Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board
Hi MM, I mostly support that approach, but I'd propose the following modifications. Instead of one naming community representative, I'd suggest one from the GNSO and one from ccNSO. In addition, I'd suggest adding the Exec Dir of the PTI to the board. In total, a lightweight and small five person board. -- Brenden On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 11:08 AM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Regarding the composition of the board, the Summary of Legal Structure says only: “The PTI board could be an ICANN-designated board” and that we should “avoid the need to replicate the complexity of the multistakeholder ICANN board.” I agree with the latter concern, but we will need to flesh out more detail regarding the composition of the PTI board.
I have missed most recent calls, so perhaps this has been discussed already, but if it has, it didn’t appear in the Sidley Austin draft.
I think a simple and easily implementable solution would be to have ICANN-designated members be fixed by rules or bylaws (as opposed to wholly discretionary).
In my view, the PTI board should consist of the following 3 members:
1. The existing IETF liaison on the ICANN board
2. Someone designated by the ASO
3. Someone designated by ICANN’s board essentially representing the naming community. One could add to this a recommendation from the CSC if one wanted, I would be amenable to that.
This PTI board would be balanced across the 3 operational communities and thus would be in a good position to provide oversight for the IANA functions.
--MM
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Lise Fuhr *Sent:* Monday, April 20, 2015 8:50 AM *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* [CWG-Stewardship] Structure and comments from Sidley Austin
Dear All,
Please be aware of the following documents from Sidley Austin.
1. The structural model diagram
2. Summary of Legal Structure
3. CWG - Draft Transition Proposal (Sidley Comments)
Best regards,
Lise
Excellent suggestions. On 4/20/2015 4:52 PM, Brenden Kuerbis wrote:
Hi MM,
I mostly support that approach, but I'd propose the following modifications. Instead of one naming community representative, I'd suggest one from the GNSO and one from ccNSO. In addition, I'd suggest adding the Exec Dir of the PTI to the board. In total, a lightweight and small five person board.
-- Brenden
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 11:08 AM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> wrote:
Regarding the composition of the board, the Summary of Legal Structure says only: “The PTI board could be an ICANN-designated board” and that we should “avoid the need to replicate the complexity of the multistakeholder ICANN board.” I agree with the latter concern, but we will need to flesh out more detail regarding the composition of the PTI board.
I have missed most recent calls, so perhaps this has been discussed already, but if it has, it didn’t appear in the Sidley Austin draft.
I think a simple and easily implementable solution would be to have ICANN-designated members be fixed by rules or bylaws (as opposed to wholly discretionary).
In my view, the PTI board should consist of the following 3 members:
1.The existing IETF liaison on the ICANN board
2.Someone designated by the ASO
3.Someone designated by ICANN’s board essentially representing the naming community. One could add to this a recommendation from the CSC if one wanted, I would be amenable to that.
This PTI board would be balanced across the 3 operational communities and thus would be in a good position to provide oversight for the IANA functions.
--MM
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Lise Fuhr *Sent:* Monday, April 20, 2015 8:50 AM *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject:* [CWG-Stewardship] Structure and comments from Sidley Austin
Dear All,
Please be aware of the following documents from Sidley Austin.
1.The structural model diagram
2.Summary of Legal Structure
3.CWG - Draft Transition Proposal (Sidley Comments)
Best regards,
Lise
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
Hi, I do not think we should avoid putting some multistakeholder character in the PTI. And still keep it small. If I understand, so far we have: PTI Exec Director IETF laision (are we sure they would agree to this extra level of participation? We should be cautious assigning roles & responsibilities to them that they may not wish to have) RIR liaison (see about re IETF) GNSO rep ccNSO rep I think we should consider a CSC rep (same caution as above, this may be too operational for the CSC) I would also recommend a GAC rep (government particpation) an ALAC (user particpatiion) and possibly an ICANN Board rep If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. Still a small number. avri On 20-Apr-15 11:55, Matthew Shears wrote:
Excellent suggestions.
On 4/20/2015 4:52 PM, Brenden Kuerbis wrote:
Hi MM,
I mostly support that approach, but I'd propose the following modifications. Instead of one naming community representative, I'd suggest one from the GNSO and one from ccNSO. In addition, I'd suggest adding the Exec Dir of the PTI to the board. In total, a lightweight and small five person board.
-- Brenden
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 11:08 AM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu <mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> wrote:
Regarding the composition of the board, the Summary of Legal Structure says only: “The PTI board could be an ICANN-designated board” and that we should “avoid the need to replicate the complexity of the multistakeholder ICANN board.” I agree with the latter concern, but we will need to flesh out more detail regarding the composition of the PTI board.
I have missed most recent calls, so perhaps this has been discussed already, but if it has, it didn’t appear in the Sidley Austin draft.
I think a simple and easily implementable solution would be to have ICANN-designated members be fixed by rules or bylaws (as opposed to wholly discretionary).
In my view, the PTI board should consist of the following 3 members:
1. The existing IETF liaison on the ICANN board
2. Someone designated by the ASO
3. Someone designated by ICANN’s board essentially representing the naming community. One could add to this a recommendation from the CSC if one wanted, I would be amenable to that.
This PTI board would be balanced across the 3 operational communities and thus would be in a good position to provide oversight for the IANA functions.
--MM
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Lise Fuhr *Sent:* Monday, April 20, 2015 8:50 AM *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject:* [CWG-Stewardship] Structure and comments from Sidley Austin
Dear All,
Please be aware of the following documents from Sidley Austin.
1. The structural model diagram
2. Summary of Legal Structure
3. CWG - Draft Transition Proposal (Sidley Comments)
Best regards,
Lise
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
--- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. http://www.avast.com
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:17:53PM -0400, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I do not think we should avoid putting some multistakeholder character in the PTI.
It seems to me that the proposal _is_ multi-stakeholder. There are stakes -- names, numbers, protocol parameters -- and they're represented.
IETF laision (are we sure they would agree to this extra level of participation? We should be cautious assigning roles & responsibilities to them
I agree with this worry and thank you for raising it. One thing that's attractive about Milton's proposal, however, is that it simply adds a responsibility to a role alredy defined, so we don't have to find more volunteers and so on (though we do need to add this to the list of things the liaison would have to do). It certainly needs to be confirmed.
a GAC rep (government particpation) an ALAC (user particpatiion)
Why? IANA is a clerical job for a specific purpose. What ought the GAC or the ALAC have to say about it? By constraining the board to this narrow scope of those actually directly affected, we have the hope of constraining PTI from becoming the leverage with which to force other issues (much as has been done in this process, where the entirely clerical IANA job is getting used as the lever to cause ICANN governance changes).
an ICANN Board rep
Since the other appointees are already ICANN board members, why is an additional one needed?
If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. Still a small number.
In my experience, a team of five can make a decision that a group of 9 cannot. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
All, In thinking about the composition of the board, we need to be clear about the purpose or function of the board and what (if any) tasks it needs to undertake and or decisions it needs to make. It is clear to me that it has (at minimum) a legal function but that function may well be filled by a minimum board that we previously referred to as an internal or insider board. Are we clear that the PTI board has a function beyond that minimum and that the functions we may require it to perform are not already to be performed elsewhere? Thanks, Jonathan -----Original Message----- From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com] Sent: 20 April 2015 17:36 To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:17:53PM -0400, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I do not think we should avoid putting some multistakeholder character in the PTI.
It seems to me that the proposal _is_ multi-stakeholder. There are stakes -- names, numbers, protocol parameters -- and they're represented.
IETF laision (are we sure they would agree to this extra level of participation? We should be cautious assigning roles & responsibilities to them
I agree with this worry and thank you for raising it. One thing that's attractive about Milton's proposal, however, is that it simply adds a responsibility to a role alredy defined, so we don't have to find more volunteers and so on (though we do need to add this to the list of things the liaison would have to do). It certainly needs to be confirmed.
a GAC rep (government particpation) an ALAC (user particpatiion)
Why? IANA is a clerical job for a specific purpose. What ought the GAC or the ALAC have to say about it? By constraining the board to this narrow scope of those actually directly affected, we have the hope of constraining PTI from becoming the leverage with which to force other issues (much as has been done in this process, where the entirely clerical IANA job is getting used as the lever to cause ICANN governance changes).
an ICANN Board rep
Since the other appointees are already ICANN board members, why is an additional one needed?
If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. Still a small number.
In my experience, a team of five can make a decision that a group of 9 cannot. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Jonathan In that regard, one of the questions I think we have to answer is what responsibility does the PTI Board have vis-a-vis the IANA functions team, if any? If there is a management responsibility (and I would assume there is if PTI is the operator) then the PTI Board is more than just a legal function. The IANA team I assume would be accountable to the PTI Board, the PTI Board in turn to the ICANN Board. So, if as a result of the periodic review undertaken by the PRT there are changes that should be implemented in the IANA team or its operations, the PTI Board (as operator) would implement those changes. Seems to me that this points to a PTI Board that has a broader role than just a legal purpose related to the affiliate. Matthew On 4/20/2015 5:45 PM, Jonathan Robinson wrote:
All,
In thinking about the composition of the board, we need to be clear about the purpose or function of the board and what (if any) tasks it needs to undertake and or decisions it needs to make.
It is clear to me that it has (at minimum) a legal function but that function may well be filled by a minimum board that we previously referred to as an internal or insider board.
Are we clear that the PTI board has a function beyond that minimum and that the functions we may require it to perform are not already to be performed elsewhere?
Thanks,
Jonathan
-----Original Message----- From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com] Sent: 20 April 2015 17:36 To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:17:53PM -0400, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I do not think we should avoid putting some multistakeholder character in the PTI. It seems to me that the proposal _is_ multi-stakeholder. There are stakes -- names, numbers, protocol parameters -- and they're represented.
IETF laision (are we sure they would agree to this extra level of participation? We should be cautious assigning roles & responsibilities to them I agree with this worry and thank you for raising it. One thing that's attractive about Milton's proposal, however, is that it simply adds a responsibility to a role alredy defined, so we don't have to find more volunteers and so on (though we do need to add this to the list of things the liaison would have to do). It certainly needs to be confirmed.
a GAC rep (government particpation) an ALAC (user particpatiion) Why? IANA is a clerical job for a specific purpose. What ought the GAC or the ALAC have to say about it? By constraining the board to this narrow scope of those actually directly affected, we have the hope of constraining PTI from becoming the leverage with which to force other issues (much as has been done in this process, where the entirely clerical IANA job is getting used as the lever to cause ICANN governance changes).
an ICANN Board rep Since the other appointees are already ICANN board members, why is an additional one needed?
If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. Still a small number. In my experience, a team of five can make a decision that a group of 9 cannot.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 06:00:06PM +0100, Matthew Shears wrote:
those changes. Seems to me that this points to a PTI Board that has a broader role than just a legal purpose related to the affiliate.
The maximal responsibilites the PTI board can have are its legal function and the normal board function of managerial oversight. If it can be any larger than that, we're well into Contract Co land. So even if there is a slightly larger function, it still militates in favour of a small, tightly-focussed board along the lines Milton proposed. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
Andrew, Contract Co. was intended to have a small, tightly-focused board with the legal minimum of responsibilities. There was intended to be the larger, multistakeholder MRT, which would have certain powers to control Contract Co. in regard to certain activities under certain circumstances (possibly through a membership model); perhaps you are thinking of the MRT role as you cite the dangers of "Contract Co. land." Greg On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 2:01 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 06:00:06PM +0100, Matthew Shears wrote:
those changes. Seems to me that this points to a PTI Board that has a broader role than just a legal purpose related to the affiliate.
The maximal responsibilites the PTI board can have are its legal function and the normal board function of managerial oversight. If it can be any larger than that, we're well into Contract Co land.
So even if there is a slightly larger function, it still militates in favour of a small, tightly-focussed board along the lines Milton proposed.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 02:20:15PM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
through a membership model); perhaps you are thinking of the MRT role as you cite the dangers of "Contract Co. land."
Yep. The proposal that I saw last year that involved Contract Co and MRT and so on looked to me like a way of building all the structures of ICANN all over again, only without tearing down ICANN. I thought then and, having reviewed it since, think now that such an approach would not yield a stable system. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
Just to put in perspective. There is seemingly no difference in structures of present model compared to contract-co in that legal still has PTI and PRF which is equivalence of Contract-co and MRT. The major role of the 2 options is where I think the difference lies; where the legal version acts as the IANA operator(contactee), the contract-co version acts as the IANA owner (contractor) Cheers! sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 20 Apr 2015 19:26, "Andrew Sullivan" <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 02:20:15PM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
through a membership model); perhaps you are thinking of the MRT role as you cite the dangers of "Contract Co. land."
Yep. The proposal that I saw last year that involved Contract Co and MRT and so on looked to me like a way of building all the structures of ICANN all over again, only without tearing down ICANN. I thought then and, having reviewed it since, think now that such an approach would not yield a stable system.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Seun, I would strongly disagree with you that “There is seemingly no difference in structures of present model compared to contract-co in that legal still has PTI and PRF which is equivalence of Contract-co and MRT.” Just to name a couple big differences: complexity and increased costs. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Seun Ojedeji Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 2:50 PM To: Andrew Sullivan Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board Just to put in perspective. There is seemingly no difference in structures of present model compared to contract-co in that legal still has PTI and PRF which is equivalence of Contract-co and MRT. The major role of the 2 options is where I think the difference lies; where the legal version acts as the IANA operator(contactee), the contract-co version acts as the IANA owner (contractor) Cheers! sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 20 Apr 2015 19:26, "Andrew Sullivan" <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> wrote: On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 02:20:15PM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
through a membership model); perhaps you are thinking of the MRT role as you cite the dangers of "Contract Co. land."
Yep. The proposal that I saw last year that involved Contract Co and MRT and so on looked to me like a way of building all the structures of ICANN all over again, only without tearing down ICANN. I thought then and, having reviewed it since, think now that such an approach would not yield a stable system. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
I would disagree with Seun, but for different reasons than Chuck. First, a multistakeholder oversight body of some sort has been part of every plan we've discussed, so claiming similarity (MRT/PRF) between any two models based on a similarity among all models proves nothing (other than that there may be no better arguments to use). PTI and Contract Co. could not be more different (or less equivalent). PTI would be an operating company, with employees, assets, expenses and an ongoing business operation. Contract Co. would be a holding company, with virtually none of the above. PTI would be a party providing services under an agreement, responsible for performing every day. Contract Co. would be a party contracting for services to be provided, with activities limited to exercising oversight. PTI would be controlled by ICANN, through a single member structure (or conceivably controlled by three members, under an alternate scenarios). Contract Co. would not be controlled by any third party. If this is an attempt at perspective, I have to say it is rather "skewed" (see http://www.tripadvisor.com/LocationPhotoDirectLink-g186525-i63947201-Edinbur... ). Greg On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 7:35 PM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> wrote:
Seun,
I would strongly disagree with you that “There is seemingly no difference in structures of present model compared to contract-co in that legal still has PTI and PRF which is equivalence of Contract-co and MRT.” Just to name a couple big differences: complexity and increased costs.
Chuck
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Seun Ojedeji *Sent:* Monday, April 20, 2015 2:50 PM *To:* Andrew Sullivan *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board
Just to put in perspective. There is seemingly no difference in structures of present model compared to contract-co in that legal still has PTI and PRF which is equivalence of Contract-co and MRT. The major role of the 2 options is where I think the difference lies; where the legal version acts as the IANA operator(contactee), the contract-co version acts as the IANA owner (contractor)
Cheers! sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 20 Apr 2015 19:26, "Andrew Sullivan" <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 02:20:15PM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
through a membership model); perhaps you are thinking of the MRT role as you cite the dangers of "Contract Co. land."
Yep. The proposal that I saw last year that involved Contract Co and MRT and so on looked to me like a way of building all the structures of ICANN all over again, only without tearing down ICANN. I thought then and, having reviewed it since, think now that such an approach would not yield a stable system.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Hi Greg, I think you have just said the difference I mentioned in details. However let's not argue about this since it won't take us anywhere. Let's just move on. Thanks sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 21 Apr 2015 02:49, "Greg Shatan" <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I would disagree with Seun, but for different reasons than Chuck. First, a multistakeholder oversight body of some sort has been part of every plan we've discussed, so claiming similarity (MRT/PRF) between any two models based on a similarity among all models proves nothing (other than that there may be no better arguments to use). PTI and Contract Co. could not be more different (or less equivalent). PTI would be an operating company, with employees, assets, expenses and an ongoing business operation. Contract Co. would be a holding company, with virtually none of the above. PTI would be a party providing services under an agreement, responsible for performing every day. Contract Co. would be a party contracting for services to be provided, with activities limited to exercising oversight. PTI would be controlled by ICANN, through a single member structure (or conceivably controlled by three members, under an alternate scenarios). Contract Co. would not be controlled by any third party. If this is an attempt at perspective, I have to say it is rather "skewed" (see http://www.tripadvisor.com/LocationPhotoDirectLink-g186525-i63947201-Edinbur... ).
Greg
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 7:35 PM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> wrote:
Seun,
I would strongly disagree with you that “There is seemingly no difference in structures of present model compared to contract-co in that legal still has PTI and PRF which is equivalence of Contract-co and MRT.” Just to name a couple big differences: complexity and increased costs.
Chuck
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Seun Ojedeji *Sent:* Monday, April 20, 2015 2:50 PM *To:* Andrew Sullivan *Cc:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board
Just to put in perspective. There is seemingly no difference in structures of present model compared to contract-co in that legal still has PTI and PRF which is equivalence of Contract-co and MRT. The major role of the 2 options is where I think the difference lies; where the legal version acts as the IANA operator(contactee), the contract-co version acts as the IANA owner (contractor)
Cheers! sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 20 Apr 2015 19:26, "Andrew Sullivan" <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 02:20:15PM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
through a membership model); perhaps you are thinking of the MRT role as you cite the dangers of "Contract Co. land."
Yep. The proposal that I saw last year that involved Contract Co and MRT and so on looked to me like a way of building all the structures of ICANN all over again, only without tearing down ICANN. I thought then and, having reviewed it since, think now that such an approach would not yield a stable system.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Good evening: May I suggest that the present thread is off-topic, if not invidious. The composition of the eventual PTI Board, if any, should be discussed in open process with all stakeholders concerned, when the time comes. CWG is not the appropriate forum. CW On 20 Apr 2015, at 20:20, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
Andrew,
Contract Co. was intended to have a small, tightly-focused board with the legal minimum of responsibilities. There was intended to be the larger, multistakeholder MRT, which would have certain powers to control Contract Co. in regard to certain activities under certain circumstances (possibly through a membership model); perhaps you are thinking of the MRT role as you cite the dangers of "Contract Co. land."
Greg
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 2:01 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> wrote: On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 06:00:06PM +0100, Matthew Shears wrote:
those changes. Seems to me that this points to a PTI Board that has a broader role than just a legal purpose related to the affiliate.
The maximal responsibilites the PTI board can have are its legal function and the normal board function of managerial oversight. If it can be any larger than that, we're well into Contract Co land.
So even if there is a slightly larger function, it still militates in favour of a small, tightly-focussed board along the lines Milton proposed.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
I would disagree with CW's suggestion. This is germane and on-topic for this forum. The PTI board is a reasonably significant aspect of the CWG's proposal. It would be an abdication of our responsibilities not to propose a board when we are proposing such an entity. "All stakeholders" will be free to comment during the public comment period (which is, of course, an open process). The other IANA "customer" communities can also weigh in directly during the ICG phase. It should also be kept in mind that this is the board of an entity wholly-controlled by ICANN, so it is essentially an internal-to-ICANN matter. Greg Shatan On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 2:32 PM, CW Lists <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu> wrote:
Good evening:
May I suggest that the present thread is off-topic, if not invidious. The composition of the eventual PTI Board, if any, should be discussed in open process with all stakeholders concerned, when the time comes. CWG is not the appropriate forum.
CW
On 20 Apr 2015, at 20:20, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
Andrew,
Contract Co. was intended to have a small, tightly-focused board with the legal minimum of responsibilities. There was intended to be the larger, multistakeholder MRT, which would have certain powers to control Contract Co. in regard to certain activities under certain circumstances (possibly through a membership model); perhaps you are thinking of the MRT role as you cite the dangers of "Contract Co. land."
Greg
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 2:01 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 06:00:06PM +0100, Matthew Shears wrote:
those changes. Seems to me that this points to a PTI Board that has a broader role than just a legal purpose related to the affiliate.
The maximal responsibilites the PTI board can have are its legal function and the normal board function of managerial oversight. If it can be any larger than that, we're well into Contract Co land.
So even if there is a slightly larger function, it still militates in favour of a small, tightly-focussed board along the lines Milton proposed.
Best regards,
A
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I’d see Milton’s approach as a good one – the PTI is an operational structure that has to take responsibility for delivering the quality of service and technical excellence required from the PTI: essentially we need a management Board that can keep the IANA functions operation team focussed and resourced. I could certainly go with one ccTLD and one gTLD rep as Brenden suggested – and why not chosen from ICANN Board members as they are going to be responsible on the Board for ensuring that the PTI has the resources necessary? I also like his idea that the PTI’s executive director be on the Board – this seems to me to be quite usual practice. While I have some sympathy for ensuring multi-stakeholder engagement, I think we actually need a Board that has the skills and expertise to ensure a successful operation. The multi-stakeholder accountability should be from the ICANN Board as this is where resources (budget) come from. It also comes in through the PRF and the general transparency that we should expect from the process. We do not improve accountability by growing the Board or by stuffing it with people with little knowledge of the service they are managing. Martin From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan Sent: 20 April 2015 19:20 To: Andrew Sullivan Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board Andrew, Contract Co. was intended to have a small, tightly-focused board with the legal minimum of responsibilities. There was intended to be the larger, multistakeholder MRT, which would have certain powers to control Contract Co. in regard to certain activities under certain circumstances (possibly through a membership model); perhaps you are thinking of the MRT role as you cite the dangers of "Contract Co. land." Greg On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 2:01 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> wrote: On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 06:00:06PM +0100, Matthew Shears wrote:
those changes. Seems to me that this points to a PTI Board that has a broader role than just a legal purpose related to the affiliate.
The maximal responsibilites the PTI board can have are its legal function and the normal board function of managerial oversight. If it can be any larger than that, we're well into Contract Co land. So even if there is a slightly larger function, it still militates in favour of a small, tightly-focussed board along the lines Milton proposed. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Hi, On 20-Apr-15 14:48, Martin Boyle wrote:
While I have some sympathy for ensuring multi-stakeholder engagement, I think we actually need a Board that has the skills and expertise to ensure a successful operation. The multi-stakeholder accountability should be from the ICANN Board as this is where resources (budget) come from. It also comes in through the PRF and the general transparency that we should expect from the process.
Why is there an assumption that this people would not have skills? With CSC being just registries and IGOs (the .int registrants), and the PRT being periodic, it does seem like we are well on our way toward a nearly multistakeholder free solution. Is that really what we want to present? I am comfortable with taking the CSC - they already are prepesented by GNSO/ccNSO & IETF and RIRs (they are ICANN customers not IANA direct customers) out of the mix if it is too big. avri --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. http://www.avast.com
Why is there an assumption that this people would not have skills? MM: Because you are proposing to put them there to represent policy perspectives, not to manage a registry. The whole point of legal separation is to put some distance between IANA functions operator and the MSH policy process. By proposing a fully MSH board with GAC and ALAC you are inviting policy intervention in IANA functions, and to quote Andrew,
If it were possible for me to disagree with this more, I would disagree with it that much too.
In my experience, Boards usually don't have operational management responsibilities although the management team would answer to the Board. I think it is accurate though that the Board will direct management to implement agreed to changes. Chuck -----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Matthew Shears Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 1:00 PM To: jrobinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board Jonathan In that regard, one of the questions I think we have to answer is what responsibility does the PTI Board have vis-a-vis the IANA functions team, if any? If there is a management responsibility (and I would assume there is if PTI is the operator) then the PTI Board is more than just a legal function. The IANA team I assume would be accountable to the PTI Board, the PTI Board in turn to the ICANN Board. So, if as a result of the periodic review undertaken by the PRT there are changes that should be implemented in the IANA team or its operations, the PTI Board (as operator) would implement those changes. Seems to me that this points to a PTI Board that has a broader role than just a legal purpose related to the affiliate. Matthew On 4/20/2015 5:45 PM, Jonathan Robinson wrote:
All,
In thinking about the composition of the board, we need to be clear about the purpose or function of the board and what (if any) tasks it needs to undertake and or decisions it needs to make.
It is clear to me that it has (at minimum) a legal function but that function may well be filled by a minimum board that we previously referred to as an internal or insider board.
Are we clear that the PTI board has a function beyond that minimum and that the functions we may require it to perform are not already to be performed elsewhere?
Thanks,
Jonathan
-----Original Message----- From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com] Sent: 20 April 2015 17:36 To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:17:53PM -0400, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I do not think we should avoid putting some multistakeholder character in the PTI. It seems to me that the proposal _is_ multi-stakeholder. There are stakes -- names, numbers, protocol parameters -- and they're represented.
IETF laision (are we sure they would agree to this extra level of participation? We should be cautious assigning roles & responsibilities to them I agree with this worry and thank you for raising it. One thing that's attractive about Milton's proposal, however, is that it simply adds a responsibility to a role alredy defined, so we don't have to find more volunteers and so on (though we do need to add this to the list of things the liaison would have to do). It certainly needs to be confirmed.
a GAC rep (government particpation) an ALAC (user particpatiion) Why? IANA is a clerical job for a specific purpose. What ought the GAC or the ALAC have to say about it? By constraining the board to this narrow scope of those actually directly affected, we have the hope of constraining PTI from becoming the leverage with which to force other issues (much as has been done in this process, where the entirely clerical IANA job is getting used as the lever to cause ICANN governance changes).
an ICANN Board rep Since the other appointees are already ICANN board members, why is an additional one needed?
If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. Still a small number. In my experience, a team of five can make a decision that a group of 9 cannot.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
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-- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987 _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
We can always get more clarity on this from counsel. Here's a generic description of the duties of a California non-profit corporation from the website of another firm (Adler & Colvin). The fourth bullet is most germane to the present discussion. The following are the general duties and responsibilities of nonprofit directors in California. Many states have similar provisions, although the specific laws of nonprofit corporate governance will differ from state to state: - The Board of Directors, as a group, is ultimately responsible for overseeing the corporation's affairs. Individual directors as such have no authority over the corporation or its staff. - The Board may delegate its responsibilities to others (staff, professional advisors, officers), but it retains the obligation to supervise those persons. Directors may rely on reports from officers and employees, reliable outside experts, or Board committees, so long as the director has no reason to believe that reliance is unwarranted. - Directors must act in good faith, in what they believe to be in the corporation's best interests (the duty of loyalty), with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under the circumstances (the duty of care). - Board functions generally include strategic planning; hiring, firing, reviewing and compensating (if applicable) the Executive Director; approving the annual budget and annual financial statements; overseeing investments; fundraising (if necessary); ensuring legal compliance (including tax-exempt status) in administration and program operations. Boards should avoid micromanagement. - Both California corporate law and Federal tax law permit transactions with insiders, but impose additional procedural protections to ensure the transaction is beneficial to the corporation. Those protective procedures include advance full disclosure of conflicts, reasonable investigation, findings of fairness, approval by disinterested directors, and proper documentation. - Boards are required to ensure that assets are spent for the charitable purposes for which they were received by the corporation (the charitable trust doctrine), in accordance with the Articles of Incorporation, the Bylaws, and the donor's intent. Deviation from these purposes may require court approval. - The Board must ensure that assets held for investment are invested prudently. - A director's breach of fiduciary duty that causes harm to the corporation will make the director personally liable to make the corporation whole. The Attorney General is responsible for enforcement. On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 7:53 PM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> wrote:
In my experience, Boards usually don't have operational management responsibilities although the management team would answer to the Board. I think it is accurate though that the Board will direct management to implement agreed to changes.
Chuck
-----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Matthew Shears Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 1:00 PM To: jrobinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board
Jonathan
In that regard, one of the questions I think we have to answer is what responsibility does the PTI Board have vis-a-vis the IANA functions team, if any? If there is a management responsibility (and I would assume there is if PTI is the operator) then the PTI Board is more than just a legal function. The IANA team I assume would be accountable to the PTI Board, the PTI Board in turn to the ICANN Board. So, if as a result of the periodic review undertaken by the PRT there are changes that should be implemented in the IANA team or its operations, the PTI Board (as operator) would implement those changes. Seems to me that this points to a PTI Board that has a broader role than just a legal purpose related to the affiliate.
Matthew
On 4/20/2015 5:45 PM, Jonathan Robinson wrote:
All,
In thinking about the composition of the board, we need to be clear about the purpose or function of the board and what (if any) tasks it needs to undertake and or decisions it needs to make.
It is clear to me that it has (at minimum) a legal function but that function may well be filled by a minimum board that we previously referred to as an internal or insider board.
Are we clear that the PTI board has a function beyond that minimum and that the functions we may require it to perform are not already to be performed elsewhere?
Thanks,
Jonathan
-----Original Message----- From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com] Sent: 20 April 2015 17:36 To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:17:53PM -0400, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I do not think we should avoid putting some multistakeholder character in the PTI. It seems to me that the proposal _is_ multi-stakeholder. There are stakes -- names, numbers, protocol parameters -- and they're represented.
IETF laision (are we sure they would agree to this extra level of participation? We should be cautious assigning roles & responsibilities to them I agree with this worry and thank you for raising it. One thing that's attractive about Milton's proposal, however, is that it simply adds a responsibility to a role alredy defined, so we don't have to find more volunteers and so on (though we do need to add this to the list of things the liaison would have to do). It certainly needs to be confirmed.
a GAC rep (government particpation) an ALAC (user particpatiion) Why? IANA is a clerical job for a specific purpose. What ought the GAC or the ALAC have to say about it? By constraining the board to this narrow scope of those actually directly affected, we have the hope of constraining PTI from becoming the leverage with which to force other issues (much as has been done in this process, where the entirely clerical IANA job is getting used as the lever to cause ICANN governance changes).
an ICANN Board rep Since the other appointees are already ICANN board members, why is an additional one needed?
If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. Still a small number. In my experience, a team of five can make a decision that a group of 9 cannot.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
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-- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Thanks Greg. Chuck From: Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 9:24 PM To: Gomes, Chuck Cc: Matthew Shears; jrobinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board We can always get more clarity on this from counsel. Here's a generic description of the duties of a California non-profit corporation from the website of another firm (Adler & Colvin). The fourth bullet is most germane to the present discussion. The following are the general duties and responsibilities of nonprofit directors in California. Many states have similar provisions, although the specific laws of nonprofit corporate governance will differ from state to state: · The Board of Directors, as a group, is ultimately responsible for overseeing the corporation's affairs. Individual directors as such have no authority over the corporation or its staff. · The Board may delegate its responsibilities to others (staff, professional advisors, officers), but it retains the obligation to supervise those persons. Directors may rely on reports from officers and employees, reliable outside experts, or Board committees, so long as the director has no reason to believe that reliance is unwarranted. · Directors must act in good faith, in what they believe to be in the corporation's best interests (the duty of loyalty), with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under the circumstances (the duty of care). · Board functions generally include strategic planning; hiring, firing, reviewing and compensating (if applicable) the Executive Director; approving the annual budget and annual financial statements; overseeing investments; fundraising (if necessary); ensuring legal compliance (including tax-exempt status) in administration and program operations. Boards should avoid micromanagement. · Both California corporate law and Federal tax law permit transactions with insiders, but impose additional procedural protections to ensure the transaction is beneficial to the corporation. Those protective procedures include advance full disclosure of conflicts, reasonable investigation, findings of fairness, approval by disinterested directors, and proper documentation. · Boards are required to ensure that assets are spent for the charitable purposes for which they were received by the corporation (the charitable trust doctrine), in accordance with the Articles of Incorporation, the Bylaws, and the donor's intent. Deviation from these purposes may require court approval. · The Board must ensure that assets held for investment are invested prudently. · A director's breach of fiduciary duty that causes harm to the corporation will make the director personally liable to make the corporation whole. The Attorney General is responsible for enforcement. On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 7:53 PM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com<mailto:cgomes@verisign.com>> wrote: In my experience, Boards usually don't have operational management responsibilities although the management team would answer to the Board. I think it is accurate though that the Board will direct management to implement agreed to changes. Chuck -----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Matthew Shears Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 1:00 PM To: jrobinson@afilias.info<mailto:jrobinson@afilias.info>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board Jonathan In that regard, one of the questions I think we have to answer is what responsibility does the PTI Board have vis-a-vis the IANA functions team, if any? If there is a management responsibility (and I would assume there is if PTI is the operator) then the PTI Board is more than just a legal function. The IANA team I assume would be accountable to the PTI Board, the PTI Board in turn to the ICANN Board. So, if as a result of the periodic review undertaken by the PRT there are changes that should be implemented in the IANA team or its operations, the PTI Board (as operator) would implement those changes. Seems to me that this points to a PTI Board that has a broader role than just a legal purpose related to the affiliate. Matthew On 4/20/2015 5:45 PM, Jonathan Robinson wrote:
All,
In thinking about the composition of the board, we need to be clear about the purpose or function of the board and what (if any) tasks it needs to undertake and or decisions it needs to make.
It is clear to me that it has (at minimum) a legal function but that function may well be filled by a minimum board that we previously referred to as an internal or insider board.
Are we clear that the PTI board has a function beyond that minimum and that the functions we may require it to perform are not already to be performed elsewhere?
Thanks,
Jonathan
-----Original Message----- From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>] Sent: 20 April 2015 17:36 To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:17:53PM -0400, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I do not think we should avoid putting some multistakeholder character in the PTI. It seems to me that the proposal _is_ multi-stakeholder. There are stakes -- names, numbers, protocol parameters -- and they're represented.
IETF laision (are we sure they would agree to this extra level of participation? We should be cautious assigning roles & responsibilities to them I agree with this worry and thank you for raising it. One thing that's attractive about Milton's proposal, however, is that it simply adds a responsibility to a role alredy defined, so we don't have to find more volunteers and so on (though we do need to add this to the list of things the liaison would have to do). It certainly needs to be confirmed.
a GAC rep (government particpation) an ALAC (user particpatiion) Why? IANA is a clerical job for a specific purpose. What ought the GAC or the ALAC have to say about it? By constraining the board to this narrow scope of those actually directly affected, we have the hope of constraining PTI from becoming the leverage with which to force other issues (much as has been done in this process, where the entirely clerical IANA job is getting used as the lever to cause ICANN governance changes).
an ICANN Board rep Since the other appointees are already ICANN board members, why is an additional one needed?
If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. Still a small number. In my experience, a team of five can make a decision that a group of 9 cannot.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987<tel:%2B%2044%20%280%29771%20247%202987> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Agree Chuck. The issue is to whom is the IANA functions team accountable - if it is a/the "management team" what entity is that (PTI management team?) and/or who is it comprised of? Thanks. On 4/21/2015 12:53 AM, Gomes, Chuck wrote: > In my experience, Boards usually don't have operational management responsibilities although the management team would answer to the Board. I think it is accurate though that the Board will direct management to implement agreed to changes. > > Chuck > > -----Original Message----- > From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Matthew Shears > Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 1:00 PM > To: jrobinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board > > Jonathan > > In that regard, one of the questions I think we have to answer is what responsibility does the PTI Board have vis-a-vis the IANA functions team, if any? If there is a management responsibility (and I would assume there is if PTI is the operator) then the PTI Board is more than just a legal function. The IANA team I assume would be accountable to the PTI Board, the PTI Board in turn to the ICANN Board. So, if as a result of the periodic review undertaken by the PRT there are changes that should be implemented in the IANA team or its operations, the PTI Board (as operator) would implement those changes. Seems to me that this points to a PTI Board that has a broader role than just a legal purpose related to the affiliate. > > Matthew > > On 4/20/2015 5:45 PM, Jonathan Robinson wrote: >> All, >> >> In thinking about the composition of the board, we need to be clear >> about the purpose or function of the board and what (if any) tasks it >> needs to undertake and or decisions it needs to make. >> >> It is clear to me that it has (at minimum) a legal function but that >> function may well be filled by a minimum board that we previously >> referred to as an internal or insider board. >> >> Are we clear that the PTI board has a function beyond that minimum and >> that the functions we may require it to perform are not already to be >> performed elsewhere? >> >> Thanks, >> >> Jonathan >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com] >> Sent: 20 April 2015 17:36 >> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org >> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board >> >> On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:17:53PM -0400, Avri Doria wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> I do not think we should avoid putting some multistakeholder >>> character in the PTI. >> It seems to me that the proposal _is_ multi-stakeholder. There are >> stakes >> -- names, numbers, protocol parameters -- and they're represented. >> >>> IETF laision (are we sure they would agree to this extra level of >>> participation? >>> We should be cautious assigning roles & >>> responsibilities to them >> I agree with this worry and thank you for raising it. One thing >> that's attractive about Milton's proposal, however, is that it simply >> adds a responsibility to a role alredy defined, so we don't have to >> find more volunteers and so on (though we do need to add this to the >> list of things the liaison would have to do). It certainly needs to be confirmed. >> >>> a GAC rep (government particpation) >>> an ALAC (user particpatiion) >> Why? IANA is a clerical job for a specific purpose. What ought the >> GAC or the ALAC have to say about it? By constraining the board to >> this narrow scope of those actually directly affected, we have the >> hope of constraining PTI from becoming the leverage with which to >> force other issues (much as has been done in this process, where the >> entirely clerical IANA job is getting used as the lever to cause ICANN governance changes). >> >>> an ICANN Board rep >> Since the other appointees are already ICANN board members, why is an >> additional one needed? >> >>> If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. >>> Still a small number. >> In my experience, a team of five can make a decision that a group of 9 >> cannot. >> >> Best regards, >> >> A >> >> >> -- >> Andrew Sullivan >> ajs@anvilwalrusden.com >> _______________________________________________ >> CWG-Stewardship mailing list >> CWG-Stewardship@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship >> >> _______________________________________________ >> CWG-Stewardship mailing list >> CWG-Stewardship@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship > -- > Matthew Shears > Global Internet Policy and Human Rights > Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) > + 44 (0)771 247 2987 > > _______________________________________________ > CWG-Stewardship mailing list > CWG-Stewardship@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship -- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
Good questions Matthew. At present the IANA team is managed by ICANN management and so its own internal management is fairly limited. As an affiliate, the ICANN management will essentially not be there any more, at least not directly. At the same time, because it is a small team relatively speaking, I suspect that the management structure can be small as well as long as it is well defined and avoids single points of failure. As I think about it, I believe that PTI management will not be a hard problem to solve. Chuck -----Original Message----- From: Matthew Shears [mailto:mshears@cdt.org] Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2015 7:16 AM To: Gomes, Chuck; jrobinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board Agree Chuck. The issue is to whom is the IANA functions team accountable - if it is a/the "management team" what entity is that (PTI management team?) and/or who is it comprised of? Thanks. On 4/21/2015 12:53 AM, Gomes, Chuck wrote: > In my experience, Boards usually don't have operational management responsibilities although the management team would answer to the Board. I think it is accurate though that the Board will direct management to implement agreed to changes. > > Chuck > > -----Original Message----- > From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org > [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Matthew Shears > Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 1:00 PM > To: jrobinson@afilias.info; cwg-stewardship@icann.org > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board > > Jonathan > > In that regard, one of the questions I think we have to answer is what responsibility does the PTI Board have vis-a-vis the IANA functions team, if any? If there is a management responsibility (and I would assume there is if PTI is the operator) then the PTI Board is more than just a legal function. The IANA team I assume would be accountable to the PTI Board, the PTI Board in turn to the ICANN Board. So, if as a result of the periodic review undertaken by the PRT there are changes that should be implemented in the IANA team or its operations, the PTI Board (as operator) would implement those changes. Seems to me that this points to a PTI Board that has a broader role than just a legal purpose related to the affiliate. > > Matthew > > On 4/20/2015 5:45 PM, Jonathan Robinson wrote: >> All, >> >> In thinking about the composition of the board, we need to be clear >> about the purpose or function of the board and what (if any) tasks it >> needs to undertake and or decisions it needs to make. >> >> It is clear to me that it has (at minimum) a legal function but that >> function may well be filled by a minimum board that we previously >> referred to as an internal or insider board. >> >> Are we clear that the PTI board has a function beyond that minimum >> and that the functions we may require it to perform are not already >> to be performed elsewhere? >> >> Thanks, >> >> Jonathan >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com] >> Sent: 20 April 2015 17:36 >> To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org >> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board >> >> On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:17:53PM -0400, Avri Doria wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> I do not think we should avoid putting some multistakeholder >>> character in the PTI. >> It seems to me that the proposal _is_ multi-stakeholder. There are >> stakes >> -- names, numbers, protocol parameters -- and they're represented. >> >>> IETF laision (are we sure they would agree to this extra level of >>> participation? >>> We should be cautious assigning roles & >>> responsibilities to them >> I agree with this worry and thank you for raising it. One thing >> that's attractive about Milton's proposal, however, is that it simply >> adds a responsibility to a role alredy defined, so we don't have to >> find more volunteers and so on (though we do need to add this to the >> list of things the liaison would have to do). It certainly needs to be confirmed. >> >>> a GAC rep (government particpation) an ALAC (user particpatiion) >> Why? IANA is a clerical job for a specific purpose. What ought the >> GAC or the ALAC have to say about it? By constraining the board to >> this narrow scope of those actually directly affected, we have the >> hope of constraining PTI from becoming the leverage with which to >> force other issues (much as has been done in this process, where the >> entirely clerical IANA job is getting used as the lever to cause ICANN governance changes). >> >>> an ICANN Board rep >> Since the other appointees are already ICANN board members, why is an >> additional one needed? >> >>> If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. >>> Still a small number. >> In my experience, a team of five can make a decision that a group of >> 9 cannot. >> >> Best regards, >> >> A >> >> >> -- >> Andrew Sullivan >> ajs@anvilwalrusden.com >> _______________________________________________ >> CWG-Stewardship mailing list >> CWG-Stewardship@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship >> >> _______________________________________________ >> CWG-Stewardship mailing list >> CWG-Stewardship@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship > -- > Matthew Shears > Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & > Technology (CDT) > + 44 (0)771 247 2987 > > _______________________________________________ > CWG-Stewardship mailing list > CWG-Stewardship@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship -- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
I agree that some clarity here would be useful. The Board *IS* responsible for the PTI. Perhaps some envision it as a puppet to some other entity (including budget decisions as well as overseeing senior IANA staff). If that is the case, please specify who. Alan At 20/04/2015 12:45 PM, Jonathan Robinson wrote:
All,
In thinking about the composition of the board, we need to be clear about the purpose or function of the board and what (if any) tasks it needs to undertake and or decisions it needs to make.
It is clear to me that it has (at minimum) a legal function but that function may well be filled by a minimum board that we previously referred to as an internal or insider board.
Are we clear that the PTI board has a function beyond that minimum and that the functions we may require it to perform are not already to be performed elsewhere?
Thanks,
Jonathan
-----Original Message----- From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com] Sent: 20 April 2015 17:36 To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:17:53PM -0400, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I do not think we should avoid putting some multistakeholder character in the PTI.
It seems to me that the proposal _is_ multi-stakeholder. There are stakes -- names, numbers, protocol parameters -- and they're represented.
IETF laision (are we sure they would agree to this extra level of participation? We should be cautious assigning roles & responsibilities to them
I agree with this worry and thank you for raising it. One thing that's attractive about Milton's proposal, however, is that it simply adds a responsibility to a role alredy defined, so we don't have to find more volunteers and so on (though we do need to add this to the list of things the liaison would have to do). It certainly needs to be confirmed.
a GAC rep (government particpation) an ALAC (user particpatiion)
Why? IANA is a clerical job for a specific purpose. What ought the GAC or the ALAC have to say about it? By constraining the board to this narrow scope of those actually directly affected, we have the hope of constraining PTI from becoming the leverage with which to force other issues (much as has been done in this process, where the entirely clerical IANA job is getting used as the lever to cause ICANN governance changes).
an ICANN Board rep
Since the other appointees are already ICANN board members, why is an additional one needed?
If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. Still a small number.
In my experience, a team of five can make a decision that a group of 9 cannot.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
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Alan, First, I agree that the PTI board has responsibility for PTI, as described in the excerpt I pasted in earlier. Generically, "insider" boards are also answerable to the parent company (sole shareholder) and to their board. It is typically a more constrained set of responsibilities, and much less independent than the board of an independent company. Even within those parameters, there are more or less active boards. I doubt that I would describe any as a complete "puppet" -- was that someone else's positive description or just your somewhat negative one? Greg On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 3:54 PM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca> wrote:
I agree that some clarity here would be useful.
The Board *IS* responsible for the PTI. Perhaps some envision it as a puppet to some other entity (including budget decisions as well as overseeing senior IANA staff). If that is the case, please specify who.
Alan
At 20/04/2015 12:45 PM, Jonathan Robinson wrote:
All,
In thinking about the composition of the board, we need to be clear about the purpose or function of the board and what (if any) tasks it needs to undertake and or decisions it needs to make.
It is clear to me that it has (at minimum) a legal function but that function may well be filled by a minimum board that we previously referred to as an internal or insider board.
Are we clear that the PTI board has a function beyond that minimum and that the functions we may require it to perform are not already to be performed elsewhere?
Thanks,
Jonathan
-----Original Message----- From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com] Sent: 20 April 2015 17:36 To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:17:53PM -0400, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
I do not think we should avoid putting some multistakeholder character in the PTI.
It seems to me that the proposal _is_ multi-stakeholder. There are stakes -- names, numbers, protocol parameters -- and they're represented.
IETF laision (are we sure they would agree to this extra level of participation? We should be cautious assigning roles & responsibilities to them
I agree with this worry and thank you for raising it. One thing that's attractive about Milton's proposal, however, is that it simply adds a responsibility to a role alredy defined, so we don't have to find more volunteers and so on (though we do need to add this to the list of things the liaison would have to do). It certainly needs to be confirmed.
a GAC rep (government particpation) an ALAC (user particpatiion)
Why? IANA is a clerical job for a specific purpose. What ought the GAC or the ALAC have to say about it? By constraining the board to this narrow scope of those actually directly affected, we have the hope of constraining PTI from becoming the leverage with which to force other issues (much as has been done in this process, where the entirely clerical IANA job is getting used as the lever to cause ICANN governance changes).
an ICANN Board rep
Since the other appointees are already ICANN board members, why is an additional one needed?
If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. Still a small number.
In my experience, a team of five can make a decision that a group of 9 cannot.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
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On 20-Apr-15 12:36, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
an ICANN Board rep Since the other appointees are already ICANN board members, why is an additional one needed?
while the IETF liaison might already be a ICANN board member, I did not think any of the others were. As for the GAC and ALAC. While the work that IANA can be called primarily clerical, the way it does its work, its budget, the degree to which it responsive, the way it deals with crises &c. are larger issues and in this multistakeholder environment, just seemed appropriate. avri --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. http://www.avast.com
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 01:36:20PM -0400, Avri Doria wrote:
while the IETF liaison might already be a ICANN board member, I did not think any of the others were.
Hmm. Ok. Could this be a liaison instead?
As for the GAC and ALAC. While the work that IANA can be called primarily clerical, the way it does its work, its budget, the degree to which it responsive, the way it deals with crises &c. are larger issues and in this multistakeholder environment, just seemed appropriate.
If it were possible for me to disagree with this more, I would disagree with it that much too. 1. "The way it does its work": a singluar and recurring weakness of ICANN is the constant dragging of the board into decisions that ought properly to be operational ones. The only question is whether what goes in and what comes out is acceptable. 2. "Its budget": PTI does not need a multistakeholder process to establish. It needs clear managerial oversight with respect to what IANA is going to need to do, and that will establish what the costs and expenditures are. Moreover, since we know where the money is going to come from, that portion of the budget is already subject to multistakeholder observation. 3. "Degree to which it is responsive": Responsiveness is dealt with under the service level expectations for the various communities. This shouldn't be the job of the board, because it's the job of the CSC. 4. "The way it deals with crises": I'd like to know what these looming crises are supposed to be before we vastly expand representation on the board. It seems to me that the greatest opportunity for crisis comes from PTI not sticking to its narrow function. The surest way to cause that is to appoint board members who do not have an interest in the narrowest possible interpretation of PTI's mandate. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
Hi,
If it were possible for me to disagree with this more, I would disagree with it that much too.
Lets see if i can inspire you further. On 20-Apr-15 14:14, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
2. "Its budget": PTI does not need a multistakeholder process to establish. It needs clear managerial oversight with respect to what IANA is going to need to do, and that will establish what the costs and expenditures are. Moreover, since we know where the money is going to come from, that portion of the budget is already subject to multistakeholder observation.
Depends on what degree of Independence this has in terms of setting its budget. And are we sure that ICANN will always fund all for the services for ever more? If IANA wants to improve some aspect of its capitalized capabilities and ICANN says no, is that the end of the story.
3. "Degree to which it is responsive": Responsiveness is dealt with under the service level expectations for the various communities. This shouldn't be the job of the board, because it's the job of the CSC.
And after all of the ICANN escalation processes who is it that is responsible for decision on how to deal with it? Is this all in the hands of the ICANN Board?
4. "The way it deals with crises": I'd like to know what these looming crises are supposed to be before we vastly expand
vastly would be, at least > 10 adding two people is not vast in my opinion, though they do represent a a vast number of stakeholders, that is true.
representation on the board. It seems to me that the greatest opportunity for crisis comes from PTI not sticking to its narrow function. The surest way to cause that is to appoint board members who do not have an interest in the narrowest possible interpretation of PTI's mandate.
Optimist. I believe you need someone assigned to deal with crisis before they happen. It is called exception management - but you don't wait for the first exception before figuring out who is ultimately repsonsible. Maybe this is in the hands of the ICANN board as well? I know that is not everyone's way. avri --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. http://www.avast.com
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 02:36:09PM -0400, Avri Doria wrote:
And are we sure that ICANN will always fund all for the services for ever more? If IANA wants to improve some aspect of its capitalized capabilities and ICANN says no, is that the end of the story.
No, but we're not carving letters in granite, either. In the event there is a deep, abiding, and unresolvable conflict between ICANN and PTI, then we'll have a crisis and have to deal with it. We have no way of knowing now what form that will take. We cannot possibly create a board that will be ideally suited for all logically possible worlds. What we have before us is a specific set of responsibilities with specific directly-affected users. We should solve that problem, and not work on problems we do not have, cannot describe concretely, and may never face.
3. "Degree to which it is responsive": Responsiveness is dealt with under the service level expectations for the various communities. This shouldn't be the job of the board, because it's the job of the CSC.
And after all of the ICANN escalation processes who is it that is responsible for decision on how to deal with it? Is this all in the hands of the ICANN Board?
Yes. Or anyway, on the ICANN side of the operation. How the customer deals with that is how the customer deals with it. This is _exactly_ the same rationale for why the IETF will not give up its termination language: the ultimate power is that of the customer to go find someone else to do the work. Why should this case be different?
vastly would be, at least > 10 adding two people is not vast in my opinion, though they do represent a a vast number of stakeholders, that is true.
And a set of interests that have approximatley no direct stake in the actions of IANA. The moment one starts adding representatives to the board who have an agenda that is anything other than, "Make this narrow clerical function go well," one invites pet projects to become part of the task. We see this over and over again, and there is a pretty good argument to be made that it is part of the problem we're trying to address with ICANN accountability. So we should keep the focus very narrow.
Optimist.
That is only the second time in my life anyone has hurled that epithet at me, and I believe the other time had to do with IANA transition as well :)
I believe you need someone assigned to deal with crisis before they happen.
Yes, sure, the board must be able to cope with a crisis. That's what "board" means. But I don't to begin with see why adding more people to the board is likely to increase its resilience in that way. Moreover, it's not clear to me that the skills needed are going to come from the GAC or ALAC. In order to answer these questions, we'd need to have some inkling of what sort of crises we're likely to see and what challenges they represent. What are the crises that you think could arise? I can imagine a budget one, or a serious problem with the staff, or something like that. Why would adding ALAC and GAC representatives help? What other crises are you thinking of? Best regards, a -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 20 Apr 2015 17:37, "Andrew Sullivan" <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> wrote:
an ICANN Board rep
Since the other appointees are already ICANN board members, why is an additional one needed?
SO: I am not sure it's been determined yet that PTI will be populated from ICANN board. Considering ICANN is expected to act as oversight on PTI, it may be better to populate from the community; independent of ICANN board members. Regards
If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. Still a small number.
In my experience, a team of five can make a decision that a group of 9 cannot.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Hi, If PTI is meant to coordinate/oversee operation of IANA then it needs to be clear if it's members would be representative or act in the interest of the overall subsidiary. It's accountability measures also needs to be clear (I presume that would be within the scope of CCWG to worry about) In terms of composition, I don't think the CSC needs a special seat on PTI since PTI is now understood be managing entire IANA. The overall decision making powers of PTI may determine if GAC/ALAC Reps will be required. Regards sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 20 Apr 2015 17:19, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
I do not think we should avoid putting some multistakeholder character in the PTI. And still keep it small.
If I understand, so far we have:
PTI Exec Director IETF laision (are we sure they would agree to this extra level of participation? We should be cautious assigning roles & responsibilities to them that they may not wish to have) RIR liaison (see about re IETF) GNSO rep ccNSO rep
I think we should consider a CSC rep (same caution as above, this may be too operational for the CSC)
I would also recommend
a GAC rep (government particpation) an ALAC (user particpatiion)
and possibly
an ICANN Board rep
If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. Still a small number.
avri
On 20-Apr-15 11:55, Matthew Shears wrote:
Excellent suggestions.
On 4/20/2015 4:52 PM, Brenden Kuerbis wrote:
Hi MM,
I mostly support that approach, but I'd propose the following modifications. Instead of one naming community representative, I'd suggest one from the GNSO and one from ccNSO. In addition, I'd suggest adding the Exec Dir of the PTI to the board. In total, a lightweight and small five person board.
-- Brenden
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 11:08 AM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Regarding the composition of the board, the Summary of Legal Structure says only: “The PTI board could be an ICANN-designated board” and that we should “avoid the need to replicate the complexity of the multistakeholder ICANN board.” I agree with the latter concern, but we will need to flesh out more detail regarding the composition of the PTI board.
I have missed most recent calls, so perhaps this has been discussed already, but if it has, it didn’t appear in the Sidley Austin draft.
I think a simple and easily implementable solution would be to have ICANN-designated members be fixed by rules or bylaws (as opposed to wholly discretionary).
In my view, the PTI board should consist of the following 3 members:
1. The existing IETF liaison on the ICANN board
2. Someone designated by the ASO
3. Someone designated by ICANN’s board essentially representing the naming community. One could add to this a recommendation from the CSC if one wanted, I would be amenable to that.
This PTI board would be balanced across the 3 operational communities and thus would be in a good position to provide oversight for the IANA functions.
--MM
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Lise Fuhr *Sent:* Monday, April 20, 2015 8:50 AM *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* [CWG-Stewardship] Structure and comments from Sidley Austin
Dear All,
Please be aware of the following documents from Sidley Austin.
1. The structural model diagram
2. Summary of Legal Structure
3. CWG - Draft Transition Proposal (Sidley Comments)
Best regards,
Lise
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Can't accept this. I would also recommend a GAC rep (government particpation) an ALAC (user particpatiion) and possibly an ICANN Board rep If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. Still a small number. MM: Not small at all. Bigger than the IANA affiliate. Absurd.
I have trouble accepting this as well. In my opinion, the PTI board needs to be made up of a few people with the right skill sets to manage a very limited function. The CSC will oversee performance and the IANA Review Team will serve as the M-S body that deals with big issues including systemic problems. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Milton L Mueller Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 3:09 PM To: 'avri@acm.org'; 'cwg-stewardship@icann.org' Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board Can't accept this. I would also recommend a GAC rep (government particpation) an ALAC (user particpatiion) and possibly an ICANN Board rep If all accepted, that would bring it to 9. Still a small number. MM: Not small at all. Bigger than the IANA affiliate. Absurd.
Makes sense to me. From: Matthew Shears [mailto:mshears@cdt.org] Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 11:55 AM To: Brenden Kuerbis; Milton L Mueller Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board Excellent suggestions. On 4/20/2015 4:52 PM, Brenden Kuerbis wrote: Hi MM, I mostly support that approach, but I'd propose the following modifications. Instead of one naming community representative, I'd suggest one from the GNSO and one from ccNSO. In addition, I'd suggest adding the Exec Dir of the PTI to the board. In total, a lightweight and small five person board. -- Brenden On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 11:08 AM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> wrote: Regarding the composition of the board, the Summary of Legal Structure says only: "The PTI board could be an ICANN-designated board" and that we should "avoid the need to replicate the complexity of the multistakeholder ICANN board." I agree with the latter concern, but we will need to flesh out more detail regarding the composition of the PTI board. I have missed most recent calls, so perhaps this has been discussed already, but if it has, it didn't appear in the Sidley Austin draft. I think a simple and easily implementable solution would be to have ICANN-designated members be fixed by rules or bylaws (as opposed to wholly discretionary). In my view, the PTI board should consist of the following 3 members: 1. The existing IETF liaison on the ICANN board 2. Someone designated by the ASO 3. Someone designated by ICANN's board essentially representing the naming community. One could add to this a recommendation from the CSC if one wanted, I would be amenable to that. This PTI board would be balanced across the 3 operational communities and thus would be in a good position to provide oversight for the IANA functions. --MM From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Lise Fuhr Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 8:50 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Structure and comments from Sidley Austin Dear All, Please be aware of the following documents from Sidley Austin. 1. The structural model diagram 2. Summary of Legal Structure 3. CWG - Draft Transition Proposal (Sidley Comments) Best regards, Lise _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship -- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
This makeup seems fine to me with one condition: each of the directors need to have the right skill set to match the PTI functions, i.e., a strong understanding of the IANA services and their value to the community. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Milton L Mueller Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 3:08 PM To: 'Matthew Shears'; 'Brenden Kuerbis' Cc: 'cwg-stewardship@icann.org' Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board Makes sense to me. From: Matthew Shears [mailto:mshears@cdt.org] Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 11:55 AM To: Brenden Kuerbis; Milton L Mueller Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The PTI board Excellent suggestions. On 4/20/2015 4:52 PM, Brenden Kuerbis wrote: Hi MM, I mostly support that approach, but I'd propose the following modifications. Instead of one naming community representative, I'd suggest one from the GNSO and one from ccNSO. In addition, I'd suggest adding the Exec Dir of the PTI to the board. In total, a lightweight and small five person board. -- Brenden On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 11:08 AM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> wrote: Regarding the composition of the board, the Summary of Legal Structure says only: "The PTI board could be an ICANN-designated board" and that we should "avoid the need to replicate the complexity of the multistakeholder ICANN board." I agree with the latter concern, but we will need to flesh out more detail regarding the composition of the PTI board. I have missed most recent calls, so perhaps this has been discussed already, but if it has, it didn't appear in the Sidley Austin draft. I think a simple and easily implementable solution would be to have ICANN-designated members be fixed by rules or bylaws (as opposed to wholly discretionary). In my view, the PTI board should consist of the following 3 members: 1. The existing IETF liaison on the ICANN board 2. Someone designated by the ASO 3. Someone designated by ICANN's board essentially representing the naming community. One could add to this a recommendation from the CSC if one wanted, I would be amenable to that. This PTI board would be balanced across the 3 operational communities and thus would be in a good position to provide oversight for the IANA functions. --MM From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Lise Fuhr Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 8:50 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Structure and comments from Sidley Austin Dear All, Please be aware of the following documents from Sidley Austin. 1. The structural model diagram 2. Summary of Legal Structure 3. CWG - Draft Transition Proposal (Sidley Comments) Best regards, Lise _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship -- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
participants (12)
-
Alan Greenberg -
Andrew Sullivan -
Avri Doria -
Brenden Kuerbis -
CW Lists -
Gomes, Chuck -
Greg Shatan -
Jonathan Robinson -
Martin Boyle -
Matthew Shears -
Milton L Mueller -
Seun Ojedeji