My note below has already led to private comments. I appreciate folks being frank.. Suffice it to say the following, my choice of words may not have been ideal and perhaps my some seen as insensitive. That wasn't my intent. Apologies for that if it is the case. If you permit me, let me try to rephrase the comment, in perhaps a more constructive fashion.. (1) How many type of agreements exist? Only 2, or more? Section 2.2 lists two country examples. Are they reflective of the fact that there are only 2 types of agreements with ccTLD's? If there are more, then it might be worthwhile to include an additional example that perhaps could include additional geographical regions. (2) Good to add references .. If the reference does not already exist in the document, it might be good to point to the list of existing agreements with ccTLD's. regards Robert On 2014-11-11 9:44 AM, Robert Guerra wrote:

Chuck,

Thanks for sharing the updated draft.

A quick comment ...

- in section 2.2 Additional sources of accountability for a limited number of ccTLDs sample agreements for .au and .az are cited.

We might want to give more thought as to the countries that are listed so that they represent different legal systems and different regions of the world. Additionally, IMHO, it might also be good to make sure that countries are listed with good rule of law..

Perhaps it might be good to keep Australia, and add another country Say one from Latin America ?

regards

Robert

On 2014-11-11 8:18 AM, Gomes, Chuck wrote:

...

Here is a draft of the ICG RFP Section 2B proposal for full CWG review and discussion. Please make any suggested edits using the Word redlining function and save the file with your name before sending it to the CWG list. Questions and comments are also welcome on this list before you make edits.

Chuck

“This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.”

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All: If you have edits to suggest in the 2B proposal, please make them using the attached version instead of the version I sent earlier. Remember that any edits must be received not later than 1800 UTC and earlier would be better. Chuck From: Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com] Sent: Friday, November 14, 2014 12:26 PM To: Gomes, Chuck Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] FW: CWG RFP2B Proposal Chuck and All, I have attached a revised version RFP2B. Primarily, I took certain sections of the text (primarily those involving lists) and converted those sections to tables. Due to quirks in the interaction between tables and track changes, I did not make these changes in track changes. However, I think it will be fairly obvious where these changes are, especially since there were no tables in this document beforehand. One reason for this change is that, in preparing RFP3, we will need to consider how these existing aspects oversight and accountability will be dealt with in our transition proposal. It will be easier to take these charts and add additional columns to show this. I did make a few minor editing changes as well. These are marked in track changes. Greg Shatan On Fri, Nov 14, 2014 at 11:35 AM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com<mailto:cgomes@verisign.com>> wrote: Edits need to be received not later than 1800 UTC, Monday, 17 November. Earlier would be appreciated. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Gomes, Chuck Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2014 8:19 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] CWG RFP2B Proposal Importance: High Here is a draft of the ICG RFP Section 2B proposal for full CWG review and discussion. Please make any suggested edits using the Word redlining function and save the file with your name before sending it to the CWG list. Questions and comments are also welcome on this list before you make edits. Chuck “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship

Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the principles. And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition. On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

I have suggested a few edits to the doc. hope I did it in the mandated manner.

the changes refer to

- transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be published. - bottom-up modalities - multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements.

Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting.

avri

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Avri I'm sure your viewpoints are not being ignored. Peace. I forgive you for your sin. Nobody is saying multi stakeholder compositions are not applicable or there is consensus against it. Please look at strawmans 2 and 3. I intact support a multi-stakeholder composition. I'm just saying I don't agree there is consensus against a registry only composition, which you seem to be eliminating by way of the principle that you are suggesting. On 15 Nov 2014 11:51, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

Apologies, guess I picked the wrong email. I hope I can be forgiven for this sin.

I guess that means that my viewpoints will just be ignored.

But if this group is able to decide that multistakeholder models are not applicable, no matter which thread an email is attached to. I think we may be in more trouble than I think we are. Are you saying we have consensus on a principle against commitment to the multistakeholder model? How can that be when the multistakeholder model is really one of the first principles we much meet for an NTIA solution

avri

On 14-Nov-14 22:48, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the principles.

And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition.

On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

I have suggested a few edits to the doc. hope I did it in the mandated manner.

the changes refer to

- transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be published. - bottom-up modalities - multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements.

Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting.

avri

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Avri, I reproduce some previous conversations on this list below that may help have an informed discussion. I request you to address the points raised by Becky and MM. - *Becky*: Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. - *Greg*: Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. - *MM*: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based on a fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of ICANN’s policy making process with the accountability of and input into the IANA functions. All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair representation in the process of policy development. But once a policy is agreed, the implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative technical and operational function in which its direct customers are the primary stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best (because random members of the public would not know what is going on at that level) and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to circumvent agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation level). I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN. That’s wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP – and many others – have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation need to be clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the policy process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy by a registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do that. Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a contracting authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency purposes and for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable to the people who actually use its services and whose basic functions and activities are dependent on those services. Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US government’s authority over modifications to the root zone created the potential for that kind of political intervention at the implementation level. This set a very bad precedent for the world that we are still dealing with. Now some people are trying to reproduce that situation by making IANA oversight a way for interest groups who don’t get what they want in a policy process to get a second, back door bite at the apple. Let’s reject that clearly. If one knows what the performance of the IANA functions actually are, the idea that every stakeholder in the world should be engaged in “oversight” of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You might as well say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over what secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they live in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be affected, right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected, right? If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone file data neither you, Greg – nor I – are in a position to say whether the request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up. - Becky: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues: Things like SLAs, how quickly name server changes are processed, etc. Where a government actually operates the ccTLD, it would be direct consumers of IANA services, like gTLDs and ccTLDs. But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. - MM: Totally agree with Becky. I think any IANA transition solution that gives governments a special, privileged role is not meeting the NTIA criteria and could not be implemented. Most governmental concerns arise in the policy development process. As I’ve said before, IANA does not and should not be involved in making policy, nor should it be viewed as a way to veto or circumvent agreed policy. Therefore govts – and we - must not confuse IANA issues with the accountability of ICANN’s policy making process. For that reason I really like Stacey King’s statement: if GAC is represents on an oversight council “that the ICANN Bylaws provision allowing for GAC advice on any policy matter does not apply to IANA. Ie, that the GAC cannot exercise any additional authority over IANA functions through other means/routes.” - Guru: Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. - Allan: There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem - Becky: IANA is a service provider. If you hire a contractor to build a house, it is the contractor’s job to make sure that the plumber and the electrician do their work properly. If your house burns down because the wiring is faulty, you are going to look to the contractor – not the electrician – to make you whole. I fully support multi-stakeholder policy development. Multi-stakeholder oversight of the electrician doesn’t make sense to me. - Oliver: irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too - MM: I can’t agree with Olivier and Fouad. Olivier, help me to understand why the directly affected parties shouldn’t have the primary responsibility for operations they are the direct users of and that their own operations depend on. To me your claim that this constitutes a “conflict of interest” is almost self-contradictory and self-refuting – it is a confluence of interest, not a conflict – but perhaps I am missing something. Please explain. What I suspect is happening is that both of you are confusing policy development functions of ICANN with the operational and technical functions of IANA, and applying inappropriate mental models drawn from the former to the latter. In policy development we want “openness, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective.” In the DNS IANA functions the users are the registries, it’s an intermediate good, it’s all about implementation, so we want efficiency, security and direct accountability to the primary users, not some playground for different stakeholders to voice their opinions. I do agree with Alan there should be safeguards to prevent the operational and technical functions from being managed in ways that undermine or subvert policy that is made in the MS process. It would be useful to discuss institutional safeguards – including antitrust law – to prevent those kinds of things. But throwing an infinite number of “stakeholders” into looking over the shoulders of those making root zone file modifications accomplishes nothing useful from a public interest perspective, while raising all kinds of risks and inefficiencies. If Alan can recognize the danger that IANA contractors or implementations might compromise the policy process, I hope that he can also recognize the danger that politicized ‘multstakeholdered’ oversight of the technical operations could be abused to circumvent or veto the policies developed by the MS process. On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 1:41 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

I think we need to start from principles, as opposed to having a solution and making sure the principles fit the desired solution.

And if we are stating that we think 'one Stakeholder Group is more relevant than all other stakeholder types' and by virtue of that have primacy in decision making, then that should be stated explicitly in the principles section. If it is already then I missed it.

I prefer the equal-footing multistakeholder principle, but if there is near consensus for the one stakeholder above all stakeholders viewpoint, I would like to understand.

Thanks

avri

On 15-Nov-14 01:33, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri

I'm sure your viewpoints are not being ignored. Peace. I forgive you for your sin.

Nobody is saying multi stakeholder compositions are not applicable or there is consensus against it. Please look at strawmans 2 and 3.

I intact support a multi-stakeholder composition.

I'm just saying I don't agree there is consensus against a registry only composition, which you seem to be eliminating by way of the principle that you are suggesting. On 15 Nov 2014 11:51, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

Apologies, guess I picked the wrong email. I hope I can be forgiven for this sin.

I guess that means that my viewpoints will just be ignored.

But if this group is able to decide that multistakeholder models are not applicable, no matter which thread an email is attached to. I think we may be in more trouble than I think we are. Are you saying we have consensus on a principle against commitment to the multistakeholder model? How can that be when the multistakeholder model is really one of the first principles we much meet for an NTIA solution

avri

On 14-Nov-14 22:48, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the principles.

And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition.

On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

I have suggested a few edits to the doc. hope I did it in the mandated manner.

the changes refer to

- transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be published. - bottom-up modalities - multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements.

Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting.

avri

_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship

_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship

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Avri, I find your message below very helpful. I haven’t had time to fully grasp your concern regarding ‘oversight’ and what you say below clarifies it a lot. If I am understanding you correctly, I also don’t believe that day-to-day oversight is required. I will be curious to see your reaction to the modified Straw Man 1 proposal that Stephanie sent to the CWG list yesterday. In particular, I would like to know whether you think it meets your concerns regarding oversight. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 8:43 AM Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B Hi, Thanks for pulling that all together. You display one of the best attributes of a list member. I had read those arguments on the list earlier, though in some cases a few days late, and my view was that we were in the midst of a discussion that had not yet resolved. As far as I could tell we were still early in the discussion and that the few who had weighed in were split on the issue. There is nothing in the quote you sent to show a consensus. Part of the problem we are getting into here, is that the principles of some seem to presuppose that there will be oversight of the day to day operation of IANA, and are thus proposing principles for oversight and not principles for the transition of Stewardship. From all of the exegesis of the NTIA contract and practice I have seen to date, NTIA never engaged in day to day oversight of naming or any other operations. I.e. in many of the arguments it is a predetermined solution, one I do not accept, that is presupposing a principle. I think, on the other hand that in the NTIA mssion the multistakeholder principle is inherent and must be carried through in the principles of a solution. To put it another way, I think many of the arguments here have the tail wagging the dog. Therefore I maintain that accepting that the multistakeholder principle is fundamental in our work is essential and cannot be removed by solutionism . As I said in another hand, if there is a concensus argument that on principle "one stakeholder should be more equal than all other stakeholders," then that should be set down as the principle. I do not believe I have seen that consensus. I do agree that there needs to be remedies/redress for SLA issue &c., and this is part of our brief. But solutions for these issues do not necessarily require day to day operational oversight in my opinion and we should not use one possible remedy as the explanation for a principle. I do agree that performance on SLA &c. would be material that was reviewed at the time of the renewal, but would argue that a multistakeholder group is fully capable of understanding and coming up with an appropriate decision on renwal taking those issue into consideration with all other relevant issues. Thanks avri On 15-Nov-14 03:42, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri, I reproduce some previous conversations on this list below that may help have an informed discussion. I request you to address the points raised by Becky and MM. - *Becky*: Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. - *Greg*: Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. - *MM*: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based on a fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of ICANN’s policy making process with the accountability of and input into the IANA functions. All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair representation in the process of policy development. But once a policy is agreed, the implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative technical and operational function in which its direct customers are the primary stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best (because random members of the public would not know what is going on at that level) and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to circumvent agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation level). I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN. That’s wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP – and many others – have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation need to be clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the policy process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy by a registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do that. Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a contracting authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency purposes and for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable to the people who actually use its services and whose basic functions and activities are dependent on those services. Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US government’s authority over modifications to the root zone created the potential for that kind of political intervention at the implementation level. This set a very bad precedent for the world that we are still dealing with. Now some people are trying to reproduce that situation by making IANA oversight a way for interest groups who don’t get what they want in a policy process to get a second, back door bite at the apple. Let’s reject that clearly. If one knows what the performance of the IANA functions actually are, the idea that every stakeholder in the world should be engaged in “oversight” of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You might as well say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over what secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they live in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be affected, right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected, right? If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone file data neither you, Greg – nor I – are in a position to say whether the request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up. - Becky: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues: Things like SLAs, how quickly name server changes are processed, etc. Where a government actually operates the ccTLD, it would be direct consumers of IANA services, like gTLDs and ccTLDs. But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. - MM: Totally agree with Becky. I think any IANA transition solution that gives governments a special, privileged role is not meeting the NTIA criteria and could not be implemented. Most governmental concerns arise in the policy development process. As I’ve said before, IANA does not and should not be involved in making policy, nor should it be viewed as a way to veto or circumvent agreed policy. Therefore govts – and we - must not confuse IANA issues with the accountability of ICANN’s policy making process. For that reason I really like Stacey King’s statement: if GAC is represents on an oversight council “that the ICANN Bylaws provision allowing for GAC advice on any policy matter does not apply to IANA. Ie, that the GAC cannot exercise any additional authority over IANA functions through other means/routes.” - Guru: Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. - Allan: There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem - Becky: IANA is a service provider. If you hire a contractor to build a house, it is the contractor’s job to make sure that the plumber and the electrician do their work properly. If your house burns down because the wiring is faulty, you are going to look to the contractor – not the electrician – to make you whole. I fully support multi-stakeholder policy development. Multi-stakeholder oversight of the electrician doesn’t make sense to me. - Oliver: irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too - MM: I can’t agree with Olivier and Fouad. Olivier, help me to understand why the directly affected parties shouldn’t have the primary responsibility for operations they are the direct users of and that their own operations depend on. To me your claim that this constitutes a “conflict of interest” is almost self-contradictory and self-refuting – it is a confluence of interest, not a conflict – but perhaps I am missing something. Please explain. What I suspect is happening is that both of you are confusing policy development functions of ICANN with the operational and technical functions of IANA, and applying inappropriate mental models drawn from the former to the latter. In policy development we want “openness, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective.” In the DNS IANA functions the users are the registries, it’s an intermediate good, it’s all about implementation, so we want efficiency, security and direct accountability to the primary users, not some playground for different stakeholders to voice their opinions. I do agree with Alan there should be safeguards to prevent the operational and technical functions from being managed in ways that undermine or subvert policy that is made in the MS process. It would be useful to discuss institutional safeguards – including antitrust law – to prevent those kinds of things. But throwing an infinite number of “stakeholders” into looking over the shoulders of those making root zone file modifications accomplishes nothing useful from a public interest perspective, while raising all kinds of risks and inefficiencies. If Alan can recognize the danger that IANA contractors or implementations might compromise the policy process, I hope that he can also recognize the danger that politicized ‘multstakeholdered’ oversight of the technical operations could be abused to circumvent or veto the policies developed by the MS process. On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 1:41 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, I think we need to start from principles, as opposed to having a solution and making sure the principles fit the desired solution. And if we are stating that we think 'one Stakeholder Group is more relevant than all other stakeholder types' and by virtue of that have primacy in decision making, then that should be stated explicitly in the principles section. If it is already then I missed it. I prefer the equal-footing multistakeholder principle, but if there is near consensus for the one stakeholder above all stakeholders viewpoint, I would like to understand. Thanks avri On 15-Nov-14 01:33, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri I'm sure your viewpoints are not being ignored. Peace. I forgive you for your sin. Nobody is saying multi stakeholder compositions are not applicable or there is consensus against it. Please look at strawmans 2 and 3. I intact support a multi-stakeholder composition. I'm just saying I don't agree there is consensus against a registry only composition, which you seem to be eliminating by way of the principle that you are suggesting. On 15 Nov 2014 11:51, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, Apologies, guess I picked the wrong email. I hope I can be forgiven for this sin. I guess that means that my viewpoints will just be ignored. But if this group is able to decide that multistakeholder models are not applicable, no matter which thread an email is attached to. I think we may be in more trouble than I think we are. Are you saying we have consensus on a principle against commitment to the multistakeholder model? How can that be when the multistakeholder model is really one of the first principles we much meet for an NTIA solution avri On 14-Nov-14 22:48, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the principles. And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition. On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, I have suggested a few edits to the doc. hope I did it in the mandated manner. the changes refer to - transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be published. - bottom-up modalities - multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements. Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting. avri _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship

Avri, As I tried to say in another message, I understand and support the use of a multi-stakeholder approach for the policy development aspects of the process but fear that applying it to the administrative and technical checks part of the process will cause delays in the performance of specific IANA functions. Maybe what we need to explore is how the functions of the OPRC could be divided in a way that distinguishes those that are specifically related to administrative and technical checks versus broader more policy related functions and think of ways to involve the multistakeholder community in the latter. Note that these are just my personal thoughts; I have not vetted them within the RySG. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 7:32 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B Hi, I assume you are referring to the RFP3 strawman. I read it and added some comments in the text, which I will sent the RFP3 list (unless I am confused again about the mapping of document numero-names to email lists) . I will send my comments to that list. I basically had difficulty with several aspects of it. - the unistakeholder approach - the lack of a credible separability mechanism for removing the function to another contractor if needed - the reliance on changes to the bylaws that could be undone but, - it probably does avoid the problem of mission creep and bureaucratic scope, as it would be able to leverage ICANN's capabilities in that area. As it is a solution and not a principle, it does not have the effect of presupposing the solution in the principle. It seems to be forming based on the principle that one stakeholder is more relevant than all other stakeholders and the determination that they should be the sole oversight is consistent with a unistakeholder modality. As such it does not answer my issue about the need for a multistakeheholder principle to guide our work, though it does demonstrate what kind of solution one can arrive out without that principle. thanks avri On 15-Nov-14 09:14, Gomes, Chuck wrote: Avri, I find your message below very helpful. I haven’t had time to fully grasp your concern regarding ‘oversight’ and what you say below clarifies it a lot. If I am understanding you correctly, I also don’t believe that day-to-day oversight is required. I will be curious to see your reaction to the modified Straw Man 1 proposal that Stephanie sent to the CWG list yesterday. In particular, I would like to know whether you think it meets your concerns regarding oversight. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 8:43 AM Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B Hi, Thanks for pulling that all together. You display one of the best attributes of a list member. I had read those arguments on the list earlier, though in some cases a few days late, and my view was that we were in the midst of a discussion that had not yet resolved. As far as I could tell we were still early in the discussion and that the few who had weighed in were split on the issue. There is nothing in the quote you sent to show a consensus. Part of the problem we are getting into here, is that the principles of some seem to presuppose that there will be oversight of the day to day operation of IANA, and are thus proposing principles for oversight and not principles for the transition of Stewardship. From all of the exegesis of the NTIA contract and practice I have seen to date, NTIA never engaged in day to day oversight of naming or any other operations. I.e. in many of the arguments it is a predetermined solution, one I do not accept, that is presupposing a principle. I think, on the other hand that in the NTIA mssion the multistakeholder principle is inherent and must be carried through in the principles of a solution. To put it another way, I think many of the arguments here have the tail wagging the dog. Therefore I maintain that accepting that the multistakeholder principle is fundamental in our work is essential and cannot be removed by solutionism . As I said in another hand, if there is a concensus argument that on principle "one stakeholder should be more equal than all other stakeholders," then that should be set down as the principle. I do not believe I have seen that consensus. I do agree that there needs to be remedies/redress for SLA issue &c., and this is part of our brief. But solutions for these issues do not necessarily require day to day operational oversight in my opinion and we should not use one possible remedy as the explanation for a principle. I do agree that performance on SLA &c. would be material that was reviewed at the time of the renewal, but would argue that a multistakeholder group is fully capable of understanding and coming up with an appropriate decision on renwal taking those issue into consideration with all other relevant issues. Thanks avri On 15-Nov-14 03:42, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri, I reproduce some previous conversations on this list below that may help have an informed discussion. I request you to address the points raised by Becky and MM. - *Becky*: Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. - *Greg*: Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. - *MM*: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based on a fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of ICANN’s policy making process with the accountability of and input into the IANA functions. All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair representation in the process of policy development. But once a policy is agreed, the implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative technical and operational function in which its direct customers are the primary stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best (because random members of the public would not know what is going on at that level) and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to circumvent agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation level). I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN. That’s wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP – and many others – have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation need to be clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the policy process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy by a registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do that. Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a contracting authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency purposes and for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable to the people who actually use its services and whose basic functions and activities are dependent on those services. Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US government’s authority over modifications to the root zone created the potential for that kind of political intervention at the implementation level. This set a very bad precedent for the world that we are still dealing with. Now some people are trying to reproduce that situation by making IANA oversight a way for interest groups who don’t get what they want in a policy process to get a second, back door bite at the apple. Let’s reject that clearly. If one knows what the performance of the IANA functions actually are, the idea that every stakeholder in the world should be engaged in “oversight” of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You might as well say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over what secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they live in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be affected, right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected, right? If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone file data neither you, Greg – nor I – are in a position to say whether the request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up. - Becky: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues: Things like SLAs, how quickly name server changes are processed, etc. Where a government actually operates the ccTLD, it would be direct consumers of IANA services, like gTLDs and ccTLDs. But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. - MM: Totally agree with Becky. I think any IANA transition solution that gives governments a special, privileged role is not meeting the NTIA criteria and could not be implemented. Most governmental concerns arise in the policy development process. As I’ve said before, IANA does not and should not be involved in making policy, nor should it be viewed as a way to veto or circumvent agreed policy. Therefore govts – and we - must not confuse IANA issues with the accountability of ICANN’s policy making process. For that reason I really like Stacey King’s statement: if GAC is represents on an oversight council “that the ICANN Bylaws provision allowing for GAC advice on any policy matter does not apply to IANA. Ie, that the GAC cannot exercise any additional authority over IANA functions through other means/routes.” - Guru: Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. - Allan: There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem - Becky: IANA is a service provider. If you hire a contractor to build a house, it is the contractor’s job to make sure that the plumber and the electrician do their work properly. If your house burns down because the wiring is faulty, you are going to look to the contractor – not the electrician – to make you whole. I fully support multi-stakeholder policy development. Multi-stakeholder oversight of the electrician doesn’t make sense to me. - Oliver: irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too - MM: I can’t agree with Olivier and Fouad. Olivier, help me to understand why the directly affected parties shouldn’t have the primary responsibility for operations they are the direct users of and that their own operations depend on. To me your claim that this constitutes a “conflict of interest” is almost self-contradictory and self-refuting – it is a confluence of interest, not a conflict – but perhaps I am missing something. Please explain. What I suspect is happening is that both of you are confusing policy development functions of ICANN with the operational and technical functions of IANA, and applying inappropriate mental models drawn from the former to the latter. In policy development we want “openness, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective.” In the DNS IANA functions the users are the registries, it’s an intermediate good, it’s all about implementation, so we want efficiency, security and direct accountability to the primary users, not some playground for different stakeholders to voice their opinions. I do agree with Alan there should be safeguards to prevent the operational and technical functions from being managed in ways that undermine or subvert policy that is made in the MS process. It would be useful to discuss institutional safeguards – including antitrust law – to prevent those kinds of things. But throwing an infinite number of “stakeholders” into looking over the shoulders of those making root zone file modifications accomplishes nothing useful from a public interest perspective, while raising all kinds of risks and inefficiencies. If Alan can recognize the danger that IANA contractors or implementations might compromise the policy process, I hope that he can also recognize the danger that politicized ‘multstakeholdered’ oversight of the technical operations could be abused to circumvent or veto the policies developed by the MS process. On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 1:41 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, I think we need to start from principles, as opposed to having a solution and making sure the principles fit the desired solution. And if we are stating that we think 'one Stakeholder Group is more relevant than all other stakeholder types' and by virtue of that have primacy in decision making, then that should be stated explicitly in the principles section. If it is already then I missed it. I prefer the equal-footing multistakeholder principle, but if there is near consensus for the one stakeholder above all stakeholders viewpoint, I would like to understand. Thanks avri On 15-Nov-14 01:33, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri I'm sure your viewpoints are not being ignored. Peace. I forgive you for your sin. Nobody is saying multi stakeholder compositions are not applicable or there is consensus against it. Please look at strawmans 2 and 3. I intact support a multi-stakeholder composition. I'm just saying I don't agree there is consensus against a registry only composition, which you seem to be eliminating by way of the principle that you are suggesting. On 15 Nov 2014 11:51, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, Apologies, guess I picked the wrong email. I hope I can be forgiven for this sin. I guess that means that my viewpoints will just be ignored. But if this group is able to decide that multistakeholder models are not applicable, no matter which thread an email is attached to. I think we may be in more trouble than I think we are. Are you saying we have consensus on a principle against commitment to the multistakeholder model? How can that be when the multistakeholder model is really one of the first principles we much meet for an NTIA solution avri On 14-Nov-14 22:48, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the principles. And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition. On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, I have suggested a few edits to the doc. hope I did it in the mandated manner. the changes refer to - transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be published. - bottom-up modalities - multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements. Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting. avri _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship><mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship><mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship><mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship><mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org><mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org><mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship

Olivier, The administrative and technical checks now do not involve a multi-stakeholder process. Multi-stakeholder is by definition slower. How could changing to multi-stakeholder not slow it down? Chuck From: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond [mailto:ocl@gih.com] Sent: Sunday, November 16, 2014 12:11 PM To: Gomes, Chuck; Avri Doria; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B Dear Chuck, we are going to have to discuss this in Frankfurt since I'm afraid my opinion is that the administrative and technical check parts of the process cannot be accountable if they do not have a multi-stakeholder aspect to them. Would you please be so kind to expand on why you think this would cause delays in the performance of specific IANA functions and what functions were you thinking would be affected? Kindest regards, Olivier (own opinions) On 16/11/2014 16:13, Gomes, Chuck wrote: Avri, As I tried to say in another message, I understand and support the use of a multi-stakeholder approach for the policy development aspects of the process but fear that applying it to the administrative and technical checks part of the process will cause delays in the performance of specific IANA functions. Maybe what we need to explore is how the functions of the OPRC could be divided in a way that distinguishes those that are specifically related to administrative and technical checks versus broader more policy related functions and think of ways to involve the multistakeholder community in the latter. Note that these are just my personal thoughts; I have not vetted them within the RySG. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 7:32 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B Hi, I assume you are referring to the RFP3 strawman. I read it and added some comments in the text, which I will sent the RFP3 list (unless I am confused again about the mapping of document numero-names to email lists) . I will send my comments to that list. I basically had difficulty with several aspects of it. - the unistakeholder approach - the lack of a credible separability mechanism for removing the function to another contractor if needed - the reliance on changes to the bylaws that could be undone but, - it probably does avoid the problem of mission creep and bureaucratic scope, as it would be able to leverage ICANN's capabilities in that area. As it is a solution and not a principle, it does not have the effect of presupposing the solution in the principle. It seems to be forming based on the principle that one stakeholder is more relevant than all other stakeholders and the determination that they should be the sole oversight is consistent with a unistakeholder modality. As such it does not answer my issue about the need for a multistakeheholder principle to guide our work, though it does demonstrate what kind of solution one can arrive out without that principle. thanks avri On 15-Nov-14 09:14, Gomes, Chuck wrote: Avri, I find your message below very helpful. I haven't had time to fully grasp your concern regarding 'oversight' and what you say below clarifies it a lot. If I am understanding you correctly, I also don't believe that day-to-day oversight is required. I will be curious to see your reaction to the modified Straw Man 1 proposal that Stephanie sent to the CWG list yesterday. In particular, I would like to know whether you think it meets your concerns regarding oversight. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 8:43 AM Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B Hi, Thanks for pulling that all together. You display one of the best attributes of a list member. I had read those arguments on the list earlier, though in some cases a few days late, and my view was that we were in the midst of a discussion that had not yet resolved. As far as I could tell we were still early in the discussion and that the few who had weighed in were split on the issue. There is nothing in the quote you sent to show a consensus. Part of the problem we are getting into here, is that the principles of some seem to presuppose that there will be oversight of the day to day operation of IANA, and are thus proposing principles for oversight and not principles for the transition of Stewardship. From all of the exegesis of the NTIA contract and practice I have seen to date, NTIA never engaged in day to day oversight of naming or any other operations. I.e. in many of the arguments it is a predetermined solution, one I do not accept, that is presupposing a principle. I think, on the other hand that in the NTIA mssion the multistakeholder principle is inherent and must be carried through in the principles of a solution. To put it another way, I think many of the arguments here have the tail wagging the dog. Therefore I maintain that accepting that the multistakeholder principle is fundamental in our work is essential and cannot be removed by solutionism . As I said in another hand, if there is a concensus argument that on principle "one stakeholder should be more equal than all other stakeholders," then that should be set down as the principle. I do not believe I have seen that consensus. I do agree that there needs to be remedies/redress for SLA issue &c., and this is part of our brief. But solutions for these issues do not necessarily require day to day operational oversight in my opinion and we should not use one possible remedy as the explanation for a principle. I do agree that performance on SLA &c. would be material that was reviewed at the time of the renewal, but would argue that a multistakeholder group is fully capable of understanding and coming up with an appropriate decision on renwal taking those issue into consideration with all other relevant issues. Thanks avri On 15-Nov-14 03:42, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri, I reproduce some previous conversations on this list below that may help have an informed discussion. I request you to address the points raised by Becky and MM. - *Becky*: Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like registstrars, registrants, etc. - *Greg*: Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative. - *MM*: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based on a fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of ICANN's policy making process with the accountability of and input into the IANA functions. All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair representation in the process of policy development. But once a policy is agreed, the implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative technical and operational function in which its direct customers are the primary stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best (because random members of the public would not know what is going on at that level) and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to circumvent agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation level). I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN. That's wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP - and many others - have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation need to be clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the policy process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy by a registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do that. Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a contracting authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency purposes and for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable to the people who actually use its services and whose basic functions and activities are dependent on those services. Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US government's authority over modifications to the root zone created the potential for that kind of political intervention at the implementation level. This set a very bad precedent for the world that we are still dealing with. Now some people are trying to reproduce that situation by making IANA oversight a way for interest groups who don't get what they want in a policy process to get a second, back door bite at the apple. Let's reject that clearly. If one knows what the performance of the IANA functions actually are, the idea that every stakeholder in the world should be engaged in "oversight" of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You might as well say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over what secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they live in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be affected, right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected, right? If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone file data neither you, Greg - nor I - are in a position to say whether the request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up. - Becky: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the "oversight counsel" would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues: Things like SLAs, how quickly name server changes are processed, etc. Where a government actually operates the ccTLD, it would be direct consumers of IANA services, like gTLDs and ccTLDs. But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise "public interest" concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel. - MM: Totally agree with Becky. I think any IANA transition solution that gives governments a special, privileged role is not meeting the NTIA criteria and could not be implemented. Most governmental concerns arise in the policy development process. As I've said before, IANA does not and should not be involved in making policy, nor should it be viewed as a way to veto or circumvent agreed policy. Therefore govts - and we - must not confuse IANA issues with the accountability of ICANN's policy making process. For that reason I really like Stacey King's statement: if GAC is represents on an oversight council "that the ICANN Bylaws provision allowing for GAC advice on any policy matter does not apply to IANA. Ie, that the GAC cannot exercise any additional authority over IANA functions through other means/routes." - Guru: Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council. - Allan: There is a potential problem with having just registries doing the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call IANA out on the problem - Becky: IANA is a service provider. If you hire a contractor to build a house, it is the contractor's job to make sure that the plumber and the electrician do their work properly. If your house burns down because the wiring is faulty, you are going to look to the contractor - not the electrician - to make you whole. I fully support multi-stakeholder policy development. Multi-stakeholder oversight of the electrician doesn't make sense to me. - Oliver: irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too - MM: I can't agree with Olivier and Fouad. Olivier, help me to understand why the directly affected parties shouldn't have the primary responsibility for operations they are the direct users of and that their own operations depend on. To me your claim that this constitutes a "conflict of interest" is almost self-contradictory and self-refuting - it is a confluence of interest, not a conflict - but perhaps I am missing something. Please explain. What I suspect is happening is that both of you are confusing policy development functions of ICANN with the operational and technical functions of IANA, and applying inappropriate mental models drawn from the former to the latter. In policy development we want "openness, diversity, inclusiveness and the user perspective." In the DNS IANA functions the users are the registries, it's an intermediate good, it's all about implementation, so we want efficiency, security and direct accountability to the primary users, not some playground for different stakeholders to voice their opinions. I do agree with Alan there should be safeguards to prevent the operational and technical functions from being managed in ways that undermine or subvert policy that is made in the MS process. It would be useful to discuss institutional safeguards - including antitrust law - to prevent those kinds of things. But throwing an infinite number of "stakeholders" into looking over the shoulders of those making root zone file modifications accomplishes nothing useful from a public interest perspective, while raising all kinds of risks and inefficiencies. If Alan can recognize the danger that IANA contractors or implementations might compromise the policy process, I hope that he can also recognize the danger that politicized 'multstakeholdered' oversight of the technical operations could be abused to circumvent or veto the policies developed by the MS process. On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 1:41 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, I think we need to start from principles, as opposed to having a solution and making sure the principles fit the desired solution. And if we are stating that we think 'one Stakeholder Group is more relevant than all other stakeholder types' and by virtue of that have primacy in decision making, then that should be stated explicitly in the principles section. If it is already then I missed it. I prefer the equal-footing multistakeholder principle, but if there is near consensus for the one stakeholder above all stakeholders viewpoint, I would like to understand. Thanks avri On 15-Nov-14 01:33, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri I'm sure your viewpoints are not being ignored. Peace. I forgive you for your sin. Nobody is saying multi stakeholder compositions are not applicable or there is consensus against it. Please look at strawmans 2 and 3. I intact support a multi-stakeholder composition. I'm just saying I don't agree there is consensus against a registry only composition, which you seem to be eliminating by way of the principle that you are suggesting. On 15 Nov 2014 11:51, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, Apologies, guess I picked the wrong email. I hope I can be forgiven for this sin. I guess that means that my viewpoints will just be ignored. But if this group is able to decide that multistakeholder models are not applicable, no matter which thread an email is attached to. I think we may be in more trouble than I think we are. Are you saying we have consensus on a principle against commitment to the multistakeholder model? How can that be when the multistakeholder model is really one of the first principles we much meet for an NTIA solution avri On 14-Nov-14 22:48, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the principles. And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition. On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, I have suggested a few edits to the doc. hope I did it in the mandated manner. the changes refer to - transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be published. - bottom-up modalities - multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements. Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting. avri _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship><mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship><mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship><mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship><mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org><mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org><mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship -- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html

Dear Chuck, my point is that there should be a multi-stakeholder aspect to it, whether reporting to a multi-stakeholder committee or having the function performed by someone selected or reporting to a multi-stakeholder process. I would not recommend that the function of administrative and technical checks be performed by a multi-stakeholder process. Kind regards, Olivier On 16/11/2014 19:39, Gomes, Chuck wrote:

Olivier,

The administrative and technical checks now do not involve a multi-stakeholder process. Multi-stakeholder is by definition slower. How could changing to multi-stakeholder not slow it down?

Chuck

*From:*Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond [mailto:ocl@gih.com] *Sent:* Sunday, November 16, 2014 12:11 PM *To:* Gomes, Chuck; Avri Doria; cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B

Dear Chuck,

we are going to have to discuss this in Frankfurt since I'm afraid my opinion is that the administrative and technical check parts of the process cannot be accountable if they do not have a multi-stakeholder aspect to them. Would you please be so kind to expand on why you think this would cause delays in the performance of specific IANA functions and what functions were you thinking would be affected? Kindest regards,

Olivier (own opinions)

On 16/11/2014 16:13, Gomes, Chuck wrote:

Avri,

As I tried to say in another message, I understand and support the use of a multi-stakeholder approach for the policy development aspects of the process but fear that applying it to the administrative and technical checks part of the process will cause delays in the performance of specific IANA functions. Maybe what we need to explore is how the functions of the OPRC could be divided in a way that distinguishes those that are specifically related to administrative and technical checks versus broader more policy related functions and think of ways to involve the multistakeholder community in the latter.

Note that these are just my personal thoughts; I have not vetted them within the RySG.

Chuck

*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Avri Doria *Sent:* Saturday, November 15, 2014 7:32 PM *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B

Hi,

I assume you are referring to the RFP3 strawman. I read it and added some comments in the text, which I will sent the RFP3 list (unless I am confused again about the mapping of document numero-names to email lists) . I will send my comments to that list.

I basically had difficulty with several aspects of it.

- the unistakeholder approach - the lack of a credible separability mechanism for removing the function to another contractor if needed - the reliance on changes to the bylaws that could be undone

but,

- it probably does avoid the problem of mission creep and bureaucratic scope, as it would be able to leverage ICANN's capabilities in that area.

As it is a solution and not a principle, it does not have the effect of presupposing the solution in the principle. It seems to be forming based on the principle that one stakeholder is more relevant than all other stakeholders and the determination that they should be the sole oversight is consistent with a unistakeholder modality. As such it does not answer my issue about the need for a multistakeheholder principle to guide our work, though it does demonstrate what kind of solution one can arrive out without that principle.

thanks

avri

On 15-Nov-14 09:14, Gomes, Chuck wrote:

Avri,

I find your message below very helpful. I haven’t had time to fully grasp your concern regarding ‘oversight’ and what you say below clarifies it a lot. If I am understanding you correctly, I also don’t believe that day-to-day oversight is required.

I will be curious to see your reaction to the modified Straw Man 1 proposal that Stephanie sent to the CWG list yesterday. In particular, I would like to know whether you think it meets your concerns regarding oversight.

Chuck

From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria

Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 8:43 AM

Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>

Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B

Hi,

Thanks for pulling that all together. You display one of the best attributes of a list member.

I had read those arguments on the list earlier, though in some cases a few days late, and my view was that we were in the midst of a discussion that had not yet resolved. As far as I could tell we were still early in the discussion and that the few who had weighed in were split on the issue. There is nothing in the quote you sent to show a consensus.

Part of the problem we are getting into here, is that the principles of some seem to presuppose that there will be oversight of the day to day operation of IANA, and are thus proposing principles for oversight and not principles for the transition of Stewardship. From all of the exegesis of the NTIA contract and practice I have seen to date, NTIA never engaged in day to day oversight of naming or any other operations. I.e. in many of the arguments it is a predetermined solution, one I do not accept, that is presupposing a principle. I think, on the other hand that in the NTIA mssion the multistakeholder principle is inherent and must be carried through in the principles of a solution.

To put it another way, I think many of the arguments here have the tail wagging the dog.

Therefore I maintain that accepting that the multistakeholder principle is fundamental in our work is essential and cannot be removed by solutionism . As I said in another hand, if there is a concensus argument that on principle "one stakeholder should be more equal than all other stakeholders," then that should be set down as the principle. I do not believe I have seen that consensus.

I do agree that there needs to be remedies/redress for SLA issue &c., and this is part of our brief. But solutions for these issues do not necessarily require day to day operational oversight in my opinion and we should not use one possible remedy as the explanation for a principle. I do agree that performance on SLA &c. would be material that was reviewed at the time of the renewal, but would argue that a multistakeholder group is fully capable of understanding and coming up with an appropriate decision on renwal taking those issue into consideration with all other relevant issues.

Thanks

avri

On 15-Nov-14 03:42, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri,

I reproduce some previous conversations on this list below that may help

have an informed discussion.

I request you to address the points raised by Becky and MM.

-

*Becky*: Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry

operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like

registstrars, registrants, etc.

-

*Greg*: Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should

not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An

essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet

stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected,

directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly

representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or

created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly

representative.

-

*MM*: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based

on a fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of

ICANN’s policy making process with the accountability of and input into the

IANA functions. All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair

representation in the process of policy development. But once a policy is

agreed, the implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative

technical and operational function in which its direct customers are the

primary stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best

(because random members of the public would not know what is going on at

that level) and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to

circumvent agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation

level). I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA

contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some

kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In

other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN.

That’s wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP – and many others –

have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation need to be

clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the policy

process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy by a

registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do that.

Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a contracting

authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency purposes and

for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable to the people

who actually use its services and whose basic functions and activities are

dependent on those services. Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US

government’s authority over modifications to the root zone created the

potential for that kind of political intervention at the implementation

level. This set a very bad precedent for the world that we are still

dealing with. Now some people are trying to reproduce that situation by

making IANA oversight a way for interest groups who don’t get what they

want in a policy process to get a second, back door bite at the apple.

Let’s reject that clearly. If one knows what the performance of the IANA

functions actually are, the idea that every stakeholder in the world should

be engaged in “oversight” of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You

might as well say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over

what secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they

live in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be

affected, right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected,

right? If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone

file data neither you, Greg – nor I – are in a position to say whether the

request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may

argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA

implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the

answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more

damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both

incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from

happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the

security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be

relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up.

-

Becky: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight

counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to

policy issues: Things like SLAs, how quickly name server changes are

processed, etc. Where a government actually operates the ccTLD, it would be

direct consumers of IANA services, like gTLDs and ccTLDs. But policy for

IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me

understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public

interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a

Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I

am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.

-

MM: Totally agree with Becky. I think any IANA transition solution that

gives governments a special, privileged role is not meeting the NTIA

criteria and could not be implemented. Most governmental concerns arise in

the policy development process. As I’ve said before, IANA does not and

should not be involved in making policy, nor should it be viewed as a way

to veto or circumvent agreed policy. Therefore govts – and we - must not

confuse IANA issues with the accountability of ICANN’s policy making

process. For that reason I really like Stacey King’s statement: if GAC is

represents on an oversight council “that the ICANN Bylaws provision

allowing for GAC advice on any policy matter does not apply to IANA. Ie,

that the GAC cannot exercise any additional authority over IANA functions

through other means/routes.”

-

Guru: Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight

council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to

policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be

required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be

inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC

participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the

oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the

council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in

the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction

of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where

the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a

part of the oversight council.

-

Allan: There is a potential problem with having just registries doing

the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the

GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD

registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting

threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the

oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call

IANA out on the problem

-

Becky: IANA is a service provider. If you hire a contractor to build a

house, it is the contractor’s job to make sure that the plumber and the

electrician do their work properly. If your house burns down because the

wiring is faulty, you are going to look to the contractor – not the

electrician – to make you whole. I fully support multi-stakeholder policy

development. Multi-stakeholder oversight of the electrician doesn’t make

sense to me.

-

Oliver: irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable

thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very

basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where

only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them

directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I

have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected

parties, would need a number of seats too

-

MM: I can’t agree with Olivier and Fouad. Olivier, help me to understand

why the directly affected parties shouldn’t have the primary responsibility

for operations they are the direct users of and that their own operations

depend on. To me your claim that this constitutes a “conflict of interest”

is almost self-contradictory and self-refuting – it is a confluence of

interest, not a conflict – but perhaps I am missing something. Please

explain. What I suspect is happening is that both of you are confusing

policy development functions of ICANN with the operational and technical

functions of IANA, and applying inappropriate mental models drawn from the

former to the latter. In policy development we want “openness, diversity,

inclusiveness and the user perspective.” In the DNS IANA functions the

users are the registries, it’s an intermediate good, it’s all about

implementation, so we want efficiency, security and direct accountability

to the primary users, not some playground for different stakeholders to

voice their opinions. I do agree with Alan there should be safeguards to

prevent the operational and technical functions from being managed in ways

that undermine or subvert policy that is made in the MS process. It would

be useful to discuss institutional safeguards – including antitrust law –

to prevent those kinds of things. But throwing an infinite number of

“stakeholders” into looking over the shoulders of those making root zone

file modifications accomplishes nothing useful from a public interest

perspective, while raising all kinds of risks and inefficiencies. If Alan

can recognize the danger that IANA contractors or implementations might

compromise the policy process, I hope that he can also recognize the danger

that politicized ‘multstakeholdered’ oversight of the technical operations

could be abused to circumvent or veto the policies developed by the MS

process.

On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 1:41 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

I think we need to start from principles, as opposed to having a solution

and making sure the principles fit the desired solution.

And if we are stating that we think 'one Stakeholder Group is more

relevant than all other stakeholder types' and by virtue of that have

primacy in decision making, then that should be stated explicitly in the

principles section. If it is already then I missed it.

I prefer the equal-footing multistakeholder principle, but if there is

near consensus for the one stakeholder above all stakeholders viewpoint, I

would like to understand.

Thanks

avri

On 15-Nov-14 01:33, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri

I'm sure your viewpoints are not being ignored. Peace. I forgive you for

your sin.

Nobody is saying multi stakeholder compositions are not applicable or there

is consensus against it. Please look at strawmans 2 and 3.

I intact support a multi-stakeholder composition.

I'm just saying I don't agree there is consensus against a registry only

composition, which you seem to be eliminating by way of the principle that

you are suggesting.

On 15 Nov 2014 11:51, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

Apologies, guess I picked the wrong email. I hope I can be forgiven for

this sin.

I guess that means that my viewpoints will just be ignored.

But if this group is able to decide that multistakeholder models are not

applicable, no matter which thread an email is attached to. I think we may

be in more trouble than I think we are. Are you saying we have consensus

on a principle against commitment to the multistakeholder model? How can

that be when the multistakeholder model is really one of the first

principles we much meet for an NTIA solution

avri

On 14-Nov-14 22:48, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the

principles.

And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the

oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores

the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition.

On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

I have suggested a few edits to the doc. hope I did it in the mandated

manner.

the changes refer to

- transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be

published.

- bottom-up modalities

- multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements.

Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting.

avri

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-- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html

-- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html

Olivier and Chuck and All, I think this is an important point, and one we should hold onto as we look at the issues relating to the roles that various stakeholders play after the transition. Greg On Sun, Nov 16, 2014 at 6:31 PM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> wrote:

So we may not be that far apart Olivier.

Chuck

Sent via the Samsung GALAXY S® 5, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone

-------- Original message -------- From: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> Date:11/16/2014 5:29 PM (GMT-05:00) To: "Gomes, Chuck" <cgomes@verisign.com>, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org>, cwg-stewardship@icann.org Cc: Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B

Dear Chuck,

my point is that there should be a multi-stakeholder aspect to it, whether reporting to a multi-stakeholder committee or having the function performed by someone selected or reporting to a multi-stakeholder process. I would not recommend that the function of administrative and technical checks be performed by a multi-stakeholder process. Kind regards,

Olivier

On 16/11/2014 19:39, Gomes, Chuck wrote:

Olivier,

The administrative and technical checks now do not involve a multi-stakeholder process. Multi-stakeholder is by definition slower. How could changing to multi-stakeholder not slow it down?

Chuck

*From:* Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond [mailto:ocl@gih.com <ocl@gih.com>] *Sent:* Sunday, November 16, 2014 12:11 PM *To:* Gomes, Chuck; Avri Doria; cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B

Dear Chuck,

we are going to have to discuss this in Frankfurt since I'm afraid my opinion is that the administrative and technical check parts of the process cannot be accountable if they do not have a multi-stakeholder aspect to them. Would you please be so kind to expand on why you think this would cause delays in the performance of specific IANA functions and what functions were you thinking would be affected? Kindest regards,

Olivier (own opinions)

On 16/11/2014 16:13, Gomes, Chuck wrote:

Avri,

As I tried to say in another message, I understand and support the use of a multi-stakeholder approach for the policy development aspects of the process but fear that applying it to the administrative and technical checks part of the process will cause delays in the performance of specific IANA functions. Maybe what we need to explore is how the functions of the OPRC could be divided in a way that distinguishes those that are specifically related to administrative and technical checks versus broader more policy related functions and think of ways to involve the multistakeholder community in the latter.

Note that these are just my personal thoughts; I have not vetted them within the RySG.

Chuck

*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Avri Doria *Sent:* Saturday, November 15, 2014 7:32 PM *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B

Hi,

I assume you are referring to the RFP3 strawman. I read it and added some comments in the text, which I will sent the RFP3 list (unless I am confused again about the mapping of document numero-names to email lists) . I will send my comments to that list.

I basically had difficulty with several aspects of it.

- the unistakeholder approach - the lack of a credible separability mechanism for removing the function to another contractor if needed - the reliance on changes to the bylaws that could be undone

but,

- it probably does avoid the problem of mission creep and bureaucratic scope, as it would be able to leverage ICANN's capabilities in that area.

As it is a solution and not a principle, it does not have the effect of presupposing the solution in the principle. It seems to be forming based on the principle that one stakeholder is more relevant than all other stakeholders and the determination that they should be the sole oversight is consistent with a unistakeholder modality. As such it does not answer my issue about the need for a multistakeheholder principle to guide our work, though it does demonstrate what kind of solution one can arrive out without that principle.

thanks

avri

On 15-Nov-14 09:14, Gomes, Chuck wrote:

Avri,

I find your message below very helpful. I haven’t had time to fully grasp your concern regarding ‘oversight’ and what you say below clarifies it a lot. If I am understanding you correctly, I also don’t believe that day-to-day oversight is required.

I will be curious to see your reaction to the modified Straw Man 1 proposal that Stephanie sent to the CWG list yesterday. In particular, I would like to know whether you think it meets your concerns regarding oversight.

Chuck

From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Avri Doria

Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 8:43 AM

Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org

Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B

Hi,

Thanks for pulling that all together. You display one of the best attributes of a list member.

I had read those arguments on the list earlier, though in some cases a few days late, and my view was that we were in the midst of a discussion that had not yet resolved. As far as I could tell we were still early in the discussion and that the few who had weighed in were split on the issue. There is nothing in the quote you sent to show a consensus.

Part of the problem we are getting into here, is that the principles of some seem to presuppose that there will be oversight of the day to day operation of IANA, and are thus proposing principles for oversight and not principles for the transition of Stewardship. From all of the exegesis of the NTIA contract and practice I have seen to date, NTIA never engaged in day to day oversight of naming or any other operations. I.e. in many of the arguments it is a predetermined solution, one I do not accept, that is presupposing a principle. I think, on the other hand that in the NTIA mssion the multistakeholder principle is inherent and must be carried through in the principles of a solution.

To put it another way, I think many of the arguments here have the tail wagging the dog.

Therefore I maintain that accepting that the multistakeholder principle is fundamental in our work is essential and cannot be removed by solutionism . As I said in another hand, if there is a concensus argument that on principle "one stakeholder should be more equal than all other stakeholders," then that should be set down as the principle. I do not believe I have seen that consensus.

I do agree that there needs to be remedies/redress for SLA issue &c., and this is part of our brief. But solutions for these issues do not necessarily require day to day operational oversight in my opinion and we should not use one possible remedy as the explanation for a principle. I do agree that performance on SLA &c. would be material that was reviewed at the time of the renewal, but would argue that a multistakeholder group is fully capable of understanding and coming up with an appropriate decision on renwal taking those issue into consideration with all other relevant issues.

Thanks

avri

On 15-Nov-14 03:42, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri,

I reproduce some previous conversations on this list below that may help

have an informed discussion.

I request you to address the points raised by Becky and MM.

-

*Becky*: Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry

operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like

registstrars, registrants, etc.

-

*Greg*: Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should

not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An

essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet

stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected,

directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly

representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or

created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly

representative.

-

*MM*: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based

on a fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of

ICANN’s policy making process with the accountability of and input into the

IANA functions. All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair

representation in the process of policy development. But once a policy is

agreed, the implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative

technical and operational function in which its direct customers are the

primary stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best

(because random members of the public would not know what is going on at

that level) and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to

circumvent agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation

level). I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA

contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some

kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In

other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN.

That’s wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP – and many others –

have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation need to be

clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the policy

process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy by a

registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do that.

Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a contracting

authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency purposes and

for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable to the people

who actually use its services and whose basic functions and activities are

dependent on those services. Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US

government’s authority over modifications to the root zone created the

potential for that kind of political intervention at the implementation

level. This set a very bad precedent for the world that we are still

dealing with. Now some people are trying to reproduce that situation by

making IANA oversight a way for interest groups who don’t get what they

want in a policy process to get a second, back door bite at the apple.

Let’s reject that clearly. If one knows what the performance of the IANA

functions actually are, the idea that every stakeholder in the world should

be engaged in “oversight” of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You

might as well say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over

what secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they

live in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be

affected, right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected,

right? If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone

file data neither you, Greg – nor I – are in a position to say whether the

request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may

argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA

implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the

answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more

damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both

incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from

happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the

security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be

relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up.

-

Becky: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight

counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to

policy issues: Things like SLAs, how quickly name server changes are

processed, etc. Where a government actually operates the ccTLD, it would be

direct consumers of IANA services, like gTLDs and ccTLDs. But policy for

IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me

understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public

interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a

Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I

am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.

-

MM: Totally agree with Becky. I think any IANA transition solution that

gives governments a special, privileged role is not meeting the NTIA

criteria and could not be implemented. Most governmental concerns arise in

the policy development process. As I’ve said before, IANA does not and

should not be involved in making policy, nor should it be viewed as a way

to veto or circumvent agreed policy. Therefore govts – and we - must not

confuse IANA issues with the accountability of ICANN’s policy making

process. For that reason I really like Stacey King’s statement: if GAC is

represents on an oversight council “that the ICANN Bylaws provision

allowing for GAC advice on any policy matter does not apply to IANA. Ie,

that the GAC cannot exercise any additional authority over IANA functions

through other means/routes.”

-

Guru: Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight

council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to

policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be

required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be

inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC

participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the

oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the

council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in

the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction

of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where

the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a

part of the oversight council.

-

Allan: There is a potential problem with having just registries doing

the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the

GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD

registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting

threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the

oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call

IANA out on the problem

-

Becky: IANA is a service provider. If you hire a contractor to build a

house, it is the contractor’s job to make sure that the plumber and the

electrician do their work properly. If your house burns down because the

wiring is faulty, you are going to look to the contractor – not the

electrician – to make you whole. I fully support multi-stakeholder policy

development. Multi-stakeholder oversight of the electrician doesn’t make

sense to me.

-

Oliver: irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable

thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very

basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where

only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them

directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I

have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected

parties, would need a number of seats too

-

MM: I can’t agree with Olivier and Fouad. Olivier, help me to understand

why the directly affected parties shouldn’t have the primary responsibility

for operations they are the direct users of and that their own operations

depend on. To me your claim that this constitutes a “conflict of interest”

is almost self-contradictory and self-refuting – it is a confluence of

interest, not a conflict – but perhaps I am missing something. Please

explain. What I suspect is happening is that both of you are confusing

policy development functions of ICANN with the operational and technical

functions of IANA, and applying inappropriate mental models drawn from the

former to the latter. In policy development we want “openness, diversity,

inclusiveness and the user perspective.” In the DNS IANA functions the

users are the registries, it’s an intermediate good, it’s all about

implementation, so we want efficiency, security and direct accountability

to the primary users, not some playground for different stakeholders to

voice their opinions. I do agree with Alan there should be safeguards to

prevent the operational and technical functions from being managed in ways

that undermine or subvert policy that is made in the MS process. It would

be useful to discuss institutional safeguards – including antitrust law –

to prevent those kinds of things. But throwing an infinite number of

“stakeholders” into looking over the shoulders of those making root zone

file modifications accomplishes nothing useful from a public interest

perspective, while raising all kinds of risks and inefficiencies. If Alan

can recognize the danger that IANA contractors or implementations might

compromise the policy process, I hope that he can also recognize the danger

that politicized ‘multstakeholdered’ oversight of the technical operations

could be abused to circumvent or veto the policies developed by the MS

process.

On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 1:41 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

I think we need to start from principles, as opposed to having a solution

and making sure the principles fit the desired solution.

And if we are stating that we think 'one Stakeholder Group is more

relevant than all other stakeholder types' and by virtue of that have

primacy in decision making, then that should be stated explicitly in the

principles section. If it is already then I missed it.

I prefer the equal-footing multistakeholder principle, but if there is

near consensus for the one stakeholder above all stakeholders viewpoint, I

would like to understand.

Thanks

avri

On 15-Nov-14 01:33, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri

I'm sure your viewpoints are not being ignored. Peace. I forgive you for

your sin.

Nobody is saying multi stakeholder compositions are not applicable or there

is consensus against it. Please look at strawmans 2 and 3.

I intact support a multi-stakeholder composition.

I'm just saying I don't agree there is consensus against a registry only

composition, which you seem to be eliminating by way of the principle that

you are suggesting.

On 15 Nov 2014 11:51, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

Apologies, guess I picked the wrong email. I hope I can be forgiven for

this sin.

I guess that means that my viewpoints will just be ignored.

But if this group is able to decide that multistakeholder models are not

applicable, no matter which thread an email is attached to. I think we may

be in more trouble than I think we are. Are you saying we have consensus

on a principle against commitment to the multistakeholder model? How can

that be when the multistakeholder model is really one of the first

principles we much meet for an NTIA solution

avri

On 14-Nov-14 22:48, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the

principles.

And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the

oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores

the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition.

On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

I have suggested a few edits to the doc. hope I did it in the mandated

manner.

the changes refer to

- transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be

published.

- bottom-up modalities

- multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements.

Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting.

avri

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--

Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD

http://www.gih.com/ocl.html

-- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhDhttp://www.gih.com/ocl.html

_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship

This is exactly what I had also mentioned to Chuck. Cheers! PS: Personal view sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 17 Nov 2014 08:41, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

Nor would I recommend that it by done by the Registries.

There needs to be a neutral party employed to do the actual work of administering the checks, as is the case now.

avri

On 16-Nov-14 17:29, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:

Dear Chuck,

my point is that there should be a multi-stakeholder aspect to it, whether reporting to a multi-stakeholder committee or having the function performed by someone selected or reporting to a multi-stakeholder process. I would not recommend that the function of administrative and technical checks be performed by a multi-stakeholder process. Kind regards,

Olivier

On 16/11/2014 19:39, Gomes, Chuck wrote:

Olivier,

The administrative and technical checks now do not involve a multi-stakeholder process. Multi-stakeholder is by definition slower. How could changing to multi-stakeholder not slow it down?

Chuck

*From:*Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond [mailto:ocl@gih.com <ocl@gih.com>] *Sent:* Sunday, November 16, 2014 12:11 PM *To:* Gomes, Chuck; Avri Doria; cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B

Dear Chuck,

we are going to have to discuss this in Frankfurt since I'm afraid my opinion is that the administrative and technical check parts of the process cannot be accountable if they do not have a multi-stakeholder aspect to them. Would you please be so kind to expand on why you think this would cause delays in the performance of specific IANA functions and what functions were you thinking would be affected? Kindest regards,

Olivier (own opinions)

On 16/11/2014 16:13, Gomes, Chuck wrote:

Avri,

As I tried to say in another message, I understand and support the use of a multi-stakeholder approach for the policy development aspects of the process but fear that applying it to the administrative and technical checks part of the process will cause delays in the performance of specific IANA functions. Maybe what we need to explore is how the functions of the OPRC could be divided in a way that distinguishes those that are specifically related to administrative and technical checks versus broader more policy related functions and think of ways to involve the multistakeholder community in the latter.

Note that these are just my personal thoughts; I have not vetted them within the RySG.

Chuck

*From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Avri Doria *Sent:* Saturday, November 15, 2014 7:32 PM *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B

Hi,

I assume you are referring to the RFP3 strawman. I read it and added some comments in the text, which I will sent the RFP3 list (unless I am confused again about the mapping of document numero-names to email lists) . I will send my comments to that list.

I basically had difficulty with several aspects of it.

- the unistakeholder approach - the lack of a credible separability mechanism for removing the function to another contractor if needed - the reliance on changes to the bylaws that could be undone

but,

- it probably does avoid the problem of mission creep and bureaucratic scope, as it would be able to leverage ICANN's capabilities in that area.

As it is a solution and not a principle, it does not have the effect of presupposing the solution in the principle. It seems to be forming based on the principle that one stakeholder is more relevant than all other stakeholders and the determination that they should be the sole oversight is consistent with a unistakeholder modality. As such it does not answer my issue about the need for a multistakeheholder principle to guide our work, though it does demonstrate what kind of solution one can arrive out without that principle.

thanks

avri

On 15-Nov-14 09:14, Gomes, Chuck wrote:

Avri,

I find your message below very helpful. I haven’t had time to fully grasp your concern regarding ‘oversight’ and what you say below clarifies it a lot. If I am understanding you correctly, I also don’t believe that day-to-day oversight is required.

I will be curious to see your reaction to the modified Straw Man 1 proposal that Stephanie sent to the CWG list yesterday. In particular, I would like to know whether you think it meets your concerns regarding oversight.

Chuck

From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Avri Doria

Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 8:43 AM

Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>

Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B

Hi,

Thanks for pulling that all together. You display one of the best attributes of a list member.

I had read those arguments on the list earlier, though in some cases a few days late, and my view was that we were in the midst of a discussion that had not yet resolved. As far as I could tell we were still early in the discussion and that the few who had weighed in were split on the issue. There is nothing in the quote you sent to show a consensus.

Part of the problem we are getting into here, is that the principles of some seem to presuppose that there will be oversight of the day to day operation of IANA, and are thus proposing principles for oversight and not principles for the transition of Stewardship. From all of the exegesis of the NTIA contract and practice I have seen to date, NTIA never engaged in day to day oversight of naming or any other operations. I.e. in many of the arguments it is a predetermined solution, one I do not accept, that is presupposing a principle. I think, on the other hand that in the NTIA mssion the multistakeholder principle is inherent and must be carried through in the principles of a solution.

To put it another way, I think many of the arguments here have the tail wagging the dog.

Therefore I maintain that accepting that the multistakeholder principle is fundamental in our work is essential and cannot be removed by solutionism . As I said in another hand, if there is a concensus argument that on principle "one stakeholder should be more equal than all other stakeholders," then that should be set down as the principle. I do not believe I have seen that consensus.

I do agree that there needs to be remedies/redress for SLA issue &c., and this is part of our brief. But solutions for these issues do not necessarily require day to day operational oversight in my opinion and we should not use one possible remedy as the explanation for a principle. I do agree that performance on SLA &c. would be material that was reviewed at the time of the renewal, but would argue that a multistakeholder group is fully capable of understanding and coming up with an appropriate decision on renwal taking those issue into consideration with all other relevant issues.

Thanks

avri

On 15-Nov-14 03:42, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri,

I reproduce some previous conversations on this list below that may help

have an informed discussion.

I request you to address the points raised by Becky and MM.

-

*Becky*: Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry

operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like

registstrars, registrants, etc.

-

*Greg*: Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should

not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An

essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet

stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected,

directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly

representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or

created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly

representative.

-

*MM*: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based

on a fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of

ICANN’s policy making process with the accountability of and input into the

IANA functions. All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair

representation in the process of policy development. But once a policy is

agreed, the implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative

technical and operational function in which its direct customers are the

primary stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best

(because random members of the public would not know what is going on at

that level) and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to

circumvent agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation

level). I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA

contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some

kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In

other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN.

That’s wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP – and many others –

have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation need to be

clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the policy

process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy by a

registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do that.

Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a contracting

authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency purposes and

for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable to the people

who actually use its services and whose basic functions and activities are

dependent on those services. Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US

government’s authority over modifications to the root zone created the

potential for that kind of political intervention at the implementation

level. This set a very bad precedent for the world that we are still

dealing with. Now some people are trying to reproduce that situation by

making IANA oversight a way for interest groups who don’t get what they

want in a policy process to get a second, back door bite at the apple.

Let’s reject that clearly. If one knows what the performance of the IANA

functions actually are, the idea that every stakeholder in the world should

be engaged in “oversight” of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You

might as well say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over

what secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they

live in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be

affected, right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected,

right? If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone

file data neither you, Greg – nor I – are in a position to say whether the

request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may

argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA

implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the

answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more

damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both

incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from

happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the

security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be

relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up.

-

Becky: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight

counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to

policy issues: Things like SLAs, how quickly name server changes are

processed, etc. Where a government actually operates the ccTLD, it would be

direct consumers of IANA services, like gTLDs and ccTLDs. But policy for

IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me

understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public

interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a

Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I

am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.

-

MM: Totally agree with Becky. I think any IANA transition solution that

gives governments a special, privileged role is not meeting the NTIA

criteria and could not be implemented. Most governmental concerns arise in

the policy development process. As I’ve said before, IANA does not and

should not be involved in making policy, nor should it be viewed as a way

to veto or circumvent agreed policy. Therefore govts – and we - must not

confuse IANA issues with the accountability of ICANN’s policy making

process. For that reason I really like Stacey King’s statement: if GAC is

represents on an oversight council “that the ICANN Bylaws provision

allowing for GAC advice on any policy matter does not apply to IANA. Ie,

that the GAC cannot exercise any additional authority over IANA functions

through other means/routes.”

-

Guru: Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight

council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to

policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be

required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be

inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC

participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the

oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the

council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in

the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction

of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where

the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a

part of the oversight council.

-

Allan: There is a potential problem with having just registries doing

the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the

GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD

registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting

threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the

oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call

IANA out on the problem

-

Becky: IANA is a service provider. If you hire a contractor to build a

house, it is the contractor’s job to make sure that the plumber and the

electrician do their work properly. If your house burns down because the

wiring is faulty, you are going to look to the contractor – not the

electrician – to make you whole. I fully support multi-stakeholder policy

development. Multi-stakeholder oversight of the electrician doesn’t make

sense to me.

-

Oliver: irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable

thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very

basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where

only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them

directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I

have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected

parties, would need a number of seats too

-

MM: I can’t agree with Olivier and Fouad. Olivier, help me to understand

why the directly affected parties shouldn’t have the primary responsibility

for operations they are the direct users of and that their own operations

depend on. To me your claim that this constitutes a “conflict of interest”

is almost self-contradictory and self-refuting – it is a confluence of

interest, not a conflict – but perhaps I am missing something. Please

explain. What I suspect is happening is that both of you are confusing

policy development functions of ICANN with the operational and technical

functions of IANA, and applying inappropriate mental models drawn from the

former to the latter. In policy development we want “openness, diversity,

inclusiveness and the user perspective.” In the DNS IANA functions the

users are the registries, it’s an intermediate good, it’s all about

implementation, so we want efficiency, security and direct accountability

to the primary users, not some playground for different stakeholders to

voice their opinions. I do agree with Alan there should be safeguards to

prevent the operational and technical functions from being managed in ways

that undermine or subvert policy that is made in the MS process. It would

be useful to discuss institutional safeguards – including antitrust law –

to prevent those kinds of things. But throwing an infinite number of

“stakeholders” into looking over the shoulders of those making root zone

file modifications accomplishes nothing useful from a public interest

perspective, while raising all kinds of risks and inefficiencies. If Alan

can recognize the danger that IANA contractors or implementations might

compromise the policy process, I hope that he can also recognize the danger

that politicized ‘multstakeholdered’ oversight of the technical operations

could be abused to circumvent or veto the policies developed by the MS

process.

On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 1:41 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

I think we need to start from principles, as opposed to having a solution

and making sure the principles fit the desired solution.

And if we are stating that we think 'one Stakeholder Group is more

relevant than all other stakeholder types' and by virtue of that have

primacy in decision making, then that should be stated explicitly in the

principles section. If it is already then I missed it.

I prefer the equal-footing multistakeholder principle, but if there is

near consensus for the one stakeholder above all stakeholders viewpoint, I

would like to understand.

Thanks

avri

On 15-Nov-14 01:33, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri

I'm sure your viewpoints are not being ignored. Peace. I forgive you for

your sin.

Nobody is saying multi stakeholder compositions are not applicable or there

is consensus against it. Please look at strawmans 2 and 3.

I intact support a multi-stakeholder composition.

I'm just saying I don't agree there is consensus against a registry only

composition, which you seem to be eliminating by way of the principle that

you are suggesting.

On 15 Nov 2014 11:51, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

Apologies, guess I picked the wrong email. I hope I can be forgiven for

this sin.

I guess that means that my viewpoints will just be ignored.

But if this group is able to decide that multistakeholder models are not

applicable, no matter which thread an email is attached to. I think we may

be in more trouble than I think we are. Are you saying we have consensus

on a principle against commitment to the multistakeholder model? How can

that be when the multistakeholder model is really one of the first

principles we much meet for an NTIA solution

avri

On 14-Nov-14 22:48, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the

principles.

And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the

oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores

the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition.

On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

I have suggested a few edits to the doc. hope I did it in the mandated

manner.

the changes refer to

- transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be

published.

- bottom-up modalities

- multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements.

Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting.

avri

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Hi, +1 Although, i won't be present at the F2F meeting. But in my opinnion, why would further look into the technical and administrative aspect of the task be much needed to causing any unrealistic protraction? I think IANA functions had already been broken down into tokens, if am correct? Regards, Wale On Sun, Nov 16, 2014 at 5:10 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:

Dear Chuck,

we are going to have to discuss this in Frankfurt since I'm afraid my opinion is that the administrative and technical check parts of the process cannot be accountable if they do not have a multi-stakeholder aspect to them. Would you please be so kind to expand on why you think this would cause delays in the performance of specific IANA functions and what functions were you thinking would be affected? Kindest regards,

Olivier (own opinions)

On 16/11/2014 16:13, Gomes, Chuck wrote:

Avri,

As I tried to say in another message, I understand and support the use of a multi-stakeholder approach for the policy development aspects of the process but fear that applying it to the administrative and technical checks part of the process will cause delays in the performance of specific IANA functions. Maybe what we need to explore is how the functions of the OPRC could be divided in a way that distinguishes those that are specifically related to administrative and technical checks versus broader more policy related functions and think of ways to involve the multistakeholder community in the latter.

Note that these are just my personal thoughts; I have not vetted them within the RySG.

Chuck

*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Avri Doria *Sent:* Saturday, November 15, 2014 7:32 PM *To:* cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B

Hi,

I assume you are referring to the RFP3 strawman. I read it and added some comments in the text, which I will sent the RFP3 list (unless I am confused again about the mapping of document numero-names to email lists) . I will send my comments to that list.

I basically had difficulty with several aspects of it.

- the unistakeholder approach - the lack of a credible separability mechanism for removing the function to another contractor if needed - the reliance on changes to the bylaws that could be undone

but,

- it probably does avoid the problem of mission creep and bureaucratic scope, as it would be able to leverage ICANN's capabilities in that area.

As it is a solution and not a principle, it does not have the effect of presupposing the solution in the principle. It seems to be forming based on the principle that one stakeholder is more relevant than all other stakeholders and the determination that they should be the sole oversight is consistent with a unistakeholder modality. As such it does not answer my issue about the need for a multistakeheholder principle to guide our work, though it does demonstrate what kind of solution one can arrive out without that principle.

thanks

avri

On 15-Nov-14 09:14, Gomes, Chuck wrote:

Avri,

I find your message below very helpful. I haven’t had time to fully grasp your concern regarding ‘oversight’ and what you say below clarifies it a lot. If I am understanding you correctly, I also don’t believe that day-to-day oversight is required.

I will be curious to see your reaction to the modified Straw Man 1 proposal that Stephanie sent to the CWG list yesterday. In particular, I would like to know whether you think it meets your concerns regarding oversight.

Chuck

From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Avri Doria

Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 8:43 AM

Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org

Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B

Hi,

Thanks for pulling that all together. You display one of the best attributes of a list member.

I had read those arguments on the list earlier, though in some cases a few days late, and my view was that we were in the midst of a discussion that had not yet resolved. As far as I could tell we were still early in the discussion and that the few who had weighed in were split on the issue. There is nothing in the quote you sent to show a consensus.

Part of the problem we are getting into here, is that the principles of some seem to presuppose that there will be oversight of the day to day operation of IANA, and are thus proposing principles for oversight and not principles for the transition of Stewardship. From all of the exegesis of the NTIA contract and practice I have seen to date, NTIA never engaged in day to day oversight of naming or any other operations. I.e. in many of the arguments it is a predetermined solution, one I do not accept, that is presupposing a principle. I think, on the other hand that in the NTIA mssion the multistakeholder principle is inherent and must be carried through in the principles of a solution.

To put it another way, I think many of the arguments here have the tail wagging the dog.

Therefore I maintain that accepting that the multistakeholder principle is fundamental in our work is essential and cannot be removed by solutionism . As I said in another hand, if there is a concensus argument that on principle "one stakeholder should be more equal than all other stakeholders," then that should be set down as the principle. I do not believe I have seen that consensus.

I do agree that there needs to be remedies/redress for SLA issue &c., and this is part of our brief. But solutions for these issues do not necessarily require day to day operational oversight in my opinion and we should not use one possible remedy as the explanation for a principle. I do agree that performance on SLA &c. would be material that was reviewed at the time of the renewal, but would argue that a multistakeholder group is fully capable of understanding and coming up with an appropriate decision on renwal taking those issue into consideration with all other relevant issues.

Thanks

avri

On 15-Nov-14 03:42, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri,

I reproduce some previous conversations on this list below that may help

have an informed discussion.

I request you to address the points raised by Becky and MM.

-

*Becky*: Seems to me that the core of this group would be registry

operators, perhaps with representation from other stakeholders like

registstrars, registrants, etc.

-

*Greg*: Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should

not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An

essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet

stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected,

directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly

representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or

created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly

representative.

-

*MM*: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based

on a fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of

ICANN’s policy making process with the accountability of and input into the

IANA functions. All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair

representation in the process of policy development. But once a policy is

agreed, the implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative

technical and operational function in which its direct customers are the

primary stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best

(because random members of the public would not know what is going on at

that level) and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to

circumvent agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation

level). I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA

contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some

kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In

other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN.

That’s wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP – and many others –

have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation need to be

clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the policy

process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy by a

registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do that.

Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a contracting

authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency purposes and

for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable to the people

who actually use its services and whose basic functions and activities are

dependent on those services. Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US

government’s authority over modifications to the root zone created the

potential for that kind of political intervention at the implementation

level. This set a very bad precedent for the world that we are still

dealing with. Now some people are trying to reproduce that situation by

making IANA oversight a way for interest groups who don’t get what they

want in a policy process to get a second, back door bite at the apple.

Let’s reject that clearly. If one knows what the performance of the IANA

functions actually are, the idea that every stakeholder in the world should

be engaged in “oversight” of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You

might as well say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over

what secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they

live in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be

affected, right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected,

right? If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone

file data neither you, Greg – nor I – are in a position to say whether the

request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may

argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA

implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the

answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more

damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both

incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from

happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the

security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be

relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up.

-

Becky: Thanks Elise, very helpful. I was thinking that the “oversight

counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to

policy issues: Things like SLAs, how quickly name server changes are

processed, etc. Where a government actually operates the ccTLD, it would be

direct consumers of IANA services, like gTLDs and ccTLDs. But policy for

IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes. Could you help me

understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public

interest” concerns? I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a

Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I

am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.

-

MM: Totally agree with Becky. I think any IANA transition solution that

gives governments a special, privileged role is not meeting the NTIA

criteria and could not be implemented. Most governmental concerns arise in

the policy development process. As I’ve said before, IANA does not and

should not be involved in making policy, nor should it be viewed as a way

to veto or circumvent agreed policy. Therefore govts – and we - must not

confuse IANA issues with the accountability of ICANN’s policy making

process. For that reason I really like Stacey King’s statement: if GAC is

represents on an oversight council “that the ICANN Bylaws provision

allowing for GAC advice on any policy matter does not apply to IANA. Ie,

that the GAC cannot exercise any additional authority over IANA functions

through other means/routes.”

-

Guru: Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight

council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to

policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be

required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be

inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model. However, I think GAC

participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the

oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the

council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in

the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction

of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where

the insight of the GAC may be beneficial? Therefore I think GAC should be a

part of the oversight council.

-

Allan: There is a potential problem with having just registries doing

the oversight. Particularly for gTLD,s policy is set by a MS group (the

GNSO) and it is possible that they can set a policy that the gTLD

registries do not approve of (they do not have a veto based on GNSO voting

threshholds). If IANA were to not be implementing that policy properly, the

oversight body, composed of only registries would have no incentive to call

IANA out on the problem

-

Becky: IANA is a service provider. If you hire a contractor to build a

house, it is the contractor’s job to make sure that the plumber and the

electrician do their work properly. If your house burns down because the

wiring is faulty, you are going to look to the contractor – not the

electrician – to make you whole. I fully support multi-stakeholder policy

development. Multi-stakeholder oversight of the electrician doesn’t make

sense to me.

-

Oliver: irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable

thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very

basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where

only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them

directly. There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I

have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected

parties, would need a number of seats too

-

MM: I can’t agree with Olivier and Fouad. Olivier, help me to understand

why the directly affected parties shouldn’t have the primary responsibility

for operations they are the direct users of and that their own operations

depend on. To me your claim that this constitutes a “conflict of interest”

is almost self-contradictory and self-refuting – it is a confluence of

interest, not a conflict – but perhaps I am missing something. Please

explain. What I suspect is happening is that both of you are confusing

policy development functions of ICANN with the operational and technical

functions of IANA, and applying inappropriate mental models drawn from the

former to the latter. In policy development we want “openness, diversity,

inclusiveness and the user perspective.” In the DNS IANA functions the

users are the registries, it’s an intermediate good, it’s all about

implementation, so we want efficiency, security and direct accountability

to the primary users, not some playground for different stakeholders to

voice their opinions. I do agree with Alan there should be safeguards to

prevent the operational and technical functions from being managed in ways

that undermine or subvert policy that is made in the MS process. It would

be useful to discuss institutional safeguards – including antitrust law –

to prevent those kinds of things. But throwing an infinite number of

“stakeholders” into looking over the shoulders of those making root zone

file modifications accomplishes nothing useful from a public interest

perspective, while raising all kinds of risks and inefficiencies. If Alan

can recognize the danger that IANA contractors or implementations might

compromise the policy process, I hope that he can also recognize the danger

that politicized ‘multstakeholdered’ oversight of the technical operations

could be abused to circumvent or veto the policies developed by the MS

process.

On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 1:41 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

I think we need to start from principles, as opposed to having a solution

and making sure the principles fit the desired solution.

And if we are stating that we think 'one Stakeholder Group is more

relevant than all other stakeholder types' and by virtue of that have

primacy in decision making, then that should be stated explicitly in the

principles section. If it is already then I missed it.

I prefer the equal-footing multistakeholder principle, but if there is

near consensus for the one stakeholder above all stakeholders viewpoint, I

would like to understand.

Thanks

avri

On 15-Nov-14 01:33, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri

I'm sure your viewpoints are not being ignored. Peace. I forgive you for

your sin.

Nobody is saying multi stakeholder compositions are not applicable or there

is consensus against it. Please look at strawmans 2 and 3.

I intact support a multi-stakeholder composition.

I'm just saying I don't agree there is consensus against a registry only

composition, which you seem to be eliminating by way of the principle that

you are suggesting.

On 15 Nov 2014 11:51, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

Apologies, guess I picked the wrong email. I hope I can be forgiven for

this sin.

I guess that means that my viewpoints will just be ignored.

But if this group is able to decide that multistakeholder models are not

applicable, no matter which thread an email is attached to. I think we may

be in more trouble than I think we are. Are you saying we have consensus

on a principle against commitment to the multistakeholder model? How can

that be when the multistakeholder model is really one of the first

principles we much meet for an NTIA solution

avri

On 14-Nov-14 22:48, Guru Acharya wrote:

Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the

principles.

And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the

oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores

the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition.

On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:

Hi,

I have suggested a few edits to the doc. hope I did it in the mandated

manner.

the changes refer to

- transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be

published.

- bottom-up modalities

- multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements.

Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting.

avri

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Avri, I fully support the multistakeholder approach for policy development and for policy implementation but I don’t think it fits very well in the day-to-day implementation of IANA functions except at a very high level such as replacing the IANA Functions Operator as someone else already pointed out. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 3:11 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B Hi, I think we need to start from principles, as opposed to having a solution and making sure the principles fit the desired solution. And if we are stating that we think 'one Stakeholder Group is more relevant than all other stakeholder types' and by virtue of that have primacy in decision making, then that should be stated explicitly in the principles section. If it is already then I missed it. I prefer the equal-footing multistakeholder principle, but if there is near consensus for the one stakeholder above all stakeholders viewpoint, I would like to understand. Thanks avri On 15-Nov-14 01:33, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri I'm sure your viewpoints are not being ignored. Peace. I forgive you for your sin. Nobody is saying multi stakeholder compositions are not applicable or there is consensus against it. Please look at strawmans 2 and 3. I intact support a multi-stakeholder composition. I'm just saying I don't agree there is consensus against a registry only composition, which you seem to be eliminating by way of the principle that you are suggesting. On 15 Nov 2014 11:51, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, Apologies, guess I picked the wrong email. I hope I can be forgiven for this sin. I guess that means that my viewpoints will just be ignored. But if this group is able to decide that multistakeholder models are not applicable, no matter which thread an email is attached to. I think we may be in more trouble than I think we are. Are you saying we have consensus on a principle against commitment to the multistakeholder model? How can that be when the multistakeholder model is really one of the first principles we much meet for an NTIA solution avri On 14-Nov-14 22:48, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the principles. And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition. On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org><mailto:avri@acm.org> wrote: Hi, I have suggested a few edits to the doc. hope I did it in the mandated manner. the changes refer to - transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be published. - bottom-up modalities - multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements. Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting. avri _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<mailto:listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship

I support the argument of Avri regarding the Multistakeholder approach. If we were only looking at technical oversight, we do not need this approach. However, the task is to replace an administrative supervisor of IANA Function Operator (through the contract), who wants a new mechanism specifically  based on Multistakeholder approach. For this reason I will suggest we focus on how the new arrangement would fit into the requirements of all stakeholders participating on equal footing and not on technical oversight. Having said these, I also understand the point that the best technical overseers are the direct customers of IANA (Registries- gTLD and ccTLD), this may be included as a value add. Mary Uduma   On Saturday, November 15, 2014 4:12 PM, "Gomes, Chuck" <cgomes@verisign.com> wrote: #yiv5332570735 #yiv5332570735 -- _filtered #yiv5332570735 {font-family:Calibri;panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;} _filtered #yiv5332570735 {font-family:Tahoma;panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;} _filtered #yiv5332570735 {font-family:Consolas;panose-1:2 11 6 9 2 2 4 3 2 4;}#yiv5332570735 #yiv5332570735 p.yiv5332570735MsoNormal, #yiv5332570735 li.yiv5332570735MsoNormal, #yiv5332570735 div.yiv5332570735MsoNormal {margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;font-size:12.0pt;color:#330033;}#yiv5332570735 a:link, #yiv5332570735 span.yiv5332570735MsoHyperlink {color:blue;text-decoration:underline;}#yiv5332570735 a:visited, #yiv5332570735 span.yiv5332570735MsoHyperlinkFollowed {color:purple;text-decoration:underline;}#yiv5332570735 pre {margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;font-size:10.0pt;color:#330033;}#yiv5332570735 span.yiv5332570735HTMLPreformattedChar {font-family:Consolas;color:#330033;}#yiv5332570735 span.yiv5332570735EmailStyle19 {color:#1F497D;}#yiv5332570735 .yiv5332570735MsoChpDefault {font-size:10.0pt;} _filtered #yiv5332570735 {margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;}#yiv5332570735 div.yiv5332570735WordSection1 {}#yiv5332570735 Avri,   I fully support the multistakeholder approach for policy development and for policy implementation but I don’t think it fits very well in the day-to-day implementation of IANA functions except at a very high level such as replacing the IANA Functions Operator as someone else already pointed out.   Chuck   From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org]On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 3:11 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] multistakeholder principle was Re: [] FW: FW: CWG ... 2B   Hi, I think we need to start from principles, as opposed to having a solution and making sure the principles fit the desired solution. And if we are stating that we think 'one Stakeholder Group is more relevant than all other stakeholder types' and by virtue of that have primacy in decision making, then that should be stated explicitly in the principles section.   If it is already then I missed it. I prefer the equal-footing multistakeholder principle, but if there is near consensus for the one stakeholder above all stakeholders viewpoint, I would like to understand. Thanks avri On 15-Nov-14 01:33, Guru Acharya wrote: Avri   I'm sure your viewpoints are not being ignored. Peace. I forgive you for your sin.   Nobody is saying multi stakeholder compositions are not applicable or there is consensus against it. Please look at strawmans 2 and 3.   I intact support a multi-stakeholder composition.   I'm just saying I don't agree there is consensus against a registry only composition, which you seem to be eliminating by way of the principle that you are suggesting. On 15 Nov 2014 11:51, "Avri Doria" <avri@acm.org> wrote:   Hi,   Apologies, guess I picked the wrong email.  I hope I can be forgiven for this sin.   I guess that means that my viewpoints will just be ignored.   But if this group is able to decide that multistakeholder models are not applicable, no matter which thread an email is attached to. I think we may be in more trouble than I think we are.  Are you saying we have consensus on a principle against commitment to the multistakeholder model?  How can that be when the multistakeholder model is really one of the first principles we much meet for an NTIA solution   avri   On 14-Nov-14 22:48, Guru Acharya wrote:   Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the principles.   And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition.   On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> <avri@acm.org> wrote:       Hi,   I have suggested a few edits to the doc.  hope I did it in the mandated manner.   the changes refer to   - transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be published. - bottom-up modalities - multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements.   Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting.   avri     _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing listCWG-Stewardship@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship       _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship         _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship

I keep starting to make the same mistake as Avri. I suggest that the file naming be more carefully done to not duplicate the use of key RFP section names. Using a RFP Subsection number like ‘2B’ in the file name for a principles document should be avoided going forward. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: Friday, November 14, 2014 10:49 PM To: Avri Doria Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] FW: FW: CWG RFP2B Proposal Avri - You got the wrong thread. This thread is for RFP2B and not the principles. And your suggested principle for a multi-stakeholder composition of the oversight council appears to be in contradiction to Strawman 1 and ignores the range of discussions that happened on this list about the composition. On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org<mailto:avri@acm.org>> wrote: Hi, I have suggested a few edits to the doc. hope I did it in the mandated manner. the changes refer to - transparency and requirements that any and all audit reports be published. - bottom-up modalities - multistakeholder nature of any committee or oversight arrangements. Hope I did not mess up any of the formatting. avri _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship