January 2016 - Accountability-Cross-Community

ICANN Board comments - Recommendation 3 - Fundamental Bylaws
by Bruce Tonkin March 16, 2016

March 16, 2016

Hello All, On the Fundamental Bylaws (Recommendation 3), the Board has the following comment following the first reading: The Board is supportive of the changes reflected in the document after the first reading. The Board notes that while it is supportive of the inspection right being reflected as a Fundamental Bylaw, the inspection right should be noted as a right of the community, and not of the Sole Designator, to align with the Board's comments on Recommendation 1. Regards, Bruce Tonkin ICANN Board Liaison to the CCWG

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 2, 2016

Feb. 2, 2016

Greg, That is a simple question, but not a particularly relevant one in my mind. I and ALAC have accepted a LOT of things that we do not believe "is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition". So have other parts of the community. I would ask the opposite. What is the HARM? The overall number of times that GAC advice is rejected is small. I find it hard to imagine that there will be any substantive difference in outcomes in the future with the two alternatives. If people want to die in the ditch (so to speak) over the difference, I guess that is what will happen. Alan At 28/01/2016 06:24 PM, Greg Shatan wrote: >I'd like to ask a simple question. > >Aside from members of the GAC, is there any >affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In >other words, does any member or participant >think that this is a good idea, or enhances >ICANN's accountability, or corrects a >problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed >for the transition? How about any chartering >organization or constituent part of a chartering organization? > >I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or >the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or >whether it's something you can live with. I'm >asking about affirmative support. > >Greg > >[cross-posts to GAC list removed] > >On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh ><<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> wrote: >GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in >announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO >and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC >must formally reject the Recommendation as >currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 >,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority >becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 >.That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, >WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT >NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . >THAT IS NOT FAIR >Kavouss > >2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan ><<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>ajs(a)anvilwalrusden.com>: >On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote: > > Where in writing has the GAC stated that it > will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there. > >I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but >rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. >But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my >recollection of the Dublin communiqÃ©. In fact it does not exactly say >that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong. > >I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way >forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC >(because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 >number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour >of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions. > >Best regards, > >A > >-- >Andrew Sullivan ><mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>ajs(a)anvilwalrusden.com >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list ><mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list ><mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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Board comments on Rec 10
by Chris Disspain Feb. 2, 2016

Feb. 2, 2016

All, Here are the current Board comments on Recommendation 10 (SO/AC Accountability): The Board continues to support this recommendation, and the importance of a focus on SO/AC accountability in light of the community empowerment recommended by the CCWG. The Mutual Accountability roundtable is a welcome innovation. The Bylaws-mandated independent structural review of various ICANN bodies, known as Organizational Reviews, will continue to have an important role in assessing SO/AC Accountability. The Board has strong concerns surrounding the details In Recommendation 10 on these reviews, particularly in how the recommendations might not uphold the import of independence as the key facet of that work. Reviews are a mechanism to hold ICANN accountable and transparent, but also a means of inspiring a culture of continuous improvement. Independence and objectivity are essential ingredients of effective performance assessment. a) On the proposal that independent reviews should be commenced at the request of a majority of the SO/ACs rather than by the Board - the current process is instrumental in ensuring accountability: a regular, predictable review cycle that is not left to the discretion of the group to be reviewed is necessary to maintain accountability. The initiation of these reviews should be on a predictable cycle, and the proposal on the table leaves the possibility that a review might never commence. b) The CCWG draft document also suggests that recommendations should be approved only by the SOs/ACs acting through the community forum. This removes the Board’s role in approval of recommendations, and could undermine the independence and accountability implicit in the current process. While there could be a mechanism to better involve the voice of the group under review, the Board plays an important role to preserve the independence of reviews and ensure that the group under review remains accountable. c) The CCWG also suggests that the reviews should happen in two phases – a self-assessment by the group under review, and then the independent examination after that self-assessment is completed. Self-assessments by the group under review serve as an important and valuable input into the independent examiner’s work. The self-assessment, however, cannot be the sole focus of the independent examiner’s work. It is essential the independent examiner reach his/her own conclusions to preserve objectivity, impartiality and independence – qualities essential to an effective review process. Thank you Cheers, Chris

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The 60 percent solution
by Greg Shatan Feb. 1, 2016

Feb. 1, 2016

All, I wanted to pluck this suggestion out of the email swamp. Kavouss made an alternative proposal concerning another threshold between Simple Majority and 2/3 -- the alternative threshold is 60%. Speaking only for myself, this could be a simple but creative way out of the current situation. It is a literally a middle ground between the current majority threshold and the previously proposed 2/3 threshold: *Votes* *Percentage* *Result* 8/16 50% No 9/16 56.25% Yes, by majority 10/16 62.50% Yes, if by 60% 11/16 68.75% Yes, if by 2/3 This would require one more vote than the current threshold and one less vote than the 2/3 threshold. Win/win? Greg On Sun, Jan 31, 2016 at 5:41 AM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Dear Co-Chairs > Pls kindly confirm that you have received my last alternative proposal > concerning another threshold between Simple Majority and 2/3. This > alternative threshould is *60%* > *There has been many cases considered with that level of threshold* > *Pls confirm its recption and confirm actions to be taken before you go to > poll* > *Awaiting for your reply* > *Kavouss * > > >> [...] >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] CCWG - Recommendation 8 - Final draft version for legal review - co-chair approval requested
by Bruce Tonkin Feb. 1, 2016

Feb. 1, 2016

Hello All, In terms of this statement: “Concern was raised that the Ombudsman is not sufficiently equipped and knowledgeable to do substantive evaluation. It is also suggested that an independent party, such as the Ombudsman, provide an initial assessment to the Board as to the merit of any and all Reconsideration Requests. “ It is worth considering that the Ombudsman is a function rather than just a single person. At the moment there is more than one person involved in providing the Ombudsman function. In addition to Chris LaHatte, Herb Waye has also provide adjunct services. I suggest using the text "Ombudsman Function" where references are made to the Ombudsman in the CCWG report. It is possible in future that we increase the number of people and skills available in the Ombudsman Function to meet the needs specified in the CCWG proposal, and as a result of further improvements resulting from work stream 2. Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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"feasible and appropriate" reliance on market mechanisms
by Burr, Becky Feb. 1, 2016

Feb. 1, 2016

All - As a follow up to our call on Tuesday regarding the language for Core Value 5/4: The language in the current Bylaws reads as follows: Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment. The CCWG dropped the introductory “where feasible and appropriate” when we issued the 1rst Draft Proposal. The ALAC, and now some additional members/participants, have objected to that change. I objected to the reinsertion of that language. Based on our call on Tuesday I would characterize the mood as follows: * Most folks are indifferent * Some folks feel very strongly that it is very important to retain the “where feasible and appropriate” * Some folks would probably prefer to drop the language, but no one feels as strongly as I do about it I would propose to resolve the situation by reverting the existing Bylaws language and adding the following language to the explanatory text of Recommendation 5: While acknowledging that ICANN does not possess antitrust expertise or authority, on balance the CCWG elected to retain the introductory language to ensure that ICANN continues to have the authority, for example, to refer competition-related questions regarding new registry services to competent authorities under the RSEP program, to establish bottom-up policies for allocating top-level domains (e.g., community preference), etc. Thoughts? J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz>

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Notice of polling of members on Recommendation 11 at the next meeting of the CCWG February 2nd 06:00UTC
by Mathieu Weill Feb. 1, 2016

Feb. 1, 2016

Dear Colleagues, Our usual approach is not achieving consensus on a way forward with Recommendation 11. So, as discussed at our last meeting, we will be conducting a poll of Members on this question at our next meeting. We will only be conducting a poll on third draft Recommendation 11, with the current minor amendments, given it is the text presented in the third draft and no alternative so far has demonstrated an ability to bring the different perspectives any closer. Exceptionally and unfortunately we will only be polling Members of the CCWG as defined and permitted in our charter. According to our Charter, the co-chairs shall be responsible for designating each position as having one of the following designations: a) Full Consensus - a position where no minority disagrees; identified by an absence of objection b) Consensus a position where a small minority disagrees, but most agree Accordingly, determination of consensus will be based on the level of objection, not support. In the absence of Full Consensus, the co chairs will allow for the submission of minority viewpoint(s)which will be included in the Suppplemental report. In the absence of Consensus, we will need to assess what process the group will follow to rebuild consensus, or whether the absence of Consensus should be reported to the Chartering Organizations. The polling question will be: Do you object to including Recommendation 11 as written below in the CCWG-Accountabilitys supplemental report to be submitted for Chartering Organisation approval? Members unable to attend the meeting in-person may appoint an alternate. Alternates will be eligible if they are a current participant of the CCWG-Accountability. Alternates must be announced prior to the call to acct-staff(a)icann.org. * * * Recommendation 11 is designed to address Stress Test 18, which identified that GAC may change its method of decision-making to something other than the method it now uses: general agreement in the absence of any formal objections. Todays bylaws would still require the ICANN board to try to find a mutually acceptable solution, even for GAC advice that was opposed by a significant number of governments. To address this Stress Test, Recommendation 11 currently reads: 1 The CCWG-Accountability recommends that the following changes be made to the ICANN Bylaws Article XI, Section 2: j. The advice of the Governmental Advisory Committee on public policy matters shall be duly taken into account, both in the formulation and adoption of policies. In the event that the ICANN Board determines to take an action that is not consistent with the Governmental Advisory Committee advice, it shall so inform the Committee and state the reasons why it decided not to follow that advice. Any Governmental Advisory Committee advice approved by a full Governmental Advisory Committee consensus, understood to mean the practice of adopting decisions by general agreement in the absence of any formal objection, may only be rejected by a vote of 2/3 of the Board, and the Governmental Advisory Committee and the ICANN Board will then try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mutually acceptable solution. 2 Notes: The GAC has the autonomy to refine its operating procedures to specify how objections are raised and considered (for example, disallowing a single country to continue an objection on the same issue if no other countries will join in an objection). When transmitting consensus advice to the Board for which the GAC seeks to receive special consideration, the GAC has the obligation to confirm the lack of any formal objection. This recommendation is intended only to limit the conditions under which the ICANN board and GAC must try to find a mutually acceptable solution, as required in ICANNs current bylaws. This recommendation shall not create any new obligations for ICANN board to consider, vote upon, or to implement GAC advice, relative to the bylaws in effect prior to the IANA transition. Insert this requirement for all ACs: A rationale must accompany any formal advice provided by an Advisory Committee to the ICANN Board. The Board shall have the responsibility to determine whether the rationale provided is adequate to enable determination of whether following that advice would be consistent with ICANN bylaws. To address the concern of GAC advice inconsistent with bylaws, add this clarification for legal counsel to consider when drafting bylaws language: ICANN cannot take action - based on advice or otherwise that is inconsistent with Bylaws. While the GAC is not restricted as to the advice it can offer to ICANN, it is clear that ICANN may not take action that is inconsistent with its Bylaws. Any aggrieved party, or the empowered community, will have standing to bring an IRP to challenge whether a board action or inaction is inconsistent with its bylaws, even if the board acted on GAC advice. The language proposed in recommendations for ICANN Bylaw revisions are conceptual in nature at this stage. The CCWG-Accountabilitys external legal counsel and the ICANN legal team will draft final language for these revisions to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws (Fundamental/Standard Bylaws). As a reminder, Recommendation 11 obtained the following results in the public comment period on the third draft of the CCWG-Accountability: · Support 35 · Against 19 · Neutral 2 · N/A 26 Chartering Organization responses to the Third draft are summarized as: · GNSO : Little support; strong opposition to Rec 11 as written in Third Draft Proposal. Most SG/Cs do not support raising threshold for Board vote to reject GAC advice. Serious concern over lack of specificity in relation of requirements for GAC advice (such as provision of rationale) and possibility that this recommendation, if adopted, could unduly change nature of Board-GAC relationship and/or position of GAC vis-à-vis other SO/ACs. Several SG/Cs believe any recommendation should retain current flexibility in Bylaws where Board is not required to undertake a formal vote in order to reject GAC advice. · ccNSO: no specific comment · ASO: In general, we find the current text acceptable. Additionally, we would like to make the following remarks: We would support a text that clarifies todays practices and does not substantially change the GAC's role and how its advice is treated by the Board or substantially strengthen obligations for the Board to consider the GAC advice. We would not support a text that cannot be acceptable by the NTIA. · GAC: There is no consensus within the GAC so far to support or object to the text contained in Recommendation 11 of the 3rd Draft Proposal. · ALAC: supports the recommendation SSAC: no specific comment Best, Leon Thomas & Mathieu CCWG Accountability Co-chairs

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Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
by Andrew Sullivan Feb. 1, 2016

Feb. 1, 2016

Dear colleagues, I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say. For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway? As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse. The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community. Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place. The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs(a)anvilwalrusden.com

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Regarding mission statement and human rights
by Kavouss Arasteh Feb. 1, 2016

Feb. 1, 2016

Bruce, Your Resolution needs to capture major elements of the Recommendation regarding HF WITH A CLEAR ONE OR MORE RESOLVES TO provide the firm committment. Regards Kavouss 2016-01-28 8:58 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>: > Yes > You are absolutely right. > I can not agree more than what you very well described, But THERE ARE > MAJOR DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS . > We have two options : > One which was on the table by CCWG as a possible emerged consensus > Another as the Board mentioned BUT to be accompanied by a strong > REsolution as a firm committments to respect ,observe and implement the > fundamental right as you mentined, That Board's Resolution yet to be > drafted agreed by Board ,examined by CCWG and ensorded by CCWG > Regards > Kavouss > > 2016-01-28 5:42 GMT+01:00 Seth Johnson <seth.p.johnson(a)gmail.com>: > >> Seriously need to say fundamental rights are the question. Treaty >> human rights are weak, and the concern has to be that the transition >> involves a loss of the strict standard that relates to fundamental >> rights. This might have been the standard the NTIA would have been >> expected to apply in its semiregular reviews of ICANN. But note, >> since there's no reference to the constitution (of the US, just by >> happenstance, could have been any other country with a constitutional >> basis for rights) but just rights like free speech, the NTIA is free >> to just say all they would have applied would have been the standards >> that apply internationally. >> >> The UN always says "human rights" and "fundamental freedoms" rather >> than "fundamental rights" because saying fundamental raises the issue >> of the fact that treaty-based rights are weak. >> >> The international standard is really weak. There's no way to overrule >> a treaty on the basis of another treaty, because even if one is on >> human rights and another is on, say, fighting terror, both are enacted >> by the same "body" -- participating governments. So the standard is >> at best how do the two treaties interact and balance against each >> other. >> >> If you just issue a statement on human rights, they've conned the >> group again, all along keeping the discussion narrowly focused on the >> issue of how to structure ICANN -- which never could have addressed >> the implications of the transition, from the start -- as I think you >> are seeing. >> >> >> Seth Johnson >> >> On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 4:06 PM, Bruce Tonkin >> <Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au> wrote: >> > Hello Kavouss, >> > >> > >> >>> For the Human Rights issue, one suggestion was to follow the Board's >> request ( Not to include any thing about HR in the transitional/ >> intermediate Bylaws but receiving the Board's FIRM Commitment IN A BOARD'S >> RESOLUTION APPROVED AND SENT TO CCWG IMMEDIATELY) enabling CCWG whether it >> could endorse that and annex it to the Bylaws to cool down those who are >> worried about the HR. >> > >> > Thanks for this suggestion. It is under active consideration by the >> Board. >> > >> > One possible option is that we pass a resolution in support of human >> rights principles in our meeting in Singapore next week. >> > >> > I will provide an update next week. >> > >> > Regards, >> > Bruce Tonkin >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > >

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FW: ICANN Board comments on recommendation 9
by Steve DelBianco Jan. 31, 2016

Jan. 31, 2016

Bruce — thank you for elaborating on the board’s general comment about bringing AoC reviews into the bylaws (Rec 9). Your email helped us understand specific areas where you want to leave more decisions to the board and to the AC/SO chairs. I have offered response in-line with your comments (see red text below), based upon my notes from multiple CCWG discussions of this topic over the last 12 months. From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au>> Date: Tuesday, January 26, 2016 at 3:19 PM To: CCWG Accountability <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] ICANN Board comments on recommendation 9 Board Comment - Recommendation 9: As noted in its comments on the third draft proposal, the Board supports the incorporation of the AOC reviews into the Bylaws, while noting the importance of maintaining operational standards for reviews outside of the Bylaws. While the Board agrees that operational standards should be in alignment with the provisions of the Bylaws, the Board views operational standards as a more suitable place to address multiple review-related operational items that do not belong in the Bylaws. There are a few specific areas that the Board is flagging in relation to the operational standards - a) The Board is concerned about potential constrains that may limit flexibility and effectiveness in the operational standards and that certain CCWG-Accountability recommendations may not be aligned with best practices or industry standards, including: o Fixed numbers of total review team members, as well as a fixed allocation among SO/ACs, without consideration of specific issues and required expertise for a given review. Reply: This regards para 54 in Annex 9, repeated here for convenience: "Review Teams are established to include both a fixed number of members and an open number of participants. Each SO and AC participating in the review may suggest up to seven prospective members for the Review Team. The group of chairs of the participating SOs and ACs will select a group of up to 21 Review Team members, balanced for diversity and skills, allocating at least three members from each participating SO and AC that suggests threeor more prospective members. In addition, the ICANN Board may designate one Director as a member of the Review Team." CCWG proposed that "chairs of participating SOs and ACs will select a group of up to 21 Review Team members.” The phrase is “up to 21”, so we are not actually proposing a fixed number of review team members. (We do acknowledge the need to remove “fixed number of members” from the introductory sentence.) We are proposing a maximum of 21 members, based on community experience with previous reviews and data provided by staff on the number of members proposed by the community. We proposed 21 in order to accommodate each of the 7 AC/SOs having up to 3 members. We anticipate that some ACs and SOs will not offer 3 names, and have given the AC/SO chairs flexibility to give those member slots to an AC/SO that had higher interest and offered more than 3 candidates (per a comment from GNSO CSG). o Unlimited number of participants, in addition to the appointed review team members, potentially affecting the team's productivity. Reply: This regards para 54 in Annex 9, where CCWG proposed an”open number of participants”. Levels of community interest and the principle of transparency argue for that meetings, calls, and email lists for cross-community working groups and review teams be open to the community. We note that chair(s) of the Review Team could restrict posting privileges and consensus calls to appointed members of the Review Team, and thereby manage the team’s productivity. CCWG proposed this to ensure that Review Teams work in a predictable method that is consistent with cross community working groups in the ICANN context. o Exact trigger points for the commencement of reviews without taking into account the Community bandwidth, or the state of pending implementation activities. Reply: This regards a paragraph on each of the 4 AoC reviews “shall be convened no less frequently than every five years, measured from the date the previous review was convened.” CCWG took into account community bandwidth concerns when we proposed that AoC reviews occur every 5 years — instead of the 3 year interval required in the AoC. We phrased the proposal to give flexibility for reviews to occur sooner than 5 year intervals. But we felt strongly that reviews need an interval requirement in order to ensure the reviews are not deferred indefinitely. b) To accommodate differing needs of reviews, the Board recommends leaving the number of review team members to the selectors of a specific review team, as to prescribing a specific formula for composition. This could leave to the selectors the flexibility, for example, to include more members from a specific SO or AC that is more impacted by a specific review, without hardcoding numbers into the Bylaws that might need to be changed later. Reply: We are proposing a maximum of 21 members, based on community experience with previous reviews and data provided by staff on the number of members proposed by the community. We proposed 21 in order to accommodate each of the 7 AC/SOs having up to 3 members. We anticipate that some ACs and SOs will not offer 3 names, and have given the AC/SO chairs flexibility to give those member slots to an AC/SO that had higher interest and offered more than 3 candidates (per a comment from GNSO CSG). . c) The Board is concerned with the CCWG-Accountability's recommendations on determinations of how consensus is applied. Reply: This comment regards para 57: "If consensus cannot be reached among the participants, consensus will be sought among the members. In the event a consensus cannot be found among the members, a majority vote of the members may be taken. " CCWG proposed this text to ensure that Review Teams work in a predictable method that is consistent with cross community working groups in the ICANN context. Imposing Bylaws requirements on allowing participants and observers, or requiring consensus calls are other examples where trying to hardcode specific requirements for reviews now might actually develop reviews that are less efficient, more resource intensive, and detract from the responsibilities of the review teams. The Board notes that the ICANN community would benefit from a review schedule that would take into consideration community bandwidth and ICANN resources in developing a staggered or phased review schedule. These factors should determine what a workable number of concurrent reviews would be and ensure that no more than that number of reviews are scheduled at the same time. Finally, the Board would like to highlight the work that has been underway within ICANN towards improving review effectiveness so that the CCWG and the community may factor this work in the development of operational standards. Work has been underway on the development of Operational Standards since last year, originating from ATRT2 recommendation 11 to improve effectiveness of Reviews together with Board Resolution 2015.07.28.14. In July 2015, after factoring public comments, the Board endorsed the proposed process and operational improvements designed to simplify and increase the effectiveness of Reviews. The Organizational Effectiveness Board Committee is currently working to finalize Policies, Procedures and Guidelines for the Organizational Reviews mandated by the Bylaws. Reply: We note that the drafting being done by the board is for Organizational reviews — not the AoC reviews. Still, CCWG is open to consider the board’s specific operational improvements as part of the implementation of CCWG’s proposal. If possible, could you circulate to CCWG the current draft of these policies, procedures, and guidelines? Regards, Bruce Tonkin ICANN Board Liaison to the CCWG

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