What could have been, and what can still be
As a followup to my critique of a recent CircleID "defense" of multistakeholderism on the NARALO mailing list, I want to offer up some brief constructive commentary on what is generally regarded as Internet Governance: In a recent conversation with a well-known ICANNer, I was asked: if I could replace the current management of the Internet with some other model, what would it be? Complaining is easy, but does a superior alternative exist? My answer didn't take too long: something largely similar to the model that governs the world's air travel. The United Nations treaty agency ICAO and the airline industry IATA have their headquarters within a four-minute walk in downtown Montréal. They are highly interdependent -- maybe even symbiotic -- but have very specific roles that are generally not duplicated. They have public advisory bodies, regional bureaus and expert groups that propose standards and regulations. In other words, this infrastructure has been multistakeholder since the 1940s, long before the tech world thought it had invented the concept. And, generally speaking, that infrastructure has been proven to work, even between warring countries. Airlines under intense international sanctions remain members <https://www.iata.org/en/about/members/airline-list/s7-airlines/338/>. Safety and stability are the prime objectives of both, though IATA of course cares more about commercial sustainability while ICAO cares about interoperability and environmental sustainability. Having two separate complementary bodies offers plenty of advantages because they keep each other in check; as a result we have neither full government capture nor full commercial capture. The public interest is promoted through both bodies, especially if one is more concerned about results (ie, a global airline industry that is safe, reliable, adaptable and sustainable) than process (ie, splitting hairs about representation). I believe that this model is adaptable to Internet governance and that it would work better than what we think we have now. I also believe it is still possible. What needs to change is a) the arrogance of asserting the Internet is the first instance of multistakeholder governance, b) the misbelief that ICANN is a public-serving example of it, and c) the visceral hostility to anything multilateral, even as a partial component. -- Evan Leibovitch, Toronto Canada @evanleibovitch / @el56
I appreciate the points that Evan makes here. ICANN may have been given too large of a mandate - as both a technical body and as a body that is responsible for policy matters that are in the public interest, without actually being representative of or accountable to the public. ICANN has proven itself unable to represent the public interest in negotiating market rates for the registry services that Verisign provides to ICANN, as ICANN is the beneficial owner of the legacy extensions and Verisign is merely a service provider. PIR is paying its registry service provider $1.50 per domain name per year for essentially the same services that ICANN is contracting with Verisign for at over $10 per domain name per year, an unjustified transfer of over $1 billion per year from the global Internet community to the coffers of one US. corporation. These are funds that should go to ICANN or be returned to domain name registrants. ICANN claims that it is unable to negotiate prices in service contracts - although presumably it does so when hiring office cleaners to clean its offices. ICANN has also established a quasi global court system through the UDRP - and then largely abandoned it to be operated by third parties, under no contracts and under no effective oversight by ICANN. Under the UDRP, unaccountable administrators at the various UDRP providers pick and choose who they are going to accredit as panelists, and hand select which panelists will hear which disputes, and all this occurs with no ICANN oversight. This leads to situations where people who are arguably unqualified or unfit are resolving complex business disputes with a financial impact in the hundreds of thousands of dollars or more, by employing a rudimentary policy only suited for resolving the clearest instances of cybersquatting. Further, in many instances there is no recourse for an incorrect decision as the national courts that would have jurisdiction offer no cause of action that allows for the overturning of the UDRP decision. It is a problem that ICANN has taken on a mandate in areas that are ill-suited for a technical body with a competence in assigning names and numbers. Nat Cohen, Washington, DC. On Wed, Dec 11, 2024 at 12:57 PM Evan Leibovitch via CPWG <cpwg@icann.org> wrote:
As a followup to my critique of a recent CircleID "defense" of multistakeholderism on the NARALO mailing list, I want to offer up some brief constructive commentary on what is generally regarded as Internet Governance:
In a recent conversation with a well-known ICANNer, I was asked: if I could replace the current management of the Internet with some other model, what would it be? Complaining is easy, but does a superior alternative exist?
My answer didn't take too long: something largely similar to the model that governs the world's air travel.
The United Nations treaty agency ICAO and the airline industry IATA have their headquarters within a four-minute walk in downtown Montréal. They are highly interdependent -- maybe even symbiotic -- but have very specific roles that are generally not duplicated. They have public advisory bodies, regional bureaus and expert groups that propose standards and regulations. In other words, this infrastructure has been multistakeholder since the 1940s, long before the tech world thought it had invented the concept.
And, generally speaking, that infrastructure has been proven to work, even between warring countries. Airlines under intense international sanctions remain members <https://www.iata.org/en/about/members/airline-list/s7-airlines/338/>. Safety and stability are the prime objectives of both, though IATA of course cares more about commercial sustainability while ICAO cares about interoperability and environmental sustainability. Having two separate complementary bodies offers plenty of advantages because they keep each other in check; as a result we have neither full government capture nor full commercial capture. The public interest is promoted through both bodies, especially if one is more concerned about results (ie, a global airline industry that is safe, reliable, adaptable and sustainable) than process (ie, splitting hairs about representation).
I believe that this model is adaptable to Internet governance and that it would work better than what we think we have now. I also believe it is still possible. What needs to change is a) the arrogance of asserting the Internet is the first instance of multistakeholder governance, b) the misbelief that ICANN is a public-serving example of it, and c) the visceral hostility to anything multilateral, even as a partial component.
-- Evan Leibovitch, Toronto Canada @evanleibovitch / @el56 _______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list -- cpwg@icann.org To unsubscribe send an email to cpwg-leave@icann.org
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I think the airline model is not comparable to ICANN's multi-stakeholder model. No country wants to close its airports to foreign airlines, and they don't want another country to ban their planes from landing. This makes that model work. But there are many countries that want to close their "borders" to a global Internet. Russia just did a test a few days ago, and many Russian users were left without access. Kind regards Alberto De: Nat Cohen via CPWG <cpwg@icann.org> Enviado el: miércoles, 11 de diciembre de 2024 15:34 Para: Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> CC: NARALO Discussion List <na-discuss@atlarge-lists.icann.org>; CPWG <cpwg@icann.org> Asunto: [CPWG] Re: What could have been, and what can still be I appreciate the points that Evan makes here. ICANN may have been given too large of a mandate - as both a technical body and as a body that is responsible for policy matters that are in the public interest, without actually being representative of or accountable to the public. ICANN has proven itself unable to represent the public interest in negotiating market rates for the registry services that Verisign provides to ICANN, as ICANN is the beneficial owner of the legacy extensions and Verisign is merely a service provider. PIR is paying its registry service provider $1.50 per domain name per year for essentially the same services that ICANN is contracting with Verisign for at over $10 per domain name per year, an unjustified transfer of over $1 billion per year from the global Internet community to the coffers of one US. corporation. These are funds that should go to ICANN or be returned to domain name registrants. ICANN claims that it is unable to negotiate prices in service contracts - although presumably it does so when hiring office cleaners to clean its offices. ICANN has also established a quasi global court system through the UDRP - and then largely abandoned it to be operated by third parties, under no contracts and under no effective oversight by ICANN. Under the UDRP, unaccountable administrators at the various UDRP providers pick and choose who they are going to accredit as panelists, and hand select which panelists will hear which disputes, and all this occurs with no ICANN oversight. This leads to situations where people who are arguably unqualified or unfit are resolving complex business disputes with a financial impact in the hundreds of thousands of dollars or more, by employing a rudimentary policy only suited for resolving the clearest instances of cybersquatting. Further, in many instances there is no recourse for an incorrect decision as the national courts that would have jurisdiction offer no cause of action that allows for the overturning of the UDRP decision. It is a problem that ICANN has taken on a mandate in areas that are ill-suited for a technical body with a competence in assigning names and numbers. Nat Cohen, Washington, DC. On Wed, Dec 11, 2024 at 12:57 PM Evan Leibovitch via CPWG <cpwg@icann.org <mailto:cpwg@icann.org> > wrote: As a followup to my critique of a recent CircleID "defense" of multistakeholderism on the NARALO mailing list, I want to offer up some brief constructive commentary on what is generally regarded as Internet Governance: In a recent conversation with a well-known ICANNer, I was asked: if I could replace the current management of the Internet with some other model, what would it be? Complaining is easy, but does a superior alternative exist? My answer didn't take too long: something largely similar to the model that governs the world's air travel. The United Nations treaty agency ICAO and the airline industry IATA have their headquarters within a four-minute walk in downtown Montréal. They are highly interdependent -- maybe even symbiotic -- but have very specific roles that are generally not duplicated. They have public advisory bodies, regional bureaus and expert groups that propose standards and regulations. In other words, this infrastructure has been multistakeholder since the 1940s, long before the tech world thought it had invented the concept. And, generally speaking, that infrastructure has been proven to work, even between warring countries. Airlines under intense international sanctions remain members <https://www.iata.org/en/about/members/airline-list/s7-airlines/338/> . Safety and stability are the prime objectives of both, though IATA of course cares more about commercial sustainability while ICAO cares about interoperability and environmental sustainability. Having two separate complementary bodies offers plenty of advantages because they keep each other in check; as a result we have neither full government capture nor full commercial capture. The public interest is promoted through both bodies, especially if one is more concerned about results (ie, a global airline industry that is safe, reliable, adaptable and sustainable) than process (ie, splitting hairs about representation). I believe that this model is adaptable to Internet governance and that it would work better than what we think we have now. I also believe it is still possible. What needs to change is a) the arrogance of asserting the Internet is the first instance of multistakeholder governance, b) the misbelief that ICANN is a public-serving example of it, and c) the visceral hostility to anything multilateral, even as a partial component. -- Evan Leibovitch, Toronto Canada @evanleibovitch / @el56 _______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list -- cpwg@icann.org <mailto:cpwg@icann.org> To unsubscribe send an email to cpwg-leave@icann.org <mailto:cpwg-leave@icann.org> _______________________________________________ By submitting your personal data, you consent to the processing of your personal data for purposes of subscribing to this mailing list accordance with the ICANN Privacy Policy (https://www.icann.org/privacy/policy) and the website Terms of Service (https://www.icann.org/privacy/tos). You can visit the Mailman link above to change your membership status or configuration, including unsubscribing, setting digest-style delivery or disabling delivery altogether (e.g., for a vacation), and so on.
On Wed, Dec 11, 2024 at 2:55 PM <alberto@soto.net.ar> wrote: No country wants to close its airports to foreign airlines
Tell that to El Al, Iran Air, Cubana or S7. IMO you are absolutely misinformed in this regard. Many countries close access to not only their airports but also their airspace. British Airways no longer operates London to Beijing because of the closure of Russian airspace. There is an entire list of airlines and home bases for airlines that are banned by the EU <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_airlines_banned_in_the_European_Union> . Even in Argentina, there is a standing ban on Venezuela's Conviasa airline. Indeed, the airspace-banning component has no Internet equivalent (so far). It would be like a country filtering-out packets containing any source or destination IP addresses from banned countries using any Internet infrastructure within its borders. Then again, I'm not sure if there is an airline equivalent of VPNs, but those too have been banned or restricted in a number of countries. In any case, I never said the air industry model could be copied 100%. My broader point is about the necessary involvement of an international treaty organization, working in tandem with a completely separate body representing commercial interests. Russia just did a test a few days ago, and many Russian users were left
without access.
Russian flyers are also left without access to European, North American and other airports. That was lost two years ago. Meanwhile, because of the lack of any accountability or treaty, the .su domain continues as a worldwide home for bad actors. Thank you for helping to make my point regarding similar political threats that must be dealt with by both environments. - Evan
Don't give an opinion without first informing yourself. I also don't criticize those who don't. This airline system controls planes, their flights, passenger lists, etc. Each party does its own thing, it imposes rules that are not negotiable. It is not a multi-stakeholder system. It is a system where there are many parties with the same rules, with common interests. I am not going to explain what the Internet is, everyone here knows it, that is why they are incomparable systems. In short, we have a system of multiple stakeholders that must negotiate according to the interests of each of the parties. Greetings Alberto De: Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> Enviado el: miércoles, 11 de diciembre de 2024 18:12 Para: alberto@soto.net.ar CC: Nat Cohen <ncohen@telepathy.com>; NARALO Discussion List <na-discuss@atlarge-lists.icann.org>; CPWG <cpwg@icann.org> Asunto: Re: [CPWG] Re: What could have been, and what can still be On Wed, Dec 11, 2024 at 2:55 PM <alberto@soto.net.ar <mailto:alberto@soto.net.ar> > wrote: No country wants to close its airports to foreign airlines Tell that to El Al, Iran Air, Cubana or S7. IMO you are absolutely misinformed in this regard. Many countries close access to not only their airports but also their airspace. British Airways no longer operates London to Beijing because of the closure of Russian airspace. There is an entire list of airlines and home bases for airlines that are banned by the EU <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_airlines_banned_in_the_European_Union> . Even in Argentina, there is a standing ban on Venezuela's Conviasa airline. Indeed, the airspace-banning component has no Internet equivalent (so far). It would be like a country filtering-out packets containing any source or destination IP addresses from banned countries using any Internet infrastructure within its borders. Then again, I'm not sure if there is an airline equivalent of VPNs, but those too have been banned or restricted in a number of countries. In any case, I never said the air industry model could be copied 100%. My broader point is about the necessary involvement of an international treaty organization, working in tandem with a completely separate body representing commercial interests. Russia just did a test a few days ago, and many Russian users were left without access. Russian flyers are also left without access to European, North American and other airports. That was lost two years ago. Meanwhile, because of the lack of any accountability or treaty, the .su domain continues as a worldwide home for bad actors. Thank you for helping to make my point regarding similar political threats that must be dealt with by both environments. - Evan
Both ecosystems are infrastructure and have multiple stakeholders, in fact many of their categories (law enforcement, suppliers, consumers) are common. "We have a system of multiple stakeholders that must negotiate according to the interests of each of the parties" can describe just about any public infrastructure, from highways to sewers to shipping. Just because one doesn't know who the stakeholders are in each of these fields does not make them irrelevant or invisible. That's OK, because most of the world doesn't -- and need not -- know all the details of the stakeholders involved in keeping the Internet stable and safe, just as they don't know all the stakeholders involved in getting clean water to their home. There is nothing special about the Internet that makes it inherently more resistant to the way global society has evolved to govern other forms of cross-national infrastructure. It is more technically complex and poses some unique challenges in carriage, to be sure. But just as the UPU and ITU and ICAO are different in many ways, so is the evolution of a multilateral treaty body that must form some part of what is being called "Internet governance". Insiders think they're beyond such scrutiny because the Internet is special. It's special in our lifetime, just as the telephone was in lifetimes past etc. What is taken for granted in our time was groundbreaking in another. Such is the Internet too. However, "everyone knows here what the Internet is" does not offer much explanation of why we shouldn't learn from how the world has adapted to other infrastructure challenges of the past. We're just not that special. Cheers, Evan. On Wed, Dec 11, 2024 at 5:35 PM <alberto@soto.net.ar> wrote:
Don't give an opinion without first informing yourself. I also don't criticize those who don't. This airline system controls planes, their flights, passenger lists, etc. Each party does its own thing, it imposes rules that are not negotiable. It is not a multi-stakeholder system. It is a system where there are many parties with the same rules, with common interests. I am not going to explain what the Internet is, everyone here knows it, that is why they are incomparable systems. In short, we have a system of multiple stakeholders that must negotiate according to the interests of each of the parties.
Greetings
Alberto
Evan, You raise the idea that the UN ICAO and Industry IATA organizational combo is an example of an existing multistakeholder infrastructure. Unfortunately, I’m not very familiar with these organizations. I’m particularly interested in the end user stakeholder experience within these organizations. Can you tell me more about the public advisory capacities of these organizations? Is there an ICANN At-Large equivalent component that has board level representation at ICAO/IATA? As an airline end-user, do I have similar rights to participate in a bottom-up ICAN/IATA policy process that I have as an individual member of the ICANN At-Large community? Thanks for any help you can give me to understand more about how the ICAO/IATA multistakeholder model compares to the ICANN multistakeholder model from an end user perspective. Cheers David On Wed, Dec 11, 2024 at 6:10 PM Evan Leibovitch via CPWG <cpwg@icann.org> wrote:
Both ecosystems are infrastructure and have multiple stakeholders, in fact many of their categories (law enforcement, suppliers, consumers) are common.
"We have a system of multiple stakeholders that must negotiate according to the interests of each of the parties" can describe just about any public infrastructure, from highways to sewers to shipping. Just because one doesn't know who the stakeholders are in each of these fields does not make them irrelevant or invisible. That's OK, because most of the world doesn't -- and need not -- know all the details of the stakeholders involved in keeping the Internet stable and safe, just as they don't know all the stakeholders involved in getting clean water to their home.
There is nothing special about the Internet that makes it inherently more resistant to the way global society has evolved to govern other forms of cross-national infrastructure. It is more technically complex and poses some unique challenges in carriage, to be sure. But just as the UPU and ITU and ICAO are different in many ways, so is the evolution of a multilateral treaty body that must form some part of what is being called "Internet governance".
Insiders think they're beyond such scrutiny because the Internet is special. It's special in our lifetime, just as the telephone was in lifetimes past etc. What is taken for granted in our time was groundbreaking in another. Such is the Internet too. However, "everyone knows here what the Internet is" does not offer much explanation of why we shouldn't learn from how the world has adapted to other infrastructure challenges of the past.
We're just not that special.
Cheers, Evan.
On Wed, Dec 11, 2024 at 5:35 PM <alberto@soto.net.ar> wrote:
Don't give an opinion without first informing yourself. I also don't criticize those who don't. This airline system controls planes, their flights, passenger lists, etc. Each party does its own thing, it imposes rules that are not negotiable. It is not a multi-stakeholder system. It is a system where there are many parties with the same rules, with common interests. I am not going to explain what the Internet is, everyone here knows it, that is why they are incomparable systems. In short, we have a system of multiple stakeholders that must negotiate according to the interests of each of the parties.
Greetings
Alberto
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Hi David, On Mon, Dec 16, 2024 at 7:51 AM David Mackey via NA-Discuss < na-discuss@icann.org> wrote:
You raise the idea that the UN ICAO and Industry IATA organizational combo is an example of an existing multistakeholder infrastructure. Unfortunately, I’m not very familiar with these organizations. I’m particularly interested in the end user stakeholder experience within these organizations.
Yes, I raise the idea that the two-faceted ICAO/IATA is an example of a way to balance multilateral and multistakeholder interests and demands. I am not saying that it is an exact implementation to replicate. As I have said before, other organizations such as the UPU and the ITU have arisen, with different structures to address their own sectors' unique needs. The needs of Internet governance will be similarly unique. But I find the bicameral concept to be one that ought to at least be explored. The Internet commercial interests have tried to assert that they can do governance without need of treaty or bilateralism and I've come to the conclusion that's just daft. I find the harping on the specifics of the two organizations fascinating, though, as well as the attempt to view them through the paradigm of ICANN's structures. Can you tell me more about the public advisory capacities of these
organizations?
ICAO has what it calls a Roster of Experts <https://www.icao.int/secretariat/CapacityDevelopmentImplementation/Pages/fps...> that anyone can apply to join. Currently there are about 6,000 members of this Roster worldwide. IATA does not have a direct public participation component, but it does have an accreditation and association for travel agents which are certainly among the field's stakeholders. Is there an ICANN At-Large equivalent component that has board level
representation at ICAO/IATA?
No. But so what? Given that I consider ICANN At-Large a self-enfeebling and generally useless mechanism, I am doubtful that an equivalent mechanism would have any better voice in the field of air travel than it does in the world of Internet domains in advancing the public interest. Heck, At-Large can't even agree whether or not its constituency includes registrants, whose interests are often in conflict with non-registrant Internet users. Such ambiguity rarely exists elsewhere, but here it is an ambiguity of At-Large's own making and active maintenance. I consider it an advantage of other organizations that have explored public participation based on expertise and meritocracy rather than the impotent, self-important burden that At-Large has become.
As an airline end-user, do I have similar rights to participate in a bottom-up ICAN/IATA policy process that I have as an individual member of the ICANN At-Large community?
I haven't tried so I can't say definitively. But since I believe that the At-Large Community has been ineffective at what it was designed to do, whatever processes ICAO (and the ITU, UPU etc) have in place are unlikely to be worse. I guess my main overall point is that, regardless of the ways these entities have evolved to incorporate public participation, the complex and self-important charade that is ICANN At-Large is not demonstrably better at asserting the public interest. Indeed, where ICANN does its best job at serving the public interest -- through advisory bodies such as RSAC and SSAC, themselves based on expertise rather than political participation -- At-Large is not a factor. That is not a coincidence. Cheers, Evan
Oh, and one other thing, significant enough that it merits an addendum: On Mon, Dec 16, 2024 at 7:51 AM David Mackey via NA-Discuss < na-discuss@icann.org> wrote:
Is there an ICANN At-Large equivalent component that has board level representation at ICAO/IATA?
It is worth reminding at this time that At-Large does ***NOT*** have Board *representation* within ICANN. Never did. ALAC gets to send someone. Once that person is seated, they are sworn by ICANN's lawyers to explicitly disavow representing the constituency that sent them, and to only consider the interests of ICANN-the-entity. I refer you to this slide presentation <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/2265195/Director-Fiduciary-...>, and specifically slide #9. Could not possibly be more clear. In other words, I would most definitely not want public-interest representation in any future Internet governance body, multilateral or multistakeholder or multi-anything, to resemble the crippled At-Large voice within ICANN. This is not a feature worth boasting about. Cheers, Evan
Hi Evan, Thanks for the information. I looked at the ICAO's Roster of Experts, but I'm not sure it's comparable to the mix of stakeholders found in ICANN. If I understand correctly, anyone can apply, but there's a selection criteria that controls acceptance into that community ... experts only. I personally find the inclusiveness of ICANN to be good, although it also comes with challenges of coordination and education. The challenges of coordination and education seem to be inevitable given the scale of a global Internet. I note that you said "I believe that the At-Large Community has been ineffective at what it was designed to do". Can I ask you for clarification? As I understand it, the ICANN At-Large Community supports ICANN's mission, commitments and core values defined in ICANN Bylaws Article 1 <https://www.icann.org/en/governance/documents/bylaws-for-internet-corporatio...>. Is this what you're referring to when you talk about the design of At-Large, or am I missing something more detailed in other At-Large documents? By the way, you're right about what you said that At-Large does not have "board representation" within ICANN. That was my mistake. I should not have used the words "Board level representation", since the role of Board Governance is not the same as Representational Democracy. All Board members (including all ICANN Board members) have a fiduciary "duty of loyalty" and "duty of care" to the corporation which is different from public-interest representation. Sorry for the confusion, eh. :-) Cheers David On Wed, Dec 18, 2024 at 7:01 PM Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> wrote:
Oh, and one other thing, significant enough that it merits an addendum:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2024 at 7:51 AM David Mackey via NA-Discuss < na-discuss@icann.org> wrote:
Is there an ICANN At-Large equivalent component that has board level representation at ICAO/IATA?
It is worth reminding at this time that At-Large does ***NOT*** have Board *representation* within ICANN. Never did.
ALAC gets to send someone. Once that person is seated, they are sworn by ICANN's lawyers to explicitly disavow representing the constituency that sent them, and to only consider the interests of ICANN-the-entity. I refer you to this slide presentation <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/2265195/Director-Fiduciary-...>, and specifically slide #9. Could not possibly be more clear.
In other words, I would most definitely not want public-interest representation in any future Internet governance body, multilateral or multistakeholder or multi-anything, to resemble the crippled At-Large voice within ICANN. This is not a feature worth boasting about.
Cheers, Evan
Hi David and Evan, Thank you both for sharing your insights. I appreciate the thoughtful perspectives on ICANN’s inclusiveness and the coordination challenges that come with it. Evan, I’d like to better understand your concerns about At-Large’s influence and effectiveness. How do you think At-Large could strengthen its role within ICANN to better reflect the interests of the community? Additionally, I’m curious—do you see specific areas where At-Large could take initiatives that align with the current needs or priorities of the At-Large Community? If possible, could you share what you think are the top three pressing needs or demands from the At-Large Community today? Your thoughts would be incredibly valuable as I continue exploring ways to enhance engagement. Best regards, Mohibul On Sat, Dec 21, 2024 at 4:20 PM David Mackey via NA-Discuss < na-discuss@icann.org> wrote:
Hi Evan,
Thanks for the information.
I looked at the ICAO's Roster of Experts, but I'm not sure it's comparable to the mix of stakeholders found in ICANN. If I understand correctly, anyone can apply, but there's a selection criteria that controls acceptance into that community ... experts only. I personally find the inclusiveness of ICANN to be good, although it also comes with challenges of coordination and education. The challenges of coordination and education seem to be inevitable given the scale of a global Internet.
I note that you said "I believe that the At-Large Community has been ineffective at what it was designed to do". Can I ask you for clarification? As I understand it, the ICANN At-Large Community supports ICANN's mission, commitments and core values defined in ICANN Bylaws Article 1 <https://www.icann.org/en/governance/documents/bylaws-for-internet-corporatio...>. Is this what you're referring to when you talk about the design of At-Large, or am I missing something more detailed in other At-Large documents?
By the way, you're right about what you said that At-Large does not have "board representation" within ICANN. That was my mistake. I should not have used the words "Board level representation", since the role of Board Governance is not the same as Representational Democracy. All Board members (including all ICANN Board members) have a fiduciary "duty of loyalty" and "duty of care" to the corporation which is different from public-interest representation. Sorry for the confusion, eh. :-)
Cheers David
On Wed, Dec 18, 2024 at 7:01 PM Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> wrote:
Oh, and one other thing, significant enough that it merits an addendum:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2024 at 7:51 AM David Mackey via NA-Discuss < na-discuss@icann.org> wrote:
Is there an ICANN At-Large equivalent component that has board level representation at ICAO/IATA?
It is worth reminding at this time that At-Large does ***NOT*** have Board *representation* within ICANN. Never did.
ALAC gets to send someone. Once that person is seated, they are sworn by ICANN's lawyers to explicitly disavow representing the constituency that sent them, and to only consider the interests of ICANN-the-entity. I refer you to this slide presentation <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/2265195/Director-Fiduciary-...>, and specifically slide #9. Could not possibly be more clear.
In other words, I would most definitely not want public-interest representation in any future Internet governance body, multilateral or multistakeholder or multi-anything, to resemble the crippled At-Large voice within ICANN. This is not a feature worth boasting about.
Cheers, Evan
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Hi Mohibul, On Sat, Dec 21, 2024 at 6:28 PM Mohibul Mahmud via NA-Discuss < na-discuss@icann.org> wrote:
Evan, I’d like to better understand your concerns about At-Large’s influence and effectiveness. How do you think At-Large could strengthen its role within ICANN to better reflect the interests of the community?
In its current form, the structural barriers within ICANN prevent At-Large from being effective are significant: - As mentioned, the inability to provide Board-level representation - The fact that ICANN's vested interests can compel the Board to act (via the GNSO) but ALAC may only provide advice However, many non-structural ways through which ALAC impedes itself aren't helping. Its emphasis on diversity over expertise means it is often poorly equipped to counter the paid lobbyists, advocates and grifters within ICANN's many vested-interest constituencies. The number of instances of ALAC self-sabotage, usually through obsession with process and mission-creep into areas well beyond the public interest, are numerous enough to fill a book. As just one example of such egregious misdirection; does anyone really think that non-registrant end-users care deeply about "closed generics"? Does the public even know what they are, let alone oppose them as ALAC appears to do? *Why should it care?* Significant effort has been put into addressing many such ICANN issues without giving similar levels of thought on exactly how (or even whether) these issues impact non-registrant end-users who in large part don't know ICANN even exists.
Additionally, I’m curious—do you see specific areas where At-Large could take initiatives that align with the current needs or priorities of the At-Large Community? If possible, could you share what you think are the top three pressing needs or demands from the At-Large Community today?
Keep in mind that I see ICANN primarily as part of internet infrastructure, and generally the public doesn't think about infrastructure (water supply, sewage, roads, electrical supply, etc) unless it stops working. In that realm, stability is primary. But within ICANN, that stability is provided by expert-led advisory bodies (SSAC, RSAC) with which At-Large has little to do. The non-infrastructure part of ICANN -- the rental of Internet domains -- is different, but that is where At-Large mostly works. There is a role to play in preventing end-user abuse by fighting for registrant transparency so that we may hold abusers accountable. This too is an area in which end-user interests veer sharply from those of commercial registrants (who IMO have way too much influence within ALAC even though they already have representation through multiple GNSO constituencies). Beyond stability, ease-of-use should prevail as the issue for non-registrant end-users. Seekers of Internet goods and services should be able to easily find and reach the sources of such goods and services. There are multiple facets of the domain-name environment that make this overly complex, so much so that by and large people have come to prefer search engines, QR codes and increasingly AI chatbots over "memorable" domains. I'm not sure that this can be corrected by now, but ALAC has not done itself any favours by, for instance, uncritically cheerleading ICANN's disastrous approach to non-Latin character scripts. This too is probably too far-gone for redemption. Given the large number of important issues which are now too late to fix, in my opinion the remaining priorities should be to: - Take all steps necessary to inhibit use of domains to abuse and scam end-users, including fighting against registrant anonymity - De-incentivize and reduce the speculative hoarding of domains, which makes it needlessly expensive for new businesses to acquire domains that are intuitive to their customers - Engage in public research to determine what end-users need from ICANN, don't guess (because most previous guesses have been wrong) I have little confidence that At-Large is capable of asserting these basic end-user interests to any level of effectiveness, because it is so caught up in internal process distractions and fighting the battles of other constituencies as described above. But I hope this answers your question. Cheers, - Evan
Hi Evan, Thank you for sharing your detailed insights. As someone relatively new to the NARALO community, I really appreciate the context you provided. I understand that achieving greater influence within ICANN can be challenging, but perhaps we could begin by identifying specific instances where NARALO has encountered obstacles. This might help reveal patterns or recurring challenges. It could also be helpful to engage with other RALOs to see if they face similar issues. By raising these concerns collectively and consistently, we may be able to amplify our voice and drive meaningful change. I’d love to hear if you think there are particular areas where such joint efforts could have the greatest impact. Best regards, Mohibul On Sun, Dec 22, 2024 at 12:05 AM Evan Leibovitch <evanleibovitch@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Mohibul,
On Sat, Dec 21, 2024 at 6:28 PM Mohibul Mahmud via NA-Discuss < na-discuss@icann.org> wrote:
Evan, I’d like to better understand your concerns about At-Large’s influence and effectiveness. How do you think At-Large could strengthen its role within ICANN to better reflect the interests of the community?
In its current form, the structural barriers within ICANN prevent At-Large from being effective are significant:
- As mentioned, the inability to provide Board-level representation - The fact that ICANN's vested interests can compel the Board to act (via the GNSO) but ALAC may only provide advice
However, many non-structural ways through which ALAC impedes itself aren't helping. Its emphasis on diversity over expertise means it is often poorly equipped to counter the paid lobbyists, advocates and grifters within ICANN's many vested-interest constituencies. The number of instances of ALAC self-sabotage, usually through obsession with process and mission-creep into areas well beyond the public interest, are numerous enough to fill a book. As just one example of such egregious misdirection; does anyone really think that non-registrant end-users care deeply about "closed generics"? Does the public even know what they are, let alone oppose them as ALAC appears to do? *Why should it care?* Significant effort has been put into addressing many such ICANN issues without giving similar levels of thought on exactly how (or even whether) these issues impact non-registrant end-users who in large part don't know ICANN even exists.
Additionally, I’m curious—do you see specific areas where At-Large could take initiatives that align with the current needs or priorities of the At-Large Community? If possible, could you share what you think are the top three pressing needs or demands from the At-Large Community today?
Keep in mind that I see ICANN primarily as part of internet infrastructure, and generally the public doesn't think about infrastructure (water supply, sewage, roads, electrical supply, etc) unless it stops working. In that realm, stability is primary. But within ICANN, that stability is provided by expert-led advisory bodies (SSAC, RSAC) with which At-Large has little to do.
The non-infrastructure part of ICANN -- the rental of Internet domains -- is different, but that is where At-Large mostly works. There is a role to play in preventing end-user abuse by fighting for registrant transparency so that we may hold abusers accountable. This too is an area in which end-user interests veer sharply from those of commercial registrants (who IMO have way too much influence within ALAC even though they already have representation through multiple GNSO constituencies).
Beyond stability, ease-of-use should prevail as the issue for non-registrant end-users. Seekers of Internet goods and services should be able to easily find and reach the sources of such goods and services. There are multiple facets of the domain-name environment that make this overly complex, so much so that by and large people have come to prefer search engines, QR codes and increasingly AI chatbots over "memorable" domains. I'm not sure that this can be corrected by now, but ALAC has not done itself any favours by, for instance, uncritically cheerleading ICANN's disastrous approach to non-Latin character scripts. This too is probably too far-gone for redemption.
Given the large number of important issues which are now too late to fix, in my opinion the remaining priorities should be to:
- Take all steps necessary to inhibit use of domains to abuse and scam end-users, including fighting against registrant anonymity - De-incentivize and reduce the speculative hoarding of domains, which makes it needlessly expensive for new businesses to acquire domains that are intuitive to their customers - Engage in public research to determine what end-users need from ICANN, don't guess (because most previous guesses have been wrong)
I have little confidence that At-Large is capable of asserting these basic end-user interests to any level of effectiveness, because it is so caught up in internal process distractions and fighting the battles of other constituencies as described above. But I hope this answers your question.
Cheers,
- Evan
Hi Mohibul, On Sun, Dec 22, 2024 at 4:57 AM Mohibul Mahmud <mohibul.mahmud@gmail.com> wrote:
I’d love to hear if you think there are particular areas where such joint efforts could have the greatest impact
Earlier in the year I ran in the election for NARALO rep to ALAC, providing a very specific and detailed agenda for reform and improvement. The result of the election indicates that little popular taste exists for such reform. So I will leave it to others to address your question; perhaps there is a broader consensus here that the challenges I identified don't even exist. Cheers, Evan
Hi, While it is true that all directors must serve the best interests of ICANN, their perceptions of what is best depends on who they are and the perceptions they walk in with. Additionally each of the groups they come from can and often do, send documents in that become part of the basis the Board must use to find the public interest. Given their affinity to the perspective of the SO/AC they come from (plus reelection and all that) those perspectives are discussed to death in the Board's deliberations (I do wish they did a better job of showing what the rough and tumble of discussions looks like - want to argue transparency, sign me up). Additionally on any fundamental change there is the Empowered Community that has a voice and can overrule the board. In this ALAC does have a full and equal voice. Finally, while not strictly speaking bicameral, the Bylaws defined relationship of the GAC and the Board could be seen as hinting at the very thing you seem to be talking. cheers, avri On 2024-12-18 19:00, Evan Leibovitch via CPWG wrote:
Oh, and one other thing, significant enough that it merits an addendum:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2024 at 7:51 AM David Mackey via NA-Discuss <na-discuss@icann.org> wrote:
Is there an ICANN At-Large equivalent component that has board level representation at ICAO/IATA?
It is worth reminding at this time that At-Large does **NOT** have Board representation within ICANN. Never did.
ALAC gets to send someone. Once that person is seated, they are sworn by ICANN's lawyers to explicitly disavow representing the constituency that sent them, and to only consider the interests of ICANN-the-entity. I refer you to this slide presentation [1], and specifically slide #9. Could not possibly be more clear.
In other words, I would most definitely not want public-interest representation in any future Internet governance body, multilateral or multistakeholder or multi-anything, to resemble the crippled At-Large voice within ICANN. This is not a feature worth boasting about.
Cheers, Evan _______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list -- cpwg@icann.org To unsubscribe send an email to cpwg-leave@icann.org
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Links: ------ [1] https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/2265195/Director-Fiduciary-...
I partially support Evan's model , since in my opinion, ICANN is mainly a technical organization and should care about technical management (*and mainly the evolvement** ) *of the DNS, which is currently a huge task , and abandon or delegate the policies (regulations related to DNS activities) * extra tasks/*duties to some *UN institution* (the ITU, for example), since those institutions are the natural place where the MSM principles could be practiced ! The issue is not whether the ICANN( or SO/AC ) has succeeded or not in this regulation task but is more or less an Organisational/Governance improvement action. Friendly regards Chokri On Wed, Dec 11, 2024 at 6:57 PM Evan Leibovitch via CPWG <cpwg@icann.org> wrote:
As a followup to my critique of a recent CircleID "defense" of multistakeholderism on the NARALO mailing list, I want to offer up some brief constructive commentary on what is generally regarded as Internet Governance:
In a recent conversation with a well-known ICANNer, I was asked: if I could replace the current management of the Internet with some other model, what would it be? Complaining is easy, but does a superior alternative exist?
My answer didn't take too long: something largely similar to the model that governs the world's air travel.
The United Nations treaty agency ICAO and the airline industry IATA have their headquarters within a four-minute walk in downtown Montréal. They are highly interdependent -- maybe even symbiotic -- but have very specific roles that are generally not duplicated. They have public advisory bodies, regional bureaus and expert groups that propose standards and regulations. In other words, this infrastructure has been multistakeholder since the 1940s, long before the tech world thought it had invented the concept.
And, generally speaking, that infrastructure has been proven to work, even between warring countries. Airlines under intense international sanctions remain members <https://www.iata.org/en/about/members/airline-list/s7-airlines/338/>. Safety and stability are the prime objectives of both, though IATA of course cares more about commercial sustainability while ICAO cares about interoperability and environmental sustainability. Having two separate complementary bodies offers plenty of advantages because they keep each other in check; as a result we have neither full government capture nor full commercial capture. The public interest is promoted through both bodies, especially if one is more concerned about results (ie, a global airline industry that is safe, reliable, adaptable and sustainable) than process (ie, splitting hairs about representation).
I believe that this model is adaptable to Internet governance and that it would work better than what we think we have now. I also believe it is still possible. What needs to change is a) the arrogance of asserting the Internet is the first instance of multistakeholder governance, b) the misbelief that ICANN is a public-serving example of it, and c) the visceral hostility to anything multilateral, even as a partial component.
-- Evan Leibovitch, Toronto Canada @evanleibovitch / @el56 _______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list -- cpwg@icann.org To unsubscribe send an email to cpwg-leave@icann.org
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participants (8)
-
alberto＠soto.net.ar -
avri＠doria.org -
Chokri Ben Romdhane -
David Mackey -
Evan Leibovitch -
Evan Leibovitch -
Mohibul Mahmud -
Nat Cohen