Let the record show I bear witness that the views expressed are not new but arrived at after fulsome deliberations; some are at least 15 years old. I was an early convert to Evan's countervailing idea on domain pricing after seeing evidence provided by a few ccTLD registries. The argument from inside then was that the competition expected from DNS expansion would put a brake on prices. This narrative conveniently ignored how the mandated pricing structure for the .com domains contoured the domain name market. Mind you, the Verisign agreements, if nothing else, was a primary exhibit for a prima facie case for ICANN as de facto [market] regulator on one hand even as it absolved itself of its duty to act as regulator. The ALAC's role as mandated in by-law is particularly challenging because it chafes against the reality of how a private power is exercised in cyberspace as if it were a treaty power, the representational model we seek to employ and power equation in play. Not a new idea for sure. What we see comes straight from an earlier land grab that created the need for the papal bull known as the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. That's the one which prompted the grouse [allegedly] of the French Bourbon king "Am I not a christian and a prince'. Carlton ============================== *Carlton A Samuels* *Mobile: 876-818-1799Strategy, Process, Governance, Assessment & Turnaround* ============================= On Sun, 27 Aug 2023 at 05:30, Evan Leibovitch via CPWG <cpwg@icann.org> wrote:
Hi Micheal,
I greatly appreciate the length and thoughtfulness put into your email, as well as your offer. However I suspect that our approaches may be so radically different as to make collaboration difficult. As I describe my worldview of the domain-name landscape below, I invite any and all attempts to find common ground in seeking paths forward.
You speak of the dot-com price increase of $2 over five years, and potential future increases as if they're a bad thing. I come from the opposite PoV, that they're way too cheap. The starting point of my solution is that retail domains should be at least $15 to $25, based on higher ICANN fees. The extra revenue generated by these fees would go toward abuse reduction, public education into using the Internet safely and effectively, as well as public oversight that has more substance and authority to it than ALAC was ever designed to provide. It would also compensate for the reduction in total domains, which is beneficial for a number of reasons.
My rationale:
To registrants using a domain for their legitimate business, communications or personal interest (going forward I will call them "domain consumers") , $15 a year is a miniscule part of the total cost of providing the infrastructure, content and marketing to maintain an Internet presence. If the benefits above were provided I think that most domain consumers would find that good value. (The public education component indicated above is bidirectional, requiring appropriate market research so that we know what the public wants and needs from Internet domains.)
Of course, raising the price will also lower the volume of domain purchases and renewals, which I also think is a Very Good Thing. The status quo means that many sensible domain names are scooped up by speculators whose only "added value" is being in the queue first. I find the domain-resale industry, by and large, at the same ethical level as concert ticket scalpers. And the ticket-scalper analogy is very useful when you look at how ticket prices have skyrocketed for in-demand concerts. Far better for the artist to get the proceeds of that demand-induced price boost than the scalper.
Higher domain prices will have negligible effect on domain consumers but I suspect it would have a significant effect on those keeping portfolios of speculative domains. Scores of domains that are of borderline value to speculators will be released back to the registry pools, making it less likely that new startups and other registrants have to resort to the rent-seeking resale market for a suitable domain. Even among existing domain consumers, there would be less need for defensive domains (if the extra fees were spent on fighting abuse) so they would benefit too. They would spend a little more per domain but would need fewer domains. An added bonus from higher fees could be a drop in the purchases of one-time "burner" domains obtained for the purpose of abuse.
Of course, such a regime would be poison to today's ICANN because, as you said, it is financially self-interested (indeed dependent) on having as many extant domains as possible. I see it as spending the minimum possible in the public interest, using its resources to (a) support a governance infrastructure that is unwieldy and unaccountable by design and (b) promote its own growth by maximizing domain sales. (For instance, I have long held that the "Universal Acceptance" initiative is merely an elaborate marketing campaign designed to sell more domains in non-Latin scripts.) Higher fees mean fewer domains (though higher revenue from each) and probably even a smaller ICANN than now exists; I would also consider that to be a Good Thing. Of course maybe ICANN could find other revenue, from foundation grants and other sources that might make it less dependent on its derived industries for both governance and policies. I would welcome such a transition, along with the accompanying boost in accountability. Maybe even dues from public membership, that would allow people to actually vote for the Board again...
ICANN's history has enabled entire industries to emerge with little purpose except to ultimately extract maximum value from domain consumers. These industries, through the GNSO, have acquired the ability to force the ICANN Board to enable policies friendly to them while public-interest views from governments and consumers are relegated to advisory roles. It's a very "inmates running the asylum" vibe, the very opposite of most organizations performing regulatory functions. One need look no further than ICANN's evolution from public Board elections, through a "Nominating Committee" that doesn't nominate (it appoints), to the sham "empowered community", to see how the power has shifted and how convoluted everything has become. It is for this reason that I bristle at those who already have voices through these other ICANN communities coming to ALAC with the "I'm an end-user too" justification. Sorry, but ALAC desperately needs more voices from those who have not and never will buy a domain, and fewer voices from insiders that know the game. At very least At-Large needs a conflict-of-interest policy that goes beyond mere disclosure. The current insider-heavy makeup is why ALAC serves to constantly react to the agendas of others rather than set its own from a purely end-user perspective.
Those who know me can verify that these are not new ideas, they are long-held views that emerged more than a decade ago from my experiences in ALAC leadership. It's my belief that an ALAC that was truly serving its bylaw mandate, it would advocate for a domain pool that was smaller but more effective, and end-users that are better informed on how to use domains safely and efficiently.
Cheers,
- Evan
PS: Don't get me started on the disparity between gTLDs and ccTLDs. ICANN has FOREVER had a responsibility to inform the public what the difference is. - How is dot-com different from dot-co? - Why is there still a dot-su TLD? - Is my use of bit.ly for URL shortening really sending my data through Libya? - Why can I buy a .me domain if I don't live in Montenegro?
So much public confusion exists, yet ICANN has shirked its responsibility to address it.
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