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Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s)
by Alan Greenberg Jan. 16, 2015

Jan. 16, 2015

I believe that this is the minimalist list of accountability measures or accountability-related processes that would be required based on the two proposals currently under consideration. I have explicitly not included the wider list of measures that the CCWG is considering for possible inclusion in its WS1, specifically those which the community would like to see and for which the IANA transition might provide additional impetus for the Board to approve, but are not absolutely required to ensure that the IANA transition can occur. I recognize that this is a judgement call that not all might agree with. During the last of the four weekend meetings, Chuck mentioned one additional issue, and referred to a chat exchange between him and Donna during the third meeting that listed several other potential accountability issues. Unfortunately, that chat transcript was not preserved due to an error in saving it. The list of measures for the Contract Co. model is based on the list that the Co-Chairs created in December, augmented by Chucks suggestion. I do not believe that the December list has been negated by any work done in the interim, but perhaps I have missed something. I could not find a rationale for the inclusion of the first of the three items, but include it here so that the CWG could decide if it is based on a real need associated with the proposal or not. If included, I would suggest the CWG be more specific as to under what conditions it would apply. Chuck's suggestion seems to conflict with the 2nd measure in that the 2nd measure is specified as being binding. I am also not sure if it could possibly be replaced by the more generalized IAP (once the request goes to IANA). The requirements for the internal-to-ICANN model are based on my discussions with a number of people over the last weeks. Contract Co. Model Requirements 1. Independent Review of Board Actions Change the ICANN Bylaws to specify that under certain circumstances (to be defined) the determinations of an Independent Review of Board Actions Panel would be binding and not implemented at the Board's discretions. 2. Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests This would be a replacement for the authorization function for all changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database currently performed by the NTIA. The replacement mechanism would have gTLD requests for delegations and re-delegations authorized by an independent third party and its decision on these matters would be binding on ICANN/IANA. 3. Independent Appeals Panel An independent review panel must be set up to deal with contested changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database. Although discussions are still ongoing as to the specifics of such a proposal, it is generally agreed that the decisions of such a panel would be binding. There may also be a need for an injunction-like mechanism to defer the change in question during the appeal process. 4. gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within ICANN prior to the change request going to IANA A Registry could appeal an ICANN decision to delegate or redelegate and gTLD, based on policy not being followed (or presumably contractual terms not being followed). Internal-To-ICANN Model Requirements This model will require all of the above measures plus the following: 5. Control over ICANN Board decisions. The ability for ICANN Stakeholders, potentially augmented by other non-ICANN entities, to mandate or overrule, a particular Board decision, or to require that the implementation of such a decision be subject to consideration of an independent, binding review. These measures might need to be augmented by advance notice of such decisions and allow the MS community to react. In the most restricted form, this ability might be restricted to decisions related to IANA, but in reality, it may not be practical to define this scope limitation (ie how to recognize an IANA-related decision). 6. Ability to Remove Directors The ability of the overall multi-stakeholder community to remove some or all of the Board Directors. In the case of a full Board removal, a mechanism would be required for appointing an Interim Board and then a replacement regular Board. In addition, ACs and SOs could be given the right to recall their appointed Director(s).

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Conditional Accountability Requirements
by Jonathan Robinson Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

All, I recall from the weekend sessions that we agreed to work on the "Conditional Accountability" requirements to be developed as part of the CWG proposal. And moreover, to the extent that it was possible, to formulate these in such a way as to guide the work (on work stream 1) of the CCWG next week. I believe Alan Greenberg was going to hold the pen on this but have not seen anything on list so will make a contribution here to be synthesised with anything Alan has led or developed. It seems to me that we have three categories as follows: 1. General i.e. work that will be done by the CCWG and on which the CWG will rely on regardless of the variant proposal it produces. >From previous correspondence with the CCWG, we know that they have identified the following areas: o Independent Review of Board Actions o Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation o Independent Appeals Panel 2. Relating to RFP 3a - A (potentially) limited set of requirements given the strength of recourse associated with 3a o A o B o C 3. Relating to RFP 3b - A (potentially) more extensive list of requirements given the likely integrated nature of the outcome from this group o D o E o F Now, clearly the key question is formulating the bullet points A-F under 3a and 3 b above and deciding whether 3a is a subset of 3b or whether there are unique conditions associated with 3a. It will be very helpful to have clear input on A-F above in a form that we can transmit to the CCWG ahead of their meetings next week. Thank-you Jonathan

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Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s)
by Alan Greenberg Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

I think I answered on the call, but in case not... At 15/01/2015 09:55 AM, Gomes, Chuck wrote: >Alan, > >First let me put in writing the what I said in >the last weekend call: We need the >Accountability CCWG to provide an accountability >process that registry operators (cs & gs) and >possibly governments in the case of ccTLDs can >use in cases where they think delegation and >re-delegation decisions are not in line with >approved policy or for governments local >law. This may be covered by your item 4 (gTLD >Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within ICANN >prior to the change request going to IANA) >although I am not sure that appeals would always >have to happen before going to IANA; that would be preferred though. 4 was included based on your comment at the meeting. I wored it as best as I could based on my understanding, but it was just my take on it. > >Alan why do you think that this would conflict >with item 2 (Independent certification for >delegation and re-delegation requests)? In the >case of gTLDs, the decision whether or not a >gTLD could be delegated or re-delegated would >happen before any certification would >occur. The certification would simply confirm >that required steps were followed properly. For >gTLDs I think that any appeal would preferably >happen before any certification happened but I >suppose it could happen afterwards; those >details would need to be defined. I wont try to venture into the ccTLD world. The possible conflict is that they both called for binding output. If the item 2 was done in all cases, I was not sure if the concept of appealing a binding outcome made sense or not. > >On a totally different topic with regard to item >2, I dont think that is something that we need >the Accountability CCWG to deal with that. In >my view, that seems to be clearly in our >court. Any accountability for a certification >decision would probably be covered by general accountability processes. You may be right. I included it because Jonathan and Lise did in an earlier document. > >Why is item 6 (Ability to Remove Directors) an >action that the CWG needs from the CCWG. I >agree that we need some specific accountability >mechanisms from the CCWG but we dont >specifically need the one that would allow for >the removal of Directors. That option may >provide some of the accountability that the CWG >needs but we require that specific option. It was mentioned in one version of the ALAC proposal and I saw it in some version of the auDA comment (although I appear to be wrong about it being in the final auDA proposal). Alan > >Chuck > >From: cwg-stewardship-bounces(a)icann.org >[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg >Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 1:12 AM >To: CWG IANA >Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s) > >I believe that this is the minimalist list of >accountability measures or >accountability-related processes that would be >required based on the two proposals currently under consideration. > >I have explicitly not included the wider list of >measures that the CCWG is considering for >possible inclusion in its WS1, specifically >those which the community would like to see and >for which the IANA transition might provide >additional impetus for the Board to approve, but >are not absolutely required to ensure that the >IANA transition can occur. I recognize that this >is a judgement call that not all might agree with. > >During the last of the four weekend meetings, >Chuck mentioned one additional issue, and >referred to a chat exchange between him and >Donna during the third meeting that listed >several other potential accountability issues. >Unfortunately, that chat transcript was not >preserved due to an error in saving it. > >The list of measures for the Contract Co. model >is based on the list that the Co-Chairs created >in December, augmented by Chucks suggestion. I >do not believe that the December list has been >negated by any work done in the interim, but >perhaps I have missed something. I could not >find a rationale for the inclusion of the first >of the three items, but include it here so that >the CWG could decide if it is based on a real >need associated with the proposal or not. If >included, I would suggest the CWG be more >specific as to under what conditions it would >apply. Chuck's suggestion seems to conflict with >the 2nd measure in that the 2nd measure is >specified as being binding. I am also not sure >if it could possibly be replaced by the more >generalized IAP (once the request goes to IANA). > >The requirements for the internal-to-ICANN model >are based on my discussions with a number of people over the last weeks. > >Contract Co. Model Requirements > >1. Independent Review of Board Actions > >Change the ICANN Bylaws to specify that under >certain circumstances (to be defined) the >determinations of an Independent Review of Board >Actions Panel would be binding and not implemented at the Board's discretions. > >2. Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests > >This would be a replacement for the >authorization function for all changes to the >Root Zone or its WHOIS Database currently >performed by the NTIA. The replacement mechanism >would have gTLD requests for delegations and >re-delegations authorized by an independent >third party and its decision on these matters would be binding on ICANN/IANA. > >3. Independent Appeals Panel > >An independent review panel must be set up to >deal with contested changes to the Root Zone or >its WHOIS Database. Although discussions are >still ongoing as to the specifics of such a >proposal, it is generally agreed that the >decisions of such a panel would be binding. >There may also be a need for an injunction-like >mechanism to defer the change in question during the appeal process. > >4. gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within >ICANN prior to the change request going to IANA > >A Registry could appeal an ICANN decision to >delegate or redelegate and gTLD, based on policy >not being followed (or presumably contractual terms not being followed). > >Internal-To-ICANN Model Requirements > >This model will require all of the above measures plus the following: > >5. Control over ICANN Board decisions. > >The ability for ICANN Stakeholders, potentially >augmented by other non-ICANN entities, to >mandate or overrule, a particular Board >decision, or to require that the implementation >of such a decision be subject to consideration >of an independent, binding review. These >measures might need to be augmented by advance >notice of such decisions and allow the MS >community to react. In the most restricted form, >this ability might be restricted to decisions >related to IANA, but in reality, it may not be >practical to define this scope limitation (ie >how to recognize an IANA-related decision). > >6. Ability to Remove Directors > >The ability of the overall multi-stakeholder >community to remove some or all of the Board >Directors. In the case of a full Board removal, >a mechanism would be required for appointing an >Interim Board and then a replacement regular >Board. In addition, ACs and SOs could be given >the right to recall their appointed Director(s). > > > > > >

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Draft Legal Scope Google Doc; Search for Counsel
by Greg Shatan Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

All: Here is a link to the Google Doc: https://docs.google.com/document/d/14CfnVwo4d3tIGyuFB2fyxqF0ycQ6uxo0rjlvtqh… Please make your comments in "suggest" mode. Please make your comments by 15:00 UTC Friday 16 January 2015 (i.e., tomorrow, for most of us). Please make your comments as revision where possible, and in a form consistent with the document so we can send it on quickly. Also, any suggestions for outside counsel would be most appreciated, as soon as possible. Thank you! Greg Shatan

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Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s)
by Alan Greenberg Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

RESEND WITHOUT TYPOS! The typical meaning of a poison pill is a provision to prevent or forestall a hostile corporate takeover, but it is also used in reference to a proposed bill (as in an act of a legislature) where an amendment is made which causes it to be distasteful to someone who otherwise would have supported it. I presume that this latter meaning is implied, in that a provision of the CWG proposal would invalidate it in its entirely if specific accountability measures were not taken. Alan At 15/01/2015 02:44 PM, Gomes, Chuck wrote: >Jonathan, > >I do not understand the 'poison pill' point. > >Chuck > >From: cwg-stewardship-bounces(a)icann.org >[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jonathan Robinson >Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 8:16 AM >To: jrobinson(a)afilias.info; 'Alan Greenberg'; 'CWG IANA' >Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by >CWG Proposal(s) > >All, > >Note the reference that Fadi has very recently made to the possible >use of an over-arching conditionality (in the CWG proposal) in the >form of a "poison pill" i.e. our (CWG) proposal being invalid unless >certain key accountability conditions are met. > >Jonathan > >From: Jonathan Robinson [mailto:jrobinson@afilias.info] >Sent: 15 January 2015 12:46 >To: 'Alan Greenberg'; 'CWG IANA' >Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by >CWG Proposal(s) > >Alan (and the CWG), > >One question that strikes me which we will almost certainly be asked >to clarify is; What is the problem/issue that you (we) are trying to >solve for in each case? > >The purpose for establishing the motivation is that it may be that >there is more than one remedy and that one remedy is more desirable >than another (for whatever reason including but not limited to legal advice). > >Perhaps a table in the form of issue / proposed resolution 1 / >proposed resolution 2? > >Jonathan > >From: Alan Greenberg >[<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] >Sent: 15 January 2015 06:12 >To: CWG IANA >Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s) > >I believe that this is the minimalist list of accountability >measures or accountability-related processes that would be required >based on the two proposals currently under consideration. > >I have explicitly not included the wider list of measures that the >CCWG is considering for possible inclusion in its WS1, specifically >those which the community would like to see and for which the IANA >transition might provide additional impetus for the Board to >approve, but are not absolutely required to ensure that the IANA >transition can occur. I recognize that this is a judgement call that >not all might agree with. > >During the last of the four weekend meetings, Chuck mentioned one >additional issue, and referred to a chat exchange between him and >Donna during the third meeting that listed several other potential >accountability issues. Unfortunately, that chat transcript was not >preserved due to an error in saving it. > >The list of measures for the Contract Co. model is based on the list >that the Co-Chairs created in December, augmented by Chucks >suggestion. I do not believe that the December list has been negated >by any work done in the interim, but perhaps I have missed >something. I could not find a rationale for the inclusion of the >first of the three items, but include it here so that the CWG could >decide if it is based on a real need associated with the proposal or >not. If included, I would suggest the CWG be more specific as to >under what conditions it would apply. Chuck's suggestion seems to >conflict with the 2nd measure in that the 2nd measure is specified >as being binding. I am also not sure if it could possibly be >replaced by the more generalized IAP (once the request goes to IANA). > >The requirements for the internal-to-ICANN model are based on my >discussions with a number of people over the last weeks. > >Contract Co. Model Requirements > >1. Independent Review of Board Actions > >Change the ICANN Bylaws to specify that under certain circumstances >(to be defined) the determinations of an Independent Review of Board >Actions Panel would be binding and not implemented at the Board's discretions. > >2. Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests > >This would be a replacement for the authorization function for all >changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database currently performed >by the NTIA. The replacement mechanism would have gTLD requests for >delegations and re-delegations authorized by an independent third >party and its decision on these matters would be binding on ICANN/IANA. > >3. Independent Appeals Panel > >An independent review panel must be set up to deal with contested >changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database. Although discussions >are still ongoing as to the specifics of such a proposal, it is >generally agreed that the decisions of such a panel would be >binding. There may also be a need for an injunction-like mechanism >to defer the change in question during the appeal process. > >4. gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within ICANN prior to the >change request going to IANA > >A Registry could appeal an ICANN decision to delegate or redelegate >and gTLD, based on policy not being followed (or presumably >contractual terms not being followed). > >Internal-To-ICANN Model Requirements > >This model will require all of the above measures plus the following: > >5. Control over ICANN Board decisions. > >The ability for ICANN Stakeholders, potentially augmented by other >non-ICANN entities, to mandate or overrule, a particular Board >decision, or to require that the implementation of such a decision >be subject to consideration of an independent, binding review. These >measures might need to be augmented by advance notice of such >decisions and allow the MS community to react. In the most >restricted form, this ability might be restricted to decisions >related to IANA, but in reality, it may not be practical to define >this scope limitation (ie how to recognize an IANA-related decision). > >6. Ability to Remove Directors > >The ability of the overall multi-stakeholder community to remove >some or all of the Board Directors. In the case of a full Board >removal, a mechanism would be required for appointing an Interim >Board and then a replacement regular Board. In addition, ACs and SOs >could be given the right to recall their appointed Director(s). > > >

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Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s)
by Alan Greenberg Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

The typical meaning of Poison pill is a provision to prevent or forestall a hostile corporate takeover, but it is also used tin reference to a proposed bill (and in an act of a legislature) where an amendment is made which causes it to be distasteful to someone who otherwise would have supported it. I presume that this latter meaning is implied, in that a provision of the CWG proposal would invalidate it in its entirely if specific accountability measures were not taken. Alan At 15/01/2015 02:44 PM, Gomes, Chuck wrote: >Jonathan, > >I do not understand the 'poison pill' point. > >Chuck > >From: cwg-stewardship-bounces(a)icann.org >[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jonathan Robinson >Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 8:16 AM >To: jrobinson(a)afilias.info; 'Alan Greenberg'; 'CWG IANA' >Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by >CWG Proposal(s) > >All, > >Note the reference that Fadi has very recently made to the possible >use of an over-arching conditionality (in the CWG proposal) in the >form of a "poison pill" i.e. our (CWG) proposal being invalid unless >certain key accountability conditions are met. > >Jonathan > >From: Jonathan Robinson [mailto:jrobinson@afilias.info] >Sent: 15 January 2015 12:46 >To: 'Alan Greenberg'; 'CWG IANA' >Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by >CWG Proposal(s) > >Alan (and the CWG), > >One question that strikes me which we will almost certainly be asked >to clarify is; What is the problem/issue that you (we) are trying to >solve for in each case? > >The purpose for establishing the motivation is that it may be that >there is more than one remedy and that one remedy is more desirable >than another (for whatever reason including but not limited to legal advice). > >Perhaps a table in the form of issue / proposed resolution 1 / >proposed resolution 2? > >Jonathan > >From: Alan Greenberg >[<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] >Sent: 15 January 2015 06:12 >To: CWG IANA >Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s) > >I believe that this is the minimalist list of accountability >measures or accountability-related processes that would be required >based on the two proposals currently under consideration. > >I have explicitly not included the wider list of measures that the >CCWG is considering for possible inclusion in its WS1, specifically >those which the community would like to see and for which the IANA >transition might provide additional impetus for the Board to >approve, but are not absolutely required to ensure that the IANA >transition can occur. I recognize that this is a judgement call that >not all might agree with. > >During the last of the four weekend meetings, Chuck mentioned one >additional issue, and referred to a chat exchange between him and >Donna during the third meeting that listed several other potential >accountability issues. Unfortunately, that chat transcript was not >preserved due to an error in saving it. > >The list of measures for the Contract Co. model is based on the list >that the Co-Chairs created in December, augmented by Chucks >suggestion. I do not believe that the December list has been negated >by any work done in the interim, but perhaps I have missed >something. I could not find a rationale for the inclusion of the >first of the three items, but include it here so that the CWG could >decide if it is based on a real need associated with the proposal or >not. If included, I would suggest the CWG be more specific as to >under what conditions it would apply. Chuck's suggestion seems to >conflict with the 2nd measure in that the 2nd measure is specified >as being binding. I am also not sure if it could possibly be >replaced by the more generalized IAP (once the request goes to IANA). > >The requirements for the internal-to-ICANN model are based on my >discussions with a number of people over the last weeks. > >Contract Co. Model Requirements > >1. Independent Review of Board Actions > >Change the ICANN Bylaws to specify that under certain circumstances >(to be defined) the determinations of an Independent Review of Board >Actions Panel would be binding and not implemented at the Board's discretions. > >2. Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests > >This would be a replacement for the authorization function for all >changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database currently performed >by the NTIA. The replacement mechanism would have gTLD requests for >delegations and re-delegations authorized by an independent third >party and its decision on these matters would be binding on ICANN/IANA. > >3. Independent Appeals Panel > >An independent review panel must be set up to deal with contested >changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database. Although discussions >are still ongoing as to the specifics of such a proposal, it is >generally agreed that the decisions of such a panel would be >binding. There may also be a need for an injunction-like mechanism >to defer the change in question during the appeal process. > >4. gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within ICANN prior to the >change request going to IANA > >A Registry could appeal an ICANN decision to delegate or redelegate >and gTLD, based on policy not being followed (or presumably >contractual terms not being followed). > >Internal-To-ICANN Model Requirements > >This model will require all of the above measures plus the following: > >5. Control over ICANN Board decisions. > >The ability for ICANN Stakeholders, potentially augmented by other >non-ICANN entities, to mandate or overrule, a particular Board >decision, or to require that the implementation of such a decision >be subject to consideration of an independent, binding review. These >measures might need to be augmented by advance notice of such >decisions and allow the MS community to react. In the most >restricted form, this ability might be restricted to decisions >related to IANA, but in reality, it may not be practical to define >this scope limitation (ie how to recognize an IANA-related decision). > >6. Ability to Remove Directors > >The ability of the overall multi-stakeholder community to remove >some or all of the Board Directors. In the case of a full Board >removal, a mechanism would be required for appointing an Interim >Board and then a replacement regular Board. In addition, ACs and SOs >could be given the right to recall their appointed Director(s). > > > >

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Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft Scope Document for Legal Counsel
by Alan Greenberg Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Greg, this document does not include a question about the MRT-Contract Co. relationship that I have raised numerous times. We have repeatedly said that the MRT is an incorporated entity but simply a "committee" (or something similar) with no specific parent. Contract Co is bound to take its orders from the MRT, and the MRT is bound to maintain its MS character as specified by Contract Co. How are these two bound together to ensure that the bilateral commitments are ensured? As mentioned in the questionnaire, the MRT could be a part of Contract Co, or even its Board, but they we have created a new ICANN-like body that we explicitly said we would not do. So that cannot be a solution. Also, there needs to be reference to the concept that Contract Co is bare bones, little or no staff, and a Board that has no mandate to do anything but follow orders from the MRT. Alan At 14/01/2015 06:23 PM, Greg Shatan wrote: >All: > > >Attached is a draft scope document intended to refine our request >for independent legal counsel. Your comments would be most >appreciated at the soonest time. > > >Greg >Content-Type: >application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; > name="CWG-Legal Questions (1).docx" >Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="CWG-Legal Questions (1).docx" >X-Attachment-Id: f_i4xc496d0 > >_______________________________________________ >CWG-Stewardship mailing list >CWG-Stewardship(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship

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CWG Dependencies on CCWG Accountability
by Avri Doria Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Hi, I have taken the list produced by Alan and the comment by Jonathan and created a drive document entitled 'CWG-Stewardship accountability issues' that is open to comment by all who have the url. <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1c4Eab_fZMCQeeYvhy8OcE6f_PqhGza2qW4-UgFn…> Note I also added an item or two that I had picked up in previous meetings and had made note of. I also tried to express the cctLD accountability issue as best I understood, which I expect falls short and needs editing. I will go back through the email to the extent I can over the next two days (I fly to Frankfurt on Saturday) and add other issues I may find. But if people have other issues please add them in comment mode. Thanks avri

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Notes and Action Items: CWG IANA #18 conference call 15 January 2015 14:00 - 16:00 UTC
by Brenda Brewer Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Dear all, The notes, transcripts, and recordings for the CCWG IANA #18 call on 15 January are available on the Wiki here: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51413036 Also, here is a summary of the Agenda, Notes and Action Items: Agenda 1. Welcome & Roll Call 2. Status Updates from RFP subgroups 3. Relationship with CCWG-Accountability a. Review Flowchart b. Inputs for Frankfurt 4. Looking Ahead & Timeline a. Key Dependencies b. Legal Advice c. Timeline 5. Review of Action Items 6. AOB Notes 15/1: Robert on phone line only Chairs' Statement: <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2015-01-12-en> https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2015-01-12-en RFP3 presented by Greg * Work this past week was taken over by work weekend. Notes the creation if RFP3B sub team. * Most activity has been on list. Also a data-mining project to find nuggets from previous calls that can help in futhering the RFP3 draft work (Bernie is staff support on this) RFP3B presented by Allan * First call yesterday -- good attendance * Suggestion to go back at look at the functions we are trying to replicate, so that will be focus of next call RFP4 presented by Robert * Did not have a meeting this week, so are at same status as last week. * Siva circulate a document for which we are still awaiting feedback. Siva's document is available here: <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1QVC12Q-NuB35pyaBirUDF85DBR_oFHkEYC5vbWu…> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1QVC12Q-NuB35pyaBirUDF85DBR_oFHkEYC5vbWu… RFP5 presented by Cheryl * Also no meeting last week, but have a draft in Wiki and able to contribute some early work * Draft page here: <https://community.icann.org/display/gnsocwgdtstwrdshp/CWG-RFP5+-+Draft> https://community.icann.org/display/gnsocwgdtstwrdshp/CWG-RFP5+-+Draft Relationship with CCWG-Accountability Please take a look at the flowchart to see the conditionalities Inputs for Frankfurt (initial draft by Alan) -- there is some urgency because the CCWG is meeting on Monday and Tuesday. The two streams of work (CWG and CCWG) are interrelated but need to be decoupled in some way. The timelines are not in sync, which is why there is a need for conditionality and coordination. For a draft list of inputs, please see Alan's email on list. Chuck Gomes: There are some items for which we don't need input from the CCWG-Accountability. For example: #2 Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests --> this is in "our court" Internal to ICANN Model Requirements Milton Mueller: Hard to know what actions you will need when you remove separability Jonathan Robinson: When the transition occurs,IANA function must remain operational. Must also replace NTIA's role in oversight Avri Doria: The list may actually be more complex, but not sure how to show/capture that yet Paul Kane: any decision made by the ICANN Board should be subject to appeal (also endorsed Jonathan's and Chuck's earlier statements) 1. gTLDS 2. ccTLDs a. contractual agreement b. no contractual agreement Action: Avri & Chuck volunteer to work on Alan's document Action: Grace to assist editors with capturing comments made on today's call in document Looking Ahead & Timeline A. Key Dependencies * one of them is relationship with CCWG-Accountability (Jonathan will discuss) * legal advice (will be discussed under B) * chartering organizations --> No new key dependencies * Will need legal advice on what we can and cannot do (under the current ICANN structure) * The details of the way forward B. Legal Advice * Take a look at the draft and the thread on the list * Had conversation with Sam Eisner from ICANN Legal. She assisted in refining the questions. * Will receive outside counsel and, even through ICANN will pay, the direction and advice is provided to the client (the CWG). * Will be an iterative process -- more detailed legal questions can be added as we get them * ICANN has a procurement process so if we used a firm that had never worked with ICANN before, then we would need to go through that. * --> This is a dependency as well, so will need to consider "Legal A (no procurement)" and "Legal B (procurement)" Action: Review Legal document and comment as soon possible C. Timeline Chairs had dialogue with ICG Chairs. Indicated that CWG needs more time. ICG Chairs understand that but would like a new timeline proposal. We have started to review a timeline, keeping in ind the dependencies, and will propose this on Thursday next week. Would be useful to get an update to the draft by Singapore (to help with discussions) Action: Chairs to present revised timeline on next call. Action: all should start to think about questions for which we'd like to have feedback in Singapore (communities can discuss within their own meetings) 5. Review of Action Items Action: Avri volunteers to work on Alan's document Action: Grace to assist editors with capturing comments made on today's call in document Action: Review Legal document and comment as soon possible Action: Chairs to present revised timeline on next call. Action: all should start to think about questions for which we'd like to have feedback in Singapore (communities can discuss within their own meetings) 6. AOB Please complete your SOIs. Will send reminders to those who have not completed them. The next call is on Thursday 22 January at 11:00 - 13:00 UTC. For a full list of upcoming meetings, please see: https://community.icann.org/display/gnsocwgdtstwrdshp/Meetings Best, Brenda

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Draft Scope Document for Legal Counsel
by Greg Shatan Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

All: Attached is a draft scope document intended to refine our request for independent legal counsel. Your comments would be most appreciated at the soonest time. Greg

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