Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards, Acharya
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing listIana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
-- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhDhttp://www.gih.com/ocl.html
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>*
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa
Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<http://www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN. From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process. I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email: <http://goog_1872880453> seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email:<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__goog-5F1872880453&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=NULclLMrhmnGXaXp49q0AJdwnkNF2NL096tm99kuIvU&e=>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=>
Becky - you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over' the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let's begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA's to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA's are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the "SLA Council." Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the "technical community proposals" I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants "the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments." That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=>
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=>
I'm not versed with US law, but at the face of it, I see a few anomalies in Becky's suggestion that an unincorporated entity (comprising of CCNSO & GNSO) can enter into a SLA contract with ICANN. Firstly, the parallel/analogy with NFL is flawed. Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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*Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: * *http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGa...> **Mobile: +2348035233535* *alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>*
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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+1. Just to also mention that this route may even complicate things further. One of the questions govt would ask the ccNSO is "who made you Lord over us to sign a contract on our behalf" I think the more we think that contract is the only way forward, the more we loose focus on the main point of weakness which is the names PDP; how can we ensure that the names PDP gets strengthened and immune from ICANN board interference as much as possible is the puzzle for me. This is one of the reasons why the numbers PDP has progressed for so long (not just because it has membership). One way to approach this could be to consider having actual representation of the relevant SO/AC on the board. That way the community will indirectly have an oversight on the implementation of policies they have created. Nevertheless, having an ultimate jury that can come to the rescue if ICANN becomes so out of control (which is improbable) is a good thing to consider. Thinking about this I wonder if IETF (being a longer historical source) will not fit for such role. Cheers! sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 23 Oct 2014 18:13, "Guru Acharya" <gurcharya@gmail.com> wrote:
I'm not versed with US law, but at the face of it, I see a few anomalies in Becky's suggestion that an unincorporated entity (comprising of CCNSO & GNSO) can enter into a SLA contract with ICANN.
Firstly, the parallel/analogy with NFL is flawed.
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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--
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http://www.gih.com/ocl.html <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=A...>
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: * *http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGa...> **Mobile: +2348035233535 <%2B2348035233535>* *alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>*
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blog...> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d...>
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@ Seun : I stand corrected but the SO/ACs have representation on the ICANN board already so the representation is there. What i am tempted to see going forward really is to formalise a council or whatever between the main groups on the CWG as it is right now with chairs and whatever to have a structure of oversight on IANA. @ All: I would love to see IANA as an entity independent completely and we ascertain an oversight on it via some process or entity. If we do that the challenges of administration and costs etc., would get in the process which ICANN happily does today. If we turn it around and say we work on developing an Entity that keeps only an oversight role having all CWGs together as we work on setting up a common Policy Development Process within the CWG to ascertain that the varied groups are doing a common force of work. That could just play the bit. We ensure a leadership of an Entity group and this same entity group creates an influx for the PDP which would replicate the RIR process for the PDP but should be enough to ensure that there is a clear and transparent process where issues arise. Kris
On Oct 23, 2014, at 9:49 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1. Just to also mention that this route may even complicate things further. One of the questions govt would ask the ccNSO is "who made you Lord over us to sign a contract on our behalf"
I think the more we think that contract is the only way forward, the more we loose focus on the main point of weakness which is the names PDP; how can we ensure that the names PDP gets strengthened and immune from ICANN board interference as much as possible is the puzzle for me. This is one of the reasons why the numbers PDP has progressed for so long (not just because it has membership). One way to approach this could be to consider having actual representation of the relevant SO/AC on the board. That way the community will indirectly have an oversight on the implementation of policies they have created.
Nevertheless, having an ultimate jury that can come to the rescue if ICANN becomes so out of control (which is improbable) is a good thing to consider. Thinking about this I wonder if IETF (being a longer historical source) will not fit for such role.
Cheers!
sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 23 Oct 2014 18:13, "Guru Acharya" <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> wrote: I'm not versed with US law, but at the face of it, I see a few anomalies in Becky's suggestion that an unincorporated entity (comprising of CCNSO & GNSO) can enter into a SLA contract with ICANN.
Firstly, the parallel/analogy with NFL is flawed.
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <mailto:mueller@syr.edu>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
<> I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject:
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
Date:
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
From:
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To:
cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGa...> Mobile: +2348035233535 <tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blog...> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d...> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org <mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship>
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@Kris, What currently exist is representation in terms of the community contributing board members...it does not necessarily extend to the board members officially representing their community's interest. I will also like to suggest that when we say IANA we put it in perspective of names as we would all agree that IANA is beyond names. Cheers! sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 23 Oct 2014 19:26, "Kris Seeburn" <seeburn.k@gmail.com> wrote:
@ Seun : I stand corrected but the SO/ACs have representation on the ICANN board already so the representation is there. What i am tempted to see going forward really is to formalise a council or whatever between the main groups on the CWG as it is right now with chairs and whatever to have a structure of oversight on IANA.
@ All: I would love to see IANA as an entity independent completely and we ascertain an oversight on it via some process or entity. If we do that the challenges of administration and costs etc., would get in the process which ICANN happily does today. If we turn it around and say we work on developing an Entity that keeps only an oversight role having all CWGs together as we work on setting up a common Policy Development Process within the CWG to ascertain that the varied groups are doing a common force of work. That could just play the bit. We ensure a leadership of an Entity group and this same entity group creates an influx for the PDP which would replicate the RIR process for the PDP but should be enough to ensure that there is a clear and transparent process where issues arise.
Kris
On Oct 23, 2014, at 9:49 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1. Just to also mention that this route may even complicate things further. One of the questions govt would ask the ccNSO is "who made you Lord over us to sign a contract on our behalf"
I think the more we think that contract is the only way forward, the more we loose focus on the main point of weakness which is the names PDP; how can we ensure that the names PDP gets strengthened and immune from ICANN board interference as much as possible is the puzzle for me. This is one of the reasons why the numbers PDP has progressed for so long (not just because it has membership). One way to approach this could be to consider having actual representation of the relevant SO/AC on the board. That way the community will indirectly have an oversight on the implementation of policies they have created.
Nevertheless, having an ultimate jury that can come to the rescue if ICANN becomes so out of control (which is improbable) is a good thing to consider. Thinking about this I wonder if IETF (being a longer historical source) will not fit for such role.
Cheers!
sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 23 Oct 2014 18:13, "Guru Acharya" <gurcharya@gmail.com> wrote:
I'm not versed with US law, but at the face of it, I see a few anomalies in Becky's suggestion that an unincorporated entity (comprising of CCNSO & GNSO) can enter into a SLA contract with ICANN.
Firstly, the parallel/analogy with NFL is flawed.
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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--
Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: * *http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGa...> **Mobile: +2348035233535 <%2B2348035233535>* *alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>*
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blog...> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d...>
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Kris Seeburn seeburn.k@gmail.com
- www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/
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Others may have already pointed this out but, in case not, I will do so. It is true that SOs and ACs appoint ICANN Board directors but, according to the Bylaws, it is not accurate to say that those directors represent their respective SOs and ACs. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kris Seeburn Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 2:19 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities @ Seun : I stand corrected but the SO/ACs have representation on the ICANN board already so the representation is there. What i am tempted to see going forward really is to formalise a council or whatever between the main groups on the CWG as it is right now with chairs and whatever to have a structure of oversight on IANA. @ All: I would love to see IANA as an entity independent completely and we ascertain an oversight on it via some process or entity. If we do that the challenges of administration and costs etc., would get in the process which ICANN happily does today. If we turn it around and say we work on developing an Entity that keeps only an oversight role having all CWGs together as we work on setting up a common Policy Development Process within the CWG to ascertain that the varied groups are doing a common force of work. That could just play the bit. We ensure a leadership of an Entity group and this same entity group creates an influx for the PDP which would replicate the RIR process for the PDP but should be enough to ensure that there is a clear and transparent process where issues arise. Kris On Oct 23, 2014, at 9:49 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1. Just to also mention that this route may even complicate things further. One of the questions govt would ask the ccNSO is "who made you Lord over us to sign a contract on our behalf" I think the more we think that contract is the only way forward, the more we loose focus on the main point of weakness which is the names PDP; how can we ensure that the names PDP gets strengthened and immune from ICANN board interference as much as possible is the puzzle for me. This is one of the reasons why the numbers PDP has progressed for so long (not just because it has membership). One way to approach this could be to consider having actual representation of the relevant SO/AC on the board. That way the community will indirectly have an oversight on the implementation of policies they have created. Nevertheless, having an ultimate jury that can come to the rescue if ICANN becomes so out of control (which is improbable) is a good thing to consider. Thinking about this I wonder if IETF (being a longer historical source) will not fit for such role. Cheers! sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 23 Oct 2014 18:13, "Guru Acharya" <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> wrote: I'm not versed with US law, but at the face of it, I see a few anomalies in Becky's suggestion that an unincorporated entity (comprising of CCNSO & GNSO) can enter into a SLA contract with ICANN. Firstly, the parallel/analogy with NFL is flawed. Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN. From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process. I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship Kris Seeburn seeburn.k@gmail.com<mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com> * www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/<http://www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/>
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN. From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process. I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Is it not the point being made that the GNSO and ccNSO etc are THEMSELVES unincorporated legal entities and are essentially supporting structures (to the ICANN Board) existing only within the ICANN Bylaws? On Oct 23, 2014 3:42 PM, "Milton L Mueller" <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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--
Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD
http://www.gih.com/ocl.html <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=A...>
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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: * *http://www.fuoye.edu.ng* <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGa...> *Mobile: +2348035233535 <%2B2348035233535>* *alt email:**seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng* <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_li...>
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blog...> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d...>
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The GNSO and ccNSO are certainly unincorporated. I do not think that they are legal entities. I would rather hope not, since an unincorporated legal entity (an unincorporated association (if non-profit) or a general partnership (if for-profit)) conveys unlimited joint and several personal liability on each of its members for the actions of the "entity." As an individual member of the IPC, that would mean that I bear full joint and several liablity for all the actions of the IPC, CSG and the GNSO (if each of these were considered to be unincorporated associations). Similarly, a member of the NCUC would have unlimited liability for the acts of the NCUC, the NCSG and GNSO (if each were an unincorporated association). I think that these bodies are more like committees of the ICANN Board than they are recognizable legal entities. They exist by creation of the ICANN Bylaws and not by a separate constitution or bylaws. Going back to earlier points: -- An unincorporated association (UA) cannot enter into contracts unless the law of its "home" jurisdiction allows UAs to do so. (In the eyes of the law, a UA is more of a "non-entity" than an entity.) -- Unless there are laws saying otherwise, a contract entered into by a UA would be viewed as a contract entered into by each member of the UA, if it is enforceable at all. -- Unless there are laws saying otherwise, each member of a UA bears unlimited personal liability for the actions of the UA. -- If properly put together, UAs are supposed to have a constitution and bylaws, just like incorporated entities. (There is a fair bit of law (from what I see) about "inadvertent" UAs, where people band together to police a dog run or form an amateur rugby club and don't realize that they have now become a UA. Then a misstep by the UA happens and liability finds its way to the members....) I believe (but don't quote me on this, since I am certainly not qualified to give tax advice) that UAs are also supposed to make the same tax filings as other (incorporated) nonprofits. If one is going to the trouble of having a constitution and bylaws and making tax filings, why not incorporate and get the benefit of limited liability and much more certainty about whether you exist and how the law view you? Finally, while certain arms of the GNSO are composed largely of incorporated entities (RySG, RrSG, ISPCPC) others are largely not or are a combination of both. Also, I believe most of the organizations that are largely composed of incorporated entities have individual members (consultants, advisors, interested parties). Greg Shatan (Not legal advice) On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:16 PM, Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google < tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> wrote:
Is it not the point being made that the GNSO and ccNSO etc are THEMSELVES unincorporated legal entities and are essentially supporting structures (to the ICANN Board) existing only within the ICANN Bylaws?
On Oct 23, 2014 3:42 PM, "Milton L Mueller" <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=>
So let's see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions - let's call it 'RegistryCo' for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky - you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over' the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let's begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA's to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA's are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the "SLA Council." Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the "technical community proposals" I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants "the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments." That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=>
First, as I’ve said, I’m not entirely sure that the "IANA Users’ Council" would need to be incorporated – need a little more legal work on that. As Milton points out, most registries and regional organizations are actually some form of legal person. We would need some resources to reach agreement about the organization’s charter, etc., and how representative registries would be designated, elected, etc., to serve on the IANA SLA negotiation committee. Then, of course, we would need to negotiate the SLAs – but I suspect in both cases that we’d be able to depend on volunteers and existing groups to a great extent. The hard part here is to determine what kind of recourse the Council would have if IANA failed to meet the SLAs. Not sure that setting up a corporation or not changes the economic equation at all. Presumably, the consumers of IANA services are the ones who should be negotiating the SLAs, and will have the most investment in those negotiations. So the negotiations will need to take place no matter the format. Am I missing something? I do agree, however, that it would be expensive – and there are more worrisome liability issues associated with – creating mechanisms to provide accountability to an individual TLD in the context of revocation/delegation and complying with ICANN developed naming policies. That is why I would leave this to some kind of bylaws fix that ensures that aggrieved registries are able to use whatever independent review/fundamental accountability mechanisms come out of the other work going on now. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Cc: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=1TG6hGQ3KYTPqIV2a8XSTH6IICkVN58L3AyeN_rLBew&s=24HqxGJmoBYhv4lCarwCGXskosZU5lrz5qwODszmdDs&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=>
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
*From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr < becky.burr@neustar.biz> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa < fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com <gurcharya@gmail.com>]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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--
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*Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: * *http://www.fuoye.edu.ng* <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGa...> *Mobile: +2348035233535 <%2B2348035233535>* *alt email:**seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng* <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=0knJhHDN8_VTb0SESfSAujo5jrIrLR9bFwC6kRIu9PY&e=>
Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that dont participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit ccs to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote: So lets see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions lets call it RegistryCo for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40sy r.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYah OP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv 7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=> > Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> becky.burr@neustar.biz / <http://www.neustar.biz> www.neustar.biz From: Allan MacGillivray < <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr < <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40sy r.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYah OP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNu Rzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=> mueller@syr.edu>, Fouad Bajwa < <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com> fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: " <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From: <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, lets begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLAs to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLAs are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the SLA Council. Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> becky.burr@neustar.biz / <http://www.neustar.biz> www.neustar.biz From: Milton L Mueller < <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40sy r.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYah OP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXM llT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=> mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa < <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com> fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: " <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the technical community proposals I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments. That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4R iRiE8/edit?usp=sharing <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_docu ment_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d =AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDk Mr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK 3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fu llscreen_apnic_report-2Dianatransition_1&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw &r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVO gTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ipQr6NSV4s2YyeTKtleRzaehK6NnJP70z0QOuy57W7o&e=> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_d raft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_l ULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvta RwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-ia na-transition-the-meissen-proposal/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernanc e.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dth e-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_G Rlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07c w&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman _listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_G Rlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07c w&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html& d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDD kMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rG IWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman _listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_G Rlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07c w&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AA MGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4 k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSM sZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> http://www.fuoye.edu.ng Mobile: +2348035233535 <tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email: <mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman _listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_G Rlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07c w&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.b logspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjD mrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3 haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajw a&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8W DDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs -fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman _listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm 6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1 N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman _listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm 6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeA Gs0EU&s=0knJhHDN8_VTb0SESfSAujo5jrIrLR9bFwC6kRIu9PY&e=>
Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org> wrote:
Thanks Tracy for raising this.
Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions.
However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats:
Out of the 248 ccTLDs:
152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD).
38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO.
58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards,
Peter Van Roste
General Manager, CENTR
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 *To:* Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *"Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM *To: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Cc: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, " cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
*From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr < becky.burr@neustar.biz> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa < fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com <gurcharya@gmail.com>]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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--
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The ccNSO is a valuable forum for those ccTLDs that wish to discuss issues and (potentially) be accountable to ICANN and its processes/determinations. There are many ccTLDs that have never been to a ccNSO meeting, know little about ICANN and are accountable to their users under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the ccTLD Registry is incorporated and/or the legal jurisdiction of the user contracts with the ccTLD Registry. Unlike gTLDs which specifically obtain their authority to be in the IANA ROOT by virtue of a contract with ICANN, the ccTLD Registry falls into (at least) two categories. There are ccTLDs that have agreements with ICANN and those that do not. To be specific, 7 have a MoU with ICANN, 9 have a "Sponsorship Agreement" with ICANN, 27 have an "Accountability Agreement" with ICANN, 42 have an "Exchange of Letters" with ICANN and 170 ccTLDs do not cede authority to ICANN. Best Paul Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote:
Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD?
So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here.
That is not insubstantial.
I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions.
I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ...
However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs.
Any thoughts?
/t
On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org <mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote:
Thanks Tracy for raising this.
Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions.
However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats:
Out of the 248 ccTLDs:
152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD).
38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO.
58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards,
Peter Van Roste
General Manager, CENTR
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 *To:* Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz>
*From: *"Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com <mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM *To: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> *Cc: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <mailto:mueller@syr.edu>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote:
So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
*From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.5332932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustarbiz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz>
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz>
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz>
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _/is/_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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Wow. Very enlightening indeed Paul. Thank you. ------ Rgds, Tracy On Oct 24, 2014 4:33 AM, "Paul M Kane" <Paul.Kane@icb.co.uk> wrote:
The ccNSO is a valuable forum for those ccTLDs that wish to discuss issues and (potentially) be accountable to ICANN and its processes/determinations.
There are many ccTLDs that have never been to a ccNSO meeting, know little about ICANN and are accountable to their users under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the ccTLD Registry is incorporated and/or the legal jurisdiction of the user contracts with the ccTLD Registry.
Unlike gTLDs which specifically obtain their authority to be in the IANA ROOT by virtue of a contract with ICANN, the ccTLD Registry falls into (at least) two categories. There are ccTLDs that have agreements with ICANN and those that do not.
To be specific, 7 have a MoU with ICANN, 9 have a "Sponsorship Agreement" with ICANN, 27 have an "Accountability Agreement" with ICANN, 42 have an "Exchange of Letters" with ICANN and 170 ccTLDs do not cede authority to ICANN.
Best
Paul
Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote:
Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD?
So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here.
That is not insubstantial.
I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions.
I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ...
However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs.
Any thoughts?
/t
On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org <mailto: peter@centr.org>> wrote:
Thanks Tracy for raising this.
Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions.
However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats:
Out of the 248 ccTLDs:
152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD).
38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO.
58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards,
Peter Van Roste
General Manager, CENTR
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 *To:* Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz>
*From: *"Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com <mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM *To: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> *Cc: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <mailto:mueller@syr.edu>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote:
So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
*From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.5332932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustarbiz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz>
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http- 3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r= 62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR- ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz>
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http- 3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r= 62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_ 6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV 4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz>
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http- 3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r= 62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_ jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _/is/_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/ 1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https- 3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2B MOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r= 62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_ x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAY JOV5JFJEPECSo&e=>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/ apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http- 3A__www.slideshare.net_fullscreen_apnic_report- 2Dianatransition_1&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_ GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy0 7cw&s=ipQr6NSV4s2YyeTKtleRzaehK6NnJP70z0QOuy57W7o&e=>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg- response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http- 3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg- 2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_ GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy0 7cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance. org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen- proposal/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http- 3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students- 2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe- 2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_ GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy0 7cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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On the subject of non-participating ccTLD’s, would bringing the proposed organisational change that would bring control to an independent entity really change anything in the status quo? If these ccTLD’s are not participating within the current structure are they likely to change that stance with a new IANA entity? If the future organisational change remains open to their participation and/or input then from that organisations standpoint there would be no change from the current situation? While improvement of the process is a component of the transition if they do not wish to change from their current stance then I don’t see why this would become an issue? Maybe Im missing a key point here? James On 24 Oct 2014, at 12:07, Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> wrote: Wow. Very enlightening indeed Paul. Thank you. ------ Rgds, Tracy On Oct 24, 2014 4:33 AM, "Paul M Kane" <Paul.Kane@icb.co.uk<mailto:Paul.Kane@icb.co.uk>> wrote: The ccNSO is a valuable forum for those ccTLDs that wish to discuss issues and (potentially) be accountable to ICANN and its processes/determinations. There are many ccTLDs that have never been to a ccNSO meeting, know little about ICANN and are accountable to their users under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the ccTLD Registry is incorporated and/or the legal jurisdiction of the user contracts with the ccTLD Registry. Unlike gTLDs which specifically obtain their authority to be in the IANA ROOT by virtue of a contract with ICANN, the ccTLD Registry falls into (at least) two categories. There are ccTLDs that have agreements with ICANN and those that do not. To be specific, 7 have a MoU with ICANN, 9 have a "Sponsorship Agreement" with ICANN, 27 have an "Accountability Agreement" with ICANN, 42 have an "Exchange of Letters" with ICANN and 170 ccTLDs do not cede authority to ICANN. Best Paul Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org> <mailto:peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR *From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 *To:* Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr *Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/>> *From: *"Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> <mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM *To: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>> *Cc: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu> <mailto:mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>> wrote: So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. *From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>>] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J Beckwith Burr *Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> <tel:%2B%201.202.5332932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustarbiz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/>> *From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com> <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. *From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr *Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/>> *From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com> <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan *From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr *Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/>> *From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com> <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _/is/_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com> <mailto:ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- *Subject: * [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities *Date: * Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 *From: * Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> *To: * cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<http://www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN. From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process. I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> <mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_li...> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=A...> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> <mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mmicann.org_mailman_lis...> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ /Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: //http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=>/ //Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> <tel:%2B2348035233535>// //alt email://seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng/<http://seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng/> <mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> <mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_li...> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blog...> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d...> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_li...> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_li...> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
I’m not sure why this wasn’t clear, but I agree with Peter that the ccNSO is not, on its own, representative of all ccTLDs. Specifically, some ccTLDs that do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations, which is why those must be included. My understanding is that in addition there are some ccTLDs who don’t participate in either forum, so we would need to account for that. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net<mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 9:32 AM To: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities On the subject of non-participating ccTLD’s, would bringing the proposed organisational change that would bring control to an independent entity really change anything in the status quo? If these ccTLD’s are not participating within the current structure are they likely to change that stance with a new IANA entity? If the future organisational change remains open to their participation and/or input then from that organisations standpoint there would be no change from the current situation? While improvement of the process is a component of the transition if they do not wish to change from their current stance then I don’t see why this would become an issue? Maybe Im missing a key point here? James On 24 Oct 2014, at 12:07, Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> wrote: Wow. Very enlightening indeed Paul. Thank you. ------ Rgds, Tracy On Oct 24, 2014 4:33 AM, "Paul M Kane" <Paul.Kane@icb.co.uk<mailto:Paul.Kane@icb.co.uk>> wrote: The ccNSO is a valuable forum for those ccTLDs that wish to discuss issues and (potentially) be accountable to ICANN and its processes/determinations. There are many ccTLDs that have never been to a ccNSO meeting, know little about ICANN and are accountable to their users under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the ccTLD Registry is incorporated and/or the legal jurisdiction of the user contracts with the ccTLD Registry. Unlike gTLDs which specifically obtain their authority to be in the IANA ROOT by virtue of a contract with ICANN, the ccTLD Registry falls into (at least) two categories. There are ccTLDs that have agreements with ICANN and those that do not. To be specific, 7 have a MoU with ICANN, 9 have a "Sponsorship Agreement" with ICANN, 27 have an "Accountability Agreement" with ICANN, 42 have an "Exchange of Letters" with ICANN and 170 ccTLDs do not cede authority to ICANN. Best Paul Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org> <mailto:peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR *From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 *To:* Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr *Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/>> *From: *"Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> <mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM *To: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>> *Cc: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...> <mailto:mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMF-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=ywafUHoi6i6pOm8gv0t97tvPuY5gpSnalUwXbUbMp1w&s=FpF7I88o7PkrhbFKaaSJMpFjOxiyNasPrd5GblmAKHc&e=>>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>> wrote: So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. *From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>>] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J Beckwith Burr *Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> <tel:%2B%201.202.5332932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustarbiz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/>> *From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com> <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. *From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr *Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/>> *From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com> <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan *From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr *Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/>> *From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com> <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _/is/_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com> <mailto:ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMF-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=ywafUHoi6i6pOm8gv0t97tvPuY5gpSnalUwXbUbMp1w&s=YlmceCglNvlNSJ3TGzs-bXBNjU3PAfKIjCW39DYrspU&e=> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- *Subject: * [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities *Date: * Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 *From: * Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> *To: * cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMF-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=ywafUHoi6i6pOm8gv0t97tvPuY5gpSnalUwXbUbMp1w&s=UaWyH-7M9L-J-5cJF33-fKg5o-ihJF4zwGhFfNlOsNY&e=> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMF-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=ywafUHoi6i6pOm8gv0t97tvPuY5gpSnalUwXbUbMp1w&s=NWqJwYhiR1usVqRAoUlkEGwb4SPhJgf8Yy4mRd5Lzj8&e=> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN. From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process. I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> <mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMF-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=ywafUHoi6i6pOm8gv0t97tvPuY5gpSnalUwXbUbMp1w&s=3uOGAnl7hwNgtugHRCTTfEfXLf1HgFaedNJvlkgY-U4&e=> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_li...> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMF-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=ywafUHoi6i6pOm8gv0t97tvPuY5gpSnalUwXbUbMp1w&s=-wRSy2YD0lZi_poMzmBkg78tWDqpYgxi4y4L1irJT8U&e=> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=A...> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> <mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMF-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=ywafUHoi6i6pOm8gv0t97tvPuY5gpSnalUwXbUbMp1w&s=3uOGAnl7hwNgtugHRCTTfEfXLf1HgFaedNJvlkgY-U4&e=> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mmicann.org_mailman_lis...> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ /Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: //http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng_&d=AAMF-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=ywafUHoi6i6pOm8gv0t97tvPuY5gpSnalUwXbUbMp1w&s=vYf1cel3R2Z6G6j2C-oFGCReKFCX4_3bwgLmEmzd4F8&e=> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=>/ //Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> <tel:%2B2348035233535>// //alt email://seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__seun.ojedeji-40fuoye.edu...> <mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! 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(Sorry for the delay in replying, I am doing this CWG role in my spare time). James Gannon wrote:
On the subject of non-participating ccTLD’s, would bringing the proposed organisational change that would bring control to an independent entity really change anything in the status quo? I am not sure what is meant by "non-participating" ccTLDs.
For clarity, _all_ ccTLDs participate in the IANA database and most ccTLDs want to retain the status quo - namely that they are exclusively responsible (and liable) for managing their entries in the IANA database and accountable to their users (including Government) under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the Registry is based. Since year dot, the "legacy ccTLDs" prefer to follow the technical standards set by the IETF and to determine Policies based on local procedures that accord with local customs, laws and user community needs. More recently, a second group of ccTLD Registries have emerged that have been asking ICANN to "share" the responsibility (and liability) for their entries in the IANA database. ICANN has (rightly) asked the ccTLDs registries who want ICANN to be involved in their operations to determine "Best Practice Polices" for ICANN's involvement. So please make the distinction between those "legacy ccTLDs" that have always served their respective community and shielded the IANA from liability (whilst adhering to local/national laws, culture, and operating environments) and those that want contracts with ICANN (under the US legal system) to share the responsibility (and liability) for managing the ccTLD Registry's entry in the IANA database.
If these ccTLD’s are not participating within the current structure are they likely to change that stance with a new IANA entity?
Rest assured, many ccTLDs welcome the opportunity to revert back to the automated IANA processes that existed prior to ICANN and if that needs a new entity so be it. Currently IANA is a separate department within ICANN and the IANA staff have done a good job at serving both the "legacy ccTLD" and the "contracted (cc)TLD" groups and the pre-requisite for a new IANA entity has yet to be justified. When the IANA was administered by Jon Postel - he purposefully empowered each ccTLD Registry to directly manage (and be exclusively responsible for) their entries in the IANA database via an interface provided by the then Network Solutions. ICANN in 2006 welcomed the opportunity to provide such automated interfaces for the legacy ccTLDs but were prevented by NTIA who wanted to have manual oversight of each change request. In the 2012 IANA contract, NTIA recognised the benefits of automation and clause C.2.9.2.e specifically encourages IANA to provide end-to-end root zone automation - but IANA grappled with the issue of NTIA's manual oversight - so little changed. Without NTIA, the IANA can once again serve the legacy ccTLD directly - in a manner very similar to the Numbers community - ie devolved responsibility.
If the future organisational change remains open to their participation and/or input then from that organisations standpoint there would be no change from the current situation? While improvement of the process is a component of the transition if they do not wish to change from their current stance then I don’t see why this would become an issue?
The ccTLD community is very diverse, and rest assured just because some ccTLD Manager have never been to an ICANN meeting does not mean they fail to serve their community well. Some legacy ccTLDs, especially those run by a Government (contractor) are unable to engage with a private sector organisation in a foreign jurisdiction without specific permission (which may never be forthcoming). This should not be a surprise, even the .US ccTLD Registry contractor cannot implement any policies or procedures or execute any agreements without the prior approval of NTIA - clause C.3.2.2 of .US registry contract*. * In summary, there is general support for the NTIA to stand back from its oversight role and general support amongst the Registries that support an independent IANA that serves their needs. Forcing a ccTLD to surrender sovereignty to an external body/jurisdiction would present a problem for many legacy ccTLDs and Governments.
Maybe Im missing a key point here?
The contracted ccTLDs and gTLDs have very similar perspectives but such Registries have already lost their ability for self-accountability, and they may need the independent accountability "uber-IANA" being discussed. For the legacy ccTLDs there is no need for an "uber-IANA" accountability mechanism as it would inherently trigger a loss of sovereignty. I think the key issue is to ensure all users of IANA's services can be accommodated without any one usurping the standing of another IANA user - so there are likely to be two, may be three modus operandi within the IANA from the names community. Many of us have spent decades fostering a universally accessible Internet, but fragmentation of the legacy system has always been the pariah and without sensitive and respectful handling, fragmentation could become reality much sooner than any one would wish. Best Paul
James
On 24 Oct 2014, at 12:07, Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com <mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> wrote:
Wow.
Very enlightening indeed Paul. Thank you.
------ Rgds,
Tracy
On Oct 24, 2014 4:33 AM, "Paul M Kane" <Paul.Kane@icb.co.uk <mailto:Paul.Kane@icb.co.uk>> wrote:
The ccNSO is a valuable forum for those ccTLDs that wish to discuss issues and (potentially) be accountable to ICANN and its processes/determinations.
There are many ccTLDs that have never been to a ccNSO meeting, know little about ICANN and are accountable to their users under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the ccTLD Registry is incorporated and/or the legal jurisdiction of the user contracts with the ccTLD Registry.
Unlike gTLDs which specifically obtain their authority to be in the IANA ROOT by virtue of a contract with ICANN, the ccTLD Registry falls into (at least) two categories. There are ccTLDs that have agreements with ICANN and those that do not.
To be specific, 7 have a MoU with ICANN, 9 have a "Sponsorship Agreement" with ICANN, 27 have an "Accountability Agreement" with ICANN, 42 have an "Exchange of Letters" with ICANN and 170 ccTLDs do not cede authority to ICANN.
Best
Paul
Whoa! There are an awful lot of sweeping statements here that fly in the face of the one clearly true statement that there is enormous diversity among ccTLD models. In particular, the distinction between ³legacy² ccTLDs and ³contracted² ccTLDs does not reflect my understanding of history. In the early days of ICANN there was a significant push (including by me) for ccTLDs to recognize ICANN¹s authority (as the IANA Administrator) to intervene in the event that a ccTLD was threatening the security and stability of the DNS and/or Internet. Some early ICANN enthusiasts - for a host of VERY DIFFERENT reasons - caused their ccTLD to enter into contracts with ICANN. The whole concept quickly fell apart when it became clear that most ccTLD managers were not interested and, in particular, when the US government refused to do so. As a result, there are a very small number of ccTLDs with full blown contracts with ICANN. And to say that they have surrendered sovereignty to ICANN is extraordinary hyperbole. I am sure that the operators of .CA, .JP, and .AU - as well as the respective governments of the associated countries - would vehemently disagree. Since that time a number of ccTLD operators - again for a host of VERY DIFFERENT reasons - have ³exchanged letters² or entered into ³accountability frameworks² with ICANN. These vary as well, some involve ³mutual recognition² and some involve much less than that. The exchange of letters with Luxembourg is illustrative. https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/lu-icann-letters-22feb11-en.pdf . It says that .LU will be operated ³at the local level and in close cooperation with the local Internet community and in compliance with Luxembourg law.² The manager then acknowledges its responsibility not to mess up the stability and security of the DNS. The exchange of letters with the Solomon Islands likewise commits the operator to operate its name servers in a stable and secure manner ³within the limits of national law and national public policy.² https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sb-icann-letters-30oct07-en.pdf As someone who spends a significant amount of time with the ccTLD community, I can assure you that ccTLD operators have not ³lost their ability for self-accountability.² Acknowledging the FACT that ICANN performs IANA services simply does not amount to ³ceding authority² to ICANN. Second, to my knowledge, IANA was NEVER ³automated.² It¹s possible that until 1998 you could simply enter the IP address of a new name server on the IANA website, which IANA then passed on to Network Solutions/Verisign to implement, and it felt ³automatic² - but I¹m pretty certain that this was a very manual process. In 1998 the US government used its contract with Network Solutions/Verisign to prohibit Verisign to unilaterally make changes to the root. If you were part of this in 1998, it isn¹t hard to understand why - we were concerned that Verisign would use its access to thwart the emerging consensus around bottom-up, private sector led, representative and diverse management of the domain name system. The fact is that the vast majority of ccTLD operators participate in the ccNSO and/or regional organizations. Even so, it is entirely possible for those who prefer not to do so to make their voices heard on both policy and technical issues associated with IANA. I have a great deal of respect for Paul Kane, but the suggestion that participating involves a surrender of sovereignty is way over the top IMHO. Finally, many many ccTLD operators depend on cost-free IANA services. I agree with Christopher about the importance of maintaining that situation. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz On 10/26/14, 5:15 AM, "Paul M Kane" <Paul.Kane@icb.co.uk> wrote:
<html> (Sorry for the delay in replying, I am doing this CWG role in my spare time).
James Gannon wrote:
On the subject of non-participating ccTLD¹s, would bringing the proposed organisational change that would bring control to an independent entity really change anything in the status quo? I am not sure what is meant by "non-participating" ccTLDs.
For clarity, _all_ ccTLDs participate in the IANA database and most ccTLDs want to retain the status quo - namely that they are exclusively responsible (and liable) for managing their entries in the IANA database and accountable to their users (including Government) under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the Registry is based.
Since year dot, the "legacy ccTLDs" prefer to follow the technical standards set by the IETF and to determine Policies based on local procedures that accord with local customs, laws and user community needs.
More recently, a second group of ccTLD Registries have emerged that have been asking ICANN to "share" the responsibility (and liability) for their entries in the IANA database. ICANN has (rightly) asked the ccTLDs registries who want ICANN to be involved in their operations to determine "Best Practice Polices" for ICANN's involvement.
So please make the distinction between those "legacy ccTLDs" that have always served their respective community and shielded the IANA from liability (whilst adhering to local/national laws, culture, and operating environments) and those that want contracts with ICANN (under the US legal system) to share the responsibility (and liability) for managing the ccTLD Registry's entry in the IANA database.
If these ccTLD¹s are not participating within the current structure are they likely to change that stance with a new IANA entity?
Rest assured, many ccTLDs welcome the opportunity to revert back to the automated IANA processes that existed prior to ICANN and if that needs a new entity so be it. Currently IANA is a separate department within ICANN and the IANA staff have done a good job at serving both the "legacy ccTLD" and the "contracted (cc)TLD" groups and the pre-requisite for a new IANA entity has yet to be justified.
When the IANA was administered by Jon Postel - he purposefully empowered each ccTLD Registry to directly manage (and be exclusively responsible for) their entries in the IANA database via an interface provided by the then Network Solutions.
ICANN in 2006 welcomed the opportunity to provide such automated interfaces for the legacy ccTLDs but were prevented by NTIA who wanted to have manual oversight of each change request.
In the 2012 IANA contract, NTIA recognised the benefits of automation and clause C.2.9.2.e specifically encourages IANA to provide end-to-end root zone automation - but IANA grappled with the issue of NTIA's manual oversight - so little changed.
Without NTIA, the IANA can once again serve the legacy ccTLD directly - in a manner very similar to the Numbers community - ie devolved responsibility.
If the future organisational change remains open to their participation and/or input then from that organisations standpoint there would be no change from the current situation? While improvement of the process is a component of the transition if they do not wish to change from their current stance then I don¹t see why this would become an issue?
The ccTLD community is very diverse, and rest assured just because some ccTLD Manager have never been to an ICANN meeting does not mean they fail to serve their community well.
Some legacy ccTLDs, especially those run by a Government (contractor) are unable to engage with a private sector organisation in a foreign jurisdiction without specific permission (which may never be forthcoming). This should not be a surprise, even the .US ccTLD Registry contractor cannot implement any policies or procedures or execute any agreements without the prior approval of NTIA - clause C.3.2.2 of .US registry contract*. * In summary, there is general support for the NTIA to stand back from its oversight role and general support amongst the Registries that support an independent IANA that serves their needs. Forcing a ccTLD to surrender sovereignty to an external body/jurisdiction would present a problem for many legacy ccTLDs and Governments.
Maybe Im missing a key point here?
The contracted ccTLDs and gTLDs have very similar perspectives but such Registries have already lost their ability for self-accountability, and they may need the independent accountability "uber-IANA" being discussed. For the legacy ccTLDs there is no need for an "uber-IANA" accountability mechanism as it would inherently trigger a loss of sovereignty.
I think the key issue is to ensure all users of IANA's services can be accommodated without any one usurping the standing of another IANA user - so there are likely to be two, may be three modus operandi within the IANA from the names community.
Many of us have spent decades fostering a universally accessible Internet, but fragmentation of the legacy system has always been the pariah and without sensitive and respectful handling, fragmentation could become reality much sooner than any one would wish.
Best
Paul
James
On 24 Oct 2014, at 12:07, Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com <mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> wrote:
Wow.
Very enlightening indeed Paul. Thank you.
------ Rgds,
Tracy
On Oct 24, 2014 4:33 AM, "Paul M Kane" <Paul.Kane@icb.co.uk <mailto:Paul.Kane@icb.co.uk>> wrote:
The ccNSO is a valuable forum for those ccTLDs that wish to discuss issues and (potentially) be accountable to ICANN and its processes/determinations.
There are many ccTLDs that have never been to a ccNSO meeting, know little about ICANN and are accountable to their users under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the ccTLD Registry is incorporated and/or the legal jurisdiction of the user contracts with the ccTLD Registry.
Unlike gTLDs which specifically obtain their authority to be in the IANA ROOT by virtue of a contract with ICANN, the ccTLD Registry falls into (at least) two categories. There are ccTLDs that have agreements with ICANN and those that do not.
To be specific, 7 have a MoU with ICANN, 9 have a "Sponsorship Agreement" with ICANN, 27 have an "Accountability Agreement" with ICANN, 42 have an "Exchange of Letters" with ICANN and 170 ccTLDs do not cede authority to ICANN.
Best
Paul
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Paul M Kane writes:
(Sorry for the delay in replying, I am doing this CWG role in my spare time).
Don't we all?
When the IANA was administered by Jon Postel - he purposefully empowered each ccTLD Registry to directly manage (and be exclusively responsible for) their entries in the IANA database via an interface provided by the then Network Solutions.
Eh?? It might be that my memoery is starting to fail me, but as far as I remember it was always been direct (e-) mail contact with Jon and friends. Network Solutions was not involved in any root zone maintenance. jaap
Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote:
Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD?
So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here.
That is not insubstantial.
I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions.
I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ...
However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs.
Any thoughts?
/t
On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org <mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote:
Thanks Tracy for raising this.
Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions.
However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats:
Out of the 248 ccTLDs:
152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD).
38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO.
58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards,
Peter Van Roste
General Manager, CENTR
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 *To:* Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz>
*From: *"Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com <mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM *To: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> *Cc: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <mailto:mueller@syr.edu>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote:
So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
*From:*Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz>
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:*Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz>
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz>
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _/is/_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren’t actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldn’t those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I don’t know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User’s Council might be affected by the contract, but I don’t think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=0knJhHDN8_VTb0SESfSAujo5jrIrLR9bFwC6kRIu9PY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=nxFm0ts_S3ChCWzkn3RQczBO3NlPaImRwFjf4LcdtHo&e=> -- [cid:part79.06050502.08080204@lactld.org]
I agree with Becky on the below and what is true for GAC members is mostly true for ccTLDs as well, I guess. Dont get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldnt object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: vrijdag 24 oktober 2014 16:20 To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these arent actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldnt those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I dont know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a Users Council might be affected by the contract, but I dont think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Dont get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldnt object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> becky.burr@neustar.biz / <http://www.neustar.biz> www.neustar.biz From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that dont participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit ccs to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr. edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8W DDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtno rPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=> >, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote: So lets see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions lets call it RegistryCo for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr. edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8W DDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTul gFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=> > Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> becky.burr@neustar.biz / <http://www.neustar.biz> www.neustar.biz From: Allan MacGillivray < <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr < <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr. edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8W DDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0 a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=> mueller@syr.edu>, Fouad Bajwa < <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com> fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: " <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From: <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, lets begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLAs to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLAs are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the SLA Council. Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 <tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 <tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> becky.burr@neustar.biz / <http://www.neustar.biz> www.neustar.biz From: Milton L Mueller < <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr. edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8W DDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJ Rt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=> mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa < <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com> fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: " <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the technical community proposals I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments. That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR iE8/edit?usp=sharing <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_docume nt_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAM GaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m =iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QA YJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_full screen_apnic_report-2Dianatransition_1&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=6 2cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0 efqUDkGy07cw&s=ipQr6NSV4s2YyeTKtleRzaehK6NnJP70z0QOuy57W7o&e=> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_dra ft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw &r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgT vzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana -transition-the-meissen-proposal/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance. org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2D meissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8M o8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19 PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l istinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq 8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z- dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d= AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4 k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ 0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l istinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq 8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z- dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMG aQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m= iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6Joh vhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> http://www.fuoye.edu.ng Mobile: +2348035233535 <tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email: <mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l istinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq 8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z- dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blo gspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxd YahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fn sOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa& d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkM r4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh 4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l istinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_G Rlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU& s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l istinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_G Rlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU& s=0knJhHDN8_VTb0SESfSAujo5jrIrLR9bFwC6kRIu9PY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardsh ip <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l istinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_G Rlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw& s=nxFm0ts_S3ChCWzkn3RQczBO3NlPaImRwFjf4LcdtHo&e=> --
True Maarten. We should think deeply about a mechanism that will be as neutral in the stewardship oversight service delivery as the NTIA and at the same time has the legal enforceable powers to contract the IANA function operator. Putting on my regulator hat, I think it may perhaps be best to have more of the non-direct customers of IANA functions in the "council" ("SLA council") than the operational communities. Still not sure of the name. My feeling is that non-operators as the Overseer of the IANA function operator would gain more acceptability to all concerned than replicating what we have in ICANN with all the attendant accountability questions. Mary Uduma On Friday, October 24, 2014 11:47 PM, Maarten Botterman GNKS <maarten@gnksconsult.com> wrote: I agree with Becky on the below – and what is true for GAC members is mostly true for ccTLDs as well, I guess. “Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. “ From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: vrijdag 24 oktober 2014 16:20 To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren’t actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldn’t those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I don’t know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User’s Council might be affected by the contract, but I don’t think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD?
So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t
On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR
From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote: So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
From:Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
From:Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote: Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards, Acharya
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Hello all, I've been giving some thought to the issue of an Oversight Council, or whatever you choose to call it. One of the most persistent issues with IANA has been that it is not very good at self-improvement. We could debate why but at this stage it's not that important. The fact is that IANA has had to be forced to improve itself (as opposed to just keep doing what it's always done in the same way for years). There was the whole eIANA issue where outside bodies developed new software for a better IANA system and then had to push it for over a year as well as provide it for free to ICANN before it was finally accepted (and not before IANA felt sufficiently threatened that it developed a weak alternative as a way of saying 'we don't need this'.) There was the extreme unhappiness with how and how fast IANA functions were being carried out and the fact there was literally no information coming out. That was only resolved when David Conrad was sent in to fix things (a system reliant on finding a new David Conrad every five years is doomed). Then there was the whole NTIA rebid and new contract where a large number of improvement clauses were written into the new contract in order to force improvements that the community had been asking for for years (improvements developed through a rebid process that asked the internet community what changes they wished to see). My point is that for whatever reason the 'customers' of IANA are not treated as organizations that IANA is striving to keep happy. They are locked in and pretty much have to deal with whatever they are given. Hence stagnation. Since this transition period is the one opportunity that the customers of IANA have to build a system that will serve them better in future, it is worth thinking about how to shift the culture. The day-to-day of an Oversight Committee would likely be checking policies are being followed. But there also needs to be a mechanism/culture that encourages IANA to continuously improve based not on its or ICANN's agenda but on what its customers want. The committee would need a stick and a carrot. ICANN /IANA would have to be obliged to make improvements (like clauses in a new contract) but the emphasis should be on how to reward improvements so the stick is not needed. IANA is not a stationary function and I think it would be smart to recognise that. I am concerned that because we have a lot of policy people and process people here but not many business folk that this group may draw up wonderful new structures that just add more process rather than focus on making the IANA functions a very efficient machine with happy customers. Philosophical and conceptual issues aside, the bulk of IANA's Names work always be making changes and/or additions in response to existing customers' requests. Kieren On Thursday, October 30, 2014, Mary Uduma <mnuduma@yahoo.com> wrote:
True Maarten.
We should think deeply about a mechanism that will be as neutral in the stewardship oversight service delivery as the NTIA and at the same time has the legal enforceable powers to contract the IANA function operator.
Putting on my regulator hat, I think it may perhaps be best to have more of the non-direct customers of IANA functions in the "council" ("SLA council") than the operational communities. Still not sure of the name.
My feeling is that non-operators as the Overseer of the IANA function operator would gain more acceptability to all concerned than replicating what we have in ICANN with all the attendant accountability questions.
Mary Uduma
On Sat, Nov 1, 2014 at 3:28 PM, Kieren McCarthy <kieren@kierenmccarthy.com> wrote:
Hello all,
<snip> the explanation is quite on point
Since this transition period is the one opportunity that the customers of IANA have to build a system that will serve them better in future, it is worth thinking about how to shift the culture.
Maybe we should not think of how to change the culture (as that may be beyond scope) but we should think of what we will include in the MOU/Contract or whatever mechanism that finally suffice. That will ensure that the community's contribution is noted to improve IANA improve operation.
The day-to-day of an Oversight Committee would likely be checking policies are being followed. But there also needs to be a mechanism/culture that encourages IANA to continuously improve based not on its or ICANN's agenda but on what its customers want.
+1 and i presume most part of that can also be achieved by policy.
The committee would need a stick and a carrot. ICANN /IANA would have to be obliged to make improvements (like clauses in a new contract) but the emphasis should be on how to reward improvements so the stick is not needed.
I agree but 'stick' needs to be clearly defined within the MOU/Mechanism. Remembering there is a stick is usually a good approach to ensure compliance.
IANA is not a stationary function and I think it would be smart to recognise that. I am concerned that because we have a lot of policy people and process people here but not many business folk that this group may draw up wonderful new structures that just add more process rather than focus on making the IANA functions a very efficient machine with happy customers.
Philosophical and conceptual issues aside, the bulk of IANA's Names work always be making changes and/or additions in response to existing customers' requests.
Correct and usually what may cause more of the delay in getting the records updated could be the intermediate processes which the community should look into as i don't think that will be within the scope of this cwg. However as you have said earlier, we need to include the necessary clauses/mechanism that enables the community's consensus based suggestions to be recognised by the IANA operator. Thanks Cheers!
Kieren
On Thursday, October 30, 2014, Mary Uduma <mnuduma@yahoo.com> wrote:
True Maarten.
We should think deeply about a mechanism that will be as neutral in the stewardship oversight service delivery as the NTIA and at the same time has the legal enforceable powers to contract the IANA function operator.
Putting on my regulator hat, I think it may perhaps be best to have more of the non-direct customers of IANA functions in the "council" ("SLA council") than the operational communities. Still not sure of the name.
My feeling is that non-operators as the Overseer of the IANA function operator would gain more acceptability to all concerned than replicating what we have in ICANN with all the attendant accountability questions.
Mary Uduma
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* The key to understanding is humility - my view !
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kieren McCarthy My point is that for whatever reason the 'customers' of IANA are not treated as organizations that IANA is striving to keep happy. They are locked in and pretty much have to deal with whatever they are given. Hence stagnation. Agree with your analysis Kieren but to my mind the problem is solved primarily by dealing with the fact that customers are “locked in” as you say. If the primary users of IANA are not locked in I suspect that ‘stagnation’ would change very rapidly. Indeed, the names (DNS) part is the most locked in and protocols are the least locked in, and today one finds the protocols people the most happy with IANA and the names people generally the least happy. This line of analysis also leads to interesting questions about why ICANN or any other entity would have an incentive not to lose the IANA functions. The idea that it is an unpaid ‘public service’ is, historically, a sure-fire recipe for the kind of stagnation you are talking about. Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org<http://internetgovernance.org/>
It's 96 if you ONLY include the ccNSO in the proposed incorporation arrangements is the point I'm trying to surface. Also the ccTLD issue and national Governments is quite sensitive (see the GAC Principles and Guidelines for the Delegation and Administration of ccTLDs) and should be taken into consideration in any future arrangements. YJ Park makes some salient observations on this issue as well in her various papers post the Michael Geist work done for the ITU in 2004. /t ---------------------------- Social Footprint Google Me: http://goo.gl/p4xs6 | Google+: http://plus.ly/tracy | Google Profile: http://goo.gl/8j2xk | LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/tracyhackshaw | Quora: http://www.quora.com/Tracy-Hackshaw | Twitter: @thackshaw <http://twitter.com/#!/@thackshaw> | facebook: http://www.facebook.com/tracyhackshaw | Storify: http://storify.com/tracyhackshaw | Pinterest: http://pinterest.com/tracyhackshaw/ | Scoop.it: http://www.scoop.it/u/tracy-hackshaw | Instagram: http://instagram.com/tracyhackshaw | On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 10:20 AM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
Tracy,
First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren’t actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me.
Second, why couldn’t those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?)
Finally, I don’t know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User’s Council might be affected by the contract, but I don’t think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services.
Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally.
B
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hi Tracy,
Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD
Carolina
On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote:
Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD?
So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here.
That is not insubstantial.
I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions.
I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ...
However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs.
Any thoughts?
/t
On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org> wrote:
Thanks Tracy for raising this.
Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions.
However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats:
Out of the 248 ccTLDs:
152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD).
38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO.
58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards,
Peter Van Roste
General Manager, CENTR
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 *To:* Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *"Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM *To: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Cc: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
*From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr < becky.burr@neustar.biz> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa < fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com <gurcharya@gmail.com>]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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Becky, all Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that "... the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution." I'm just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable? Thanks, Donna [Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne | Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<http://www.ariservices.com/> Follow us on Twitter<https://twitter.com/ARIservices> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren't actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldn't those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I don't know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User's Council might be affected by the contract, but I don't think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Don't get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn't object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don't participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc's to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let's see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions - let's call it 'RegistryCo' for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky - you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over' the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let's begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA's to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA's are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the "SLA Council." Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the "technical community proposals" I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants "the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments." That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=0knJhHDN8_VTb0SESfSAujo5jrIrLR9bFwC6kRIu9PY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=nxFm0ts_S3ChCWzkn3RQczBO3NlPaImRwFjf4LcdtHo&e=> -- [cid:image002.jpg@01CFF1DA.ED67A170]
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 7:41 PM, Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com> wrote:
Becky, all
Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that “… the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution.”
I’m just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable?
IMHO "On Equal basis" should qualify.....not doubt govt has to be involved in this process and they already are (through the GAC) so i will also expect any oversight that comes to emerge to include them. This is one of the reason why i think the oversight needs to be transferred to the existing communities as much as possible. Getting a multistakeholder oversight beyond the walls of existing ICANN community could just be as complicated. Cheers!
Thanks,
Donna
[image: Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]*D**ONNA AUSTIN* Policy and Industry Affairs Manager
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*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM *To:* Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Tracy,
First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren’t actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me.
Second, why couldn’t those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?)
Finally, I don’t know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User’s Council might be affected by the contract, but I don’t think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services.
Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally.
B
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org> *Date: *Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM *To: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hi Tracy,
Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD
Carolina
On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote:
Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD?
So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here.
That is not insubstantial.
I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions.
I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ...
However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs.
Any thoughts?
/t
On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org> wrote:
Thanks Tracy for raising this.
Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions.
However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats:
Out of the 248 ccTLDs:
152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD).
38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO.
58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards,
Peter Van Roste
General Manager, CENTR
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 *To:* Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *"Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM *To: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Cc: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
*From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr < becky.burr@neustar.biz> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa < fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com <gurcharya@gmail.com>]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* The key to understanding is humility - my view !
I agree with Seul in the fact that govts will need to be part of the whole multi-stakeholder, equal basis equation. The challenge will be who in the GAC will be part of this group where one government can not represent another. -ed On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 2:52 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 7:41 PM, Donna Austin < Donna.Austin@ariservices.com> wrote:
Becky, all
Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that “… the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution.”
I’m just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable?
IMHO "On Equal basis" should qualify.....not doubt govt has to be involved in this process and they already are (through the GAC) so i will also expect any oversight that comes to emerge to include them. This is one of the reason why i think the oversight needs to be transferred to the existing communities as much as possible. Getting a multistakeholder oversight beyond the walls of existing ICANN community could just be as complicated.
Cheers!
Thanks,
Donna
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*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM *To:* Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Tracy,
First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren’t actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me.
Second, why couldn’t those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?)
Finally, I don’t know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User’s Council might be affected by the contract, but I don’t think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services.
Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally.
B
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org> *Date: *Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM *To: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hi Tracy,
Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD
Carolina
On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote:
Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD?
So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here.
That is not insubstantial.
I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions.
I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ...
However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs.
Any thoughts?
/t
On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org> wrote:
Thanks Tracy for raising this.
Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions.
However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats:
Out of the 248 ccTLDs:
152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD).
38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO.
58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards,
Peter Van Roste
General Manager, CENTR
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 *To:* Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *"Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM *To: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Cc: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
*From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr < becky.burr@neustar.biz> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa < fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com <gurcharya@gmail.com>]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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*Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>*
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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Hi I think we all agree that GAC is already part of the MSM - and the NTIA would most likely be concerned if a body like GAC were NOT part of the MSM. And GAC does manage - as a whole - to work through to a position on issues of concern to all of them. On that basis, the whole of GAC has always been happy to have someone like Heather to speak on their behalf, when they have followed due process within their structure, to come to an agreed position. Otherwise, noone in GAC (or otherwise) can speak for individual countries. But then I imagine there would be difficulties if one registry tried to speak on behalf of all registries without following GNSO processes. Holly On 28 Oct 2014, at 7:49 am, Eduardo Diaz <eduardodiazrivera@gmail.com> wrote:
I agree with Seul in the fact that govts will need to be part of the whole multi-stakeholder, equal basis equation. The challenge will be who in the GAC will be part of this group where one government can not represent another.
-ed
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 2:52 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 7:41 PM, Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com> wrote: Becky, all
Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that “… the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution.”
I’m just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable?
IMHO "On Equal basis" should qualify.....not doubt govt has to be involved in this process and they already are (through the GAC) so i will also expect any oversight that comes to emerge to include them. This is one of the reason why i think the oversight needs to be transferred to the existing communities as much as possible. Getting a multistakeholder oversight beyond the walls of existing ICANN community could just be as complicated.
Cheers!
Thanks,
Donna
<image001.png>DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager
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From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Tracy,
First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren’t actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me.
Second, why couldn’t those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?)
Finally, I don’t know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User’s Council might be affected by the contract, but I don’t think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services.
Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally.
B
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hi Tracy,
Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD
Carolina
On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote:
Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD?
So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here.
That is not insubstantial.
I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions.
I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ...
However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs.
Any thoughts?
/t
On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org> wrote:
Thanks Tracy for raising this.
Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions.
However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats:
Out of the 248 ccTLDs:
152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD).
38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO.
58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards,
Peter Van Roste
General Manager, CENTR
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject:
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
Date:
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
From:
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>
To:
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email: seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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-- NOTICE: This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Hi, Is it necessary for further clarifications from GAC or perhaps Heather? Regards Wale On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 9:30 PM, Holly Raiche <h.raiche@internode.on.net> wrote:
Hi
I think we all agree that GAC is already part of the MSM - and the NTIA would most likely be concerned if a body like GAC were NOT part of the MSM. And GAC does manage - as a whole - to work through to a position on issues of concern to all of them. On that basis, the whole of GAC has always been happy to have someone like Heather to speak on their behalf, when they have followed due process within their structure, to come to an agreed position. Otherwise, noone in GAC (or otherwise) can speak for individual countries. But then I imagine there would be difficulties if one registry tried to speak on behalf of all registries without following GNSO processes.
Holly
On 28 Oct 2014, at 7:49 am, Eduardo Diaz <eduardodiazrivera@gmail.com> wrote:
I agree with Seul in the fact that govts will need to be part of the whole multi-stakeholder, equal basis equation. The challenge will be who in the GAC will be part of this group where one government can not represent another.
-ed
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 2:52 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 7:41 PM, Donna Austin < Donna.Austin@ariservices.com> wrote:
Becky, all
Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that “… the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution.”
I’m just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable?
IMHO "On Equal basis" should qualify.....not doubt govt has to be involved in this process and they already are (through the GAC) so i will also expect any oversight that comes to emerge to include them. This is one of the reason why i think the oversight needs to be transferred to the existing communities as much as possible. Getting a multistakeholder oversight beyond the walls of existing ICANN community could just be as complicated.
Cheers!
Thanks,
Donna
<image001.png>*D**ONNA AUSTIN*
Policy and Industry Affairs Manager
*ARI REGISTRY SERVICES* Melbourne *|* Los Angeles *P* +1 310 890 9655 *P* +61 3 9866 3710 *E* donna.austin@ariservices.com *W* www.ariservices.com
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*The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately.*
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM *To:* Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Tracy,
First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren’t actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me.
Second, why couldn’t those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?)
Finally, I don’t know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User’s Council might be affected by the contract, but I don’t think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services.
Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally.
B
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org> *Date: *Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM *To: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hi Tracy,
Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD
Carolina
On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote:
Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD?
So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here.
That is not insubstantial.
I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions.
I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ...
However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs.
Any thoughts?
/t
On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org> wrote:
Thanks Tracy for raising this.
Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions.
However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats:
Out of the 248 ccTLDs:
152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD).
38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO.
58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards,
Peter Van Roste
General Manager, CENTR
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 *To:* Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *"Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM *To: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Cc: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
*From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr < becky.burr@neustar.biz> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa < fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com <gurcharya@gmail.com>]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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I honestly don’t know that the GAC would want to participate in the Oversight Council – seems very technical/operational to me. I don’t think have a couple of GAC members on the council would be unacceptable to the USG – balance is the key. I’m not sure what you mean by “on an equal basis” however. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com<mailto:Donna.Austin@ariservices.com>> Date: Monday, October 27, 2014 at 2:41 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky, all Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that “… the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution.” I’m just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable? Thanks, Donna [Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne|Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.ariservices.com_&d=A...> Follow us on Twitter<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ARIservices...> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren’t actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldn’t those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I don’t know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User’s Council might be affected by the contract, but I don’t think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=0knJhHDN8_VTb0SESfSAujo5jrIrLR9bFwC6kRIu9PY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=nxFm0ts_S3ChCWzkn3RQczBO3NlPaImRwFjf4LcdtHo&e=> -- [cid:image002.jpg@01CFF1DA.ED67A170]
Hi Becky I guess what I mean by 'on an equal basis' is that they would not have any elevated right above another other member or group of an Oversight Council, ie, their input would not be treated with greater weight or importance than others. While the GAC may not be interested, I could envisage a situation where individual governments may be interested. Thanks, Donna [Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne | Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<http://www.ariservices.com/> Follow us on Twitter<https://twitter.com/ARIservices> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] Sent: Monday, 27 October 2014 2:45 PM To: Donna Austin; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities I honestly don't know that the GAC would want to participate in the Oversight Council - seems very technical/operational to me. I don't think have a couple of GAC members on the council would be unacceptable to the USG - balance is the key. I'm not sure what you mean by "on an equal basis" however. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com<mailto:Donna.Austin@ariservices.com>> Date: Monday, October 27, 2014 at 2:41 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky, all Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that "... the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution." I'm just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable? Thanks, Donna [Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne|Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.ariservices.com_&d=A...> Follow us on Twitter<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ARIservices...> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren't actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldn't those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I don't know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User's Council might be affected by the contract, but I don't think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Don't get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn't object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don't participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc's to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let's see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions - let's call it 'RegistryCo' for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky - you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over' the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let's begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA's to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA's are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the "SLA Council." Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the "technical community proposals" I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants "the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments." That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=0knJhHDN8_VTb0SESfSAujo5jrIrLR9bFwC6kRIu9PY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=nxFm0ts_S3ChCWzkn3RQczBO3NlPaImRwFjf4LcdtHo&e=> -- [cid:image002.jpg@01CFF1F5.ABC798E0]
I think this is a fair observation by Donna - on both counts. /t On Mon, Oct 27, 2014, 5:53 PM Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com> wrote:
Hi Becky
I guess what I mean by ‘on an equal basis’ is that they would not have any elevated right above another other member or group of an Oversight Council, ie, their input would not be treated with greater weight or importance than others. While the GAC may not be interested, I could envisage a situation where individual governments may be interested.
Thanks,
Donna
[image: Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]*D**ONNA AUSTIN* Policy and Industry Affairs Manager
*ARI REGISTRY SERVICES* Melbourne *|* Los Angeles *P* +1 310 890 9655 *P* +61 3 9866 3710 *E* donna.austin@ariservices.com *W* www.ariservices.com
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*From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] *Sent:* Monday, 27 October 2014 2:45 PM *To:* Donna Austin; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
I honestly don’t know that the GAC would want to participate in the Oversight Council – seems very technical/operational to me. I don’t think have a couple of GAC members on the council would be unacceptable to the USG – balance is the key. I’m not sure what you mean by “on an equal basis” however.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com> *Date: *Monday, October 27, 2014 at 2:41 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Carolina Aguerre < carolina@lactld.org>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky, all
Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that “… the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution.”
I’m just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable?
Thanks,
Donna
[image: Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]*D**ONNA AUSTIN* Policy and Industry Affairs Manager
*ARI REGISTRY SERVICES* Melbourne*|*Los Angeles *P* +1 310 890 9655 *P* +61 3 9866 3710 *E* donna.austin@ariservices.com *W* www.ariservices.com <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.ariservices.com_&d=A...>
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*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM *To:* Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Tracy,
First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren’t actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me.
Second, why couldn’t those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?)
Finally, I don’t know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User’s Council might be affected by the contract, but I don’t think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services.
Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally.
B
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org> *Date: *Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM *To: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hi Tracy,
Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD
Carolina
On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote:
Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD?
So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here.
That is not insubstantial.
I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions.
I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ...
However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs.
Any thoughts?
/t
On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org> wrote:
Thanks Tracy for raising this.
Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions.
However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats:
Out of the 248 ccTLDs:
152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD).
38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO.
58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards,
Peter Van Roste
General Manager, CENTR
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 *To:* Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *"Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM *To: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Cc: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
*From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr < becky.burr@neustar.biz> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa < fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com <gurcharya@gmail.com>]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
_______
Speaking personally, I do not object to governments participating on an equal basis, as defined by Donna. If they were TRULY a part of the MS process (as opposed to a veto for which they have NO accountability) I would welcome them. So far, I am not hearing it Sent from my iPad On Oct 27, 2014, at 6:50 PM, Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> wrote: I think this is a fair observation by Donna - on both counts. /t On Mon, Oct 27, 2014, 5:53 PM Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com<mailto:Donna.Austin@ariservices.com>> wrote: Hi Becky I guess what I mean by ‘on an equal basis’ is that they would not have any elevated right above another other member or group of an Oversight Council, ie, their input would not be treated with greater weight or importance than others. While the GAC may not be interested, I could envisage a situation where individual governments may be interested. Thanks, Donna <image001.png>DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne | Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.ariservices.com_&d=A...> Follow us on Twitter<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ARIservices...> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: Monday, 27 October 2014 2:45 PM To: Donna Austin; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities I honestly don’t know that the GAC would want to participate in the Oversight Council – seems very technical/operational to me. I don’t think have a couple of GAC members on the council would be unacceptable to the USG – balance is the key. I’m not sure what you mean by “on an equal basis” however. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com<mailto:Donna.Austin@ariservices.com>> Date: Monday, October 27, 2014 at 2:41 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky, all Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that “… the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution.” I’m just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable? Thanks, Donna <image001.png>DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne|Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.ariservices.com_&d=A...> Follow us on Twitter<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ARIservices...> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren’t actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldn’t those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I don’t know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User’s Council might be affected by the contract, but I don’t think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______
+1 From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 5:52 PM To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Speaking personally, I do not object to governments participating on an equal basis, as defined by Donna. If they were TRULY a part of the MS process (as opposed to a veto for which they have NO accountability) I would welcome them. So far, I am not hearing it Sent from my iPad On Oct 27, 2014, at 6:50 PM, Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> wrote: I think this is a fair observation by Donna - on both counts. /t On Mon, Oct 27, 2014, 5:53 PM Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com<mailto:Donna.Austin@ariservices.com>> wrote: Hi Becky I guess what I mean by 'on an equal basis' is that they would not have any elevated right above another other member or group of an Oversight Council, ie, their input would not be treated with greater weight or importance than others. While the GAC may not be interested, I could envisage a situation where individual governments may be interested. Thanks, Donna <image001.png>DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne | Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.ariservices.com_&d=A...> Follow us on Twitter<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ARIservices...> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: Monday, 27 October 2014 2:45 PM To: Donna Austin; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities I honestly don't know that the GAC would want to participate in the Oversight Council - seems very technical/operational to me. I don't think have a couple of GAC members on the council would be unacceptable to the USG - balance is the key. I'm not sure what you mean by "on an equal basis" however. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com<mailto:Donna.Austin@ariservices.com>> Date: Monday, October 27, 2014 at 2:41 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky, all Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that "... the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution." I'm just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable? Thanks, Donna <image001.png>DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne|Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.ariservices.com_&d=A...> Follow us on Twitter<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ARIservices...> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren't actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldn't those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I don't know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User's Council might be affected by the contract, but I don't think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Don't get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn't object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don't participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc's to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let's see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions - let's call it 'RegistryCo' for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky - you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over' the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let's begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA's to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA's are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the "SLA Council." Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the "technical community proposals" I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants "the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments." That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______
Totally agree with Becky. I think any IANA transition solution that gives governments a special, privileged role is not meeting the NTIA criteria and could not be implemented. Most governmental concerns arise in the policy development process. As I've said before, IANA does not and should not be involved in making policy, nor should it be viewed as a way to veto or circumvent agreed policy. Therefore govts - and we - must not confuse IANA issues with the accountability of ICANN's policy making process. For that reason I really like Stacey King's statement: if GAC is represents on an oversight council "that the ICANN Bylaws provision allowing for GAC advice on any policy matter does not apply to IANA. Ie, that the GAC cannot exercise any additional authority over IANA functions through other means/routes." --MM From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 8:52 PM To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Speaking personally, I do not object to governments participating on an equal basis, as defined by Donna. If they were TRULY a part of the MS process (as opposed to a veto for which they have NO accountability) I would welcome them. So far, I am not hearing it Sent from my iPad On Oct 27, 2014, at 6:50 PM, Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> wrote: I think this is a fair observation by Donna - on both counts. /t On Mon, Oct 27, 2014, 5:53 PM Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com<mailto:Donna.Austin@ariservices.com>> wrote: Hi Becky I guess what I mean by 'on an equal basis' is that they would not have any elevated right above another other member or group of an Oversight Council, ie, their input would not be treated with greater weight or importance than others. While the GAC may not be interested, I could envisage a situation where individual governments may be interested. Thanks, Donna <image001.png>DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne | Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.ariservices.com_&d=A...> Follow us on Twitter<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ARIservices...> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: Monday, 27 October 2014 2:45 PM To: Donna Austin; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities I honestly don't know that the GAC would want to participate in the Oversight Council - seems very technical/operational to me. I don't think have a couple of GAC members on the council would be unacceptable to the USG - balance is the key. I'm not sure what you mean by "on an equal basis" however. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com<mailto:Donna.Austin@ariservices.com>> Date: Monday, October 27, 2014 at 2:41 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky, all Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that "... the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution." I'm just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable? Thanks, Donna <image001.png>DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne|Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.ariservices.com_&d=A...> Follow us on Twitter<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ARIservices...> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren't actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldn't those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I don't know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User's Council might be affected by the contract, but I don't think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Don't get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn't object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don't participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc's to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let's see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions - let's call it 'RegistryCo' for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky - you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over' the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let's begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA's to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA's are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the "SLA Council." Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the "technical community proposals" I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants "the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments." That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______
I'm not speaking on behalf of the GAC here, and not even from my own Government's perspective, however I would remark that ... "I honestly don’t know that the GAC would want to participate in the Oversight Council – seems very technical/operational to me." ... Is probably not representative of several Governments' POV. /t On Mon, Oct 27, 2014, 5:45 PM Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
I honestly don’t know that the GAC would want to participate in the Oversight Council – seems very technical/operational to me. I don’t think have a couple of GAC members on the council would be unacceptable to the USG – balance is the key. I’m not sure what you mean by “on an equal basis” however.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com> Date: Monday, October 27, 2014 at 2:41 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Carolina Aguerre < carolina@lactld.org>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky, all
Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that “… the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution.”
I’m just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable?
Thanks,
Donna
[image: Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]*D**ONNA AUSTIN* Policy and Industry Affairs Manager
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*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM *To:* Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Tracy,
First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren’t actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me.
Second, why couldn’t those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?)
Finally, I don’t know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User’s Council might be affected by the contract, but I don’t think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services.
Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally.
B
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org> *Date: *Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM *To: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hi Tracy,
Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD
Carolina
On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote:
Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD?
So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here.
That is not insubstantial.
I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions.
I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ...
However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs.
Any thoughts?
/t
On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org> wrote:
Thanks Tracy for raising this.
Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions.
However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats:
Out of the 248 ccTLDs:
152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD).
38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO.
58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards,
Peter Van Roste
General Manager, CENTR
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 *To:* Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *"Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM *To: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Cc: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
*From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr < becky.burr@neustar.biz> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa < fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com <gurcharya@gmail.com>]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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Hi. I think there is a great, and fairly obvious, difference between a governmental or intergovernmental led organization, and one where they participate as one stakeholder group among others. In one they are just one stakeholder among many, kind of like in the ICG or ICANN (despite the constant tussle). In the other they are boss, like the ITU or even the CSTD WG on Enhanced Cooperation - where others were allowed to speak for change - but excluded when the talking got to decision making. Since I am at PP14 at the moment, I can tell you the difference is very obvious and palpable. avri On 28-Oct-14 03:41, Donna Austin wrote:
Becky, all
Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that "... the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution."
I'm just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable?
Thanks,
Donna
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From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Tracy,
First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren't actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me.
Second, why couldn't those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?)
Finally, I don't know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User's Council might be affected by the contract, but I don't think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services.
Don't get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn't object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally.
B
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz>
From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hi Tracy,
Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD
Carolina
On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote:
Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD?
So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here.
That is not insubstantial.
I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions.
I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ...
However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs.
Any thoughts?
/t
On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don't participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc's to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz>
From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let's see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions - let's call it 'RegistryCo' for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz>
From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz>
From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky - you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over' the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let's begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA's to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA's are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the "SLA Council." Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
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From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad: By the "technical community proposals" I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants "the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments." That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject:
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
Date:
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
From:
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>
To:
cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards, Acharya
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Dear Donna, all I just wanted to inform you that I have sent an email to GAC members and Participant in the CWG regarding the role of the GAC/government representation in a model where there is established an "Oversight Council" on the IANA function and deliveries. There is of course the fact that each and every GAC representatives only speak on behalf of their own government/administration, but I guess that's also the case for the ccTLDs and gTLDs - they do not represent the whole of the ccNSO or the GNSO as such. The model in itself is very challenging, and we don't have any conclusion on it. I just want to underline that If a council were to be established with broad representation from the community, - I don't see that GAC/Government representation in such a model in any way would be in contradiction with the requirements stated by the NTIA. Governments are one stakeholder in the Multistakeholder ECO system. Their role in a "Oversight Council" on equal basis with other stakeholders, looking after the public interest in the processes of IANA, could not be seen as a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution. Best regards Elise Knutssøn Lindeberg Senior Legal Adviser, GAC representative Networks Department Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority e-mail: ekl@npt.no<mailto:ekl@npt.no> Mobile: +47 90190947 As of January 1st 2015 NPT will be known as the Norwegian Communications Authority. Fra: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] På vegne av Donna Austin Sendt: 27. oktober 2014 19:42 Til: Burr, Becky; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Emne: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky, all Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that "... the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution." I'm just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable? Thanks, Donna [Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne | Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<http://www.ariservices.com/> Follow us on Twitter<https://twitter.com/ARIservices> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org]<mailto:[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org]> On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren't actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldn't those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I don't know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User's Council might be affected by the contract, but I don't think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Don't get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn't object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don't participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc's to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let's see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions - let's call it 'RegistryCo' for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky - you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over' the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let's begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA's to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA's are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the "SLA Council." Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the "technical community proposals" I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants "the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments." That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=0knJhHDN8_VTb0SESfSAujo5jrIrLR9bFwC6kRIu9PY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=nxFm0ts_S3ChCWzkn3RQczBO3NlPaImRwFjf4LcdtHo&e=> -- [cid:image002.jpg@01CFF262.CD086530]
Thanks Elise, very helpful. Sent from my iPhone On Oct 27, 2014, at 8:28 PM, Lindeberg, Elise <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> wrote: Dear Donna, all I just wanted to inform you that I have sent an email to GAC members and Participant in the CWG regarding the role of the GAC/government representation in a model where there is established an “Oversight Council” on the IANA function and deliveries. There is of course the fact that each and every GAC representatives only speak on behalf of their own government/administration, but I guess that’s also the case for the ccTLDs and gTLDs - they do not represent the whole of the ccNSO or the GNSO as such. The model in itself is very challenging, and we don’t have any conclusion on it. I just want to underline that If a council were to be established with broad representation from the community, - I don’t see that GAC/Government representation in such a model in any way would be in contradiction with the requirements stated by the NTIA. Governments are one stakeholder in the Multistakeholder ECO system. Their role in a “Oversight Council” on equal basis with other stakeholders, looking after the public interest in the processes of IANA, could not be seen as a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution. Best regards Elise Knutssøn Lindeberg Senior Legal Adviser, GAC representative Networks Department Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority e-mail: ekl@npt.no<mailto:ekl@npt.no> Mobile: +47 90190947 As of January 1st 2015 NPT will be known as the Norwegian Communications Authority. Fra: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] På vegne av Donna Austin Sendt: 27. oktober 2014 19:42 Til: Burr, Becky; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Emne: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky, all Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that “… the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution.” I’m just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable? Thanks, Donna <image001.png>DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne | Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<http://www.ariservices.com/> Follow us on Twitter<https://twitter.com/ARIservices> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org]<mailto:[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org]> On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren’t actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldn’t those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I don’t know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User’s Council might be affected by the contract, but I don’t think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=0knJhHDN8_VTb0SESfSAujo5jrIrLR9bFwC6kRIu9PY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=nxFm0ts_S3ChCWzkn3RQczBO3NlPaImRwFjf4LcdtHo&e=> -- <image002.jpg>
Great initial response from the GAC Elise. +1 From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Lindeberg, Elise Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2014 3:28 AM To: Donna Austin; Burr, Becky; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Dear Donna, all I just wanted to inform you that I have sent an email to GAC members and Participant in the CWG regarding the role of the GAC/government representation in a model where there is established an "Oversight Council" on the IANA function and deliveries. There is of course the fact that each and every GAC representatives only speak on behalf of their own government/administration, but I guess that's also the case for the ccTLDs and gTLDs - they do not represent the whole of the ccNSO or the GNSO as such. The model in itself is very challenging, and we don't have any conclusion on it. I just want to underline that If a council were to be established with broad representation from the community, - I don't see that GAC/Government representation in such a model in any way would be in contradiction with the requirements stated by the NTIA. Governments are one stakeholder in the Multistakeholder ECO system. Their role in a "Oversight Council" on equal basis with other stakeholders, looking after the public interest in the processes of IANA, could not be seen as a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution. Best regards Elise Knutssøn Lindeberg Senior Legal Adviser, GAC representative Networks Department Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority e-mail: ekl@npt.no<mailto:ekl@npt.no> Mobile: +47 90190947 As of January 1st 2015 NPT will be known as the Norwegian Communications Authority. Fra: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] På vegne av Donna Austin Sendt: 27. oktober 2014 19:42 Til: Burr, Becky; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Emne: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky, all Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that "... the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution." I'm just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable? Thanks, Donna [Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne | Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<http://www.ariservices.com/> Follow us on Twitter<https://twitter.com/ARIservices> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org]<mailto:[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org]> On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren't actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldn't those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I don't know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User's Council might be affected by the contract, but I don't think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Don't get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn't object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don't participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc's to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let's see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions - let's call it 'RegistryCo' for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky - you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over' the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let's begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA's to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA's are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the "SLA Council." Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the "technical community proposals" I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants "the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments." That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=0knJhHDN8_VTb0SESfSAujo5jrIrLR9bFwC6kRIu9PY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=nxFm0ts_S3ChCWzkn3RQczBO3NlPaImRwFjf4LcdtHo&e=> -- [cid:image004.jpg@01CFF29B.35B327E0]
Thanks, Elise. It seems that one way around the concern is that we make sure that somewhere it specifically says that members of the GAC are on equal standing as any other member of the Oversight Council and, in addition, that the ICANN Bylaws provision allowing for GAC advice on any policy matter does not apply to IANA. Ie, that the GAC cannot exercise any additional authority over IANA functions through other means/routes. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of James Gannon Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2014 3:38 AM To: Lindeberg, Elise; Donna Austin; Burr, Becky; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Great initial response from the GAC Elise. +1 From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Lindeberg, Elise Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2014 3:28 AM To: Donna Austin; Burr, Becky; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Dear Donna, all I just wanted to inform you that I have sent an email to GAC members and Participant in the CWG regarding the role of the GAC/government representation in a model where there is established an "Oversight Council" on the IANA function and deliveries. There is of course the fact that each and every GAC representatives only speak on behalf of their own government/administration, but I guess that's also the case for the ccTLDs and gTLDs - they do not represent the whole of the ccNSO or the GNSO as such. The model in itself is very challenging, and we don't have any conclusion on it. I just want to underline that If a council were to be established with broad representation from the community, - I don't see that GAC/Government representation in such a model in any way would be in contradiction with the requirements stated by the NTIA. Governments are one stakeholder in the Multistakeholder ECO system. Their role in a "Oversight Council" on equal basis with other stakeholders, looking after the public interest in the processes of IANA, could not be seen as a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution. Best regards Elise Knutssøn Lindeberg Senior Legal Adviser, GAC representative Networks Department Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority e-mail: ekl@npt.no<mailto:ekl@npt.no> Mobile: +47 90190947 As of January 1st 2015 NPT will be known as the Norwegian Communications Authority. Fra: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] På vegne av Donna Austin Sendt: 27. oktober 2014 19:42 Til: Burr, Becky; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Emne: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky, all Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that "... the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution." I'm just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable? Thanks, Donna [Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne | Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<http://www.ariservices.com/> Follow us on Twitter<https://twitter.com/ARIservices> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org]<mailto:[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org]> On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren't actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldn't those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I don't know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User's Council might be affected by the contract, but I don't think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Don't get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn't object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don't participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc's to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let's see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions - let's call it 'RegistryCo' for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky - you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over' the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let's begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA's to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA's are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the "SLA Council." Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the "technical community proposals" I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants "the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments." That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=0knJhHDN8_VTb0SESfSAujo5jrIrLR9bFwC6kRIu9PY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=nxFm0ts_S3ChCWzkn3RQczBO3NlPaImRwFjf4LcdtHo&e=> -- [cid:image002.jpg@01CFF273.01E7C100]
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues: Things like SLAs, how quickly name server changes are processed, etc. Where a government actually operates the ccTLD, it would be direct consumers of IANA services, like gTLDs and ccTLDs. But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Legal <King>, Stacey King <stacek@amazon.com<mailto:stacek@amazon.com>> Date: Tuesday, October 28, 2014 at 8:50 AM To: James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net<mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>>, Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com<mailto:Donna.Austin@ariservices.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Thanks, Elise. It seems that one way around the concern is that we make sure that somewhere it specifically says that members of the GAC are on equal standing as any other member of the Oversight Council and, in addition, that the ICANN Bylaws provision allowing for GAC advice on any policy matter does not apply to IANA. Ie, that the GAC cannot exercise any additional authority over IANA functions through other means/routes. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of James Gannon Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2014 3:38 AM To: Lindeberg, Elise; Donna Austin; Burr, Becky; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Great initial response from the GAC Elise. +1 From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Lindeberg, Elise Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2014 3:28 AM To: Donna Austin; Burr, Becky; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Dear Donna, all I just wanted to inform you that I have sent an email to GAC members and Participant in the CWG regarding the role of the GAC/government representation in a model where there is established an “Oversight Council” on the IANA function and deliveries. There is of course the fact that each and every GAC representatives only speak on behalf of their own government/administration, but I guess that’s also the case for the ccTLDs and gTLDs - they do not represent the whole of the ccNSO or the GNSO as such. The model in itself is very challenging, and we don’t have any conclusion on it. I just want to underline that If a council were to be established with broad representation from the community, - I don’t see that GAC/Government representation in such a model in any way would be in contradiction with the requirements stated by the NTIA. Governments are one stakeholder in the Multistakeholder ECO system. Their role in a “Oversight Council” on equal basis with other stakeholders, looking after the public interest in the processes of IANA, could not be seen as a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution. Best regards Elise Knutssøn Lindeberg Senior Legal Adviser, GAC representative Networks Department Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority e-mail: ekl@npt.no<mailto:ekl@npt.no> Mobile: +47 90190947 As of January 1st 2015 NPT will be known as theNorwegian Communications Authority. Fra:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] På vegne av Donna Austin Sendt: 27. oktober 2014 19:42 Til: Burr, Becky; Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Emne: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky, all Can someone explain to me how GAC participation/involvement in an Oversight Council is considered in the context of the NTIA provision that “… the NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organisation solution.” I’m just trying to understand the distinction being made here. Is a solution that allows government participation on an equal basis as others, viable? Thanks, Donna [Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne|Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.ariservices.com_&d=A...> Follow us on Twitter<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ARIservices...> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org]<mailto:[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org]>On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Friday, 24 October 2014 7:20 AM To: Carolina Aguerre; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Tracy, First, the total number of completely unaffiliated ccTLDs is somewhere around 58, not 96. I suspect that a few of these aren’t actually delegated, so probably a bit less. But do we think that all gTLDs participate in the gNSO? That would really surprise me. Second, why couldn’t those that are completely unaffiliated and prefer to remain that way participate directly (I.e., without the ccNSO or the regional organization as an intermediary?) Finally, I don’t know why this creates the nexus for GAC in future arrangements? Some ccTLDs operate under government contracts (for example, .US). Our participation in a User’s Council might be affected by the contract, but I don’t think that means the Department of Commerce should (or would want to be) a member of the Council. In a relatively small number of cases, a government institution actually operates the ccTLD. In that case, the government would be a direct consumer of IANA services. Don’t get me wrong, if the notion is that the GAC would have a seat on the Council, I suppose I wouldn’t object, but in my experience members of the GAC represent their OWN governments, not the GAC generally. B J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Carolina Aguerre <carolina@lactld.org<mailto:carolina@lactld.org>> Date: Friday, October 24, 2014 at 6:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi Tracy, Indeed the numbers raised by Peter are global, thus including the LAC region and LACTLD Carolina On 24/10/2014 05:03 a.m., Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google wrote: Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter@centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=MfTsSXzXbuHI0rFcHtnorPW-C4XKghU8vC-r39Erl4M&e=>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=ZpmqRGN-6diwUv7gbTulgFXccZAa2eMl5e0pxgIPoEk&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=GgzA5SwJogI0ald8wwDSR-ml1BmbWp0LkVsHeAGs0EU&s=0knJhHDN8_VTb0SESfSAujo5jrIrLR9bFwC6kRIu9PY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMD-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=QpQAt_piuchJf9ejWDh3H_z119DN4HT2HzMk0YusRzw&s=nxFm0ts_S3ChCWzkn3RQczBO3NlPaImRwFjf4LcdtHo&e=> -- [cid:image002.jpg@01CFF273.01E7C100]
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
At this stage, I don’t think we should be wedded to the terminology of an “oversight council;” some of us would prefer to see it as a “contracting authority” for the IANA functions that would conduct “oversight” to verify and enforce its SLAs. So in that sense, my view is consistent with Allan’s as expressed below but its primary function would be to award the contract. --MM From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Allan MacGillivray Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 9:02 AM To: Guru Acharya; Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks: The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements. Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council: 1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator 2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism". 3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC. 4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator. How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO? On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Guru Acharya *Sent:* October-29-14 8:32 AM *To:* Becky Burr *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards,
Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks: The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements. Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council: 1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator 2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism". 3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC. 4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator. How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO? On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments. From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem. Alan At 29/10/2014 10:33 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
Id envisioned the Oversight Council to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Lets not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Guru Acharya <<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>gurcharya@gmail.com> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>becky.burr@neustar.biz>, "<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>elise.lindeberg@npt.no> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
I see the oversight council as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the oversight council alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From:<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards,
Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the oversight counsel would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise public interest concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
If IANA is not implementing policy properly, the GNSO would call the Board and staff out. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:00 AM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem. Alan At 29/10/2014 10:33 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> >, " cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no> > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks: The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements. Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council: 1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator 2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism". 3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC. 4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator. How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO? On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> > wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=f_dUJVj6jJPmpQAt5smHRlUgXbM0PYmu7UGCflKYh9Y&s=8JQhW6hJkxj5xWBI55LWXbi9z_hph1qAqsepz9bJTv0&e=>
You are presuming that the GNSO is watching, which is not it its formal mandate, nor does it have any real mechanism which which to take action if it did. Alan At 29/10/2014 02:17 PM, Burr, Becky wrote:
If IANA is not implementing policy properly, the GNSO would call the Board and staff out.
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Alan Greenberg <<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:00 AM To: Becky Burr <<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Guru Acharya <<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>gurcharya@gmail.com>, Allan MacGillivray <<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: "<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>elise.lindeberg@npt.no> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem.
Alan
At 29/10/2014 10:33 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
Id envisioned the Oversight Council to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Lets not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Guru Acharya <<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>gurcharya@gmail.com> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>becky.burr@neustar.biz
, "<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>elise.lindeberg@npt.no > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote: I see the oversight council as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the oversight council alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From:<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards, Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>Becky.Burr@neustar.biz > wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the oversight counsel would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise public interest concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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The GNSO should be watching if implementation of policy is in question but, more importantly, the watching would probably come from the RySG as a SG in the GNSO and more importantly a registry operator who experiences a problem. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 2:43 PM To: Burr, Becky; Guru Acharya; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities You are presuming that the GNSO is watching, which is not it its formal mandate, nor does it have any real mechanism which which to take action if it did. Alan At 29/10/2014 02:17 PM, Burr, Becky wrote: If IANA is not implementing policy properly, the GNSO would call the Board and staff out. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> From: Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> > Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:00 AM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> >, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: " cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no> > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem. Alan At 29/10/2014 10:33 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: I'd envisioned the "Oversight Council" to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella - so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) - so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let's not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> >, " cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no> > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks: The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements. Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council: 1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator 2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism". 3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC. 4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator. How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO? On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the "oversight council" as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the 'oversight council' alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> > wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the "oversight counsel" would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise "public interest" concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
If IANA is not implementing policy properly, the GNSO would call the Board and staff out. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> I don't get this. The Board and staff of ICANN are part of the policy development process and thus should not be in charge of the IANA. Milton L. Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/mueller/Home.html
+1 there needs to be a separation of responsibility for oversight to be effective in this situation. James Gannon Director Cyber Invasion Ltd Dun Laoghaire, County Dublin, Ireland Cell: +353 (0)86-025-8974 Email:james@cyberinvasion.net<mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net?subject=Via:%20Email%20Signature> From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Milton L Mueller Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 8:59 PM To: 'Burr, Becky'; 'Alan Greenberg'; 'Guru Acharya'; 'Allan MacGillivray' Cc: 'cwg-stewardship@icann.org'; 'Lindeberg, Elise' Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities If IANA is not implementing policy properly, the GNSO would call the Board and staff out. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> I don't get this. The Board and staff of ICANN are part of the policy development process and thus should not be in charge of the IANA. Milton L. Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/mueller/Home.html
"If IANA is not implementing policy properly, the GNSO would call the Board and staff out." The GNSO could do that now. Under the current set-up, the NTIA provides an additional level of oversight and accountability (and redress) above and beyond dealing with the Board and staff. When the NTIA exits, the GNSO should not be left to "calling out" the Board and staff as a method of dealing with IANA issues, policy or otherwise. And the GNSO should not be left to petitioning a Registry Council from outside the gates. Greg Shatan On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 2:17 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
If IANA is not implementing policy properly, the GNSO would call the Board and staff out.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:00 AM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no>
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem.
Alan
At 29/10/2014 10:33 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz >, " cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards,
Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz > wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_li...>
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The issue is how to possibly add in - - The ability to strengthen the ability for concerns to be raised - Aa much stronger oversight mechanism/body that has an enforcement capability over the board & staff. Robert
On Oct 29, 2014, at 2:17 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
If IANA is not implementing policy properly, the GNSO would call the Board and staff out.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz
From: Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca <mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:00 AM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no <mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem.
Alan
At 29/10/2014 10:33 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> >, " cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no <mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no> > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards,
Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> > wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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Well said Robert. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Robert Guerra Sent: Thursday, October 30, 2014 11:21 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities The issue is how to possibly add in - - The ability to strengthen the ability for concerns to be raised - Aa much stronger oversight mechanism/body that has an enforcement capability over the board & staff. Robert On Oct 29, 2014, at 2:17 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: If IANA is not implementing policy properly, the GNSO would call the Board and staff out. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:00 AM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem. Alan At 29/10/2014 10:33 AM, Burr, Becky wrote: I'd envisioned the "Oversight Council" to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella - so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) - so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let's not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> >, " cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no> > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks: The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements. Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council: 1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator 2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism". 3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC. 4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator. How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO? On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the "oversight council" as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the 'oversight council' alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> > wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the "oversight counsel" would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise "public interest" concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=f_dUJVj6jJPmpQAt5smHRlUgXbM0PYmu7UGCflKYh9Y&s=8JQhW6hJkxj5xWBI55LWXbi9z_hph1qAqsepz9bJTv0&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
My two cents on .NZ's setup. It looks good on paper and has been shown to work for .NZ but I think I'm right in saying that all the separate arms are in the same building and all the heads of the different arms not only know one another but are actually quite good friends. This is obviously great for .NZ but IANA is a very different animal. To extrapolate .NZ to the global root, you'd need to dig into the details of any disagreements and see how they were resolved - whether personally or through process. Kieren On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 10:28 AM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> wrote:
Well said Robert.
Chuck
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Robert Guerra *Sent:* Thursday, October 30, 2014 11:21 AM *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
The issue is how to possibly add in -
- The ability to strengthen the ability for concerns to be raised
- Aa much stronger oversight mechanism/body that has an enforcement capability over the board & staff.
Robert
On Oct 29, 2014, at 2:17 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
If IANA is not implementing policy properly, the GNSO would call the Board and staff out.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> *Date: *Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:00 AM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Guru Acharya < gurcharya@gmail.com>, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem.
Alan
At 29/10/2014 10:33 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz >, " cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya
Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM
To: Becky Burr
Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards,
Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz > wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 4:20 PM, Robert Guerra <rguerra@privaterra.org> wrote:
The issue is how to possibly add in -
- The ability to strengthen the ability for concerns to be raised - Aa much stronger oversight mechanism/body that has an enforcement capability over the board & staff.
Great and it will be good if such mechanism is more concentrated on board while we leave board to ensure that staff comply Cheers!
Robert
On Oct 29, 2014, at 2:17 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
If IANA is not implementing policy properly, the GNSO would call the Board and staff out.
J. Beckwith Burr *Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:00 AM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem.
Alan
At 29/10/2014 10:33 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz >, " cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards,
Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz > wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* The key to understanding is humility - my view !
Hi, It feels to me like I have a naively simplistic view of what we should be discussing and proposing to the ICG. Sure…, there need to be more effective safeguards than are currently in existence for (any and all) stakeholders to be able to address cases where implementation of policy is not proceeding as intended. These also certainly need to be more serious and enforceable than the current process of “requests for reconsideration”, where the ICANN board is asked to reconsider the dodgy decisions they themselves make. However, I would not want to conflate these issues with what we are discussing here. They constitute concerns of broader ICANN accountability, and need to be addressed and dealt with in parallel to the IANA stewardship transition. I’m concerned that if we try to deal with issues of ICANN accountability using oversight here now, we’ll never get the actual transition of IANA stewardship done in time. Like I said, I have a rather simplistic view here; an agreement between two parties — a principle and a contractor. Terms of the agreement need to be set, probably very much consistent with the technical duties Becky listed earlier. In the event of a breach of contract, the principle could (according to the terms of the agreement) either terminate the relationship with the contractor seeking an alternative IANA operator, or whatever it is we decide might be a less drastic set of steps to take before reaching this conclusion. I’m guessing that gTLD and ccTLD registries will be the most likely to be able to point out that a breach in contract has occurred under those conditions. So their inclusion in the group constituting the principle should be a no-brainer. If other stakeholders want to be involved in the group, we should be made to understand exactly why. I’m not saying there shouldn’t be any, but I would really like to understand the necessity. Is there a concern that the principle in the agreement may abuse its authority by either terminating the contract without just cause? Perhaps grant the contract to another operator for underhanded reasons? I can see why it would be beneficial to have others in the loop of the decision-making body for those purposes, but that is still not the same as oversight of the operator to me. The oversight is still being done by the direct client (registries). Furthermore, aren’t there already laws in place that would allow a wronged contractor to sue a principle that terminates a contract unjustly? I’m really asking as I am not a legal expert of any kind. Aren’t there any? Would be grateful to hear more thoughts, with specifics on why folks believe it is important to have multistakeholder oversight of the OPERATOR (not policy development organisation), and how this would be achieved. Thanks. Amr On Oct 30, 2014, at 4:20 PM, Robert Guerra <rguerra@privaterra.org> wrote:
The issue is how to possibly add in -
- The ability to strengthen the ability for concerns to be raised - Aa much stronger oversight mechanism/body that has an enforcement capability over the board & staff.
Robert
On Oct 29, 2014, at 2:17 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
If IANA is not implementing policy properly, the GNSO would call the Board and staff out.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:00 AM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem.
Alan
At 29/10/2014 10:33 AM, Burr, Becky wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz >, " cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards,
Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz > wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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First I am not in favour of the wording Oversight Council or any such attempts of councils and new orgs etc. In the IANA sense of things, I'd stick with an ad-hoc committee that would be put together with representation beyond a registry controlled group. This committee can be well equipped to deal with SLA and contractual agreements etc. Such a committee must be established on the basis of a multistakeholder representation that is renewed each year in an open and transparent manner where openess, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective is well represented. Whoever says this is impractical may be over looking the fact that there is similarity with IGF MAG and various ICANN AC/OC selection processes though not optimal but indeed adoptable with certain improvements. Making IANA prone to new councils or orgs etc is impractical. IANA can itself exist independently with an Advisory or Management committee with rotating yearly membership but contractual staffing. Best Found On Wednesday, 29 October 2014, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','becky.burr@neustar.biz');> / www.neustar.biz
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','gurcharya@gmail.com');>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','allan.macgillivray@cira.ca');>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','becky.burr@neustar.biz');>>, " cwg-stewardship@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship@icann.org');>" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship@icann.org');>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','elise.lindeberg@npt.no');>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','allan.macgillivray@cira.ca');>> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org');> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org');>] *On Behalf Of *Guru Acharya *Sent:* October-29-14 8:32 AM *To:* Becky Burr *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship@icann.org');>; Lindeberg, Elise *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards,
Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Becky.Burr@neustar.biz');>> wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa
Dear Fouad, Reply in in-line On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 9:12 PM, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> wrote:
First I am not in favour of the wording Oversight Council or any such attempts of councils and new orgs etc.
In the IANA sense of things, I'd stick with an ad-hoc committee that would be put together with representation beyond a registry controlled group. This committee can be well equipped to deal with SLA and contractual agreements etc.
Are you suggesting an ad-hoc committee inside ICANN? How can an ad-hoc committee inside ICANN have a contractual agreement with IANA that is also within ICANN? If you are suggesting an ad-hoc committee outside the ICANN umbrella then thats exactly what we are calling an Oversight Council.
Such a committee must be established on the basis of a multistakeholder representation that is renewed each year in an open and transparent manner where openess, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective is well represented.
In your ad-hoc committee, we are dealing with Beckys suggestion of whether only registeries should be part of the committee because the day to day SLA monitoring is technical and operational without any policy implications. Therefore, if you are suggesting a MS representation beyond the registeries, request you to explain how you are countering Beckys rationale?
Whoever says this is impractical may be over looking the fact that there is similarity with IGF MAG and various ICANN AC/OC selection processes though not optimal but indeed adoptable with certain improvements.
Nobody is contesting that there can be a selection/nomination process with sufficient accountability checks.
Making IANA prone to new councils or orgs etc is impractical. IANA can itself exist independently with an Advisory or Management committee with rotating yearly membership but contractual staffing.
I dont understand how IANA is suddenly independent? Are you suggesting that IANA be transferred to a new entity?
Best
Found
IANA is a service provider. If you hire a contractor to build a house, it is the contractor’s job to make sure that the plumber and the electrician do their work properly. If your house burns down because the wiring is faulty, you are going to look to the contractor – not the electrician – to make you whole. I fully support multi-stakeholder policy development. Multi-stakeholder oversight of the electrician doesn’t make sense to me. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:42 AM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities First I am not in favour of the wording Oversight Council or any such attempts of councils and new orgs etc. In the IANA sense of things, I'd stick with an ad-hoc committee that would be put together with representation beyond a registry controlled group. This committee can be well equipped to deal with SLA and contractual agreements etc. Such a committee must be established on the basis of a multistakeholder representation that is renewed each year in an open and transparent manner where openess, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective is well represented. Whoever says this is impractical may be over looking the fact that there is similarity with IGF MAG and various ICANN AC/OC selection processes though not optimal but indeed adoptable with certain improvements. Making IANA prone to new councils or orgs etc is impractical. IANA can itself exist independently with an Advisory or Management committee with rotating yearly membership but contractual staffing. Best Found On Wednesday, 29 October 2014, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','becky.burr@neustar.biz');> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','gurcharya@gmail.com');>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','allan.macgillivray@cira.ca');>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','becky.burr@neustar.biz');>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship@icann.org');>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship@icann.org');>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','elise.lindeberg@npt.no');>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks: The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements. Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council: 1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator 2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism". 3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC. 4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator. How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO? On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','allan.macgillivray@cira.ca');>> wrote: I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments. From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org');> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org');>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship@icann.org');>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Becky.Burr@neustar.biz');>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=f6KZGZywZb0e4ozcRq4rLx4kuzJ2KwUFbRMZv_-FhSs&s=sYaRjaOne3P6EYfVw3R4CZPTVnChBjo6B5QE6mL2goI&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=f6KZGZywZb0e4ozcRq4rLx4kuzJ2KwUFbRMZv_-FhSs&s=Em5lnxmSZ4r7HBAgLB0FLACjyTcRc8PYd_vAAOwHFpA&e=>
Becky, I don't normally like analogies because they often break down, but since you introduced it, you are right, if the house burns down I might go after the contractor, but that does not stop me from, when there is an opportunity, watching the electrician and bricklayer and plumber and calling them on things that they are doing wrong. A far easier, faster and cheaper way to fix problems than after the fire or flood or house collapse (and from personal experieince, it works). Alan At 29/10/2014 01:20 PM, Burr, Becky wrote:
IANA is a service provider. If you hire a contractor to build a house, it is the contractors job to make sure that the plumber and the electrician do their work properly. If your house burns down because the wiring is faulty, you are going to look to the contractor not the electrician to make you whole.
I fully support multi-stakeholder policy development. Multi-stakeholder oversight of the electrician doesnt make sense to me.
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Fouad Bajwa <<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:42 AM To: Becky Burr <<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>becky.burr@neustar.biz> Cc: Guru Acharya <<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>gurcharya@gmail.com>, Allan MacGillivray <<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, "<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>elise.lindeberg@npt.no> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
First I am not in favour of the wording Oversight Council or any such attempts of councils and new orgs etc.
In the IANA sense of things, I'd stick with an ad-hoc committee that would be put together with representation beyond a registry controlled group. This committee can be well equipped to deal with SLA and contractual agreements etc.
Such a committee must be established on the basis of a multistakeholder representation that is renewed each year in an open and transparent manner where openess, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective is well represented.
Whoever says this is impractical may be over looking the fact that there is similarity with IGF MAG and various ICANN AC/OC selection processes though not optimal but indeed adoptable with certain improvements.
Making IANA prone to new councils or orgs etc is impractical. IANA can itself exist independently with an Advisory or Management committee with rotating yearly membership but contractual staffing.
Best
Found
On Wednesday, 29 October 2014, Burr, Becky <<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote: Id envisioned the Oversight Council to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Lets not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / <http://www.neustar.biz>www.neustar.biz
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
I see the oversight council as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the oversight council alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards,
Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the oversight counsel would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise public interest concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=f6KZGZywZb0e4ozcRq4rLx4kuzJ2KwUFbRMZv_-FhSs&s=sYaRjaOne3P6EYfVw3R4CZPTVnChBjo6B5QE6mL2goI&e=>http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=f6KZGZywZb0e4ozcRq4rLx4kuzJ2KwUFbRMZv_-FhSs&s=Em5lnxmSZ4r7HBAgLB0FLACjyTcRc8PYd_vAAOwHFpA&e=>http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa
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Agree
On Oct 29, 2014, at 1:20 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
IANA is a service provider. If you hire a contractor to build a house, it is the contractor’s job to make sure that the plumber and the electrician do their work properly. If your house burns down because the wiring is faulty, you are going to look to the contractor – not the electrician – to make you whole.
I fully support multi-stakeholder policy development. Multi-stakeholder oversight of the electrician doesn’t make sense to me.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz
From: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com <mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:42 AM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no <mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
First I am not in favour of the wording Oversight Council or any such attempts of councils and new orgs etc.
In the IANA sense of things, I'd stick with an ad-hoc committee that would be put together with representation beyond a registry controlled group. This committee can be well equipped to deal with SLA and contractual agreements etc.
Such a committee must be established on the basis of a multistakeholder representation that is renewed each year in an open and transparent manner where openess, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective is well represented.
Whoever says this is impractical may be over looking the fact that there is similarity with IGF MAG and various ICANN AC/OC selection processes though not optimal but indeed adoptable with certain improvements.
Making IANA prone to new councils or orgs etc is impractical. IANA can itself exist independently with an Advisory or Management committee with rotating yearly membership but contractual staffing.
Best
Found
On Wednesday, 29 October 2014, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','becky.burr@neustar.biz');> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','gurcharya@gmail.com');>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','allan.macgillivray@cira.ca');>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','becky.burr@neustar.biz');>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship@icann.org');>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship@icann.org');>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','elise.lindeberg@npt.no');>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','allan.macgillivray@cira.ca');>> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org');> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org');>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship@icann.org');>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards, Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Becky.Burr@neustar.biz');>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blog...> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d...>
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
If we are not careful, we are going to overcomplicate a process that is working very well. We need to ensure that there is true accountability but whatever we do must not slow down the delivery of IANA services. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Fouad Bajwa Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 11:42 AM To: Burr, Becky Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities First I am not in favour of the wording Oversight Council or any such attempts of councils and new orgs etc. In the IANA sense of things, I'd stick with an ad-hoc committee that would be put together with representation beyond a registry controlled group. This committee can be well equipped to deal with SLA and contractual agreements etc. Such a committee must be established on the basis of a multistakeholder representation that is renewed each year in an open and transparent manner where openess, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective is well represented. Whoever says this is impractical may be over looking the fact that there is similarity with IGF MAG and various ICANN AC/OC selection processes though not optimal but indeed adoptable with certain improvements. Making IANA prone to new councils or orgs etc is impractical. IANA can itself exist independently with an Advisory or Management committee with rotating yearly membership but contractual staffing. Best Found On Wednesday, 29 October 2014, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','becky.burr@neustar.biz');> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','gurcharya@gmail.com');>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','allan.macgillivray@cira.ca');>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','becky.burr@neustar.biz');>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship@icann.org');>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship@icann.org');>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','elise.lindeberg@npt.no');>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks: The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements. Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council: 1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator 2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism". 3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC. 4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator. How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO? On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','allan.macgillivray@cira.ca');>> wrote: I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments. From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org');> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org');>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cwg-stewardship@icann.org');>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Becky.Burr@neustar.biz');>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa
Hello all, irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too. Kind regards, Olivier On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no <mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Guru Acharya *Sent:* October-29-14 8:32 AM *To:* Becky Burr *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards,
Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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Oliver, I agree we haven't reached consensus that we are going with an Oversight Council. However, I figure this discussion is just with the hope of thrashing out alternatives so that we can eventually reach consensus. Anyway, as Allan suggested, I see two types of oversights emerging 1) Day to day oversight 2) Major review oversight "Day to day oversight" include SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. "Major review oversight" include change in IANA operator or any major review of IANA as done in 2011 by NTIA. In my opinion, while "day to day oversight" is technical/operational; any "major review oversight" will involve policy issues. I agree with Becky that "day to day oversight" only involves the registeries. I however strongly feel that "major review oversight" involves the GAC and ALAC and other stakeholder groups from GNSO such as NCSG. Establishing a "separate mechanism" for "major review oversight" appears to be cumbersome. Therefore i disagree with Alan and Milton. I feel it is simpler to include all ACs and SGs in the "Oversight Council" to deal with "major review oversight". On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 9:20 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Guru Acharya *Sent:* October-29-14 8:32 AM *To:* Becky Burr *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards,
Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
With the exception of changing providers, I think all “major review oversight” will involve ICANN policy, and hence will be decided by ICANN through the multi-stakeholder policy process. To the extent we are talking about remedies for serious failures to perform the IANA functions (e.g., to change providers) then I agree that something else is needed. But I can’t think of anything else that falls into that group. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 12:07 PM To: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Oliver, I agree we haven't reached consensus that we are going with an Oversight Council. However, I figure this discussion is just with the hope of thrashing out alternatives so that we can eventually reach consensus. Anyway, as Allan suggested, I see two types of oversights emerging 1) Day to day oversight 2) Major review oversight "Day to day oversight" include SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. "Major review oversight" include change in IANA operator or any major review of IANA as done in 2011 by NTIA. In my opinion, while "day to day oversight" is technical/operational; any "major review oversight" will involve policy issues. I agree with Becky that "day to day oversight" only involves the registeries. I however strongly feel that "major review oversight" involves the GAC and ALAC and other stakeholder groups from GNSO such as NCSG. Establishing a "separate mechanism" for "major review oversight" appears to be cumbersome. Therefore i disagree with Alan and Milton. I feel it is simpler to include all ACs and SGs in the "Oversight Council" to deal with "major review oversight". On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 9:20 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too. Kind regards, Olivier On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote: I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks: The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements. Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council: 1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator 2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism". 3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC. 4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator. How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO? On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments. From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=6frHEnLraO0jl7d5yyRqhcMMRK-T0qbhn5smyjyM57Y&s=pExxed9bE9eN3PwH0AdQTOkQbUmc0R9NzScE08v3gnc&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=6frHEnLraO0jl7d5yyRqhcMMRK-T0qbhn5smyjyM57Y&s=pExxed9bE9eN3PwH0AdQTOkQbUmc0R9NzScE08v3gnc&e=>
In my opinion, while "day to day oversight" is technical/operational; any "major review oversight" will involve policy issues. It depends on what you mean by “policy issues.” I would disagree that the choice of an IANA operator is a way to make global policy for the DNS. What you call “major review oversight” is, I think, nothing more than the power to change the IANA functions operator. Milton L. Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/mueller/Home.html I agree with Becky that "day to day oversight" only involves the registeries. I however strongly feel that "major review oversight" involves the GAC and ALAC and other stakeholder groups from GNSO such as NCSG. Establishing a "separate mechanism" for "major review oversight" appears to be cumbersome. Therefore i disagree with Alan and Milton. I feel it is simpler to include all ACs and SGs in the "Oversight Council" to deal with "major review oversight". On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 9:20 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too. Kind regards, Olivier On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote: I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks: The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements. Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council: 1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator 2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism". 3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC. 4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator. How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO? On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments. From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Milton: I agree that changing the IANA operator is a technical decision and not a policy decision; however there are contingent policy issues that may arise due to this technical decision - such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator - where GAC/ALAC participation may be beneficial. On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 2:27 AM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
In my opinion, while "day to day oversight" is technical/operational; any "major review oversight" will involve policy issues.
It depends on what you mean by “policy issues.” I would disagree that the choice of an IANA operator is a way to make global policy for the DNS. What you call “major review oversight” is, I think, nothing more than the power to change the IANA functions operator.
Guru My understanding of the contingent policy issues you identify are taken into account by IANA in their review of any delegation/redelegation requests. Thanks, Donna [Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]DONNA AUSTIN Policy and Industry Affairs Manager ARI REGISTRY SERVICES Melbourne | Los Angeles P +1 310 890 9655 P +61 3 9866 3710 E donna.austin@ariservices.com<mailto:donna.austin@ariservices.com> W www.ariservices.com<http://www.ariservices.com/> Follow us on Twitter<https://twitter.com/ARIservices> The information contained in this communication is intended for the named recipients only. It is subject to copyright and may contain legally privileged and confidential information and if you are not an intended recipient you must not use, copy, distribute or take any action in reliance on it. If you have received this communication in error, please delete all copies from your system and notify us immediately. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: Wednesday, 29 October 2014 2:11 PM To: Milton L Mueller Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Milton: I agree that changing the IANA operator is a technical decision and not a policy decision; however there are contingent policy issues that may arise due to this technical decision - such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator - where GAC/ALAC participation may be beneficial. On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 2:27 AM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> wrote: In my opinion, while "day to day oversight" is technical/operational; any "major review oversight" will involve policy issues. It depends on what you mean by “policy issues.” I would disagree that the choice of an IANA operator is a way to make global policy for the DNS. What you call “major review oversight” is, I think, nothing more than the power to change the IANA functions operator.
Donna. I dont think policy issues arising as a result of delegation and redelegation of TLDs are the same as the policy issues arising as a result of contracting a new IANA operator. We're talking about C.7.3 from the IANA Functions Contract. On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 3:51 PM, Donna Austin <Donna.Austin@ariservices.com> wrote:
Guru
My understanding of the contingent policy issues you identify are taken into account by IANA in their review of any delegation/redelegation requests.
Thanks,
Donna
[image: Description: Description: Description: ARI Logo]*D**ONNA AUSTIN* Policy and Industry Affairs Manager
*ARI REGISTRY SERVICES* Melbourne *|* Los Angeles *P* +1 310 890 9655 *P* +61 3 9866 3710 *E* donna.austin@ariservices.com *W* www.ariservices.com
*Follow us on **Twitter* <https://twitter.com/ARIservices>
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*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Guru Acharya *Sent:* Wednesday, 29 October 2014 2:11 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Milton: I agree that changing the IANA operator is a technical decision and not a policy decision; however there are contingent policy issues that may arise due to this technical decision - such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator - where GAC/ALAC participation may be beneficial.
On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 2:27 AM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
In my opinion, while "day to day oversight" is technical/operational; any "major review oversight" will involve policy issues.
It depends on what you mean by “policy issues.” I would disagree that the choice of an IANA operator is a way to make global policy for the DNS. What you call “major review oversight” is, I think, nothing more than the power to change the IANA functions operator.
Olivier, Thanks for this input. I’d like to take a step back so that we are all on the same page. I hope everyone with take the time to review this post. I think we are making this work unnecessarily complicated. Under the straw man I’ve suggested the “Council” or “Body” or whatever it is called is responsible for negotiating and interacting with IANA on technical issues. As defined by the IANA functions contract, IANA’s naming-related tasks include the following: 1. Root Zone File Change Request Management -- The Contractor shall receive and process root zone file change requests for TLDs as expeditiously as possible. This does not include a policy role at all. A new TLD is entered into the root only after the ICANN Board directs IANA to do that. Policy remains in ICANN, not the IANA function. 2. Root Zone “WHOIS” Change Request and Database Management -- The Contractor shall maintain, update, and make publicly accessible a Root Zone “WHOIS” database with current and verified contact information for all TLD registry operators. Again, this involves no policy role. ICANN makes policy on WHOIS, not IANA. IANA just follows ICANN’s orders. 3. Delegation and Redelegation of a Generic TLDs and Country Code TLDs. Again, the role is administrative and not policy making. IANA adds or removes a TLD from the root only at the direction of the ICANN Board. It is responsible for documenting that the action was consistent with established ICANN policy, but has no role in formulating that policy. 4. Root Zone Automation -- The Contractor shall work with NTIA and the Root Zone Maintainer, and collaborate with all interested and affected parties to deploy a fully automated root zone management system. This is an administrative/operations task, not a policy task. 5. Root Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Key Management --The Contractor shall be responsible for the management of the root zone Key Signing Key (KSK), including generation, publication, and use for signing the Root Keyset. Again, DNSSEC policy is set by ICANN, informed by all stakeholders, the SSAC, etc. IANA simply administers the ICANN policy. 6. Customer Service Complaint Resolution Process (CSCRP) --The Contractor shall work with NTIA and collaborate with all interested and affected parties to establish and implement a process for IANA function customers to submit complaints for timely resolution that follows industry best practice and includes a reasonable timeframe for resolution. This relates to complaints about IANA doing its technical job in a timely and competent fashion, not policy, which remains with ICANN. 7. Perform Administrative Functions Associated With Root Zone Management. Facilitate and coordinate the root zone of the domain name system, and maintain 24 hour-a-day/7 days-a-week operational coverage. I would agree with you that a conflict of interest could emerge if IANA was developing policies for the registries, but that is not what’s being proposed. Rather, all policy work would remain with ICANN subject to multi-stakeholder processes – just as it is now. What conflict of interest arises in this situation? Registries will be in the best position to know whether or not IANA is processing name server changes in a timely fashion. Registries are harmed if it takes forever to do that. To the limited extent this kind of thing might impact end users, registries have all of the necessary incentives to get it fixed. In the early years of ICANN, when IANA was performing very poorly, registries were unhappy, but most of the rest of the ICANN community was not impacted in any way. Today, the ICANN board - NOT IANA - promises stakeholders that IANA will do its work in accordance with ICANN policy. If it doesn't, I am going to look to the ICANN Board and not the IANA staff for redress. I don’t see a conflict of interest in registries performing an oversight role with respect to IANA’s purely technical and operational functions. Remember, the IANA function contract specifies that IANA’s role is technical and operational, not policy development. If IANA does something that is inconsistent with ICANN policy, I want the ICANN Board to be accountable. Again, to be clear, I am not unalterably opposed to having other parts of the community participate, but I don’t understand why they would want to. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hello all, irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too. Kind regards, Olivier On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote: I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks: The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements. Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council: 1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator 2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism". 3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC. 4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator. How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO? On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments. From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMF-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=TdVuaup5FYNO7Kbzw-WeiPL40WR6uQHvHCZH8wY06S4&s=yoOCQp_8bldp5dAaRtsRf1G1SnLtkZg7UeOAZjWdPj8&e=>
Sorry, formatting was odd, so resending Olivier, Thanks for this input. I’d like to take a step back so that we are all on the same page. I hope everyone with take the time to review this post. I think we are making this work unnecessarily complicated. Under the straw man I’ve suggested the “Council” or “Body” or whatever it is called is responsible for negotiating and interacting with IANA on technical issues. As defined by the IANA functions contract, IANA’s naming-related tasks include the following: Root Zone File Change Request Management— The Contractor shall receive and process root zone file change requests for TLDs as expeditiously as possible. This does not include a policy role at all. A new TLD is entered into the root only after the ICANN Board directs IANA to do that. Policy remains in ICANN, not the IANA function. Root Zone “WHOIS” Change Request and Database Management –The Contractor shall maintain, update, and make publicly accessible a Root Zone “WHOIS” database with current and verified contact information for all TLD registry operators. Again, this involves no policy role. ICANN makes policy on WHOIS, not IANA. IANA just follows ICANN’s orders. Delegation and Redelegation of Generic TLDs and Country Code TLDs. Again, the role is administrative and not policy making. IANA adds or removes a TLD from the root only at the direction of the ICANN Board. It is responsible for documenting that the action was consistent with established ICANN policy, but has no role in formulating that policy. Root Zone Automation--The Contractor shall work with NTIA and the Root Zone Maintainer, and collaborate with all interested and affected parties to deploy a fully automated root zone managements system. This is an administrative/operations task, not a policy task. Root Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Key Management—The Contractor shall be responsible for the management of the root zone Key Signing Key (KSK), including generation, publication, and use for signing the Root Key set. Again, DNSSEC policy is set by ICANN, informed by all stakeholders, the SSAC, etc. IANA simply administers the ICANN policy. Customer Service Complaint Resolution Process (CSCRP)—The Contractor shall work with NTIA and collaborate with all interested and affected parties to establish and implement a process for IANA function customers to submit complaints for timely resolution that follows industry best practice a and includes a reasonable time frame for resolution. This relates to complaints about IANA doing its technical job in a timely and competent fashion, not policy, which remains with ICANN. Perform Administrative Functions Associated With Root Zone Management. Facilitate and coordinate the root zone of the domain name system, and maintain24 hour-a-day/7days-a-weekoperationalcoverage. I would agree with you that a conflict of interest could emerge if IANA was developing policies for the registries, but that is not what’s being proposed. Rather, all policy work would remain with ICANN subject to multi-stakeholder processes – just as it is now. What conflict of interest arises in this situation? Registries will be in the best position to know whether or not IANA is processing name server changes in a timely fashion. Registries are harmed if it takes forever to do that. To the limited extent this kind of thing might impact end users, registries have all of the necessary incentives to get it fixed. In the early years of ICANN, when IANA was performing very poorly, registries were unhappy, but most of the rest of the ICANN community was not impacted in any way. Today, the ICANN board - NOT IANA - promises stakeholders that IANA will do its work in accordance with ICANN policy. If it doesn't, I am going to look to the ICANN Board and not the IANA staff for redress. I don’t see a conflict of interest in registries performing an oversight role with respect to IANA’s purely technical and operational functions. Remember, the IANA function contract specifies that IANA’s role is technical and operational, not policy development. If IANA does something that is inconsistent with ICANN policy, I want the ICANN Board to be accountable. Again, to be clear, I am not unalterably opposed to having other parts of the community participate, but I don’t understand why they would want to. Becky J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: <Burr>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 1:16 PM To: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Olivier, Thanks for this input. I’d like to take a step back so that we are all on the same page. I hope everyone with take the time to review this post. I think we are making this work unnecessarily complicated. Under the straw man I’ve suggested the “Council” or “Body” or whatever it is called is responsible for negotiating and interacting with IANA on technical issues. As defined by the IANA functions contract, IANA’s naming-related tasks include the following: 1. RootZone FileChangeRequestManagement-- TheContractorshallreceiveandprocessrootzonefile changerequests forTLDsas expeditiouslyas possible. This does not include a policy role at all. A new TLD is entered into the root only after the ICANN Board directs IANA to do that. Policy remains in ICANN, not the IANA function. 2. RootZone“WHOIS”ChangeRequestandDatabaseManagement --TheContractorshallmaintain,update,and make publiclyaccessible aRootZone“WHOIS”databasewithcurrentand verifiedcontact informationforallTLD registryoperators. Again, this involves no policy role. ICANN makes policy on WHOIS, not IANA. IANA just follows ICANN’s orders. 3. DelegationandRedelegationofa Generic TLDs and CountryCode TLDs. Again, the role is administrative and not policy making. IANA adds or removes a TLD from the root only at the direction of the ICANN Board. It is responsible for documenting that the action was consistent with established ICANN policy, but has no role in formulating that policy. 4. RootZone Automation--The Contractor shallworkwithNTIA andtheRootZoneMaintainer,and collaboratewithall interestedandaffectedparties todeploya fullyautomated rootzonemanagementsystem. This is an administrative/operations task, not a policy task. 5. RootDomainNameSystemSecurityExtensions(DNSSEC)Key Management--TheContractorshallbe responsiblefor themanagementof the rootzoneKey SigningKey(KSK),includinggeneration,publication,andusefor signingthe RootKeyset. Again, DNSSEC policy is set by ICANN, informed by all stakeholders, the SSAC, etc. IANA simply administers the ICANN policy. 6. CustomerServiceComplaintResolutionProcess(CSCRP)--TheContractorshallworkwithNTIAand collaboratewithallinterestedandaffectedpartiestoestablishandimplementaprocessforIANAfunctioncustomerstosubmitcomplaintsfortimelyresolutionthatfollows industrybestpracticeandincludesareasonabletimeframeforresolution. This relates to complaints about IANA doing its technical job in a timely and competent fashion, not policy, which remains with ICANN. 7. PerformAdministrativeFunctionsAssociatedWith RootZoneManagement. Facilitateand coordinatetherootzone ofthedomainnamesystem,and maintain24 hour-a-day/7days-a-weekoperationalcoverage. I would agree with you that a conflict of interest could emerge if IANA was developing policies for the registries, but that is not what’s being proposed. Rather, all policy work would remain with ICANN subject to multi-stakeholder processes – just as it is now. What conflict of interest arises in this situation? Registries will be in the best position to know whether or not IANA is processing name server changes in a timely fashion. Registries are harmed if it takes forever to do that. To the limited extent this kind of thing might impact end users, registries have all of the necessary incentives to get it fixed. In the early years of ICANN, when IANA was performing very poorly, registries were unhappy, but most of the rest of the ICANN community was not impacted in any way. Today, the ICANN board - NOT IANA - promises stakeholders that IANA will do its work in accordance with ICANN policy. If it doesn't, I am going to look to the ICANN Board and not the IANA staff for redress. I don’t see a conflict of interest in registries performing an oversight role with respect to IANA’s purely technical and operational functions. Remember, the IANA function contract specifies that IANA’s role is technical and operational, not policy development. If IANA does something that is inconsistent with ICANN policy, I want the ICANN Board to be accountable. Again, to be clear, I am not unalterably opposed to having other parts of the community participate, but I don’t understand why they would want to. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hello all, irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too. Kind regards, Olivier On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote: I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks: The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements. Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council: 1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator 2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism". 3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC. 4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator. How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO? On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments. From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMF-g&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=TdVuaup5FYNO7Kbzw-WeiPL40WR6uQHvHCZH8wY06S4&s=yoOCQp_8bldp5dAaRtsRf1G1SnLtkZg7UeOAZjWdPj8&e=>
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
Sorry, formatting was odd, so resending
Olivier,
Thanks for this input. I’d like to take a step back so that we are all on the same page. I hope everyone with take the time to review this post. I think we are making this work unnecessarily complicated.
Under the straw man I’ve suggested the “Council” or “Body” or whatever it is called is responsible for negotiating and interacting with IANA on technical issues.
Hmm...technical issue? so its assumed that the members of the council will be technical folks right? or the council members will further employ people to do their review? (Because i am positive that Larry of NTIA may not necessarily be technical enough to follow-up with the terms of the contract. However their oversight has been smooth because NTIA has access to resources to get as much personnel as required)
As defined by the IANA functions contract, IANA’s naming-related tasks include the following:
<snipped the functions> And you don't think the community within ICANN can also perform those functions?....isn't what we are doing right now a sample? wouldn't setting up a cwg for this purpose achieve the same goal
I would agree with you that a conflict of interest could emerge if IANA was developing policies for the registries, but that is not what’s being proposed.
*Rather, all policy work would remain with ICANN subject to
multi-stakeholder processes – just as it is now*. What conflict of interest arises in this situation?
Multi-stakeholder group that also consist of the registries right. Proposing a council consisting registries alone already create another layer of decision making which generally means that the registries can wake-up one day and decide that ICANN is not doing fine (since they are presumably the contractor). How does the community's view get to influence such decision making? Also recall that the transition by NTIA requirement indicated that the role be transferred to multi-stakeholder and i don't think the registry alone will fit such description.
Registries will be in the best position to know whether or not IANA is processing name server changes in a timely fashion. Registries are harmed if it takes forever to do that.
Well if they are then, they should raise it as a member of the community, again performing this role should not make the registries the contractor; they don't have to be a contractor to know/do this.
I don’t see a conflict of interest in registries performing an oversight role with respect to IANA’s purely technical and operational functions.
Again i have no problem with them doing this, but i have a problem when i don't have the opportunity to be part of the decision making (as an end-user for instance).
Remember, the IANA function contract specifies that IANA’s role is technical and operational, *not policy development. *If IANA does something that is inconsistent with ICANN policy, I want the ICANN Board to be accountable.
I think even an end-user who is involved in the process will detect this, its not overly technical to know when something is going wrong.
Again, to be clear, I am not unalterably opposed to having other parts of the community participate, but I don’t understand why they would want to.
They want to because they utilise the names resources. Perhaps i should refer to the numbers world where the oversight rest on community as much as possible(does not mean there is no room for improvement). I think such would be desired for the names world. Getting the registries to become the contractor and then the same registries participate in the policy process (with others) already is an indication of probable conflict in near future. There is also the aspect of who determines the members of the council. Registries are not fairly distribute accross regions, so how will that be resolved to ensure there is fairness of representation. Who funds the council to perform its operations? these are all questions that could help us appreciate that we may be heading to creating a political council and not necessarily a technical council Regards
Becky
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: <Burr>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 1:16 PM To: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Olivier,
Thanks for this input. I’d like to take a step back so that we are all on the same page. I hope everyone with take the time to review this post. I think we are making this work unnecessarily complicated.
Under the straw man I’ve suggested the “Council” or “Body” or whatever it is called is responsible for negotiating and interacting with IANA on technical issues. As defined by the IANA functions contract, IANA’s naming-related tasks include the following:
1. *RootZone FileChangeRequestManagement-- *TheContractorshallreceive andprocessrootzonefile changerequests forTLDsas expeditiouslyas possible. This does not include a policy role at all. A new TLD is entered into the root only after the ICANN Board directs IANA to do that. Policy remains in ICANN, not the IANA function. 2. *Root**Zone“WHOIS”ChangeRequestandDatabaseManagement --*The Contractorshallmaintain,update,and make publiclyaccessible aRootZone“ WHOIS”databasewithcurrentand verifiedcontact informationforallTLD r egistryoperators. Again, this involves no policy role. ICANN makes policy on WHOIS, not IANA. IANA just follows ICANN’s orders. 3. *DelegationandRedelegation**ofa Generic TLDs and CountryCode** TLDs*. Again, the role is administrative and not policy making. IANA adds or removes a TLD from the root only at the direction of the ICANN Board. It is responsible for documenting that the action was consistent with established ICANN policy, but has no role in formulating that policy. 4. *RootZone Automation--*The Contractor shallworkwithNTIA andtheRoot ZoneMaintainer,and collaboratewithall interestedandaffectedparties to deploya fullyautomated rootzonemanagementsystem. This is an administrative/operations task, not a policy task. 5. *RootDomainNameSystemSecurityExtensions(DNSSEC)Key Management--*The Contractorshallbe responsiblefor themanagementof the rootzoneKey SigningKey(KSK),includinggeneration,publication,andusefor signingthe RootKeyset. Again, DNSSEC policy is set by ICANN, informed by all stakeholders, the SSAC, etc. IANA simply administers the ICANN policy. 6. *CustomerServiceComplaintResolutionProcess(CSCRP)--*TheContractor shallworkwithNTIAand collaboratewithallinterestedandaffectedpartiesto establishandimplementaprocessforIANAfunctioncustomerstosubmitcomplaints fortimelyresolutionthatfollows industrybestpracticeandincludesa reasonabletimeframeforresolution. This relates to complaints about IANA doing its technical job in a timely and competent fashion, not policy, which remains with ICANN. 7. *PerformAdministrativeFunctionsAssociatedWith RootZoneManagement. F*acilitateand coordinatetherootzone ofthedomainnamesystem,and maintain24 hour-a-day/7days-a-weekoperationalcoverage.
I would agree with you that a conflict of interest could emerge if IANA was developing policies for the registries, but that is not what’s being proposed. *Rather, all policy work would remain with ICANN subject to multi-stakeholder processes – just as it is now*. What conflict of interest arises in this situation? Registries will be in the best position to know whether or not IANA is processing name server changes in a timely fashion. Registries are harmed if it takes forever to do that. To the limited extent this kind of thing might impact end users, registries have all of the necessary incentives to get it fixed. In the early years of ICANN, when IANA was performing very poorly, registries were unhappy, but most of the rest of the ICANN community was not impacted in any way. Today, the ICANN board - NOT IANA - promises stakeholders that IANA will do its work in accordance with ICANN policy. If it doesn't, I am going to look to the ICANN Board and not the IANA staff for redress.
I don’t see a conflict of interest in registries performing an oversight role with respect to IANA’s purely technical and operational functions. Remember, the IANA function contract specifies that IANA’s role is technical and operational, *not policy development. *If IANA does something that is inconsistent with ICANN policy, I want the ICANN Board to be accountable.
Again, to be clear, I am not unalterably opposed to having other parts of the community participate, but I don’t understand why they would want to.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hello all,
irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Guru Acharya *Sent:* October-29-14 8:32 AM *To:* Becky Burr *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org; Lindeberg, Elise *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards,
Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* The key to understanding is humility - my view !
Becky, Some personal (non-authoritative) opinions intended to offer slight clarifications/comments: On Oct 29, 2014, at 10:39 AM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
Root Zone File Change Request Management— The Contractor shall receive and process root zone file change requests for TLDs as expeditiously as possible. This does not include a policy role at all. A new TLD is entered into the root only after the ICANN Board directs IANA to do that. Policy remains in ICANN, not the IANA function.
This third sentence here is probably misplaced. While true, I presume you are talking here about root zone change requests (i.e., name server changes, delegation signer changes, or glue changes), not adding a new TLD (which is discussed under delegation/redelegation). To be explicit, the board does NOT direct IANA staff to do name server, delegation signer, and/or glue changes but does confirm staff has followed documented policy in the cases of delegations and re-delegations and directs staff to go ahead. And yes, policy is not in the IANA function.
Root Zone “WHOIS” Change Request and Database Management –The Contractor shall maintain, update, and make publicly accessible a Root Zone “WHOIS” database with current and verified contact information for all TLD registry operators. Again, this involves no policy role. ICANN makes policy on WHOIS, not IANA. IANA just follows ICANN’s orders.
Agreed that there is no policy role. However, a slight ambiguity/complication here: not just ICANN's orders. Whois, the protocol, is defined by the IETF and the data schema associated with registration data is somewhat entangled with IETF requirements. For example, there is a requirement implicit in the new RDAP protocol (likely to eventually replace the Whois protocol) that the registration data include a pointer to the RDAP server. I believe the IETF will be instructing IANA (in the "IANA Considerations" section of the RDAP specification RFCs) to do whatever is necessary for that pointer is kept with the registration data.
Delegation and Redelegation of Generic TLDs and Country Code TLDs. Again, the role is administrative and not policy making. IANA adds or removes a TLD from the root only at the direction of the ICANN Board. It is responsible for documenting that the action was consistent with established ICANN policy, but has no role in formulating that policy.
True.
Root Zone Automation--The Contractor shall work with NTIA and the Root Zone Maintainer, and collaborate with all interested and affected parties to deploy a fully automated root zone managements system. This is an administrative/operations task, not a policy task.
Agreed that this is not policy and it is probably worth pointing out this has been done (as much as software is ever 'done').
Root Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Key Management—The Contractor shall be responsible for the management of the root zone Key Signing Key (KSK), including generation, publication, and use for signing the Root Key set. Again, DNSSEC policy is set by ICANN, informed by all stakeholders, the SSAC, etc. IANA simply administers the ICANN policy.
It is true that IANA simply (for some value of the variable 'simply' :)) administers the policy, however the statement of DNSSEC policy (known as the DNSSEC Practice Statement or DPS) was a joint effort between ICANN staff and Verisign, with significant input from the community, designed to meet the requirements specified by NTIA (the actual DPS is at https://www.iana.org/dnssec/icann-dps.txt).
Customer Service Complaint Resolution Process (CSCRP)—The Contractor shall work with NTIA and collaborate with all interested and affected parties to establish and implement a process for IANA function customers to submit complaints for timely resolution that follows industry best practice a and includes a reasonable time frame for resolution. This relates to complaints about IANA doing its technical job in a timely and competent fashion, not policy, which remains with ICANN.
True.
Perform Administrative Functions Associated With Root Zone Management. Facilitate and coordinate the root zone of the domain name system, and maintain 24 hour-a-day/7 days-a-week operational coverage.
I would agree that this is not policy (if that was your intent). Hope this helps. Regards, -drc
Joy, Thanks for sharing the experience in .nz. Curious to hear from others if the example from NZ could scale to what we have in mind for the IANA transition. Robert
On Oct 29, 2014, at 6:31 PM, joy <joy@apc.org> wrote:
hi all In .nz I have direct experience of structures developed for handoff oversight of an SLA negotiated with a single shared registry service. The oversight function is by a small board of directors (which until recently I chaired) on which no registries or registrars are represented. Instead, a small group of persons with the skills needed to oversee the function in the public interest do so - there are no government persons . It used to be called the .nz Oversight Committee, but is now the Domain Name Commission Limited (a charitable public interest company). There is a separate registrar advisory committee. of course, it is a small and discrete example, but it works and works well. My point, is that an oversight committee can operate to ensure day to day oversight of a technical SLA. To do so, it's important to focus on the skills the oversight function needs, not simply the stakeholders it can represent or the clients it might serve.
Regards
Joy Liddicoat
On 30/10/2014 6:16 a.m., Burr, Becky wrote:
Olivier,
Thanks for this input. I’d like to take a step back so that we are all on the same page. I hope everyone with take the time to review this post. I think we are making this work unnecessarily complicated.
Under the straw man I’ve suggested the “Council” or “Body” or whatever it is called is responsible for negotiating and interacting with IANA on technical issues. As defined by the IANA functions contract, IANA’s naming-related tasks include the following:
Root Zone File Change Request Management -- The Contractorshall receive and process root zone file change requests for TLDs asexpeditiously as possible. This does not include a policy role at all. A new TLD is entered into the root only after the ICANN Board directs IANA to do that. Policy remains in ICANN, not the IANA function. Root Zone “WHOIS” Change Request and DatabaseManagement -- The Contractor shall maintain, update, and make publicly accessible a Root Zone “WHOIS” database with current and verified contact information for all TLD registry operators. Again, this involves no policy role. ICANN makes policy on WHOIS, not IANA. IANA just follows ICANN’s orders. Delegation and Redelegation of a Generic TLDs and CountryCode TLDs. Again, the role is administrative and not policy making. IANA adds or removes a TLD from the root only at the direction of the ICANN Board. It is responsible for documenting that the action was consistent with established ICANN policy, but has no role in formulating that policy. Root Zone Automation -- The Contractor shall work with NTIA andthe Root Zone Maintainer, and collaborate with all interested andaffected parties to deploy a fully automated root zone managementsystem. This is an administrative/operations task, not a policy task. Root Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) KeyManagement --The Contractor shall be responsible for themanagement of the root zone Key Signing Key (KSK), includinggeneration, publication, and use for signing the Root Keyset. Again, DNSSEC policy is set by ICANN, informed by all stakeholders, the SSAC, etc. IANA simply administers the ICANN policy. Customer Service Complaint Resolution Process (CSCRP) --TheContractor shall work with NTIA and collaborate with all interestedand affected parties to establish and implement a process for IANAfunction customers to submit complaints for timely resolution thatfollows industry best practice and includes a reasonable timeframefor resolution. This relates to complaints about IANA doing its technical job in a timely and competent fashion, not policy, which remains with ICANN. Perform Administrative Functions Associated With Root ZoneManagement. Facilitate and coordinate the root zone of the domainname system, and maintain 24 hour-a-day/7 days-a-weekoperational coverage.
I would agree with you that a conflict of interest could emerge if IANA was developing policies for the registries, but that is not what’s being proposed. Rather, all policy work would remain with ICANN subject to multi-stakeholder processes – just as it is now. What conflict of interest arises in this situation? Registries will be in the best position to know whether or not IANA is processing name server changes in a timely fashion. Registries are harmed if it takes forever to do that. To the limited extent this kind of thing might impact end users, registries have all of the necessary incentives to get it fixed. In the early years of ICANN, when IANA was performing very poorly, registries were unhappy, but most of the rest of the ICANN community was not impacted in any way. Today, the ICANN board - NOT IANA - promises stakeholders that IANA will do its work in accordance with ICANN policy. If it doesn't, I am going to look to the ICANN Board and not the IANA staff for redress.
I don’t see a conflict of interest in registries performing an oversight role with respect to IANA’s purely technical and operational functions. Remember, the IANA function contract specifies that IANA’s role is technical and operational, not policy development. If IANA does something that is inconsistent with ICANN policy, I want the ICANN Board to be accountable.
Again, to be clear, I am not unalterably opposed to having other parts of the community participate, but I don’t understand why they would want to.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hello all,
irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no <mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards, Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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Hi, I find this sort of setup appealing if we decide that there must be a standing oversight, something I am still not sure about. It seems far better than a setup controlled by registries. Focusing on necessary skill set instead of client with vested interest makes good sense. I see no reason why it shouldn't scale, what are the scaling factors that make you think it might not? there are almost alwasy fewer names at the top level than at even the smallest 2nd level. avri On 31-Oct-14 00:24, Robert Guerra wrote:
Joy,
Thanks for sharing the experience in .nz. Curious to hear from others if the example from NZ could scale to what we have in mind for the IANA transition.
Robert
On Oct 29, 2014, at 6:31 PM, joy <joy@apc.org> wrote:
hi all In .nz I have direct experience of structures developed for handoff oversight of an SLA negotiated with a single shared registry service. The oversight function is by a small board of directors (which until recently I chaired) on which no registries or registrars are represented. Instead, a small group of persons with the skills needed to oversee the function in the public interest do so - there are no government persons . It used to be called the .nz Oversight Committee, but is now the Domain Name Commission Limited (a charitable public interest company). There is a separate registrar advisory committee. of course, it is a small and discrete example, but it works and works well. My point, is that an oversight committee can operate to ensure day to day oversight of a technical SLA. To do so, it's important to focus on the skills the oversight function needs, not simply the stakeholders it can represent or the clients it might serve.
Regards
Joy Liddicoat
On 30/10/2014 6:16 a.m., Burr, Becky wrote:
Olivier,
Thanks for this input. I'd like to take a step back so that we are all on the same page. I hope everyone with take the time to review this post. I think we are making this work unnecessarily complicated.
Under the straw man I've suggested the "Council" or "Body" or whatever it is called is responsible for negotiating and interacting with IANA on technical issues. As defined by the IANA functions contract, IANA's naming-related tasks include the following:
Root Zone File Change Request Management -- The Contractorshall receive and process root zone file change requests for TLDs asexpeditiously as possible. This does not include a policy role at all. A new TLD is entered into the root only after the ICANN Board directs IANA to do that. Policy remains in ICANN, not the IANA function. Root Zone "WHOIS" Change Request and DatabaseManagement -- The Contractor shall maintain, update, and make publicly accessible a Root Zone "WHOIS" database with current and verified contact information for all TLD registry operators. Again, this involves no policy role. ICANN makes policy on WHOIS, not IANA. IANA just follows ICANN's orders. Delegation and Redelegation of a Generic TLDs and CountryCode TLDs. Again, the role is administrative and not policy making. IANA adds or removes a TLD from the root only at the direction of the ICANN Board. It is responsible for documenting that the action was consistent with established ICANN policy, but has no role in formulating that policy. Root Zone Automation -- The Contractor shall work with NTIA andthe Root Zone Maintainer, and collaborate with all interested andaffected parties to deploy a fully automated root zone managementsystem. This is an administrative/operations task, not a policy task. Root Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) KeyManagement --The Contractor shall be responsible for themanagement of the root zone Key Signing Key (KSK), includinggeneration, publication, and use for signing the Root Keyset. Again, DNSSEC policy is set by ICANN, informed by all stakeholders, the SSAC, etc. IANA simply administers the ICANN policy. Customer Service Complaint Resolution Process (CSCRP) --TheContractor shall work with NTIA and collaborate with all interestedand affected parties to establish and implement a process for IANAfunction customers to submit complaints for timely resolution thatfollows industry best practice and includes a reasonable timeframefor resolution. This relates to complaints about IANA doing its technical job in a timely and competent fashion, not policy, which remains with ICANN. Perform Administrative Functions Associated With Root ZoneManagement. Facilitate and coordinate the root zone of the domainname system, and maintain 24 hour-a-day/7 days-a-weekoperational coverage.
I would agree with you that a conflict of interest could emerge if IANA was developing policies for the registries, but that is not what's being proposed. Rather, all policy work would remain with ICANN subject to multi-stakeholder processes -- just as it is now. What conflict of interest arises in this situation? Registries will be in the best position to know whether or not IANA is processing name server changes in a timely fashion. Registries are harmed if it takes forever to do that. To the limited extent this kind of thing might impact end users, registries have all of the necessary incentives to get it fixed. In the early years of ICANN, when IANA was performing very poorly, registries were unhappy, but most of the rest of the ICANN community was not impacted in any way. Today, the ICANN board - NOT IANA - promises stakeholders that IANA will do its work in accordance with ICANN policy. If it doesn't, I am going to look to the ICANN Board and not the IANA staff for redress.
I don't see a conflict of interest in registries performing an oversight role with respect to IANA's purely technical and operational functions. Remember, the IANA function contract specifies that IANA's role is technical and operational, not policy development. If IANA does something that is inconsistent with ICANN policy, I want the ICANN Board to be accountable.
Again, to be clear, I am not unalterably opposed to having other parts of the community participate, but I don't understand why they would want to.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hello all,
irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote:
I'd envisioned the "Oversight Council" to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella -- so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) -- so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let's not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no <mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the "oversight council" as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the 'oversight council' alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards, Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the "oversight counsel" would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise "public interest" concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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On Fri, Oct 31, 2014 at 12:17 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
I find this sort of setup appealing if we decide that there must be a standing oversight, something I am still not sure about. It seems far better than a setup controlled by registries. Focusing on necessary skill set instead of client with vested interest makes good sense.
+1. It would ease off any kind of bottlenecks, i think. And, if registries may still be part of the setup, it should be nothing but on a dependent roles on those with no interest.
I see no reason why it shouldn't scale, what are the scaling factors that make you think it might not? there are almost alwasy fewer names at the top level than at even the smallest 2nd level.
avri
Regards,
Wale
On 31-Oct-14 00:24, Robert Guerra wrote:
Joy,
Thanks for sharing the experience in .nz. Curious to hear from others if the example from NZ could scale to what we have in mind for the IANA transition.
Robert
On Oct 29, 2014, at 6:31 PM, joy <joy@apc.org> <joy@apc.org> wrote:
hi all In .nz I have direct experience of structures developed for handoff oversight of an SLA negotiated with a single shared registry service. The oversight function is by a small board of directors (which until recently I chaired) on which no registries or registrars are represented. Instead, a small group of persons with the skills needed to oversee the function in the public interest do so - there are no government persons . It used to be called the .nz Oversight Committee, but is now the Domain Name Commission Limited (a charitable public interest company). There is a separate registrar advisory committee. of course, it is a small and discrete example, but it works and works well. My point, is that an oversight committee can operate to ensure day to day oversight of a technical SLA. To do so, it's important to focus on the skills the oversight function needs, not simply the stakeholders it can represent or the clients it might serve.
Regards
Joy Liddicoat
On 30/10/2014 6:16 a.m., Burr, Becky wrote:
Olivier,
Thanks for this input. I’d like to take a step back so that we are all on the same page. I hope everyone with take the time to review this post. I think we are making this work unnecessarily complicated.
Under the straw man I’ve suggested the “Council” or “Body” or whatever it is called is responsible for negotiating and interacting with IANA on technical issues. As defined by the IANA functions contract, IANA’s naming-related tasks include the following:
Root Zone File Change Request Management -- The Contractorshall receive and process root zone file change requests for TLDs asexpeditiously as possible. This does not include a policy role at all. A new TLD is entered into the root only after the ICANN Board directs IANA to do that. Policy remains in ICANN, not the IANA function. Root Zone “WHOIS” Change Request and DatabaseManagement -- The Contractor shall maintain, update, and make publicly accessible a Root Zone “WHOIS” database with current and verified contact information for all TLD registry operators. Again, this involves no policy role. ICANN makes policy on WHOIS, not IANA. IANA just follows ICANN’s orders. Delegation and Redelegation of a Generic TLDs and CountryCode TLDs. Again, the role is administrative and not policy making. IANA adds or removes a TLD from the root only at the direction of the ICANN Board. It is responsible for documenting that the action was consistent with established ICANN policy, but has no role in formulating that policy. Root Zone Automation -- The Contractor shall work with NTIA andthe Root Zone Maintainer, and collaborate with all interested andaffected parties to deploy a fully automated root zone managementsystem. This is an administrative/operations task, not a policy task. Root Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) KeyManagement --The Contractor shall be responsible for themanagement of the root zone Key Signing Key (KSK), includinggeneration, publication, and use for signing the Root Keyset. Again, DNSSEC policy is set by ICANN, informed by all stakeholders, the SSAC, etc. IANA simply administers the ICANN policy. Customer Service Complaint Resolution Process (CSCRP) --TheContractor shall work with NTIA and collaborate with all interestedand affected parties to establish and implement a process for IANAfunction customers to submit complaints for timely resolution thatfollows industry best practice and includes a reasonable timeframefor resolution. This relates to complaints about IANA doing its technical job in a timely and competent fashion, not policy, which remains with ICANN. Perform Administrative Functions Associated With Root ZoneManagement. Facilitate and coordinate the root zone of the domainname system, and maintain 24 hour-a-day/7 days-a-weekoperational coverage.
I would agree with you that a conflict of interest could emerge if IANA was developing policies for the registries, but that is not what’s being proposed. Rather, all policy work would remain with ICANN subject to multi-stakeholder processes – just as it is now. What conflict of interest arises in this situation? Registries will be in the best position to know whether or not IANA is processing name server changes in a timely fashion. Registries are harmed if it takes forever to do that. To the limited extent this kind of thing might impact end users, registries have all of the necessary incentives to get it fixed. In the early years of ICANN, when IANA was performing very poorly, registries were unhappy, but most of the rest of the ICANN community was not impacted in any way. Today, the ICANN board - NOT IANA - promises stakeholders that IANA will do its work in accordance with ICANN policy. If it doesn't, I am going to look to the ICANN Board and not t! he IANA staff for redress.
I don’t see a conflict of interest in registries performing an oversight role with respect to IANA’s purely technical and operational functions. Remember, the IANA function contract specifies that IANA’s role is technical and operational, not policy development. If IANA does something that is inconsistent with ICANN policy, I want the ICANN Board to be accountable.
Again, to be clear, I am not unalterably opposed to having other parts of the community participate, but I don’t understand why they would want to.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com> <ocl@gih.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hello all,
irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no <mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no> <elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards, Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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On Oct 31, 2014, at 8:17 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
I find this sort of setup appealing if we decide that there must be a standing oversight, something I am still not sure about. It seems far better than a setup controlled by registries. Focusing on necessary skill set instead of client with vested interest makes good sense.
If we want to explore the .nz example some further, it might be good to hear more about the history - issues/disputes, how issues have been resolved and what if any enforcement mechanisms are possible.
I see no reason why it shouldn't scale, what are the scaling factors that make you think it might not? there are almost alwasy fewer names at the top level than at even the smallest 2nd level.
More staff and likely more issues involved at IANA vs. NZ. Yes, less names.. Robert
On 31-Oct-14 00:24, Robert Guerra wrote:
Joy,
Thanks for sharing the experience in .nz. Curious to hear from others if the example from NZ could scale to what we have in mind for the IANA transition.
Robert
On Oct 29, 2014, at 6:31 PM, joy <joy@apc.org> <mailto:joy@apc.org> wrote:
hi all In .nz I have direct experience of structures developed for handoff oversight of an SLA negotiated with a single shared registry service. The oversight function is by a small board of directors (which until recently I chaired) on which no registries or registrars are represented. Instead, a small group of persons with the skills needed to oversee the function in the public interest do so - there are no government persons . It used to be called the .nz Oversight Committee, but is now the Domain Name Commission Limited (a charitable public interest company). There is a separate registrar advisory committee. of course, it is a small and discrete example, but it works and works well. My point, is that an oversight committee can operate to ensure day to day oversight of a technical SLA. To do so, it's important to focus on the skills the oversight function needs, not simply the stakeholders it can represent or the clients it might serve.
Regards
Joy Liddicoat
On 30/10/2014 6:16 a.m., Burr, Becky wrote:
Olivier,
Thanks for this input. I’d like to take a step back so that we are all on the same page. I hope everyone with take the time to review this post. I think we are making this work unnecessarily complicated.
Under the straw man I’ve suggested the “Council” or “Body” or whatever it is called is responsible for negotiating and interacting with IANA on technical issues. As defined by the IANA functions contract, IANA’s naming-related tasks include the following:
Root Zone File Change Request Management -- The Contractorshall receive and process root zone file change requests for TLDs asexpeditiously as possible. This does not include a policy role at all. A new TLD is entered into the root only after the ICANN Board directs IANA to do that. Policy remains in ICANN, not the IANA function. Root Zone “WHOIS” Change Request and DatabaseManagement -- The Contractor shall maintain, update, and make publicly accessible a Root Zone “WHOIS” database with current and verified contact information for all TLD registry operators. Again, this involves no policy role. ICANN makes policy on WHOIS, not IANA. IANA just follows ICANN’s orders. Delegation and Redelegation of a Generic TLDs and CountryCode TLDs. Again, the role is administrative and not policy making. IANA adds or removes a TLD from the root only at the direction of the ICANN Board. It is responsible for documenting that the action was consistent with established ICANN policy, but has no role in formulating that policy. Root Zone Automation -- The Contractor shall work with NTIA andthe Root Zone Maintainer, and collaborate with all interested andaffected parties to deploy a fully automated root zone managementsystem. This is an administrative/operations task, not a policy task. Root Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) KeyManagement --The Contractor shall be responsible for themanagement of the root zone Key Signing Key (KSK), includinggeneration, publication, and use for signing the Root Keyset. Again, DNSSEC policy is set by ICANN, informed by all stakeholders, the SSAC, etc. IANA simply administers the ICANN policy. Customer Service Complaint Resolution Process (CSCRP) --TheContractor shall work with NTIA and collaborate with all interestedand affected parties to establish and implement a process for IANAfunction customers to submit complaints for timely resolution thatfollows industry best practice and includes a reasonable timeframefor resolution. This relates to complaints about IANA doing its technical job in a timely and competent fashion, not policy, which remains with ICANN. Perform Administrative Functions Associated With Root ZoneManagement. Facilitate and coordinate the root zone of the domainname system, and maintain 24 hour-a-day/7 days-a-weekoperational coverage.
I would agree with you that a conflict of interest could emerge if IANA was developing policies for the registries, but that is not what’s being proposed. Rather, all policy work would remain with ICANN subject to multi-stakeholder processes – just as it is now. What conflict of interest arises in this situation? Registries will be in the best position to know whether or not IANA is processing name server changes in a timely fashion. Registries are harmed if it takes forever to do that. To the limited extent this kind of thing might impact end users, registries have all of the necessary incentives to get it fixed. In the early years of ICANN, when IANA was performing very poorly, registries were unhappy, but most of the rest of the ICANN community was not impacted in any way. Today, the ICANN board - NOT IANA - promises stakeholders that IANA will do its work in accordance with ICANN policy. If it doesn't, I am going to look to the ICANN Board and not t! he IANA staff for redress.
I don’t see a conflict of interest in registries performing an oversight role with respect to IANA’s purely technical and operational functions. Remember, the IANA function contract specifies that IANA’s role is technical and operational, not policy development. If IANA does something that is inconsistent with ICANN policy, I want the ICANN Board to be accountable.
Again, to be clear, I am not unalterably opposed to having other parts of the community participate, but I don’t understand why they would want to.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com> <mailto:ocl@gih.com> <mailto:ocl@gih.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hello all,
irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz/> <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no <mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no> <mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no> <mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards, Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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Becky, Thank you for the email and laying out the processes defined in the IANA functions contract. Good that you remind us that the existing technical/ operational processes work well now. The challenge is adding accountability, which is the non-technical oversight role that NTIA can exert over ICANN now. Robert
On Oct 29, 2014, at 1:16 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
Olivier,
Thanks for this input. I’d like to take a step back so that we are all on the same page. I hope everyone with take the time to review this post. I think we are making this work unnecessarily complicated.
Under the straw man I’ve suggested the “Council” or “Body” or whatever it is called is responsible for negotiating and interacting with IANA on technical issues. As defined by the IANA functions contract, IANA’s naming-related tasks include the following:
Root Zone File Change Request Management -- The Contractor shall receive and process root zone file change requests for TLDs as expeditiously as possible. This does not include a policy role at all. A new TLD is entered into the root only after the ICANN Board directs IANA to do that. Policy remains in ICANN, not the IANA function. Root Zone “WHOIS” Change Request and Database Management -- The Contractor shall maintain, update, and make publicly accessible a Root Zone “WHOIS” database with current and verified contact information for all TLD registry operators. Again, this involves no policy role. ICANN makes policy on WHOIS, not IANA. IANA just follows ICANN’s orders. Delegation and Redelegation of a Generic TLDs and Country Code TLDs. Again, the role is administrative and not policy making. IANA adds or removes a TLD from the root only at the direction of the ICANN Board. It is responsible for documenting that the action was consistent with established ICANN policy, but has no role in formulating that policy. Root Zone Automation -- The Contractor shall work with NTIA and the Root Zone Maintainer, and collaborate with all interested and affected parties to deploy a fully automated root zone management system. This is an administrative/operations task, not a policy task. Root Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Key Management --The Contractor shall be responsible for the management of the root zone Key Signing Key (KSK), including generation, publication, and use for signing the Root Keyset. Again, DNSSEC policy is set by ICANN, informed by all stakeholders, the SSAC, etc. IANA simply administers the ICANN policy. Customer Service Complaint Resolution Process (CSCRP) --The Contractor shall work with NTIA and collaborate with all interested and affected parties to establish and implement a process for IANA function customers to submit complaints for timely resolution that follows industry best practice and includes a reasonable timeframe for resolution. This relates to complaints about IANA doing its technical job in a timely and competent fashion, not policy, which remains with ICANN. Perform Administrative Functions Associated With Root Zone Management. Facilitate and coordinate the root zone of the domain name system, and maintain 24 hour-a-day/7 days-a-week operational coverage.
I would agree with you that a conflict of interest could emerge if IANA was developing policies for the registries, but that is not what’s being proposed. Rather, all policy work would remain with ICANN subject to multi-stakeholder processes – just as it is now. What conflict of interest arises in this situation? Registries will be in the best position to know whether or not IANA is processing name server changes in a timely fashion. Registries are harmed if it takes forever to do that. To the limited extent this kind of thing might impact end users, registries have all of the necessary incentives to get it fixed. In the early years of ICANN, when IANA was performing very poorly, registries were unhappy, but most of the rest of the ICANN community was not impacted in any way. Today, the ICANN board - NOT IANA - promises stakeholders that IANA will do its work in accordance with ICANN policy. If it doesn't, I am going to look to the ICANN Board and not the IANA staff for redress.
I don’t see a conflict of interest in registries performing an oversight role with respect to IANA’s purely technical and operational functions. Remember, the IANA function contract specifies that IANA’s role is technical and operational, not policy development. If IANA does something that is inconsistent with ICANN policy, I want the ICANN Board to be accountable.
Again, to be clear, I am not unalterably opposed to having other parts of the community participate, but I don’t understand why they would want to.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 11:50 AM To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hello all,
irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no <mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards, Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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I can't agree with Olivier and Fouad. Olivier, help me to understand why the directly affected parties shouldn't have the primary responsibility for operations they are the direct users of and that their own operations depend on. To me your claim that this constitutes a "conflict of interest" is almost self-contradictory and self-refuting - it is a confluence of interest, not a conflict - but perhaps I am missing something. Please explain. What I suspect is happening is that both of you are confusing policy development functions of ICANN with the operational and technical functions of IANA, and applying inappropriate mental models drawn from the former to the latter. In policy development we want "openness, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective." In the DNS IANA functions the users are the registries, it's an intermediate good, it's all about implementation, so we want efficiency, security and direct accountability to the primary users, not some playground for different stakeholders to voice their opinions. I do agree with Alan there should be safeguards to prevent the operational and technical functions from being managed in ways that undermine or subvert policy that is made in the MS process. It would be useful to discuss institutional safeguards - including antitrust law - to prevent those kinds of things. But throwing an infinite number of "stakeholders" into looking over the shoulders of those making root zone file modifications accomplishes nothing useful from a public interest perspective, while raising all kinds of risks and inefficiencies. If Alan can recognize the danger that IANA contractors or implementations might compromise the policy process, I hope that he can also recognize the danger that politicized 'multstakeholdered' oversight of the technical operations could be abused to circumvent or veto the policies developed by the MS process. --MM From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 11:51 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hello all, irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too. Kind regards, Olivier On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote: I'd envisioned the "Oversight Council" to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella - so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) - so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let's not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks: The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements. Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council: 1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator 2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism". 3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC. 4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator. How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO? On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the "oversight council" as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the 'oversight council' alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments. From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. Regards, Guru On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the "oversight counsel" would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise "public interest" concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Dear Milton, thanks for your kind reply. I have replied separately to Becky but I'll also reply here. On 29/10/2014 19:00, Milton L Mueller wrote:
What I suspect is happening is that both of you are confusing policy development functions of ICANN with the operational and technical functions of IANA, and applying inappropriate mental models drawn from the former to the latter. In policy development we want “openness, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective.” In the DNS IANA functions the users are the registries, it’s an intermediate good, it’s all about implementation, so we want efficiency, security and direct accountability to the primary users, not some playground for different stakeholders to voice their opinions.
I am not confusing policy development with operational & technical functions of IANA. All I am saying is that end users should be afforded space on the Council or Body, if representative(s) from the GAC are to be also considered. I fail to understand the apparent uproar that this suggestion is generating. Kind regards, Olivier
Agree with you Milton
On Oct 29, 2014, at 3:00 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
I can’t agree with Olivier and Fouad.
Olivier, help me to understand why the directly affected parties shouldn’t have the primary responsibility for operations they are the direct users of and that their own operations depend on. To me your claim that this constitutes a “conflict of interest” is almost self-contradictory and self-refuting – it is a confluence of interest, not a conflict – but perhaps I am missing something. Please explain.
What I suspect is happening is that both of you are confusing policy development functions of ICANN with the operational and technical functions of IANA, and applying inappropriate mental models drawn from the former to the latter. In policy development we want “openness, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective.” In the DNS IANA functions the users are the registries, it’s an intermediate good, it’s all about implementation, so we want efficiency, security and direct accountability to the primary users, not some playground for different stakeholders to voice their opinions.
I do agree with Alan there should be safeguards to prevent the operational and technical functions from being managed in ways that undermine or subvert policy that is made in the MS process. It would be useful to discuss institutional safeguards – including antitrust law – to prevent those kinds of things. But throwing an infinite number of “stakeholders” into looking over the shoulders of those making root zone file modifications accomplishes nothing useful from a public interest perspective, while raising all kinds of risks and inefficiencies. If Alan can recognize the danger that IANA contractors or implementations might compromise the policy process, I hope that he can also recognize the danger that politicized ‘multstakeholdered’ oversight of the technical operations could be abused to circumvent or veto the policies developed by the MS process.
--MM <> From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 11:51 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Hello all,
irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote: I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day. It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc. Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism. Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> /www.neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz/>
From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz <mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg@npt.no <mailto:elise.lindeberg@npt.no>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:
The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.
Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:
1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator
2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".
3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.
4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.
How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca <mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days. I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards, Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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Apologies for late comments - catching up the conversation just now.
On Oct 29, 2014, at 9:02 AM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days.
Agree as well
I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.
Might we want another body (council / governance board / etc) to be created to handle this? Robert
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>]On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM To: Becky Burr Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?
Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.
Regards, Guru
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz <mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.
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Only to ad to Peter Answer ccTLDs unaffiliated (free riders ), have direct relation with IANA (historically (for first delegation), or for changes in their delegation (again with IANA). The must see the ccTLD situation more in a complete perspective, in special about legislation related with the operation of cctlds in some countries , the legal nature of ccTLD, and also the relations with governments. For example in Cuba ccTLD .cu (the operation not the ccTLD as part of the DNS system) was created by a Resolution of the Government in 1996 (IANA did not mentioned in the document: http://www.latinoamericann.org/?q=node/1806 ) or the Bolivian ccTLD operation was created as civil society then “assimilated” to the government (in the information society agency that appear now in IANA as a contact (again the creation of cctld .bo operation did not said IANA anywhere: http://www.latinoamericann.org/?q=node/1809 ) So, is clear al the ccTLDs have real relation with IANA (appear in the root server), but how each cctld sees itself (in special in the cases the operation is inside a governmental entity) is different. Yours, Erick El 24/10/2014, a las 02:20, Peter Van Roste <peter@centr.org> escribió:
Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote: So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote: Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards, Acharya
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The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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+1 Erick On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Erick Iriarte <eiriarte@iriartelaw.com> wrote:
Only to ad to Peter Answer
ccTLDs unaffiliated (free riders ), have direct relation with IANA (historically (for first delegation), or for changes in their delegation (again with IANA).
The must see the ccTLD situation more in a complete perspective, in special about legislation related with the operation of cctlds in some countries , the legal nature of ccTLD, and also the relations with governments. For example in Cuba ccTLD .cu (the operation not the ccTLD as part of the DNS system) was created by a Resolution of the Government in 1996 (IANA did not mentioned in the document: http://www.latinoamericann.org/?q=node/1806 ) or the Bolivian ccTLD operation was created as civil society then “assimilated” to the government (in the information society agency that appear now in IANA as a contact (again the creation of cctld .bo operation did not said IANA anywhere: http://www.latinoamericann.org/?q=node/1809 )
So, is clear al the ccTLDs have real relation with IANA (appear in the root server), but how each cctld sees itself (in special in the cases the operation is inside a governmental entity) is different.
Yours,
Erick
El 24/10/2014, a las 02:20, Peter Van Roste <peter@centr.org> escribió:
Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests.
Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated.
Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 *To:* Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself.
J. Beckwith Burr *Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *"Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM *To: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Cc: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, " cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote: So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue.
*From:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] *Sent:* October-23-14 4:20 PM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya *Cc:* Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr *Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM *To: *Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr < becky.burr@neustar.biz> *Cc: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa < fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com <gurcharya@gmail.com>]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr *Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr *Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message -------- *Subject:* [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities *Date:* Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 *From:* Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com> *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards, Acharya
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Maybe this could be possible but will only be if all the cctlds are in the same nest. So assuming this becomes the case, I will then think of the following route possibility: - That the gtld/cctld (and end user, alac like?) form a legal entity xxx - That the xxx sign an MOU (not contract) with ICANN (just like NRO did) on how the names management should happen (which should be largely tied to the names PDP within ICANN community). The MOU will then specify what process to take to resolve issues with ICANN board whenever it arises (again in a similar manner as the numbers mou). The overall puzzle will be the composition of the xxx entity, as it's should be as light as much as possible.[1] Perhaps leaders of the regional TLD group becoming member of the xxx entity (like aftld for Africa region) could be an option. This way ICANN remains the operator, the SO/AC maintain their role with gnso/ccNSO as the policy entities within ICANN. Cheers! 1. It's easy with RIR because we have only 5 in the world, same can't be said with names ;) sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 23 Oct 2014 21:20, "Burr, Becky" <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz
Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>, Fouad Bajwa < fouadbajwa@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated.
*From:* Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com <gurcharya@gmail.com>]
Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party.
In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM *To: *Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz>, Milton L Mueller < mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.e...>
*Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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--
Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD
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*Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: * *http://www.fuoye.edu.ng* <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGa...> *Mobile: +2348035233535 <%2B2348035233535>* *alt email:**seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng* <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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Yes, these are the lines I’m thinking along J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 4:41 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Maybe this could be possible but will only be if all the cctlds are in the same nest. So assuming this becomes the case, I will then think of the following route possibility: - That the gtld/cctld (and end user, alac like?) form a legal entity xxx - That the xxx sign an MOU (not contract) with ICANN (just like NRO did) on how the names management should happen (which should be largely tied to the names PDP within ICANN community). The MOU will then specify what process to take to resolve issues with ICANN board whenever it arises (again in a similar manner as the numbers mou). The overall puzzle will be the composition of the xxx entity, as it's should be as light as much as possible.[1] Perhaps leaders of the regional TLD group becoming member of the xxx entity (like aftld for Africa region) could be an option. This way ICANN remains the operator, the SO/AC maintain their role with gnso/ccNSO as the policy entities within ICANN. Cheers! 1. It's easy with RIR because we have only 5 in the world, same can't be said with names ;) sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 23 Oct 2014 21:20, "Burr, Becky" <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=1Z3jHzhnydsL_waj92M_4gPlOMCuN3njtUQXOmEN2qE&s=3gjPl1r2jkqPVidpnwICeS0GbYoNtoa-DBDbhUL9o2Y&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=xm679ts9ebwDNuRzz6N0a2u03BsoJV4iMSTlfNWBXKU&e=>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=9jEM_hACGXiATouHvV-V_jUNH5sc3y-bQFzqRD4_qRU&s=WD5mnQGH8gOzXMllT3aJRt_wLg7aZMZR0oiM_ERgS0g&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=INYMVpabyaFlLICPn_6grbXytRGxGNbwdxstS1N6kfU&s=i8zyWIAX2_rh8EVJjDDnKtCQtxhae8Qqzt-EA16lRiY&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=1Z3jHzhnydsL_waj92M_4gPlOMCuN3njtUQXOmEN2qE&s=D1QNgkfSNuXg353txrKMCh-qmExobZ9SXrifJAWLZrw&e=>
Hi, IMHO, what Becky says makes a lot of sense. I would, however, like to caution against suggestions making the ccNSO/GNSO/ALAC themselves the contracting organisations in this kind of model. These organisations are very geared towards policy development. I can’t speak intelligently about the details of policy development in ALAC and the ccNSO. However, as far as the GNSO is concerned, both its stakeholder group/constituency structure (representing a mixture of special interests) and operating procedures are designed specifically for the purpose of policy development. It carries out its policy development function well; using bottom-up multistakeholder consensus. And although I believe it serves that purpose well, a different sort of organization/council motivated and governed by a different set of rules and agreements will be needed to enter into a contractual relationship with ICANN for the IANA function. That is not to say that this hypothetical unincorporated entity that takes over the NTIA role as a contractual principle shouldn't include representatives of these communities. This is something I hope the CWG will explore further. Just not the SOs/ACs themselves. Thanks. Amr On Oct 23, 2014, at 6:04 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf OfBurr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote: Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards, Acharya
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
I agree with Amr. My prior comment was not intended to suggest that I agree that CCNSO and GNSO should be the contracting authority for IANA. I simply want to say that I didn't think it is impossible for an unincorporated entity to be the contracting authority. But Amr is correct that GNSO, with which I have more experience than I care to admit, is not suitably organized for contracting and supervision of an operational function. Because it is focused on policy development, it emphasizes checks and balances among stakeholder groups to such an extent that it is not capable of quick, decisive action. This is a feature in policy development - it is designed to make action without broad consensus very difficult. It is a bug for a more operational and contracting role. From: Amr Elsadr [mailto:aelsadr@egyptig.org] Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 1:04 PM To: Allan MacGillivray Cc: Becky Burr; Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi, IMHO, what Becky says makes a lot of sense. I would, however, like to caution against suggestions making the ccNSO/GNSO/ALAC themselves the contracting organisations in this kind of model. These organisations are very geared towards policy development. I can't speak intelligently about the details of policy development in ALAC and the ccNSO. However, as far as the GNSO is concerned, both its stakeholder group/constituency structure (representing a mixture of special interests) and operating procedures are designed specifically for the purpose of policy development. It carries out its policy development function well; using bottom-up multistakeholder consensus. And although I believe it serves that purpose well, a different sort of organization/council motivated and governed by a different set of rules and agreements will be needed to enter into a contractual relationship with ICANN for the IANA function. That is not to say that this hypothetical unincorporated entity that takes over the NTIA role as a contractual principle shouldn't include representatives of these communities. This is something I hope the CWG will explore further. Just not the SOs/ACs themselves. Thanks. Amr On Oct 23, 2014, at 6:04 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: Becky - you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over' the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf OfBurr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let's begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA's to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA's are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the "SLA Council." Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the "technical community proposals" I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants "the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments." That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Agreed, it should be the registries themselves and/or a separate entity they set up. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:53 PM To: Amr Elsadr <aelsadr@egyptig.org<mailto:aelsadr@egyptig.org>>, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities I agree with Amr. My prior comment was not intended to suggest that I agree that CCNSO and GNSO should be the contracting authority for IANA. I simply want to say that I didn’t think it is impossible for an unincorporated entity to be the contracting authority. But Amr is correct that GNSO, with which I have more experience than I care to admit, is not suitably organized for contracting and supervision of an operational function. Because it is focused on policy development, it emphasizes checks and balances among stakeholder groups to such an extent that it is not capable of quick, decisive action. This is a feature in policy development – it is designed to make action without broad consensus very difficult. It is a bug for a more operational and contracting role. From: Amr Elsadr [mailto:aelsadr@egyptig.org] Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 1:04 PM To: Allan MacGillivray Cc: Becky Burr; Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Hi, IMHO, what Becky says makes a lot of sense. I would, however, like to caution against suggestions making the ccNSO/GNSO/ALAC themselves the contracting organisations in this kind of model. These organisations are very geared towards policy development. I can’t speak intelligently about the details of policy development in ALAC and the ccNSO. However, as far as the GNSO is concerned, both its stakeholder group/constituency structure (representing a mixture of special interests) and operating procedures are designed specifically for the purpose of policy development. It carries out its policy development function well; using bottom-up multistakeholder consensus. And although I believe it serves that purpose well, a different sort of organization/council motivated and governed by a different set of rules and agreements will be needed to enter into a contractual relationship with ICANN for the IANA function. That is not to say that this hypothetical unincorporated entity that takes over the NTIA role as a contractual principle shouldn't include representatives of these communities. This is something I hope the CWG will explore further. Just not the SOs/ACs themselves. Thanks. Amr On Oct 23, 2014, at 6:04 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf OfBurr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz/> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=uYNoJb1Xnmczm6_q6mCnEFj9sorW34YMemQmjdsyxhY&s=39dnKkbBExTOb_qUp-08IKYzXPiH6wBFDKNPzSnLQcY&e=>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=fUDcpKHcSBfPHc8c3PFUK3EGMl9QAYJOV5JFJEPECSo&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=hsoL84pOSYzJR4QRMfhJYR6ybddmed3Zi1M-kuVH5uQ&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=HC19PauLIvR68L1aaQZMUV1ysZRdzy1Rku_FhtwR4P0&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=u0-58tAisZxOIbFv-8rGIWKmmQ0MbrreYyVITk4iFgM&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=ZYONh-kEmB5dv3rzYIFWLLSMsZ6JohvhU3mRuNA0IvA&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=z-dUNEELhtQ-yVDbG2261BTmwYXpCqVfPM_t-PljY5Q&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=zkexu-3haN6fnsOXhCc6YlS9R1_kJqU41Ly9Qg6NDw8&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMGaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=iSr26xOvv_x1A2nuUqvtaRwVOgTvzV0efqUDkGy07cw&s=Q41AU5yY9bUlqSxfJs-fCoCh4KuNHdFYeG8IwC5gisw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFAw&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=uYNoJb1Xnmczm6_q6mCnEFj9sorW34YMemQmjdsyxhY&s=ejL431Ov6BAJPQstI8yIvdZbjixIw2dwucd33Vd4wEo&e=>
Well at this point it could mean indirectly creating another version of ICANN board within the 3 communities(where the level of lobby in those communities leadership positions will become so political). The practical question will be on what basis will the 3 communities use to determine ICANN is no longer worthy of IANA? Cheers! sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 23 Oct 2014 17:05, "Allan MacGillivray" <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this?
Allan
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Burr, Becky *Sent:* October-23-14 11:43 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met.
If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association).
Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
*From: *Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> *Date: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM *To: *Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com> *Cc: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_documen...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draf...>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.o...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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--
Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD
http://www.gih.com/ocl.html <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=A...>
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_li...>
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: * *http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMGa...> **Mobile: +2348035233535 <%2B2348035233535>* *alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>*
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_li...>
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blog...> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d...>
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] Rather than starting with legal constructs, let's begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. MM: Agree 100%. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA's to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA's are not met. MM: Agree here too. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the "SLA Council." Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. MM: This is exactly what IGP proposed. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? MM: Stand alone seems cleaner to me. The names part of the problem is so different from protocols that it makes no sense to put it in IETF or ISOC, and (though I cannot speak for them) I think IETF would not want to deal with the political and economic externalities of the association. Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. MM: We also need protections against registries somehow abusing their contractual influence over IANA to act in ways that prevent competition or protect incumbents
See question re your last point? J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:09 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa@gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. MM: Agree 100%. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. MM: Agree here too. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. MM: This is exactly what IGP proposed. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? MM: Stand alone seems cleaner to me. The names part of the problem is so different from protocols that it makes no sense to put it in IETF or ISOC, and (though I cannot speak for them) I think IETF would not want to deal with the political and economic externalities of the association. I have no problem with that approach. Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. MM: We also need protections against registries somehow abusing their contractual influence over IANA to act in ways that prevent competition or protect incumbents Isn’t this addressed through ICANN policy development and accountability mechanisms? In other words, IANA implements ICANN policy with respect to names in accordance with IANA user negotiated SLAs. If IANA does something that is no consistent with ICANN policy, ICANN is accountable through whatever mechanisms we come up with in the accountability track.
True Milton, no argument there. By the technical community I did mean all the technical groups outside ICANN and yes the MoU with ICANN can always be revoked. The proposal by ICG can be made to NTIA even without going through ICANN Board. This does entail that a new oversight body be created and then a whole new world of activities will be developed in order to govern that oversight body because its not NTIA but has the likes of it... IANA (lets say if it was not under an MoU with ICANN) can exist independently? Then why not make that proposal that yes IANA should exist independently and then an IANA community will decide who it should have its operational MoU or contract with but how will IANA be independently accountable and transparent in its working without any international treaty, law or jurisdiction? I believe the challenge will become a governance one and the legitimacy of the governing. ICANN remains a domain industry influenced organization in various aspects that are always debatable and contestable but IANA should be independent of all such influences, no? My idea is that first bring IANA out of NTIA, this could be a year or two year period where a new organizational setup be evolved to manage it independently. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 8:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: * *http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> **Mobile: +2348035233535 <%2B2348035233535>* *alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>*
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa
Milton, Very much in agreement with you on this. I think in one of the threads it was also clear that coming back to the ccNSO, GNSO we are part of the ICANN entity itself and within the entity where ICANN does the naming. Obviously as one would say since ICANN has the required infrastructure to support the number resources where IANA comes in. IANA as much as sometimes Avri did mention is like we could call it a dept or the likes. But one thing important in this concept is that when it comes for the NRO - Numbering part the Policy is made from regional areas already and is brought in through the MoU and a converged decision. Somehow as i mentioned before it is slightly easier for them. Now coming down to the thinking process. From my RIR standpoint it was fine and still fine to have a contract - MoU for IANA to still be under ICANN to continue the management process. IETF is also another loose contract with ICANN for the IANA function. But IETF is also a core of the infrastructure of IANA. If they are not around things may crumble pretty much. From ALAC/NCUC the process is stalling as we seem to not formally realise that we are part of the beast - ICANN. The question is from the different SOs how do we ascertain the transparency and accountability process is maintained which means no government control and i think this can be achieved independently from having the GAC as part of the process and no direct government involvement. Perhaps one way to look at the problem is as much as we have setup this cross working group is a foresight answer to the problem already. Why not the CWG creates a council of membership from the different stakeholders in it and becomes the community that ensures the names part and maintain the accountability. As far as i remember these were the considerations: The considerations: (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference; (b) integrity, stability, continuity, security and robustness of the administration of the root zone; (c) widespread [international] trust by Internet users in the administration of this function; (d) support of a single unified root zone; and (e) agreement regarding an accountability mechanism for this function that is broadly accepted as being in the global public interest.” As far as i remember these were the solutions characteristics: (a) offers a legal structure that is robust against rogue litigation attacks (b) is aligned with the Internet technical infrastructure in a way that supports innovative, technology based evolution of the DNS . (c) is an inclusive model (d) is a demonstrable improvement on current processes in this area If these are the core principles it should not take much time to accomplish a resolution. Legally stating can ccNSO, GNSO etc., create a legal, i am pretty much doubtful but we can create a council or something that can take the different SOs to be managing and ascertaining the same processes. IETF on the other hand is housed under ISOC. IETF would not be able to house us. We need to still bear in mind we are part of ICANN here. Unless we are looking at decoupling ourselves from ICANN which is not worth. We need to bear in mind IETF, IAB are closely housed into ISOC which is the entity /organisation that does the management / operational aspect. My two cents worth.
On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. <> I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <http://www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards, Acharya
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org <mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues>
-- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html <http://www.gih.com/ocl.html>
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org <mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues>
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/> Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email: <http://goog_1872880453/>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view !
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org <mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues>
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ <http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa <http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa>_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Kris Seeburn seeburn.k@gmail.com www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/ <http://www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/>
All, A few thoughts/suggestions in response to recent posts in this thread: 1. *Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN*. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic). 2. *All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight*. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. 3. *An Unincorporated Association has Issues*. It is true that the NFL is an unincorporated association. However, I believe that it uses incorporated entities (e.g., NFL Media LLC, NFL Properties LLC, NFL Enterprises LLC) or the the individual teams to enter into most (if not all) contracts. (I believe that the income of the NFL itself (which considers itself a trade association) is primarily dues from teams; all other revenue flows elsewhere.) Under US law, an unincorporated association is not a legal entity apart from its individual members. Thus, unincorporated associations cannot enter into contracts unless the unincorporated association's home State has specific enabling unincorporated associations to enter into contracts. (I don't know what California law says on this matter, assuming one would want the unincorporated association's "home" to be California.) Also, individual members of an unincorporated association have full personal liability for the acts of the unincorporated association (in contrast to corporations and other "limited liability" entities, which act as a shield against personal liability under most circumstances) I doubt that stakeholder groups or representatives would want to assume personal liability for the acts of the group. 4. *An Entity Immune from "Rogue" Litigation Attacks is also likely to be Immune from Legitimate Litigation*. The issues of jurisdiction, domicile, immunity, etc. are complex and beyond the scope of this email. However, the idea that an entity can be immunized from rogue litigation while still being subject to legitimate litigation is far-fetched. Legitimate litigation is an important accountability mechanism (although a relatively extreme one). The threat of "rogue litigation" is overblown, in my opinion, and is another "bogeyman" that should be avoided. Most litigation is not objectively frivolous or baseless; if it is, it will likely be dismissed relatively quickly and there may be sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel. Furthermore, avoiding litigation is not as easy as changing the state or country of incorporation -- there are "long arm statutes" and many other ways of dragging defendants into court as long as the entity or its activities have a reasonable nexus with the location of the litigation. If we are concerned about accountability, I don't think we should be in the business of shielding entities from litigation. Greg Shatan (Caveat: Although I am a practicing attorney, I offer the above in my personal capacity and it does not constitute legal advice.) On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Kris Seeburn <seeburn.k@gmail.com> wrote:
Milton,
Very much in agreement with you on this. I think in one of the threads it was also clear that coming back to the ccNSO, GNSO we are part of the ICANN entity itself and within the entity where ICANN does the naming. Obviously as one would say since ICANN has the required infrastructure to support the number resources where IANA comes in.
IANA as much as sometimes Avri did mention is like we could call it a dept or the likes. But one thing important in this concept is that when it comes for the NRO - Numbering part the Policy is made from regional areas already and is brought in through the MoU and a converged decision. Somehow as i mentioned before it is slightly easier for them.
Now coming down to the thinking process. From my RIR standpoint it was fine and still fine to have a contract - MoU for IANA to still be under ICANN to continue the management process. IETF is also another loose contract with ICANN for the IANA function. But IETF is also a core of the infrastructure of IANA. If they are not around things may crumble pretty much.
From ALAC/NCUC the process is stalling as we seem to not formally realise that we are part of the beast - ICANN. The question is from the different SOs how do we ascertain the transparency and accountability process is maintained which means no government control and i think this can be achieved independently from having the GAC as part of the process and no direct government involvement.
Perhaps one way to look at the problem is as much as we have setup this cross working group is a foresight answer to the problem already. Why not the CWG creates a council of membership from the different stakeholders in it and becomes the community that ensures the names part and maintain the accountability.
As far as i remember these were the considerations:
The considerations: (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference; (b) integrity, stability, continuity, security and robustness of the administration of the root zone; (c) widespread [international] trust by Internet users in the administration of this function; (d) support of a single unified root zone; and (e) agreement regarding an accountability mechanism for this function that is broadly accepted as being in the global public interest.”
As far as i remember these were the solutions characteristics:
(a) offers a legal structure that is robust against rogue litigation attacks (b) is aligned with the Internet technical infrastructure in a way that supports innovative, technology based evolution of the DNS . (c) is an inclusive model (d) is a demonstrable improvement on current processes in this area
If these are the core principles it should not take much time to accomplish a resolution. Legally stating can ccNSO, GNSO etc., create a legal, i am pretty much doubtful but we can create a council or something that can take the different SOs to be managing and ascertaining the same processes. IETF on the other hand is housed under ISOC. IETF would not be able to house us. We need to still bear in mind we are part of ICANN here. Unless we are looking at decoupling ourselves from ICANN which is not worth.
We need to bear in mind IETF, IAB are closely housed into ISOC which is the entity /organisation that does the management / operational aspect.
My two cents worth.
On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
_______________________________________________
Iana-issues mailing list
Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
--
Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: * *http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/> **Mobile: +2348035233535 <%2B2348035233535>* *alt email: <http://goog_1872880453/>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>*
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Kris Seeburn seeburn.k@gmail.com
- www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Greg, You suggest that IANA should be removed from ICANN and transferred to a new legal entity that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN. There can then be a SLA between ICANN and the subsidiary. I think I like this idea. But can you suggest a mechanism to ensure that the decision of changing the IANA operator from the subsidiary to a new entity in the future will rest with GNSO/CCSNO and not the ICANN board. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:35 PM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
All,
A few thoughts/suggestions in response to recent posts in this thread:
1. *Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN*. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic).
2. *All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight*. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative.
3. *An Unincorporated Association has Issues*. It is true that the NFL is an unincorporated association. However, I believe that it uses incorporated entities (e.g., NFL Media LLC, NFL Properties LLC, NFL Enterprises LLC) or the the individual teams to enter into most (if not all) contracts. (I believe that the income of the NFL itself (which considers itself a trade association) is primarily dues from teams; all other revenue flows elsewhere.) Under US law, an unincorporated association is not a legal entity apart from its individual members. Thus, unincorporated associations cannot enter into contracts unless the unincorporated association's home State has specific enabling unincorporated associations to enter into contracts. (I don't know what California law says on this matter, assuming one would want the unincorporated association's "home" to be California.) Also, individual members of an unincorporated association have full personal liability for the acts of the unincorporated association (in contrast to corporations and other "limited liability" entities, which act as a shield against personal liability under most circumstances) I doubt that stakeholder groups or representatives would want to assume personal liability for the acts of the group.
4. *An Entity Immune from "Rogue" Litigation Attacks is also likely to be Immune from Legitimate Litigation*. The issues of jurisdiction, domicile, immunity, etc. are complex and beyond the scope of this email. However, the idea that an entity can be immunized from rogue litigation while still being subject to legitimate litigation is far-fetched. Legitimate litigation is an important accountability mechanism (although a relatively extreme one). The threat of "rogue litigation" is overblown, in my opinion, and is another "bogeyman" that should be avoided. Most litigation is not objectively frivolous or baseless; if it is, it will likely be dismissed relatively quickly and there may be sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel. Furthermore, avoiding litigation is not as easy as changing the state or country of incorporation -- there are "long arm statutes" and many other ways of dragging defendants into court as long as the entity or its activities have a reasonable nexus with the location of the litigation. If we are concerned about accountability, I don't think we should be in the business of shielding entities from litigation.
Greg Shatan
(Caveat: Although I am a practicing attorney, I offer the above in my personal capacity and it does not constitute legal advice.)
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Kris Seeburn <seeburn.k@gmail.com> wrote:
Milton,
Very much in agreement with you on this. I think in one of the threads it was also clear that coming back to the ccNSO, GNSO we are part of the ICANN entity itself and within the entity where ICANN does the naming. Obviously as one would say since ICANN has the required infrastructure to support the number resources where IANA comes in.
IANA as much as sometimes Avri did mention is like we could call it a dept or the likes. But one thing important in this concept is that when it comes for the NRO - Numbering part the Policy is made from regional areas already and is brought in through the MoU and a converged decision. Somehow as i mentioned before it is slightly easier for them.
Now coming down to the thinking process. From my RIR standpoint it was fine and still fine to have a contract - MoU for IANA to still be under ICANN to continue the management process. IETF is also another loose contract with ICANN for the IANA function. But IETF is also a core of the infrastructure of IANA. If they are not around things may crumble pretty much.
From ALAC/NCUC the process is stalling as we seem to not formally realise that we are part of the beast - ICANN. The question is from the different SOs how do we ascertain the transparency and accountability process is maintained which means no government control and i think this can be achieved independently from having the GAC as part of the process and no direct government involvement.
Perhaps one way to look at the problem is as much as we have setup this cross working group is a foresight answer to the problem already. Why not the CWG creates a council of membership from the different stakeholders in it and becomes the community that ensures the names part and maintain the accountability.
As far as i remember these were the considerations:
The considerations: (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference; (b) integrity, stability, continuity, security and robustness of the administration of the root zone; (c) widespread [international] trust by Internet users in the administration of this function; (d) support of a single unified root zone; and (e) agreement regarding an accountability mechanism for this function that is broadly accepted as being in the global public interest.”
As far as i remember these were the solutions characteristics:
(a) offers a legal structure that is robust against rogue litigation attacks (b) is aligned with the Internet technical infrastructure in a way that supports innovative, technology based evolution of the DNS . (c) is an inclusive model (d) is a demonstrable improvement on current processes in this area
If these are the core principles it should not take much time to accomplish a resolution. Legally stating can ccNSO, GNSO etc., create a legal, i am pretty much doubtful but we can create a council or something that can take the different SOs to be managing and ascertaining the same processes. IETF on the other hand is housed under ISOC. IETF would not be able to house us. We need to still bear in mind we are part of ICANN here. Unless we are looking at decoupling ourselves from ICANN which is not worth.
We need to bear in mind IETF, IAB are closely housed into ISOC which is the entity /organisation that does the management / operational aspect.
My two cents worth.
On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
_______________________________________________
Iana-issues mailing list
Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
--
Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: * *http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/> **Mobile: +2348035233535 <%2B2348035233535>* *alt email: <http://goog_1872880453/>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>*
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Kris Seeburn seeburn.k@gmail.com
- www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Greg, In what you suggested, Can you clarify the rationale for transferring IANA to a ICANN subsidiary and not to a new independent entity. Is the rationale - continuity, ease and satisfaction with present IANA services? Or something else? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:55 PM, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> wrote:
Greg,
You suggest that IANA should be removed from ICANN and transferred to a new legal entity that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN. There can then be a SLA between ICANN and the subsidiary.
I think I like this idea.
But can you suggest a mechanism to ensure that the decision of changing the IANA operator from the subsidiary to a new entity in the future will rest with GNSO/CCSNO and not the ICANN board.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:35 PM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
All,
A few thoughts/suggestions in response to recent posts in this thread:
1. *Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN*. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic).
2. *All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight*. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative.
3. *An Unincorporated Association has Issues*. It is true that the NFL is an unincorporated association. However, I believe that it uses incorporated entities (e.g., NFL Media LLC, NFL Properties LLC, NFL Enterprises LLC) or the the individual teams to enter into most (if not all) contracts. (I believe that the income of the NFL itself (which considers itself a trade association) is primarily dues from teams; all other revenue flows elsewhere.) Under US law, an unincorporated association is not a legal entity apart from its individual members. Thus, unincorporated associations cannot enter into contracts unless the unincorporated association's home State has specific enabling unincorporated associations to enter into contracts. (I don't know what California law says on this matter, assuming one would want the unincorporated association's "home" to be California.) Also, individual members of an unincorporated association have full personal liability for the acts of the unincorporated association (in contrast to corporations and other "limited liability" entities, which act as a shield against personal liability under most circumstances) I doubt that stakeholder groups or representatives would want to assume personal liability for the acts of the group.
4. *An Entity Immune from "Rogue" Litigation Attacks is also likely to be Immune from Legitimate Litigation*. The issues of jurisdiction, domicile, immunity, etc. are complex and beyond the scope of this email. However, the idea that an entity can be immunized from rogue litigation while still being subject to legitimate litigation is far-fetched. Legitimate litigation is an important accountability mechanism (although a relatively extreme one). The threat of "rogue litigation" is overblown, in my opinion, and is another "bogeyman" that should be avoided. Most litigation is not objectively frivolous or baseless; if it is, it will likely be dismissed relatively quickly and there may be sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel. Furthermore, avoiding litigation is not as easy as changing the state or country of incorporation -- there are "long arm statutes" and many other ways of dragging defendants into court as long as the entity or its activities have a reasonable nexus with the location of the litigation. If we are concerned about accountability, I don't think we should be in the business of shielding entities from litigation.
Greg Shatan
(Caveat: Although I am a practicing attorney, I offer the above in my personal capacity and it does not constitute legal advice.)
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Kris Seeburn <seeburn.k@gmail.com> wrote:
Milton,
Very much in agreement with you on this. I think in one of the threads it was also clear that coming back to the ccNSO, GNSO we are part of the ICANN entity itself and within the entity where ICANN does the naming. Obviously as one would say since ICANN has the required infrastructure to support the number resources where IANA comes in.
IANA as much as sometimes Avri did mention is like we could call it a dept or the likes. But one thing important in this concept is that when it comes for the NRO - Numbering part the Policy is made from regional areas already and is brought in through the MoU and a converged decision. Somehow as i mentioned before it is slightly easier for them.
Now coming down to the thinking process. From my RIR standpoint it was fine and still fine to have a contract - MoU for IANA to still be under ICANN to continue the management process. IETF is also another loose contract with ICANN for the IANA function. But IETF is also a core of the infrastructure of IANA. If they are not around things may crumble pretty much.
From ALAC/NCUC the process is stalling as we seem to not formally realise that we are part of the beast - ICANN. The question is from the different SOs how do we ascertain the transparency and accountability process is maintained which means no government control and i think this can be achieved independently from having the GAC as part of the process and no direct government involvement.
Perhaps one way to look at the problem is as much as we have setup this cross working group is a foresight answer to the problem already. Why not the CWG creates a council of membership from the different stakeholders in it and becomes the community that ensures the names part and maintain the accountability.
As far as i remember these were the considerations:
The considerations: (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference; (b) integrity, stability, continuity, security and robustness of the administration of the root zone; (c) widespread [international] trust by Internet users in the administration of this function; (d) support of a single unified root zone; and (e) agreement regarding an accountability mechanism for this function that is broadly accepted as being in the global public interest.”
As far as i remember these were the solutions characteristics:
(a) offers a legal structure that is robust against rogue litigation attacks (b) is aligned with the Internet technical infrastructure in a way that supports innovative, technology based evolution of the DNS . (c) is an inclusive model (d) is a demonstrable improvement on current processes in this area
If these are the core principles it should not take much time to accomplish a resolution. Legally stating can ccNSO, GNSO etc., create a legal, i am pretty much doubtful but we can create a council or something that can take the different SOs to be managing and ascertaining the same processes. IETF on the other hand is housed under ISOC. IETF would not be able to house us. We need to still bear in mind we are part of ICANN here. Unless we are looking at decoupling ourselves from ICANN which is not worth.
We need to bear in mind IETF, IAB are closely housed into ISOC which is the entity /organisation that does the management / operational aspect.
My two cents worth.
On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
_______________________________________________
Iana-issues mailing list
Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
--
Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: * *http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/> **Mobile: +2348035233535 <%2B2348035233535>* *alt email: <http://goog_1872880453/>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>*
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues
-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Kris Seeburn seeburn.k@gmail.com
- www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/
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In answer to recent posts: "You suggest that IANA should be removed from ICANN and transferred to a new legal entity that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN. There can then be a SLA between ICANN and the subsidiary." Turning IANA into a subsidiary would not remove it from ICANN. Subsidiaries are controlled by their parents. I do not think any agreement (SLA or otherwise) regarding IANA functions should be between ICANN and the subsidiary. ICANN is not the global multistakeholder community and it is not the customer of IANA. It would be the parent of IANA in this structure. An "intracompany contract" (i.e., a contract between a parent and a sub) is essentially a company contracting with itself and not at "arm's length." The agreement (or agreements) should be between IANA and an independent entity or entities (such as the SLA Council mentioned earlier). "Can you clarify the rationale for transferring IANA to a ICANN subsidiary and not to a new independent entity. Is the rationale - continuity, ease and satisfaction with present IANA services? Or something else?" My rationale is as follows: 1. I see no rationale for moving IANA to an independent entity (unless it is absolutely necessary for oversight and accountability purposes). 2. Security and stability (see Avri's earlier post on this point). 3. Do no more than is necessary. 4. Moving it to a completely independent entity creates a load of complex follow-on tasks, for no current benefit. "Greg – thanks for your contribution. If the GNSO, ccNSO, etc. cannot enter into contracts, and assuming that we want to have some arrangement that is legally binding, what are the options from this perspective: · GNSO, ccNSO, ALAC etc. all incorporate and enter into the contract with ICANN/IANA? I think having each multistakeholder organization and council separately incorporate is a nightmare scenario, and not necessary (and practicallly impossible). I think that a single representative entity ("SLA Council, Inc.") for the SO's/AC's and any other stakeholders (e.g., ccTLDs not in ccNSO) is much cleaner and much more achievable. · IANA becomes a standalone corporation, likely with GNSO, ccNSO, IETF, RIR etc. representation on its board, with some binding undertaking from ICANN to fund it (I think this is close to what Milton has suggested). I still favor having IANA exist as a legally separate sub from ICANN, but not as a standalone corporation. I think that the board of the sub could have representation as mentioned above, as an additional check on operational oversight and accountability. Either solution would be legally valid, but I don't see the reason to go further than necessary in separating IANA from ICANN. · The community comes to a written understanding as to what the ‘IANA functions’ will comprise going forward, and the ICANN bylaws are amended to obligate it to respect this ‘understanding’. Off the top of my head, this strikes me as legally dubious and unenforceable, at least standing on its own. That said, this could be an additional "check" in terms of accountability. Alternately, this could be in the By-Laws of the subsidiary IANA, Inc. rather than ICANN (or this could all be overkill -- I am wary of too many bodies and pieces of paper). Are these valid legally? Can you think of any others?" Please see above regarding legal viability. As for any other structures or legal solutions, I'll have to think about it further. I have thought about the possibility of IANA, Inc. being a less-than-wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN, but given that the other owners would need to be legal entities or "natural persons", we go back to the issue that not all of the "players" here meet that criterion. Greg Shatan On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 1:44 PM, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> wrote:
Greg,
In what you suggested,
Can you clarify the rationale for transferring IANA to a ICANN subsidiary and not to a new independent entity.
Is the rationale - continuity, ease and satisfaction with present IANA services? Or something else?
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:55 PM, Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> wrote:
Greg,
You suggest that IANA should be removed from ICANN and transferred to a new legal entity that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN. There can then be a SLA between ICANN and the subsidiary.
I think I like this idea.
But can you suggest a mechanism to ensure that the decision of changing the IANA operator from the subsidiary to a new entity in the future will rest with GNSO/CCSNO and not the ICANN board.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:35 PM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
All,
A few thoughts/suggestions in response to recent posts in this thread:
1. *Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN*. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic).
2. *All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight*. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative.
3. *An Unincorporated Association has Issues*. It is true that the NFL is an unincorporated association. However, I believe that it uses incorporated entities (e.g., NFL Media LLC, NFL Properties LLC, NFL Enterprises LLC) or the the individual teams to enter into most (if not all) contracts. (I believe that the income of the NFL itself (which considers itself a trade association) is primarily dues from teams; all other revenue flows elsewhere.) Under US law, an unincorporated association is not a legal entity apart from its individual members. Thus, unincorporated associations cannot enter into contracts unless the unincorporated association's home State has specific enabling unincorporated associations to enter into contracts. (I don't know what California law says on this matter, assuming one would want the unincorporated association's "home" to be California.) Also, individual members of an unincorporated association have full personal liability for the acts of the unincorporated association (in contrast to corporations and other "limited liability" entities, which act as a shield against personal liability under most circumstances) I doubt that stakeholder groups or representatives would want to assume personal liability for the acts of the group.
4. *An Entity Immune from "Rogue" Litigation Attacks is also likely to be Immune from Legitimate Litigation*. The issues of jurisdiction, domicile, immunity, etc. are complex and beyond the scope of this email. However, the idea that an entity can be immunized from rogue litigation while still being subject to legitimate litigation is far-fetched. Legitimate litigation is an important accountability mechanism (although a relatively extreme one). The threat of "rogue litigation" is overblown, in my opinion, and is another "bogeyman" that should be avoided. Most litigation is not objectively frivolous or baseless; if it is, it will likely be dismissed relatively quickly and there may be sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel. Furthermore, avoiding litigation is not as easy as changing the state or country of incorporation -- there are "long arm statutes" and many other ways of dragging defendants into court as long as the entity or its activities have a reasonable nexus with the location of the litigation. If we are concerned about accountability, I don't think we should be in the business of shielding entities from litigation.
Greg Shatan
(Caveat: Although I am a practicing attorney, I offer the above in my personal capacity and it does not constitute legal advice.)
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Kris Seeburn <seeburn.k@gmail.com> wrote:
Milton,
Very much in agreement with you on this. I think in one of the threads it was also clear that coming back to the ccNSO, GNSO we are part of the ICANN entity itself and within the entity where ICANN does the naming. Obviously as one would say since ICANN has the required infrastructure to support the number resources where IANA comes in.
IANA as much as sometimes Avri did mention is like we could call it a dept or the likes. But one thing important in this concept is that when it comes for the NRO - Numbering part the Policy is made from regional areas already and is brought in through the MoU and a converged decision. Somehow as i mentioned before it is slightly easier for them.
Now coming down to the thinking process. From my RIR standpoint it was fine and still fine to have a contract - MoU for IANA to still be under ICANN to continue the management process. IETF is also another loose contract with ICANN for the IANA function. But IETF is also a core of the infrastructure of IANA. If they are not around things may crumble pretty much.
From ALAC/NCUC the process is stalling as we seem to not formally realise that we are part of the beast - ICANN. The question is from the different SOs how do we ascertain the transparency and accountability process is maintained which means no government control and i think this can be achieved independently from having the GAC as part of the process and no direct government involvement.
Perhaps one way to look at the problem is as much as we have setup this cross working group is a foresight answer to the problem already. Why not the CWG creates a council of membership from the different stakeholders in it and becomes the community that ensures the names part and maintain the accountability.
As far as i remember these were the considerations:
The considerations: (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference; (b) integrity, stability, continuity, security and robustness of the administration of the root zone; (c) widespread [international] trust by Internet users in the administration of this function; (d) support of a single unified root zone; and (e) agreement regarding an accountability mechanism for this function that is broadly accepted as being in the global public interest.”
As far as i remember these were the solutions characteristics:
(a) offers a legal structure that is robust against rogue litigation attacks (b) is aligned with the Internet technical infrastructure in a way that supports innovative, technology based evolution of the DNS . (c) is an inclusive model (d) is a demonstrable improvement on current processes in this area
If these are the core principles it should not take much time to accomplish a resolution. Legally stating can ccNSO, GNSO etc., create a legal, i am pretty much doubtful but we can create a council or something that can take the different SOs to be managing and ascertaining the same processes. IETF on the other hand is housed under ISOC. IETF would not be able to house us. We need to still bear in mind we are part of ICANN here. Unless we are looking at decoupling ourselves from ICANN which is not worth.
We need to bear in mind IETF, IAB are closely housed into ISOC which is the entity /organisation that does the management / operational aspect.
My two cents worth.
On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Fouad:
By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message --------
*Subject: *
[CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities
*Date: *
Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530
*From: *
Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com>
*To: *
cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN.
www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards,
Acharya
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*Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: * *http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/> **Mobile: +2348035233535 <%2B2348035233535>* *alt email: <http://goog_1872880453/>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>*
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
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Greg – thanks for your contribution. If the GNSO, ccNSO, etc. cannot enter into contracts, and assuming that we want to have some arrangement that is legally binding, what are the options from this perspective: · GNSO, ccNSO, ALAC etc. all incorporate and enter into the contract with ICANN/IANA? · IANA becomes a standalone corporation, likely with GNSO, ccNSO, IETF, RIR etc. representation on its board, with some binding undertaking from ICANN to fund it (I think this is close to what Milton has suggested). · The community comes to a written understanding as to what the ‘IANA functions’ will comprise going forward, and the ICANN bylaws are amended to obligate it to respect this ‘understanding’. Are these valid legally? Can you think of any others? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan Sent: October-23-14 1:06 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities All, A few thoughts/suggestions in response to recent posts in this thread: 1. Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic). 2. All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. 3. An Unincorporated Association has Issues. It is true that the NFL is an unincorporated association. However, I believe that it uses incorporated entities (e.g., NFL Media LLC, NFL Properties LLC, NFL Enterprises LLC) or the the individual teams to enter into most (if not all) contracts. (I believe that the income of the NFL itself (which considers itself a trade association) is primarily dues from teams; all other revenue flows elsewhere.) Under US law, an unincorporated association is not a legal entity apart from its individual members. Thus, unincorporated associations cannot enter into contracts unless the unincorporated association's home State has specific enabling unincorporated associations to enter into contracts. (I don't know what California law says on this matter, assuming one would want the unincorporated association's "home" to be California.) Also, individual members of an unincorporated association have full personal liability for the acts of the unincorporated association (in contrast to corporations and other "limited liability" entities, which act as a shield against personal liability under most circumstances) I doubt that stakeholder groups or representatives would want to assume personal liability for the acts of the group. 4. An Entity Immune from "Rogue" Litigation Attacks is also likely to be Immune from Legitimate Litigation. The issues of jurisdiction, domicile, immunity, etc. are complex and beyond the scope of this email. However, the idea that an entity can be immunized from rogue litigation while still being subject to legitimate litigation is far-fetched. Legitimate litigation is an important accountability mechanism (although a relatively extreme one). The threat of "rogue litigation" is overblown, in my opinion, and is another "bogeyman" that should be avoided. Most litigation is not objectively frivolous or baseless; if it is, it will likely be dismissed relatively quickly and there may be sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel. Furthermore, avoiding litigation is not as easy as changing the state or country of incorporation -- there are "long arm statutes" and many other ways of dragging defendants into court as long as the entity or its activities have a reasonable nexus with the location of the litigation. If we are concerned about accountability, I don't think we should be in the business of shielding entities from litigation. Greg Shatan (Caveat: Although I am a practicing attorney, I offer the above in my personal capacity and it does not constitute legal advice.) On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Kris Seeburn <seeburn.k@gmail.com<mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com>> wrote: Milton, Very much in agreement with you on this. I think in one of the threads it was also clear that coming back to the ccNSO, GNSO we are part of the ICANN entity itself and within the entity where ICANN does the naming. Obviously as one would say since ICANN has the required infrastructure to support the number resources where IANA comes in. IANA as much as sometimes Avri did mention is like we could call it a dept or the likes. But one thing important in this concept is that when it comes for the NRO - Numbering part the Policy is made from regional areas already and is brought in through the MoU and a converged decision. Somehow as i mentioned before it is slightly easier for them. Now coming down to the thinking process. From my RIR standpoint it was fine and still fine to have a contract - MoU for IANA to still be under ICANN to continue the management process. IETF is also another loose contract with ICANN for the IANA function. But IETF is also a core of the infrastructure of IANA. If they are not around things may crumble pretty much. From ALAC/NCUC the process is stalling as we seem to not formally realise that we are part of the beast - ICANN. The question is from the different SOs how do we ascertain the transparency and accountability process is maintained which means no government control and i think this can be achieved independently from having the GAC as part of the process and no direct government involvement. Perhaps one way to look at the problem is as much as we have setup this cross working group is a foresight answer to the problem already. Why not the CWG creates a council of membership from the different stakeholders in it and becomes the community that ensures the names part and maintain the accountability. As far as i remember these were the considerations: The considerations: (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference; (b) integrity, stability, continuity, security and robustness of the administration of the root zone; (c) widespread [international] trust by Internet users in the administration of this function; (d) support of a single unified root zone; and (e) agreement regarding an accountability mechanism for this function that is broadly accepted as being in the global public interest.” As far as i remember these were the solutions characteristics: (a) offers a legal structure that is robust against rogue litigation attacks (b) is aligned with the Internet technical infrastructure in a way that supports innovative, technology based evolution of the DNS . (c) is an inclusive model (d) is a demonstrable improvement on current processes in this area If these are the core principles it should not take much time to accomplish a resolution. Legally stating can ccNSO, GNSO etc., create a legal, i am pretty much doubtful but we can create a council or something that can take the different SOs to be managing and ascertaining the same processes. IETF on the other hand is housed under ISOC. IETF would not be able to house us. We need to still bear in mind we are part of ICANN here. Unless we are looking at decoupling ourselves from ICANN which is not worth. We need to bear in mind IETF, IAB are closely housed into ISOC which is the entity /organisation that does the management / operational aspect. My two cents worth. On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> wrote: Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<http://www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN. From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process. I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email: <http://goog_1872880453/> seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship Kris Seeburn seeburn.k@gmail.com<mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com> * www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/<http://www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Let’s not forget the GAC…Do we want to include them as one of the communities to include. If so, not sure the collection of governments it represents can enter into a contract with ICANN, let alone with anyone else. Robert
On Oct 23, 2014, at 2:30 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
Greg – thanks for your contribution. If the GNSO, ccNSO, etc. cannot enter into contracts, and assuming that we want to have some arrangement that is legally binding, what are the options from this perspective:
· GNSO, ccNSO, ALAC etc. all incorporate and enter into the contract with ICANN/IANA? · IANA becomes a standalone corporation, likely with GNSO, ccNSO, IETF, RIR etc. representation on its board, with some binding undertaking from ICANN to fund it (I think this is close to what Milton has suggested). · The community comes to a written understanding as to what the ‘IANA functions’ will comprise going forward, and the ICANN bylaws are amended to obligate it to respect this ‘understanding’.
Are these valid legally? Can you think of any others?
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan Sent: October-23-14 1:06 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
All,
A few thoughts/suggestions in response to recent posts in this thread:
1. Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic).
2. All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative.
3. An Unincorporated Association has Issues. It is true that the NFL is an unincorporated association. However, I believe that it uses incorporated entities (e.g., NFL Media LLC, NFL Properties LLC, NFL Enterprises LLC) or the the individual teams to enter into most (if not all) contracts. (I believe that the income of the NFL itself (which considers itself a trade association) is primarily dues from teams; all other revenue flows elsewhere.) Under US law, an unincorporated association is not a legal entity apart from its individual members. Thus, unincorporated associations cannot enter into contracts unless the unincorporated association's home State has specific enabling unincorporated associations to enter into contracts. (I don't know what California law says on this matter, assuming one would want the unincorporated association's "home" to be California.) Also, individual members of an unincorporated association have full personal liability for the acts of the unincorporated association (in contrast to corporations and other "limited liability" entities, which act as a shield against personal liability under most circumstances) I doubt that stakeholder groups or representatives would want to assume personal liability for the acts of the group.
4. An Entity Immune from "Rogue" Litigation Attacks is also likely to be Immune from Legitimate Litigation. The issues of jurisdiction, domicile, immunity, etc. are complex and beyond the scope of this email. However, the idea that an entity can be immunized from rogue litigation while still being subject to legitimate litigation is far-fetched. Legitimate litigation is an important accountability mechanism (although a relatively extreme one). The threat of "rogue litigation" is overblown, in my opinion, and is another "bogeyman" that should be avoided. Most litigation is not objectively frivolous or baseless; if it is, it will likely be dismissed relatively quickly and there may be sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel. Furthermore, avoiding litigation is not as easy as changing the state or country of incorporation -- there are "long arm statutes" and many other ways of dragging defendants into court as long as the entity or its activities have a reasonable nexus with the location of the litigation. If we are concerned about accountability, I don't think we should be in the business of shielding entities from litigation.
Greg Shatan
(Caveat: Although I am a practicing attorney, I offer the above in my personal capacity and it does not constitute legal advice.)
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Kris Seeburn <seeburn.k@gmail.com <mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com>> wrote: Milton,
Very much in agreement with you on this. I think in one of the threads it was also clear that coming back to the ccNSO, GNSO we are part of the ICANN entity itself and within the entity where ICANN does the naming. Obviously as one would say since ICANN has the required infrastructure to support the number resources where IANA comes in.
IANA as much as sometimes Avri did mention is like we could call it a dept or the likes. But one thing important in this concept is that when it comes for the NRO - Numbering part the Policy is made from regional areas already and is brought in through the MoU and a converged decision. Somehow as i mentioned before it is slightly easier for them.
Now coming down to the thinking process. From my RIR standpoint it was fine and still fine to have a contract - MoU for IANA to still be under ICANN to continue the management process. IETF is also another loose contract with ICANN for the IANA function. But IETF is also a core of the infrastructure of IANA. If they are not around things may crumble pretty much.
From ALAC/NCUC the process is stalling as we seem to not formally realise that we are part of the beast - ICANN. The question is from the different SOs how do we ascertain the transparency and accountability process is maintained which means no government control and i think this can be achieved independently from having the GAC as part of the process and no direct government involvement.
Perhaps one way to look at the problem is as much as we have setup this cross working group is a foresight answer to the problem already. Why not the CWG creates a council of membership from the different stakeholders in it and becomes the community that ensures the names part and maintain the accountability.
As far as i remember these were the considerations:
The considerations: (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference; (b) integrity, stability, continuity, security and robustness of the administration of the root zone; (c) widespread [international] trust by Internet users in the administration of this function; (d) support of a single unified root zone; and (e) agreement regarding an accountability mechanism for this function that is broadly accepted as being in the global public interest.”
As far as i remember these were the solutions characteristics:
(a) offers a legal structure that is robust against rogue litigation attacks (b) is aligned with the Internet technical infrastructure in a way that supports innovative, technology based evolution of the DNS . (c) is an inclusive model (d) is a demonstrable improvement on current processes in this area
If these are the core principles it should not take much time to accomplish a resolution. Legally stating can ccNSO, GNSO etc., create a legal, i am pretty much doubtful but we can create a council or something that can take the different SOs to be managing and ascertaining the same processes. IETF on the other hand is housed under ISOC. IETF would not be able to house us. We need to still bear in mind we are part of ICANN here. Unless we are looking at decoupling ourselves from ICANN which is not worth.
We need to bear in mind IETF, IAB are closely housed into ISOC which is the entity /organisation that does the management / operational aspect.
My two cents worth.
On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> wrote:
Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. <> I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process.
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...>
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1 <http://www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1>
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00>
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...>
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards, Acharya
_______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org <mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues>
-- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html <http://www.gih.com/ocl.html>
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/> Mobile: +2348035233535 <tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email: <http://goog_1872880453/>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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-- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ <http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa <http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org <mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship>
Kris Seeburn seeburn.k@gmail.com <mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com> <>www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/ <http://www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/>
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This is an interesting observation Robert. When the GAC attempted to execute a contract in order to engage an independent Secretariat, several issues were brought to the fore (how it was to be funded by donor Governments, how were payments to be made to Secretariat, who can sign for the GAC, etc., etc.) In the final analysis, while a workaround was achieved for the funding issue, the contract still ended up being drafted by ICANN, through its Legal Counsel, given that the GAC is not a legal entity and is a creature of the ICANN Bylaws. In addition, I am aware that there are issues and areas for discussion/contention between ccTLDs and Governments - which may NOT be equal to the ccNSO and the GAC, given that not all ccTLDs are members of the ccNSO and not all Governments are members of the GAC and the various permutations in between .... On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:37 PM, Robert Guerra <rguerra@privaterra.org> wrote:
Let’s not forget the GAC…Do we want to include them as one of the communities to include. If so, not sure the collection of governments it represents can enter into a contract with ICANN, let alone with anyone else.
Robert
On Oct 23, 2014, at 2:30 PM, Allan MacGillivray < allan.macgillivray@cira.ca> wrote:
Greg – thanks for your contribution. If the GNSO, ccNSO, etc. cannot enter into contracts, and assuming that we want to have some arrangement that is legally binding, what are the options from this perspective:
· GNSO, ccNSO, ALAC etc. all incorporate and enter into the contract with ICANN/IANA? · IANA becomes a standalone corporation, likely with GNSO, ccNSO, IETF, RIR etc. representation on its board, with some binding undertaking from ICANN to fund it (I think this is close to what Milton has suggested). · The community comes to a written understanding as to what the ‘IANA functions’ will comprise going forward, and the ICANN bylaws are amended to obligate it to respect this ‘understanding’.
Are these valid legally? Can you think of any others?
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Greg Shatan *Sent:* October-23-14 1:06 PM *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
All,
A few thoughts/suggestions in response to recent posts in this thread:
1. *Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN*. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic).
2. *All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight*. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative.
3. *An Unincorporated Association has Issues*. It is true that the NFL is an unincorporated association. However, I believe that it uses incorporated entities (e.g., NFL Media LLC, NFL Properties LLC, NFL Enterprises LLC) or the the individual teams to enter into most (if not all) contracts. (I believe that the income of the NFL itself (which considers itself a trade association) is primarily dues from teams; all other revenue flows elsewhere.) Under US law, an unincorporated association is not a legal entity apart from its individual members. Thus, unincorporated associations cannot enter into contracts unless the unincorporated association's home State has specific enabling unincorporated associations to enter into contracts. (I don't know what California law says on this matter, assuming one would want the unincorporated association's "home" to be California.) Also, individual members of an unincorporated association have full personal liability for the acts of the unincorporated association (in contrast to corporations and other "limited liability" entities, which act as a shield against personal liability under most circumstances) I doubt that stakeholder groups or representatives would want to assume personal liability for the acts of the group.
4. *An Entity Immune from "Rogue" Litigation Attacks is also likely to be Immune from Legitimate Litigation*. The issues of jurisdiction, domicile, immunity, etc. are complex and beyond the scope of this email. However, the idea that an entity can be immunized from rogue litigation while still being subject to legitimate litigation is far-fetched. Legitimate litigation is an important accountability mechanism (although a relatively extreme one). The threat of "rogue litigation" is overblown, in my opinion, and is another "bogeyman" that should be avoided. Most litigation is not objectively frivolous or baseless; if it is, it will likely be dismissed relatively quickly and there may be sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel. Furthermore, avoiding litigation is not as easy as changing the state or country of incorporation -- there are "long arm statutes" and many other ways of dragging defendants into court as long as the entity or its activities have a reasonable nexus with the location of the litigation. If we are concerned about accountability, I don't think we should be in the business of shielding entities from litigation.
Greg Shatan
(Caveat: Although I am a practicing attorney, I offer the above in my personal capacity and it does not constitute legal advice.)
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Kris Seeburn <seeburn.k@gmail.com> wrote: Milton,
Very much in agreement with you on this. I think in one of the threads it was also clear that coming back to the ccNSO, GNSO we are part of the ICANN entity itself and within the entity where ICANN does the naming. Obviously as one would say since ICANN has the required infrastructure to support the number resources where IANA comes in.
IANA as much as sometimes Avri did mention is like we could call it a dept or the likes. But one thing important in this concept is that when it comes for the NRO - Numbering part the Policy is made from regional areas already and is brought in through the MoU and a converged decision. Somehow as i mentioned before it is slightly easier for them.
Now coming down to the thinking process. From my RIR standpoint it was fine and still fine to have a contract - MoU for IANA to still be under ICANN to continue the management process. IETF is also another loose contract with ICANN for the IANA function. But IETF is also a core of the infrastructure of IANA. If they are not around things may crumble pretty much.
From ALAC/NCUC the process is stalling as we seem to not formally realise that we are part of the beast - ICANN. The question is from the different SOs how do we ascertain the transparency and accountability process is maintained which means no government control and i think this can be achieved independently from having the GAC as part of the process and no direct government involvement.
Perhaps one way to look at the problem is as much as we have setup this cross working group is a foresight answer to the problem already. Why not the CWG creates a council of membership from the different stakeholders in it and becomes the community that ensures the names part and maintain the accountability.
As far as i remember these were the considerations:
The considerations: (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference; (b) integrity, stability, continuity, security and robustness of the administration of the root zone; (c) widespread [international] trust by Internet users in the administration of this function; (d) support of a single unified root zone; and (e) agreement regarding an accountability mechanism for this function that is broadly accepted as being in the global public interest.”
As far as i remember these were the solutions characteristics:
(a) offers a legal structure that is robust against rogue litigation attacks (b) is aligned with the Internet technical infrastructure in a way that supports innovative, technology based evolution of the DNS . (c) is an inclusive model (d) is a demonstrable improvement on current processes in this area
If these are the core principles it should not take much time to accomplish a resolution. Legally stating can ccNSO, GNSO etc., create a legal, i am pretty much doubtful but we can create a council or something that can take the different SOs to be managing and ascertaining the same processes. IETF on the other hand is housed under ISOC. IETF would not be able to house us. We need to still bear in mind we are part of ICANN here. Unless we are looking at decoupling ourselves from ICANN which is not worth.
We need to bear in mind IETF, IAB are closely housed into ISOC which is the entity /organisation that does the management / operational aspect.
My two cents worth.
On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community.
What your argument misses is that IANA _*is*_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities.
The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified.
No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk.
I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control.
The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes.
The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role.
Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here.
First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already.
The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
+1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:
Hello all,
you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR...
So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
FYI
-------- Forwarded Message -------- *Subject: * [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities *Date: * Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 *From: * Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com> <gurcharya@gmail.com> *To: * cwg-stewardship@icann.org
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards, Acharya
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It is interesting, but supports my notion that we separate accountability for performance (SLAs) from accountability for operating in accordance with properly developed ICANN policy. The direct consumers of IANA services (which may include a random government or two, but not the GAC itself) would worry about the SLAs and we would all use the ICANN accountability and policy development processes to deal with the latter. Presumably it is in the latter space that governments want to play. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:16 PM To: Robert Guerra <rguerra@privaterra.org<mailto:rguerra@privaterra.org>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities This is an interesting observation Robert. When the GAC attempted to execute a contract in order to engage an independent Secretariat, several issues were brought to the fore (how it was to be funded by donor Governments, how were payments to be made to Secretariat, who can sign for the GAC, etc., etc.) In the final analysis, while a workaround was achieved for the funding issue, the contract still ended up being drafted by ICANN, through its Legal Counsel, given that the GAC is not a legal entity and is a creature of the ICANN Bylaws. In addition, I am aware that there are issues and areas for discussion/contention between ccTLDs and Governments - which may NOT be equal to the ccNSO and the GAC, given that not all ccTLDs are members of the ccNSO and not all Governments are members of the GAC and the various permutations in between .... On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:37 PM, Robert Guerra <rguerra@privaterra.org<mailto:rguerra@privaterra.org>> wrote: Let’s not forget the GAC…Do we want to include them as one of the communities to include. If so, not sure the collection of governments it represents can enter into a contract with ICANN, let alone with anyone else. Robert On Oct 23, 2014, at 2:30 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: Greg – thanks for your contribution. If the GNSO, ccNSO, etc. cannot enter into contracts, and assuming that we want to have some arrangement that is legally binding, what are the options from this perspective: · GNSO, ccNSO, ALAC etc. all incorporate and enter into the contract with ICANN/IANA? · IANA becomes a standalone corporation, likely with GNSO, ccNSO, IETF, RIR etc. representation on its board, with some binding undertaking from ICANN to fund it (I think this is close to what Milton has suggested). · The community comes to a written understanding as to what the ‘IANA functions’ will comprise going forward, and the ICANN bylaws are amended to obligate it to respect this ‘understanding’. Are these valid legally? Can you think of any others? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan Sent: October-23-14 1:06 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities All, A few thoughts/suggestions in response to recent posts in this thread: 1. Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic). 2. All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. 3. An Unincorporated Association has Issues. It is true that the NFL is an unincorporated association. However, I believe that it uses incorporated entities (e.g., NFL Media LLC, NFL Properties LLC, NFL Enterprises LLC) or the the individual teams to enter into most (if not all) contracts. (I believe that the income of the NFL itself (which considers itself a trade association) is primarily dues from teams; all other revenue flows elsewhere.) Under US law, an unincorporated association is not a legal entity apart from its individual members. Thus, unincorporated associations cannot enter into contracts unless the unincorporated association's home State has specific enabling unincorporated associations to enter into contracts. (I don't know what California law says on this matter, assuming one would want the unincorporated association's "home" to be California.) Also, individual members of an unincorporated association have full personal liability for the acts of the unincorporated association (in contrast to corporations and other "limited liability" entities, which act as a shield against personal liability under most circumstances) I doubt that stakeholder groups or representatives would want to assume personal liability for the acts of the group. 4. An Entity Immune from "Rogue" Litigation Attacks is also likely to be Immune from Legitimate Litigation. The issues of jurisdiction, domicile, immunity, etc. are complex and beyond the scope of this email. However, the idea that an entity can be immunized from rogue litigation while still being subject to legitimate litigation is far-fetched. Legitimate litigation is an important accountability mechanism (although a relatively extreme one). The threat of "rogue litigation" is overblown, in my opinion, and is another "bogeyman" that should be avoided. Most litigation is not objectively frivolous or baseless; if it is, it will likely be dismissed relatively quickly and there may be sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel. Furthermore, avoiding litigation is not as easy as changing the state or country of incorporation -- there are "long arm statutes" and many other ways of dragging defendants into court as long as the entity or its activities have a reasonable nexus with the location of the litigation. If we are concerned about accountability, I don't think we should be in the business of shielding entities from litigation. Greg Shatan (Caveat: Although I am a practicing attorney, I offer the above in my personal capacity and it does not constitute legal advice.) On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Kris Seeburn <seeburn.k@gmail.com<mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com>> wrote: Milton, Very much in agreement with you on this. I think in one of the threads it was also clear that coming back to the ccNSO, GNSO we are part of the ICANN entity itself and within the entity where ICANN does the naming. Obviously as one would say since ICANN has the required infrastructure to support the number resources where IANA comes in. IANA as much as sometimes Avri did mention is like we could call it a dept or the likes. But one thing important in this concept is that when it comes for the NRO - Numbering part the Policy is made from regional areas already and is brought in through the MoU and a converged decision. Somehow as i mentioned before it is slightly easier for them. Now coming down to the thinking process. From my RIR standpoint it was fine and still fine to have a contract - MoU for IANA to still be under ICANN to continue the management process. IETF is also another loose contract with ICANN for the IANA function. But IETF is also a core of the infrastructure of IANA. If they are not around things may crumble pretty much.
From ALAC/NCUC the process is stalling as we seem to not formally realise that we are part of the beast - ICANN. The question is from the different SOs how do we ascertain the transparency and accountability process is maintained which means no government control and i think this can be achieved independently from having the GAC as part of the process and no direct government involvement.
Perhaps one way to look at the problem is as much as we have setup this cross working group is a foresight answer to the problem already. Why not the CWG creates a council of membership from the different stakeholders in it and becomes the community that ensures the names part and maintain the accountability. As far as i remember these were the considerations: The considerations: (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference; (b) integrity, stability, continuity, security and robustness of the administration of the root zone; (c) widespread [international] trust by Internet users in the administration of this function; (d) support of a single unified root zone; and (e) agreement regarding an accountability mechanism for this function that is broadly accepted as being in the global public interest.” As far as i remember these were the solutions characteristics: (a) offers a legal structure that is robust against rogue litigation attacks (b) is aligned with the Internet technical infrastructure in a way that supports innovative, technology based evolution of the DNS . (c) is an inclusive model (d) is a demonstrable improvement on current processes in this area If these are the core principles it should not take much time to accomplish a resolution. Legally stating can ccNSO, GNSO etc., create a legal, i am pretty much doubtful but we can create a council or something that can take the different SOs to be managing and ascertaining the same processes. IETF on the other hand is housed under ISOC. IETF would not be able to house us. We need to still bear in mind we are part of ICANN here. Unless we are looking at decoupling ourselves from ICANN which is not worth. We need to bear in mind IETF, IAB are closely housed into ISOC which is the entity /organisation that does the management / operational aspect. My two cents worth. On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=iRuNKr3FGyZArkdKsUiTICAuqC3F8Bf8vlq8nc_L188&e=>> wrote: Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=b5s8wCdIvKkZecKxIkqRenk1DoEj1N4__4BwrrylrcQ&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=BFCX-eRL_kwYQxX61WOu2L1MIYESyLg0cDJ-mL4DQmc&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=KEUo2A8NlxnhVjDjLBDBSfoSy7KlKMF8eEPab1WUbUs&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=8OtFqxjl5Vb6nM2EeFOiQsGOrujlqiI_IZkjvbFa_NY&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=2DEdfKrr1WjHkWdmdZx_Nn-zs35flUprDk4aDOJ-ck4&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=8OtFqxjl5Vb6nM2EeFOiQsGOrujlqiI_IZkjvbFa_NY&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng_&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=7CtDz9TUZWruHl8DsLFeU5A-HBNK9As5AYCjrzU7Fxk&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email: <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__goog-5F1872880453_&d=AAM...> seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! 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The SLAs for gTLD IANA services could be included in the gTLD Registry agreements; some already are. But they would need to also be consequences and/or redress mechanisms if they are not met. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 5:24 PM To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Robert Guerra Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities It is interesting, but supports my notion that we separate accountability for performance (SLAs) from accountability for operating in accordance with properly developed ICANN policy. The direct consumers of IANA services (which may include a random government or two, but not the GAC itself) would worry about the SLAs and we would all use the ICANN accountability and policy development processes to deal with the latter. Presumably it is in the latter space that governments want to play. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw@gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:16 PM To: Robert Guerra <rguerra@privaterra.org<mailto:rguerra@privaterra.org>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities This is an interesting observation Robert. When the GAC attempted to execute a contract in order to engage an independent Secretariat, several issues were brought to the fore (how it was to be funded by donor Governments, how were payments to be made to Secretariat, who can sign for the GAC, etc., etc.) In the final analysis, while a workaround was achieved for the funding issue, the contract still ended up being drafted by ICANN, through its Legal Counsel, given that the GAC is not a legal entity and is a creature of the ICANN Bylaws. In addition, I am aware that there are issues and areas for discussion/contention between ccTLDs and Governments - which may NOT be equal to the ccNSO and the GAC, given that not all ccTLDs are members of the ccNSO and not all Governments are members of the GAC and the various permutations in between .... On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:37 PM, Robert Guerra <rguerra@privaterra.org<mailto:rguerra@privaterra.org>> wrote: Let's not forget the GAC...Do we want to include them as one of the communities to include. If so, not sure the collection of governments it represents can enter into a contract with ICANN, let alone with anyone else. Robert On Oct 23, 2014, at 2:30 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: Greg - thanks for your contribution. If the GNSO, ccNSO, etc. cannot enter into contracts, and assuming that we want to have some arrangement that is legally binding, what are the options from this perspective: · GNSO, ccNSO, ALAC etc. all incorporate and enter into the contract with ICANN/IANA? · IANA becomes a standalone corporation, likely with GNSO, ccNSO, IETF, RIR etc. representation on its board, with some binding undertaking from ICANN to fund it (I think this is close to what Milton has suggested). · The community comes to a written understanding as to what the 'IANA functions' will comprise going forward, and the ICANN bylaws are amended to obligate it to respect this 'understanding'. Are these valid legally? Can you think of any others? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan Sent: October-23-14 1:06 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities All, A few thoughts/suggestions in response to recent posts in this thread: 1. Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic). 2. All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. 3. An Unincorporated Association has Issues. It is true that the NFL is an unincorporated association. However, I believe that it uses incorporated entities (e.g., NFL Media LLC, NFL Properties LLC, NFL Enterprises LLC) or the the individual teams to enter into most (if not all) contracts. (I believe that the income of the NFL itself (which considers itself a trade association) is primarily dues from teams; all other revenue flows elsewhere.) Under US law, an unincorporated association is not a legal entity apart from its individual members. Thus, unincorporated associations cannot enter into contracts unless the unincorporated association's home State has specific enabling unincorporated associations to enter into contracts. (I don't know what California law says on this matter, assuming one would want the unincorporated association's "home" to be California.) Also, individual members of an unincorporated association have full personal liability for the acts of the unincorporated association (in contrast to corporations and other "limited liability" entities, which act as a shield against personal liability under most circumstances) I doubt that stakeholder groups or representatives would want to assume personal liability for the acts of the group. 4. An Entity Immune from "Rogue" Litigation Attacks is also likely to be Immune from Legitimate Litigation. The issues of jurisdiction, domicile, immunity, etc. are complex and beyond the scope of this email. However, the idea that an entity can be immunized from rogue litigation while still being subject to legitimate litigation is far-fetched. Legitimate litigation is an important accountability mechanism (although a relatively extreme one). The threat of "rogue litigation" is overblown, in my opinion, and is another "bogeyman" that should be avoided. Most litigation is not objectively frivolous or baseless; if it is, it will likely be dismissed relatively quickly and there may be sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel. Furthermore, avoiding litigation is not as easy as changing the state or country of incorporation -- there are "long arm statutes" and many other ways of dragging defendants into court as long as the entity or its activities have a reasonable nexus with the location of the litigation. If we are concerned about accountability, I don't think we should be in the business of shielding entities from litigation. Greg Shatan (Caveat: Although I am a practicing attorney, I offer the above in my personal capacity and it does not constitute legal advice.) On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Kris Seeburn <seeburn.k@gmail.com<mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com>> wrote: Milton, Very much in agreement with you on this. I think in one of the threads it was also clear that coming back to the ccNSO, GNSO we are part of the ICANN entity itself and within the entity where ICANN does the naming. Obviously as one would say since ICANN has the required infrastructure to support the number resources where IANA comes in. IANA as much as sometimes Avri did mention is like we could call it a dept or the likes. But one thing important in this concept is that when it comes for the NRO - Numbering part the Policy is made from regional areas already and is brought in through the MoU and a converged decision. Somehow as i mentioned before it is slightly easier for them. Now coming down to the thinking process. From my RIR standpoint it was fine and still fine to have a contract - MoU for IANA to still be under ICANN to continue the management process. IETF is also another loose contract with ICANN for the IANA function. But IETF is also a core of the infrastructure of IANA. If they are not around things may crumble pretty much.
From ALAC/NCUC the process is stalling as we seem to not formally realise that we are part of the beast - ICANN. The question is from the different SOs how do we ascertain the transparency and accountability process is maintained which means no government control and i think this can be achieved independently from having the GAC as part of the process and no direct government involvement.
Perhaps one way to look at the problem is as much as we have setup this cross working group is a foresight answer to the problem already. Why not the CWG creates a council of membership from the different stakeholders in it and becomes the community that ensures the names part and maintain the accountability. As far as i remember these were the considerations: The considerations: (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference; (b) integrity, stability, continuity, security and robustness of the administration of the root zone; (c) widespread [international] trust by Internet users in the administration of this function; (d) support of a single unified root zone; and (e) agreement regarding an accountability mechanism for this function that is broadly accepted as being in the global public interest." As far as i remember these were the solutions characteristics: (a) offers a legal structure that is robust against rogue litigation attacks (b) is aligned with the Internet technical infrastructure in a way that supports innovative, technology based evolution of the DNS . (c) is an inclusive model (d) is a demonstrable improvement on current processes in this area If these are the core principles it should not take much time to accomplish a resolution. Legally stating can ccNSO, GNSO etc., create a legal, i am pretty much doubtful but we can create a council or something that can take the different SOs to be managing and ascertaining the same processes. IETF on the other hand is housed under ISOC. IETF would not be able to house us. We need to still bear in mind we are part of ICANN here. Unless we are looking at decoupling ourselves from ICANN which is not worth. We need to bear in mind IETF, IAB are closely housed into ISOC which is the entity /organisation that does the management / operational aspect. My two cents worth. On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.edu&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=iRuNKr3FGyZArkdKsUiTICAuqC3F8Bf8vlq8nc_L188&e=>> wrote: Fouad: By the "technical community proposals" I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants "the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments." That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8/edit?usp=sharing<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_document_d_1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiRiE8_edit-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=b5s8wCdIvKkZecKxIkqRenk1DoEj1N4__4BwrrylrcQ&e=> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_fulls...> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dianaplan-2Dicg-2Dresponse-2D00&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=BFCX-eRL_kwYQxX61WOu2L1MIYESyLg0cDJ-mL4DQmc&e=> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana-transition-the-meissen-proposal/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.org_2014_08_04_students-2Dschool-2Dfaculty-2Don-2Diana-2Dtransition-2Dthe-2Dmeissen-2Dproposal_&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=KEUo2A8NlxnhVjDjLBDBSfoSy7KlKMF8eEPab1WUbUs&e=> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=8OtFqxjl5Vb6nM2EeFOiQsGOrujlqiI_IZkjvbFa_NY&e=> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=2DEdfKrr1WjHkWdmdZx_Nn-zs35flUprDk4aDOJ-ck4&e=> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=8OtFqxjl5Vb6nM2EeFOiQsGOrujlqiI_IZkjvbFa_NY&e=> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng_&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=7CtDz9TUZWruHl8DsLFeU5A-HBNK9As5AYCjrzU7Fxk&e=> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email: <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__goog-5F1872880453_&d=AAM...> seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_iana-2Dissues&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=8OtFqxjl5Vb6nM2EeFOiQsGOrujlqiI_IZkjvbFa_NY&e=> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blogspot.com_&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=Gt8shzw1NWYjdJLIEoCkwVMzdB5wa2CtAKflUuareJw&e=> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=sbHTNDogLRsE6eCcLt_WmuUFhzjPHuYfg4NzcbSvFnI&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=UeZXf8yP9NUCYRipxiHsSUFt3H8Ujbd2Z_Izlx4Nsyw&e=> Kris Seeburn seeburn.k@gmail.com<mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com> * www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.linkedin.com_in_ksee...> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=UeZXf8yP9NUCYRipxiHsSUFt3H8Ujbd2Z_Izlx4Nsyw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=UeZXf8yP9NUCYRipxiHsSUFt3H8Ujbd2Z_Izlx4Nsyw&e=> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AAMFaQ&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=BzZdo2h_acl8c5-wPUMwpV3oDME1MAmeXOsJSQ-fRrc&s=UeZXf8yP9NUCYRipxiHsSUFt3H8Ujbd2Z_Izlx4Nsyw&e=>
The IGP plan proposed to allow two governmental representatives selected by the GAC to sit on the DROC (the IANA contracting authority). This would be enough to give them insight/transparency into the contracting process and performance, but avoid politicization of the IANA function. --MM From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Robert Guerra Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:38 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Let’s not forget the GAC…Do we want to include them as one of the communities to include. If so, not sure the collection of governments it represents can enter into a contract with ICANN, let alone with anyone else. Robert On Oct 23, 2014, at 2:30 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: Greg – thanks for your contribution. If the GNSO, ccNSO, etc. cannot enter into contracts, and assuming that we want to have some arrangement that is legally binding, what are the options from this perspective: • GNSO, ccNSO, ALAC etc. all incorporate and enter into the contract with ICANN/IANA? • IANA becomes a standalone corporation, likely with GNSO, ccNSO, IETF, RIR etc. representation on its board, with some binding undertaking from ICANN to fund it (I think this is close to what Milton has suggested). • The community comes to a written understanding as to what the ‘IANA functions’ will comprise going forward, and the ICANN bylaws are amended to obligate it to respect this ‘understanding’. Are these valid legally? Can you think of any others? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan Sent: October-23-14 1:06 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities All, A few thoughts/suggestions in response to recent posts in this thread: 1. Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic). 2. All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. 3. An Unincorporated Association has Issues. It is true that the NFL is an unincorporated association. However, I believe that it uses incorporated entities (e.g., NFL Media LLC, NFL Properties LLC, NFL Enterprises LLC) or the the individual teams to enter into most (if not all) contracts. (I believe that the income of the NFL itself (which considers itself a trade association) is primarily dues from teams; all other revenue flows elsewhere.) Under US law, an unincorporated association is not a legal entity apart from its individual members. Thus, unincorporated associations cannot enter into contracts unless the unincorporated association's home State has specific enabling unincorporated associations to enter into contracts. (I don't know what California law says on this matter, assuming one would want the unincorporated association's "home" to be California.) Also, individual members of an unincorporated association have full personal liability for the acts of the unincorporated association (in contrast to corporations and other "limited liability" entities, which act as a shield against personal liability under most circumstances) I doubt that stakeholder groups or representatives would want to assume personal liability for the acts of the group. 4. An Entity Immune from "Rogue" Litigation Attacks is also likely to be Immune from Legitimate Litigation. The issues of jurisdiction, domicile, immunity, etc. are complex and beyond the scope of this email. However, the idea that an entity can be immunized from rogue litigation while still being subject to legitimate litigation is far-fetched. Legitimate litigation is an important accountability mechanism (although a relatively extreme one). The threat of "rogue litigation" is overblown, in my opinion, and is another "bogeyman" that should be avoided. Most litigation is not objectively frivolous or baseless; if it is, it will likely be dismissed relatively quickly and there may be sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel. Furthermore, avoiding litigation is not as easy as changing the state or country of incorporation -- there are "long arm statutes" and many other ways of dragging defendants into court as long as the entity or its activities have a reasonable nexus with the location of the litigation. If we are concerned about accountability, I don't think we should be in the business of shielding entities from litigation. Greg Shatan (Caveat: Although I am a practicing attorney, I offer the above in my personal capacity and it does not constitute legal advice.) On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Kris Seeburn <seeburn.k@gmail.com<mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com>> wrote: Milton, Very much in agreement with you on this. I think in one of the threads it was also clear that coming back to the ccNSO, GNSO we are part of the ICANN entity itself and within the entity where ICANN does the naming. Obviously as one would say since ICANN has the required infrastructure to support the number resources where IANA comes in. IANA as much as sometimes Avri did mention is like we could call it a dept or the likes. But one thing important in this concept is that when it comes for the NRO - Numbering part the Policy is made from regional areas already and is brought in through the MoU and a converged decision. Somehow as i mentioned before it is slightly easier for them. Now coming down to the thinking process. From my RIR standpoint it was fine and still fine to have a contract - MoU for IANA to still be under ICANN to continue the management process. IETF is also another loose contract with ICANN for the IANA function. But IETF is also a core of the infrastructure of IANA. If they are not around things may crumble pretty much. From ALAC/NCUC the process is stalling as we seem to not formally realise that we are part of the beast - ICANN. The question is from the different SOs how do we ascertain the transparency and accountability process is maintained which means no government control and i think this can be achieved independently from having the GAC as part of the process and no direct government involvement. Perhaps one way to look at the problem is as much as we have setup this cross working group is a foresight answer to the problem already. Why not the CWG creates a council of membership from the different stakeholders in it and becomes the community that ensures the names part and maintain the accountability. As far as i remember these were the considerations: The considerations: (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference; (b) integrity, stability, continuity, security and robustness of the administration of the root zone; (c) widespread [international] trust by Internet users in the administration of this function; (d) support of a single unified root zone; and (e) agreement regarding an accountability mechanism for this function that is broadly accepted as being in the global public interest.” As far as i remember these were the solutions characteristics: (a) offers a legal structure that is robust against rogue litigation attacks (b) is aligned with the Internet technical infrastructure in a way that supports innovative, technology based evolution of the DNS . (c) is an inclusive model (d) is a demonstrable improvement on current processes in this area If these are the core principles it should not take much time to accomplish a resolution. Legally stating can ccNSO, GNSO etc., create a legal, i am pretty much doubtful but we can create a council or something that can take the different SOs to be managing and ascertaining the same processes. IETF on the other hand is housed under ISOC. IETF would not be able to house us. We need to still bear in mind we are part of ICANN here. Unless we are looking at decoupling ourselves from ICANN which is not worth. We need to bear in mind IETF, IAB are closely housed into ISOC which is the entity /organisation that does the management / operational aspect. My two cents worth. On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> wrote: Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<http://www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN. From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process. I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email: <http://goog_1872880453/> seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship Kris Seeburn seeburn.k@gmail.com<mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com> * www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/<http://www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Wouldn’t that solution potentially mean that a government would have a say – no matter how limited – on another country’s ccTLD? In what way wouldn’t that politicise the debate? Martin From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Milton L Mueller Sent: 23 October 2014 23:43 To: Robert Guerra; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities The IGP plan proposed to allow two governmental representatives selected by the GAC to sit on the DROC (the IANA contracting authority). This would be enough to give them insight/transparency into the contracting process and performance, but avoid politicization of the IANA function. --MM From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Robert Guerra Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:38 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Let’s not forget the GAC…Do we want to include them as one of the communities to include. If so, not sure the collection of governments it represents can enter into a contract with ICANN, let alone with anyone else. Robert On Oct 23, 2014, at 2:30 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: Greg – thanks for your contribution. If the GNSO, ccNSO, etc. cannot enter into contracts, and assuming that we want to have some arrangement that is legally binding, what are the options from this perspective: • GNSO, ccNSO, ALAC etc. all incorporate and enter into the contract with ICANN/IANA? • IANA becomes a standalone corporation, likely with GNSO, ccNSO, IETF, RIR etc. representation on its board, with some binding undertaking from ICANN to fund it (I think this is close to what Milton has suggested). • The community comes to a written understanding as to what the ‘IANA functions’ will comprise going forward, and the ICANN bylaws are amended to obligate it to respect this ‘understanding’. Are these valid legally? Can you think of any others? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan Sent: October-23-14 1:06 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities All, A few thoughts/suggestions in response to recent posts in this thread: 1. Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic). 2. All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. 3. An Unincorporated Association has Issues. It is true that the NFL is an unincorporated association. However, I believe that it uses incorporated entities (e.g., NFL Media LLC, NFL Properties LLC, NFL Enterprises LLC) or the the individual teams to enter into most (if not all) contracts. (I believe that the income of the NFL itself (which considers itself a trade association) is primarily dues from teams; all other revenue flows elsewhere.) Under US law, an unincorporated association is not a legal entity apart from its individual members. Thus, unincorporated associations cannot enter into contracts unless the unincorporated association's home State has specific enabling unincorporated associations to enter into contracts. (I don't know what California law says on this matter, assuming one would want the unincorporated association's "home" to be California.) Also, individual members of an unincorporated association have full personal liability for the acts of the unincorporated association (in contrast to corporations and other "limited liability" entities, which act as a shield against personal liability under most circumstances) I doubt that stakeholder groups or representatives would want to assume personal liability for the acts of the group. 4. An Entity Immune from "Rogue" Litigation Attacks is also likely to be Immune from Legitimate Litigation. The issues of jurisdiction, domicile, immunity, etc. are complex and beyond the scope of this email. However, the idea that an entity can be immunized from rogue litigation while still being subject to legitimate litigation is far-fetched. Legitimate litigation is an important accountability mechanism (although a relatively extreme one). The threat of "rogue litigation" is overblown, in my opinion, and is another "bogeyman" that should be avoided. Most litigation is not objectively frivolous or baseless; if it is, it will likely be dismissed relatively quickly and there may be sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel. Furthermore, avoiding litigation is not as easy as changing the state or country of incorporation -- there are "long arm statutes" and many other ways of dragging defendants into court as long as the entity or its activities have a reasonable nexus with the location of the litigation. If we are concerned about accountability, I don't think we should be in the business of shielding entities from litigation. Greg Shatan (Caveat: Although I am a practicing attorney, I offer the above in my personal capacity and it does not constitute legal advice.) On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Kris Seeburn <seeburn.k@gmail.com<mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com>> wrote: Milton, Very much in agreement with you on this. I think in one of the threads it was also clear that coming back to the ccNSO, GNSO we are part of the ICANN entity itself and within the entity where ICANN does the naming. Obviously as one would say since ICANN has the required infrastructure to support the number resources where IANA comes in. IANA as much as sometimes Avri did mention is like we could call it a dept or the likes. But one thing important in this concept is that when it comes for the NRO - Numbering part the Policy is made from regional areas already and is brought in through the MoU and a converged decision. Somehow as i mentioned before it is slightly easier for them. Now coming down to the thinking process. From my RIR standpoint it was fine and still fine to have a contract - MoU for IANA to still be under ICANN to continue the management process. IETF is also another loose contract with ICANN for the IANA function. But IETF is also a core of the infrastructure of IANA. If they are not around things may crumble pretty much. From ALAC/NCUC the process is stalling as we seem to not formally realise that we are part of the beast - ICANN. The question is from the different SOs how do we ascertain the transparency and accountability process is maintained which means no government control and i think this can be achieved independently from having the GAC as part of the process and no direct government involvement. Perhaps one way to look at the problem is as much as we have setup this cross working group is a foresight answer to the problem already. Why not the CWG creates a council of membership from the different stakeholders in it and becomes the community that ensures the names part and maintain the accountability. As far as i remember these were the considerations: The considerations: (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference; (b) integrity, stability, continuity, security and robustness of the administration of the root zone; (c) widespread [international] trust by Internet users in the administration of this function; (d) support of a single unified root zone; and (e) agreement regarding an accountability mechanism for this function that is broadly accepted as being in the global public interest.” As far as i remember these were the solutions characteristics: (a) offers a legal structure that is robust against rogue litigation attacks (b) is aligned with the Internet technical infrastructure in a way that supports innovative, technology based evolution of the DNS . (c) is an inclusive model (d) is a demonstrable improvement on current processes in this area If these are the core principles it should not take much time to accomplish a resolution. Legally stating can ccNSO, GNSO etc., create a legal, i am pretty much doubtful but we can create a council or something that can take the different SOs to be managing and ascertaining the same processes. IETF on the other hand is housed under ISOC. IETF would not be able to house us. We need to still bear in mind we are part of ICANN here. Unless we are looking at decoupling ourselves from ICANN which is not worth. We need to bear in mind IETF, IAB are closely housed into ISOC which is the entity /organisation that does the management / operational aspect. My two cents worth. On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> wrote: Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<http://www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN. From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process. I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email: <http://goog_1872880453/> seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship Kris Seeburn seeburn.k@gmail.com<mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com> * www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/<http://www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
No, the DROC merely decides who gets the IANA contract in our model. I don’t see how that gives them “a say” on another country’s TLD policies, etc. But I am a bit puzzled by the broader implications of your concern about anyone else “having a say” in another country’s TLD, Martin. The DNS root is a collective good, the operation of which MUST be shared across all TLDs, whether cc’s or g’s. In that very narrow sense, everyone involved in the operation of the root has “a say” in another country’s TLD, and there is no avoiding that. So let’s not use that inherent interdependency as an argument against particular governance structures. From: Martin Boyle [mailto:Martin.Boyle@nominet.org.uk] Sent: Friday, October 24, 2014 6:08 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Robert Guerra; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Wouldn’t that solution potentially mean that a government would have a say – no matter how limited – on another country’s ccTLD? In what way wouldn’t that politicise the debate? Martin From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Milton L Mueller Sent: 23 October 2014 23:43 To: Robert Guerra; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities The IGP plan proposed to allow two governmental representatives selected by the GAC to sit on the DROC (the IANA contracting authority). This would be enough to give them insight/transparency into the contracting process and performance, but avoid politicization of the IANA function. --MM From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Robert Guerra Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:38 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Let’s not forget the GAC…Do we want to include them as one of the communities to include. If so, not sure the collection of governments it represents can enter into a contract with ICANN, let alone with anyone else. Robert On Oct 23, 2014, at 2:30 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray@cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: Greg – thanks for your contribution. If the GNSO, ccNSO, etc. cannot enter into contracts, and assuming that we want to have some arrangement that is legally binding, what are the options from this perspective: • GNSO, ccNSO, ALAC etc. all incorporate and enter into the contract with ICANN/IANA? • IANA becomes a standalone corporation, likely with GNSO, ccNSO, IETF, RIR etc. representation on its board, with some binding undertaking from ICANN to fund it (I think this is close to what Milton has suggested). • The community comes to a written understanding as to what the ‘IANA functions’ will comprise going forward, and the ICANN bylaws are amended to obligate it to respect this ‘understanding’. Are these valid legally? Can you think of any others? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan Sent: October-23-14 1:06 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities All, A few thoughts/suggestions in response to recent posts in this thread: 1. Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic). 2. All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. 3. An Unincorporated Association has Issues. It is true that the NFL is an unincorporated association. However, I believe that it uses incorporated entities (e.g., NFL Media LLC, NFL Properties LLC, NFL Enterprises LLC) or the the individual teams to enter into most (if not all) contracts. (I believe that the income of the NFL itself (which considers itself a trade association) is primarily dues from teams; all other revenue flows elsewhere.) Under US law, an unincorporated association is not a legal entity apart from its individual members. Thus, unincorporated associations cannot enter into contracts unless the unincorporated association's home State has specific enabling unincorporated associations to enter into contracts. (I don't know what California law says on this matter, assuming one would want the unincorporated association's "home" to be California.) Also, individual members of an unincorporated association have full personal liability for the acts of the unincorporated association (in contrast to corporations and other "limited liability" entities, which act as a shield against personal liability under most circumstances) I doubt that stakeholder groups or representatives would want to assume personal liability for the acts of the group. 4. An Entity Immune from "Rogue" Litigation Attacks is also likely to be Immune from Legitimate Litigation. The issues of jurisdiction, domicile, immunity, etc. are complex and beyond the scope of this email. However, the idea that an entity can be immunized from rogue litigation while still being subject to legitimate litigation is far-fetched. Legitimate litigation is an important accountability mechanism (although a relatively extreme one). The threat of "rogue litigation" is overblown, in my opinion, and is another "bogeyman" that should be avoided. Most litigation is not objectively frivolous or baseless; if it is, it will likely be dismissed relatively quickly and there may be sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel. Furthermore, avoiding litigation is not as easy as changing the state or country of incorporation -- there are "long arm statutes" and many other ways of dragging defendants into court as long as the entity or its activities have a reasonable nexus with the location of the litigation. If we are concerned about accountability, I don't think we should be in the business of shielding entities from litigation. Greg Shatan (Caveat: Although I am a practicing attorney, I offer the above in my personal capacity and it does not constitute legal advice.) On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:48 AM, Kris Seeburn <seeburn.k@gmail.com<mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com>> wrote: Milton, Very much in agreement with you on this. I think in one of the threads it was also clear that coming back to the ccNSO, GNSO we are part of the ICANN entity itself and within the entity where ICANN does the naming. Obviously as one would say since ICANN has the required infrastructure to support the number resources where IANA comes in. IANA as much as sometimes Avri did mention is like we could call it a dept or the likes. But one thing important in this concept is that when it comes for the NRO - Numbering part the Policy is made from regional areas already and is brought in through the MoU and a converged decision. Somehow as i mentioned before it is slightly easier for them. Now coming down to the thinking process. From my RIR standpoint it was fine and still fine to have a contract - MoU for IANA to still be under ICANN to continue the management process. IETF is also another loose contract with ICANN for the IANA function. But IETF is also a core of the infrastructure of IANA. If they are not around things may crumble pretty much. From ALAC/NCUC the process is stalling as we seem to not formally realise that we are part of the beast - ICANN. The question is from the different SOs how do we ascertain the transparency and accountability process is maintained which means no government control and i think this can be achieved independently from having the GAC as part of the process and no direct government involvement. Perhaps one way to look at the problem is as much as we have setup this cross working group is a foresight answer to the problem already. Why not the CWG creates a council of membership from the different stakeholders in it and becomes the community that ensures the names part and maintain the accountability. As far as i remember these were the considerations: The considerations: (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference; (b) integrity, stability, continuity, security and robustness of the administration of the root zone; (c) widespread [international] trust by Internet users in the administration of this function; (d) support of a single unified root zone; and (e) agreement regarding an accountability mechanism for this function that is broadly accepted as being in the global public interest.” As far as i remember these were the solutions characteristics: (a) offers a legal structure that is robust against rogue litigation attacks (b) is aligned with the Internet technical infrastructure in a way that supports innovative, technology based evolution of the DNS . (c) is an inclusive model (d) is a demonstrable improvement on current processes in this area If these are the core principles it should not take much time to accomplish a resolution. Legally stating can ccNSO, GNSO etc., create a legal, i am pretty much doubtful but we can create a council or something that can take the different SOs to be managing and ascertaining the same processes. IETF on the other hand is housed under ISOC. IETF would not be able to house us. We need to still bear in mind we are part of ICANN here. Unless we are looking at decoupling ourselves from ICANN which is not worth. We need to bear in mind IETF, IAB are closely housed into ISOC which is the entity /organisation that does the management / operational aspect. My two cents worth. On Oct 23, 2014, at 7:17 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> wrote: Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4RiR... So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<http://www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00 Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana... Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN. From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process. I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email: <http://goog_1872880453/> seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/ Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship Kris Seeburn seeburn.k@gmail.com<mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com> * www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/<http://www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
2. All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. MM: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based on a fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of ICANN’s policy making process with the accountability of and input into the IANA functions. All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair representation in the process of policy development. But once a policy is agreed, the implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative technical and operational function in which its direct customers are the primary stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best (because random members of the public would not know what is going on at that level) and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to circumvent agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation level). I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN. That’s wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP – and many others – have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation need to be clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the policy process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy by a registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do that. Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a contracting authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency purposes and for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable to the people who actually use its services and whose basic functions and activities are dependent on those services. Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US government’s authority over modifications to the root zone created the potential for that kind of political intervention at the implementation level. This set a very bad precedent for the world that we are still dealing with. Now some people are trying to reproduce that situation by making IANA oversight a way for interest groups who don’t get what they want in a policy process to get a second, back door bite at the apple. Let’s reject that clearly. If one knows what the performance of the IANA functions actually are, the idea that every stakeholder in the world should be engaged in “oversight” of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You might as well say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over what secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they live in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be affected, right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected, right? If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone file data neither you, Greg – nor I – are in a position to say whether the request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up.
I agree with Milton here. In addition, I question whether this would not also open up IANA oversight to government oversight – the very thing we are supposed to be staying away from? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Milton L Mueller Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:39 PM To: Greg Shatan; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities 2. All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. MM: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based on a fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of ICANN’s policy making process with the accountability of and input into the IANA functions. All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair representation in the process of policy development. But once a policy is agreed, the implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative technical and operational function in which its direct customers are the primary stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best (because random members of the public would not know what is going on at that level) and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to circumvent agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation level). I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN. That’s wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP – and many others – have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation need to be clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the policy process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy by a registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do that. Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a contracting authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency purposes and for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable to the people who actually use its services and whose basic functions and activities are dependent on those services. Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US government’s authority over modifications to the root zone created the potential for that kind of political intervention at the implementation level. This set a very bad precedent for the world that we are still dealing with. Now some people are trying to reproduce that situation by making IANA oversight a way for interest groups who don’t get what they want in a policy process to get a second, back door bite at the apple. Let’s reject that clearly. If one knows what the performance of the IANA functions actually are, the idea that every stakeholder in the world should be engaged in “oversight” of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You might as well say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over what secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they live in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be affected, right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected, right? If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone file data neither you, Greg – nor I – are in a position to say whether the request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up.
+1 J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Legal <King>, Stacey King <stacek@amazon.com<mailto:stacek@amazon.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 9:05 PM To: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>>, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities I agree with Milton here. In addition, I question whether this would not also open up IANA oversight to government oversight – the very thing we are supposed to be staying away from? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Milton L Mueller Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:39 PM To: Greg Shatan; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities 2. All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. MM: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based on a fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of ICANN’s policy making process with the accountability of and input into the IANA functions. All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair representation in the process of policy development. But once a policy is agreed, the implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative technical and operational function in which its direct customers are the primary stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best (because random members of the public would not know what is going on at that level) and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to circumvent agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation level). I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN. That’s wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP – and many others – have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation need to be clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the policy process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy by a registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do that. Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a contracting authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency purposes and for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable to the people who actually use its services and whose basic functions and activities are dependent on those services. Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US government’s authority over modifications to the root zone created the potential for that kind of political intervention at the implementation level. This set a very bad precedent for the world that we are still dealing with. Now some people are trying to reproduce that situation by making IANA oversight a way for interest groups who don’t get what they want in a policy process to get a second, back door bite at the apple. Let’s reject that clearly. If one knows what the performance of the IANA functions actually are, the idea that every stakeholder in the world should be engaged in “oversight” of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You might as well say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over what secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they live in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be affected, right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected, right? If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone file data neither you, Greg – nor I – are in a position to say whether the request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up.
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan 1. Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic). MM: Based on my initial, rather quick evaluation of this idea, I think it is a good idea for the short term; in fact, those who argue for a new, independent contracting authority might be well-served if IANA were a separate subsidiary of ICANN. This would, as Greg suggests, make it easier to contract separately with ICANN’s IANA and facilitate the kind of separability that might be required in the future. However, this would be the easy part. The hard part is: who awards the contract?
And aren’t we concerned that incorporating IANA as a sub leaves users depending on an asset-less entity in the event there is a problem? Presumably, ICANN would want to set up a sub that would survive an attempt to pierce the corporate veil. In addition, we would have to replicate all of the broader (other than SLA) accountability mechanisms. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:51 PM To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan 1. Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic). MM: Based on my initial, rather quick evaluation of this idea, I think it is a good idea for the short term; in fact, those who argue for a new, independent contracting authority might be well-served if IANA were a separate subsidiary of ICANN. This would, as Greg suggests, make it easier to contract separately with ICANN’s IANA and facilitate the kind of separability that might be required in the future. However, this would be the easy part. The hard part is: who awards the contract?
I don't think there's any reason to assume that IANA, Inc. would be an asset-less entity. The assets that the IANA department uses to perform its functions could (and probably should) become assets of IANA, Inc. Likewise, the employees of the IANA department could become employees of IANA, Inc. Capitalizing the entity and giving it revenue would be a challenge, but not an unreasonable one. As for piercing the corporate veil, I don't think that would be a paramount concern for ICANN, since they are now fully liable for the acts of the IANA department. Finally, I doubt that one would need to replicate the broader accountability mechanisms -- amend and adapt, yes -- but not replicate. Greg Shatan On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:22 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
And aren’t we concerned that incorporating IANA as a sub leaves users depending on an asset-less entity in the event there is a problem? Presumably, ICANN would want to set up a sub that would survive an attempt to pierce the corporate veil. In addition, we would have to replicate all of the broader (other than SLA) accountability mechanisms.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:51 PM To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Greg Shatan
1. *Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN*. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic).
MM: Based on my initial, rather quick evaluation of this idea, I think it is a good idea for the short term; in fact, those who argue for a new, independent contracting authority might be well-served if IANA were a separate subsidiary of ICANN. This would, as Greg suggests, make it easier to contract separately with ICANN’s IANA and facilitate the kind of separability that might be required in the future.
However, this would be the easy part. The hard part is: who awards the contract?
ICANN currently performs the IANA functions under contract to USG at no charge, so what is the revenue source? Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW. Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/Cell Twitter: @VLawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: Greg Shatan Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 5:08 PM To: Burr, Becky Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities I don't think there's any reason to assume that IANA, Inc. would be an asset-less entity. The assets that the IANA department uses to perform its functions could (and probably should) become assets of IANA, Inc. Likewise, the employees of the IANA department could become employees of IANA, Inc. Capitalizing the entity and giving it revenue would be a challenge, but not an unreasonable one. As for piercing the corporate veil, I don't think that would be a paramount concern for ICANN, since they are now fully liable for the acts of the IANA department. Finally, I doubt that one would need to replicate the broader accountability mechanisms -- amend and adapt, yes -- but not replicate. Greg Shatan On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:22 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: And aren’t we concerned that incorporating IANA as a sub leaves users depending on an asset-less entity in the event there is a problem? Presumably, ICANN would want to set up a sub that would survive an attempt to pierce the corporate veil. In addition, we would have to replicate all of the broader (other than SLA) accountability mechanisms. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:51 PM To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan 1. Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic). MM: Based on my initial, rather quick evaluation of this idea, I think it is a good idea for the short term; in fact, those who argue for a new, independent contracting authority might be well-served if IANA were a separate subsidiary of ICANN. This would, as Greg suggests, make it easier to contract separately with ICANN’s IANA and facilitate the kind of separability that might be required in the future. However, this would be the easy part. The hard part is: who awards the contract?
+1. Would that suggest an agreement and/or MOU rather than a contract? Cheers On Oct 23, 2014 10:14 PM, "Phil Corwin" <psc@vlaw-dc.com> wrote:
ICANN currently performs the IANA functions under contract to USG at no charge, so what is the revenue source?
Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.
Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW. Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/Cell Twitter: @VLawDC
"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey *From: *Greg Shatan *Sent: *Thursday, October 23, 2014 5:08 PM *To: *Burr, Becky *Cc: *cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
I don't think there's any reason to assume that IANA, Inc. would be an asset-less entity. The assets that the IANA department uses to perform its functions could (and probably should) become assets of IANA, Inc. Likewise, the employees of the IANA department could become employees of IANA, Inc. Capitalizing the entity and giving it revenue would be a challenge, but not an unreasonable one. As for piercing the corporate veil, I don't think that would be a paramount concern for ICANN, since they are now fully liable for the acts of the IANA department.
Finally, I doubt that one would need to replicate the broader accountability mechanisms -- amend and adapt, yes -- but not replicate.
Greg Shatan
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:22 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr@neustar.biz> wrote:
And aren’t we concerned that incorporating IANA as a sub leaves users depending on an asset-less entity in the event there is a problem? Presumably, ICANN would want to set up a sub that would survive an attempt to pierce the corporate veil. In addition, we would have to replicate all of the broader (other than SLA) accountability mechanisms.
J. Beckwith Burr
*Neustar, Inc. /* Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz
From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:51 PM To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" < cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Greg Shatan
1. *Make IANA a Subsidiary of ICANN*. In order to promote structural separation, and to allow for future separation of the IANA group from ICANN should that become appropriate, IANA could become a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN (rather than a department). This would allow other entities to contract directly with IANA, rather than contracting with ICANN for IANA services.This would also make future separation easier (and should make the threat of separation as an accountability mechanism more realistic).
MM: Based on my initial, rather quick evaluation of this idea, I think it is a good idea for the short term; in fact, those who argue for a new, independent contracting authority might be well-served if IANA were a separate subsidiary of ICANN. This would, as Greg suggests, make it easier to contract separately with ICANN’s IANA and facilitate the kind of separability that might be required in the future.
However, this would be the easy part. The hard part is: who awards the contract?
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participants (34)
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Alan Greenberg -
Allan MacGillivray -
Amr Elsadr -
Avri Doria -
Burr, Becky -
Carolina Aguerre -
David Conrad -
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Eduardo Diaz -
Erick Iriarte -
Fouad Bajwa -
Gomes, Chuck -
Greg Shatan -
Guru Acharya -
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joy -
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Lindeberg, Elise -
Maarten Botterman GNKS -
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Mary Uduma -
Milton L Mueller -
Olawale Bakare -
Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond -
Paul M Kane -
Peter Van Roste -
Phil Corwin -
Robert Guerra -
Seun Ojedeji -
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