Independence of policy from IANA: the IANA funtions operator should be independent of the policy processes. Its role is to implement changes in accordance with policy agreed through the relevant bottom up policy process [Note: this does not pre-suppose any model for separation of the policy and IANA roles. The current contract already requires such separation];
Is bottom up a cliche we want to see in our principles? Diversity of IANA's Customers:
For ccTLDs, the IANA should provide a service without requiring a contract and should respect the diversity of agreements and arrangements in place for ccTLDs. In particular, the national policy authority or legislation (related to the ccTLD operator) should be respected and no additional requirements should be imposed unless it is directly and demonstrably linked to global security, stability and resilience of the DNS.
"unless it is directly and demonstrably linked to global security, stability and resilience of the DNS" Is there any example of a policy that can be implemented at the ccTLD level that can threaten the DNS? ______________________ Mwendwa Kivuva, Nairobi, Kenya L: https://www.linkedin.com/in/lordmwesh B: http://lord.me.ke/ T: twitter.com/lordmwesh "There are some men who lift the age they inhabit, till all men walk on higher ground in that lifetime." - Maxwell Anderson On 5 November 2014 20:40, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
I agree 100% with Avri. Separability has to be a principle, otherwise we have failed the accountability test.
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] * On Behalf Of *Avri Doria *Sent:* Tuesday, November 4, 2014 9:16 PM *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Draft of Principles
Hi,
While actual separation and the means of implementing that separation may be solutions, I am strongly of the opinion that the potential to separate MUST be a principle any solution is built on. It may never be exercised, but it would be unacceptable for there to be a solution that prohibited or did not otherwise allow any possible future separation of the function from ICANN.
This is one of several principles I feel I must personally argue for persistently, and without which any solution would be unsatisfactory.
avri
On 05-Nov-14 10:45, Guru Acharya wrote:
Avri,
While I agree that separability should be a part of the solution, I don't
think it can be made a principle.
There are many who want IANA to perpetually reside in ICANN. They believe
that self regulation will ensure accountability and that the need for
separability does not exist.
Therefore, separability may be a component of your solution rather than a
principle for all solutions.
Regards,
Guru
On 5 Nov 2014 04:00, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Comments:
a. *Oversight, accountability and transparency*: the service
should be accountable and transparent.
I see no reason to include the term 'oversight' here.
i. *Independence of oversight*: Oversight
should be independent of the IANA functions operator and should assure the
accountability of the operator to the (inclusive) global multi-stakeholder
community;
I recommend removing this as a principle for the following reasons:
a. I do not think oversight is a principle, but one possible solution to
the accountability issue.
b. if 'oversight' is a component of the solution, I do not understand how
it is independent of the stakeholders to whom ICANN is also accountable, so
the notion of 'Independence' is not a principle I understand in this case.
Yes any possible oversight mechanism should be independent of ICANN
corporate, but I do believe it is accountable to the same stakeholders as
is ICANN.
I think we need a specific principle on accountability in this section:
Accountability: Post transition accountability on the IANA Stewardship
function should be to the Internet stakeholder community.
I also think we need to add a principle called separability
Separability: In the event that the ICANN corporation, or any of its
subsidies, remains responsible for the IANA functions after the transition
of stewardship, it should remain possible for a well formed review and
contracting granting authority to reassign the IANA function to a new IANA
service provider(s). The power of removing the function to a different
operator should persist through any future transfers of the the IANA
function(s)
Under (c.) I recommend that we include the principle that service levels
be subject to independent audit, with results published for review by the
Internet community on an annual basis.
thanks
avri
_______________________________________________
CWG-Stewardship mailing list
CWG-Stewardship@icann.org
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship