Hello all, I've been giving some thought to the issue of an Oversight Council, or whatever you choose to call it. One of the most persistent issues with IANA has been that it is not very good at self-improvement. We could debate why but at this stage it's not that important. The fact is that IANA has had to be forced to improve itself (as opposed to just keep doing what it's always done in the same way for years). There was the whole eIANA issue where outside bodies developed new software for a better IANA system and then had to push it for over a year as well as provide it for free to ICANN before it was finally accepted (and not before IANA felt sufficiently threatened that it developed a weak alternative as a way of saying 'we don't need this'.) There was the extreme unhappiness with how and how fast IANA functions were being carried out and the fact there was literally no information coming out. That was only resolved when David Conrad was sent in to fix things (a system reliant on finding a new David Conrad every five years is doomed). Then there was the whole NTIA rebid and new contract where a large number of improvement clauses were written into the new contract in order to force improvements that the community had been asking for for years (improvements developed through a rebid process that asked the internet community what changes they wished to see). My point is that for whatever reason the 'customers' of IANA are not treated as organizations that IANA is striving to keep happy. They are locked in and pretty much have to deal with whatever they are given. Hence stagnation. Since this transition period is the one opportunity that the customers of IANA have to build a system that will serve them better in future, it is worth thinking about how to shift the culture. The day-to-day of an Oversight Committee would likely be checking policies are being followed. But there also needs to be a mechanism/culture that encourages IANA to continuously improve based not on its or ICANN's agenda but on what its customers want. The committee would need a stick and a carrot. ICANN /IANA would have to be obliged to make improvements (like clauses in a new contract) but the emphasis should be on how to reward improvements so the stick is not needed. IANA is not a stationary function and I think it would be smart to recognise that. I am concerned that because we have a lot of policy people and process people here but not many business folk that this group may draw up wonderful new structures that just add more process rather than focus on making the IANA functions a very efficient machine with happy customers. Philosophical and conceptual issues aside, the bulk of IANA's Names work always be making changes and/or additions in response to existing customers' requests. Kieren On Thursday, October 30, 2014, Mary Uduma <mnuduma@yahoo.com> wrote:
True Maarten.
We should think deeply about a mechanism that will be as neutral in the stewardship oversight service delivery as the NTIA and at the same time has the legal enforceable powers to contract the IANA function operator.
Putting on my regulator hat, I think it may perhaps be best to have more of the non-direct customers of IANA functions in the "council" ("SLA council") than the operational communities. Still not sure of the name.
My feeling is that non-operators as the Overseer of the IANA function operator would gain more acceptability to all concerned than replicating what we have in ICANN with all the attendant accountability questions.
Mary Uduma