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Proposed agenda - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - Thursday, 09 January 2020 at 20:00 UTC
by Julie Hedlund Jan. 8, 2020

Jan. 8, 2020

Dear all, Please find below the proposed agenda for the call on Thursday, 09 January 2020 at 20:00 UTC for 90 minutes: 1. Review Agenda/Statements of Interest 2. Predictability Framework: * Proposed Answers to Open Questions: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xDaENKupUoHSfIQ20klw0NYZK1Qwm43l56EvISH… – Start at Section 8 * Process Flow Chart (attached) 3. String Contention Mechanisms of Last Resort (time permitting): https://docs.google.com/document/d/16qDoiK6vydQp6a0v9tMvU2l5fcypJY24hCzTIVT… 4. AOB If you need a dial out or would like to submit an apology, please email gnso-secs(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-secs@icann.org>. Kind regards, Julie Julie Hedlund, Policy Director

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Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 7 January 2020
by Emily Barabas Jan. 8, 2020

Jan. 8, 2020

Dear Working Group members, Please see below the notes from the meeting on 7 January 2020. These high-level notes are designed to help WG members navigate through the content of the call and are not a substitute for the recording, transcript, or the chat, which will be posted at: https://community.icann.org/display/NGSPP/2020-01-07+New+gTLD+Subsequent+Pr… As a follow-up to the first action item below, the Working Group discussed the principle that the SPIRT should be able to provide input regardless of the level of consensus achieved on recommendations. A Working Group member raised on the call that a rationale should accompany the different perspectives within the SPIRT when there is a division of opinion within the group. Working Group members are encouraged to review the Standard Methodology for Making Decisions in Section 3.6 of the Working Group Guidelines to see if there is sufficient guidance in Section 3.6 about documenting the rationale supporting different views. Section 3.6 is available on page 8 of the WG Guidelines: https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/file/field-file-attach/annex-1-g… Kind regards, Emily Notes and Action Items: ACTION ITEM: Leadership will circulate Section 3.6 of the WG Guidelines to so that the group can review if it adequately addresses providing a rationale when opinion is divided and there is not consensus. ACTION ITEM: Throughout the document, change “raised” an issue with the SPIRT to “forwarded.” Notes 1. Review Agenda/Statements of Interest * No updates to SOIs 2. Work Plan * This will be discussed at a high level today. A more detailed work plan will be available at the end of this week or beginning of next week. * Original plan was to hold a public comment period at the beginning of this year, with delivery of the Final Report by the end of Q1. This plan will need to be revised. * Documents are under development on each of the topics in this PDP, narrowly focused on areas of agreement with the intent to reach draft final recommendations. * We will have another public comment period. The leadership team has been discussing how to structure this in line with feedback received. * Leadership team recommends making all draft recs available during the public comment period, but seeking feedback on specific areas that have not been out for public comment previously. We can’t stop people from making comments on other areas, but we will make clear that the focus will be on topics for which we are seeking input. * In one of the upcoming meetings, we will go over one of the recommendations documents drafted on one of the “easier” topics so everyone can review approach and format that will put forward for public comment. * Question – if the WG gets feedback from Board, GAC, SSAC or other groups on sections of the Report that we don’t request feedback on, what are we going to do with that? The input could be important and valuable and we don’t want to disenfranchise anyone. * Answer – We will need to make a judgment call in these cases and determine whether the input needs to go through another layer of analysis. * Auction Proceeds Proposed Final Report – this went out for public comment recently. There were three specific questions that commenters were asked to focus on, but people can provide comments on other topics as well. This might be a model to use for SubPro. * Question – how do we distinguish between areas that are new and haven’t been covered (and therefore require public comment) and those that have not? This sounds subjective. * Answer – For example, if the group concludes that we are going to do a series of fixed rounds, and someone puts in a comment supporting first-come, first-served, we are going to respond that we have already considered this and the issue is closed. We don’t want to rehash what has already been reviewed where a decision has been made. * Some WG members supported making sure that new suggestions and ideas are considered. * On areas that are new, like the predictability model or if we come up with something new for contention resolution, we will ask focused questions and encouraging comments. * Staff clarification – draft policy recommendations documents will not all be discussion papers. Discussion papers have been focused on those topics where there needs to be further discussion. For most topics, the intention is to develop draft policy recommendations with rationale, as well limited text on deliberations focused on issues raised since the last public comment. These will follow the format of the WT5 Final Report. * Question – Will CCT-RT recs be discussed in the report with explanation of how the WG is addressing them? * Chart that was reviewed by the group late last year includes state of the discussion on each recommendation and also includes SubPro topics that are applicable to each recommendation. The CCT-RT recs will be addressed in the applicable sections of the final report. * As we review draft recommendations, it’s important for everyone to review the materials in advance. If there are open issues that are not included in the documents, it’s important to raise them on the mailing list before the call where the topic will be covered. 3. Predictability Framework: a. Summary Document: https://docs.google.com/document/d/12_x8zYR9r6zXqfA7dmoosSPH12NmcyJ-2FEjecG… * Review of the issue we are trying to address - How do we address changes after the launch of the next round of the New gTLD Program? How do we deal with unanticipated issues? * Review of policy goals - Regarding when the Predictability Framework commences, leadership team believes it should become applicable once the AGB is finalized (as opposed to when the application window opens), but the WG needs to come to agreement on this. * Review of the proposal – recommending the formation of a Standing Predictability Implementation Review Team to review potential changes to the program. b. Proposed Answers to Open Questions: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xDaENKupUoHSfIQ20klw0NYZK1Qwm43l56EvISH… * Review of proposed Role of the SPIRT – staff to correct text to note that the SPIRT comes into play after approval of the AGB. * Staff note – the WG discussed that existing documents might be a basis for materials regarding the SPIRT. This document attempts to pull elements from the IRT Guidelines, CSC and PDP charters, and IoT Guidelines that might be applicable to the SPIRT. * Review of role of the GNSO – Some agreement that the second bullet is redundant and can be removed. * Review of who can raise an issue to the SPIRT and rationale. * Question – does the GNSO Council have a mechanism in which it can provide feedback in a rapid fashion? * Answer – this will be discussed under the next section: how can each of these groups raise an issue? The GNSO may need to tailor some of its existing procedures. One of our recommendations could be that they develop that. * No objections raised to Board and Org having the ability to raise issues. * Regarding the GNSO Council, there are different options of who can raise an issue. This will have an impact on timing. * We shouldn’t develop process for the sake of developing processes. * Comment - There is nothing stopping a PDP or PDP leadership team from asking Council for input. This is a good starting point. There is no reason for Council not to be able to be nimble in responding. The Council Liaison could be a tool that could be more extensively used as well. * Response - It might not be that someone from the SPIRT group is asking Council for input. It would likely be someone from the community raising it to Council, and the issue is raised within Council. The question is about what the threshold will be for Council to take up the issue. * Some support for the fact that raising an issue within Council should be informal and could be raised by a single Councilor. From this perspective, voting and a more formal mechanism is appropriate to determine how the issue is handled – SPIRT or other process/mechanism. * We are starting with the assumption that if the GNSO Council wants to send something to the SPIRT team and determining what happens next. This is the perspective we are coming from. * From one perspective, we would need to state that Council has not elected to use other processes. It is important to be clear about procedures. * For item 5. Suggestion to rephrase the category: “How can each of these groups raise an issue to the SPIRT?” * There are difficult questions about the mechanism of how issues get raised to Council. We need to think about the relationship between SG/Cs and Council, Council Members as representatives of the SG/Cs, etc. We could suggest an email address where community members can raise issues to Council. There is no halfway approach – either you leave it to Council to figure out how to handle or you provide a detailed approach recommending how Council carries this out. * Reminder that the SPIRT is advisory in nature, which may make it less political. * Concern that allowing one Councilor to send an issue to the SPIRT might leave the SPIRT susceptible to lobbying. * Suggestion to pick and propose one of the options under section 5 and put it out for public comment. * Clarification regarding the options available – if a Constituency could raise an issue, the IPC alone could raise the issue (for example). But if a Stakeholder Group is the minimum threshold, it would need to be the whole CSG that is raising the issue to Council. * Review of decision-making process of SPIRT – Clarification – this group should be able to report its advice regardless of the level of support achieved. Text may need clarification. We may not only want to report the divisions of perspectives but also the rationales. * Leadership believes that this is largely covered in Section 3.6 of the Working Group Guidelines. * This group is different, less formal than at WG. If the SPIRT group is divided, it needs to be clear why. ACTION ITEM: Leadership will circulate Section 3.6 of the WG Guidelines to so that the group can review if it adequately addresses providing a rationale when opinion is divided and there is not consensus. * Section 7 – review of who receives Advice/Guidance issued by the SPIRT? ACTION ITEM: Throughout the document, change “raised” an issue with the SPIRT to “forwarded.” * Comment regarding section 5 that there should be text that processes should be carried out expeditiously. * The WG will start with section 8 on the next call. c. Process Flow Chart (to be provided) * Item deferred. 4. String Contention Mechanisms of Last Resort (time permitting): * Item deferred. 5. AOB a. Update from meeting of the ICANN Board/Senior ICANN org management/SubPro leadership/Council leadership * In attendance: Jeff and Cheryl from SubPro; Goran and Cyrus from ICANN org; Keith, Pam, Rafik from Council leadership; Becky and Avri from the Board. * Board wants to be aware of particularly thorny issues that are coming their way and the timing of when issues will reach the Board. * The Board will likely be getting more letters from SO/ACs and other interested parties, and this is a way of opening up communications between the PDP, Org, and Board on handling the issues raised. * ICANN org has set up an executive team to start planning processes to implement next round. * If, for example, the WG expects to put forward a recommendation that is in conflict with GAC Advice, the Board will want to know this. * The goal is to be in closer communication and flag an issues in advance. * If anything of note comes up on these coordination calls in the future, the SubPro Co-Chairs will share with the WG. * Board requested current thinking of the WG on the public comment period as letters from the GAC and ALAC went to the Board. Co-Chairs said that they would talk with the WG and make sure there is agreement on the approach and then share this approach with the Board. * The purpose is to avoid as many surprises as possible through early and regular communication. * GAC is interested in learning in advance how SubPro recommendations may deviate from their advice. This is not something we have started working on but it has been requested.

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GNSO Working Group Guidelines and applicability to the SPIRT
by Jeff Neuman Jan. 8, 2020

Jan. 8, 2020

All, The language below is from Section 3.6 of the latest version of the GNSO Operating Procedures (https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/file/field-file-attach/op-proced…) and is being proposed to guide the work of the SPIRT. To address the question raised by Anne, the Chair must indicate whether there are any minority views regardless of whether there is Full Consensus, Strong support, etc. ************************************** 3.6 Standard Methodology for Making Decisions The Chair will be responsible for designating each position as having one of the following designations: * Full consensus - when no one in the group speaks against the recommendation in its last readings. This is also sometimes referred to as Unanimous Consensus. * Consensus - a position where only a small minority disagrees, but most agree.4 * Strong support but significant opposition - a position where, while most of the group supports a recommendation, there are a significant number of those who do not support it. * Divergence (also referred to as No Consensus) - a position where there isn't strong support for any particular position, but many different points of view. Sometimes this is due to irreconcilable differences of opinion and sometimes it is due to the fact that no one has a particularly strong or convincing viewpoint, but the members of the group agree that it is worth listing the issue in the report nonetheless. * Minority View - refers to a proposal where a small number of people support the recommendation. This can happen in response to a Consensus, Strong support but significant opposition, and No Consensus; or, it can happen in cases where there is neither support nor opposition to a suggestion made by a small number of individuals. In cases of Consensus, Strong support but significant opposition, and No Consensus, an effort should be made to document that variance in viewpoint and to present any Minority View recommendations that may have been made. Documentation of Minority View recommendations normally depends on text offered by the proponent(s). In all cases of Divergence, the WG Chair should encourage the submission of minority viewpoint(s). The recommended method for discovering the consensus level designation on recommendations should work as follows: i. After the group has discussed an issue long enough for all issues to have been raised, understood and discussed, the Chair, or Co-Chairs, make an evaluation of the designation and publish it for the group to review. ii. After the group has discussed the Chair's estimation of designation, the Chair, or Co-Chairs, should reevaluate and publish an updated evaluation. iii. Steps (i) and (ii) should continue until the Chair/Co-Chairs make an evaluation that is accepted by the group. iv. In rare case, a Chair may decide that the use of polls is reasonable. Some of the reasons for this might be: * A decision needs to be made within a time frame that does not allow for the natural process of iteration and settling on a designation to occur. * It becomes obvious after several iterations that it is impossible to arrive at a designation. This will happen most often when trying to discriminate between Consensus and Strong support but Significant Opposition or between Strong support but Significant Opposition and Divergence. Care should be taken in using polls that they do not become votes. A liability with the use of polls is that, in situations where there is Divergence or Strong Opposition, there are often disagreements about the meanings of the poll questions or of the poll results. Based upon the WG's needs, the Chair may direct that WG participants do not have to have their name explicitly associated with any Full Consensus or Consensus view/position. However, in all other cases and in those cases where a group member represents the minority viewpoint, their name must be explicitly linked, especially in those cases where polls where taken. If a Chartering Organization wishes to deviate from the standard methodology for making decisions or empower the WG to decide its own decision-making methodology it should be affirmatively stated in the WG Charter. Consensus calls should always involve the entire Working Group and, for this reason, should take place on the designated mailing list to ensure that all Working Group members have the opportunity to fully participate in the consensus process. It is the role of the Chair to designate which level of consensus is reached and announce this designation to the Working Group. Member(s) of the Working Group should be able to challenge the designation of the Chair as part of the Working Group discussion. However, if disagreement persists, members of the WG may use the process set forth below to challenge the designation. If several participants5 in a WG disagree with the designation given to a position by the Chair or any other consensus call, they may follow these steps sequentially: 1. Send email to the Chair, copying the WG explaining why the decision is believed to be in error. 2. If the Chair still disagrees with the complainants, the Chair will forward the appeal to the CO liaison(s). The Chair must explain his or her reasoning in the response to the complainants and in the submission to the liaison. If the liaison(s) supports the Chair's position, the liaison(s) will provide their response to the complainants. The liaison(s) must explain their reasoning in the response. If the CO liaison disagrees with the Chair, the liaison will forward the appeal to the CO. Should the complainants disagree with the liaison support of the Chair's determination, the complainants may appeal to the Chair of the CO or their designated representative. If the CO agrees with the complainants' position, the CO should recommend remedial action to the Chair. 3. In the event of any appeal, the CO will attach a statement of the appeal to the WG and/or Board report. This statement should include all of the documentation from all steps in the appeals process and should include a statement from the CO. Jeff Neuman Senior Vice President Com Laude | Valideus 1751 Pinnacle Drive Suite 600, McLean VA 22102, USA M: +1.202.549.5079 D: +1.703.635.7514 E: jeff.neuman(a)comlaude.com<mailto:jeff.neuman@comlaude.com> www.comlaude.com<http://www.comlaude.com/> [cid:image003.jpg@01D5C593.DF721E00] ________________________________ The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential to the intended recipient. They may not be disclosed, used by or copied in any way by anyone other than the intended recipient. If you have received this message in error, please return it to the sender (deleting the body of the email and attachments in your reply) and immediately and permanently delete it. Please note that the Com Laude Group does not accept any responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan or otherwise check this email and any attachments. The Com Laude Group does not accept liability for statements which are clearly the sender's own and not made on behalf of the group or one of its member entities. The Com Laude Group includes Nom-IQ Limited t/a Com Laude, a company registered in England and Wales with company number 5047655 and registered office at 28-30 Little Russell Street, London, WC1A 2HN England; Valideus Limited, a company registered in England and Wales with company number 06181291 and registered office at 28-30 Little Russell Street, London, WC1A 2HN England; Demys Limited, a company registered in Scotland with company number SC197176, having its registered office at 33 Melville Street, Edinburgh, Lothian, EH3 7JF Scotland; Consonum, Inc. dba Com Laude USA and Valideus USA, headquartered at 1751 Pinnacle Drive, Suite 600, McLean, VA 22102, USA; Com Laude (Japan) Corporation, a company registered in Japan having its registered office at Suite 319,1-3-21 Shinkawa, Chuo-ku, Tokyo, 104-0033, Japan. For further information see www.comlaude.com<https://comlaude.com>

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Proposed agenda - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - Tuesday, 07 January 2020 at 03:00 UTC
by Julie Hedlund Jan. 7, 2020

Jan. 7, 2020

Dear all, Happy New Year! Please find below the proposed agenda for the call on Tuesday, 07 January 2020 at 03:00 UTC for 90 minutes: 1. Review Agenda/Statements of Interest 2. Work Plan 3. Predictability Framework: * Summary Document: https://docs.google.com/document/d/12_x8zYR9r6zXqfA7dmoosSPH12NmcyJ-2FEjecG… * Proposed Answers to Open Questions: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xDaENKupUoHSfIQ20klw0NYZK1Qwm43l56EvISH… * Process Flow Chart (to be provided) 4. String Contention Mechanisms of Last Resort (time permitting): https://docs.google.com/document/d/16qDoiK6vydQp6a0v9tMvU2l5fcypJY24hCzTIVT… 5. AOB If you need a dial out or would like to submit an apology, please email gnso-secs(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-secs@icann.org>. Kind regards, Julie Julie Hedlund, Policy Director

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Post call | New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Working Group call | Tuesday, 07 January 2020 at 03:00 UTC
by Andrea Glandon Jan. 7, 2020

Jan. 7, 2020

Dear all, All recordings for the New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Working Group call held on Tuesday, 07 January 2020 at 03:00 UTC can be found on the agenda wiki page<https://community.icann.org/x/pgRxBw> (attendance included) and the GNSO Master calendar <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__gnso.icann.org_en_group…> . These include: * Attendance (please let me know if your name has been left off the attendance list) * Audio recording * Zoom chat archive * Zoom recording (including audio, visual, rough transcript) * Transcript As a reminder only members can join the call, observers can listen to the recordings and read the transcript afterwards. Please email gnso-secs(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-secs@icann.org> if you would like to change your status from observer to member. For additional information, you may consult the mailing list archives <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/gnso-newgtld-wg/> and the main wiki page<https://community.icann.org/x/RgV1Aw>. Thank you. Kind regards, Andrea

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Difference of value at application time x further down the road
by Rubens Kuhl Jan. 2, 2020

Jan. 2, 2020

In one of the arguments against submitting a bid at application time, it was said that at that time the perception of asset value would be different than after reveal day or any other milestone. The point I will make here is that this doesn't make one time better than the other for settling the contention, since ICANN is a non-profit. The usual reasoning for giving the asset to the highest bidder is that it's a proxy for one with the better usage of the asset. But that only requires relative gauging of the contenders; if they are bidding with the same information level, at that time the best project would still be selected by the method. So, postponing the decision could cause ICANN to make more money or less money, depending on what the new information brought to the table, but since ICANN mission is not to profit from asset allocation, we shouldn't care about it. Other factors might play into the decision, but this shouldn't be one of them. Rubens

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Happy Holidays !
by Vanda Scartezini Dec. 22, 2019

Dec. 22, 2019

My best wishes for 2020 full of Health, Joy and Success! kisses Vanda Scartezini Polo Consultores Associados Av. Paulista 1159, cj 1004 01311-200- Sao Paulo, SP, Brazil Land Line: +55 11 3266.6253 Mobile: + 55 11 98181.1464 Sorry for any typos.

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Re: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019
by Pruis, Elaine Dec. 21, 2019

Dec. 21, 2019

Happy Holidays! I was hoping we’d have this conversation on the last call. Now we’re heading into a long break, so I’ll put some thoughts out to the list for further discussion on these two points: 1. Kristine wrote: “I even included a “pro” in the ICANN Auction of Last Resort category because I know some folks on here believe there is a hypothetical problem with “applicants being paid to lose”. And Paul McGrady suggesting in his comments, “There have been rumors of gaming in the last round.” A quick google of “Minds + Machines auction” very clearly exemplifies “being paid to lose” as a winning strategy in the 2012 round. It isn’t a “hypothetical”. Here is one of many examples; “….MMX, which applied for .inc and .llc, said this morning that it has benefited from a $2.4 million windfall by losing both auctions.” The ICANN Board has expressed their concern around the “practice of participating in private auctions for the sole purpose of being paid to drop out” via their Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Report public comments for this PDP WG to address. This practice is not hypothetical, nor a rumor, but is this a “problem”? I think we can best answer that question by considering another of Paul’s statements, 1. “Weaknesses…Enriches ICANN (which has never justified why it thinks it “owns” the undelegated TLD resource).” Are TLDs public assets? If not, what are they? How do you justify your answer to that question? We’ve created a MSM that defines ICANN as a steward of this resource. If we don’t treat TLDs as public assets, we decrease ICANN’s legitimacy. Imagine if new TLD application fees were $50k, and private auctions are a part of the contention resolution formula. There will be thousands of speculative “pay me to go away” applications, instead of just hundreds like in 2012. People noticed the windfalls in the last round and are hoping that it is a business strategy they can deploy in the next round, with no intention of actually operating the TLD. Donna suggested some rules or policy that might prevent speculative participation. But a recent article<https://www.aei.org/technology-and-innovation/experiments-in-market-solutio…> on the “Experiments in market solutions: The FCC’s toll-free number auction” states “This creates incentives for strategic behavior by RespOrgs such as warehousing or hoarding available numbers, which ties up these resources unproductively and leads to quicker exhaustion of the limited supply of numbers in each area code. Historically the Commission has tried to control this strategic behavior via regulation, which can be costly and is not guaranteed to be effective. Moreover, assignment via a first-in-time rule can lead to inefficient allocation of toll-free numbers, as they flow to customers with the fastest trigger fingers, rather than those who value the number the most. Woke: Toll-free assignment auction To address this inefficiency, the FCC voted last year to allocate the most popular numbers in the new area code via auction. The structure is a single-round Vickrey auction. Qualified bidders submit a sealed bid for each available toll-free number they are interested in. The highest bid wins the number, but the bidder is only required to pay the value of the second-highest bid. The single-round structure reduces the agency’s administrative costs compared to the multi-round structure used for more valuable spectrum auctions. And as the Commission notes, the Vickrey design discourages strategic bidding by encouraging a participant to bid its true estimate of a number’s value, knowing it will only have to pay the value placed on it by the runner-up.” I think it is impossible to prevent private resolution. Those that want to make deals will do it before or after the delegation. But I don’t think we should set up the program to encourage private auctions. We need to treat TLDs as a public asset. Perhaps we can recommend that auction funds to ICANN be used strictly for security and stability purposes (for example, fund the RIRs). I’d like us to look at this piece through the lens of “public benefit” and not “private gain”. Elaine From: Gnso-newgtld-wg <gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces(a)icann.org> on behalf of "Dorrain, Kristine via Gnso-newgtld-wg" <gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org> Reply-To: "Dorrain, Kristine" <dorraink(a)amazon.com> Date: Thursday, December 12, 2019 at 3:43 PM To: Kurt Pritz <kurt(a)kjpritz.com> Cc: "gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org" <gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019 Fair points. I also prefer a model where ICANN is not enriched and the process *is* cost neutral. Therefore, I support having this conversation at a policy level. Regarding the preferability of Vickrey, I think there will be a range of outcomes regardless of what scheme is used, which is why I like the idea of choice. Applicants can select for themselves what model fits their situation. To answer your question below, even with Vickrey, the most well-off applicants can simply bid an outrageous amount, so Vickrey does favor deep pockets, as Paul pointed out in the table. The only option currently on the list that provides ANY hope for a resolution that doesn’t necessarily cost a pile of money is private resolution. Kristine From: Kurt Pritz <kurt(a)kjpritz.com> Sent: Thursday, December 12, 2019 12:11 PM To: Dorrain, Kristine <dorraink(a)amazon.com> Cc: McGrady, Paul D. <PMcGrady(a)taftlaw.com>; gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org Subject: Re: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019 Thanks for your comments Kristine. I did purposefully leave off the “paid to ICANN” part as that is a separate policy question I think. I don’t think we need to assume that the money would go to ICANN: * as that did not go so well the first time, and * we should consider what a “cost neutral” application process really means. If we think the process should be cost neutral to ICANN, then I think / suppose that placing the auction funds aside in a foundation of sorts would satisfy the neutrality requirement. (Although, the lie might have been put to that when ICANN replenished its reserve out of the auction funds.) If we think the process should be cost neutral to ICANN AND the applicants, then should not the money go back to the applicants in some way? Isn’t that truly cost neutral? Additionally, as a question of policy, maybe the money can be placed in some more effective foundation than one that is taking years to establish. I think these are policy choices for us. Finally, to me it seems that Vickrey is probably preferable to a highest price auction but, as I said in an earlier email, it is a complex economics issue. For example, can the Vickrey scheme be gamed in someway where there are well-off and not-well-off applicants? Or does the Vickrey scheme tend to defeat that gaming? We should tell ICANN what our policy goals are for this and ask them to figure it out in implementation, which will be reviewed by the community. Whew, sorry, Kurt On Dec 12, 2019, at 11:56 AM, Dorrain, Kristine <dorraink(a)amazon.com<mailto:dorraink@amazon.com>> wrote: I fully support Paul’s choice model and have added a few more pros and cons to the table. In the interest of equity, I even included a “pro” in the ICANN Auction of Last Resort category because I know some folks on here believe there is a hypothetical problem with “applicants being paid to lose.” The Auction of Last Resort can be effective against any perception that this might be a problem because applicants must ALL agree to any other mechanism. I generally support Kurt’s additions, with a few questions/suggestions in red. I’m going to be late for the call that starts shortly… Kristine From: Gnso-newgtld-wg <gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces@icann.org>> On Behalf Of Kurt Pritz Sent: Thursday, December 12, 2019 11:35 AM To: McGrady, Paul D. <PMcGrady(a)taftlaw.com<mailto:PMcGrady@taftlaw.com>> Cc: gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org> Subject: Re: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019 I think the table is a great idea. If it helps clarify the discussion, under ‘Auction Type,’ I think the options could be: Sealed Bid - winner pays highest price bid to ICANN (why would the winner not pay the second highest price…did I miss something? I think this option is more about timing, not any other change to the Vickrey model) Sealed Bid - Vickrey (winner pays second highest price bid to ICANN) Ascending auctions (paid to ICANN) - similar to the previous round Private resolution (fully private...notably, participants could self-select a sealed bid auction as their private auction mechanism of choice) Additionally, under ‘Auction Type’ or ‘Auction Timing' as a separate table the options would be: (I do like the idea of making this clear in the chart) Timing - bids submitted at time of TLD application Timing - bids submitted at near time of TLD award (after evaluation, clearing of objectionsetc) I think breaking it out this way would make the identification of strengths and weaknesses easier and clearer. Best regards, Kurt On Dec 10, 2019, at 2:25 PM, McGrady, Paul D. <PMcGrady(a)taftlaw.com<mailto:PMcGrady@taftlaw.com>> wrote: Hi All! I have really enjoyed the conversation on the calls and on this list regarding auctions. It is a great reminder of how rich in talent our community is. Below I have summarized some of the pros and cons of each process discussed (these are not meant to be exhaustive or dismissive, just my own thoughts which I encourage others to supplement). I’ve also proposed a possible way forward that could disrupt the current default status quo (ICANN Last Resort auction found in 2012 AGB, but which in my opinion is based on the false premise that ICANN “owns” all the undelegated gTLD space) but not force everyone into a one-sized-fits-all solution. I hope that the below encourages communication and helps us reach a consensus position that everyone in the WG can stand behind. Auction Type Strengths Weaknesses Vickrey (place maximum bid amount at the time application is filed) • Straightforward. • Eliminates significant delays caused by contention sets. • Favors single TLD applicants. • Favors deep pockets. • Bad for .brand applicants who could end up paying significantly more • Enriches ICANN (which has never justified why it thinks it “owns” the undelegated TLD resource). • Assumes no changes in the round/procedures/ other circumstances between filing of the application and the auction. • Assumes money is the only way to solve a contention. Modified Vickrey (place maximum bid amount at the time contention sets are formed) • Straightforward. • Eliminates much of the delay caused by contention sets • Eliminates ICANN Last Resort auctions. • Allows multiple TLD applicants to use resources more efficiently. • Favors deep pockets. • Enriches ICANN (which has never justified why it thinks it “owns” the undelegated TLD resource). • Assumes money is the only way to solve a contention. Private Resolution (could be dollar amounts, acquisitions, other consideration, etc.) • Allows for full creativity to resolve contention sets. • Doesn’t enrich ICANN (which has never justified why it thinks it “owns” the undelegated TLD resource). • The parties may agree on an auction process to resolve the contention set or they may agree instead to negotiate toward a mutually rewarding outcome. • There have been rumors of gaming in the last round. • Favors deep pockets.Amend to say: may favor deep pockets…private resolutions do not require the expenditure of ANY cash. ICANN Last Resort (status quo from 2012 AGB) None. • No applicant “gets paid to lose.” • Favors deep pockets. • Enriches ICANN (which has never justified why it thinks it “owns” the undelegated TLD resource). A possible way forward: Choice. Let each applicant choose how they would like to proceed. If all of the other members in the contention set make the same choice, that is the method that will be used. If, however, the members of the contention set do not agree, then ICANN Last Resort (status quo) will be default. There is no harm to the pro-Vickrey applicants in this option since whatever dollar amount they designated in their applications can, if they so choose, become their maximum dollar amount in an ICANN Last Resort if need be. Since an applicant submitting a Vickrey auction preference might be compromised in an ICANN Last Resort, the maximum dollar amount they are prepared to spend should be lodged with a third party under strict confidentiality obligations, e.g. with one of the large accounting firms. The same is true for the pro-Modified Vickrey applicants. Whatever maximum dollar amount that they would have bid once contention sets were finalized can become their maximum bid in an ICANN Last Resort if need be. Likewise, if an applicants selected Private Resolution and the other member(s) of the contention set did not, they would simply bid in the ICANN Last Resort whatever they were prepared to pay in a private auction. Because Private Resolution opens up the door to creative problem solving between members of a contention set, the applicants in that contention set should be allowed to select – after contention sets are formed – to try Private Resolution. Such a selection should be unanimous and if it doesn’t lead to resolution (e.g. negotiations are attempted and fail instead of the parties using a private auction), then the ICANN Last Resort option would kick in. I hope the above is helpful and moves us a bit closer to a consensus position. Thanks. Best, Paul This message may contain information that is attorney-client privileged, attorney work product or otherwise confidential. If you are not an intended recipient, use and disclosure of this message are prohibited. If you received this transmission in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete the message and any attachments. From: Gnso-newgtld-wg <gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces@icann.org>> On Behalf Of Justine Chew Sent: Monday, December 9, 2019 6:49 PM To: Austin, Donna <Donna.Austin(a)team.neustar<mailto:Donna.Austin@team.neustar>> Cc: gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org> Subject: Re: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019 Thank you, Donna, for picking this up. Just in relation to Goal No. 1, on reflection, I think the text "...in which the winner ultimately overpays for the TLD" should be omitted or reworded, firstly as Donna has explained, we don't know what "overpays" actually means. Secondly, even if that is the case, why should we be concerned if an applicant chooses to "overpay". Thirdly, At-Large's concerns had to do with the situation of wealthier applicants outbidding less-wealthy applicants, thereby potentially stifling competition. So, perhaps the goal should be re-stated as "Reduce the risk of unintended outcomes from “bidding wars". As for the remaining texts, I would like to be able to review the flowcharts for the 3 Alternatives before making further comments. Thanks, Justine Chew ----- On Sat, 7 Dec 2019 at 04:57, Austin, Donna via Gnso-newgtld-wg <gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org>> wrote: Thanks for the notes Julie, these are particularly helpful as I wasn’t able to attend the call. I have listened to the recording and I wanted to address a couple of issues that were discussed and are captured in your notes. I don’t agree that Alternative 1 addresses the following goal: 1. Reduce the risk of “bidding wars” in which the winner ultimately overpays for the TLD. a. Tentative, related goal for discussion: encourage applicants to bid their true value for a TLD. I personally struggle with this as a goal because it’s a subjective assessment that applicants from 2012 overpaid for a TLD. Only the successful applicant can make that judgement and if the applicant willingly entered into a private or ICANN auction of last resort they didn’t do so blindly: they had an opportunity to assess the market and combined with their own personal objectives for wanting a string made a judgement about how much they were willing to pay for the string. As I noted previously, my main issue with Alternative 1 is that the sealed bid has to be provided at the time of application, which is unfair to any applicant that ultimately finds themselves in a contention set. No-one can predict how many applications will be received and how many strings will end up in a contention set so the applicant has no information available at the time of submitting their application on which to assess the value of the TLD to them. It would be eminently fairer to all applicants to submit sealed bids at a time when more information is available that would allow them to make a more informed decision about the value of the TLD to them, which is ultimately why I proposed Alternative 2 originally. Donna Donna Austin Neustar, Inc. / Senior Policy Manager, Registry Solutions Mobile: +1 310 890 9655 donna.austin(a)team.neustar<mailto:donna.austin@team.neustar> / Website: home.neustar<http://www.home.neustar/> Follow Neustar: LinkedIn<http://www.linkedin.com/company/5349> / Twitter<http://www.twitter.com/neustar> Reduce your environmental footprint. Print only if necessary. ________________________________ The information contained in this email message is intended only for the use of the recipient(s) named above and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient you have received this email message in error and any review, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately and delete the original message. From: Gnso-newgtld-wg [mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces@icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Julie Hedlund Sent: Monday, December 02, 2019 8:52 AM To: gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org> Subject: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019 Dear Working Group members, Please see below the notes from the meeting on 02 December 2019. These high-level notes are designed to help WG members navigate through the content of the call and are not a substitute for the recording, transcript, or the chat, which will be posted at: https://community.icann.org/display/NGSPP/2019-12-02+New+gTLD+Subsequent+Pr…<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__community.icann.org_di…>. Kind regards, Julie Julie Hedlund, Policy Director Notes and Action Items: Actions: ACTION ITEM 1: Add a third alternative. ACTION ITEM 2: Add another goal (#7): “Increase efficiencies in application evaluation by way of understanding the contention set?” ACTION ITEM 3: Create a flow chart with a fictional string to show how alternative 1 would work. ACTION ITEM 4: Update the list of goals. Notes: 1. Review Agenda/Statements of Interest: Susan Payne was reappointed IPC Secretary for another year. 2. String Contention Mechanisms of Last Resort:https://docs.google.com/document/d/16qDoiK6vydQp6a0v9tMvU2l5fcypJY24… [docs.google.com]<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_docume…> What is the issue we are trying to address: -- The Working Group has discussed a number of potential issues with the mechanisms of last resort used in the 2012 New gTLD Round. These issues are captured in the Supplemental Initial Report. -- Although the Working Group ultimately believes that when there is string contention, an auction process should be used to select the Registry Operator invited to enter into a Registry Agreement with ICANN, the Working Group is still discussing what forms of private resolution should be allowed (if any), the specific type of auction to be used, and the timing of such an auction. Policy Goals / What the WG is Seeking to Accomplish: -- The WG is largely supportive of existing Implementation Guideline F: Implementation Guideline F: If there is contention for strings, applicants may: i) resolve contention between them within a pre-established timeframe ii) if there is no mutual agreement, a claim to support a community by one party will be a reason to award priority to that application. If there is no such claim, and no mutual agreement a process will be put in place to enable efficient resolution of contention and; iii) the ICANN Board may be used to make a final decision, using advice from staff and expert panels. Other goals include: 1. Reduce the risk of “bidding wars” in which the winner ultimately overpays for the TLD. * Tentative, related goal for discussion: encourage applicants to bid their true value for a TLD. 1. Reduce collusion, profiteering, and/or speculation, especially as it relates to financial transactions external to the program (Note, while this is not an explicit goal for the mechanisms of last resort, it has been discussed as a motivation for altering the auction mechanism). 2. Increase transparency. 3. Resolve contention more quickly. 4. Increase predictability. 5. Encourage new entrants into the field. b. Which could include, making it easier to implement “multipliers” for certain types of applicants, such as those eligible for Applicant Support. -- Note that some of the terminology may need to be further defined if the above goals are adopted. In order to ensure that recommendations align with goals, it is important for the Working Group to agree on specific objectives. Discussion: -- Do we still need iii)? An alternative may be, "The ICANN Board may use expert panels to make Community Priority Evaluation determinations." This may also be dependent on recommendations on the new appeals mechanism. -- ICANN Board says it does not make policy. Its decision would be subject to RFR and IRP - very messy so it may be better to stick with what we developed earlier. -- This isn’t about the Board making policy, but making it clear that it’s an auction process rather than the Board making a decision. -- There should be a reference instead to Auction of last resort. -- Agree they are good goals so suggest removing possible description What are we Proposing? -- The Working Group is leaning towards recommending a sealed-bid auction as the ultimate form of auction used as a mechanism to resolve string contention. When a sealed-bid auction is held where bids are submitted without knowing the bid of others in the auction (e.g., prior to evaluating any of the applications) it is also called a Vickrey Auction. A sealed-bid auction can also be used as a mechanism of last resort and at the end of the process. -- With a sealed-bid auction, each applicant submits a sealed bid, stating the amount that they are willing to pay for the TLD. The ultimate “winner” pays the amount submitted by the second-highest bidder.. -- Regardless of when the sealed bid auction is held, if there are one or more Community-based Applications, that/those application(s) would need to be processed first through Community Priority Evaluation before looking at the auction bids. Alternative 1 - Vickrey Auction (No Private Resolution) -- Addresses goals 1, 2, 4, and 6. -- The principle pro here is the seemingly near elimination of private resolution. However, the principle con is the substantial complications this approach introduces (see Additional Considerations, Mostly For Alternative 1 below). Other cons are that other forms of private resolution might be impacted (e.g., joint ventures, string change, etc.) in seeking to eliminate private resolution for financial benefit and that bids are submitted with no contextual information. Alternative 2 - Sealed-Bid Auction allowing Private Resolution -- It seems to be supportive of, or at least not impede, 1, 2, and 6, but in a less pronounced manner as it relates to Alternative 1; the maker of this Alternative has acknowledged that it does not fully address concerns around potential collusion and profiteering on application withdrawals. -- However, some benefits are likely derived by obtaining sealed bids (which can reduce the incentive for all parties to agree to private resolution, if an applicant already knows they have the highest bid). The other main pro here is simplicity - most other processes remain unaffected. Discussion: -- Re: Alternative 2: First bullet point and third bullet point seem incompatible. Third bullet point: “Applicants would still have an opportunity to resolve the contention set through other means such as private auction, a joint venture arrangement or to choose another string as was suggested for ‘brands’ of the same name.” -- Assuming you stayed in only those applicants who stayed in would be revealed on reveal day. So you could still have private resolution. -- For clarity, the third bullet could be swapped with the fourth bullet and add “post reveal day”. In third bullet point, after "opportunity", you would need to insert "after reveal day" or something to clarify that parties become known. -- Question: Wasn’t one of the proposals to outlaw private auctions? So not sure why we are still allowing private resolution. Answer: If we went with alternative 1 we would eliminate private resolution, but not for alternative 2. So that is one of the drawbacks with alternative 2. -- Thought alternative 2 was to allow participants to know how many contention sets there are. Add as a third alternative: Alternative three could remove some of the elements about private resolution. -- They may not resolve privately and should only have a limited period to resolve. If not resolved in a limited period, it should proceed to the sealed bid winner. I am not seeing the time limit in alternative 2 though. Is it there? -- Question: How would the timing work with a string contention objection process? -- How could private auctions be prevented? -- Objections should not be triggered until a winner (or a private resolution winner) is identified. -- Re: Alternative 2 there should be a limited time for private resolution. -- Helpful to put these alternatives out for public comment and indicate whether the WG has a preference. -- Re: Alternative 2 -- Question: For string confusion objections those would have to be heard right away. Additional Considerations: Public Comment: Comments from the public are solicited on all applications regardless of where they are placed in the queue. To do it otherwise would mean opening up separate public comment periods depending on whether there is a need to go to the second bidder, and that would be impossible to monitor. Discussion: -- Strongly support 1 public comment period, for the exact same length of time for all. -- Impractical to have multiple public comments. String Similarity Evaluation: Discussion: -- Don’t see how this fits with the notion of closed bids and timing. You have a scenario where you have some who know who they are bidding against and everyone else doesn’t. -- In the scenario where the result of a string similarity evaluation is that some would have insight into who is in the set -- this is an unfair result. -- Which is why getting every applicant to submit a bid at the point of application is something to consider, even though it may be cumbersome for many. -- What if this fact situation should default to sealed bid only? -- Why would they not be all announced at the same time? -- So we are proposing to treat some applicants differently from others? That does not seem to be in line with the Bylaws. -- Wouldn’t alternative 1 solve this issue? -- What about plurals? -- There was only one case in 2012 that was found to be similar (unicorn/unicom). -- Why string similarity evaluation after reveal day? Why not make it before reveal day? That is a possibility. -- is string similarity not subject to accountability mechanisms and appeals? would that not “reveal” it in some manner? -- Agree with that suggestion re string similarity evaluation occurring first and before reveal day. bids would have to be in before appeal. Objections: Objections on the highest bidder’s application must be filed within the objection period. With respect to objections to the other applications, ICANN would create a system for the filing of “an intent to file an objection.” Discussion: -- Question: What happens when someone indicates that they are filing a community objection and they are filing it against all of the applicants for a string. Answer: All applicants should have a chance to respond. Add text to relay your comment on "can indicate that an objection will apply to all applications for same string"?  -- Objections should not come into full proceedings unless and until there is a winner - it's a huge waste of time and money if it does proceed but private parties need to know what the value of the string may be. -- Some concern about not having to submit the objections on a standard timeline, although support not engaging fees or panels until the objection is necessary, based on bidder ordering . -- “time” may benefit some as they build their case. Or could the “intent to file” require some key points that will be included in the objection filing? -- Question: We are agreeing on the principle that the intent to object is a good idea, but when would that happen? Would one party have to state the type of objection and the grounds? Could it just be a party filing very general intent to objection concerning a risk associated with that application. Would there be a panel for an intent to object process? Answer: Proposal was that the objection would be “bare bones”. There would be no panel if it was just an intent to object to one application, but if for all applications (to the string) then one could request a panel. You file your objection against the applicant first in the queue and an intent to file against the others in the queue. Or, you could say I have the same objection to all of the applicants/string. -- Important for private parties in resolution to know that there is an intent to object (but that doesn’t pertain to alternative 1 as there is no private resolution). -- The objection should be submitted within a certain time period. -- The nature of the applicant is important. It's not just the existence of the string. It depends on who is operating it and what the purpose of the tld as stated in the application in Question 18 answers and services to be provided in answer to Question 23. There should be an intent to object process prior to determining the order of the queue with no panel convened. Other complications: Objections if there is more than one Community Application String Confusion Objection Results in the Creation of a New Contention Set or Adds to an Existing Contention Set Appeals/Accountability Mechanisms Applicant Support Program Discussion: -- Seems that these are all related to the attempt to gain efficiencies to know the order of the contention sets. If you don’t need to know the order then you could leave the program untouched. If you go back to the goals knowing the order of the contention sets goes to goals 3, 4, and 5. -- Add a goal: “Increase efficiencies in application evaluation by way of understanding the contention set?” -- Note that alternative 1 would eliminate the goal to allow contention resolution. “If there is contention for strings, applicants may: i) resolve contention between them within a pre-established timeframe” _______________________________________________ Gnso-newgtld-wg mailing list Gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:Gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-newgtld-wg _______________________________________________ By submitting your personal data, you consent to the processing of your personal data for purposes of subscribing to this mailing list accordance with the ICANN Privacy Policy (https://www.icann.org/privacy/policy) and the website Terms of Service (https://www.icann.org/privacy/tos) You can visit the Mailman link above to change your membership status or configuration, including unsubscribing, setting digest-style delivery or disabling delivery altogether (e.g., for a vacation), and so on. _______________________________________________ Gnso-newgtld-wg mailing list Gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:Gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-newgtld-wg _______________________________________________ By submitting your personal data, you consent to the processing of your personal data for purposes of subscribing to this mailing list accordance with the ICANN Privacy Policy (https://www.icann.org/privacy/policy) and the website Terms of Service (https://www.icann.org/privacy/tos) You can visit the Mailman link above to change your membership status or configuration, including unsubscribing, setting digest-style delivery or disabling delivery altogether (e.g., for a vacation), and so on.

4 7

Re: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019
by Pruis, Elaine Dec. 20, 2019

Dec. 20, 2019

Thanks for the response Kristine, Let me clarify, I said we should recognize that ICANN is a steward of public assets, TLDs. I didn’t say we should operate all TLDs only as a public benefit. Not the same thing at all. Elaine From: "Dorrain, Kristine" <dorraink(a)amazon.com> Date: Friday, December 20, 2019 at 3:49 PM To: "Pruis, Elaine" <epruis(a)verisign.com>, "kurt(a)kjpritz.com" <kurt(a)kjpritz.com> Cc: "gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org" <gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019 Thanks Elaine, Just a quick response so I hope it makes sense. I didn’t say that some people weren’t paid to lose. I said it was a hypothetical problem. So my answer to your question at the end of #1 is “no, it’s not a problem.” If two willing parties felt like a TLD was worth a certain amount, it’s not a problem. They could have walked away. I think the auction (private and otherwise) prices were high the first round because people were betting on running very profitable registries. I don’t see that being the reality. A few are, but not most. Not yet. Will folks show up to write these big checks in the next round given the slow start to new gTLDs? Regarding #2 – if we start to insist that all TLDs operate only as a public benefit, we will discourage what little competition the new gTLD program currently permits. No one willing to take a risk, or do anything creative with the DNS will be able to pass the test because they’re simply experimenting (many experiments fail or require iteration and may take a while to prove their status as a public benefit). You will simply perpetuate the same “speculators snatch up domains at low cost, from registrars who are forced to compete to sell them for next to nothing, to sell them at a markup to people who want to start a website” philosophy. This does not encourage anything more than what we’ve been doing for 20 years already. Private resolution means MORE than an auction. It means that the parties may agree to exchange other valuable consideration or join forces. It provides opportunities to innovate. Paul’s proposal to let the parties decide doesn’t actually hurt anyone. If you don’t want to participate in a private resolution (auction or otherwise) don’t. It doesn’t affect you. But why limit what others can do? Thanks, Kristine From: Pruis, Elaine <epruis(a)verisign.com> Sent: Friday, December 20, 2019 8:32 AM To: Dorrain, Kristine <dorraink(a)amazon.com>; kurt(a)kjpritz.com Cc: gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org Subject: Re: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019 Happy Holidays! I was hoping we’d have this conversation on the last call. Now we’re heading into a long break, so I’ll put some thoughts out to the list for further discussion on these two points: 1. Kristine wrote: “I even included a “pro” in the ICANN Auction of Last Resort category because I know some folks on here believe there is a hypothetical problem with “applicants being paid to lose”. And Paul McGrady suggesting in his comments, “There have been rumors of gaming in the last round.” A quick google of “Minds + Machines auction” very clearly exemplifies “being paid to lose” as a winning strategy in the 2012 round. It isn’t a “hypothetical”. Here is one of many examples; “….MMX, which applied for .inc and .llc, said this morning that it has benefited from a $2.4 million windfall by losing both auctions.” The ICANN Board has expressed their concern around the “practice of participating in private auctions for the sole purpose of being paid to drop out” via their Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Report public comments for this PDP WG to address. This practice is not hypothetical, nor a rumor, but is this a “problem”? I think we can best answer that question by considering another of Paul’s statements, 1. “Weaknesses…Enriches ICANN (which has never justified why it thinks it “owns” the undelegated TLD resource).” Are TLDs public assets? If not, what are they? How do you justify your answer to that question? We’ve created a MSM that defines ICANN as a steward of this resource. If we don’t treat TLDs as public assets, we decrease ICANN’s legitimacy. Imagine if new TLD application fees were $50k, and private auctions are a part of the contention resolution formula. There will be thousands of speculative “pay me to go away” applications, instead of just hundreds like in 2012. People noticed the windfalls in the last round and are hoping that it is a business strategy they can deploy in the next round, with no intention of actually operating the TLD. Donna suggested some rules or policy that might prevent speculative participation. But a recent article<https://www.aei.org/technology-and-innovation/experiments-in-market-solutio…> on the “Experiments in market solutions: The FCC’s toll-free number auction” states “This creates incentives for strategic behavior by RespOrgs such as warehousing or hoarding available numbers, which ties up these resources unproductively and leads to quicker exhaustion of the limited supply of numbers in each area code. Historically the Commission has tried to control this strategic behavior via regulation, which can be costly and is not guaranteed to be effective. Moreover, assignment via a first-in-time rule can lead to inefficient allocation of toll-free numbers, as they flow to customers with the fastest trigger fingers, rather than those who value the number the most. Woke: Toll-free assignment auction To address this inefficiency, the FCC voted last year to allocate the most popular numbers in the new area code via auction. The structure is a single-round Vickrey auction. Qualified bidders submit a sealed bid for each available toll-free number they are interested in. The highest bid wins the number, but the bidder is only required to pay the value of the second-highest bid. The single-round structure reduces the agency’s administrative costs compared to the multi-round structure used for more valuable spectrum auctions. And as the Commission notes, the Vickrey design discourages strategic bidding by encouraging a participant to bid its true estimate of a number’s value, knowing it will only have to pay the value placed on it by the runner-up.” I think it is impossible to prevent private resolution. Those that want to make deals will do it before or after the delegation. But I don’t think we should set up the program to encourage private auctions. We need to treat TLDs as a public asset. Perhaps we can recommend that auction funds to ICANN be used strictly for security and stability purposes (for example, fund the RIRs). I’d like us to look at this piece through the lens of “public benefit” and not “private gain”. Elaine From: Gnso-newgtld-wg <gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of "Dorrain, Kristine via Gnso-newgtld-wg" <gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org>> Reply-To: "Dorrain, Kristine" <dorraink(a)amazon.com<mailto:dorraink@amazon.com>> Date: Thursday, December 12, 2019 at 3:43 PM To: Kurt Pritz <kurt(a)kjpritz.com<mailto:kurt@kjpritz.com>> Cc: "gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org>" <gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org>> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019 Fair points. I also prefer a model where ICANN is not enriched and the process *is* cost neutral. Therefore, I support having this conversation at a policy level. Regarding the preferability of Vickrey, I think there will be a range of outcomes regardless of what scheme is used, which is why I like the idea of choice. Applicants can select for themselves what model fits their situation. To answer your question below, even with Vickrey, the most well-off applicants can simply bid an outrageous amount, so Vickrey does favor deep pockets, as Paul pointed out in the table. The only option currently on the list that provides ANY hope for a resolution that doesn’t necessarily cost a pile of money is private resolution. Kristine From: Kurt Pritz <kurt(a)kjpritz.com<mailto:kurt@kjpritz.com>> Sent: Thursday, December 12, 2019 12:11 PM To: Dorrain, Kristine <dorraink(a)amazon.com<mailto:dorraink@amazon.com>> Cc: McGrady, Paul D. <PMcGrady(a)taftlaw.com<mailto:PMcGrady@taftlaw.com>>; gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org> Subject: Re: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019 Thanks for your comments Kristine. I did purposefully leave off the “paid to ICANN” part as that is a separate policy question I think. I don’t think we need to assume that the money would go to ICANN: * as that did not go so well the first time, and * we should consider what a “cost neutral” application process really means. If we think the process should be cost neutral to ICANN, then I think / suppose that placing the auction funds aside in a foundation of sorts would satisfy the neutrality requirement. (Although, the lie might have been put to that when ICANN replenished its reserve out of the auction funds.) If we think the process should be cost neutral to ICANN AND the applicants, then should not the money go back to the applicants in some way? Isn’t that truly cost neutral? Additionally, as a question of policy, maybe the money can be placed in some more effective foundation than one that is taking years to establish. I think these are policy choices for us. Finally, to me it seems that Vickrey is probably preferable to a highest price auction but, as I said in an earlier email, it is a complex economics issue. For example, can the Vickrey scheme be gamed in someway where there are well-off and not-well-off applicants? Or does the Vickrey scheme tend to defeat that gaming? We should tell ICANN what our policy goals are for this and ask them to figure it out in implementation, which will be reviewed by the community. Whew, sorry, Kurt On Dec 12, 2019, at 11:56 AM, Dorrain, Kristine <dorraink(a)amazon.com<mailto:dorraink@amazon.com>> wrote: I fully support Paul’s choice model and have added a few more pros and cons to the table. In the interest of equity, I even included a “pro” in the ICANN Auction of Last Resort category because I know some folks on here believe there is a hypothetical problem with “applicants being paid to lose.” The Auction of Last Resort can be effective against any perception that this might be a problem because applicants must ALL agree to any other mechanism. I generally support Kurt’s additions, with a few questions/suggestions in red. I’m going to be late for the call that starts shortly… Kristine From: Gnso-newgtld-wg <gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces@icann.org>> On Behalf Of Kurt Pritz Sent: Thursday, December 12, 2019 11:35 AM To: McGrady, Paul D. <PMcGrady(a)taftlaw.com<mailto:PMcGrady@taftlaw.com>> Cc: gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org> Subject: Re: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019 I think the table is a great idea. If it helps clarify the discussion, under ‘Auction Type,’ I think the options could be: Sealed Bid - winner pays highest price bid to ICANN (why would the winner not pay the second highest price…did I miss something? I think this option is more about timing, not any other change to the Vickrey model) Sealed Bid - Vickrey (winner pays second highest price bid to ICANN) Ascending auctions (paid to ICANN) - similar to the previous round Private resolution (fully private...notably, participants could self-select a sealed bid auction as their private auction mechanism of choice) Additionally, under ‘Auction Type’ or ‘Auction Timing' as a separate table the options would be: (I do like the idea of making this clear in the chart) Timing - bids submitted at time of TLD application Timing - bids submitted at near time of TLD award (after evaluation, clearing of objectionsetc) I think breaking it out this way would make the identification of strengths and weaknesses easier and clearer. Best regards, Kurt On Dec 10, 2019, at 2:25 PM, McGrady, Paul D. <PMcGrady(a)taftlaw.com<mailto:PMcGrady@taftlaw.com>> wrote: Hi All! I have really enjoyed the conversation on the calls and on this list regarding auctions. It is a great reminder of how rich in talent our community is. Below I have summarized some of the pros and cons of each process discussed (these are not meant to be exhaustive or dismissive, just my own thoughts which I encourage others to supplement). I’ve also proposed a possible way forward that could disrupt the current default status quo (ICANN Last Resort auction found in 2012 AGB, but which in my opinion is based on the false premise that ICANN “owns” all the undelegated gTLD space) but not force everyone into a one-sized-fits-all solution. I hope that the below encourages communication and helps us reach a consensus position that everyone in the WG can stand behind. Auction Type Strengths Weaknesses Vickrey (place maximum bid amount at the time application is filed) • Straightforward. • Eliminates significant delays caused by contention sets. • Favors single TLD applicants. • Favors deep pockets. • Bad for .brand applicants who could end up paying significantly more • Enriches ICANN (which has never justified why it thinks it “owns” the undelegated TLD resource). • Assumes no changes in the round/procedures/ other circumstances between filing of the application and the auction. • Assumes money is the only way to solve a contention. Modified Vickrey (place maximum bid amount at the time contention sets are formed) • Straightforward. • Eliminates much of the delay caused by contention sets • Eliminates ICANN Last Resort auctions. • Allows multiple TLD applicants to use resources more efficiently. • Favors deep pockets. • Enriches ICANN (which has never justified why it thinks it “owns” the undelegated TLD resource). • Assumes money is the only way to solve a contention. Private Resolution (could be dollar amounts, acquisitions, other consideration, etc.) • Allows for full creativity to resolve contention sets. • Doesn’t enrich ICANN (which has never justified why it thinks it “owns” the undelegated TLD resource). • The parties may agree on an auction process to resolve the contention set or they may agree instead to negotiate toward a mutually rewarding outcome. • There have been rumors of gaming in the last round. • Favors deep pockets.Amend to say: may favor deep pockets…private resolutions do not require the expenditure of ANY cash. ICANN Last Resort (status quo from 2012 AGB) None. • No applicant “gets paid to lose.” • Favors deep pockets. • Enriches ICANN (which has never justified why it thinks it “owns” the undelegated TLD resource). A possible way forward: Choice. Let each applicant choose how they would like to proceed. If all of the other members in the contention set make the same choice, that is the method that will be used. If, however, the members of the contention set do not agree, then ICANN Last Resort (status quo) will be default. There is no harm to the pro-Vickrey applicants in this option since whatever dollar amount they designated in their applications can, if they so choose, become their maximum dollar amount in an ICANN Last Resort if need be. Since an applicant submitting a Vickrey auction preference might be compromised in an ICANN Last Resort, the maximum dollar amount they are prepared to spend should be lodged with a third party under strict confidentiality obligations, e.g. with one of the large accounting firms. The same is true for the pro-Modified Vickrey applicants. Whatever maximum dollar amount that they would have bid once contention sets were finalized can become their maximum bid in an ICANN Last Resort if need be. Likewise, if an applicants selected Private Resolution and the other member(s) of the contention set did not, they would simply bid in the ICANN Last Resort whatever they were prepared to pay in a private auction. Because Private Resolution opens up the door to creative problem solving between members of a contention set, the applicants in that contention set should be allowed to select – after contention sets are formed – to try Private Resolution. Such a selection should be unanimous and if it doesn’t lead to resolution (e.g. negotiations are attempted and fail instead of the parties using a private auction), then the ICANN Last Resort option would kick in. I hope the above is helpful and moves us a bit closer to a consensus position. Thanks. Best, Paul This message may contain information that is attorney-client privileged, attorney work product or otherwise confidential. If you are not an intended recipient, use and disclosure of this message are prohibited. If you received this transmission in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete the message and any attachments. From: Gnso-newgtld-wg <gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces@icann.org>> On Behalf Of Justine Chew Sent: Monday, December 9, 2019 6:49 PM To: Austin, Donna <Donna.Austin(a)team.neustar<mailto:Donna.Austin@team.neustar>> Cc: gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org> Subject: Re: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019 Thank you, Donna, for picking this up. Just in relation to Goal No. 1, on reflection, I think the text "...in which the winner ultimately overpays for the TLD" should be omitted or reworded, firstly as Donna has explained, we don't know what "overpays" actually means. Secondly, even if that is the case, why should we be concerned if an applicant chooses to "overpay". Thirdly, At-Large's concerns had to do with the situation of wealthier applicants outbidding less-wealthy applicants, thereby potentially stifling competition. So, perhaps the goal should be re-stated as "Reduce the risk of unintended outcomes from “bidding wars". As for the remaining texts, I would like to be able to review the flowcharts for the 3 Alternatives before making further comments. Thanks, Justine Chew ----- On Sat, 7 Dec 2019 at 04:57, Austin, Donna via Gnso-newgtld-wg <gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org>> wrote: Thanks for the notes Julie, these are particularly helpful as I wasn’t able to attend the call. I have listened to the recording and I wanted to address a couple of issues that were discussed and are captured in your notes. I don’t agree that Alternative 1 addresses the following goal: 1. Reduce the risk of “bidding wars” in which the winner ultimately overpays for the TLD. a. Tentative, related goal for discussion: encourage applicants to bid their true value for a TLD. I personally struggle with this as a goal because it’s a subjective assessment that applicants from 2012 overpaid for a TLD. Only the successful applicant can make that judgement and if the applicant willingly entered into a private or ICANN auction of last resort they didn’t do so blindly: they had an opportunity to assess the market and combined with their own personal objectives for wanting a string made a judgement about how much they were willing to pay for the string. As I noted previously, my main issue with Alternative 1 is that the sealed bid has to be provided at the time of application, which is unfair to any applicant that ultimately finds themselves in a contention set. No-one can predict how many applications will be received and how many strings will end up in a contention set so the applicant has no information available at the time of submitting their application on which to assess the value of the TLD to them. It would be eminently fairer to all applicants to submit sealed bids at a time when more information is available that would allow them to make a more informed decision about the value of the TLD to them, which is ultimately why I proposed Alternative 2 originally. Donna Donna Austin Neustar, Inc. / Senior Policy Manager, Registry Solutions Mobile: +1 310 890 9655 donna.austin(a)team.neustar<mailto:donna.austin@team.neustar> / Website: home.neustar<http://www.home.neustar/> Follow Neustar: LinkedIn<http://www.linkedin.com/company/5349> / Twitter<http://www.twitter.com/neustar> Reduce your environmental footprint. Print only if necessary. ________________________________ The information contained in this email message is intended only for the use of the recipient(s) named above and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient you have received this email message in error and any review, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately and delete the original message. From: Gnso-newgtld-wg [mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces@icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Julie Hedlund Sent: Monday, December 02, 2019 8:52 AM To: gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org> Subject: [Gnso-newgtld-wg] Notes and Action Items - New gTLD Subsequent Procedures PDP WG - 02 December 2019 Dear Working Group members, Please see below the notes from the meeting on 02 December 2019. These high-level notes are designed to help WG members navigate through the content of the call and are not a substitute for the recording, transcript, or the chat, which will be posted at: https://community.icann.org/display/NGSPP/2019-12-02+New+gTLD+Subsequent+Pr…<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__community.icann.org_di…>. Kind regards, Julie Julie Hedlund, Policy Director Notes and Action Items: Actions: ACTION ITEM 1: Add a third alternative. ACTION ITEM 2: Add another goal (#7): “Increase efficiencies in application evaluation by way of understanding the contention set?” ACTION ITEM 3: Create a flow chart with a fictional string to show how alternative 1 would work. ACTION ITEM 4: Update the list of goals. Notes: 1. Review Agenda/Statements of Interest: Susan Payne was reappointed IPC Secretary for another year. 2. String Contention Mechanisms of Last Resort:https://docs.google.com/document/d/16qDoiK6vydQp6a0v9tMvU2l5fcypJY24… [docs.google.com]<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_docume…> What is the issue we are trying to address: -- The Working Group has discussed a number of potential issues with the mechanisms of last resort used in the 2012 New gTLD Round. These issues are captured in the Supplemental Initial Report. -- Although the Working Group ultimately believes that when there is string contention, an auction process should be used to select the Registry Operator invited to enter into a Registry Agreement with ICANN, the Working Group is still discussing what forms of private resolution should be allowed (if any), the specific type of auction to be used, and the timing of such an auction. Policy Goals / What the WG is Seeking to Accomplish: -- The WG is largely supportive of existing Implementation Guideline F: Implementation Guideline F: If there is contention for strings, applicants may: i) resolve contention between them within a pre-established timeframe ii) if there is no mutual agreement, a claim to support a community by one party will be a reason to award priority to that application. If there is no such claim, and no mutual agreement a process will be put in place to enable efficient resolution of contention and; iii) the ICANN Board may be used to make a final decision, using advice from staff and expert panels. Other goals include: 1. Reduce the risk of “bidding wars” in which the winner ultimately overpays for the TLD. * Tentative, related goal for discussion: encourage applicants to bid their true value for a TLD. 1. Reduce collusion, profiteering, and/or speculation, especially as it relates to financial transactions external to the program (Note, while this is not an explicit goal for the mechanisms of last resort, it has been discussed as a motivation for altering the auction mechanism). 2. Increase transparency. 3. Resolve contention more quickly. 4. Increase predictability. 5. Encourage new entrants into the field. b. Which could include, making it easier to implement “multipliers” for certain types of applicants, such as those eligible for Applicant Support. -- Note that some of the terminology may need to be further defined if the above goals are adopted. In order to ensure that recommendations align with goals, it is important for the Working Group to agree on specific objectives. Discussion: -- Do we still need iii)? An alternative may be, "The ICANN Board may use expert panels to make Community Priority Evaluation determinations." This may also be dependent on recommendations on the new appeals mechanism. -- ICANN Board says it does not make policy. Its decision would be subject to RFR and IRP - very messy so it may be better to stick with what we developed earlier. -- This isn’t about the Board making policy, but making it clear that it’s an auction process rather than the Board making a decision. -- There should be a reference instead to Auction of last resort. -- Agree they are good goals so suggest removing possible description What are we Proposing? -- The Working Group is leaning towards recommending a sealed-bid auction as the ultimate form of auction used as a mechanism to resolve string contention. When a sealed-bid auction is held where bids are submitted without knowing the bid of others in the auction (e.g., prior to evaluating any of the applications) it is also called a Vickrey Auction. A sealed-bid auction can also be used as a mechanism of last resort and at the end of the process. -- With a sealed-bid auction, each applicant submits a sealed bid, stating the amount that they are willing to pay for the TLD. The ultimate “winner” pays the amount submitted by the second-highest bidder.. -- Regardless of when the sealed bid auction is held, if there are one or more Community-based Applications, that/those application(s) would need to be processed first through Community Priority Evaluation before looking at the auction bids. Alternative 1 - Vickrey Auction (No Private Resolution) -- Addresses goals 1, 2, 4, and 6. -- The principle pro here is the seemingly near elimination of private resolution. However, the principle con is the substantial complications this approach introduces (see Additional Considerations, Mostly For Alternative 1 below). Other cons are that other forms of private resolution might be impacted (e.g., joint ventures, string change, etc.) in seeking to eliminate private resolution for financial benefit and that bids are submitted with no contextual information. Alternative 2 - Sealed-Bid Auction allowing Private Resolution -- It seems to be supportive of, or at least not impede, 1, 2, and 6, but in a less pronounced manner as it relates to Alternative 1; the maker of this Alternative has acknowledged that it does not fully address concerns around potential collusion and profiteering on application withdrawals. -- However, some benefits are likely derived by obtaining sealed bids (which can reduce the incentive for all parties to agree to private resolution, if an applicant already knows they have the highest bid). The other main pro here is simplicity - most other processes remain unaffected. Discussion: -- Re: Alternative 2: First bullet point and third bullet point seem incompatible. Third bullet point: “Applicants would still have an opportunity to resolve the contention set through other means such as private auction, a joint venture arrangement or to choose another string as was suggested for ‘brands’ of the same name.” -- Assuming you stayed in only those applicants who stayed in would be revealed on reveal day. So you could still have private resolution. -- For clarity, the third bullet could be swapped with the fourth bullet and add “post reveal day”. In third bullet point, after "opportunity", you would need to insert "after reveal day" or something to clarify that parties become known. -- Question: Wasn’t one of the proposals to outlaw private auctions? So not sure why we are still allowing private resolution. Answer: If we went with alternative 1 we would eliminate private resolution, but not for alternative 2. So that is one of the drawbacks with alternative 2. -- Thought alternative 2 was to allow participants to know how many contention sets there are. Add as a third alternative: Alternative three could remove some of the elements about private resolution. -- They may not resolve privately and should only have a limited period to resolve. If not resolved in a limited period, it should proceed to the sealed bid winner. I am not seeing the time limit in alternative 2 though. Is it there? -- Question: How would the timing work with a string contention objection process? -- How could private auctions be prevented? -- Objections should not be triggered until a winner (or a private resolution winner) is identified. -- Re: Alternative 2 there should be a limited time for private resolution. -- Helpful to put these alternatives out for public comment and indicate whether the WG has a preference. -- Re: Alternative 2 -- Question: For string confusion objections those would have to be heard right away. Additional Considerations: Public Comment: Comments from the public are solicited on all applications regardless of where they are placed in the queue. To do it otherwise would mean opening up separate public comment periods depending on whether there is a need to go to the second bidder, and that would be impossible to monitor. Discussion: -- Strongly support 1 public comment period, for the exact same length of time for all. -- Impractical to have multiple public comments. String Similarity Evaluation: Discussion: -- Don’t see how this fits with the notion of closed bids and timing. You have a scenario where you have some who know who they are bidding against and everyone else doesn’t. -- In the scenario where the result of a string similarity evaluation is that some would have insight into who is in the set -- this is an unfair result. -- Which is why getting every applicant to submit a bid at the point of application is something to consider, even though it may be cumbersome for many. -- What if this fact situation should default to sealed bid only? -- Why would they not be all announced at the same time? -- So we are proposing to treat some applicants differently from others? That does not seem to be in line with the Bylaws. -- Wouldn’t alternative 1 solve this issue? -- What about plurals? -- There was only one case in 2012 that was found to be similar (unicorn/unicom). -- Why string similarity evaluation after reveal day? Why not make it before reveal day? That is a possibility. -- is string similarity not subject to accountability mechanisms and appeals? would that not “reveal” it in some manner? -- Agree with that suggestion re string similarity evaluation occurring first and before reveal day. bids would have to be in before appeal. Objections: Objections on the highest bidder’s application must be filed within the objection period. With respect to objections to the other applications, ICANN would create a system for the filing of “an intent to file an objection.” Discussion: -- Question: What happens when someone indicates that they are filing a community objection and they are filing it against all of the applicants for a string. Answer: All applicants should have a chance to respond. Add text to relay your comment on "can indicate that an objection will apply to all applications for same string"?  -- Objections should not come into full proceedings unless and until there is a winner - it's a huge waste of time and money if it does proceed but private parties need to know what the value of the string may be. -- Some concern about not having to submit the objections on a standard timeline, although support not engaging fees or panels until the objection is necessary, based on bidder ordering . -- “time” may benefit some as they build their case. Or could the “intent to file” require some key points that will be included in the objection filing? -- Question: We are agreeing on the principle that the intent to object is a good idea, but when would that happen? Would one party have to state the type of objection and the grounds? Could it just be a party filing very general intent to objection concerning a risk associated with that application. Would there be a panel for an intent to object process? Answer: Proposal was that the objection would be “bare bones”. There would be no panel if it was just an intent to object to one application, but if for all applications (to the string) then one could request a panel. You file your objection against the applicant first in the queue and an intent to file against the others in the queue. Or, you could say I have the same objection to all of the applicants/string. -- Important for private parties in resolution to know that there is an intent to object (but that doesn’t pertain to alternative 1 as there is no private resolution). -- The objection should be submitted within a certain time period. -- The nature of the applicant is important. It's not just the existence of the string. It depends on who is operating it and what the purpose of the tld as stated in the application in Question 18 answers and services to be provided in answer to Question 23. There should be an intent to object process prior to determining the order of the queue with no panel convened. Other complications: Objections if there is more than one Community Application String Confusion Objection Results in the Creation of a New Contention Set or Adds to an Existing Contention Set Appeals/Accountability Mechanisms Applicant Support Program Discussion: -- Seems that these are all related to the attempt to gain efficiencies to know the order of the contention sets. If you don’t need to know the order then you could leave the program untouched. If you go back to the goals knowing the order of the contention sets goes to goals 3, 4, and 5. -- Add a goal: “Increase efficiencies in application evaluation by way of understanding the contention set?” -- Note that alternative 1 would eliminate the goal to allow contention resolution. “If there is contention for strings, applicants may: i) resolve contention between them within a pre-established timeframe” _______________________________________________ Gnso-newgtld-wg mailing list Gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:Gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-newgtld-wg _______________________________________________ By submitting your personal data, you consent to the processing of your personal data for purposes of subscribing to this mailing list accordance with the ICANN Privacy Policy (https://www.icann.org/privacy/policy) and the website Terms of Service (https://www.icann.org/privacy/tos) You can visit the Mailman link above to change your membership status or configuration, including unsubscribing, setting digest-style delivery or disabling delivery altogether (e.g., for a vacation), and so on. _______________________________________________ Gnso-newgtld-wg mailing list Gnso-newgtld-wg(a)icann.org<mailto:Gnso-newgtld-wg@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-newgtld-wg _______________________________________________ By submitting your personal data, you consent to the processing of your personal data for purposes of subscribing to this mailing list accordance with the ICANN Privacy Policy (https://www.icann.org/privacy/policy) and the website Terms of Service (https://www.icann.org/privacy/tos) You can visit the Mailman link above to change your membership status or configuration, including unsubscribing, setting digest-style delivery or disabling delivery altogether (e.g., for a vacation), and so on.

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Post call / New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Working Group call / Monday, 16 December 2019 at 20:00 UTC
by Julie Bisland Dec. 16, 2019

Dec. 16, 2019

Dear all, All recordings for the New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Working Group call held on Monday, 16 December 2019 at 20:00 UTC can be found on the agenda wiki page <https://community.icann.org/x/5ZYzBw> (attendance included) and the GNSO Master calendar <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__gnso.icann.org_en_group…> . These include: * Attendance (please let me know if your name has been left off the attendance list) * Audio recording * Zoom chat archive * Zoom recording (including audio, visual, rough transcript) * Transcript As a reminder only members can join the call, observers can listen to the recordings and read the transcript afterwards. Please email gnso-secs(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-secs@icann.org> if you would like to change your status from observer to member. For additional information, you may consult the mailing list archives <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/gnso-newgtld-wg/> and the main wiki page<https://community.icann.org/x/RgV1Aw>. Thank you. Kind regards, Julie

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