Dear All, As per the request from last week's call we have produced a list of the principles from the Charter of the CWG and the ICG (attached). Also as discussed last week Martin Boyle and I have been elaborating a set of principles and/or the criteria against which we would review the proposals the CWG will be developing, in order to ensure that the proposal takes into account the different aspects that need to be covered. The draft of those principles and/or criteria are also attached to this email for your consideration. Given this is not directly in line with the work required to develop proposals I am suggesting that these should only be discussed on the mailing list for time being. We will allocate time at the Face to Face meeting in Germany for us to consider the latest version of these as they will have evolved from discussions on the list. Best regards, Lise
Thanks Lise and Martin. Here is my feedback on the ‘Draft of Principles and Criteria that Should Underpin Decisions on the Transition of NTIA Stewardship’. Principle b.v says: “Performance against service level commitments and against the agreed policy base. This should be monitored and there should be a mechanism to ensure that failures are corrected;” The second sentence seems to me to be an ongoing action item once the service is implemented rather than a criterion for evaluating service options. I think the first part could be worded into a principle but it needs some work. Not being totally sure what was intended, I will leave it to Lise and/or Martin to edit it if my comment makes sense. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Lise Fuhr Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 3:54 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles Dear All, As per the request from last week's call we have produced a list of the principles from the Charter of the CWG and the ICG (attached). Also as discussed last week Martin Boyle and I have been elaborating a set of principles and/or the criteria against which we would review the proposals the CWG will be developing, in order to ensure that the proposal takes into account the different aspects that need to be covered. The draft of those principles and/or criteria are also attached to this email for your consideration. Given this is not directly in line with the work required to develop proposals I am suggesting that these should only be discussed on the mailing list for time being. We will allocate time at the Face to Face meeting in Germany for us to consider the latest version of these as they will have evolved from discussions on the list. Best regards, Lise
Hello Lise Are the Fuhr/Boyle principles the same or related to the principles the GAC announced it was working on in LA? Thanks. Matthew On 10/29/2014 7:54 PM, Lise Fuhr wrote:
Dear All,
As per the request from last week's call we have produced a list of the principles from the Charter of the CWG and the ICG (attached).
Also as discussed last week Martin Boyle and I have been elaborating a set of principles and/or the criteria against which we would review the proposals the CWG will be developing, in order to ensure that the proposal takes into account the different aspects that need to be covered.
The draft of those principles and/or criteria are also attached to this email for your consideration.
Given this is not directly in line with the work required to develop proposals I am suggesting that these should only be discussed on the mailing list for time being.
We will allocate time at the Face to Face meeting in Germany for us to consider the latest version of these as they will have evolved from discussions on the list.
Best regards, Lise
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) mshears@cdt.org + 44 771 247 2987
Hello Matthew, They are not the same or related. Best, Lise Fra: Matthew Shears [mailto:mshears@cdt.org] Sendt: 30. oktober 2014 10:51 Til: Lise Fuhr; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Emne: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles Hello Lise Are the Fuhr/Boyle principles the same or related to the principles the GAC announced it was working on in LA? Thanks. Matthew On 10/29/2014 7:54 PM, Lise Fuhr wrote: Dear All, As per the request from last week's call we have produced a list of the principles from the Charter of the CWG and the ICG (attached). Also as discussed last week Martin Boyle and I have been elaborating a set of principles and/or the criteria against which we would review the proposals the CWG will be developing, in order to ensure that the proposal takes into account the different aspects that need to be covered. The draft of those principles and/or criteria are also attached to this email for your consideration. Given this is not directly in line with the work required to develop proposals I am suggesting that these should only be discussed on the mailing list for time being. We will allocate time at the Face to Face meeting in Germany for us to consider the latest version of these as they will have evolved from discussions on the list. Best regards, Lise _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship -- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) mshears@cdt.org + 44 771 247 2987
No - its not the same - GAC is working in fast speed on their principles. Regards Elise Fra: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] På vegne av Matthew Shears Sendt: 30. oktober 2014 10:51 Til: Lise Fuhr; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Emne: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles Hello Lise Are the Fuhr/Boyle principles the same or related to the principles the GAC announced it was working on in LA? Thanks. Matthew On 10/29/2014 7:54 PM, Lise Fuhr wrote: Dear All, As per the request from last week's call we have produced a list of the principles from the Charter of the CWG and the ICG (attached). Also as discussed last week Martin Boyle and I have been elaborating a set of principles and/or the criteria against which we would review the proposals the CWG will be developing, in order to ensure that the proposal takes into account the different aspects that need to be covered. The draft of those principles and/or criteria are also attached to this email for your consideration. Given this is not directly in line with the work required to develop proposals I am suggesting that these should only be discussed on the mailing list for time being. We will allocate time at the Face to Face meeting in Germany for us to consider the latest version of these as they will have evolved from discussions on the list. Best regards, Lise _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship -- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org> + 44 771 247 2987
Thanks Lise and Martin for the great work. Please find attached some minor input and comment seeking clarification.You may wish to fine tune further. Mary Uduma On Thursday, October 30, 2014 4:56 AM, Lise Fuhr <lise.fuhr@difo.dk> wrote: Dear All, As per the request from last week's call we have produced a list of the principles from the Charter of the CWG and the ICG (attached). Also as discussed last week Martin Boyle and I have been elaborating a set of principles and/or the criteria against which we would review the proposals the CWG will be developing, in order to ensure that the proposal takes into account the different aspects that need to be covered. The draft of those principles and/or criteria are also attached to this email for your consideration. Given this is not directly in line with the work required to develop proposals I am suggesting that these should only be discussed on the mailing list for time being. We will allocate time at the Face to Face meeting in Germany for us to consider the latest version of these as they will have evolved from discussions on the list. Best regards, Lise _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Hi, Comments:
a. _Oversight, accountability and transparency_: the service should be accountable and transparent.
I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here.
i. _Independence of oversight_: Oversight should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder community;
I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons: a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to the accountability issue. b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case. Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as is ICANN. I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section: Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship function should be to the Internet stakeholder community. I also think we need to add a principle called separability Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA service provider(s). The power of removing the function to a different operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA function(s) Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the Internet community on an annual basis. thanks avri
Avri, While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don't think it can be made a principle. There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believe that self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need for separability does not exist. Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than a principle for all solutions. Regards, Guru On 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Comments:
a. *Oversight, accountability and transparency*: the service should be accountable and transparent.
I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here.
i. *Independence of oversight*: Oversight should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder community;
I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons:
a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to the accountability issue. b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case. Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as is ICANN.
I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section:
Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship function should be to the Internet stakeholder community.
I also think we need to add a principle called separability
Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA service provider(s). The power of removing the function to a different operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA function(s)
Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the Internet community on an annual basis.
thanks
avri
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Hi, While actual separation and the means of implementing that separation may be solutions, I am strongly of the opinion that the potential to separate MUST be a principle any solution is built on. It may never be exercised, but it would be unacceptable for there to be a solution that prohibited or did not otherwise allow any possible future separation of the function from ICANN. This is one of several principles I feel I must personally argue for persistently, and without which any solution would be unsatisfactory. avri On 05-Nov-14 10:45, Guru Acharya wrote:
Avri,
While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don't think it can be made a principle.
There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believe that self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need for separability does not exist.
Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than a principle for all solutions.
Regards, Guru On 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Comments:
a. *Oversight, accountability and transparency*: the service should be accountable and transparent.
I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here.
i. *Independence of oversight*: Oversight should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder community;
I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons:
a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to the accountability issue. b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case. Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as is ICANN.
I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section:
Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship function should be to the Internet stakeholder community.
I also think we need to add a principle called separability
Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA service provider(s). The power of removing the function to a different operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA function(s)
Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the Internet community on an annual basis.
thanks
avri
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
I agree 100% with Avri. Separability has to be a principle, otherwise we have failed the accountability test. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2014 9:16 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles Hi, While actual separation and the means of implementing that separation may be solutions, I am strongly of the opinion that the potential to separate MUST be a principle any solution is built on. It may never be exercised, but it would be unacceptable for there to be a solution that prohibited or did not otherwise allow any possible future separation of the function from ICANN. This is one of several principles I feel I must personally argue for persistently, and without which any solution would be unsatisfactory. avri On 05-Nov-14 10:45, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri, While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don't think it can be made a principle. There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believe that self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need for separability does not exist. Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than a principle for all solutions. Regards, Guru On 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, Comments: a. *Oversight, accountability and transparency*: the service should be accountable and transparent. I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here. i. *Independence of oversight*: Oversight should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder community; I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons: a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to the accountability issue. b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case. Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as is ICANN. I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section: Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship function should be to the Internet stakeholder community. I also think we need to add a principle called separability Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA service provider(s). The power of removing the function to a different operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA function(s) Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the Internet community on an annual basis. thanks avri _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Independence of policy from IANA: the IANA funtions operator should be independent of the policy processes. Its role is to implement changes in accordance with policy agreed through the relevant bottom up policy process [Note: this does not pre-suppose any model for separation of the policy and IANA roles. The current contract already requires such separation];
Is bottom up a cliche we want to see in our principles? Diversity of IANA's Customers:
For ccTLDs, the IANA should provide a service without requiring a contract and should respect the diversity of agreements and arrangements in place for ccTLDs. In particular, the national policy authority or legislation (related to the ccTLD operator) should be respected and no additional requirements should be imposed unless it is directly and demonstrably linked to global security, stability and resilience of the DNS.
"unless it is directly and demonstrably linked to global security, stability and resilience of the DNS" Is there any example of a policy that can be implemented at the ccTLD level that can threaten the DNS? ______________________ Mwendwa Kivuva, Nairobi, Kenya L: https://www.linkedin.com/in/lordmwesh B: http://lord.me.ke/ T: twitter.com/lordmwesh "There are some men who lift the age they inhabit, till all men walk on higher ground in that lifetime." - Maxwell Anderson On 5 November 2014 20:40, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
I agree 100% with Avri. Separability has to be a principle, otherwise we have failed the accountability test.
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] * On Behalf Of *Avri Doria *Sent:* Tuesday, November 4, 2014 9:16 PM *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles
Hi,
While actual separation and the means of implementing that separation may be solutions, I am strongly of the opinion that the potential to separate MUST be a principle any solution is built on. It may never be exercised, but it would be unacceptable for there to be a solution that prohibited or did not otherwise allow any possible future separation of the function from ICANN.
This is one of several principles I feel I must personally argue for persistently, and without which any solution would be unsatisfactory.
avri
On 05-Nov-14 10:45, Guru Acharya wrote:
Avri,
While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don't
think it can be made a principle.
There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believe
that self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need for
separability does not exist.
Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than a
principle for all solutions.
Regards,
Guru
On 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Comments:
a. *Oversight, accountability and transparency*: the service
should be accountable and transparent.
I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here.
i. *Independence of oversight*: Oversight
should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the
accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder
community;
I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons:
a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to
the accountability issue.
b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how
it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so
the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case.
Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN
corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as
is ICANN.
I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section:
Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship
function should be to the Internet stakeholder community.
I also think we need to add a principle called separability
Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its
subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition
of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and
contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA
service provider(s). The power of removing the function to a different
operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA
function(s)
Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels
be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the
Internet community on an annual basis.
thanks
avri
_______________________________________________
CWG-Stewardship mailing list
CWG-Stewardship@icann.org
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Mwendwa, Regarding your first question, let me first say that I don't see 'bottom-up' as a cliché. Secondly, it is a fundamental principle of policy development. I think it is important to note that the principle is not saying that IANA functions are operated in a bottom-up way but rather that the IANA functions operator's role is to implement changes according to such policies. As I see it, the essence of this principle is not that policy development must be bottom-up but rather that "the IANA functions operator should be independent of the policy processes". That said, is the term 'bottom-up' essential to the principle? No. And I think that is probably your point. I personally don't have any problem leaving 'bottom-up' in the statement but I don't think removing it if the group wants to do that would detract from the principle. If we want to keep the principle short and to the point, we could delete the second sentence. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Mwendwa Kivuva Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 5:59 AM To: Milton L Mueller Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles Independence of policy from IANA: the IANA funtions operator should be independent of the policy processes. Its role is to implement changes in accordance with policy agreed through the relevant bottom up policy process [Note: this does not pre-suppose any model for separation of the policy and IANA roles. The current contract already requires such separation]; Is bottom up a cliche we want to see in our principles? Diversity of IANA's Customers: For ccTLDs, the IANA should provide a service without requiring a contract and should respect the diversity of agreements and arrangements in place for ccTLDs. In particular, the national policy authority or legislation (related to the ccTLD operator) should be respected and no additional requirements should be imposed unless it is directly and demonstrably linked to global security, stability and resilience of the DNS. "unless it is directly and demonstrably linked to global security, stability and resilience of the DNS" Is there any example of a policy that can be implemented at the ccTLD level that can threaten the DNS? ______________________ Mwendwa Kivuva, Nairobi, Kenya L: https://www.linkedin.com/in/lordmwesh B: http://lord.me.ke/ T: twitter.com/lordmwesh<http://twitter.com/lordmwesh> "There are some men who lift the age they inhabit, till all men walk on higher ground in that lifetime." - Maxwell Anderson On 5 November 2014 20:40, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> wrote: I agree 100% with Avri. Separability has to be a principle, otherwise we have failed the accountability test. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: Tuesday, November 4, 2014 9:16 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles Hi, While actual separation and the means of implementing that separation may be solutions, I am strongly of the opinion that the potential to separate MUST be a principle any solution is built on. It may never be exercised, but it would be unacceptable for there to be a solution that prohibited or did not otherwise allow any possible future separation of the function from ICANN. This is one of several principles I feel I must personally argue for persistently, and without which any solution would be unsatisfactory. avri On 05-Nov-14 10:45, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri, While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don't think it can be made a principle. There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believe that self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need for separability does not exist. Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than a principle for all solutions. Regards, Guru On 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, Comments: a. *Oversight, accountability and transparency*: the service should be accountable and transparent. I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here. i. *Independence of oversight*: Oversight should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder community; I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons: a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to the accountability issue. b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case. Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as is ICANN. I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section: Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship function should be to the Internet stakeholder community. I also think we need to add a principle called separability Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA service provider(s). The power of removing the function to a different operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA function(s) Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the Internet community on an annual basis. thanks avri _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
I agree with Chuck. "Bottom up" policy development is a fundamental concept, not a cliche. It is important to emphasize that the policy process is "bottom up" -- as we have seen, it is far to easy for "top down" policy development to be introduced inappropriately. Greg On Thu, Nov 6, 2014 at 8:07 AM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> wrote:
Mwendwa,
Regarding your first question, let me first say that I don’t see ‘bottom-up’ as a cliché. Secondly, it is a fundamental principle of policy development. I think it is important to note that the principle is not saying that IANA functions are operated in a bottom-up way but rather that the IANA functions operator’s role is to implement changes according to such policies. As I see it, the essence of this principle is not that policy development must be bottom-up but rather that “the IANA functions operator should be independent of the policy processes”. That said, is the term ‘bottom-up’ essential to the principle? No. And I think that is probably your point. I personally don’t have any problem leaving ‘bottom-up’ in the statement but I don’t think removing it if the group wants to do that would detract from the principle.
If we want to keep the principle short and to the point, we could delete the second sentence.
Chuck
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Mwendwa Kivuva *Sent:* Thursday, November 06, 2014 5:59 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles
*Independence of policy from IANA*: the IANA funtions operator should be independent of the policy processes. Its role is to implement changes in accordance with policy agreed through the relevant bottom up policy process [Note: this does not pre-suppose any model for separation of the policy and IANA roles. The current contract already requires such separation];
Is bottom up a cliche we want to see in our principles?
*Diversity of IANA’s Customers:* *For ccTLDs,* the IANA should provide a service without requiring a contract and should respect the diversity of agreements and arrangements in place for ccTLDs. In particular, the national policy authority or legislation (related to the ccTLD operator) should be respected and no additional requirements should be imposed unless it is directly and demonstrably linked to global security, stability and resilience of the DNS.
"unless it is directly and demonstrably linked to global security, stability and resilience of the DNS"
Is there any example of a policy that can be implemented at the ccTLD level that can threaten the DNS?
______________________ Mwendwa Kivuva, Nairobi, Kenya L: https://www.linkedin.com/in/lordmwesh B: http://lord.me.ke/ T: twitter.com/lordmwesh
"There are some men who lift the age they inhabit, till all men walk on higher ground in that lifetime." - Maxwell Anderson
On 5 November 2014 20:40, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
I agree 100% with Avri. Separability has to be a principle, otherwise we have failed the accountability test.
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Avri Doria *Sent:* Tuesday, November 4, 2014 9:16 PM *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles
Hi,
While actual separation and the means of implementing that separation may be solutions, I am strongly of the opinion that the potential to separate MUST be a principle any solution is built on. It may never be exercised, but it would be unacceptable for there to be a solution that prohibited or did not otherwise allow any possible future separation of the function from ICANN.
This is one of several principles I feel I must personally argue for persistently, and without which any solution would be unsatisfactory.
avri
On 05-Nov-14 10:45, Guru Acharya wrote:
Avri,
While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don't
think it can be made a principle.
There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believe
that self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need for
separability does not exist.
Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than a
principle for all solutions.
Regards,
Guru
On 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Comments:
a. *Oversight, accountability and transparency*: the service
should be accountable and transparent.
I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here.
i. *Independence of oversight*: Oversight
should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the
accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder
community;
I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons:
a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to
the accountability issue.
b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how
it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so
the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case.
Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN
corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as
is ICANN.
I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section:
Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship
function should be to the Internet stakeholder community.
I also think we need to add a principle called separability
Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its
subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition
of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and
contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA
service provider(s). The power of removing the function to a different
operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA
function(s)
Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels
be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the
Internet community on an annual basis.
thanks
avri
_______________________________________________
CWG-Stewardship mailing list
CWG-Stewardship@icann.org
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Avri, While I wholeheartedly agree that separability is required (either as a solution or principle), I believe that the following caveat needs to be noted. By arguing for separability of IANA from ICANN, you may be unknowingly arguing that the organisational structures for the names community should perpetually reside in ICANN. I could instead argue for separability of the names community from ICANN (with IANA non-separable and perpetually residing in ICANN) and still achieve the same end objective as yours. Ideally, the principles should somehow require the separability of both the IANA functions and the names community from ICANN. NTIA, using the IANA functions contract (and specifically the response of ICANN to NTIA's RFP that is incorporated into the contract by reference), could have ensured transfer of the names community from ICANN as well. The framing of the debate has somehow limited our thinking to only separability/transferrability of the IANA functions - forcing us to not even contemplate that even the names community may want to shift its organisational structures away from ICANN. Regards, Guru Hi, While actual separation and the means of implementing that separation may be solutions, I am strongly of the opinion that the potential to separate MUST be a principle any solution is built on. It may never be exercised, but it would be unacceptable for there to be a solution that prohibited or did not otherwise allow any possible future separation of the function from ICANN. This is one of several principles I feel I must personally argue for persistently, and without which any solution would be unsatisfactory. avri On 05-Nov-14 10:45, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri, While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don't think it can be made a principle. There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believe that self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need for separability does not exist. Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than a principle for all solutions. Regards, Guru On 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, Comments: a. *Oversight, accountability and transparency*: the service should be accountable and transparent. I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here. i. *Independence of oversight*: Oversight should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder community; I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons: a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to the accountability issue. b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case. Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as is ICANN. I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section: Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship function should be to the Internet stakeholder community. I also think we need to add a principle called separability Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA service provider(s). The power of removing the function to a different operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA function(s) Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the Internet community on an annual basis. thanks avri _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
I can see why would want to separate IANA from ICANN, and I can see why one might want to separate the policy making organs for DNS from ICANN, but I do not see why one would want to do both. The point of either change is to keep policy making and IANA implementation separate. If you do one, you don’t need to do the other. --MM From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: Monday, November 10, 2014 9:10 PM To: Avri Doria Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles Avri, While I wholeheartedly agree that separability is required (either as a solution or principle), I believe that the following caveat needs to be noted. By arguing for separability of IANA from ICANN, you may be unknowingly arguing that the organisational structures for the names community should perpetually reside in ICANN. I could instead argue for separability of the names community from ICANN (with IANA non-separable and perpetually residing in ICANN) and still achieve the same end objective as yours. Ideally, the principles should somehow require the separability of both the IANA functions and the names community from ICANN. NTIA, using the IANA functions contract (and specifically the response of ICANN to NTIA's RFP that is incorporated into the contract by reference), could have ensured transfer of the names community from ICANN as well. The framing of the debate has somehow limited our thinking to only separability/transferrability of the IANA functions - forcing us to not even contemplate that even the names community may want to shift its organisational structures away from ICANN. Regards, Guru Hi, While actual separation and the means of implementing that separation may be solutions, I am strongly of the opinion that the potential to separate MUST be a principle any solution is built on. It may never be exercised, but it would be unacceptable for there to be a solution that prohibited or did not otherwise allow any possible future separation of the function from ICANN. This is one of several principles I feel I must personally argue for persistently, and without which any solution would be unsatisfactory. avri On 05-Nov-14 10:45, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri, While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don't think it can be made a principle. There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believe that self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need for separability does not exist. Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than a principle for all solutions. Regards, Guru On 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, Comments: a. *Oversight, accountability and transparency*: the service should be accountable and transparent. I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here. i. *Independence of oversight*: Oversight should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder community; I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons: a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to the accountability issue. b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case. Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as is ICANN. I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section: Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship function should be to the Internet stakeholder community. I also think we need to add a principle called separability Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA service provider(s). The power of removing the function to a different operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA function(s) Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the Internet community on an annual basis. thanks avri _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
participants (10)
-
Avri Doria -
Gomes, Chuck -
Greg Shatan -
Guru Acharya -
Lindeberg, Elise -
Lise Fuhr -
Mary Uduma -
Matthew Shears -
Milton L Mueller -
Mwendwa Kivuva