Hi, Comments:
a. _Oversight, accountability and transparency_: the service should be accountable and transparent.
I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here.
i. _Independence of oversight_: Oversight should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder community;
I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons: a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to the accountability issue. b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case. Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as is ICANN. I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section: Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship function should be to the Internet stakeholder community. I also think we need to add a principle called separability Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA service provider(s). The power of removing the function to a different operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA function(s) Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the Internet community on an annual basis. thanks avri