Below are some points which raise concern with me... 1) The implication of this declaration is that the public display of WHOIS records must be different in the following way: *Legal person *Full display of all WHOIS records *Natural person *Limited display of WHOIS records Therefore, we are differentiating privacy based on legal entity types. This is a noted issue on other nations with privacy rights. 2) 6.2 One-time access to one specified full data record that is un-displayed This type of access would be limited to the record of a Registrant at a specific time, wherein a specific request is made to the Registrar for each incident. § This access would take place when there is "reasonable evidence of actionable harm" such as suspected fraudulent activity, suspected intellectual property infringement, suspected false declaration as to being a natural person, or where other criminal, civil or administrative laws may be infringed. § Such access would need to be timely to be effective. (Timeliness would be defined as proportionate to the suspected harm and related to the means of access). Any time I see this stuff, I'm reminded of the Third Reich. There was a day when privacy was paramount. Today there is the mindset that privacy is of no concern, because - well, one day you may be a criminal. Sure, this argument exists but its precept is largely based on falsehood. It is very easy to accomplish the goal of law enforcement and anti-fraud matters without this argument. However, to keep people running scared we have to put this argument into all current Nazi materials. I disagree with this entire section just based on it's intent. Secondarily, there is no way to implement controls on this. 3) And here we go again.... 6.5 Is there any need for Access? The group identified two broad categories of Accessors who might have a need for such access as described above. § Public law enforcement agencies (LEAs): governmental agencies legally mandated to investigate and/or prosecute illegal activity. § Private actors: organisations or individuals that are not part of an LEA. Did anyone catch that? AGREED § There were circumstances where LEAs must have access described above (one or more of 6.2, 6.3, 6.4) and that private actors must have access described above (one or more of 6.2 and 6.3). These circumstances broadly include suspected terrorist, fraudulent or other illegal activity, suspected consumer harm and suspected intellectual property infringement. And, therefore we group a 'suspected terrorist' with a 'suspected IP infringer'. Comes straight from the playbook. 4) AGREED: § In the absence of a known method of authentication today the group recommends access be granted to LEAs and private agencies based on self-declaration by the Accessor. § A system of safeguards to prevent abuse of this Access is needed such as a challenge mechanism by Registrars. ALTERNATIVE VIEWS: Certain user members believed self-declaration was insufficient and that authentication was essential: thus OPOC implementation should wait until authentication systems existed. One registrar member disagreed with the recommendation. One registry member disagreed with the recommendation I agree that self-declaration is HIGHLY insufficient. Authentication is essential, but not in the context that it is being laid out. OK, then I would guess that people who have intent to defraud would not ever self-disclose that they are a LEA to gain access to information. Nor, of course would they create an IBC in Belize and live in Paris, never revealing any identity. I hope to never live in this dreamworld of FOX news. However, using this method it would be incredibly easy to misuse the system and create a larger problem. Why even change the system at all? As is the WHOIS is bad enough, why make it worse just to the elitists can have their cake. --- WHOIS should have a measure of validation of the registrant/agent by proxy. WHOIS should not be publicly available. --- Whatever, RJ A@L On 8/3/07, Wendy Seltzer <wendy@seltzer.com> wrote:
Please share your comments on version 1.6 of the WHOIS WG report. I've already shared my (personal) disagreement with most of the statements of claimed "agreement," and with the way disagreement has been characterized. Others who'd like to agree or disagree should please do so.
I have not said the OPOC should have no responsibilities, rather that those responsibilities should be determined between the registrant and its OPOC, not imposed by ICANN, since the registrant remains responsible for registration and use of the domain name.
Thanks, --Wendy
-------- Original Message -------- Subject: [gnso-whois-wg] Draft outcomes report v 1.6 Date: Thu, 2 Aug 2007 14:41:31 +0200 From: Philip Sheppard <philip.sheppard@aim.be> To: <gnso-whois-wg@icann.org> References: <p06230911c2d6a8cae753@[10.0.1.2]>
Please find attached the outcomes report version 1.6.
This I hope captures the last two weeks of discussion on list and on our two calls. Changes compared to v1.5 are: - new and clarified text; - revised levels of support; - revised section 7 (with text transferred from section 2); - new section 8 (further studies). (I considered issuing a red-line tracked version but there have been too many changes to make this a useful tool.)
I would like to call a halt to changes of substance on the issues: these we have well covered. I would like to invite any comments where you feel any opinion on the substance is NOT yet recorded. Please do NOT repeat earlier opinion: that will just make life more challenging to weed out duplication. Please do WITHDRAW earlier statements of disagreement if you now believe the revised text is something that you can support.
Comments are open for one week until mid-day Thursday 9 August.
After that we will issue version 1.7 which will factor in any changes (as above) along with factual and contextual additions from ICANN staff.
I will advise later how long version 1.7 will be up for comment before completion of the group's work. Many thanks.
Philip Sheppard Chairman
-- Wendy Seltzer -- wendy@seltzer.org phone: +1.914.374.0613 Visiting Professor, Northeastern University School of Law Fellow, Berkman Center for Internet & Society http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/seltzer.html http://www.chillingeffects.org/
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