February 2016 - Accountability-Cross-Community

Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it
by Kavouss Arasteh Feb. 22, 2016

Feb. 22, 2016

Dear Jorge, WAIT FOR BECKIE'S REPLY. 2016-02-22 14:37 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>: > Beckie > You are the architect of IRP > You are the artchitect of Carve-out > What you mentioned does need clarification > What you said is inconsistant with Rec.2 > Please clarify which option of Rec.2 you referring? > TRegards > Kavouss > > 2016-02-22 14:13 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch>: > >> Dear Kavouss, dear Becky >> >> >> >> Thanks so much! >> >> >> >> From the responses I received, it seems that the carve-out applies >> generally whenever there is a Board decision to implement GAC Advice, even >> when that Board decision is deemed by the IRP to be perfectly consistent >> with ICANN Bylaws. >> >> >> >> Hence, we should be clear that there is no relation between the carve-out >> and the consistency with the Bylaws, right? Reasons for bringing such a >> challenge can be purely based on different interests, right? >> >> >> >> It is just a rule that excludes the GAC from (a decisional role in) any >> community decision where a Board decision to implement GAC Advice is at >> stake. >> >> >> >> A further question: if such a Board decision is based both on a SO >> recommendation, an ALAC advice and a GAC Advice, the only entity to be >> excluded from a community process would be the GAC, right? But the other SO >> and AC would participate on both tracks, correct? >> >> >> >> As to the threshold question: it merely has to do with the Board recall, >> but does not affect any of the mentioned characteristics of the carve-out, >> correct? >> >> >> >> Thanks very much for any further guidance >> >> >> >> Best >> >> >> >> Jorge >> >> >> >> >> >> *Von:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] >> *Gesendet:* Montag, 22. Februar 2016 14:00 >> *An:* Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch>; >> kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com >> *Cc:* steve.crocker(a)icann.org; icann-board(a)icann.org; >> accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org >> >> *Betreff:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it >> >> >> >> Jorge- >> >> >> >> The carve out would apply but you would need 4 SO/AC s to recall the >> Board. >> >> >> >> Becky >> >> >> >> *J. Beckwith Burr* >> *Neustar, Inc.* / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >> 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 >> *Office:* +1.202.533.2932 *Mobile:* +1.202.352.6367 */* *neustar.biz* >> <http://www.neustar.biz> >> >> >> >> *From: *"Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch" <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch> >> *Date: *Monday, February 22, 2016 at 6:44 AM >> *To: *Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> >> *Cc: *"steve.crocker(a)icann.org" <steve.crocker(a)icann.org>, " >> icann-board(a)icann.org" <icann-board(a)icann.org>, Accountability Community >> <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> >> *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it >> >> >> >> Dear Kavouss >> >> >> >> Thanks for the clarification. >> >> >> >> Hence, do I understand correctly that the carve-out (exclusion of GAC as >> decisional participant) applies also if the Board decision to implement GAC >> Advice has been found by the IRP to be perfectly consistent with the Bylaws? >> >> >> >> Thanks for your guidance >> >> >> >> Regards >> >> >> >> Jorge >> >> >> >> *Von:* Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com >> <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>] >> *Gesendet:* Montag, 22. Februar 2016 12:41 >> *An:* Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch> >> *Cc:* Mueller, Milton L <milton(a)gatech.edu>; Steve Crocker < >> steve.crocker(a)icann.org>; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org; >> Icann-board ICANN <icann-board(a)icann.org> >> *Betreff:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it >> >> >> >> Dear Jorge, >> >> You are right >> >> The carve out applies to all cases either in application of IRP or in the >> absence of IRP >> >> For the first Board's agreed with reduced threshold from 4 to 3 for >> Board's Spill >> >> For the second the Board wishes that the 4 SO/AC threshold applies . >> >> Some people in the community like me fully supportting the Board's views. >> >> Some others are against >> >> This is one of the issue that must be resolved tomorrow >> >> Regards >> >> Kavouss >> >> >> >> 2016-02-22 12:25 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch>: >> >> Dear all >> >> >> >> From this email by Milton it seems that some (as Milton) are >> understanding that the carve-out only would apply if the Board decision to >> implement GAC Advice is found (by the IRP I guess) to be inconsistent with >> the Bylaws. >> >> >> >> I have been away for one week, but I feel that the carve-out was meant to >> apply *generally* to situations where there is Board implementation of >> GAC Advice... >> >> >> >> Could someone kindly clarify the status? >> >> >> >> Best regards >> >> >> >> Jorge >> >> >> >> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- >> Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto: >> accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org] Im Auftrag von >> Mueller, Milton L >> Gesendet: Sonntag, 21. Februar 2016 23:34 >> An: Steve Crocker <steve.crocker(a)icann.org>; Accountability Community < >> accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> >> Cc: Icann-board ICANN <icann-board(a)icann.org> >> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it >> >> >> >> Steve >> >> I think Andrew got the issue exactly right. I do not see how your answer >> even engages with his argument, which is that nearly all of the community >> has agreed that when board actions are challenged for being out of mission >> by following GAC advice, that the GAC should not be in a position to rule >> on that. >> >> >> >> Claiming that the GAC does not have "extraordinary power" does not answer >> Andrew's argument. Whether the GAC has extraordinary power or not, if it >> advises you (the board) to do something that the rest of the community >> thinks is outside of the bounds of the bylaws (which it has a demonstrated >> tendency to do) the GAC should not be a decisional member of the empowered >> community that decides whether we get to challenge that action. >> >> >> >> From that premise on, it is all arithmetic, as Andrew showed: >> >> >> >> > > This is a choice entirely within the GAC's power. It must choose. >> >> > > If it chooses to be board-advisor-GAC, then it is in effect choosing >> >> > > that it prefers that mode of operation to being part of the wider >> >> > > Empowered Community mechanism. In effect, a GAC choice can reduce >> >> > > the possible actors in the Empowered Community to four. Otherwise, >> >> > > the GAC is in a position to insist on advice it gave being >> >> > > considered first by the board, and then that the GAC can also >> >> > > participate in the judgement of the Board's actions. That's the >> >> > > very "two bites" problem that we were trying to solve. I believe >> >> > > that in most organizations (including many governments), it would be >> >> > > regarded as surprising that a participant in the to-be-judged action >> also gets to be one of the judges. >> >> >> >> You have not refuted this, as I said before you have not even engaged >> with this. >> >> This increases my suspicion that the board's position is based on a >> political calculus, not on good governance or accountability criteria. >> >> >> >> Further, it is clear from the reaction you have gotten that the board is >> not proposing a "friendly amendment." In these rules of procedure, a >> friendly amendment has to be accepted by the group that proposed it, and >> clearly it is not. >> >> >> >> I am deeply disturbed by the board upsetting a consensual compromise, and >> a very difficult one, for the third time in this process. I wonder if you >> have any appreciation of the potential costs of this, particularly when it >> involves an issue as sensitive as the role of national governments in >> ICANN. >> >> >> >> Dr. Milton L. Mueller >> >> Professor, School of Public Policy >> >> Georgia Institute of Technology >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> >> >> >> > >

1 1

Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A message from the Co-Chairs
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 22, 2016

Feb. 22, 2016

Dear Kavouss, I have a question about the following statement. At 21/02/2016 04:12 PM, Kavouss Arasteh wrote: > * In future only a full Consensus Advice in the absence of any > formal objection would be considered by the Board which is quite > different from existing situation . This make it very probable that > as of the date of the transition coming in to force , NO MORE GAC > ADVICE WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE Board due to the > fact that, no matter how much efforts be made by 154 existing GAC > Members, one single Government on any ground as it so wishes > could block that Advice not to become eligible for consideration by > the Board. This is a new working method that enshrining a clear > VETO to null out efforts of the rest of the GAC members in this > regard. This is resulted from the proposed ST18 The current GAC Principle 47 says that decisions on Advice to the ICANN Board will be made "the practice of adopting decisions by general agreement in the absence of any formal objection". The current Proposal recommendation 11 says that the Board requires 60% to reject GAC Advice developed with "the practice of adopting decisions by general agreement in the absence of any formal objection". Perhaps I am missing something, but why do you say that going forward using this requirement which increases the Board rejection threshold from 50%+1 to 60% but otherwise uses the same words as are in force today, will make it impossible for the Board to consider GAC Advice? Certainly the GAC has developed Advice before and the Board has acted on it. Alan

2 1

Board position re the GAC carve out
by Steve Crocker Feb. 21, 2016

Feb. 21, 2016

CCWG Colleagues, The Board has a serious and continued concern about the issues being raised that may result in the reduction of the GAC’s ability to participate in community decision making. This is most noticeable in the question of thresholds for board removal, however this is not an issue about removal or even thresholds, it is one part of the community being (or perceiving that it is being) sidelined. The Board’s concerns with this issue are not about Board removal, but about maintaining the balanced multistakeholder model. The Board is against any changes to the long established equilibrium and fairness among the different stakeholders within ICANN. The Board has long supported a threshold of four participants for Board removal in the ultimate escalation method proposed by the CCWG. Selecting one portion of the ICANN community and removing them from the equation - just through the ability to say that the community is unhappy with the acceptance of GAC advice that is within ICANN’s bylaws - raises significant concerns about how the multistakeholder model, and the ultimate stability of ICANN as an organization, can be maintained. This carved out exception undercuts the established role of governments within the multi stakeholder process, and could introduce new issues with the acceptance of ICANN’s model undermining the work of the CCWG. We understand that there are concerns with this path from within other parts of ICANN community, including members of the GAC and ALAC. The best course, in our opinion, would be a careful and objective discussion of the whole matter of how advice from ALL parties is appropriately considered within ICANN. If there is a graceful way to remove this matter from the immediate pressure of the deadline of submitting this proposal and make it a priority matter for either the implementation phase or Work Stream 2, we think there will be a solution which is genuinely good for everyone. We encourage you to share the CCWG’s proposal with the Chartering Organizations while the dialog on this outstanding point continues. Thank you, Steve Crocker Chair, ICANN Board of Directors

12 16

Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps?
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 21, 2016

Feb. 21, 2016

Phil, let's be honest. If we had adopted a membership model, it is the same cats that we would be herding to exercise membership powers. Alan At 21/02/2016 12:24 PM, Phil Corwin wrote: >"... so what conclusions can be drawn from the fact that we can't >even hold the Board to the same rules that we have established for >ourselves in this process?" > >The same conclusion that can be drawn from the fact that "we" folded >on the Member model in Dublin when the Board protested, rather than >insisting that ICANN's single member community have the same >statutory powers as any other California non-profit corporation. > >Don't get me wrong. The accountability powers in the current >proposal are far more robust than what we have at present. But >getting the level of community cohesion to exercise the more >powerful ones will be like herding cats. > >Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal >Virtualaw LLC >1155 F Street, NW >Suite 1050 >Washington, DC 20004 >202-559-8597/Direct >202-559-8750/Fax >202-255-6172/cell > >Twitter: @VlawDC > >"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey > > >-----Original Message----- >From: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org >[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf >Of Schaefer, Brett >Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 6:59 AM >To: Jordan Carter >Cc: Accountability Cross Community >Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? > >Jordan, > >This is a good summary. > >I am offended at how the Board has abused its power in this process >by violating process, procedure and timelines to push its agenda. > >I would ask one additional question. Our entire proposal is focused >on how to make ICANN accountable to the community, so what >conclusions can be drawn from the fact that we can't even hold the >Board to the same rules that we have established for ourselves in this process? > >Best, > >Brett > > >________________________________ >Brett Schaefer >Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory >Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for >National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation >214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE >Washington, DC 20002 >202-608-6097 >heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> > >On Feb 20, 2016, at 10:28 PM, Jordan Carter ><jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote: > >Hi all > >I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed >but trying to help the discussion along. > >Here's the background that has caused the current extension of >debate, as I understand it: > >- CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a >special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the >Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying >accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. >(In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the >ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both). > >- if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four >other SOs and ACs participating. > >- CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should >not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the >threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation. > >- the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 >SOs/ACs should apply. > > - some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the > Board has breached the mission / bylaws > > - other participants think it's broader than that and applies > whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice > >- the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no >unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower >threshold where an IRP finds against it. > >- there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually >decided in this, which is driving the discussion. > > >So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do: > >- we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and >if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified. > >- we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives >that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that >the Board isn't happy with. > >- we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible >consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't >think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation) > >- we have to publish the report > >I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that >I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to >help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our >meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible. > >I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this >issue. Here's why > >I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the >new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of >matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number >of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being: > >- the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the >GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement >- the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it >less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment > >If I thought this was an important issue which would have a >significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death >matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by >the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the >stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into >consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do >not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting >non-negotiable positions. > >I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply >isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we >can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a >conclusion on that, and get the report out. > > >SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front >of us and come to a decision about what to do. > >If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like >dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you >find yourself a ditch? :-) > > >best >Jordan > >-- >Jordan Carter > >Chief Executive >InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet > >+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) >Email: jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> >Skype: jordancarter >Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> > > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >----- >No virus found in this message. >Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >Version: 2016.0.7303 / Virus Database: 4530/11623 - Release Date: 02/14/16 >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

2 1

Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A message from the Co-Chairs
by Kavouss Arasteh Feb. 21, 2016

Feb. 21, 2016

Dear All, The simplest and most straight forward was to resolve the issue; address/ meet the Boards Concerns is that in no way and Under any circumstances, the Spill of the Board should be decided by less than 4SO/ AC. That was the golden ruilehat everybody agreed before this so-called CARVE_OUT being proposed generating considerable disagreements and disputes Imagine that all we have done to bring ther Board on CCWG SIDE would be compromised if the Bioard tables a SERIOUS CONCERNS /disagreement on reduction on the Number os SO/AC from 4 to 3 ,no matter Under what circumnstances. Retention 4 SO(AC for Spill over of the Board may decrease the concerns of Carve-out to a greater extent Regards Kavouss 2016-02-20 5:08 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>: > Yes Thanks > IT WAS A MISTAKE > RrEGARDS > kavouss > > 2016-02-20 4:50 GMT+01:00 Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com>: > >> The next call is on 23 February at 0600 UTC. >> >> >> On Friday, February 19, 2016, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Dear Co-Chairs >>> >>> Here it is 0340UTC and I am still following all exchanged e-mails. >>> >>> Some of them promising and some other disappointing >>> >>> The Co-Chairs decision to hold on the forwarding the final report till >>> the issue of threshold is resolved is the most WISE and the most >>> appropriate decision. >>> >>> I fully support it . >>> >>> Good luck for CCWG call on 26 Feb. >>> >>> Regards >>> >>> Kavouss >>> >>> 2016-02-20 1:19 GMT+01:00 León Felipe Sánchez Ambía < >>> leonfelipe(a)sanchez.mx>: >>> >>>> Dear all, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> As you are aware, we intended to publish our Final Report today (19 >>>> February 2016) for Chartering Organization consideration. We are ready to >>>> do so, except for one issue where we would like to consider options as a >>>> full group. >>>> >>>> There is, still, ongoing discussion on the issue of thresholds for >>>> Board removal in Recommendation #2, which raised concerns in our report >>>> after we came to a compromise on Board consideration of GAC Advice >>>> (Recommendation #11). Since then, we have tried to propose compromise text >>>> that would be acceptable by different groups (c.f. the 12 February and 17 >>>> February drafts, posted at https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw) >>>> >>>> We received comments on this issue, and in some cases, minority >>>> statements, from members and participants in the ALAC, GAC, GNSO, and the >>>> Board. Earlier today, ICANN Chairman, Steve Crocker, posted a note, >>>> apparently on behalf of the Icann Board, outlining Board concerns with the >>>> latest attempt at compromise text proposed on 17 February: >>>> http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-February/…. >>>> >>>> >>>> While these last minute interventions are deeply disappointing for >>>> those of us who worked extremely hard, within the group and within their >>>> respective communities, to build bridges and promote compromise, our main >>>> target and duty remains to achieve a stable level of consensus, respecting >>>> the bottom-up, multistakeholder nature of the process. >>>> >>>> It is fortunate that the Board provided this input before we published >>>> the report, since it enables us to assess the potential consequences of a >>>> Board disagreement later in the process. >>>> >>>> We believe this issue must be discussed before sending our Final Report >>>> to Chartering Organizations. At the very least, we would like the >>>> opportunity to discuss a way forward and process as full group on next >>>> Tuesday’s CCWG-Accountability call at 06:00 UTC. There are many options and >>>> directions the group can take at this stage, each with different >>>> implications and considerations, and these options should be discussed as a >>>> group. >>>> >>>> Until the Tuesday call, let’s keep open channels of communication on >>>> our mailing list and work towards a solution. We will also reach out to the >>>> Chartering Organizations to inform them of the change in our schedule. >>>> >>>> As co-chairs, we renew our call upon every Member, upon every >>>> Participant, our call upon community leaders especially in the ICANN Board, >>>> in the GNSO and in the GAC to step away from confronting each other, to >>>> engage constructively and recognize each other’s value to the >>>> multistakeholder model. If you believe that the multistakeholder model can >>>> deliver, now is the time to act accordingly. >>>> >>>> Thank you, >>>> >>>> >>>> Thomas, León, Mathieu >>>> >>>> *CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>>> >>>> >>> >

3 7

Re: [CCWG-ACCT] what the Board is objecting to here -
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 20, 2016

Feb. 20, 2016

The Supplemental Proposal says that the threshold CAN be reduced to three under two conditions: (1) after an IRP has found that, in implementing GAC advice, the Board acted inconsistently with the ICANN Bylaws, or (2) if the IRP is not available to challenge the Board action in question. My recollection is that the Board proposed only (1). Becky (and/or perhaps others) proposed (2), but I do not recall it being accepted by the Board or by the CCWG as a whole. Alan At 19/02/2016 04:38 PM, Jordan Carter wrote: >Ok. If Steve Crocker could also confirm that his >understanding is the same, that would be very helpful. > > >On the overall point - the board has already >made its view on that question clear. Steve's >email doesn't reference the GPI test that is the >only basis the Board has set out to object to >ccwg proposals, and which it has invoked prior. > >The intervention thus has two effects. It is a >source of uncertainty, because it isn't clear. >And it is a source of delay, because the intent >and the group's response to it has to be clarified. > >Once again, we face a further delay thanks to >the way the ICANN board has chosen to behave. I >guess I wish I could say I was surprised, or >disappointed - but that's long gone. I'm just >confused: what is the end game here? > >If anyone knows, please feel free to share. > >Jordan > >On Saturday, 20 February 2016, Samantha Eisner ><<mailto:Samantha.Eisner@icann.org>Samantha.Eisner(a)icann.org> wrote: >Hi Becky - > >There was another thread on this from Alan, but >wanted to confirm in this thread too that this >is the correct understanding of the Boardâs concern. > >Thanks, >Sam > >From: ><accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org> >on behalf of "Burr, Becky" <Becky.Burr(a)neustar.biz> >Date: Friday, February 19, 2016 at 10:55 AM >To: Paul Rosenzweig ><paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com>, 'Phil >Corwin' <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com>, 'Greg Shatan' ><gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com>, 'Kavouss Arasteh' <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> >Cc: 'Thomas Rickert' <thomas(a)rickert.net>, >"accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org" ><accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> >Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] what the Board is objecting to here - > >Just for the sake of absolute precision, I think >the Boardâs point is that the carve out and >hence the 3 SO/AC threshold â could apply >where an IRP determines that the Boardâs >actions in response to GAC Advice contravene the >Bylaws. I think what worries the Board is that >the notion that the Board could be recalled by 3 >SO/AC combination for action that DOES NOT contravene the Bylaws. > >J. Beckwith Burr >Neustar, Inc./Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 >Office:+1.202.533.2932 Mobile:+1.202.352.6367 >/<http://www.neustar.biz>neustar.biz > >From: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com> >Date: Friday, February 19, 2016 at 1:15 PM >To: 'Phil Corwin' <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com>, Greg Shatan ><gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> >Cc: 'Thomas Rickert' <thomas(a)rickert.net>, >Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> >Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue > >+1 > > > >Paul Rosenzweig > >paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > >O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > >M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > >VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 > >Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 > ><https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.redbranchconsulting…>Link >to my PGP Key > ><https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.rsaconference.com_e…> >[] > > > > >From: Phil Corwin [mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com] >Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 12:52 PM >To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com>; >Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> >Cc: Thomas Rickert <thomas(a)rickert.net>; >accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org >Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue > > > >Greg: > > > >Assuming that the new Board position is indeed a >response to a minority position of a few GAC >members, I am in full agreement that it >âshould serve as a warning to us allâ. > > > >Indeed, it emphasizes exactly why the GAC should >not be able to block the communityâs ability >to hold the Board accountable for implementing >GAC consensus advice that the community feels is >outside the scope of the Bylaws or Mission Statement. > > > >Best. Philip > > > >Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal > >Virtualaw LLC > >1155 F Street, NW > >Suite 1050 > >Washington, DC 20004 > >202-559-8597/Direct > >202-559-8750/Fax > >202-255-6172/cell > > > >Twitter: @VlawDC > > > >"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey > > > >From:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org >[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] >On Behalf Of Greg Shatan >Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 12:38 PM >To: Kavouss Arasteh >Cc: accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org; Thomas Rickert >Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue > > > >It is alarming that a few GAC members could seek >to undo a carefully balanced compromise. And >even more alarming that those few GAC members >could so quickly trigger a Board intervention. > > > >The carve-out is balanced against the concerns >of other stakeholders with regard to (i) the >proposed supermajority threshold for Board >rejection of GAC advice and (ii) the GAC's >overall role as a decisional participant in the >Empowered Community, rather than its traditional >advisory capacity. The carve-out itself >underwent a compromise, requiring the Community >to go through an IRP before exercising the power of Board recall. > > > >When one pulls on one end of a compromise, the >other end tends to move as well. > > > >Do other stakeholders need to send >countervailing warnings? Will the Board respond >as quickly? Do we want to find out? > > > >I think this extraordinary response to a >minority report should serve as a warning to us all. > > > >Greg > > > > > > > >On Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 12:22 PM, Kavouss >Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> wrote: > >Please kindly confirm and acknowledge recipt of wanrning message > >Regards > >Kavouss > > > >2016-02-19 18:10 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>: > >Dear Co-chairs > >You have seen the concerns of 11 Governments >which would certainly be echoed by other gouvernements soon. > >This is an ALARMING SITUATION , > >If there is no consensus means there is no consensus , > >We could not favour one community in disfavouring another one. > >Perhaps it was hoped that the people could join >the consensus but it does not come up as such > >If a mistake has occurred we should repair it . > >Howmany times we have changed our concept from >Voluntry Model to Sole member from Sole Member to Sole designator . > >THE ISSUE IS CRITICAL > >Pls do not rush to publish the report as being >sent to the chartering organization just hold on >for few more days untill your 26 feb. calls > >Try to find out some solution including going >back to the initial stage of REC. 11 without no >carve-out and with two options of simple >majority and 2/3 theshold and rediscuss that. > >You can not ignor the growing concerns of >several governments and would certainly be further grown up soon > >Regards > >Kavouss > > > > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org ><https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > >No virus found in this message. >Checked by AVG - ><https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=CwMFaQ&c=…>www.avg.com >Version: 2016.0.7303 / Virus Database: 4530/11623 - Release Date: 02/14/16 > > > >-- >Jordan Carter >Chief Executive, InternetNZ > >+64-21-442-649 | <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz > >Sent on the run, apologies for brevity >Content-Type: image/png; name="image001.png" >Content-Disposition: inline; filename="image001.png" >Content-ID: <image001.png(a)01D16B17.90D93970> >X-Attachment-Id: 8ad2965fd910ef78_0.1 > > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

4 7

GAC Processes
by epilisse＠gmail.com Feb. 20, 2016

Feb. 20, 2016

Becky, Jordan please remind me, did we encourage the GAC in any way to be transparent in their advice to the Board (requiring special attention)? Or is Consensus our only requirement? el

2 2

what the Board is objecting to here -
by Burr, Becky Feb. 20, 2016

Feb. 20, 2016

Just for the sake of absolute precision, I think the Board’s point is that the carve out – and hence the 3 SO/AC threshold – could apply where an IRP determines that the Board’s actions in response to GAC Advice contravene the Bylaws. I think what worries the Board is that the notion that the Board could be recalled by 3 SO/AC combination for action that DOES NOT contravene the Bylaws. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>> Date: Friday, February 19, 2016 at 1:15 PM To: 'Phil Corwin' <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>>, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> Cc: 'Thomas Rickert' <thomas(a)rickert.net<mailto:thomas@rickert.net>>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue +1 Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.redbranchconsulting…> [cid:image001.png@01D16B17.90D93970]<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.rsaconference.com_e…> From: Phil Corwin [mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com] Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 12:52 PM To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>; Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> Cc: Thomas Rickert <thomas(a)rickert.net<mailto:thomas@rickert.net>>; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue Greg: Assuming that the new Board position is indeed a response to a minority position of a few GAC members, I am in full agreement that it “should serve as a warning to us all”. Indeed, it emphasizes exactly why the GAC should not be able to block the community’s ability to hold the Board accountable for implementing GAC consensus advice that the community feels is outside the scope of the Bylaws or Mission Statement. Best. Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 12:38 PM To: Kavouss Arasteh Cc: accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>; Thomas Rickert Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue It is alarming that a few GAC members could seek to undo a carefully balanced compromise. And even more alarming that those few GAC members could so quickly trigger a Board intervention. The carve-out is balanced against the concerns of other stakeholders with regard to (i) the proposed supermajority threshold for Board rejection of GAC advice and (ii) the GAC's overall role as a decisional participant in the Empowered Community, rather than its traditional advisory capacity. The carve-out itself underwent a compromise, requiring the Community to go through an IRP before exercising the power of Board recall. When one pulls on one end of a compromise, the other end tends to move as well. Do other stakeholders need to send countervailing warnings? Will the Board respond as quickly? Do we want to find out? I think this extraordinary response to a minority report should serve as a warning to us all. Greg On Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 12:22 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: Please kindly confirm and acknowledge recipt of wanrning message Regards Kavouss 2016-02-19 18:10 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>: Dear Co-chairs You have seen the concerns of 11 Governments which would certainly be echoed by other gouvernements soon. This is an ALARMING SITUATION , If there is no consensus means there is no consensus , We could not favour one community in disfavouring another one. Perhaps it was hoped that the people could join the consensus but it does not come up as such If a mistake has occurred we should repair it . Howmany times we have changed our concept from Voluntry Model to Sole member from Sole Member to Sole designator . THE ISSUE IS CRITICAL Pls do not rush to publish the report as being sent to the chartering organization just hold on for few more days untill your 26 feb. calls Try to find out some solution including going back to the initial stage of REC. 11 without no carve-out and with two options of simple majority and 2/3 theshold and rediscuss that. You can not ignor the growing concerns of several governments and would certainly be further grown up soon Regards Kavouss _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> ________________________________ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=CwMFaQ&c=…> Version: 2016.0.7303 / Virus Database: 4530/11623 - Release Date: 02/14/16

10 15

Carve-out issue
by Kavouss Arasteh Feb. 20, 2016

Feb. 20, 2016

Dear Co-chairs You have seen the concerns of 11 Governments which would certainly be echoed by other gouvernements soon. This is an ALARMING SITUATION , If there is no consensus means there is no consensus , We could not favour one community in disfavouring another one. Perhaps it was hoped that the people could join the consensus but it does not come up as such If a mistake has occurred we should repair it . Howmany times we have changed our concept from Voluntry Model to Sole member from Sole Member to Sole designator . THE ISSUE IS CRITICAL Pls do not rush to publish the report as being sent to the chartering organization just hold on for few more days untill your 26 feb. calls Try to find out some solution including going back to the initial stage of REC. 11 without no carve-out and with two options of simple majority and 2/3 theshold and rediscuss that. You can not ignor the growing concerns of several governments and would certainly be further grown up soon Regards Kavouss

11 19

Comments on the Supplemental
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 19, 2016

Feb. 19, 2016

My comments on the Supplemental Proposal Core Proposal, top of page 21; Annex 2, page 13: My recollection was that the threshold reduction was to be allowed only in case (1) and that in case (2), four would still be required (requiring unanimity of the remaining four to remove the Board). I am moderately sure that although (2) was suggested by Becky, it was never agreed to by the Board or the CCWG as a whole. Core proposal, page 30, item 3: Typo - For THE avoidance Core proposal, page 30, item 3; Annex 5, page 10, item 3: This was supposed to also cover contract renewal where the clauses in question were unchanged from the previous contract. The current wording says until "the expiration date" implying renewals are not covered. Core proposal, page 48: Perhaps nitpicking, but presumably the Bylaw should read "at least 60%" since precisely 60% is not what was envisioned. Annex 04, paragraph 120: I note that the requests from the ALAC to soften the term "ensure" have not been acted upon. No rules can "ensure"- they can only be designed to meet the objective and cannot prevent circumstances that might alter the outcome. The ALAC suggested the wording "SOs, ACs, and the Nominating Committee will develop processes designed to replace Interim Board members within 120 days." Annex 09: There are several references to the RT selection being made by the Chairs of the "participating" SOs and ACs. Two issues: 1) I don't recall any discussion limiting the selectors to other than the full 7 AC/SOs. Presuming a limitation was formally decided upon, where is "participating" defined? Is it the "Decisional Participants" in the empowered community? If so, that defined term should be used. Or some other definition provided. Annex 09, page 5: I have pointed out many times that based on prior review teams, the size of 21 is inflated. There is *NO* justification for claiming it is "based on composition of prior Review Teams". Prior review teams averaged 11.8 AC/SO members and never exceeded 13. ** END OF COMMENTS **

1 0