Hi, While actual separation and the means of implementing that separation may be solutions, I am strongly of the opinion that the potential to separate MUST be a principle any solution is built on. It may never be exercised, but it would be unacceptable for there to be a solution that prohibited or did not otherwise allow any possible future separation of the function from ICANN. This is one of several principles I feel I must personally argue for persistently, and without which any solution would be unsatisfactory. avri On 05-Nov-14 10:45, Guru Acharya wrote:
Avri,
While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don't think it can be made a principle.
There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believe that self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need for separability does not exist.
Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than a principle for all solutions.
Regards, Guru On 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Comments:
a. *Oversight, accountability and transparency*: the service should be accountable and transparent.
I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here.
i. *Independence of oversight*: Oversight should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder community;
I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons:
a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to the accountability issue. b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case. Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as is ICANN.
I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section:
Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship function should be to the Internet stakeholder community.
I also think we need to add a principle called separability
Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA service provider(s). The power of removing the function to a different operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA function(s)
Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the Internet community on an annual basis.
thanks
avri
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