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Notes, Recordings, Transcript RFP 3B 27 January 14:00 UTC
by Brenda Brewer Jan. 27, 2015

Jan. 27, 2015

Dear all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the CWG IANA Call on 22 January are available here: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51417874 Notes: RFP 3B Call Tuesday 27 January 2015, 14.00-16.00 UTC 1. Welcome Welcome by the RFP 3B coordinator 2. Roll call All on ADOBE Connect recorded as present Eduardo Diaz Audio only 3. Internal to ICANN Option Introduction by coordinator. Request to PS to clarify issues. BT (staff support) and coordinator, expanded on another internal solution Question: first "Trust" ? Response: not much progress on trust proposal given the need for legal advise. Any question re. PS email a. "Trust" b." No Trust" Internal arrangement Presentation BT on internal solution Caveats: * * Generic approach. If it is ICANN internal, most likely, most work is around managing the IANA work: community role , monitoring it ,and engage with IANA * * Approach also trying to capture most of input received, on mechanics. * * General considerations: model to replace internal mechanisms to take away need for Contract Co. * * Need to create SO type body through ICANN Body. Reasons: no NTIA contract , hence need to create method to establish formal communication with ICANN with respect to preforming the IANA Functions. To represent the needs of the IANA Function customers * * IN this approach CSC and MRT need to be represented as well. To keep it simple: the CSC is inside the MRT ( sub-group), they are linked anyway and ther is an escalation path. Does this mean the CSC only made up of persons on the MRT? Reason to include in MRT is administrative simplicity. Characteristics of CSC could be specified in ICANN Bylaws. * * MRT members have permanent members. Reason: need to fullfill functions as envisioned. This iimplies need to define membership and mechnisms. Under this proposal non- SO/AC associated interests can be included (example ccNSO and role of non-ccNSO members) How does it relate to Contract Co option? * * MRT to prepare IANA statement of Work. every 3-5 years.and send to ICANN Board for approval ( if no agreement, accountability mechanisms kick-in. * * What would MRT in other years. Escalation path for CSC: Annual ports from CSC and community, could also include recommendations to the Board In case of serious breach, MRT Separation Of IANA ( key component ) if needed/required. Mechanics need to be worked on. How to avoid ICANN Board from changing th eBylaws of MRT? Bylaws evolution may need to be needed. However, Chris Disspain: - Pushback on Auda on proposal of golden Bylaw or trust. What is best way forward? Any push from the button, must at least be endorsed by the GNSO and ccNSO. In reality the internal SO's need to involved Continuum analysis: Contract Co one end of the continuum at the other end give it to ICANN and can not be removed. Moving away from the exterm ICANN internal option. First step is going to "Golden Bylaw" option. The next step closer to Contract Co, is the "Trust" model, slightly more clearly defined. A lot of non-common law jursidiction do not understand the notion of "trust" Critical to get independent legal advice on 3 models; * * First question are the options legally viable * What are risks involved in each of the options * Do the lawyers have other ideas. AM: Ask Greg Shatan where we are with respect to legal advise Response on comments: SO and AC approval included in draft. There neds to be formal support for MRT decision. Document is about how it could work, form a practical point of view. There are unknown around Contract Co. Alan Greenberg( AG): MRT may initiate, but AG supporter of "No Trust" , now moving towards "trust" to accommodate those who are in support of Contract Co. "Golden Bylaw" is related to shareholders. better use other term. Question: Does separation need Board approval? Response: th ICANN Board will be involved, however how it is constraint. Note CD: it is entirely possible to craft bylaws that prevent the Board to overturn/ <http://change.it/> change it. AM: Legal advice needed on "Bylaw construct" AG: The CCWG is charged with accountability. The CCWG is working in the direction of accountability of Board i.e. can not overrule the community. AM: Notes overlap with "trust: question should there be two "internal options"? CD: Counter question: why should viable options be excluded, until such time legal advise has been received Donna Austin: Not sensible to exclude options. Comments received also included to "Internal to ICANN" solution. Martin Boyle: agrees with conclusion to provide a range of different options. in solution proposed by BT: how does the process move into separation of IANA? Solution has to be put in by Accountability CCWG or looking at creation Contract Co. at the point the process reached the point of separation Response BT: Draft deals with 99% point of time of IANA Function performance. How to deal with separation i.e the extreme situation, needs legal adivise. Several option possible hence currently not included. AM: Include two options in the paper, Progress on seeking independent legal advice: Greg Shatan * * Scoping document has been prepared * Call of Client committee. Includes call with Samantha Eisner to understand options, either through procument process or use of other firm then Joones Day ( to avoid procurement process, and speed up engaging a law-firm). * * Goal is to have law-firm engaged asap, preferably before Singapore meeting * * Update on RFP 3b call on Thursday, if more to be send by Greg Shatan: scoping document includes reflection on "trust" option, and some of the follow-up questions ( such as "guardian" The document can be found at the Google doc link: <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oaPfFokCAqTluwP3D0UD-9RPCHS8JqBVOW2dkuS…> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oaPfFokCAqTluwP3D0UD-9RPCHS8JqBVOW2dkuS… Note scoping document is extensive, it is intended as background paper for the law-firm. Expectation is that the lawyers will be bale to drill down to the core questions for this group CWG paper to be drafted will not include any legal advise Question to BT: Can document be shared? It is clear it meant for discussion. Document is intended for discussion, all aspects are open. Action staff: Staff to share draft with the CWG MRT Section document Primary responsibility: Statement of work Question: Are there differences in MRT section relative to MRT under Contract Co? There are specific parts specific to Internal option. Question AM: focus on differences PS: what will the MRT and CSC will look like depends on what sits on the top ( Internal, trust, or contract co model) Specific for this option: mechanism around the IANA Function Statement of work ( IFSoW) and mechanism for escalation around the IFSow Managing the option of separation will be different, conditions, method etc. Chartering SO and AC need to support separation Explanation why some of the choices are made CSC Proposal for members Final section of paper: Notes and Issues.Includes additional questions and assumptions. 4. Summation and Next Steps Prepare a paper to inform the community in Singapore. No need to replicate CSC and MRT or IAP. Bernie's paper as part of the paper ( as Bylaw model) and include "Trust" model Should next meeting go ahead: dependent on Bernie turning around paper. At this stage need for feed-back by members of the RFP 3b group. Next step could also be to take document level deeper for example bylaw) CD: Need for legal advice. Let others assist in getting legal advice Bernie's document will be made available on Google docs Google Doc of Bernie's doc: <https://docs.google.com/document/d/10lR84kmBddiUISQCZFLXe5KLarIFG7GMKVvdPNm…> https://docs.google.com/document/d/10lR84kmBddiUISQCZFLXe5KLarIFG7GMKVvdPNm… PS. to assist on "Trust" section Deadline to provide comments:on Bernie document: Friday 30 January 2015, 23.00 UTC 5. AOB 6. Next Meeting Cancelled 29 January. Next meeting TBD Action Items Deadline to provide comments:on Bernie document: Friday 30 January 2015, 23.00 UTC

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Notes, Recordings, Transcript CWG RFP3 26 January 21:00 UTC
by Brenda Brewer Jan. 26, 2015

Jan. 26, 2015

Dear all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the CWG RFP3 Call on 26 January are available here: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51416945 NOTES: RFP 3 Meeting - 26 January 2015 Agenda 1. Welcome 2. Roll Call Attendance will be taken from AC room On audio only: Siva 3. Review Structural Analysis - Contract Co. See https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KXYKuFKfPADgF3U0WmruLPrwhm8y3yHv160Lphz… <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KXYKuFKfPADgF3U0WmruLPrwhm8y3yHv160Lphz… > Entity Status of Contract Co. . Survey did not reveal many areas of convergence . Objective to flesh out details of contract co. regardless of whether the principle of contract co. is supported at the end of the day . Does non-profit corporation status require specific resources or could it be a 1$ company i.e. how well does it need to be funded? No particular minimum funding requirements (no statutory requirements), at least in the US. Not-profit does not make it cannot make money - in a US context it mainly refers to the fact that it does not have shareholders and does not return profit to third parties. Not-profit typically has a public interest purpose, which could also be in the form of a membership organization (for the benefit of its members). . A non-profit first needs to be established as a corporation - what is the timeframe to move from a corporation to a not-for-profit corporation (501C status)? As it incorporates it is immediately characterized as a not-for-profit. Needs specific approval and apply for tax exempt status. . How does this compare to a limited liability corporation? All corporation provide limited liability. A limited liability corporation is always for profit - lighter weight structure for a typical corporation (for example, units compared to shares) Jurisdiction . Diversity of jurisdiction would be satisfied by having it in another jurisdiction than California. Suggested jurisdiction is Delaware which is set up to provide a home for many corporations. . Delaware law is set up to be easily adopted by third parties - allow for standard aspects of setting up a corporation. . All registry agreements are signed under California law - could be a reason to maintain Contract Co. in the US. Membership . Contract Co. would have no members Relationship to ICANN . Independent of ICANN . Indemnification - contemplated in the contract, IANA Operator would indemnify Contract. Co. Would that mean that ICANN would be funding its opponents case without any limitations? Normally parties will bear their own costs - only in exceptional cases this may be different. Indemnification does not mean you can act with impunity. Relationship to MRT . If MRT is a committee of Contract Co, this could be problematic. - was one of the suggestion, not necessarily a recommendation . Bylaws of Contract Co would specify it would take its direction from MRT . Should MRT be Board of Contract Co? Entities should be separate to avoid empire building. However, would it be possible to keep MRT within the same bounds as Contract Co.? How would MRT institute itself? MRT could be the board and bylaws could restrict actions of MRT - could be as effective as any other set of restrictions to avoid overreaching of board. Could address some issues, but might create others? Consider pros and cons of structuring it this way. . RFP would be most labor intensive task for MRT but would only occur periodically. Organizational Documentation . Contract Co would have Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws to make its limited purpose clear - not able to act outside its limited remit. . Any decisions that would need to be made would be specified in the Bylaws . Running of RFP would fall to the MRT Transparency . Contract Co would function in a fully transparent manner Accountability . Accountable to MRT; board members subject to recall; performance subject to review as well as budget. Composition of Board . Board will be as small as allowed by relevant corporate law. . May want to consider staying away from paying board members - but further advice may be needed. . Only motivation is to carry out limited tasks of Contract Co and take direction from MRT. . Staff would be as small as possible Meetings . Conducted primarily by phone and web Term lengths / limits . Staggered, term limited How will decisions be made . Decisions will be made by the MRT and adopted by the Board of Contract Co. Support needs . Little or no staff - delegate daily functions to CSC, MRT or MRT secretariat . May require a web-site as well as email and email lists When would the Board meet . As rarely as possible consistent with legal requirements Funding . Same as MRT Capture . Safeguards must be in place to avoid capture . Capture shouldn't be defined by economic interests as registries are expected to have a specific interest in the IANA function Further legal advice will be needed to assess viability of Contract Co. option. - any suggestions for legal counsel are welcome.

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Do we need an extra scenario given the requirements formulated by the CCWG-Accountability ?
by Maarten Simon Jan. 26, 2015

Jan. 26, 2015

All, I have read the CCWG-Accountability Chairs’ statement and wonder if we should not also discuss a scenario for the situation where the CCWG-Accountability will be successful in reaching their first requirement: “Enabling community empowerment over ICANN Board decisions with limited, strictly enumerated, last resort powers;" As far as I understand, these last resort powers are meant to include the powers with regard to the IANA functions. I figure that if the community will already have the final say over the IANA functions through these last resort powers, that: 1. There will be no need for an external solution where the same community will be given the final say over the IANA functions; 2. There is no need for an MRT; 3. There might be a need for a CSC (maybe a CSC plus); But maybe I am oversimplifying things here ? Best, Maarten

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Joint CWG-Stewardship & CCWG-Accountability Chairs' Statement
by Grace Abuhamad Jan. 26, 2015

Jan. 26, 2015

To view the original announcement, please see: https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-01-26-en Joint CWG-Stewardship & CCWG-Accountability Chairs' Statement <https://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=300&winname=addthis&pub=ra-52fcc7eb 243d6d89&source=tbx32-300&lng=en-us&s=linkedin&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.icann.o rg%2Fnews%2Fannouncement-2015-01-26-en&title=Joint%20CWG-Stewardship%20%26%2 0CCWG-Accountability%20Chairs%27%20Statement%20-%20ICANN&ate=AT-ra-52fcc7eb2 43d6d89/-/-/54c6befc73130645/2&frommenu=1&uid=54c6befc7176ac61&ct=1&tt=0&cap tcha_provider=nucaptcha> <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-01-26-en#> <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-01-26-en#> <https://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=300&winname=addthis&pub=ra-52fcc7eb2 43d6d89&source=tbx32-300&lng=en-us&s=sinaweibo&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.icann.o rg%2Fnews%2Fannouncement-2015-01-26-en&title=Joint%20CWG-Stewardship%20%26%2 0CCWG-Accountability%20Chairs%27%20Statement%20-%20ICANN&ate=AT-ra-52fcc7eb2 43d6d89/-/-/54c6befc73130645/3&frommenu=1&uid=54c6befc30ef4f9c&ct=1&tt=0&cap tcha_provider=nucaptcha> <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-01-26-en#> <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-01-26-en#> Lise Fuhr & Jonathan Robinson CWG-Stewardship <https://community.icann.org/display/gnsocwgdtstwrdshp/CWG+to+Develop+an+IA NA+Stewardship+Transition+Proposal+on+Naming+Related+Functions> Thomas Rickert, León Sanchez, & Mathieu Weill CCWG-Accountability <https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhancing+ICANN+A ccountability> As both Cross Community Working Groups prepare for community engagement and work sessions at ICANN52 in Singapore, the Chairs of the CWG-Stewardship and CCWG-Accountability would like to recognize the interdependence and connected nature of the work of their respective groups, as set out by the ICANN processes1 <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-01-26-en#foot1> and further reinforced by each working group's Charter.2 <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-01-26-en#foot2> Following the ICANN 51 Meeting in Los Angeles, the CWG-Stewardship Chairs and the Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability Charter Drafting Team started to hold update and coordination calls, a practical and early recognition of the requirement for active collaboration on their respective work efforts. These weekly interchanges and updates are ongoing and serve to keep each other informed about questions and issues arising from their respective working groups. Moving forward, the Chairs commit to continue to actively work together, and synchronize insofar as possible, on timelines and milestones, especially where there are accountability mechanisms that may be relevant for both groups. To assist in broader community understanding of the interdependencies of the parts of Work Stream 1 that relates to the CWG, a schematic illustration of the dynamics between the two working groups is available in a flowchart <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/49352017/Link%20with%20CCW G%20Accountability%20-%20updated%2026%20January%202015.pdf?api=v2> [PDF, 154 KB]. Work in Progress The CCWG-Accountability has just concluded a two-day meeting <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-01-23-en> in Frankfurt, Germany (19-20 January), during which they discussed their Work Stream 1 requirements, with initial input from the CWG-Stewardship on accountability dependencies. Both working groups are expected to continue this dialogue as work progresses. The CWG-Stewardship, following an intensive work weekend <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2015-01-12-en> on 10-11 January, is in the process of reviewing its timeline for submission of a proposal to the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG). A vital part of this endeavor is the seeking of legal advice on questions related to the viability of key elements of the CWG-Stewardship proposal. As the CCWG-Accountability also moves forward to seek legal advice, the Chairs will inform each other of the process used and advice received, so as to further ensure efficient synchronization in light of dependent and compressed timeframe. ICANN 52 Meeting in Singapore (9-13 February 2015) The Chairs intend to all be present at both CWG-Stewardship and CCWG-Accountability related sessions during the ICANN 52 Meeting in Singapore <http://singapore52.icann.org/en/> , including the ICG-organized events. This will reinforce the working groups' commitment to a productive meeting, advancing discussions and improving collaboration. Below is a compiled list of engagement sessions and working sessions that are relevant to both processes: *All times in local time (UTC +8) IANA Stewardship Transition & Enhancing ICANN Accountability Information Session <http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/sun-iana-stewardship-accountabilit y> Olivia Meeting Room Sunday, 8 February 17:30-19:00 Responses to the ICG RFP Regarding the IANA Stewardship Transition <http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/mon-icg-rfp-iana-stewardship> Padang/Canning Meeting Room Monday, 9 February 10:30-13:00 CCWG-Accountability Working Session <http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/mon-ccwg-accountability> Padang Meeting Room Monday, 9 February 16:00-19:00 CCWG-Accountability Engagement Session <http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-ccwg-accountability> Padang Meeting Room Wednesday, 11 February 9:45-11:15 CWG-Stewardship Working Session <http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-cwg-stewardship> Padang Meeting Room Wednesday, 11 February 17:15-19:15 CCWG-Accountability Working Session <http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/thu-ccwg-accountability> Padang Meeting Room Thursday, 12 February 07:00-10:00 CWG-Stewardship Questions & Answers Session <http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/thu-cwg-stewardship> Padang Meeting Room Thursday, 12 February 10:30-11:45 The full schedule for the ICANN 52 meeting in Singapore is available here <http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule-full> . 1 <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-01-26-en#note1> On 6 June 2014, ICANN, in its role as facilitator, published a community-driven process for the IANAStewardship Transition <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-06-06-en> . Community discussions on the IANA Stewardship Transition led to the development of an additional process on Enhancing ICANN Accountability <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-10-10-en> , which was published on 10 October. 2 <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2015-01-26-en#note2> The CWG-Stewardship Charter <https://community.icann.org/x/2grxAg> was circulated for adoption on 14 August 2014. The CCWG-Accountability Charter <https://community.icann.org/x/KYMHAw> was circulated for adoption on 3 November 2014.

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Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Do we need an extra scenario given the requirements formulated by the CCWG-Accountability?
by John Poole Jan. 26, 2015

Jan. 26, 2015

Dear Maarten *et al*: Thank you Maarten for your posting dated January 26, 2015. What I have to say in response below, others in CWG-stewardship may agree with, in whole or in part, and some may vehemently disagree—and that’s OK—as Phil Corwin pointed out on the CCWG-accountability list, “we can disagree without being disagreeable.” I am all in favor of simplifying the CWG-stewardship *draft proposal <https://www.icann.org/public-comments/cwg-naming-transition-2014-12-01-en>* which was published for public comment (1-22 Dec 2014). I am *not* in favor of “gutting” the requirement for a contractual counter-party to ICANN, expressed in the *draft proposal* as “Contract Co.” Indeed, my reading of those public comments that disagreed with the *draft proposal *are that most objections go to the complexity of the CSC/MRT/IAP specifics and the *sense* that the *draft proposal* attempts to “fix” ICANN by replicating ICANN’s “internal accountability mechanisms” at a higher external level. That is* not the remit* of this group nor the ICG pursuant to the NTIA announcement of March 14, 2014 <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition…>:* “… NTIA is asking the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to convene global stakeholders to develop a proposal to *transition* *the current role played by NTIA* in the coordination of the Internet’s domain name system (DNS). *NTIA’s responsibility includes* the procedural role of administering changes to the authoritative root zone file – the database containing the lists of names and addresses of all top-level domains – as well as* serving as the historic steward of the DNS*. *NTIA currently contracts with ICANN <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/iana-functions-purchase-order>* to carry out the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) *functions and has a Cooperative Agreement with Verisign <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/verisign-cooperative-agreement>* under which it performs related root zone management functions. *Transitioning NTIA out of its role* marks the final phase of the privatization of the DNS as outlined by the U.S. Government in 1997…” Every individual, every organization and corporation, has both “internal” and “external” accountability mechanisms. When I drive my car if I decide, despite my “internal controls” that I will “run that stop sign” because “I am in a hurry,” society has provided “external controls” in the form of police to stop me and prevent me from endangering myself and others. *Likewise, up to now, ICANN has had both “internal accountability mechanisms” (flawed though they may be), and an “external accountability mechanism” in the form of “the current role played by NTIA.”* *What is the NTIA role for which we (as representatives of the “global multistakeholder community”) are trying to develop a proposal? The NTIA role, *as stated above in the NTIA announcement, has 3 components: *1) to serve as “steward of the DNS;”* *2) to enter into a contract for operation of “the IANA functions;”* *3) to enter into a contract for operation of “root zone management functions” which contract also includes limitations on the fees Verisign may charge domain name registrants as operator “in perpetuity” of the market-dominant .COM Registry.* A lightweight “Contract Co” could quickly “*transition NTIA out of its role” *as noted above. I have suggested previously, that “Contract Co” take the form of a Trust—with members of the Board of Trustees selected by the “global multistakeholder community.” The specifics of ICANN “accountability mechanisms” as expressed in the CSC/MRT/IAP of the *draft proposal * could (and in my view probably should) be only outlined generally as requirements that the IANA functions operator implement in accordance with terms of the IANA contract. To summarize: *Should there continue to be an IANA contract counter-party to ICANN?** Yes* said the CWG-stewardship (RFP 3) draft proposal. Contracts are a good thing--they hold people, institutions, and corporations accountable. Accountability is key here, and any internal solution will be inferior in this regard. The "external solution" may also provide legal advantages to ICANN in the future (e.g., legal defenses in antitrust litigation, etc.) that an “internal solution” would not provide and any "internal solution" might in fact expose ICANN to greater potential liability in the future. I also think it is in the global multistakeholder community's best interests to "disperse authority and control" of the Internet, with an independent Root Zone Maintainer (Verisign) and other "multiple points of failure" to avoid having a fragile system with a "single point of failure" (ICANN) in total control. Finally, the "external solution" lessens or even obviates dependency upon CCWG-accountability’s work. (Personally, I wish the CCWG-accountability group "the best" in trying to “fix” ICANN, but that committee’s work should *not* impede *replacing the US government* with an *entity of the global multistakeholder community*, as soon as possible, in response to NTIA’s announcement of March, 2014.) Even if CCWG-accountability comes up with WS-1 “fixes,” it will take *years* to both implement those fixes *and* then be able to judge whether problems with ICANN accountability have been resolved. Indeed, in the unlikely event ICANN proves to be “unfixable" for whatever reason, then, in that case, "Contract Co" would have the authority to contract with another entity to carry out the IANA functions in the wider public interest of the global multistakeholder community. Remember, that while it had always been the "intention" to transition "NTIA out of its role," no one, including ICANN, had been actively engaged in that process until the NTIA announcement was dropped like a "bombshell" upon the global multistakeholder community as a result of the Snowden revelations. Finally, I caution all fellow participants in this process to remember that they are all representatives of “the global multistakeholder community” in fashioning a proposal to transition “NTIA out of its role.” That “global multistakeholder community” is much broader than just the stakeholders represented within ICANN. The global multistakeholder community is watching this process very closely. Any indication that the “IANA stewardship transition process” has been hijacked by the ICANN Board of Directors or “ICANN insiders” will likely doom all the good work that has already been done. *Please remember that when (most of) you are in Singapore next month at ICANN 52.* I won’t be there—I am just a domain name registrant, and there is no “domain name registrants” stakeholder group within ICANN. Best regards, John Poole **remit as defined by Google <https://www.google.com/search?q=remit>* in this context: (noun) *the task or area of activity officially assigned to an individual or organization*. -- *"the committee was becoming caught up in issues that did not fall within its remit"* *On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 6:00 AM, Maarten Simon <maarten.simon(a)sidn.nl <maarten.simon(a)sidn.nl>>wrote:* *All,* *I have read the CCWG-Accountability Chairs? statement and wonder if we should not also discuss a scenario for the situation where the CCWG-Accountability will be successful in reaching their first requirement:* *?Enabling community empowerment over ICANN Board decisions with limited, strictly enumerated, last resort powers;"* *As far as I understand, these last resort powers are meant to include the powers with regard to the IANA functions. I figure that if the community will already have the final say over the IANA functions through these last resort powers, that:* * 1. There will be no need for an external solution where the same community will be given the final say over the IANA functions;* * 2. There is no need for an MRT;* * 3. There might be a need for a CSC (maybe a CSC plus);* * But maybe I am oversimplifying things here ?* * Best,* * Maarten*

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Legal Advice - Client Committee
by Jonathan Robinson Jan. 24, 2015

Jan. 24, 2015

All, As you know, legal advice to the CWG is on the critical path for our work. It is now both essential and urgent to get the ball rolling. To this extent, and as discussed at our recent meeting, we require a client committee which represents the group, has legal expertise and is available to brief and work with the lawyers. >From the volunteers, we had two lawyers make themselves available (Greg & Maarten) and so, together with the co-chairs, we will work with this small team of four in the first instance. 1. Greg Shatan (Partner at Abelman Frayne & Schwab) 2. Maarten Simon (General Counsel at SIDN) 3. Lise Fuhr (Co-chair) 4. Jonathan Robinson (Co-chair) We believe that this will keep us appropriately qualified, sufficiently fleet footed and closely connected to work and requirements of the CWG. Thank-you, Jonathan & Lise CWG Co-Chairs

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RFP3B Notes, Transcript, Recording 23 Jan 14:00 UTC
by Brenda Brewer Jan. 23, 2015

Jan. 23, 2015

Hello all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the RFP3B call on 23 January at 14:00 UTC are available here: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51417872 Notes 23/01: 1. Welcome Roll call : Audio only Eduardo Diaz, Lise Fuhr 2. Need for 'Discussion Document' for Singapore * Singapore meeting offers opportunity to engage with community; * Goal is to prepare discussion document for Singapore * At end of meeting decission what goes in as "internal draft proposal * BT: Assemble document of "what is current state of play" includes * interaction of CWG * Status of draft Interim proposal * Public comment and analysis * Key questions * Alternative proposal First draft shared, starting point To be completed before Singapore, basis for slide deck etc. * * AM: send out mock-up to list * No comments 3. Review of 'Discussion Document' draft based on auDA proposal Paul Szyndler: Not able to respond to legal questions. It is presneted as potential solution. Starting to from back to front. Starting wiht non-contentious elements IAP: considered non-contentious CSC: only standing committee, other elements only activated when required Concept Guardian: is concept aligned with"trust" similar kind of function of MRT ICANN would be declare itself trustee Beneficiaries: customers of IANA Implicit assumption: it is an internal to ICANN model, in lign with purpose of this sub-group. Key element: agree, with IAP and CSC, Guardian similar to MRT Suggestion to take questions: * What is apex/pinnacle point: trust? * Chat question: dos it this reflects the first "internal to ICANN" proposal that largely came from ALAC - is this the case? Focus on Auda proposal first Alan Greenberg (AG)( ALaC): looking for minimal proposal. At this stage no ALAC position, but is abasis for furhter discussion adn possible evolution CLO: Evolve to RFP 3B proposal, need to be acceptable if now wedded to Contract Co, For those Request and needs external legal advise, similar as for "Contract Co" proposal. Viable basis for 3B proposal. Fast track this proposal, to evolve AM: Auda or LAC proposal is short hand for developing "internal proposal" Staffan Jonson: Optimistic about proposal, some issues, what is impact of declaration of trustee, how does separation work? AG: Interesting to understand to what extend Auda prop. is more acceptable then ALAC prop. AM: Goal is to understand this proposal Greg Shatan: Notes Trust very specific area of law: NTIA claim to transfer to MS community. If transfered to ICANN how does this relate to need to transfer to MS? Guardian is only formed when needed: newly formed, or roster? Donna Austin: IAP and CSC and Guardian are all similar to what has been discussed in RFP 3. If that is the case, leave in RFP 3. and focus in RFP 3B on trust and relation involved? Suggestion supported by fair number of attendants AG: tends to agree with DA. Focus on understanding trustee and trust relation, but notes substantial differnece based on starting concept AM: starting from Frankfurt, still does not understand what goes into "trust", what would trust holds? PS: Agrees not to go into other elements at this stage and focus on core difference. In developing proposal: what is core of IANA Function and what is transferred. ICANN could be in position that it makes a unulateral statement of trust. This statement delineates what is in "trust". Suggest to focus on model, i.e. separation of IANA Function. Broad concept to ensure role of community vis-a vis Trustee/ICANN. Facilitate discussion on principle. Issues around particpation AM: Issue to understand what goes into the "trust" How would mechanics work? PS: NTIA would approve of unilateral declaration by ICANN of holding IAN Function in trust. ICANN would not hold the IANA Function. The functions would be identified in the statement of "trust" and then be bound to the community. statement could include or exclude anything community wants to. AM: notes Avri s remark on IETF trust CLO: Individual experience determine view on model. Hence need for rigorous legal advise. Internal solution through "trust" and "guardian" function, would trigger Review. There is a lot in model that at arms-length Review etc, could be triggered. AM: it is given the remit is to develop an internal solution and develop its mechanics Grag Shatan: CLO refers to guardian as an entity, but not as a legal entity. What if ICANN goes "rogue" and guardian is incorporated, how can Guardian take action? Trustee is not powered any decision, however role of trustee is to maintain "trust" , How does this difference be overcome. PS: Starting point trustee is not empowered to make changes to trust. ICANN by making statement, it can not empower itself . If ICANN goes "rogue' beneficiaries or guardians can move "trust" somewhere else. AM: What would happen in mechanical sense if ICANN as "trustee" would not recognize decision? PS. ICANN holds assets in trust, it would not empower them to take any decision on the asset. various mechanisms to change trustee. Mechanism through escalation path described in paper. Key principle ICANN would not be empowered to do anything, and hence would have no control. DA: What does "trust" hold. Structural changes needed. to clear delineate IANA Function, includes budget , own legal advise, etc. AG: what is it in the 'trust" similar question needs to be asked for " interim proposal". It is unclear what will be confereed upon, what will be tranfered? This question needs to be asked for all proposals. CWG does not know what is transferred? AM: in community not enough discussion about " Verisign root zom=ne maintainer contract". Greg Shatan: Model may work if asset is bank account.. IANA function is not clearly defined asset. Does this require internal separation to clearly delineate 'asset"? CLO: Guardina would be same. Mechanistic aspects happens in same way as NTIA does it currently. All models needs to be tested, and made robust. Greg Shatan: USG many resources at hand. Guardian does not wield any sticks. CLO: Model should be developed properly, with proper safeguards and safeguards AG: All mechanisms rely on enforcement in court, contract and Contract Co. as well internal model. Move forward with assumption, that all solutions need to be tested. AM: unfortunately not legal advice before moving forward. Would PS in the position to elaborate on questions asked today. PS: Could provide some additional clarifications, but providing fully fleshed out proposal in short term, that was worked in by CWG over last months will not work. CLO suggestion: how much of strawman has merit for legal advise? Opinion, sufficient basis for further discussion and seeking legal advise. AM: Making sure that it can be socialized Greg Shatan: How can ICANN be forced to hand over set of activities: fundamental issues, enhancing accountability mechanisms. Important in both proposals: ability to hold board accountability for its decision. AM: simpler ways to achieve what needs to be done. Question to DA: this option to propose or develop other DA: which structural changes would be required? For example build walls around IANA Function.. This discussion has never been had in CWG. Find tangibles AM: PS asked to elaborate more around this?There are simpler ways, around board resolutions and Bylaw changes? PS asked to provide elaboration AM has own ideas, focused around Board resolution and Bylaw changes. Challenge is to write some pages on internal pages. CLO: Will we have white board in ADOBE, and matrix to compare the similarities and differences, including the AM model. No problem with putting various options to community AM: Runs over matrix as presented in room. AG: Is this alternative to original Auda and ALAC proposal? The rationale for Auda, it allows for delineation and easy separation to try appease those who strongly support separation. PS: Key point Auda's initial proposal, suggested something like a "golden bylaw' informally received feed-back that such a model would be problematic, hence the evolution to "trust model" . What is needed is legal advise. AM: measure of agreement to see what he can do, AM see what he can do to elaborate. preferably in coordination. AM: need for two more meetings 4. Summation and Next Steps 5. Timing of Next Meetings AM: circulation of discussion paper early February Next RFP 3B Meetings: * Tuesday 27 January 14.00 UTC * Thursday 29 January 21.00 UTC 6. AOB --None

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USCIB statement on IANA Transition
by Grace Abuhamad Jan. 23, 2015

Jan. 23, 2015

Dear all, Please see below for a message from the U.S. Council for International Business. Best, Grace From: Barbara Wanner <bwanner(a)uscib.org> Date: Thursday, January 22, 2015 11:52 PM To: Grace Abuhamad <grace.abuhamad(a)icann.org> Cc: "el2752(a)att.com" <el2752(a)att.com>, "joseph.alhadeff(a)oracle.com" <joseph.alhadeff(a)oracle.com>, "jonathan.robinson(a)ipracon.com" <jonathan.robinson(a)ipracon.com>, Lise Fuhr <lise.fuhr(a)difo.dk>, Theresa Swinehart <theresa.swinehart(a)icann.org>, Chris Mondini <chris.mondini(a)icann.org> Subject: USCIB statement on IANA transition: Please post to Naming Functions Listserv Dear Grace, Please post the following statement to the CWG Naming Functions listserv on our behalf: The U.S. Council for International Business (USCIB) would like to thank Alissa Cooper, Distinguished Engineer, Cisco, and ICG Chair, for her recent CircleID blog post <http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150120_iana_transition_planning_proceeding_ in_fine_internet_style/> , ³IANA Transition Planning Proceeding in Fine Internet Style,² in which she discusses the ICG¹s engagement with the naming community concerning the possible need to revise the timeline for its delivery of a transition plan to the ICG. Importantly, Dr. Cooper states that the ICG has ³no interest in receiving a plan that is incomplete or that lacks community consensus, now or later.² She further reaffirms the ICG¹s confidence that the Internet community will successfully deliver to NTIA a high-quality, consensus-based transition plan ³within a time-frame acceptable to all.² USCIB has been actively participating in community discussions and submitting comments on the IANA Transition process as well as the interrelated issue of ICANN Accountability. We appreciate Dr. Cooper¹s assurance that the ICG recognizes that developing a complete and high-quality transition plan may warrant some flexibility with the interim deadlines to enable appropriate broad and meaningful consultation throughout the community. Most recently, USCIB submitted comments in response to the CWG¹s call for public comments on its draft transition proposal on IANA Naming Functions, which echo this view and emphasize that quality is a paramount issue over timing. As we all work diligently toward a timely transition, USCIB Members thought it would be useful to re-emphasize our priorities for a successful process and outcome across both of these critical endeavors. ³A Quality Result is More Important than a Fast Result -- We appreciate the CWG¹s sensitivity to the goal of developing a transition proposal before the September 30, 2015, expiration of NTIA¹s current contract to perform IANA functions. Nevertheless, this process should not be unduly rushed with issuance of an incomplete, flawed, and potentially destabilizing proposal. There is no need for such haste in view of repeated statements by Assistant Secretary Strickling that September 30 is a ³goal.² The NTIA contract can and will be renewed if the development of appropriate transition and accountability mechanisms are not completed by then. We should take the necessary time and apply the necessary detailed attention to do this right. The security and stability of the Internet and the broader Internet-enabled economy depend on this level of care and attention.² Barbara P. Wanner Vice President, ICT Policy U.S. Council for International Business 1400 K Street, NW, Suite 450 Washington, DC 20005 bwanner(a)uscib.org 202-617-3155 - phone 202-371-8249 -- fax 646-709-2481 -- mobile <http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentID=4660>

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Updated version of flow chart
by Marika Konings Jan. 22, 2015

Jan. 22, 2015

Dear All, Please find attached the latest version of the link with the CCWG-Accountability flow chart as discussed during our call earlier today. Best regards, Marika

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CWG IANA 22 January 11:00 UTC
by Jaap Akkerhuis Jan. 22, 2015

Jan. 22, 2015

Oops, Apologies for not showing up. It seems that in updating my agenda with the flurry of changes I have removed this one by accident. jaap

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