- CWG-Stewardship - lists.icann.org

Re: [CWG-Stewardship] CWG RFP 2C - Draft Triage of IANA Functions Contract
by Milton L Mueller Oct. 28, 2014

Oct. 28, 2014

Maarten Again I think we are talking past each other. Maybe we should clarify definitions. You talk of "splitting up functions" and based on your comments below, it sounds like you are discussing the splitting up of _names_-related IANA functions. I don't see any reason to do that. When I talk about the different IANA functions, I am talking about the difference between 1) names, 2) protocols and 3) numbers. In fact, the execution of those 3 functions is already 'split' because they are performed by different people in different ways, and the relevant oversight authorities (1. DNS registries and stakeholders, 2. IETF, 3. RIRs and address holders) are all different. There are very few intersections between the IANA functions for names, numbers and protocols. Are we clear(er) now? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Maarten Botterman GNKS Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 5:02 PM To: cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] CWG RFP 2C - Draft Triage of IANA Functions Contract Milton - taking the risk of asking more questions, and maybe I am indeed the only one taking it in this way, but: I don't think the problem with oversight of names is with the fact that the execution of several functions is carried out by one body. I just don't understand stand why the splitting up of the execution would be needed when indeed realizing that the oversight for different functions is not in one body, nor is likely to be part of one body. And again taking the risk that my contribution may not be what you think it should be, I would highly appreciate it to talk off line, directly if you think I am wasting the time of this forum or your time. Indeed the intent of my contribution is to be helpful, not to waste time. My summary conclusion so far is that: 1- We mostly agree that oversight should be given in the hands of those stakeholders that care most, as their "business" would be directly affected when execution fails; 2- Some stakeholders do not seem to be prepared to invest time in oversight, even if excellent execution is of utmost importance to them, and we seem to want to seek ways to still involve them. My personal opinion is that we should be willing to educate them and involve them, but that we have no power nor right to drag them in by their hairs - and there is currently clearly no common understanding on how to deal with this (ref: to discussion about ccTLDs, specifically ... and IMHO it goes beyond ccTLDs alone). A proposal that may be helpful is the following consideration for managing "names": - Have general oversight from an SSAC/RSAC perspective; - Have specific oversight per domain by stakeholders in those domains (i.e. at the lowest possible level), and consider defining those domains by their specific needs. For instance, I can see that brand domains have very little in common with open gTLDs, or ccTLDs. So (recognizing it is not a full solution, merely a possible direction for solving the problem) my proposal would be to embrace the principle of "subsidiarity" ... taking decisions at the lowest level where they can be taken, ideally by those that are directly affected. And this would require defining specific domains. Hope this is helpful. Best Maarten From: Milton L Mueller [mailto:mueller@syr.edu] Sent: maandag 27 oktober 2014 21:18 To: 'Maarten Botterman GNKS'; 'cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org' Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] CWG RFP 2C - Draft Triage of IANA Functions Contract Maarten I guess you didn't understand my point. The possibility of separating the execution of the functions has nothing to do with how well or how poorly the IANA practical work is performed now. It has to do precisely with what you say needs attention: the oversight function. Oversight for names may or may not be optimized by combining it with oversight for the other functions. What happens, e.g., if one part is performed well and the other poorly? The requirements and procedures are radically different. This is a fact. At any rate, I would encourage you to follow your own advice and "keep busy" developing a proposal that solve the problem for names, and let the other functions worry about their issues, and let the ICG worry about how they fit together when the proposals are in. Deal? --MM From: cwg-stewardship-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Maarten Botterman GNKS Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 1:11 PM To: cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] CWG RFP 2C - Draft Triage of IANA Functions Contract I'm with Avri on this. Never heard anyone being unhappy about the IANA practical work ("IANA functions") as such, I think the world sees that that works, and an old saying in IT is "don't fix it if it isn't broken". It works. Let's keep the focus on where it is to be, effectively: on the oversight function organization. A challenge big enough to keep us busy without also considering a different organization of the functions at the same time - in particular when there is no apparent need for that. Or did I miss something? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: maandag 27 oktober 2014 3:20 To: cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] CWG RFP 2C - Draft Triage of IANA Functions Contract On 27-Oct-14 00:31, Milton L Mueller wrote: C.2.4. Assumes that all of the IANA functions are in the same entity. This assumption is not warranted at the present time. Except that the assumption of this exercise is to change as few things as possible and an assumption that they can or even should be moved to seperate entities is not warranted. The solition does not need to match the structure of the operational communities doing the recommendations. Without an anaylisis of the effect of seperation, I think it unwise to assume they can or should be split. I therefore would rather assume that the unity of IANA should be preserved until such time as it is proved that sperating them is the better solution. And until it is proven that sperating them invovles no risk. Even the IETF which is assuming it can pull out of IANA at any time has not done a complete analysis of the risks of doing so. Until we are sure that it does not pose a risk to the Internet, we ought to be careful about dumping this requirement. avri

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Financing the new IANA
by Robert Guerra Oct. 28, 2014

Oct. 28, 2014

Curious if the question of how the "new" IANA would be financed has been asked ? Sent from my iPhone

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Proposed Agenda for CWG meeting on 30 October at 10:00 UTC
by Grace Abuhamad Oct. 27, 2014

Oct. 27, 2014

Hi all, Please find below the proposed agenda for the next IANA Stewardship Transition CWG meeting which is scheduled for Thursday, 30 October at 10:00 UTC. 1. Welcome & Roll Call 2. Notes from last meeting & Review of action items 3. Second reading for Proposal on how to structure the work 4. Principles new draft 5. Status on work - subgroups 6. Any other business 7. Summary of action items and agreed items Best, Grace

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[IANA-issues] CWG RFP 2C - Draft Triage of IANA Functions Contract
by Allan MacGillivray Oct. 27, 2014

Oct. 27, 2014

Please find attached an initial draft of the triage of the IANA functions contract as discussed on the CWG call this week. The first document is the draft Triage itself, organized as per our meeting this week. In the second I have pasted the provisions that I have brought together all of the provisions that I categorized as "Likely Needs Improving" and "Linked to Accountability and Oversight". I know that a number of you, including Chuck Gomes, Kris Seeburn, Greg Shatan, James Gannon, Guru Acharya, Mary Uduma, Wanawit Ahkuputra, and Pitinan Kooarmornpatana have all volunteered to work on this. Thank you. I have sent the drafts to the full list as I do not have all of your emails. Could I ask that anyone who has already volunteered, or anyone that wishes to do so now, to respond quickly to this email so that we might start a CWG RFP2C list. I invite you to review the current draft documents. I am hoping that this can be done in the documents themselves. But if the comments and changes become too cumbersome, I will ask Bart or Marika to suggest how we can deal with these. In closing let me make a general comment. I see the objective of this exercise as being to identify potential issues that will need to be addressed at some point. I do not, however, see the resolution of these issues as being part of this SWG's work. Rather I see its objective as being to inform the work of the other SWG's, RFP3 in particular. Regards Allan

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Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Oversight -- with or without Internet end users?
by Eduardo Diaz Oct. 26, 2014

Oct. 26, 2014

@All: A couple of though/questions. If IANA is moved outside ICANN, where will be it incorporated if at all? What about proposing more than one IANA like structure/organization/company (or whatever) outside ICANN to promote competition among themself? In other words, if you do not like the services provided by X you contract with Z and so forth. -ed On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 6:44 AM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Hello Tijani, Olivier, all > > In view of the recent events, I think it will be good to hear from list > members on what we expect the transitioned oversight for names to look > like. This will help inform those of us on the cwg. > > I will really encourage as many members on this list to subscribe to the > cwg list as well so things can be more synchronised in real-time as things > are moving at an exponential pace and I fear we may overtook some aspects > if we don't have as many eye balls on the watch. > > Cheers! > > sent from Google nexus 4 > kindly excuse brevity and typos. > On 25 Oct 2014 01:40, "Tijani BEN JEMAA" <tijani.benjemaa(a)planet.tn> > wrote: > >> Olivier and Alan, >> >> >> >> I share the point of Olivier. I have the feeling that the trend is to >> give the role to the DNS industry, ignoring the remaining stakeholders and >> especially in our case the end users. In the CCWG charter drafting team, >> someone from GNSO chaired the first call and said that they are waiting the >> ccNSO to appoint a co-chair. I asked the following question: >> >> How the chairs have been chosen? While I understood that for the CWG >> charter drafting team, the co-chairs were from GNSO and ccNSO because the >> CWG was mainly about the transition of the stewardship of the IANA naming >> function, I can’t see why it is also the GNSO and the ccNSO who are de >> facto chairing this team who will draft the charter of the ICANN >> accountability and governance CCWG. >> >> I also made it clear that I don’t contest those chairs or >> their affiliation, but need to understand. >> >> The answer was very evasive, and no reason was provided. I think that >> they think that it’s their business, and we are there to complete the MSM >> scene only. >> >> >> >> >> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> *Tijani BEN JEMAA* >> >> Executive Director >> >> Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (*FMAI*) >> >> Phone: + 216 41 649 605 >> >> Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 >> >> Fax: + 216 70 853 376 >> >> >> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *De :* iana-issues-bounces(a)atlarge-lists.icann.org [mailto: >> iana-issues-bounces(a)atlarge-lists.icann.org] *De la part de* Olivier MJ >> Crepin-Leblond >> *Envoyé :* vendredi 24 octobre 2014 19:52 >> *À :* Alan Greenberg; iana-issues(a)atlarge-lists.icann.org >> *Objet :* Re: [IANA-issues] Oversight -- with or without Internet end >> users? >> >> >> >> Dear Alan, >> >> well -- this is where the idea of creation of a DNSA - the DNS Authority, >> which is advocated by Milton Mueller's paper >> http://www.internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ICANNreformg… >> takes hold. However, it is devoid of any end user input. Upon discussion on >> the CWG, Milton's now mentioned there would be two seats on a "DROC" >> (whatever that means -- DNS Regulatory Oversight Committee?) for the GAC... >> which again means nothing because as someone quite rightly reminded the >> mailing list, members of the GAC cannot represent the GAC - they represent >> their own country only. >> >> Note that not one time is the "end user" mentioned anywhere in the above >> paper. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Olivier >> >> >> On 24/10/2014 19:16, Alan Greenberg wrote: >> >> Olivier, you are probably correct about the split, but I find it hard to >> accept any situation where IANA can be allowed to with impunity not follow >> policy. >> >> I will wait a bit for any further comments here before posting to the CWG >> list. >> >> Alan >> >> At 24/10/2014 01:50 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: >> >> Dear Alan, >> >> I think your observations are right on target. I can however certainly >> see serious pushback about the advocating of the following: >> >> >> *"If the oversight is purely by the ccTLD and gTLD community, then there >> is no mechanism to correct IANA diverging from policy, essentially giving >> the operational communities, with the collusion of IANA, the ability to >> override policy (essentially a veto of policy established by the MSM." * >> This, in my opinion, is going to be the huge disagreement and with all >> parties showing entrenched positions at the moment, I do not know how this >> deadlock will be resolved. >> >> Forgetting all of the other procedural stuff which is currently going on >> in the CWG, I feel that this is probably going to be the matter to resolve. >> Suggestions anyone? >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Olivier >> >> >> On 24/10/2014 17:33, Alan Greenberg wrote: >> >> Interesting issue. >> >> Apart from wanting to feel loved and part of the club, to substantively >> justify the larger community being part of the oversight body, we need a >> scenario where oversight by the operational TLD entities is not sufficient. >> >> Consider scenario where: >> - the ccTLD and gTLD community are satisfied; >> - IANA is following policy; >> - users, industry, or some other part of the MSM are not happy. >> >> The issue should be addressed by changing the policy, which by both >> Milton and Greg's definition, does involve the entire MSM. >> >> The remaining scenario is: >> - the ccTLD and gTLD community are satisfied; >> - IANA is *NOT* following policy; >> - users, industry, or some other part of the MSM are not happy that lack >> of following policy, either because of undesireable outcomes or simply >> beleiving that IANA must adhere to established policy. >> >> If the oversight is purely by the ccTLD and gTLD community, then there is >> no mechanism to correct IANA diverging from policy, essentially giving the >> operational communities, with the collusion of IANA, the ability to >> override policy (essentially a veto of policy established by the MSM. >> >> Am I missing something here? Would there be some OTHER mechanism for >> getting IANA to follow policy if the only overseer were happy with them not >> doing so. >> >> Alan >> >> At 24/10/2014 10:56 AM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: >> >> Hello all, >> >> no doubt you have been following the discussions on the CWG Stewardship >> list. >> Greg Shatan mentioned (below) that all Stakeholder Groups should be part >> of the entity/group with ICANN oversight. >> You'll note the robust response from Milton Mueller. I must say I think >> that I would agree with Greg and disagree with Milton, but what do you >> think? Milton makes some convincing points too. >> >> Our At-Large WG needs to be quite clear about what would be acceptable >> for Internet users. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Olivier >> >> >> >> -------- Forwarded Message -------- >> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the >> other two communities >> Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 19:38:43 +0000 >> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller(a)syr.edu> <mueller(a)syr.edu> >> To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com> <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com>, >> cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org <cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org> >> <cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org> >> >> >> >> 2. *All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with >> ICANN Oversight*. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming >> community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct >> "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that >> all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are >> affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly >> representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or >> created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly >> representative. >> >> MM: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based on a >> fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of >> ICANNÃ¢€™s policy making process with the accountability of and input into >> the IANA functions. >> >> All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair representation in the >> process of policy development. But once a policy is agreed, the >> implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative technical and >> operational function in which its direct customers are the primary >> stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best (because >> random members of the public would not know what is going on at that level) >> and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to circumvent >> agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation level). >> >> I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA >> contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some >> kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In >> other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN. >> ThatÃ¢€™s wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP Ã¢€“ and many >> others Ã¢€“ have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation >> need to be clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the >> policy process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy >> by a registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do >> that. Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a >> contracting authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency >> purposes and for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable >> to the people who actually use its services and whose basic functions and >> activities are dependent on those services. >> >> Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US governmentÃ¢€™s authority >> over modifications to the root zone created the potential for that kind of >> political intervention at the implementation level. This set a very bad >> precedent for the world that we are still dealing with. Now some people are >> trying to reproduce that situation by making IANA oversight a way for >> interest groups who donÃ¢€™t get what they want in a policy process to get >> a second, back door bite at the apple. LetÃ¢€™s reject that clearly. >> >> If one knows what the performance of the IANA functions actually are, the >> idea that every stakeholder in the world should be engaged in >> Ã¢€œoversightÃ¢€ of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You might as well >> say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over what >> secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they live >> in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be affected, >> right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected, right? >> >> If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone file >> data neither you, Greg Ã¢€“ nor I Ã¢€“ are in a position to say whether the >> request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may >> argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA >> implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the >> answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more >> damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both >> incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from >> happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the >> security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be >> relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up. >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Iana-issues mailing list >> Iana-issues(a)atlarge-lists.icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD >> >> http://www.gih.com/ocl.html >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> <http://www.avast.com/> >> >> Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel malveillant >> parce que la protection Antivirus avast! <http://www.avast.com/> est >> active. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Iana-issues mailing list >> Iana-issues(a)atlarge-lists.icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues >> >> > _______________________________________________ > Iana-issues mailing list > Iana-issues(a)atlarge-lists.icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues > > -- *NOTICE:* This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately.

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Confirming F2F Details
by Grace Abuhamad Oct. 24, 2014

Oct. 24, 2014

Dear all, As requested, I'm following up with the venue confirmation for the face-to-face meeting: Dates: 19-20 November 2014 (two full working days) Venue: Le Meridien Parkhotel in Frankfurt, Germany Since the meeting will start early on 19 November, the suggested arrival date is 18 November. Accordingly, since the meeting will end in the afternoon on 20 November, some may need to depart on 21 November pending flight availability. Attendance: Only the 19 members of the CWG are eligible for travel funding from ICANN. Alternates are eligible for travel funding if and only if they are a current participant of the CWG and they are approved by their SO/AC to serve as an alternate. So far, I have received confirmation from about half of the members. If you are a member, please contact me (off-list) to confirm your attendance. Since arrangements need to be made quickly, please let me know by Tuesday, 28 October at the latest. If you cannot attend but are working with your SO/AC to confirm an alternate, please let me know as well. Participants are welcome to attend the F2F meeting at the own expense. To prepare the meeting space, all participants who wish to attend the meeting in person must confirm their attendance to me (off-list) by Friday, 7 November at the latest. Remote Participation: The meeting will be webcast live through Adobe Connect and include remote participation capabilities consistent with the CWG meetings to date. The meeting will also be recorded and transcribed. Please contact me if you have any questions, Grace Grace Abuhamad Public Policy Manager ICANN | Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 801 17th Street NW, Suite 400 | Washington, DC 20006 Direct: +1 202 249 7545 | Mobile: +1 310 200 7638

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the missing ccTLDs
by Milton L Mueller Oct. 24, 2014

Oct. 24, 2014

What you may be overlooking Tracy is that even though 96 ccTLDs don’t recognize or participate in ICANN they use the IANA root. Presumably they update their zone file via IANA too. So they have not been “left out” they are simply free riders. From: cwg-stewardship-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google Sent: Friday, October 24, 2014 4:03 AM To: Peter Van Roste Cc: cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Thank you Peter ... extremely helpful. I assume you also have counted those in LACTLD? So ... 96 ccTLDs could POTENTIALLY not recognize the ccNSO in any future organizational arrangement involving the ccNSO as is being suggested here. That is not insubstantial. I can also imagine that when you factor those that are Government affiliated within these 96 ccTLDs, the issues become quite complex as they relate to these discussions. I wonder if this is the nexus for GAC involvement in future organizational arrangements ... However that will still POTENTIALLY leave some ccTLDs out of the future arrangements being considered here, save for coercing them into joining either the ccNSO or the regional orgs. Any thoughts? /t On Oct 24, 2014 3:20 AM, "Peter Van Roste" <peter(a)centr.org<mailto:peter@centr.org>> wrote: Thanks Tracy for raising this. Becky is right, this process is open to all ccTLDs. The regional organisations are reaching out to those that are not in the ccNSO and to those that are unaffiliated in their respective regions. However, it should be taken into account when discussing the future role the ccNSO could play, that some ccTLDs will not recognize the ccNSO as a representative of their interests. Some stats: Out of the 248 ccTLDs: 152 are members of the ccNSO. Most of those are also a member of their regional organisation (AfTLD, APTLD, CENTR and APTLD). 38 ccTLDs are members of their regional organisation but not of the ccNSO. 58 ccTLDs are unaffiliated. Regards, Peter Van Roste General Manager, CENTR From: cwg-stewardship-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: donderdag 23 oktober 2014 23:37 To: Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google; Allan MacGillivray Cc: cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Some of those who do not participate in the ccNSO do participate in regional organizations such as LACTLD and APTLD. We have also set up a global list to communicate with ccTLDs that don’t participate in either. Note that the ccNSO rules permit cc’s to participate fully without actually joining the ccNSO itself. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Tracy F. Hackshaw @ Google" <tracyhackshaw(a)gmail.com<mailto:tracyhackshaw@gmail.com>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 5:31 PM To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray(a)cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller(a)syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>>, Guru Acharya <gurcharya(a)gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities What about the ccTLDs who are NOT part of the ccNSO ... has this been discussed/dealt with already? On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray(a)cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> wrote: So let’s see if I have got this correct. The idea is that the registries would set up a corporation that could contract with IANA, either as a stand-alone entity or as a department of ICANN, for the performance of the IANA functions – let’s call it ‘RegistryCo’ for short. Would there not be liability concerns on the part of many registries to being directors of RegistryCo? Even if they could be convinced, would those ccTLDs that are governments be comfortable with such an approach? And it would need some money to get going. Incorporating does take little money, but negotiating the contract would be quite another issue. From: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>] Sent: October-23-14 4:20 PM To: Milton L Mueller; Guru Acharya Cc: Allan MacGillivray; Fouad Bajwa; cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Correct. In any case, it takes very little time or money to create a light weight legal entity. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller(a)syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.…>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 3:41 PM To: Guru Acharya <gurcharya(a)gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>>, Becky Burr <becky.burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>> Cc: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray(a)cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa(a)gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>>, "cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities No. Guru this is incorrect. Both the CCNSO and the GNSO are made up of mostly incorporated legal entities. Certainly the TLD registries in both entities are legally incorporated. From: Guru Acharya [mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com] Even though NFL is an unincorporated association, the 32 independent teams that comprise the unincorporated association are legal entities. These 32 legal entities then collectively enter to into pooled-rights contract with any third party. In comparison, CCNSO and GNSO are not legal entities; and they can not form an unincorporated association. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> wrote: The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in the US, the question is whether there is an enforceable contract and not whether one of the contracting parties is a formal legal entity. I can assure you, the NFL enforces contracts all the time. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray(a)cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray@cira.ca>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 12:04 PM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Milton L Mueller <mueller(a)syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.…>>, Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa(a)gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Becky – you raise a very important point as to whether unincorporated entities can enter into enforceable contracts. If they can, it may simplify things considerably e.g. have ccNSO, GNSO, ALAC? 'take over’ the contact with ICANN. I had been labouring under the assumption that the ccNSO, GNSO would have to incorporate to do this. How can we get clarity on this? Allan From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky Sent: October-23-14 11:43 AM To: Milton L Mueller; Fouad Bajwa Cc: cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Rather than starting with legal constructs, let’s begin by talking about what we need to accomplish requisite accountability. To me, we need some independent committee, council, unincorporated association, or representative group to have a contract with ICANN/IANA for performing IANA functions consistent with SLA’s to be negotiated and documented. We need this entity, presumably representative of IANA service consumers, to have recourse if the SLA’s are not met. If this is correct, then we can look at what kind of legal entity we need for the “SLA Council.” Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. Could be stand alone or perhaps housed in ISOC or the IETF? I am pretty sure that unincorporated associations can enter into enforceable contracts, etc. (For example, the National Football League in the US is actually an unincorporated association). Second, we need a mechanism that ensure recourse and redress for a registry that is wrongfully revoked, delegated, etc. That mechanism can be provided to all through the ICANN bylaws, e.g., as an independent review. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932<tel:%2B%201.202.533.2932> Mobile: +1.202.352.6367<tel:%2B1.202.352.6367> / becky.burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller(a)syr.edu<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__mailto-3Amueller-40syr.…>> Date: Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 11:17 AM To: Fouad Bajwa <fouadbajwa(a)gmail.com<mailto:fouadbajwa@gmail.com>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Fouad: By the “technical community proposals” I assume you mean the protocols community. What your argument misses is that IANA _is_ a separate organizational entity for both the numbers and protocols communities. The protocol community has an MoU with ICANN that authorizes ICANN to perform the IANA functions for them. That MoU can be revoked, and IETF can decide to use someone else. That is the perfect accountability mechanism. Now, tell me how the names community achieves that same wonderful state? There are two ways to do it: pull the IANA out of ICANN, or set up a new contracting authority to replace the NTIA, which could periodically award the contract to ICANN or to anyone else qualified. No one wants “the IANA technical and policy functions [might] fall into the hands and whims of governments.” That in fact is a requirement imposed on the transition by the NTIA. But we do need to make significant organizational changes if we are to meet the requirement of accountability. I think scare talk about take overs can divert our attention from needed reforms and I would resist that kind of talk. I don't think that IANA should be evolved as a separate entity at all and create new opportunities for bureaucracies for governments and industry control. The technical community proposals are highly reasonable to not make such a big fuss out of it and help IANA transition under a body that is somewhat messed up but can be improved in the long run however, ICANN would need some changes. The technical community has also shown its concern that it doesn't want the IANA technical and policy function to fall into the hands of the whims of governments because it functions to the technical community's needs adequately in its present environment and role. Your challenge and for the ICG is to propose that most transparent and accountable way forward that ensures an open and inclusive relationship with the Internet community treating stakeholders in their respective roles but not giving preference to one group over another another. I don't have to go through the Internet Governance ideals over and over again here. First ICANN Board control as the final word for IANA affairs would have to be reviewed and should be taken into a broader community review process. I do not trust the ICANN Board to be able to manage both ICANN and IANA in a transparent and accountable way, their progress over the years has had its own set of troubles already. The proposals are interesting but not the final word. The final word will remain with NTIA and thats my concern from a developing country member citizen perspective. I am going through a great deal of suggestions and proposals and all show a similar aspect, don't disturb the IANA technical function and the policies for IANA developed by the community have work so far but require more transparency, accountability and functional relationships with the community ensuring open and inclusive participation in its policy development processes. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji(a)gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: +1 Option 2 is preferred from my end also. However i also added Option 4 as a second preference just incase things get delayed with the accountability process. Cheers! On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl(a)gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> wrote: Hello all, you might wish to see an expanded set of "Options", in a Google Doc which has been shared. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4Ri…<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_docume…> So far, I note that the majority of our participants on the At-Large IANA Issues WG appears to prefer Option 2. Kind regards, Olivier On 15/10/2014 22:55, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote: FYI -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 02:40:47 +0530 From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya(a)gmail.com><mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com> To: cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community? Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.slideshare.net_full…> Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_dra…> Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight. Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight? Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight. Therefore, it is essential to either Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar toÂ http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-ian…<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.internetgovernance.…> Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN. From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process. I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible. Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community. Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community. Regards, Acharya _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues(a)atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.gih.com_ocl.html&d=…> _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues(a)atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.fuoye.edu.ng&d=AAMG…> Mobile: +2348035233535<tel:%2B2348035233535> alt email:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view ! _______________________________________________ Iana-issues mailing list Iana-issues(a)atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:Iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/iana-issues<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> -- Regards. -------------------------- Fouad Bajwa ICT4D and Internet Governance Advisor My Blog: Internet's Governance: http://internetsgovernance.blogspot.com/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__internetsgovernance.blo…> Follow my Tweets: http://twitter.com/fouadbajwa<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_fouadbajwa&…> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship(a)icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…>

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Names Community Organising Outside ICANN
by Guru Acharya Oct. 23, 2014

Oct. 23, 2014

I forward below a vital discussion that is happening outside CWG but relates to the names proposal. I've added Avri's suggestion as Option 5 here: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1B46mlsyZUFF4bZfeWgGCdqIQHCP2BMOy4KZU4Ri… ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Avri Doria <avri(a)acm.org> Date: Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:07 AM Subject: Re: [ianatransition] [] A thought re accountability... To: ianatransition(a)icann.org Hi, Well if the GNSO and ccNSO can't leave ICANN, maybe the IANA could leave if necessary. Wasn't that always the point of the NTIA being able to transfer the contract? So if we want to keep things similar, we need to maintain the ability for the contract to move from ICANN to another organization, or perhaps to a standalone organization. We need 'separability' of the IANA function to remain one of its attributes. Stability and security demand that it stay where it is for the moment. But I believe that one outcome of the transition should be that it remains as separable as it is now. It must be separable from ICANN if things go badly. Just as IETF can move its data to somewhere else it the relationship with ICANN turns sour, the GNSO and ccNSO should be able to move their data to somewhere else. Personally I do not believe multiple little IANAs is the best solution so perhaps we need something similar to the ICG on a periodic basis (e.g. 5 years) to be created from the various parts of the community to review the performance, the audit reports, consultation based evidence &c. and to decide whether changes are required. These changes could be minor fixes or could be major and involve transfering the responsibility. Such a mechanism based solution would be easier to craft than one that invovles creating yet another permanent superstructure that serves the same set of stakeholders involved in the current operational communities. The idea that we would create an oversight for ICANN somewhat like ICANN itself reminds me of tortoises stacked on the backs of tortoises all the way up as we reach for true accountabity. It would also not create a new organization with the risk that brings of recapitulating ICANNs all the way up. A separability mechanism gives the GNSO and ccNSO the same ability that the IETF and the RIRs have of finding another provider if necessary. And working together with the advice and participation of global stakeholders, a decision can be made periodically on whether it has become necessary to do so. One thing we have to remember, it is not ICANN the corporation that is the operational policy community for names. It is the GNSO and the ccNSO and the advising AC's that are. Just as the ICG does not require the ICANN Board's approval before sending its decision to the NTIA, so to this periodic review committee of IETF, RIRs, GNSO ccNSO and related policy advice mechanisms from the I* ecosystem, like ISOC, ALAC, GAC, SSAC, RSSAC, & others, would not require ICANN Board approval to move the IANA function. There may be some legal issues to be resolved in the creation of such a mechanism, again the problem of how does one make ICANN corporate do what ICANN corporate doesn't want to do. Perhaps the construction of an IANA trust to hold the contract, could solve that problem. Just a thought. avri On 18-Oct-14 12:39, Milton L Mueller wrote: I'm not Jordan but will answer this anyway ;-) I would say it is _possible_. The problem is that moving GNSO and CCNSO out of ICANN at this point would involve such a complex set of organizational arrangements and such destabilizing potential for power shifts among the stakeholder groups involved that it could not be contemplated within anything like the time frame we have. Would it involve the creation of a new board? What would happen to GAC and ALAC? Just 2 examples of the kind of knotty questions that would have to be answered. --MM -----Original Message----- On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz> <jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz> wrote: If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for the numbers and protocols folks to understand that: ... b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability mechanisms because they aren't organised outside ICANN c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way numbers/protocol people do Jordan - Could you elaborate on why "c" isn't possible? -----Original Message----- On Oct 15, 2014, at 3:18 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz> <jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz> wrote: A thought that has been bubbling away here at ICANN LA this week for me: If we are going to have a successful transition, it's really important for the numbers and protocols folks to understand that: a) they have superior accountability situations to the names people today b) the names people cannot copy number/protocol accountability mechanisms because they aren't organised outside ICANN c) it isn't possible for names to organise outside ICANN in the way numbers/protocol people do d) there may need to be structural changes or new bodies to provide a workable settlement for names e) without a workable settlement for names, there isn't going to be a transition. I raise this now because both for numbers and protocols there's a clear direction to try and rule out any institutional changes. I strongly caution against any part of the community being dogmatic about any of these, because it will a) attract some attention that'll risk the whole transition process failing (esp. from governments), and b) means that a negotiated outcome is harder to achieve, also risking failure. Wonder how others feel about this. cheers Jordan _______________________________________________ ianatransition mailing list ianatransition(a)icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ianatransition

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Comments on principles
by Avri Doria Oct. 23, 2014

Oct. 23, 2014

Hi, I see at least 1 other category and another entry for the Accountabilty category the new Category is Separability. In order to reproduce the NTIA contract, it has to be possible for the Naming policy groups of ICANN to become dissatisfied and move the contract for the function elsewhere. This is the correlate of the IETF capability. Other principles such as stabilty mean this can't just happen willy nilly, but there must be some sort of periodic opportunity this to happen. Or perhaps a 6 month clause like the IETF has. while there are several ways to do this, I think it critical that the plan include the possiblity and the means. And the new bullets in accountability - There needs to be a mechanism for an enforceable means of redress. Whether it is achieved by binding arbitration, some sort of juridical system or a yet to be named capability, it has to be possible for there to be an accessible and relaible mean of redress. - We need to decide to whom it is accountable. The stakeholders? The policy process? the registries? the registrants? the users? Accountabilty must be accountabilty to someone. I beleive it is the stakeholders, but that probably needs to be further defined. Do we mean the multiplicity of stakeholder groups ICANN has? Or do we mean to a Tunis Agenda model of stakeholders? Some other model? The answers to the principle questions will say a lot about the kind of solution we might come up with. thanks avri

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F2F meeting in November
by Lise Fuhr Oct. 23, 2014

Oct. 23, 2014

Dear All, In relation to the F2F meeting, we have taken note of your comments and do acknowledge that there are certain challenges associated with location as well as dates for some of you. However, taking into account the very strict timeline the CWG is on (publication of Initial Report by 1 December), availability of venue, ensuring a level of fairness of travel time required to get to the meeting, not eat into people's weekend and availability of CWG Chairs, there is no alternative to the meeting dates and location (Europe) that has been proposed. ICANN has informed the Chairs this morning that, for a variety of reasons, including travel logistics and cost effectiveness, Frankfurt is now the location of the F2F meeting instead of Amsterdam (exact venue to be confirmed shortly). We sincerely hope that you will be able to find some flexibility in your undoubtedly very busy schedules to accommodate this meeting and please do note that remote participation will be available for those that are not able to participate in person. Given these limitations on scheduling, in the interests of providing certainty to those who may face delays in securing necessary visas and to those who may be traveling at their own expense, we would like to confirm the date and venue of the meeting will remain unchanged going forward. Best regards, Jonathan Robinson and Lise Fuhr

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