On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 05:00:15PM +0000, David Conrad wrote:
separation is chosen, how will the communities (e.g., the naming community, the IETF, and the NRO) demonstrate accountability at least as strong as what ICANN provides _to the global stakeholder community_ if that separation occurs?
The problem with phrasing the question that way is that it suggests, if not assumes, that ICANN adds anything at all to the IETF's or NRO's accountability. I suppose the assumption is that if one of those communities adopted a policy through their normal methods, and someone didn't like that, then they could appeal to ICANN to stop the IANA actions attendant on such a policy. I would like to suggest that, if ICANN actually refused to perform the IANA actions as instructed by either one of those communities when those communities had already followed their well-defined, participatory processes to reach a conclusion, we'd almost certainly have a crisis that would result in the end of IANA as we know it. Therefore, it seems to me that there is no accountability change _at all_ in the event the separation is chosen. The conditions after such separation would be no different than those before: the policy is developed in one community, and the outcome is published faithfully by the relevant IANA functions operator. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com