEVER required to participate in voting to feature as an abstention. (i.e. to "positively abstain"). The definition of "abstention" is precisely "one who abstains from voting". Someone who abstains from voting is everyone who (otherwise enfranchised in the voting procedure) chooses not to, or fails to participate in the voting. Thus there is a mathematical sum which should not EVER be proved false (but see later). That is A + N + B = E where A = ayes, N = noes, B = abstentions, and E = the electorate "Counting the abstentions" (as I see regularly happen) is actually a nullity, since abstentions are DEFINED as those left over from E after counting A and B. And yes, I have been in many ICANN and CENTR meetings where this is often done, and where, apparently, E - A - N - B > 0 which is a complete absurdity (i.e. it seems some people voted neither aye, nor noe, and neither did they abstain). It IS fairly usual in small committee meetings to call for the three categories in turn simply to help with record keeping, but the chairman really needs to be awake that the number of abstentions counted is actually the correct number, as it is entirely deterministic, and woe-betide him or her if they miscount, as the Secretary will become irritated. With all good wishes N PS: In public elections we also have a long tradition of intentionally spoiling a ballot paper. This is NOT an abstention, since the (often amusing) voter did participate, but their poll was simply invalid. See http://i.imgur.com/3GwiY.jpg
This is alphabet of voting and the issue must be mentioned in each of voting procedure as follows: X% of those participating in voting and Vote. Last night I verified more than 20 convention, constitution,charter , agreement ,covenant and ..... All do not count non voters as abstention Regards Kavouss
Hi all, hi Malcolm: On 30 July 2015 at 08:14, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 29 Jul 2015, at 20:37, Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> wrote:
A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
It's not just that. If we go with the algorithm that an abstention has the same effect as a vote against (as discussed on the call yesterday) then they will be certain to block recall, since these two organisations have made it abundantly clear that they do not wish to vote, do not consider it appropriate to their mandate, and have no intention of doing so under any circumstances.
I don't think it's as bad as that, unless they were to take the step to opt-in to the system --and then-- not vote. It seems unlikely to me they will opt in based on what they have said to us so far (but that may change after this new CMSM model is debated). All -- for the record, I support the 5x5 and 2x2 proposal that Mathieu has sent. This is for the reasons he sent out, and because of all the public comments received, there was no clear thrust in any direction on this # of votes question except perhaps for some greater GNSO representation. There certainly weren't calls to boost the voting weight of the two appointed ACs. I do understand, I think, the arguments both in favour of five-all, and of different SO versus AC treatment. But in the end I think the model we proposed back in PC1 hasn't seen fundamental questions arises of a degree that means we should move from it, and I don't think any of the analysis or work we have done convinces me we should change either. The conflict inherent in asking groups appointed by the Board to the in turn wield powers to hold it to account is also a practical and principled objection to the 7x5 mechanism that hadn't occurred to me. So - 5x5 plus 2x2 has my support. thanks Jordan
Thanks to the Co-Chairs for this message. I agree that the best approach at this time is to revert to the 5x5 and 2X2 reference model included in our first proposal. It received support and we obviously don't have consensus on a replacement model. We'll continue to discuss and debate the issue of vote distribution, but I suggest we'd be better off doing so AFTER we receive community feedback from the upcoming public comment period. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Mathieu Weill Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2015 9:37 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism Dear Colleagues, You will remember that our Initial Report Reference Model on voting weights was 5 votes for ccNSO, gNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC, 2 for SSAC and RSSAC. During the public comment period, we have received some comments (largely debated since on the list) with regards to the respective number of votes of gNSO and ALAC, and these are well noted. During our call on Tuesday we discussed the voting weight section of the community mechanism proposal and asked for WP1 to refine its proposal accordingly. The topic was then discussed again during the WP1 call that followed a few hours later. WP1 agreed to submit to our group a proposal with 5 votes for each SO or AC, pending intentions from GAC, SSAC and RSSAC to joint the mechanism as voting members. (see latest doc here : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/5A2-Community-Mech...) A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest. We discussed this between co-chairs and with Jordan as WP1 rapporteurs, and as a consequence would like to suggest we go back to the initial Reference model (5x5 and 2x2 votes) as a basis for our public comment document. This proposal will be on our agenda for Thursday's calls but we wanted to provide this heads-up in advance in order to facilitate an informed discussion. Best regards, Thomas, Leon & Mathieu Co-chairs _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I support this approach as well (5X5, 2x2) for the current document. We may want to highlight this as a specific point for comment. Greg On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 7:10 PM, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com> wrote:
Thanks to the Co-Chairs for this message.
I agree that the best approach at this time is to revert to the 5x5 and 2X2 reference model included in our first proposal. It received support and we obviously don't have consensus on a replacement model. We'll continue to discuss and debate the issue of vote distribution, but I suggest we'd be better off doing so AFTER we receive community feedback from the upcoming public comment period.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Mathieu Weill Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2015 9:37 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism
Dear Colleagues,
You will remember that our Initial Report Reference Model on voting weights was 5 votes for ccNSO, gNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC, 2 for SSAC and RSSAC. During the public comment period, we have received some comments (largely debated since on the list) with regards to the respective number of votes of gNSO and ALAC, and these are well noted.
During our call on Tuesday we discussed the voting weight section of the community mechanism proposal and asked for WP1 to refine its proposal accordingly. The topic was then discussed again during the WP1 call that followed a few hours later. WP1 agreed to submit to our group a proposal with 5 votes for each SO or AC, pending intentions from GAC, SSAC and RSSAC to joint the mechanism as voting members. (see latest doc here :
https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/5A2-Community-Mech... )
A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
We discussed this between co-chairs and with Jordan as WP1 rapporteurs, and as a consequence would like to suggest we go back to the initial Reference model (5x5 and 2x2 votes) as a basis for our public comment document.
This proposal will be on our agenda for Thursday's calls but we wanted to provide this heads-up in advance in order to facilitate an informed discussion.
Best regards, Thomas, Leon & Mathieu Co-chairs
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Keith + 1. Cheers, Chris
On 30 Jul 2015, at 09:10 , Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com> wrote:
Thanks to the Co-Chairs for this message.
I agree that the best approach at this time is to revert to the 5x5 and 2X2 reference model included in our first proposal. It received support and we obviously don't have consensus on a replacement model. We'll continue to discuss and debate the issue of vote distribution, but I suggest we'd be better off doing so AFTER we receive community feedback from the upcoming public comment period.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Mathieu Weill Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2015 9:37 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism
Dear Colleagues,
You will remember that our Initial Report Reference Model on voting weights was 5 votes for ccNSO, gNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC, 2 for SSAC and RSSAC. During the public comment period, we have received some comments (largely debated since on the list) with regards to the respective number of votes of gNSO and ALAC, and these are well noted.
During our call on Tuesday we discussed the voting weight section of the community mechanism proposal and asked for WP1 to refine its proposal accordingly. The topic was then discussed again during the WP1 call that followed a few hours later. WP1 agreed to submit to our group a proposal with 5 votes for each SO or AC, pending intentions from GAC, SSAC and RSSAC to joint the mechanism as voting members. (see latest doc here : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/5A2-Community-Mech...)
A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
We discussed this between co-chairs and with Jordan as WP1 rapporteurs, and as a consequence would like to suggest we go back to the initial Reference model (5x5 and 2x2 votes) as a basis for our public comment document.
This proposal will be on our agenda for Thursday's calls but we wanted to provide this heads-up in advance in order to facilitate an informed discussion.
Best regards, Thomas, Leon & Mathieu Co-chairs
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hi all, Thanks for responding to our concerns about the ability of Board appointees to block the communities ability to remove Board members. It was pretty obvious once you examined the proposal as is the political reality that giving any voting power to the United States military, through it's 3/12 member representation at RSSAC, is going to cause problems. You guys are under such time pressure mistakes are going to happen and the consequences of actions may not always be readily apparent. I don't blame you: there is no Dummies guide to restructuring a major international corporation in 7 months or less. Writing such a book just might be a wise career choice once you wrap up this project. I hope you in good faith are not going to try to claim that there is consensus for the 5 X2 model. Just so that illusion is busted I oppose that model for the 1) inclusion of the U.S. military as a voting member through RSSAC, 2) an unwarranted change of the power balance and functions of the respective SOAC's when compared to current voting arrangements, which violates the CCWG policy published in the legal scoping document of 19 March 2015 , a consensus policy whose reversal has not been discussed or approved by the group, 3) the lack of safeguard against capture through coordinated manipulation taking advantage of the possibility of parties to simultaneously belong to multiple SO's and AC's, 4) problems of double dipping per number 3 which violate the principle of one person / one party one vote which is customary international law and required by ICANN through it's Bylaws commitment to adhere to international law...plus likely a number of other problems that neither of us have thought of given the rushed nature of things. I sadly will not be on the calls later today due to pre-existing work commitments and the last minute scheduling of the calls. I would respectfully request that if you are going to go ahead with putting the 5 X 2 proposal in the public comment materials you truthfully and transparency note that this proposal was a last minute substitute for a proposal that was deemed inadequate. I understand that this was our previous proposal but we don't know what the response would have been had we not ditched it. I agree with Keith that we will need to discuss all of this again once the public comments are received. With regards to the minority reports I appreciate the situation you are in. I do not, however, accept the explanation offered by Thomas that minority reports will be accepted later but just won't make the publication. I'm not a big fan of separate but equal. Minority views not in the initial published report are at a distinct disadvantage in terms of public receipt and review. We all know this. Let's stop pretending. You are good guys but you're starting to act like those we want to hold accountable. I know you really don't want to set the precedent of shorting minority rights. Thomas, as our GNSO representative I am informing you that there are at least two groups of GNSO members who are preparing minority reports but do not believe they can get it done by noon tomorrow. If you can't do anything, fine, but be please be prepared to explain it to them at the next Council meeting. I've tried but they are not accepting my explanations and, frankly, I don't blame them. Thanks for considering, thanks for your hard work and good luck on the calls later today. Best, Edward Morris ---------------------------------------- From: "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek@verisign.com> Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2015 12:11 AM To: "Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr" <Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism Thanks to the Co-Chairs for this message. I agree that the best approach at this time is to revert to the 5x5 and 2X2 reference model included in our first proposal. It received support and we obviously don't have consensus on a replacement model. We'll continue to discuss and debate the issue of vote distribution, but I suggest we'd be better off doing so AFTER we receive community feedback from the upcoming public comment period. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Mathieu Weill Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2015 9:37 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism Dear Colleagues, You will remember that our Initial Report Reference Model on voting weights was 5 votes for ccNSO, gNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC, 2 for SSAC and RSSAC. During the public comment period, we have received some comments (largely debated since on the list) with regards to the respective number of votes of gNSO and ALAC, and these are well noted. During our call on Tuesday we discussed the voting weight section of the community mechanism proposal and asked for WP1 to refine its proposal accordingly. The topic was then discussed again during the WP1 call that followed a few hours later. WP1 agreed to submit to our group a proposal with 5 votes for each SO or AC, pending intentions from GAC, SSAC and RSSAC to joint the mechanism as voting members. (see latest doc here : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/5A2-Community-Mech anism-Voting-PenultimateDraft.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1438079125000&a pi=v2) A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest. We discussed this between co-chairs and with Jordan as WP1 rapporteurs, and as a consequence would like to suggest we go back to the initial Reference model (5x5 and 2x2 votes) as a basis for our public comment document. This proposal will be on our agenda for Thursday's calls but we wanted to provide this heads-up in advance in order to facilitate an informed discussion. Best regards, Thomas, Leon & Mathieu Co-chairs _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
This is really quite a baffling last-second attempt to throw together a bunch of half-truths and outright misstatements, casting unwarranted aspersions on the careful work that this group with an objective that is entirely unclear. Any examination of these statements causes them to fall like a house of cards. It was pretty obvious once you examined the proposal as is the political
reality that giving any voting power to the United States military, through it's 3/12 member representation at RSSAC, is going to cause problems.
The membership of RSSAC is public knowledge and has been for the duration of this CCWG. A voting role for the RSSAC has been a possibility for months, and no one raised this "issue." I'm always skeptical when somebody says something is "obvious" -- it usually means it's BS. This attempt to trump up problems is so slapdash that the (readily available) facts aren't even accurate. There are 3 root servers under the US government, but only two are associated with the US military -- the third is controlled by NASA, a civilian agency. These have been around pretty much since the dawn of Internet time, so claiming this is suddenly a problem is really quite absurd. Are there any issues from the history of ICANN that can be cited as arising from the control of these root servers, or the membership of their (civilian) administrators in RSSAC. This just seems like FUD. Calling it a "mistake" doesn't make it one. As far as "illusion" busting, whether one participant decides to oppose for a series of manufactured reasons that don't hold water does not "bust" consensus. Going back to those reasons, for a little "myth-busting": 1) inclusion of the U.S. military as a voting member through RSSAC, Answered above 2) an unwarranted change of the power balance and functions of the
respective SOAC's when compared to current voting arrangements, which violates the CCWG policy published in the legal scoping document of 19 March 2015 , a consensus policy whose reversal has not been discussed or approved by the group,
There are no "current voting arrangements," unless one is referring to the ICANN Board, which is quite a different thing than this community mechanism; it's completely unclear and unexplained what "CCWG policy" is being "violated" -- misusing the term "consensus policy" to give this unsupported claim a sense of gravitas is really quite amusing... 3) the lack of safeguard against capture through coordinated manipulation
taking advantage of the possibility of parties to simultaneously belong to multiple SO's and AC's,
This is another summary "issue" that's never been raised before and magically appears now without any explanation or clarification. What possibility is being referred to? There has been some discussion of the possibility of parties being members of different constituencies or SGs in the GNSO, but that's been dealt with already (such parties can only vote in one such organization) and is clearly not what's being referred to here. There's a lot of scary, FUD-y words being thrown around but absolutely no substance -- no explanation, no detail, no credibility. The fact that a root server operator may also be a registry operator (among hundreds of registry operator), or that a GAC member may also be a ccNSO operator (among a couple hundred ccNSO registry operators) does not somehow become a concern due to vague imprecations in a rushed email, which won't even be defended by its author. 4) problems of double dipping per number 3 which violate the principle of
one person / one party one vote which is customary international law and required by ICANN through it's Bylaws commitment to adhere to international law
This is just a restatement of number 3, and fails along with it . Trying to inflate some unstated minor occurrence (which I assume to be the overlaps stated above) into some self-styled "double dipping" problem just doesn't hold water. Being a member of two different bodies or committees does not violate "one party/one vote" and claiming this somehow be a violation of international law is just hysterical (in both senses of the word). ...plus likely a number of other problems that neither of us have thought
of given the rushed nature of things.
This basically translates as "I can't think of any problems, but there must be some." That is hardly the kind of objection that even merits a response. Finally, I disagree with the characterization of the 5/2 proposal, and think that the suggested statement would be neither truthful nor transparent -- rather, it would by false and hyperbolic. I must give my esteemed colleague points for inventiveness, but none for substance. This is the virtual equivalent of throwing a stink-bomb into the middle of a meeting and then running away. Thankfully, we don't need to clear the room to get rid of the odor. If this an attempt to buy more time for some colleagues who are still working on minority statements, I can also give points for loyalty. But the schedule for publication of this document has been well-known for weeks. It's unfortunate that some could not plan ahead to meet that timeframe. I hardly think it's prejudicial if these are published or notified to the public comment page a couple of days after the Report -- appropriate notice can be made that minority reports are expected. Using a loaded term like "separate but equal" (harkening back to the dark days of racial segregation in the US) to describe this strays into demagoguery. Claiming "we all know" things is no more convincing than saying something is "obvious" -- everyone's entitled to their opinion, but not to claim that it is "known" by anyone other than themselves. We should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good, in this instance or in the instance of our proposal in general. It would be helpful if there were some indication of the real goal and concern behind this, rather than a bunch of baseless accusations. As it is, I remain baffled at what is hoped to be accomplished other than an attempt at delay. Greg On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote:
Hi all,
Thanks for responding to our concerns about the ability of Board appointees to block the communities ability to remove Board members. It was pretty obvious once you examined the proposal as is the political reality that giving any voting power to the United States military, through it's 3/12 member representation at RSSAC, is going to cause problems. You guys are under such time pressure mistakes are going to happen and the consequences of actions may not always be readily apparent. I don't blame you: there is no Dummies guide to restructuring a major international corporation in 7 months or less. Writing such a book just might be a wise career choice once you wrap up this project.
I hope you in good faith are not going to try to claim that there is consensus for the 5 X2 model. Just so that illusion is busted I oppose that model for the 1) inclusion of the U.S. military as a voting member through RSSAC, 2) an unwarranted change of the power balance and functions of the respective SOAC's when compared to current voting arrangements, which violates the CCWG policy published in the legal scoping document of 19 March 2015 , a consensus policy whose reversal has not been discussed or approved by the group, 3) the lack of safeguard against capture through coordinated manipulation taking advantage of the possibility of parties to simultaneously belong to multiple SO's and AC's, 4) problems of double dipping per number 3 which violate the principle of one person / one party one vote which is customary international law and required by ICANN through it's Bylaws commitment to adhere to international law...plus likely a number of other problems that neither of us have thought of given the rushed nature of things.
I sadly will not be on the calls later today due to pre-existing work commitments and the last minute scheduling of the calls.
I would respectfully request that if you are going to go ahead with putting the 5 X 2 proposal in the public comment materials you truthfully and transparency note that this proposal was a last minute substitute for a proposal that was deemed inadequate. I understand that this was our previous proposal but we don't know what the response would have been had we not ditched it. I agree with Keith that we will need to discuss all of this again once the public comments are received.
With regards to the minority reports I appreciate the situation you are in. I do not, however, accept the explanation offered by Thomas that minority reports will be accepted later but just won't make the publication. I'm not a big fan of separate but equal. Minority views not in the initial published report are at a distinct disadvantage in terms of public receipt and review. We all know this. Let's stop pretending. You are good guys but you're starting to act like those we want to hold accountable. I know you really don't want to set the precedent of shorting minority rights. Thomas, as our GNSO representative I am informing you that there are at least two groups of GNSO members who are preparing minority reports but do not believe they can get it done by noon tomorrow. If you can't do anything, fine, but be please be prepared to explain it to them at the next Council meeting. I've tried but they are not accepting my explanations and, frankly, I don't blame them.
Thanks for considering, thanks for your hard work and good luck on the calls later today.
Best,
Edward Morris
------------------------------ *From*: "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek@verisign.com> *Sent*: Thursday, July 30, 2015 12:11 AM *To*: "Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr" <Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr>, " accountability-cross-community@icann.org" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Subject*: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism
Thanks to the Co-Chairs for this message.
I agree that the best approach at this time is to revert to the 5x5 and 2X2 reference model included in our first proposal. It received support and we obviously don't have consensus on a replacement model. We'll continue to discuss and debate the issue of vote distribution, but I suggest we'd be better off doing so AFTER we receive community feedback from the upcoming public comment period.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Mathieu Weill Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2015 9:37 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism
Dear Colleagues,
You will remember that our Initial Report Reference Model on voting weights was 5 votes for ccNSO, gNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC, 2 for SSAC and RSSAC. During the public comment period, we have received some comments (largely debated since on the list) with regards to the respective number of votes of gNSO and ALAC, and these are well noted.
During our call on Tuesday we discussed the voting weight section of the community mechanism proposal and asked for WP1 to refine its proposal accordingly. The topic was then discussed again during the WP1 call that followed a few hours later. WP1 agreed to submit to our group a proposal with 5 votes for each SO or AC, pending intentions from GAC, SSAC and RSSAC to joint the mechanism as voting members. (see latest doc here :
https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/5A2-Community-Mech... )
A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
We discussed this between co-chairs and with Jordan as WP1 rapporteurs, and as a consequence would like to suggest we go back to the initial Reference model (5x5 and 2x2 votes) as a basis for our public comment document.
This proposal will be on our agenda for Thursday's calls but we wanted to provide this heads-up in advance in order to facilitate an informed discussion.
Best regards, Thomas, Leon & Mathieu Co-chairs
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I would just like to copy into this thread a response that Keith Drazek gave in another thread, which is a far more succinct (and perhaps more constructive) response to Ed's message than mine: I acknowledge there is more work to be done around the vote balance issue
(as I said in an earlier email), but I'm confident we can resolve the issue satisfactorily following the receipt of additional community feedback.
On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 2:22 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
This is really quite a baffling last-second attempt to throw together a bunch of half-truths and outright misstatements, casting unwarranted aspersions on the careful work that this group with an objective that is entirely unclear. Any examination of these statements causes them to fall like a house of cards.
It was pretty obvious once you examined the proposal as is the political
reality that giving any voting power to the United States military, through it's 3/12 member representation at RSSAC, is going to cause problems.
The membership of RSSAC is public knowledge and has been for the duration of this CCWG. A voting role for the RSSAC has been a possibility for months, and no one raised this "issue." I'm always skeptical when somebody says something is "obvious" -- it usually means it's BS. This attempt to trump up problems is so slapdash that the (readily available) facts aren't even accurate. There are 3 root servers under the US government, but only two are associated with the US military -- the third is controlled by NASA, a civilian agency. These have been around pretty much since the dawn of Internet time, so claiming this is suddenly a problem is really quite absurd. Are there any issues from the history of ICANN that can be cited as arising from the control of these root servers, or the membership of their (civilian) administrators in RSSAC. This just seems like FUD. Calling it a "mistake" doesn't make it one.
As far as "illusion" busting, whether one participant decides to oppose for a series of manufactured reasons that don't hold water does not "bust" consensus. Going back to those reasons, for a little "myth-busting":
1) inclusion of the U.S. military as a voting member through RSSAC,
Answered above
2) an unwarranted change of the power balance and functions of the
respective SOAC's when compared to current voting arrangements, which violates the CCWG policy published in the legal scoping document of 19 March 2015 , a consensus policy whose reversal has not been discussed or approved by the group,
There are no "current voting arrangements," unless one is referring to the ICANN Board, which is quite a different thing than this community mechanism; it's completely unclear and unexplained what "CCWG policy" is being "violated" -- misusing the term "consensus policy" to give this unsupported claim a sense of gravitas is really quite amusing...
3) the lack of safeguard against capture through coordinated
manipulation taking advantage of the possibility of parties to simultaneously belong to multiple SO's and AC's,
This is another summary "issue" that's never been raised before and magically appears now without any explanation or clarification. What possibility is being referred to? There has been some discussion of the possibility of parties being members of different constituencies or SGs in the GNSO, but that's been dealt with already (such parties can only vote in one such organization) and is clearly not what's being referred to here. There's a lot of scary, FUD-y words being thrown around but absolutely no substance -- no explanation, no detail, no credibility. The fact that a root server operator may also be a registry operator (among hundreds of registry operator), or that a GAC member may also be a ccNSO operator (among a couple hundred ccNSO registry operators) does not somehow become a concern due to vague imprecations in a rushed email, which won't even be defended by its author.
4) problems of double dipping per number 3 which violate the principle of
one person / one party one vote which is customary international law and required by ICANN through it's Bylaws commitment to adhere to international law
This is just a restatement of number 3, and fails along with it . Trying to inflate some unstated minor occurrence (which I assume to be the overlaps stated above) into some self-styled "double dipping" problem just doesn't hold water. Being a member of two different bodies or committees does not violate "one party/one vote" and claiming this somehow be a violation of international law is just hysterical (in both senses of the word).
...plus likely a number of other problems that neither of us have thought
of given the rushed nature of things.
This basically translates as "I can't think of any problems, but there must be some." That is hardly the kind of objection that even merits a response.
Finally, I disagree with the characterization of the 5/2 proposal, and think that the suggested statement would be neither truthful nor transparent -- rather, it would by false and hyperbolic.
I must give my esteemed colleague points for inventiveness, but none for substance. This is the virtual equivalent of throwing a stink-bomb into the middle of a meeting and then running away. Thankfully, we don't need to clear the room to get rid of the odor.
If this an attempt to buy more time for some colleagues who are still working on minority statements, I can also give points for loyalty. But the schedule for publication of this document has been well-known for weeks. It's unfortunate that some could not plan ahead to meet that timeframe. I hardly think it's prejudicial if these are published or notified to the public comment page a couple of days after the Report -- appropriate notice can be made that minority reports are expected. Using a loaded term like "separate but equal" (harkening back to the dark days of racial segregation in the US) to describe this strays into demagoguery. Claiming "we all know" things is no more convincing than saying something is "obvious" -- everyone's entitled to their opinion, but not to claim that it is "known" by anyone other than themselves. We should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good, in this instance or in the instance of our proposal in general.
It would be helpful if there were some indication of the real goal and concern behind this, rather than a bunch of baseless accusations. As it is, I remain baffled at what is hoped to be accomplished other than an attempt at delay.
Greg
On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote:
Hi all,
Thanks for responding to our concerns about the ability of Board appointees to block the communities ability to remove Board members. It was pretty obvious once you examined the proposal as is the political reality that giving any voting power to the United States military, through it's 3/12 member representation at RSSAC, is going to cause problems. You guys are under such time pressure mistakes are going to happen and the consequences of actions may not always be readily apparent. I don't blame you: there is no Dummies guide to restructuring a major international corporation in 7 months or less. Writing such a book just might be a wise career choice once you wrap up this project.
I hope you in good faith are not going to try to claim that there is consensus for the 5 X2 model. Just so that illusion is busted I oppose that model for the 1) inclusion of the U.S. military as a voting member through RSSAC, 2) an unwarranted change of the power balance and functions of the respective SOAC's when compared to current voting arrangements, which violates the CCWG policy published in the legal scoping document of 19 March 2015 , a consensus policy whose reversal has not been discussed or approved by the group, 3) the lack of safeguard against capture through coordinated manipulation taking advantage of the possibility of parties to simultaneously belong to multiple SO's and AC's, 4) problems of double dipping per number 3 which violate the principle of one person / one party one vote which is customary international law and required by ICANN through it's Bylaws commitment to adhere to international law...plus likely a number of other problems that neither of us have thought of given the rushed nature of things.
I sadly will not be on the calls later today due to pre-existing work commitments and the last minute scheduling of the calls.
I would respectfully request that if you are going to go ahead with putting the 5 X 2 proposal in the public comment materials you truthfully and transparency note that this proposal was a last minute substitute for a proposal that was deemed inadequate. I understand that this was our previous proposal but we don't know what the response would have been had we not ditched it. I agree with Keith that we will need to discuss all of this again once the public comments are received.
With regards to the minority reports I appreciate the situation you are in. I do not, however, accept the explanation offered by Thomas that minority reports will be accepted later but just won't make the publication. I'm not a big fan of separate but equal. Minority views not in the initial published report are at a distinct disadvantage in terms of public receipt and review. We all know this. Let's stop pretending. You are good guys but you're starting to act like those we want to hold accountable. I know you really don't want to set the precedent of shorting minority rights. Thomas, as our GNSO representative I am informing you that there are at least two groups of GNSO members who are preparing minority reports but do not believe they can get it done by noon tomorrow. If you can't do anything, fine, but be please be prepared to explain it to them at the next Council meeting. I've tried but they are not accepting my explanations and, frankly, I don't blame them.
Thanks for considering, thanks for your hard work and good luck on the calls later today.
Best,
Edward Morris
------------------------------ *From*: "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek@verisign.com> *Sent*: Thursday, July 30, 2015 12:11 AM *To*: "Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr" <Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr>, " accountability-cross-community@icann.org" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Subject*: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism
Thanks to the Co-Chairs for this message.
I agree that the best approach at this time is to revert to the 5x5 and 2X2 reference model included in our first proposal. It received support and we obviously don't have consensus on a replacement model. We'll continue to discuss and debate the issue of vote distribution, but I suggest we'd be better off doing so AFTER we receive community feedback from the upcoming public comment period.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Mathieu Weill Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2015 9:37 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism
Dear Colleagues,
You will remember that our Initial Report Reference Model on voting weights was 5 votes for ccNSO, gNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC, 2 for SSAC and RSSAC. During the public comment period, we have received some comments (largely debated since on the list) with regards to the respective number of votes of gNSO and ALAC, and these are well noted.
During our call on Tuesday we discussed the voting weight section of the community mechanism proposal and asked for WP1 to refine its proposal accordingly. The topic was then discussed again during the WP1 call that followed a few hours later. WP1 agreed to submit to our group a proposal with 5 votes for each SO or AC, pending intentions from GAC, SSAC and RSSAC to joint the mechanism as voting members. (see latest doc here :
https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/5A2-Community-Mech... )
A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
We discussed this between co-chairs and with Jordan as WP1 rapporteurs, and as a consequence would like to suggest we go back to the initial Reference model (5x5 and 2x2 votes) as a basis for our public comment document.
This proposal will be on our agenda for Thursday's calls but we wanted to provide this heads-up in advance in order to facilitate an informed discussion.
Best regards, Thomas, Leon & Mathieu Co-chairs
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I can not find any reference in the Charter or anywhere else that this participant has been appointed arbiter of what submissions are timely or not. Either an argument has substance or not, but when it is submitted has nothing to do with substance. This is straight out of the handbook "Short Term Negotiation Skills". For "hardly the kind of objection that even merits a response" I find the response quite long, though without much substance. As usual. el On 2015-07-30 07:22, Greg Shatan wrote:
This is really quite a baffling last-second attempt to throw together a bunch of half-truths and outright misstatements, casting unwarranted aspersions on the careful work that this group with an objective that is entirely unclear. Any examination of these statements causes them to fall like a house of cards.
It was pretty obvious once you examined the proposal as is the political reality that giving any voting power to the United States military, through it's 3/12 member representation at RSSAC, is going to cause problems.
The membership of RSSAC is public knowledge and has been for the duration of this CCWG. A voting role for the RSSAC has been a possibility for months, and no one raised this "issue." I'm always skeptical when somebody says something is "obvious" -- it usually means it's BS. This attempt to trump up problems is so slapdash that the (readily available) facts aren't even accurate. There are 3 root servers under the US government, but only two are associated with the US military -- the third is controlled by NASA, a civilian agency. These have been around pretty much since the dawn of Internet time, so claiming this is suddenly a problem is really quite absurd. Are there any issues from the history of ICANN that can be cited as arising from the control of these root servers, or the membership of their (civilian) administrators in RSSAC. This just seems like FUD. Calling it a "mistake" doesn't make it one.
As far as "illusion" busting, whether one participant decides to oppose for a series of manufactured reasons that don't hold water does not "bust" consensus. Going back to those reasons, for a little "myth-busting":
1) inclusion of the U.S. military as a voting member through RSSAC,
Answered above
2) an unwarranted change of the power balance and functions of the respective SOAC's when compared to current voting arrangements, which violates the CCWG policy published in the legal scoping document of 19 March 2015 , a consensus policy whose reversal has not been discussed or approved by the group,
There are no "current voting arrangements," unless one is referring to the ICANN Board, which is quite a different thing than this community mechanism; it's completely unclear and unexplained what "CCWG policy" is being "violated" -- misusing the term "consensus policy" to give this unsupported claim a sense of gravitas is really quite amusing...
3) the lack of safeguard against capture through coordinated manipulation taking advantage of the possibility of parties to simultaneously belong to multiple SO's and AC's,
This is another summary "issue" that's never been raised before and magically appears now without any explanation or clarification. What possibility is being referred to? There has been some discussion of the possibility of parties being members of different constituencies or SGs in the GNSO, but that's been dealt with already (such parties can only vote in one such organization) and is clearly not what's being referred to here. There's a lot of scary, FUD-y words being thrown around but absolutely no substance -- no explanation, no detail, no credibility. The fact that a root server operator may also be a registry operator (among hundreds of registry operator), or that a GAC member may also be a ccNSO operator (among a couple hundred ccNSO registry operators) does not somehow become a concern due to vague imprecations in a rushed email, which won't even be defended by its author.
4) problems of double dipping per number 3 which violate the principle of one person / one party one vote which is customary international law and required by ICANN through it's Bylaws commitment to adhere to international law
This is just a restatement of number 3, and fails along with it . Trying to inflate some unstated minor occurrence (which I assume to be the overlaps stated above) into some self-styled "double dipping" problem just doesn't hold water. Being a member of two different bodies or committees does not violate "one party/one vote" and claiming this somehow be a violation of international law is just hysterical (in both senses of the word).
...plus likely a number of other problems that neither of us have thought of given the rushed nature of things.
This basically translates as "I can't think of any problems, but there must be some." That is hardly the kind of objection that even merits a response.
Finally, I disagree with the characterization of the 5/2 proposal, and think that the suggested statement would be neither truthful nor transparent -- rather, it would by false and hyperbolic.
I must give my esteemed colleague points for inventiveness, but none for substance. This is the virtual equivalent of throwing a stink-bomb into the middle of a meeting and then running away. Thankfully, we don't need to clear the room to get rid of the odor.
If this an attempt to buy more time for some colleagues who are still working on minority statements, I can also give points for loyalty. But the schedule for publication of this document has been well-known for weeks. It's unfortunate that some could not plan ahead to meet that timeframe. I hardly think it's prejudicial if these are published or notified to the public comment page a couple of days after the Report -- appropriate notice can be made that minority reports are expected. Using a loaded term like "separate but equal" (harkening back to the dark days of racial segregation in the US) to describe this strays into demagoguery. Claiming "we all know" things is no more convincing than saying something is "obvious" -- everyone's entitled to their opinion, but not to claim that it is "known" by anyone other than themselves. We should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good, in this instance or in the instance of our proposal in general.
It would be helpful if there were some indication of the real goal and concern behind this, rather than a bunch of baseless accusations. As it is, I remain baffled at what is hoped to be accomplished other than an attempt at delay.
Greg
On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>> wrote:
Hi all,
Thanks for responding to our concerns about the ability of Board appointees to block the communities ability to remove Board members. It was pretty obvious once you examined the proposal as is the political reality that giving any voting power to the United States military, through it's 3/12 member representation at RSSAC, is going to cause problems. You guys are under such time pressure mistakes are going to happen and the consequences of actions may not always be readily apparent. I don't blame you: there is no Dummies guide to restructuring a major international corporation in 7 months or less. Writing such a book just might be a wise career choice once you wrap up this project.
I hope you in good faith are not going to try to claim that there is consensus for the 5 X2 model. Just so that illusion is busted I oppose that model for the 1) inclusion of the U.S. military as a voting member through RSSAC, 2) an unwarranted change of the power balance and functions of the respective SOAC's when compared to current voting arrangements, which violates the CCWG policy published in the legal scoping document of 19 March 2015 , a consensus policy whose reversal has not been discussed or approved by the group, 3) the lack of safeguard against capture through coordinated manipulation taking advantage of the possibility of parties to simultaneously belong to multiple SO's and AC's, 4) problems of double dipping per number 3 which violate the principle of one person / one party one vote which is customary international law and required by ICANN through it's Bylaws commitment to adhere to international law...plus likely a number of other problems that neither of us have thought of given the rushed nature of things.
I sadly will not be on the calls later today due to pre-existing work commitments and the last minute scheduling of the calls.
I would respectfully request that if you are going to go ahead with putting the 5 X 2 proposal in the public comment materials you truthfully and transparency note that this proposal was a last minute substitute for a proposal that was deemed inadequate. I understand that this was our previous proposal but we don't know what the response would have been had we not ditched it. I agree with Keith that we will need to discuss all of this again once the public comments are received.
With regards to the minority reports I appreciate the situation you are in. I do not, however, accept the explanation offered by Thomas that minority reports will be accepted later but just won't make the publication. I'm not a big fan of separate but equal. Minority views not in the initial published report are at a distinct disadvantage in terms of public receipt and review. We all know this. Let's stop pretending. You are good guys but you're starting to act like those we want to hold accountable. I know you really don't want to set the precedent of shorting minority rights. Thomas, as our GNSO representative I am informing you that there are at least two groups of GNSO members who are preparing minority reports but do not believe they can get it done by noon tomorrow. If you can't do anything, fine, but be please be prepared to explain it to them at the next Council meeting. I've tried but they are not accepting my explanations and, frankly, I don't blame them.
Thanks for considering, thanks for your hard work and good luck on the calls later today.
Best,
Edward Morris
------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From*: "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek@verisign.com <mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>> *Sent*: Thursday, July 30, 2015 12:11 AM *To*: "Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr <mailto:Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr>" <Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr <mailto:Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr>>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> *Subject*: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism
Thanks to the Co-Chairs for this message.
I agree that the best approach at this time is to revert to the 5x5 and 2X2 reference model included in our first proposal. It received support and we obviously don't have consensus on a replacement model. We'll continue to discuss and debate the issue of vote distribution, but I suggest we'd be better off doing so AFTER we receive community feedback from the upcoming public comment period.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Mathieu Weill Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2015 9:37 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism
Dear Colleagues,
You will remember that our Initial Report Reference Model on voting weights was 5 votes for ccNSO, gNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC, 2 for SSAC and RSSAC. During the public comment period, we have received some comments (largely debated since on the list) with regards to the respective number of votes of gNSO and ALAC, and these are well noted.
During our call on Tuesday we discussed the voting weight section of the community mechanism proposal and asked for WP1 to refine its proposal accordingly. The topic was then discussed again during the WP1 call that followed a few hours later. WP1 agreed to submit to our group a proposal with 5 votes for each SO or AC, pending intentions from GAC, SSAC and RSSAC to joint the mechanism as voting members. (see latest doc here : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/5A2-Community-Mech...)
A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
We discussed this between co-chairs and with Jordan as WP1 rapporteurs, and as a consequence would like to suggest we go back to the initial Reference model (5x5 and 2x2 votes) as a basis for our public comment document.
This proposal will be on our agenda for Thursday's calls but we wanted to provide this heads-up in advance in order to facilitate an informed discussion.
Best regards, Thomas, Leon & Mathieu Co-chairs
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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-- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
In reading Greg's post I can't help but have some regret that I responded negatively to the post of a GAC member a few weeks ago suggesting that ICANN has a role in controlling cyber bullying. I continue to be disturbed by Mr. Shatan's continuing propensity to question the motives and good faith of others. That, as Professor David Weil taught me at Cambridge, this reflects more on the individual making the attack than on that being attacked is small comfort. I recognize that the representative of intellectual property interests might have some difficulty in understanding some may come to this process with no goal other than to contribute to try to make the world a better place, without any economic interest whatsoever. Sad. One may disagree with my views but they are held honestly. As a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, and a long time peace activist, I can not countenance any voting scheme that gives even the slightest potential voting power to the American military. This is an honest belief, not as alleged by Mr. Shatan, part of a scheme to delay things. The US military, via RSSAC, in an advisory role and the U.S. Military, via RSSAC, as an entity with voting rights are two different things. That as an American he may have a different perspective is understandable. I don't play games. As a human rights activist with degrees in the field from several institutions and extensive work experience in the field I am deeply disturbed by any scheme that gives any entity multiple voting rights. I advocate for a fair time frame for minority views not because of any "friends", as Mr. Shatan has alleged, but because of a strong belief in due process and the protection of the rights of those whose views may be outside the mainstream. These are honestly held beliefs and I resent claims by the Chair of the IPC to the contrary. To the Chairs of the CCWG regarding minority reports: please look at the ICM IRP decision imputing to ICANN due process obligations via the international law provision in our bylaws. Consider the Ombudsman's opinion. If you ignore both...well, I hope you don't. I now need to commence my 12 hour work day. Good luck with the calls. I will conclude by noting that the politics of personal attack is a very American thing. We obviously have a long way to go in internationalizing many aspects of ICANN. Ed Sent from my iPhone
On Jul 30, 2015, at 7:22 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
This is really quite a baffling last-second attempt to throw together a bunch of half-truths and outright misstatements, casting unwarranted aspersions on the careful work that this group with an objective that is entirely unclear. Any examination of these statements causes them to fall like a house of cards.
It was pretty obvious once you examined the proposal as is the political reality that giving any voting power to the United States military, through it's 3/12 member representation at RSSAC, is going to cause problems.
The membership of RSSAC is public knowledge and has been for the duration of this CCWG. A voting role for the RSSAC has been a possibility for months, and no one raised this "issue." I'm always skeptical when somebody says something is "obvious" -- it usually means it's BS. This attempt to trump up problems is so slapdash that the (readily available) facts aren't even accurate. There are 3 root servers under the US government, but only two are associated with the US military -- the third is controlled by NASA, a civilian agency. These have been around pretty much since the dawn of Internet time, so claiming this is suddenly a problem is really quite absurd. Are there any issues from the history of ICANN that can be cited as arising from the control of these root servers, or the membership of their (civilian) administrators in RSSAC. This just seems like FUD. Calling it a "mistake" doesn't make it one.
As far as "illusion" busting, whether one participant decides to oppose for a series of manufactured reasons that don't hold water does not "bust" consensus. Going back to those reasons, for a little "myth-busting":
1) inclusion of the U.S. military as a voting member through RSSAC,
Answered above
2) an unwarranted change of the power balance and functions of the respective SOAC's when compared to current voting arrangements, which violates the CCWG policy published in the legal scoping document of 19 March 2015 , a consensus policy whose reversal has not been discussed or approved by the group,
There are no "current voting arrangements," unless one is referring to the ICANN Board, which is quite a different thing than this community mechanism; it's completely unclear and unexplained what "CCWG policy" is being "violated" -- misusing the term "consensus policy" to give this unsupported claim a sense of gravitas is really quite amusing...
3) the lack of safeguard against capture through coordinated manipulation taking advantage of the possibility of parties to simultaneously belong to multiple SO's and AC's,
This is another summary "issue" that's never been raised before and magically appears now without any explanation or clarification. What possibility is being referred to? There has been some discussion of the possibility of parties being members of different constituencies or SGs in the GNSO, but that's been dealt with already (such parties can only vote in one such organization) and is clearly not what's being referred to here. There's a lot of scary, FUD-y words being thrown around but absolutely no substance -- no explanation, no detail, no credibility. The fact that a root server operator may also be a registry operator (among hundreds of registry operator), or that a GAC member may also be a ccNSO operator (among a couple hundred ccNSO registry operators) does not somehow become a concern due to vague imprecations in a rushed email, which won't even be defended by its author.
4) problems of double dipping per number 3 which violate the principle of one person / one party one vote which is customary international law and required by ICANN through it's Bylaws commitment to adhere to international law
This is just a restatement of number 3, and fails along with it. Trying to inflate some unstated minor occurrence (which I assume to be the overlaps stated above) into some self-styled "double dipping" problem just doesn't hold water. Being a member of two different bodies or committees does not violate "one party/one vote" and claiming this somehow be a violation of international law is just hysterical (in both senses of the word).
...plus likely a number of other problems that neither of us have thought of given the rushed nature of things.
This basically translates as "I can't think of any problems, but there must be some." That is hardly the kind of objection that even merits a response.
Finally, I disagree with the characterization of the 5/2 proposal, and think that the suggested statement would be neither truthful nor transparent -- rather, it would by false and hyperbolic.
I must give my esteemed colleague points for inventiveness, but none for substance. This is the virtual equivalent of throwing a stink-bomb into the middle of a meeting and then running away. Thankfully, we don't need to clear the room to get rid of the odor.
If this an attempt to buy more time for some colleagues who are still working on minority statements, I can also give points for loyalty. But the schedule for publication of this document has been well-known for weeks. It's unfortunate that some could not plan ahead to meet that timeframe. I hardly think it's prejudicial if these are published or notified to the public comment page a couple of days after the Report -- appropriate notice can be made that minority reports are expected. Using a loaded term like "separate but equal" (harkening back to the dark days of racial segregation in the US) to describe this strays into demagoguery. Claiming "we all know" things is no more convincing than saying something is "obvious" -- everyone's entitled to their opinion, but not to claim that it is "known" by anyone other than themselves. We should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good, in this instance or in the instance of our proposal in general.
It would be helpful if there were some indication of the real goal and concern behind this, rather than a bunch of baseless accusations. As it is, I remain baffled at what is hoped to be accomplished other than an attempt at delay.
Greg
On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net> wrote: Hi all,
Thanks for responding to our concerns about the ability of Board appointees to block the communities ability to remove Board members. It was pretty obvious once you examined the proposal as is the political reality that giving any voting power to the United States military, through it's 3/12 member representation at RSSAC, is going to cause problems. You guys are under such time pressure mistakes are going to happen and the consequences of actions may not always be readily apparent. I don't blame you: there is no Dummies guide to restructuring a major international corporation in 7 months or less. Writing such a book just might be a wise career choice once you wrap up this project.
I hope you in good faith are not going to try to claim that there is consensus for the 5 X2 model. Just so that illusion is busted I oppose that model for the 1) inclusion of the U.S. military as a voting member through RSSAC, 2) an unwarranted change of the power balance and functions of the respective SOAC's when compared to current voting arrangements, which violates the CCWG policy published in the legal scoping document of 19 March 2015 , a consensus policy whose reversal has not been discussed or approved by the group, 3) the lack of safeguard against capture through coordinated manipulation taking advantage of the possibility of parties to simultaneously belong to multiple SO's and AC's, 4) problems of double dipping per number 3 which violate the principle of one person / one party one vote which is customary international law and required by ICANN through it's Bylaws commitment to adhere to international law...plus likely a number of other problems that neither of us have thought of given the rushed nature of things.
I sadly will not be on the calls later today due to pre-existing work commitments and the last minute scheduling of the calls.
I would respectfully request that if you are going to go ahead with putting the 5 X 2 proposal in the public comment materials you truthfully and transparency note that this proposal was a last minute substitute for a proposal that was deemed inadequate. I understand that this was our previous proposal but we don't know what the response would have been had we not ditched it. I agree with Keith that we will need to discuss all of this again once the public comments are received.
With regards to the minority reports I appreciate the situation you are in. I do not, however, accept the explanation offered by Thomas that minority reports will be accepted later but just won't make the publication. I'm not a big fan of separate but equal. Minority views not in the initial published report are at a distinct disadvantage in terms of public receipt and review. We all know this. Let's stop pretending. You are good guys but you're starting to act like those we want to hold accountable. I know you really don't want to set the precedent of shorting minority rights. Thomas, as our GNSO representative I am informing you that there are at least two groups of GNSO members who are preparing minority reports but do not believe they can get it done by noon tomorrow. If you can't do anything, fine, but be please be prepared to explain it to them at the next Council meeting. I've tried but they are not accepting my explanations and, frankly, I don't blame them.
Thanks for considering, thanks for your hard work and good luck on the calls later today.
Best,
Edward Morris
From: "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek@verisign.com> Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2015 12:11 AM To: "Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr" <Mathieu.Weill@afnic.fr>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism
Thanks to the Co-Chairs for this message.
I agree that the best approach at this time is to revert to the 5x5 and 2X2 reference model included in our first proposal. It received support and we obviously don't have consensus on a replacement model. We'll continue to discuss and debate the issue of vote distribution, but I suggest we'd be better off doing so AFTER we receive community feedback from the upcoming public comment period.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Mathieu Weill Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2015 9:37 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism
Dear Colleagues,
You will remember that our Initial Report Reference Model on voting weights was 5 votes for ccNSO, gNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC, 2 for SSAC and RSSAC. During the public comment period, we have received some comments (largely debated since on the list) with regards to the respective number of votes of gNSO and ALAC, and these are well noted.
During our call on Tuesday we discussed the voting weight section of the community mechanism proposal and asked for WP1 to refine its proposal accordingly. The topic was then discussed again during the WP1 call that followed a few hours later. WP1 agreed to submit to our group a proposal with 5 votes for each SO or AC, pending intentions from GAC, SSAC and RSSAC to joint the mechanism as voting members. (see latest doc here : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/5A2-Community-Mech...)
A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
We discussed this between co-chairs and with Jordan as WP1 rapporteurs, and as a consequence would like to suggest we go back to the initial Reference model (5x5 and 2x2 votes) as a basis for our public comment document.
This proposal will be on our agenda for Thursday's calls but we wanted to provide this heads-up in advance in order to facilitate an informed discussion.
Best regards, Thomas, Leon & Mathieu Co-chairs
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Ed, When considering anyone's intervention one always must try to ascertain what the individual wants to achieve, in addition to the method(s) used. Nothing but tactics. Though Americans often think that the "It's nothing personal, just business" excuses anything. I am quite partial to ad-hominem myself as is well known, and hence can rarely complain being on the receiving end :-)-O. It's also perfectly acceptable to bear a grudge, and Belzegreg has joined the likes of Antonius Lubricius long ago. el On 2015-07-30 11:53, Edward Morris wrote:
In reading Greg's post I can't help but have some regret that I responded negatively to the post of a GAC member a few weeks ago suggesting that ICANN has a role in controlling cyber bullying.
I continue to be disturbed by Mr. Shatan's continuing propensity to question the motives and good faith of others. That, as Professor David Weil taught me at Cambridge, this reflects more on the individual making the attack than on that being attacked is small comfort. I recognize that the representative of intellectual property interests might have some difficulty in understanding some may come to this process with no goal other than to contribute to try to make the world a better place, without any economic interest whatsoever. Sad.
One may disagree with my views but they are held honestly. As a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, and a long time peace activist, I can not countenance any voting scheme that gives even the slightest potential voting power to the American military. This is an honest belief, not as alleged by Mr. Shatan, part of a scheme to delay things. The US military, via RSSAC, in an advisory role and the U.S. Military, via RSSAC, as an entity with voting rights are two different things. That as an American he may have a different perspective is understandable.
I don't play games. As a human rights activist with degrees in the field from several institutions and extensive work experience in the field I am deeply disturbed by any scheme that gives any entity multiple voting rights. I advocate for a fair time frame for minority views not because of any "friends", as Mr. Shatan has alleged, but because of a strong belief in due process and the protection of the rights of those whose views may be outside the mainstream. These are honestly held beliefs and I resent claims by the Chair of the IPC to the contrary. To the Chairs of the CCWG regarding minority reports: please look at the ICM IRP decision imputing to ICANN due process obligations via the international law provision in our bylaws. Consider the Ombudsman's opinion. If you ignore both...well, I hope you don't.
I now need to commence my 12 hour work day. Good luck with the calls. I will conclude by noting that the politics of personal attack is a very American thing. We obviously have a long way to go in internationalizing many aspects of ICANN.
Ed [...] -- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
This is a complete misreading of my statement and my views in many different ways. There was nothing personal in it. I have the highest regard for Ed. That said, I was and remain baffled at the litany of what I saw (and see) as largely unsupported and far-fetched allegations regarding the consequences of particular voting rights. Coming at the last second when they could have been made for months, it seemed to me that this was as much an attempt to simply de-rail things as it was to make any specific points. It's good to know that the objections (even if misplaced) were entirely sincere. If this was read in any way as ad hominem and or ad personam I apologize for that. But that was not my intention. To insinuate that this was "cyber bullying" is misplaced, and may even do what it states it abhors. As a matter of fact, there is far more in the way of direct personal accusations and attacks in this latest response than could possibly be read into my email. Indeed the second paragraph of the email is nothing but a personal attack. I questioned only the motive of a single email, not the general integrity of the writes -- in response I am accused of cyber-bullying and a "continuing propensity to question the motives and good faith of others." To pigeonhole me as a "representative of intellectual property interests" and to contrast that with interests in making both ICANN and the world a better place is a gross mischaracterization of my values and viewpoints. I share those concerns deeply and resent being pigeonholed. I look forward to future discussions with my esteemed colleague and hope that they will stick to substance and finding mutual ways forward. Finally, I bear no grudges in this Working Group (though that has proved difficult in one case), and particularly not against Ed. Greg On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 7:48 AM, Dr Eberhard Lisse <el@lisse.na> wrote:
Ed,
When considering anyone's intervention one always must try to ascertain what the individual wants to achieve, in addition to the method(s) used.
Nothing but tactics.
Though Americans often think that the "It's nothing personal, just business" excuses anything.
I am quite partial to ad-hominem myself as is well known, and hence can rarely complain being on the receiving end :-)-O.
It's also perfectly acceptable to bear a grudge, and Belzegreg has joined the likes of Antonius Lubricius long ago.
el
On 2015-07-30 11:53, Edward Morris wrote:
In reading Greg's post I can't help but have some regret that I responded negatively to the post of a GAC member a few weeks ago suggesting that ICANN has a role in controlling cyber bullying.
I continue to be disturbed by Mr. Shatan's continuing propensity to question the motives and good faith of others. That, as Professor David Weil taught me at Cambridge, this reflects more on the individual making the attack than on that being attacked is small comfort. I recognize that the representative of intellectual property interests might have some difficulty in understanding some may come to this process with no goal other than to contribute to try to make the world a better place, without any economic interest whatsoever. Sad.
One may disagree with my views but they are held honestly. As a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, and a long time peace activist, I can not countenance any voting scheme that gives even the slightest potential voting power to the American military. This is an honest belief, not as alleged by Mr. Shatan, part of a scheme to delay things. The US military, via RSSAC, in an advisory role and the U.S. Military, via RSSAC, as an entity with voting rights are two different things. That as an American he may have a different perspective is understandable.
I don't play games. As a human rights activist with degrees in the field from several institutions and extensive work experience in the field I am deeply disturbed by any scheme that gives any entity multiple voting rights. I advocate for a fair time frame for minority views not because of any "friends", as Mr. Shatan has alleged, but because of a strong belief in due process and the protection of the rights of those whose views may be outside the mainstream. These are honestly held beliefs and I resent claims by the Chair of the IPC to the contrary. To the Chairs of the CCWG regarding minority reports: please look at the ICM IRP decision imputing to ICANN due process obligations via the international law provision in our bylaws. Consider the Ombudsman's opinion. If you ignore both...well, I hope you don't.
I now need to commence my 12 hour work day. Good luck with the calls. I will conclude by noting that the politics of personal attack is a very American thing. We obviously have a long way to go in internationalizing many aspects of ICANN.
Ed [...] -- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
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+ 1 Keith and the Co-Chairs on reverting to the 5x5 and 2x2 for the purposes of the public comment. The current "final" text would have to be changed accordingly and it should still note the minority views as well as state that there is far from consensus on this matter. I would recommend that specific attention be drawn to this issue in the public comment information note so that we elicit as much helpful feedback as possible. Frankly, I am lukewarm on the 5x5 and 2x2 model. I certainly do not support the 7x5 model. I think we have to be very careful that in enhancing ICANN's accountability and empowering the community as a whole vis-a-vis ICANN we are not seen to be empowering some parts of the community vis-a-vis others. This comment is not about the relative merits of the different parts of the community but a recognition of the primary purpose of this exercise: that we, _as a community_, can exercise powers that would, among other enhancements, result in greater accountability at ICANN . This exercise should not be about - in reality or in terms of perception - changing the roles and responsibilities of different parts of the community (and we should refrain from unseemly discussions about the merits of this or that SO or AC). Hopefully the public comment will help us in arriving at a model that we (and parties/persons outside this CCWG) can all live with. My preference w/r/t voting would be to avoid reshuffling the deck so to speak and to look to representational models that have precedence and that have been acceptable for most for some time, such as, for example, the selection of Directors - 2 GNSO, 2 ccNSO, 2 ASO, 1 ALAC and liaison roles for the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC. This is a difficult issue and it does not surprise me that we are having robust discussions on this in these final stages. It is important that we have them and understand the implications of the voting configurations/permutations and the consequences thereof post transition and in the future. Matthew On 7/30/2015 12:10 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
Thanks to the Co-Chairs for this message.
I agree that the best approach at this time is to revert to the 5x5 and 2X2 reference model included in our first proposal. It received support and we obviously don't have consensus on a replacement model. We'll continue to discuss and debate the issue of vote distribution, but I suggest we'd be better off doing so AFTER we receive community feedback from the upcoming public comment period.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Mathieu Weill Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2015 9:37 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism
Dear Colleagues,
You will remember that our Initial Report Reference Model on voting weights was 5 votes for ccNSO, gNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC, 2 for SSAC and RSSAC. During the public comment period, we have received some comments (largely debated since on the list) with regards to the respective number of votes of gNSO and ALAC, and these are well noted.
During our call on Tuesday we discussed the voting weight section of the community mechanism proposal and asked for WP1 to refine its proposal accordingly. The topic was then discussed again during the WP1 call that followed a few hours later. WP1 agreed to submit to our group a proposal with 5 votes for each SO or AC, pending intentions from GAC, SSAC and RSSAC to joint the mechanism as voting members. (see latest doc here : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/5A2-Community-Mech...)
A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
We discussed this between co-chairs and with Jordan as WP1 rapporteurs, and as a consequence would like to suggest we go back to the initial Reference model (5x5 and 2x2 votes) as a basis for our public comment document.
This proposal will be on our agenda for Thursday's calls but we wanted to provide this heads-up in advance in order to facilitate an informed discussion.
Best regards, Thomas, Leon & Mathieu Co-chairs
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
The current "final" text would have to be changed accordingly and it should still note the minority views as well as state that there is far from consensus on this matter. I would recommend that specific attention be drawn to this issue in the public comment information note so that we elicit as much helpful feedback as possible.
Agree. Cheers, Chris
On 30 Jul 2015, at 19:05 , Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org> wrote:
+ 1 Keith and the Co-Chairs on reverting to the 5x5 and 2x2 for the purposes of the public comment.
The current "final" text would have to be changed accordingly and it should still note the minority views as well as state that there is far from consensus on this matter. I would recommend that specific attention be drawn to this issue in the public comment information note so that we elicit as much helpful feedback as possible.
Frankly, I am lukewarm on the 5x5 and 2x2 model. I certainly do not support the 7x5 model. I think we have to be very careful that in enhancing ICANN's accountability and empowering the community as a whole vis-a-vis ICANN we are not seen to be empowering some parts of the community vis-a-vis others. This comment is not about the relative merits of the different parts of the community but a recognition of the primary purpose of this exercise: that we, as a community, can exercise powers that would, among other enhancements, result in greater accountability at ICANN . This exercise should not be about - in reality or in terms of perception - changing the roles and responsibilities of different parts of the community (and we should refrain from unseemly discussions about the merits of this or that SO or AC). Hopefully the public comment will help us in arriving at a model that we (and parties/persons outside this CCWG) can all live with. My preference w/r/t voting would be to avoid reshuffling the deck so to speak and to look to representational models that have precedence and that have been acceptable for most for some time, such as, for example, the selection of Directors - 2 GNSO, 2 ccNSO, 2 ASO, 1 ALAC and liaison roles for the GAC, RSSAC and SSAC.
This is a difficult issue and it does not surprise me that we are having robust discussions on this in these final stages. It is important that we have them and understand the implications of the voting configurations/permutations and the consequences thereof post transition and in the future.
Matthew
On 7/30/2015 12:10 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
Thanks to the Co-Chairs for this message.
I agree that the best approach at this time is to revert to the 5x5 and 2X2 reference model included in our first proposal. It received support and we obviously don't have consensus on a replacement model. We'll continue to discuss and debate the issue of vote distribution, but I suggest we'd be better off doing so AFTER we receive community feedback from the upcoming public comment period.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Mathieu Weill Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2015 9:37 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Voting weights in community mechanism
Dear Colleagues,
You will remember that our Initial Report Reference Model on voting weights was 5 votes for ccNSO, gNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC, 2 for SSAC and RSSAC. During the public comment period, we have received some comments (largely debated since on the list) with regards to the respective number of votes of gNSO and ALAC, and these are well noted.
During our call on Tuesday we discussed the voting weight section of the community mechanism proposal and asked for WP1 to refine its proposal accordingly. The topic was then discussed again during the WP1 call that followed a few hours later. WP1 agreed to submit to our group a proposal with 5 votes for each SO or AC, pending intentions from GAC, SSAC and RSSAC to joint the mechanism as voting members. (see latest doc here : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/5A2-Community-Mech... <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/5A2-Community-Mech...>)
A concern has come to our attention with this latest, new, proposal. If SSAC and RSSAC have 10 votes out of 35, they could jointly block a Board recall (75% votes required, 27 votes). Since they are both composed of individuals appointed by the Board, some may question their independence in case such a power is triggered. This could raise concerns of conflicts of interest.
We discussed this between co-chairs and with Jordan as WP1 rapporteurs, and as a consequence would like to suggest we go back to the initial Reference model (5x5 and 2x2 votes) as a basis for our public comment document.
This proposal will be on our agenda for Thursday's calls but we wanted to provide this heads-up in advance in order to facilitate an informed discussion.
Best regards, Thomas, Leon & Mathieu Co-chairs
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
-- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987 _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
participants (12)
-
Chris Disspain -
Dr Eberhard Lisse -
Drazek, Keith -
Edward Morris -
Greg Shatan -
Jordan Carter -
Kavouss Arasteh -
Malcolm Hutty -
Mathieu Weill -
Matthew Shears -
Nigel Roberts -
Seun Ojedeji