July 2015 - Accountability-Cross-Community

Two blog posts (key acct'y issues for Paris, what's at stake)
by Jordan Carter July 15, 2015

July 15, 2015

Hi folks I hope those who have to travel are well on their way to Paris. I've started, so only 27 hours to go... I've just written with an update on the state of play on the IANA Stewardship transition and ICANN accountability debates. The post tries to look at what's at stake in these discussions and I've tried to make it as readable as possible. The post is here: < https://internetnz.nz/blog/icann-accountability-iana-stewardship-whats-stake > For my organisation as the steward for .nz this stuff matters in a practical sense, not just as a contribution to good governance of the Internet at a global level. If ICANN breaks, the integrity of our ccTLD itself faces risks. I've also done a companion post that looks at three of the critical questions or issues facing the Accountability working group at its meeting at the end of this week. I've also offered our InternetNZ perspective on these topics. They are: * how strong the accountability measures in ICANN should be; * what the right role for governments might be; * what topics have to be dealt with before the IANA stewardship transition. That post is here: < https://internetnz.nz/blog/three-key-issues-icanns-accountability-working-g… > Happy reading and look forward to any feedback, corrections, arguments, etc, that ensue. See many of you in Paris! cheers, Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter *A better world through a better Internet *

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed
by Alan Greenberg July 15, 2015

July 15, 2015

At 14/07/2015 05:50 PM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote: >Alan, > >1. If a group went so wrong with their >selection of a Director as to warrant his/her >removal, what makes you think the Alternate they >selected at the same time would be better? Or >even still applicable given the obvious shift in priorities or perspectives? >And what makes you think the replacement or the >caretaker you will select after the removal will >be better???? This is a tricky question. To make >it more clear, what makes the US people think >the Vice President they elected together with >the president would be a good choice to replace >the President in case of vacancy????? The US VP is selected using the teenager model of life. "I will never die", so I select my VP based not on who could do the job if I die, but who can help be get the most votes. A REALLY bad model to select if we are looking for good governance! But you do get points for thinking of it! > >2. If I understand correctly, you are >proposing that a number of AC/SO could remove >the director appointed by a particular AC/SO. >And they could do so even if the appointing >organization did not agree. If that is correct, >it would allow groups to gang-up on a director >they did not like BECAUSE of that persons views. >If 4 SO/ACs decide to recall a director, it must >be because he is not performing well for the >benefit of the whole organization even if the >appointing party is not among them. But if this >bothers you, I can add a mention that the >appointing body should be among the 4 SO/ACs >necessary to recall a board director. >If you think 4 SO/ACs will likely gang-up on a >director they did not like BECAUSE of that >persons views, should we really trust them to appoint directors at all?? Actually, I don't really think it is much of a threat, but others have raised it. Safe travels to Paris, Alan > >To be specific, it would allow the rest of the >community (or a large part of it) to remove the >At-Large Director even though At-:Large was >happy with the person. Is that your intent? >See the above comment. > >3. You say that a Director could be removed >as "punishment" over a particular vote. If you >think AC/SOs will likely do this, should we >really trust them to appoint directors at all?? >See the above comment. > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >Tijani BEN JEMAA >Executive Director >Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) >Phone: + 216 41 649 605 >Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 >Fax: + 216 70 853 376 >-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > >De : Alan Greenberg [mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca] >EnvoyÃ© : mardi 14 juillet 2015 15:00 >Ã : tijani.benjemaa(a)planet.tn; 'Jordan Carter' >Cc : 'Accountability Cross Community' >Objet : Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed > >Tijani, without making a more general comment, I >do have several strong concerns with your proposal: > >1. If a group went so wrong with their selection >of a Director as to warrant his/her removal, >what makes you think the Alternate they selected >at the same time would be better? Or even still >applicable given the obvious shift in priorities or perspectives? > >2. If I understand correctly, you are proposing >that a number of AC/SO could remove the director >appointed by a particular AC/SO. And they could >do so even if the appointing organization did >not agree. If that is correct, it would allow >groups to gang-up on a director they did not >like BECAUSE of that persons views. To be >specific, it would allow the rest of the >community (or a large part of it) to remove the >At-Large Directo even though At-:Large was happy >with the person. Is that your intent? > >3. You say that a Director could be removed as >"punishment" over a particular vote. If you >think AC/SOs will likely do this, should we >really trust them to appoint directors at all??? > >Alan > >At 13/07/2015 06:25 PM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote: > > > >Hi Jordan, > >I am personally quite comfortable with the logic >of the appointing body being the removing body >for individual directors (recognising there is >work to be done in respect of NomCom appointees). > >One of the concerns that comes up in thinking >about this is probably well represented by this >hypothetical & fictional scenario: > >The GNSO demands that the proceeds of the new >gTLD programme be returned to the registries pro >rata depending on the number of registrations. >The Board does not agree, including the GNSO >appointed directors on the Board. The GNSO >removes its directors and appoints different >ones who say they will support this proposal. > >I think this scenario would never play out in practice. > >Why not? >ÃÂ· two out of sixteen directors would >never be credibly enough to completely change >the Board's position on a matter involving >significant resources and impact on the public. >The GNSO can recall their dissident director >even if they know the Board decision will not change, just to punish him >ÃÂ· the new directors would face the >same obligations the old directors faced to act in the public interest >I donÃ¢t see how this obligation will prevent >the scescenario to happen since the evaluation >of the public Interest may be different from a party (or a person) to another > >The removal of individual directors is possible >in very many organisations and it is only when >they are dysfunctional that these sorts of games start being played. >To ensure that this will only happen when there >is dysfunction, we need to put the necessary and >right rules, not permit to the appointing bodies >to recall there directors without convincing reason > >I think in any situation where an SO/AC or the >NomCom was contemplating removing a director, >they'd be carefully considering what they could >really achieve. And they'd be unlikely to do it >for reasons of rent-seeking or other self-interested things. >you are lucky to believe so even if nothing prevent it > >The whole rationale behind the power, in my >view, is that it simply tightens the link >between directors and their appointing bodies. >It isn't and should not be a backdoor way to >change directors from directors into mere >avatars for the specific interests of their appointing groups. > >George, I hope this is constructive. > >A last question... > >Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you >would see the exercise of such a power being >done by "a process that is broadly distributed >in the community" as an alternative for us to >consider, and seek legal advice on? >This is a proposals for exercising the power of >recalling Board directors by a process that is >well distributed in the community consisting in >recalling the board directors (from 1 to 15) by >the community and not a single SO or AC: >ÃÂ· The decision is taken by at least 4 >SOs and/or ACs including at list 1 SO and 1 AC. >ÃÂ· All the directors have the same >treatment (selected by their constituencies or by the nomcom) >ÃÂ· The SOs and ACs and the NomCom >select the board directors and their interim >simultaneously (the GNSO selects 2 acting >directors and 2 interim ones and the ALAC >selects 1 acting director and 1 interim one, etc.). >ÃÂ· All acting directors sign before >taking their position as Board Director a >commitment to step down in case a community decision to recall them is taken >ÃÂ· Those interim directors will fully >replace the removed directors if the number of >recalled directors is less than 8. In case the >number reaches 8 or more, the resulting board >(non recalled directors plus the interim of the >recalled ones) will act as a caretaker till the >selection of new directors to replace the recalled ones. >ÃÂ· This is to replace the 2 powers: >stilling the whole board and recalling individual board directors. >This has the merit to; >ÃÂ· Fulfill the requirement of having >the power to remove the whole Board and to remove individual board members >ÃÂ· make the change smaller and simpler >by having a single mechanism to recall the board directors instead of 2 >ÃÂ· not having to find a way for the >nomcom to remove their appointed directors >ÃÂ· avoid a period where ICANN run without board in place >ÃÂ· avoid the risk of having an SO or >AC recalling their selected director because of >the SO or AC interest and not the global public interest > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >Tijani BEN JEMAA >Executive Director >Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) >Phone: + 216 41 649 605 >Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 >Fax: + 216 70 853 376 >-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > >De : >accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org >[ >mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] >De la part de Jordan Carter >EnvoyÃÂ© : dimanche 12 juillet 2015 04:40 >Cc : Accountability Cross Community >Objet : Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed > >Thank you George, interesting post - a couple of thoughts in line below: > >On 11 July 2015 at 05:13, George Sadowsky ><<mailto:george.sadowsky@gmail.com> george.sadowsky(a)gmail.com> wrote: > ><snip> >Here's the question: Does the CCWG believe that >the global public interest is _always_ defined >by "community" consensus or "community" >dictates? Yes or no? I believe that the great >majority of the time the two are consistent, but >I believe that there are cases in which they >diverge. Is there any disagreement among us >that this could happen? In that case, what >should a Board member do? Which is the higher >authority according to the CCWG's thinking? > >I think there will always be occasions when >there is a divergence between interpretations of >the global public interest on the part of >different stakeholders. The ICANN Board will >remain charged, I think, with bringing that >global perspective to bear. But this decision is >made easier by ICANN's very limited role, and by >the identify of interests in its performance of >that role between what the Internet and its >users need, and what core operational ICANN >stakeholders want: completely reliable operation >of the IANA functions, and an open and >accountable, bottom up, consensus driven policy >process - with the Board generally validating >the outcomes of consensus policy processes. > >To put it another way, the global public >interest is always served by ICANN focusing on >doing its core operational jobs well. Beyond >that, it becomes very subjective, as you note. > ><snip> >This implies to me that the test for removal of >a Director must rest upon a process that is >broadly distributed in the community and must >recognize the different organizations to which >such a member is accountable as an important factor in the process. >What are the opinions of members of the CCWG on this point? > >I am personally quite comfortable with the logic >of the appointing body being the removing body >for individual directors (recognising there is >work to be done in respect of NomCom appointees). >)One of the concerns that comes up in thinking >about this is probably well represented by this >hypothetical & fictional scenario: > >The GNSO demands that the proceeds of the new >gTLD programme be returned to the registries pro >rata depending on the number of registrations. >The Board does not agree, including the GNSO >appointed directors on the Board. The GNSO >removes its directors and appoints different >ones who say they will support this proposal. > >I think this scenario would never play out in practice. > >Why not? > * two out of sixteen directors would never > be credibly enough to completely change the > Board's position on a matter involving > significant resources and impact on the public. > * the new directors would face the same > obligations the old directors faced to act in the public interest > >The removal of individual directors is possible >in very many organisations and it is only when >they are dysfunctional that these sorts of games start being played. > >I think in any situation where an SO/AC or the >NomCom was contemplating removing a director, >they'd be carefully considering what they could >really achieve. And they'd be unlikely to do it >for reasons of rent-seeking or other self-interested things. > >The whole rationale behind the power, in my >view, is that it simply tightens the link >between directors and their appointing bodies. >It isn't and should not be a backdoor way to >change directors from directors into mere >avatars for the specific interests of their appointing groups. > >George, I hope this is constructive. > >A last question... > >Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you >would see the exercise of such a power being >done by "a process that is broadly distributed >in the community" as an alternative for us to >consider, and seek legal advice on? >The advice we've had so far suggests that it's >simple to have the appointment and removal >function with the same group, but more >complicated (though not, if memory serves, >impossible) for removers to be different to appointers. > > >cheers >Jordan > > >-- >Jordan Carter > >Chief Executive >InternetNZ > >04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) ><mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz >Skype: jordancarter > >A better world through a better Internet > > >---------- >L'absence de virus dans ce courrier >ÃÂ©lectronique a ÃÂ©tÃÂ© vÃÂ©rifiÃÂ©e par le logiciel antivirus Avast. ><http://www.avast.com/>www.avast.com > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org ><https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > >---------- >L'absence de virus dans ce courrier >Ã©lectronique a Ã©tÃ© vÃ©rifiÃ©e par le logiciel antivirus Avast. ><http://www.avast.com/>www.avast.com

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Regarding available financial information
by Bruce Tonkin July 15, 2015

July 15, 2015

Hello All, The ICANN Chief Financial Officer (CFO) - Xavier Calvez - has published a blog entry to provide additional clarity about some of the information published in our USA tax return (IRS 2014 form 990). See: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/want-to-learn-more-about-icann-s-financials For those interested in ICANN's financials, I recommend you join the next quarterly call on 20 August 2015, where Xavier will be available to answer questions on the quarter finishing on 30 June 2015. Previous quarterly calls are archived at: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/quarterly-reports-2014-11-13-en Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Proposal for dealing with removal of directors (was Re: An mplication of accountability models being discussed)
by Julie Hammer July 15, 2015

July 15, 2015

Hi Tijani and Jordan, I realise that I am coming into this discussion quite ‘cold’, and without the background and experience of those of you who’ve been working on this for months, so please see my comments in that light. I do like Tijani’s suggestion of having people pre-selected to step in should a problem with one or more directors arise. I also like the elegance of one mechanism rather than two. A variation on this that occurred to me is, rather than select new people to be the ‘interims’, would it be feasible to actually appoint as ‘interims’ the most immediate past directors as they retire from the Board? If they have survived their term on the Board, then one could hopefully conclude they had behaved appropriately and competently in that role. That way, we do not have inexperienced directors assuming their role in a time of tension or crisis. Rather, the person or people stepping in would actually have relatively recent background, skills and experience. Appointments to be board, by both SO/ACs and NomCom could then be made on the understanding that the commitment is for a set time on the Board, followed by a period as ‘interim’ during which they may or may not be called upon the serve. It also means we don’t have look for and appoint more people than we currently do. I’m sure they may be one or two disadvantages of this suggestion, but possibly a number of advantages too? Cheers, Julie On 14 Jul 2015, at 7:21 pm, Tijani BEN JEMAA <tijani.benjemaa(a)planet.tn> wrote: I have a couple of queries / concerns with this: - if you s/elect "alternative" directors at the same time as the genuine article, is there an incentive on those people to undermine the ordinary directors? Not at all. In several organization, people elect the acting member and an alternate one to be used only in case of vacancy. - is it legally achievable - i.e. will the springing resignation letters provide enough cover for a different group than appointed, to enact the removal? As I said several times, I’m not a lawyer. But lawyers can advise for the right way to make it binding for the removed directors to step down when the community decides so - could the community council be the decision body for doing this on the community's part? I think it could, but I wouldn’t refuse any other channel that ensure there is at least 4 SOs and/or ACs willing to recall the director(s) including at least 1 SO and 1 AC. De : accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] De la part de Jordan Carter Envoyé : mardi 14 juillet 2015 07:13 Cc : Accountability Cross Community Objet : [CCWG-ACCT] Proposal for dealing with removal of directors (was Re: An mplication of accountability models being discussed) Hi all, Tijani made the proposal below and I wanted to draw it into a separate thread in case people missed it. On 14 July 2015 at 10:25, Tijani BEN JEMAA <tijani.benjemaa(a)planet.tn <mailto:tijani.benjemaa@planet.tn>> wrote: Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you would see the exercise of such a power being done by "a process that is broadly distributed in the community" as an alternative for us to consider, and seek legal advice on? This is a proposals for exercising the power of recalling Board directors by a process that is well distributed in the community consisting in recalling the board directors (from 1 to 15) by the community and not a single SO or AC: · The decision is taken by at least 4 SOs and/or ACs including at list 1 SO and 1 AC. · All the directors have the same treatment (selected by their constituencies or by the nomcom) · The SOs and ACs and the NomCom select the board directors and their interim simultaneously (the GNSO selects 2 acting directors and 2 interim ones and the ALAC selects 1 acting director and 1 interim one, etc.). · All acting directors sign before taking their position as Board Director a commitment to step down in case a community decision to recall them is taken · Those interim directors will fully replace the removed directors if the number of recalled directors is less than 8. In case the number reaches 8 or more, the resulting board (non recalled directors plus the interim of the recalled ones) will act as a caretaker till the selection of new directors to replace the recalled ones. · This is to replace the 2 powers: stilling the whole board and recalling individual board directors. This has the merit to; · Fulfill the requirement of having the power to remove the whole Board and to remove individual board members · make the change smaller and simpler by having a single mechanism to recall the board directors instead of 2 · not having to find a way for the nomcom to remove their appointed directors · avoid a period where ICANN run without board in place · avoid the risk of having an SO or AC recalling their selected director because of the SO or AC interest and not the global public interest I have a couple of queries / concerns with this: - if you s/elect "alternative" directors at the same time as the genuine article, is there an incentive on those people to undermine the ordinary directors? - is it legally achievable - i.e. will the springing resignation letters provide enough cover for a different group than appointed, to enact the removal? - could the community council be the decision body for doing this on the community's part? cheers Jordan <http://www.avast.com/> L'absence de virus dans ce courrier électronique a été vérifiée par le logiciel antivirus Avast. www.avast.com <http://www.avast.com/> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed
by Alan Greenberg July 14, 2015

July 14, 2015

Tijani, without making a more general comment, I do have several strong concerns with your proposal: 1. If a group went so wrong with their selection of a Director as to warrant his/her removal, what makes you think the Alternate they selected at the same time would be better? Or even still applicable given the obvious shift in priorities or perspectives? 2. If I understand correctly, you are proposing that a number of AC/SO could remove the director appointed by a particular AC/SO. And they could do so even if the appointing organization did not agree. If that is correct, it would allow groups to gang-up on a director they did not like BECAUSE of that persons views. To be specific, it would allow the rest of the community (or a large part of it) to remove the At-Large Directo even though At-:Large was happy with the person. Is that your intent? 3. You say that a Director could be removed as "punishment" over a particular vote. If you think AC/SOs will likely do this, should we really trust them to appoint directors at all??? Alan At 13/07/2015 06:25 PM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote: >Hi Jordan, > >I am personally quite comfortable with the logic >of the appointing body being the removing body >for individual directors (recognising there is >work to be done in respect of NomCom appointees). > >One of the concerns that comes up in thinking >about this is probably well represented by this >hypothetical & fictional scenario: > >The GNSO demands that the proceeds of the new >gTLD programme be returned to the registries pro >rata depending on the number of registrations. >The Board does not agree, including the GNSO >appointed directors on the Board. The GNSO >removes its directors and appoints different >ones who say they will support this proposal. > >I think this scenario would never play out in practice. > >Why not? >Â· two out of sixteen directors would >never be credibly enough to completely change >the Board's position on a matter involving >significant resources and impact on the public. >The GNSO can recall their dissident director >even if they know the Board decision will not change, just to punish him >Â· the new directors would face the same >obligations the old directors faced to act in the public interest >I donât see how this obligation will prevent >the scenario to happen since the evaluation of >the public Interest may be different from a party (or a person) to another > >The removal of individual directors is possible >in very many organisations and it is only when >they are dysfunctional that these sorts of games start being played. >To ensure that this will only happen when there >is dysfunction, we need to put the necessary and >right rules, not permit to the appointing bodies >to recall there directors without convincing reason > >I think in any situation where an SO/AC or the >NomCom was contemplating removing a director, >they'd be carefully considering what they could >really achieve. And they'd be unlikely to do it >for reasons of rent-seeking or other self-interested things. >you are lucky to believe so even if nothing prevent it > >The whole rationale behind the power, in my >view, is that it simply tightens the link >between directors and their appointing bodies. >It isn't and should not be a backdoor way to >change directors from directors into mere >avatars for the specific interests of their appointing groups. > >George, I hope this is constructive. > >A last question... > >Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you >would see the exercise of such a power being >done by "a process that is broadly distributed >in the community" as an alternative for us to >consider, and seek legal advice on? >This is a proposals for exercising the power of >recalling Board directors by a process that is >well distributed in the community consisting in >recalling the board directors (from 1 to 15) by >the community and not a single SO or AC: >Â· The decision is taken by at least 4 >SOs and/or ACs including at list 1 SO and 1 AC. >Â· All the directors have the same >treatment (selected by their constituencies or by the nomcom) >Â· The SOs and ACs and the NomCom select >the board directors and their interim >simultaneously (the GNSO selects 2 acting >directors and 2 interim ones and the ALAC >selects 1 acting director and 1 interim one, etc.). >Â· All acting directors sign before >taking their position as Board Director a >commitment to step down in case a community decision to recall them is taken >Â· Those interim directors will fully >replace the removed directors if the number of >recalled directors is less than 8. In case the >number reaches 8 or more, the resulting board >(non recalled directors plus the interim of the >recalled ones) will act as a caretaker till the >selection of new directors to replace the recalled ones. >Â· This is to replace the 2 powers: >stilling the whole board and recalling individual board directors. >This has the merit to; >Â· Fulfill the requirement of having the >power to remove the whole Board and to remove individual board members >Â· make the change smaller and simpler >by having a single mechanism to recall the board directors instead of 2 >Â· not having to find a way for the >nomcom to remove their appointed directors >Â· avoid a period where ICANN run without board in place >Â· avoid the risk of having an SO or AC >recalling their selected director because of the >SO or AC interest and not the global public interest > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >Tijani BEN JEMAA >Executive Director >Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) >Phone: + 216 41 649 605 >Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 >Fax: + 216 70 853 376 >-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > >De : >accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org >[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] >De la part de Jordan Carter >EnvoyÃ© : dimanche 12 juillet 2015 04:40 >Cc : Accountability Cross Community >Objet : Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed > >Thank you George, interesting post - a couple of thoughts in line below: > >On 11 July 2015 at 05:13, George Sadowsky ><<mailto:george.sadowsky@gmail.com>george.sadowsky(a)gmail.com> wrote: > ><snip> >Here's the question: Does the CCWG believe that >the global public interest is _always_ defined >by "community" consensus or "community" >dictates? Yes or no? I believe that the great >majority of the time the two are consistent, but >I believe that there are cases in which they >diverge. Is there any disagreement among us >that this could happen? In that case, what >should a Board member do? Which is the higher >authority according to the CCWG's thinking? > > >I think there will always be occasions when >there is a divergence between interpretations of >the global public interest on the part of >different stakeholders. The ICANN Board will >remain charged, I think, with bringing that >global perspective to bear. But this decision is >made easier by ICANN's very limited role, and by >the identify of interests in its performance of >that role between what the Internet and its >users need, and what core operational ICANN >stakeholders want: completely reliable operation >of the IANA functions, and an open and >accountable, bottom up, consensus driven policy >process - with the Board generally validating >the outcomes of consensus policy processes. > >To put it another way, the global public >interest is always served by ICANN focusing on >doing its core operational jobs well. Beyond >that, it becomes very subjective, as you note. > ><snip> > >This implies to me that the test for removal of >a Director must rest upon a process that is >broadly distributed in the community and must >recognize the different organizations to which >such a member is accountable as an important factor in the process. > >What are the opinions of members of the CCWG on this point? > > >I am personally quite comfortable with the logic >of the appointing body being the removing body >for individual directors (recognising there is >work to be done in respect of NomCom appointees). >)One of the concerns that comes up in thinking >about this is probably well represented by this >hypothetical & fictional scenario: > >The GNSO demands that the proceeds of the new >gTLD programme be returned to the registries pro >rata depending on the number of registrations. >The Board does not agree, including the GNSO >appointed directors on the Board. The GNSO >removes its directors and appoints different >ones who say they will support this proposal. > >I think this scenario would never play out in practice. > >Why not? > * two out of sixteen directors would never > be credibly enough to completely change the > Board's position on a matter involving > significant resources and impact on the public. > * the new directors would face the same > obligations the old directors faced to act in the public interest > >The removal of individual directors is possible >in very many organisations and it is only when >they are dysfunctional that these sorts of games start being played. > >I think in any situation where an SO/AC or the >NomCom was contemplating removing a director, >they'd be carefully considering what they could >really achieve. And they'd be unlikely to do it >for reasons of rent-seeking or other self-interested things. > >The whole rationale behind the power, in my >view, is that it simply tightens the link >between directors and their appointing bodies. >It isn't and should not be a backdoor way to >change directors from directors into mere >avatars for the specific interests of their appointing groups. > >George, I hope this is constructive. > >A last question... > >Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you >would see the exercise of such a power being >done by "a process that is broadly distributed >in the community" as an alternative for us to >consider, and seek legal advice on? >The advice we've had so far suggests that it's >simple to have the appointment and removal >function with the same group, but more >complicated (though not, if memory serves, >impossible) for removers to be different to appointers. > > >cheers >Jordan > > >-- >Jordan Carter > >Chief Executive >InternetNZ > >04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) ><mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz >Skype: jordancarter > >A better world through a better Internet > > > >---------- >L'absence de virus dans ce courrier >Ã©lectronique a Ã©tÃ© vÃ©rifiÃ©e par le logiciel antivirus Avast. ><http://www.avast.com/>www.avast.com > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for WP3 Meeting #5 (14 July)
by Kimberly Carlson July 14, 2015

July 14, 2015

Hello all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the WP3 Meeting #5- 14 July will be available here: https://community.icann.org/x/76o0Aw A copy of the notes and action items may be found below. Thank you. Best regards, Kim ACTION Items ACTION ITEM: Leon to close staff accountability doc and to send to staff for frozen set ACTION ITEM: Leon to reword suggestions ACTION ITEM: Leon to make necessary adjustments and to circulate as part of frozen set. ACTION ITEM: Sebastien to send diversity paper with note that WP3 could not agree on final version. Notes Cheryl on AC. Staff accountability Several comments were made and incorporated into document. Feedback: - Information on existing mechanisms are needed (for instance harassment education) - New section was added bottom of page 2. Board of Directors holds ICANN accountable but if Board vets powers in staff then there is no accountability measures unless we create some. It would be opportune to define ICANN's role. ---> Include definition of role of ICANN staff - Rights of staff. - Whistleblowing - ICANN suffers from absence of corporate or social responsibility officer. External audit/review of process needed. - What powers are vested in staff? Understanding is needed. - .Giving focus to staff in contract negotiations may have policy implications. When is the Board required to approve contract provisions? There are no accountability mechanism that speak to that. - Insert title that states that these are recommendations and not Bylaws - IRP is only applicable to Board actions and inactions ---> Look into mechanisms applicable to staff - Ombudsman is established as WS2. We need to make sure WS2 happens. It should be scope to review that ICANN staff does not use Ombudsman for personnel issues - IRP applicable to staff: would that be delegated to WP1? --> WP3 would be delegating suggestions to WP1 ACTION ITEM: Leon to close staff accountability doc and to send to staff for frozen set We will discuss in Paris whether recommendations will be incorporated into WS1 document. Most recommendations will be moved to WS2. SO/AC Accountability ACTION ITEM: Leon to reword suggestions. Feedback: - Add "according to the case" as it may not be applicable to GAC. - No objections to keeping paragraph 5. ACTION ITEM: Leon to make necessary adjustments and to circulate as part of frozen set. Diversity Comments were integrated. Feedback: - Implementation concerns. - Should be applicable to extent possible. - How could the fellowship program work better? - Start with creating a diverse pool. - This is a non-exhaustive list. Neutrality is most important. Disagree with preferences. Degree of priority needed. - We need practical criteria. - We can conduct a review in WS2 of what has happened in organizations and governments. Intensified outreach needed. - Define specifics. - Danger that we do not fix things but makes metrics look better. - Document that minority of group disagrees. - Add that non-exhaustive list. - Include outreach and engagement. ACTION ITEM: Sebastien to send diversity paper with note that WP3 could not agree on final version.

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Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for WP2 Meeting #8 (13 July)
by Brenda Brewer July 14, 2015

July 14, 2015

Hello all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the WP2 Meeting #8 - 13 July will be available here: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=53783221 A copy of the notes and action items may be found below. Thank you. Kind regards, Brenda Action Items ACTION ITEM: Discuss on list whether any discussion needed in Paris ACTION ITEM: Becky to propose new language to reflect comments and discussions on affirmative constraint. ACTION ITEM: Becky to circulate a revised doc on IRP. Notes Mission Statement First changes in mission statement were suggested by the IAB and Post-Kiehl comments. IAB suggested that ICANN's mission is to support the policy development for the Internet core registry. Language for coordination has been there for quite a while. Feedback: - Suggestion to use IANA registry - Concerns about IAB's use of "support". --> Retain coordination language - Coordination is important. To get it implemented and operationalized. - Is "coordinate" an attempt to evolve or devolve? We need to understand what they are aiming at. - Suggestion to use facilitate instead of coordinate - Request that we remain consistent in language - uniform approach is needed. Support or facilitate should be an open issue that would need to be considered by whole group. - Existing language has priority --> Retain wording that is in current Bylaws. ACTION ITEM: Discuss on list whether any discussion needed in Paris - Objection to "reasonably necessary" ---> It is current Bylaws language. The language is more limited - Would we rely on this language for IRP? - Consider contract enforcement and regulation - Is provision part of ICANN purpose - Concerns about ICANN compliance enforcing provisions that are not within mission. - Question raised as to whether ICANN enforcing a contract is regulation. ---> We do not believe that the language precludes ICANN from enforcing its contracts - A very large number of comments that referred to keeping ICANN squarely within its mission and indeed many that expressly referred to the need not to allow that it's mechanisms in which the contract enforcement would be included to go beyond that into a regulatory space. - ACTION ITEM: Becky to propose new language to reflect comments and discussions on affirmative constraint. Core Values - Commitments reflect ICANN's fundamental compact with the global internet community and are intended to apply consistently and comprehensively to ICANN's activities. In any situation where a core value must be reconciled or - with another, the balancing must further an important public interest goal identified through the multi-stakeholder process. ---> Ok to move on with proposed language. ---> No objection to local law addition - Suggestion to have indicative list of applicable treaties is for WP3. - Is unbiased to challenge experts or do we feel there has been biased experts in the past. - Conflict of interest is given - no need to add it. - Add in on biased is a risk. It's inherent in system. --> Agreement to remove unbiased - Suggestion to remove "to the extent feasible and appropriate" and "where feasible and appropriate" without creating unnecessary constraints on ICANN ---> Remove "to the extent feasible and appropriate" ---> Implement paragraph 336 into the language - Concerns about "consistent with the mission" and "remaining rooted in the private sector" language - Suggestion to change "governments and public authorities" to "the GAC - Suggestion to add "within their own jurisdictions" ---> Include "GAC" and "within their jurisdiction" --> Include "striving to achieve a reasonable balance between the interests of different stakeholders in the pursuit of its mission." ACTION ITEM: Becky to circulate a revised doc on IRP.

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Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for CCWG ACCT Meeting #40 (14 July)
by Kimberly Carlson July 14, 2015

July 14, 2015

Hello all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the CCWG ACCT Meeting #40 - 14 July will be available here: https://community.icann.org/x/G6g0Aw A copy of the notes and action items may be found below. Thank you. Best regards, Kim Notes Welcome to call number 40. Rollcall - anyone only on the conference bridge? (Cheryl will join the AC room) Updated SOI's (none) * Progress updates Leon WP3: 3 sub-groups formed SO/accountability Staff accountability Diversity 4 calls held, with a final call later today. Will prepare documents for Paris. Cheryl, Stress test WP Final document has been distributed We have added new tests based on public comment and discussions in Buenos Aires, on Larry Strickling's document, and the Board's impact assessment document. There are place holders for some issues. Work will continue after Paris, and the model and mechanism chosen will influence the tests and what we have to say. The next stress test call will be at 11:00 UTC July 15. Jordan WP1: Focus on the public comment and Buenos Aires comment, and reviewing that content. For the freeze collection we will have documents on the community powers, the AoC incorporation into the bylaws, on the community mechanisms and weights. We will focus on replies to public comment after Paris. Hopeful this will be done in time for the freeze. Becky WP2: Focus on revising the mission statement and core values. Content on this area in the public comment tool, which will be complete by the freeze. Content in the reconsideration section, and hope to be complete on the other sections by the freeze, should be close to complete by the freeze. Holly: The 2 firms have been working to revise the powerpoint of July 7 to address the additional issues asked to take on. And will be ready before the doc freeze. Added details of how to consider the community mechanism as the sole model. Will provide a cross model analysis. And Malcolm Hutty's questions about sections 3 and 4 of the initial proposal to see if any of the models under consideration interact with those issues in a way that needs to be addressed. Nothing from those issues needs to be addressed. Not for the freeze, but a new powerpoint for Paris, describing how a caretaker or interim board might function. This in response held with the chairs and some rapporteurs last week. Any concerns? Holly: Seen some emails about the caretaker board. Concern that some of the solutions suggested are very complex, but will try to address these issues. * Draft agenda for Paris. MW: The agenda is subject to change. We wish to capture the group's expectations Outcome: clarify direction on all key topics before finalize public comment 2 report. Important to remember we are already on course in a process, a lot of work has been done by the WP, very effective. Keep in mind, we are in a process of refinement, avoid the temptation to reinvent, we don't have time. And we must keep focused, and we have preparations for the 2 minutes timer clock for all. We have a broad range and number of topics to reach agreement on. Tijani: refinement phase, suggests no new idea, but that cannot be absolute. But we should listen to old and new ideas. MW: Not that everything is decided, but difficult to accept new ideas that have not been documented before the meeting. And aware that we have to check for unexpected consequences. Avri: In some discussion in some WP, every once in a while we get to a point to the point where someone says "lets put a question out in the second public comment", rather than seeking consensus among ourselves. And too many questions risk opening a 3rd comment process. Alan: Agree with Avri, but we we can ask questions if they are only answering A/B, clear answers. Eberhard: rather than tine constraints, one intervention/topic. Keith: ICANN has a history of 2 minutes clocks. MW: use the 2 minute clock if needed with a best practice of one intervention per topic. MW: agree with Avri on limiting the number of open questions, but we also have the WS1 and WS2 definition to utilise. Also need to be clear on the CWG requirements. The need to achieved consensus, among members and then the chartering organisations. These can be our tools for managing the meeting. See from the agenda, it is very full. CWG requirements, Lise Fuhr. Long Q&A with legal counsel on their presentation. WP3 review. Stress test discussion. AoC review incorporation has some issues to be decided on, and the community mechanisms which will be the core of our work. Review of government input, which is the next agenda item. Alan: WP1 - many parts depend on which organizational model we pick. And closure on many items will depend on the community mechanism. Thomas Schneider: govt input and the agenda and intent of the meeting. Governments have to consult with our stockholders. Very difficult to share these constantly chinned documents. Note this is not a GAC consensus, but a collection of national positions. These comment are based on the public comment documents and this to and including Buenos Aires meeting. This is the state of the discussion in the GAC, and there is not yet consensus on many issues, or the role of governments in the IG ecosystem. And the WSIS+10 will also deal with these issues. A reminder. Perhaps a step back. What are we to do: give the necessary elements to allow the transition to take place in WS1 and then a broad review of ICANN's accountability mechanisms as WS2. We need output that allows the CWG and ICG proposals to go ahead. And we have to endorse this is Dublin. We should have a clear direction when we leave Paris. Care not to overload the boat, and look closely at the CWG proposal and the NTIA requirements, and what accountability mechanisms are necessary for the transition to take place. And everything not necessary for this transition, can move. The boar overloaded. And move the unnecessary to WS2. What is the key expectation of the IANA transition, it seems to be predictability and stability. The community empowerment measures, are exciting, but is the IANA function transition the time for the possibly risky change. What is needed and defer the rest. MW: what would people be willing to move to WS2. But we must start with the CWG agenda. Encourage everyone to think about what issues they really care about and be willing to push to WS2. This will be core on any topics. Becky: Very helpful GAC document, gave a sense of the conversation of the moment. The goal has always been to do in WS1 to make sure that WS2 can also be accomplished. We will hear more calls to de-couple accountability and the IANA transition, but that was not our charge from the community. Thomas Rickert. Thomas, comments much inline with Mathieu's comments earlier. Risk that if we strip-down too many things we risk loosing acceptance and satisfying CWG and NTIA requirements. However, moving to WS2 does not mean the issue is gone, it will just be addressed later. We need concrete proposals for moving items to WS2. MW: Care about shifting options when they have not been aired in the first report, would risk push-back on such changes. Documents to be frozen at 23:59 July 14 (tonight). Staff will compile the package of documents for download. * GAC input - government member compilation. Issues discussed by govt up to BA meeting Staff will provide a summary, it will be ready in the frozen package AoB * Leon: coordination call between the ICG,CWG and AO/AC and Fadi and Board members, Larry Strickling. Monthly coordination call. A time line showing the three phases, to keep the 3 actors up to date on progress. The calls will be transcribed and recorded. As far as aware, these calls are not open. Topics: timeline. Everyone looking to the Paris meeting and our outcomes. Depending on us. Eberhard: F2F in or before Dublin? MW: yes, we are discussing. Considering a meeting before ICANN Dublin starts on Friday, as well as one on the Thursday (of the meeting) to celebrate acceptance, or commiserate. Staff will circulate a note about Dublin plans shortly. Thank you -- look forward to seeing many of you in Paris on Thursday or Friday morning. END

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CCWG ACCT Time change and meeting addition
by Kimberly Carlson July 14, 2015

July 14, 2015

Dear All, Just wanted to drop you a note to bring two things to your attention. First, we have changed the time for the CCWG Accountability call scheduled for 21 July. The new time is 19:00 UTC (old time was 06:00 UTC). This is to allow some extra time for those who are still traveling back from Paris. Secondly, we have added an additional call for 23 July 2015 at 12:00 UTC. This call is to prepare document for the Second Public Comment Period. Thank you. Best Regards, Kim Carlson

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diversity : francophone community input
by Grace Abuhamad July 14, 2015

July 14, 2015

Thank you Yves. We are forwarding your input to the CCWG. The document has also been posted on the CCWG Wiki here: https://community.icann.org/x/m4JCAw. Best, Grace From: Yves Miezan Ezo <miezanezo(a)gmail.com> Date: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 at 7:30 AM To: Accountability Staff <accountability-staff(a)icann.org> Cc: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill(a)afnic.fr>, Emmanuel Adjovi <emmanuel.adjovi(a)francophonie.org> Subject: Fwd: diversity : francophone community input Dear all, Please find below the previous email sent by Mr ADJOVI from Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, regarding the Francophone community input on diversity. This email seems to be still held for the list moderator approval. Regards, Yves MIEZAN EZO for <accountability-cross-community(a)mm.icann.org>; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 00:34:45 +0000 (UTC) Return-Path: <emmanuel.adjovi(a)francophonie.org> Reply-To: <emmanuel.adjovi(a)francophonie.org> From: "Emmanuel ADJOVI" <emmanuel.adjovi(a)francophonie.org> To: <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> Subject: francophone Community input Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 02:31:52 +0200 Message-ID: <00c801d0bdcc$7b0cd140$712673c0$(a)francophonie.org <http://francophonie.org> > Dear All, Please find in attached Francophone community input on diversity. Thank you, Kind regards Emmanuel Adjovi OIF

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