RV: A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Let me chime in to recall everyone that NTIA expects the “global multistakeholder community” to replace its role. Hence, concentration of power in parts of the community and risk of capture should be avoided at any rate, and that applies to all and every stakeholder in this environment. The GAC has already expressed that a model subject to capture by specific interests should not be approved. The Sole Member (or whatever other Community organization or mechanism is devised to empower the community) should only make decisions supported by most of the stakeholders (be it via voting or be it via positioning). Otherwise, the CCWG proposal would jeopardize the fulfillment of NTIA’s first condition (“support and enhance the multistakeholder model”) as it would be in practice substituting the NTIA by a subset of stakeholders. That is something we should avoid if the transition is to take place. Best Rafael De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] En nombre de Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> Enviado el: miércoles, 30 de septiembre de 2015 10:44 Para: james@cyberinvasion.net<mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net>; kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>; jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> CC: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Asunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Community powers only are meaningful if they represent the “community” as a whole, which is the collective we want to empower to check the power exercised by the executive power designated to represent that same community. That’s the key point. And I would beg you to avoid qualifying opinions different to yours as “autocratic” or the like. Regards Jorge Von: James Gannon [mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net] Gesendet: Mittwoch, 30. September 2015 10:36 An: Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>; kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>; jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem I have said it before and will repeat it here again, it is not our place to force parts of the community into exercising a vote, our voting thresholds should reflect variable participation to allow groups such as the SSAC and RSSAC to participate when they feel the need to, but we should not be forcing any part of our community into a role that they do not wish to have. To do so is in my mind autocratic and does not reflect the wishes of these groups as expressed through the bottom up multistakeholder process. -James From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of "Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>" Date: Wednesday 30 September 2015 09:22 To: "kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>", "jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>" Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Kavouss makes a vital point here. Any decision-making process needs to be absolutely capture-proof and respect the diversity of the ICANN community. Hence, large supermajorities and/or consensus might be required for such important decisions. This means that those large supermajorities have to be measured against the community as a whole (i.e. the seven SO/AC). Regards Jorge Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Im Auftrag von Kavouss Arasteh Gesendet: Mittwoch, 30. September 2015 10:15 An: Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem Dear All, I also understood Fadi in LA expressing a concern on how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested. Let us take a scenario as follows There is a potion to reject the Budget. Petition is agreed ( not voted ) in the petition SO Then it is discussed at Forum Then put it for voting SAS,RSSAC and very likely GAC do not participate in voting Very probably all 3 OCs participate in voting . ALAC may or may not to do so if three OCs vote ,the super majority would be 2/3 thus out of 15 votes currently foreseen 10 is enough to reset or ,at extreme, veto the budget . Then out of 29 overall weighted /weighting votes 10 succeeded to veto the budget and start an unnecessary process of back and fort of the Budget for months Is that a right process? However, if we first establish a quorum for decision making with fairly high threshold ( 3/4 or 4/5 of the 7 SOs and ACs ) which means 5 SOs and ACs or 4 SOs and ACs are the minimum requirement of quorum to decide on the matter . Then we have to apply the super majority of votes which means 2/3 of 25 or 2/3 of 22 or 2/3 of 19 , depending on the SOs and ACs participating which becomes 17, 14 and 12 votes out of 29 votes are sufficient to reject the budget .This would result in a real capture of the community by a small number of subset of that community. Consequently, should we replace the voting by consensus then we are better saved . In view of the above the decision making process voting versus consensus building needs to be seriously re-examined Kavouss 2015-09-30 9:40 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>>: Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, as Ed has argued. To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, impossible-to-avoid, last-resort for powers that AREN'T about accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it as one. To put it another way: some of the powers of a Member in the law of California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at some point] are clearly about accountability. Some of them aren't. The ones that aren't about accountability, the ones that pose some kind of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board as a participant for any decision to use them. All food for thought. best Jordan On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen <ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info<mailto:ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info>> wrote: This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with document inspection? After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN. Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what bad could result from document inspection power of the member? -- Tapani Tarvainen On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com<mailto:rudi.daniel@gmail.com>) wrote:
"the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."
Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my take on it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the legal minds.. RD On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz>
*A better world through a better Internet *
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear All, Pls be so kind and think of a scenario that only two or three out of 7 SOs and ACs vote then the rest not voting will be captured by those two or three that voting .Even those two or three that voting may not have unanimous position . It is risky situation. Pls read my example and analyze the outcome. Regards Kavouss 2015-10-01 14:14 GMT+02:00 Perez Galindo, Rafael <RPEREZGA@minetur.es>:
Let me chime in to recall everyone that NTIA expects the “*global multistakeholder community*” to replace its role. Hence, concentration of power in parts of the community and risk of capture should be avoided at any rate, and that applies to all and every stakeholder in this environment. The GAC has already expressed that a model subject to capture by specific interests should not be approved.
The Sole Member (or whatever other Community organization or mechanism is devised to empower the community) should only make decisions supported by most of the stakeholders (be it via voting or be it via positioning). Otherwise, the CCWG proposal would jeopardize the fulfillment of NTIA’s first condition (“*support and enhance the multistakeholder model*”) as it would be in practice substituting the NTIA by a subset of stakeholders. That is something we should avoid if the transition is to take place.
Best
Rafael
*De:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] *En nombre de * Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch *Enviado el:* miércoles, 30 de septiembre de 2015 10:44 *Para:* james@cyberinvasion.net; kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com; jordan@internetnz.net.nz *CC:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Asunto:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Community powers only are meaningful if they represent the “community” as a whole, which is the collective we want to empower to check the power exercised by the executive power designated to represent that same community. That’s the key point.
And I would beg you to avoid qualifying opinions different to yours as “autocratic” or the like.
Regards
Jorge
*Von:* James Gannon [mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net <james@cyberinvasion.net>] *Gesendet:* Mittwoch, 30. September 2015 10:36 *An:* Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>; kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com; jordan@internetnz.net.nz *Cc:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Betreff:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
I have said it before and will repeat it here again, it is not our place to force parts of the community into exercising a vote, our voting thresholds should reflect variable participation to allow groups such as the SSAC and RSSAC to participate when they feel the need to, but we should not be forcing any part of our community into a role that they do not wish to have. To do so is in my mind autocratic and does not reflect the wishes of these groups as expressed through the bottom up multistakeholder process.
-James
*From: *<accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of " Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch" *Date: *Wednesday 30 September 2015 09:22 *To: *"kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com", "jordan@internetnz.net.nz" *Cc: *"accountability-cross-community@icann.org" *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Kavouss makes a vital point here.
Any decision-making process needs to be absolutely capture-proof and respect the diversity of the ICANN community.
Hence, large supermajorities and/or consensus might be required for such important decisions. This means that those large supermajorities have to be measured against the community as a whole (i.e. the seven SO/AC).
Regards
Jorge
*Von:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] *Im Auftrag von *Kavouss Arasteh *Gesendet:* Mittwoch, 30. September 2015 10:15 *An:* Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> *Cc:* Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> *Betreff:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem
Dear All,
I also understood Fadi in LA expressing a concern on how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Let us take a scenario as follows
There is a potion to reject the Budget.
Petition is agreed ( not voted ) in the petition SO
Then it is discussed at Forum
Then put it for voting
SAS,RSSAC and very likely GAC do not participate in voting
Very probably all 3 OCs participate in voting .
ALAC may or may not to do so
if three OCs vote ,the super majority would be 2/3 thus out of 15 votes currently foreseen 10 is enough to reset or ,at extreme, veto the budget .
Then out of 29 overall weighted /weighting votes 10 succeeded to veto the budget and start an unnecessary process of back and fort of the Budget for months
Is that a right process?
However, if we first establish a quorum for decision making with fairly high threshold ( 3/4 or 4/5 of the 7 SOs and ACs ) which means 5 SOs and ACs or 4 SOs and ACs are the minimum requirement of quorum to decide on the matter .
Then we have to apply the super majority of votes which means 2/3 of 25 or 2/3 of 22 or 2/3 of 19 , depending on the SOs and ACs participating which becomes 17, 14 and 12 votes out of 29 votes are sufficient to reject the budget .This would result in a real capture of the community by a small number of subset of that community.
Consequently, should we replace the voting by consensus then we are better saved .
In view of the above the decision making process voting versus consensus building needs to be seriously re-examined
Kavouss
2015-09-30 9:40 GMT+02:00 Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz>:
Tapani: The approach I have suggested could work for none, any or all of the statutory powers. If it is worth exploring we can explore it. There might be some statutory rights that should not be subject to this approach, as Ed has argued.
To address Kavouss' point: Kavouss, I agree with you this is unusual. I would not suggest this for any of the accountability powers we have suggested through the CCWG. I would only suggest it as a cast-iron, impossible-to-avoid, last-resort for powers that AREN'T about accountability. Dissolving ICANN, to pick the example repeatedly raised by Board members in LA, isn't an accountability issue. So let's not treat it as one.
To put it another way: *some* of the powers of a Member in the law of California [or under any other law, should ICANN's jurisdiction change at some point] are clearly about accountability.
*Some* of them aren't.
The ones that *aren't* about accountability, the ones that pose some kind of risk to stability or that just aren't relevant, we can make impossible to use. We can make them even more impossible to use by including the Board as a participant for any decision to use them.
All food for thought.
best
Jordan
On 30 September 2015 at 19:36, Tapani Tarvainen < ncuc@tapani.tarvainen.info> wrote:
This is worrysome. While I can understand the concern about things like dissolving the company, what's the issue with document inspection?
After all, transparency is one of the key elements of trust, and trust is ultimately what will sustain or kill ICANN.
Perhaps some of the lawyers among us could explain what bad could result from document inspection power of the member?
-- Tapani Tarvainen
On Sep 29 20:48, Rudolph Daniel (rudi.daniel@gmail.com) wrote:
"the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all."
Yes , interesting, I understood Fadi today expressing a concern (my take on it)....how do we ensure ..in the single member model, that we have inclusion in consensus, rather than allowing a subset of the community to exercise that power without the Full acceptance of the community..and that can easily be construed as a capture scenario that needs to be stress tested.
Interesting take on the problem Jordon, but as you suggest...over to the legal minds.. RD On Sep 29, 2015 8:15 PM, "Jordan Carter" <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all
One of the pieces of feedback from Board members I heard in L.A. was a concern that basically goes like this:
"The Single Member is a problematic idea because of the incredible powers it has under California law - for instance, it could even dissolve ICANN!"
There were some sub-themes to this concern:
- the accountability of SO/AC actors in exercising the powers intended for the CMSM - the absence of fiduciary duties on the Single Member in making its decisions - the engineering principle of minimal change at a time
Focusing on the overarching concern, it was a tenet of the CCWG's Second Draft Proposal that the CMSM should be largely ruled out from exercising any of the powers the community didn't propose it had.
That is, aside from the five community powers and the ability to enforce the bylaws against the Board, the other powers the California law grants to member/s (document inspection, dissolve the company, etc), should face such high thresholds to action that they can, practically speaking, never be actioned at all.
[The Second Draft Proposal may not have been terribly clear about this, but that's what it was driving at.]
So how to resolve this? The CCWG's choice of a Single Member (following its earlier choice of multiple members) was to meet the accountability requirements the community has asked for. But nobody asked for the community to have these other powers.
*Here is a suggestion.*
*For the exercise of any of the Member Powers the CMSM would have (beyond those we "want" it to have), why don't we include the ICANN Board as one of the groups that has to vote / come to consensus to exercise them?*
This sounds a little strange on the face of it but think it through.
This seems to me to be a very simple way to avoid the problem.
It acknowledges that the rights of the Member are set out in law and can't be eroded - that they can only be managed by the decisions that member is able to take. And it acknowledges that the concerns about constraining the possible actions of the member to those that are intended, should be solved. It shares power in the model in quite a nice, dare-I-say-it, "multistakeholder" way.
I'd welcome others' thoughts. I'd welcome views from our lawyers about this, too. On the face of it I can't see any reason this wouldn't work in law, since the CMSM can be comprised of any set of ICANN actors. But - I Am Not A Lawyer.
cheers Jordan
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter
Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
My view is that if someone chooses not to vote (s)he chooses not to vote. That is most certainly not capture. el In 2015-10-01 15:49, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Dear All, Pls be so kind and think of a scenario that only two or three out of 7 SOs and ACs vote then the rest not voting will be captured by those two or three that voting .Even those two or three that voting may not have unanimous position . It is risky situation. Pls read my example and analyze the outcome. Regards Kavouss
The simple point is that decisions taken by the elected executive of the community should not be able to be overturned by anything less than a qualified majority of that community as a whole. It's quite simple and it means that no such decisions should be allowed with less than the support from at least 4 SO/AC. best Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 01.10.2015 um 15:54 schrieb Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.NA>:
My view is that if someone chooses not to vote (s)he chooses not to vote. That is most certainly not capture.
el
In 2015-10-01 15:49, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Dear All, Pls be so kind and think of a scenario that only two or three out of 7 SOs and ACs vote then the rest not voting will be captured by those two or three that voting .Even those two or three that voting may not have unanimous position . It is risky situation. Pls read my example and analyze the outcome. Regards Kavouss
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Even when component parts of said community have expressed a wish to not be included in certain votes? I cannot see the logic in forcing people to do things against their will. -James On 01/10/2015 15:06, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
The simple point is that decisions taken by the elected executive of the community should not be able to be overturned by anything less than a qualified majority of that community as a whole.
It's quite simple and it means that no such decisions should be allowed with less than the support from at least 4 SO/AC.
best
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 01.10.2015 um 15:54 schrieb Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.NA>:
My view is that if someone chooses not to vote (s)he chooses not to vote. That is most certainly not capture.
el
In 2015-10-01 15:49, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Dear All, Pls be so kind and think of a scenario that only two or three out of 7 SOs and ACs vote then the rest not voting will be captured by those two or three that voting .Even those two or three that voting may not have unanimous position . It is risky situation. Pls read my example and analyze the outcome. Regards Kavouss
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I agree in a way, though the Board is not the elected executive of the community. But my point was that an AC exercising a choice is not Capture (see the article in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulatory_capture) el On 2015-10-01 16:06, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
The simple point is that decisions taken by the elected executive of the community should not be able to be overturned by anything less than a qualified majority of that community as a whole.
It's quite simple and it means that no such decisions should be allowed with less than the support from at least 4 SO/AC.
best
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 01.10.2015 um 15:54 schrieb Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.NA>:
My view is that if someone chooses not to vote (s)he chooses not to vote. That is most certainly not capture.
el
In 2015-10-01 15:49, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Dear All, Pls be so kind and think of a scenario that only two or three out of 7 SOs and ACs vote then the rest not voting will be captured by those two or three that voting .Even those two or three that voting may not have unanimous position . It is risky situation. Pls read my example and analyze the outcome. Regards Kavouss
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/
Jorge Thank you very much that you emphasized what I said in my earlier mail as well as in LA when I raised the point that we not only need quorum for in petition process but also quorum in the number of SOs and ACs present and participating in the voting. Regards Kavouss 2015-10-01 16:14 GMT+02:00 Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.na>:
I agree in a way, though the Board is not the elected executive of the community.
But my point was that an AC exercising a choice is not Capture (see the article in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulatory_capture)
el
On 2015-10-01 16:06, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
The simple point is that decisions taken by the elected executive of the community should not be able to be overturned by anything less than a qualified majority of that community as a whole.
It's quite simple and it means that no such decisions should be allowed with less than the support from at least 4 SO/AC.
best
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 01.10.2015 um 15:54 schrieb Dr Eberhard W Lisse <el@lisse.NA>:
My view is that if someone chooses not to vote (s)he chooses not to vote. That is most certainly not capture.
el
In 2015-10-01 15:49, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Dear All, Pls be so kind and think of a scenario that only two or three out of 7 SOs and ACs vote then the rest not voting will be captured by those two or three that voting .Even those two or three that voting may not have unanimous position . It is risky situation. Pls read my example and analyze the outcome. Regards Kavouss
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el@lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/ _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hi, On 01-Oct-15 09:49, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Pls be so kind and think of a scenario that only two or three out of 7 SOs and ACs vote then the rest not voting will be captured by those two or three that voting .
I floated an idea on the WP1 the other day, that I was just discussing on a phone call with the At Large group working on this stuff, and was asked to repeat on the full list.
On the Community mechanism I do think we need to rename it to bring out the fact that it is only a power when there is broad agreement/consensus-by-some-definiton of the entire ACSO. We also need to explain that. I wonder whether we need to move away from even having a voting concept to having a discussion and black ball concept. i.e. if two ACSO come out against, back to the drawing board. But if the CM, conceived of as a full ACSO cross community WG, comes out with a statement that is considered by all the ACSO without 2 objections, it can go forward. So 2 ACSO can trigger the mechanism, and 2 ACSO can freeze an action after full discussion and negotiation. Or something similar.
Note since then I have been asked about the desire of some AC to only advise not vote. In this model advice-against can be just as much a black ball as a recommendation-against. Another thought that since came up was the idea that the two ACSO should be at least 1 SO and 1 AC.
I thought about the idea of adding the Board to the mix so it becomes ACSO+Board and do not see why it would not be workable as long as they participated in the mechanism on an equal footing and not as overlords with their own special veto.
This referred to an idea that Jordan floated on one of these lists. One complication that came up with this idea was how it would affect the blackball notion mentioned above. Does this mean that the Board + 1 ACSO is enough to freeze? I do not have an answer for that yet as I have not analyzed the decision matrix to see how it would work out in different circumstances - e.g. is it a Board proposal or a Community proposal that is being discussed. I have also been told that I am dreaming if I think that the Board would be willing to participate in a process on an equal footing with the ACSO - but I think it is a possibility worth considering for those decisions where the Board and the Community need to concur. The new concept in our proposal is that sometimes, we need a formal way to find concurrence between what the Community needs and what the Board thinks its fiduciary responsibility is. There is also my desire to have mechanisms that help us avoid crisis, boardicide and court, if at all possible. It is a way in which to tweak our multistakeholder model to take into account the roles and responsibilities of the Community as well as those of the Board. (note on the accountability of the Community I have also recommended that the CM be subject to IRP on adherence to bylaws) I also want to point out one other thing about our Community Consensus Membership Model - it is one able to exercise its powers only when there is consensus, for some definition of consensus. It is similar to the power we exhibited as a community before the initiation of the CCWG where the community came together and told the Board & Staff that their original idea for how this CCWG would work was not acceptable. In that case we had to gird our loins for rebellion and start making loud noises just before the IGF in Istanbul (was it really only a year ago - seems like a decade). In the Community Consensus Membership idea, we don't have to resort to rebellion and revolution, we would have a predefined process. A process based on our current structure with little change other than the formalization of things we are prepared to do anyway. One thing I do not know does CA statue allow membership organizations to decide things by a consensus process defined without a vote. avri --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus
Hi all, hi Avri, Thanks for this interesting post. Two thoughts: - my proposal to include the Board in any decision making related **only** to their concerns about certain "member powers in California law that cause us consternation" - the example floating around being dissolving the corporation. I would not support making the Board a decision-maker in the exercise of powers that are about holding the Board to account. - the co-decision model, however, is useful - we have already proposed it for the change process for Fundamental Bylaws. I'd be much happier to explore whether that could be usefully explored for other powers. cheers Jordan On 2 October 2015 at 03:50, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
On 01-Oct-15 09:49, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Pls be so kind and think of a scenario that only two or three out of 7 SOs and ACs vote then the rest not voting will be captured by those two or three that voting .
I floated an idea on the WP1 the other day, that I was just discussing on a phone call with the At Large group working on this stuff, and was asked to repeat on the full list.
On the Community mechanism I do think we need to rename it to bring out the fact that it is only a power when there is broad agreement/consensus-by-some-definiton of the entire ACSO. We also need to explain that. I wonder whether we need to move away from even having a voting concept to having a discussion and black ball concept. i.e. if two ACSO come out against, back to the drawing board. But if the CM, conceived of as a full ACSO cross community WG, comes out with a statement that is considered by all the ACSO without 2 objections, it can go forward. So 2 ACSO can trigger the mechanism, and 2 ACSO can freeze an action after full discussion and negotiation. Or something similar.
Note since then I have been asked about the desire of some AC to only advise not vote. In this model advice-against can be just as much a black ball as a recommendation-against.
Another thought that since came up was the idea that the two ACSO should be at least 1 SO and 1 AC.
I thought about the idea of adding the Board to the mix so it becomes ACSO+Board and do not see why it would not be workable as long as they participated in the mechanism on an equal footing and not as overlords with their own special veto.
This referred to an idea that Jordan floated on one of these lists.
One complication that came up with this idea was how it would affect the blackball notion mentioned above. Does this mean that the Board + 1 ACSO is enough to freeze? I do not have an answer for that yet as I have not analyzed the decision matrix to see how it would work out in different circumstances - e.g. is it a Board proposal or a Community proposal that is being discussed.
I have also been told that I am dreaming if I think that the Board would be willing to participate in a process on an equal footing with the ACSO - but I think it is a possibility worth considering for those decisions where the Board and the Community need to concur. The new concept in our proposal is that sometimes, we need a formal way to find concurrence between what the Community needs and what the Board thinks its fiduciary responsibility is. There is also my desire to have mechanisms that help us avoid crisis, boardicide and court, if at all possible. It is a way in which to tweak our multistakeholder model to take into account the roles and responsibilities of the Community as well as those of the Board. (note on the accountability of the Community I have also recommended that the CM be subject to IRP on adherence to bylaws)
I also want to point out one other thing about our Community Consensus Membership Model - it is one able to exercise its powers only when there is consensus, for some definition of consensus. It is similar to the power we exhibited as a community before the initiation of the CCWG where the community came together and told the Board & Staff that their original idea for how this CCWG would work was not acceptable. In that case we had to gird our loins for rebellion and start making loud noises just before the IGF in Istanbul (was it really only a year ago - seems like a decade). In the Community Consensus Membership idea, we don't have to resort to rebellion and revolution, we would have a predefined process. A process based on our current structure with little change other than the formalization of things we are prepared to do anyway.
One thing I do not know does CA statue allow membership organizations to decide things by a consensus process defined without a vote.
avri
--- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *
Jordan Tks fir first point I have serious concerns about the involvement of the Board on any decision making as co sharing the exercising the community powers . Example if co sharing in amendment of bylaws is entirely unique opportunity for such sharing the power and SHALL NOT be extended to any other power otherwise the separation of responsibility is totally ignored Tks Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 4 Oct 2015, at 21:39, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all, hi Avri,
Thanks for this interesting post. Two thoughts:
- my proposal to include the Board in any decision making related **only** to their concerns about certain "member powers in California law that cause us consternation" - the example floating around being dissolving the corporation. I would not support making the Board a decision-maker in the exercise of powers that are about holding the Board to account.
- the co-decision model, however, is useful - we have already proposed it for the change process for Fundamental Bylaws. I'd be much happier to explore whether that could be usefully explored for other powers.
cheers Jordan
On 2 October 2015 at 03:50, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi,
On 01-Oct-15 09:49, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Pls be so kind and think of a scenario that only two or three out of 7 SOs and ACs vote then the rest not voting will be captured by those two or three that voting .
I floated an idea on the WP1 the other day, that I was just discussing on a phone call with the At Large group working on this stuff, and was asked to repeat on the full list.
On the Community mechanism I do think we need to rename it to bring out the fact that it is only a power when there is broad agreement/consensus-by-some-definiton of the entire ACSO. We also need to explain that. I wonder whether we need to move away from even having a voting concept to having a discussion and black ball concept. i.e. if two ACSO come out against, back to the drawing board. But if the CM, conceived of as a full ACSO cross community WG, comes out with a statement that is considered by all the ACSO without 2 objections, it can go forward. So 2 ACSO can trigger the mechanism, and 2 ACSO can freeze an action after full discussion and negotiation. Or something similar.
Note since then I have been asked about the desire of some AC to only advise not vote. In this model advice-against can be just as much a black ball as a recommendation-against.
Another thought that since came up was the idea that the two ACSO should be at least 1 SO and 1 AC.
I thought about the idea of adding the Board to the mix so it becomes ACSO+Board and do not see why it would not be workable as long as they participated in the mechanism on an equal footing and not as overlords with their own special veto.
This referred to an idea that Jordan floated on one of these lists.
One complication that came up with this idea was how it would affect the blackball notion mentioned above. Does this mean that the Board + 1 ACSO is enough to freeze? I do not have an answer for that yet as I have not analyzed the decision matrix to see how it would work out in different circumstances - e.g. is it a Board proposal or a Community proposal that is being discussed.
I have also been told that I am dreaming if I think that the Board would be willing to participate in a process on an equal footing with the ACSO - but I think it is a possibility worth considering for those decisions where the Board and the Community need to concur. The new concept in our proposal is that sometimes, we need a formal way to find concurrence between what the Community needs and what the Board thinks its fiduciary responsibility is. There is also my desire to have mechanisms that help us avoid crisis, boardicide and court, if at all possible. It is a way in which to tweak our multistakeholder model to take into account the roles and responsibilities of the Community as well as those of the Board. (note on the accountability of the Community I have also recommended that the CM be subject to IRP on adherence to bylaws)
I also want to point out one other thing about our Community Consensus Membership Model - it is one able to exercise its powers only when there is consensus, for some definition of consensus. It is similar to the power we exhibited as a community before the initiation of the CCWG where the community came together and told the Board & Staff that their original idea for how this CCWG would work was not acceptable. In that case we had to gird our loins for rebellion and start making loud noises just before the IGF in Istanbul (was it really only a year ago - seems like a decade). In the Community Consensus Membership idea, we don't have to resort to rebellion and revolution, we would have a predefined process. A process based on our current structure with little change other than the formalization of things we are prepared to do anyway.
One thing I do not know does CA statue allow membership organizations to decide things by a consensus process defined without a vote.
avri
--- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Kavouss, You keep saying that, and I almost completely agree with you. My suggestion is ONLY that any powers a member has that ARE NOT ACCOUNTABILITY POWERS could be exercised with the Board participating. I **agree** with you in respect of the accountability powers. All the standard powers we have been talking about cannot have the Board involved, because that breaches the separation of powers you are talking about and which I strongly support. The only specific "Member power" mentioned so far for which my proposal would be any use is the "dissolve the corporation" power. Another is probably "Unilateral changes to ICANN bylaws". We don't need those powers; they are not the accountability powers the CCWG seeks to implement; there is no problem as a practical matter in making them "impossible to use" by making the CMSM's decision process to use them include the Board. best Jordan On 5 October 2015 at 08:48, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Jordan Tks fir first point I have serious concerns about the involvement of the Board on any decision making as co sharing the exercising the community powers . Example if co sharing in amendment of bylaws is entirely unique opportunity for such sharing the power and SHALL NOT be extended to any other power otherwise the separation of responsibility is totally ignored Tks Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 4 Oct 2015, at 21:39, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all, hi Avri,
Thanks for this interesting post. Two thoughts:
- my proposal to include the Board in any decision making related **only** to their concerns about certain "member powers in California law that cause us consternation" - the example floating around being dissolving the corporation. I would not support making the Board a decision-maker in the exercise of powers that are about holding the Board to account.
- the co-decision model, however, is useful - we have already proposed it for the change process for Fundamental Bylaws. I'd be much happier to explore whether that could be usefully explored for other powers.
cheers Jordan
On 2 October 2015 at 03:50, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
On 01-Oct-15 09:49, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Pls be so kind and think of a scenario that only two or three out of 7 SOs and ACs vote then the rest not voting will be captured by those two or three that voting .
I floated an idea on the WP1 the other day, that I was just discussing on a phone call with the At Large group working on this stuff, and was asked to repeat on the full list.
On the Community mechanism I do think we need to rename it to bring out the fact that it is only a power when there is broad agreement/consensus-by-some-definiton of the entire ACSO. We also need to explain that. I wonder whether we need to move away from even having a voting concept to having a discussion and black ball concept. i.e. if two ACSO come out against, back to the drawing board. But if the CM, conceived of as a full ACSO cross community WG, comes out with a statement that is considered by all the ACSO without 2 objections, it can go forward. So 2 ACSO can trigger the mechanism, and 2 ACSO can freeze an action after full discussion and negotiation. Or something similar.
Note since then I have been asked about the desire of some AC to only advise not vote. In this model advice-against can be just as much a black ball as a recommendation-against.
Another thought that since came up was the idea that the two ACSO should be at least 1 SO and 1 AC.
I thought about the idea of adding the Board to the mix so it becomes ACSO+Board and do not see why it would not be workable as long as they participated in the mechanism on an equal footing and not as overlords with their own special veto.
This referred to an idea that Jordan floated on one of these lists.
One complication that came up with this idea was how it would affect the blackball notion mentioned above. Does this mean that the Board + 1 ACSO is enough to freeze? I do not have an answer for that yet as I have not analyzed the decision matrix to see how it would work out in different circumstances - e.g. is it a Board proposal or a Community proposal that is being discussed.
I have also been told that I am dreaming if I think that the Board would be willing to participate in a process on an equal footing with the ACSO - but I think it is a possibility worth considering for those decisions where the Board and the Community need to concur. The new concept in our proposal is that sometimes, we need a formal way to find concurrence between what the Community needs and what the Board thinks its fiduciary responsibility is. There is also my desire to have mechanisms that help us avoid crisis, boardicide and court, if at all possible. It is a way in which to tweak our multistakeholder model to take into account the roles and responsibilities of the Community as well as those of the Board. (note on the accountability of the Community I have also recommended that the CM be subject to IRP on adherence to bylaws)
I also want to point out one other thing about our Community Consensus Membership Model - it is one able to exercise its powers only when there is consensus, for some definition of consensus. It is similar to the power we exhibited as a community before the initiation of the CCWG where the community came together and told the Board & Staff that their original idea for how this CCWG would work was not acceptable. In that case we had to gird our loins for rebellion and start making loud noises just before the IGF in Istanbul (was it really only a year ago - seems like a decade). In the Community Consensus Membership idea, we don't have to resort to rebellion and revolution, we would have a predefined process. A process based on our current structure with little change other than the formalization of things we are prepared to do anyway.
One thing I do not know does CA statue allow membership organizations to decide things by a consensus process defined without a vote.
avri
--- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *
Dear Jordan, I regret if I bwithrted you . You were not clear before but now crystal clear. I am almost as old as your father. Pls be kind when you wished to remind me of some repetition by using a softer language. I do not understand at all what was wrong. Any , sorry about that Cheers Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 4 Oct 2015, at 22:15, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Kavouss,
You keep saying that, and I almost completely agree with you.
My suggestion is ONLY that any powers a member has that ARE NOT ACCOUNTABILITY POWERS could be exercised with the Board participating.
I **agree** with you in respect of the accountability powers.
All the standard powers we have been talking about cannot have the Board involved, because that breaches the separation of powers you are talking about and which I strongly support.
The only specific "Member power" mentioned so far for which my proposal would be any use is the "dissolve the corporation" power. Another is probably "Unilateral changes to ICANN bylaws".
We don't need those powers; they are not the accountability powers the CCWG seeks to implement; there is no problem as a practical matter in making them "impossible to use" by making the CMSM's decision process to use them include the Board.
best Jordan
On 5 October 2015 at 08:48, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: Jordan Tks fir first point I have serious concerns about the involvement of the Board on any decision making as co sharing the exercising the community powers . Example if co sharing in amendment of bylaws is entirely unique opportunity for such sharing the power and SHALL NOT be extended to any other power otherwise the separation of responsibility is totally ignored Tks Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 4 Oct 2015, at 21:39, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Hi all, hi Avri,
Thanks for this interesting post. Two thoughts:
- my proposal to include the Board in any decision making related **only** to their concerns about certain "member powers in California law that cause us consternation" - the example floating around being dissolving the corporation. I would not support making the Board a decision-maker in the exercise of powers that are about holding the Board to account.
- the co-decision model, however, is useful - we have already proposed it for the change process for Fundamental Bylaws. I'd be much happier to explore whether that could be usefully explored for other powers.
cheers Jordan
On 2 October 2015 at 03:50, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi,
On 01-Oct-15 09:49, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Pls be so kind and think of a scenario that only two or three out of 7 SOs and ACs vote then the rest not voting will be captured by those two or three that voting .
I floated an idea on the WP1 the other day, that I was just discussing on a phone call with the At Large group working on this stuff, and was asked to repeat on the full list.
On the Community mechanism I do think we need to rename it to bring out the fact that it is only a power when there is broad agreement/consensus-by-some-definiton of the entire ACSO. We also need to explain that. I wonder whether we need to move away from even having a voting concept to having a discussion and black ball concept. i.e. if two ACSO come out against, back to the drawing board. But if the CM, conceived of as a full ACSO cross community WG, comes out with a statement that is considered by all the ACSO without 2 objections, it can go forward. So 2 ACSO can trigger the mechanism, and 2 ACSO can freeze an action after full discussion and negotiation. Or something similar.
Note since then I have been asked about the desire of some AC to only advise not vote. In this model advice-against can be just as much a black ball as a recommendation-against.
Another thought that since came up was the idea that the two ACSO should be at least 1 SO and 1 AC.
I thought about the idea of adding the Board to the mix so it becomes ACSO+Board and do not see why it would not be workable as long as they participated in the mechanism on an equal footing and not as overlords with their own special veto.
This referred to an idea that Jordan floated on one of these lists.
One complication that came up with this idea was how it would affect the blackball notion mentioned above. Does this mean that the Board + 1 ACSO is enough to freeze? I do not have an answer for that yet as I have not analyzed the decision matrix to see how it would work out in different circumstances - e.g. is it a Board proposal or a Community proposal that is being discussed.
I have also been told that I am dreaming if I think that the Board would be willing to participate in a process on an equal footing with the ACSO - but I think it is a possibility worth considering for those decisions where the Board and the Community need to concur. The new concept in our proposal is that sometimes, we need a formal way to find concurrence between what the Community needs and what the Board thinks its fiduciary responsibility is. There is also my desire to have mechanisms that help us avoid crisis, boardicide and court, if at all possible. It is a way in which to tweak our multistakeholder model to take into account the roles and responsibilities of the Community as well as those of the Board. (note on the accountability of the Community I have also recommended that the CM be subject to IRP on adherence to bylaws)
I also want to point out one other thing about our Community Consensus Membership Model - it is one able to exercise its powers only when there is consensus, for some definition of consensus. It is similar to the power we exhibited as a community before the initiation of the CCWG where the community came together and told the Board & Staff that their original idea for how this CCWG would work was not acceptable. In that case we had to gird our loins for rebellion and start making loud noises just before the IGF in Istanbul (was it really only a year ago - seems like a decade). In the Community Consensus Membership idea, we don't have to resort to rebellion and revolution, we would have a predefined process. A process based on our current structure with little change other than the formalization of things we are prepared to do anyway.
One thing I do not know does CA statue allow membership organizations to decide things by a consensus process defined without a vote.
avri
--- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive InternetNZ
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
A better world through a better Internet
Hello Jordan,
I would not support making the Board a decision-maker in the exercise of powers that are about holding the Board to account.
Agreed.
- the co-decision model, however, is useful - we have already proposed it for the change process for Fundamental Bylaws. I'd be much happier to explore whether that could be usefully explored for other powers.
Agreed. I think you make a useful distinction. I support both the Board and the community having a say in changing bylaws. For determining whether the Board has followed its bylaws – then an independent arbitration process of some form is appropriate. Regards, Bruce Tonkin
On 4 Oct 2015, at 22:18, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
- the co-decision model, however, is useful - we have already proposed it for the change process for Fundamental Bylaws. I'd be much happier to explore whether that could be usefully explored for other powers.
Agreed. I think you make a useful distinction. I support both the Board and the community having a say in changing bylaws.
The Board has the exclusive power of initiation for changes to the bylaws. I'd say that counts as a pretty significant say. Malcolm.
On 6 October 2015 at 11:16, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 4 Oct 2015, at 22:18, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> wrote:
- the co-decision model, however, is useful - we have already proposed it for the change process for Fundamental Bylaws. I'd be much happier to explore whether that could be usefully explored for other powers.
Agreed. I think you make a useful distinction. I support both the Board and the community having a say in changing bylaws.
The Board has the exclusive power of initiation for changes to the bylaws. I'd say that counts as a pretty significant say.
And, at risk of sounding like a broken record, the CCWG has never contemplated anything other than a joint say. The fact the CMSM approach would see a member with the power at law to make unilateral changes is not a power we have ever contemplated allowing to be exercised. best Jordan
Yep – sounds fair to me. From: Malcolm Hutty [mailto:malcolm@linx.net] Sent: Tuesday, 6 October 2015 9:16 AM To: Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> Cc: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RV: A way to avoid the 'The Single Member Can Do Anything!' problem On 4 Oct 2015, at 22:18, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> wrote:
- the co-decision model, however, is useful - we have already proposed it for the change process for Fundamental Bylaws. I'd be much happier to explore whether that could be usefully explored for other powers.
Agreed. I think you make a useful distinction. I support both the Board and the community having a say in changing bylaws. The Board has the exclusive power of initiation for changes to the bylaws. I'd say that counts as a pretty significant say. Malcolm.
participants (9)
-
Avri Doria -
Bruce Tonkin -
Dr Eberhard W Lisse -
James Gannon -
Jordan Carter -
Jorge.Cancio＠bakom.admin.ch -
Kavouss Arasteh -
Malcolm Hutty -
Perez Galindo, Rafael