January 2015 - Accountability-Cross-Community

[CCWG-Accountability] On legal advise concerning California non-profits
by Eric Brunner-Williams Jan. 23, 2015

Jan. 23, 2015

Colleagues, During the last hour of today's call there was discussion of the subject of experts, and the lack of an expert in international law identified as a deficit. In the chat a concern was expressed, not for the first time, that an expert in California non-profit law was also needed. I share the view that expert advice on issues relating to converting the Corporation from "no members" to "members", and similar questions, is a pressing need, if this, or any similar question, is to be undertaken by this, or a similar Working Group, e.g., the CWG. That I don't think the membership form feasible is another matter, and my experience in the original Membership Implementation Task Force is just that -- we didn't succeed and we didn't try everything and what we got (eventually) was "At Large" as an Advisory Committee. What I don't share is the view that the advice _must_ come from a source other than the Corporation's legal staff. The Corporation's legal staff have the subject matter expertise -- California's incorporation language and case law, and are bound by the ethics and professional responsibilities requirements of the California Bar Association. If the "member" question is worth considering, and if time is pressing, as we lack a basis to know that the Corporation's legal staff does not have subject matter expertise, nor does Corporation legal staff have an identified conflict of interest with ... an activity or activities it has called into existence -- the CCWG and/or CWG, no an ethics violation, why are we deferring the "member" and similar questions at all? It is one thing for scenarios submitted to the WS4 stream to have (many) hypotheticals of incompetence, conflict or malfeasance, it is quite another to conduct ourselves as if the hypothetical is a fact pattern in the present. The Corporation's legal staff are already paid, a defect that apparently makes finding sources of International Law expertise challenging, and from JJ to Dan to Sam to ... known to many of us, and known for many years. Absent very clear statements to the contrary, we should be able to proceed and determin whether the "member" suggestion has sufficient value to be worth implementation consideration. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon

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EXTENDED - Call for comments on Chairs' Statement
by Alice Jansen Jan. 22, 2015

Jan. 22, 2015

Dear all, In consideration of the requests for additional time, the CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs have decided to extend the call for comments on the Chairs' Statement. Comments are now invited through Friday, 23 January - 13:00 UTC. Attached to this email you will find the most recent version of the statement which includes edits received by the initial deadline. Best regards Alice

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responding to Eric's questions
by Burr, Becky Jan. 22, 2015

Jan. 22, 2015

Responding to Eric’s question re independent counsel, my responses are in blue. If one of the "free, soon, adequate" requirements can be waived, theneven I don't have my view, but the legal staff do meet those criteria, and their client is the corporation, which is capable of reorganization, a subject of interest for the purposes of exploring the "member" and "oversight" sets of issues. I don’t think ICANN staff is adequate, for the reasons described below. Even if someone at Jones Day could be, ICANN will have to pay them, which knocks out that requirement. I'm glad you mention fiduciary duty as there are no shareholders, rather stewards of the public trust exercising reasonable care, inquisitive ...the strictest standard of duty of care in American law. This is one reason that I think we need to go outside. ICANN Legal has asserted that the Board members have a fiduciary duty to the corporation, and that duty precludes them from agreeing to a binding dispute resolution mechanism. I have never heard them say that they have a duty under California law to the public trust, or suggest that such a duty trumps any obligation is may have to serve as the steward of a public interest. As many members of the community having a material interest in unique endpoint identifiers are employed by for-profit entities with shareholders, the same meaning may not be conveyed when we use the same phrase. Not sure I understand your point here Would you do me the kindness (at some point in the proximal future, it isn't urgent) of providing a URL to the conclusion, and perhaps the supporting analysis, of the Berkman Center during the first ATRT review? I'm interested in which legal positions by the Corporation's legal staff they found in need of additional research. The statement I referenced is actually in the Berkman ATRT1 Recommendations: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/proposed-recommendations-20oct1…. The following is from page 46: In the course of broad consultations, ATRT received feedback to the effect that ICANN could enter into agreements with parties that called for binding arbitration without running afoul of California law. While this latitude could apply in a contractual context, it is less clear and deserves further legal analysis as to what extent and through what mechanisms ICANN could agree to enter into binding arbitration more generally. Again, were we constituted externally by some other corporate entity, then retaining our legal counsel rather than relying upon the legal counsel of the subject of our inquiry, concerning its reorganization, would be necessary for the reason you mention -- the ethical duty of counsel towards its clients -- but we -- the CCWG-whatever -- are not, and staff -- all of staff, from IT to Legal, as resources allocated by the executive, are available to us. Absent a refusal to allocate or a demonstration of incompetence, why shouldn't we expect an adequate work product from staff counsel? I was actually thinking of the ethical obligations of ICANN staff attorneys and outside counsel. Given that ICANN has asserted that the Board’s fiduciary duty under California law prohibits the board from ceding authority to a binding dispute resolution procedure in this context, we already know that they have taken a position that is contrary to the community’s desire. Given that, as well as the Berkman Center’s conclusion that this issue deserved further legal analysis, I don’t know how we could consider the staff/outside counsel to be unconflicted in this situation. (For the record, I am not sure that binding authority is absolutely necessary – depends on what other tools are available, e.g., spilling the Board. Based on the what I heard in Frankfurt, however, the community sees this as an important tool for accountability.) Thank you for your kind note, and on the International Law issue, which to me seems excessively speculative, I share your remark. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz

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Re: [CCWG-Accountability] [ccTLDcommunity] Alternative proposal to the CWG transition plan
by Jordan Carter Jan. 22, 2015

Jan. 22, 2015

hi Chris, Thanks for sharing these thoughts. To me the critical difference between your proposal and that of the CWG is that yours basically locates responsibility for stewardship of the IANA functions inside ICANN, the operator. The CWG proposal (which we support) keeps them outside the operator and under the control of the global multistakeholder community. Could you tease out the logic behind your position for me / us all? I can see advantages in principle and practice in keeping these roles separate (as they are today). I can only see a couple of practical benefits from wrapping everything into ICANN, but practical difficulties and principled objections as well. Thanks, Jordan On 19 December 2014 at 03:58, Chris Disspain <ceo(a)auda.org.au> wrote: > All, > > Over the next couple of days auDA will be finalising its comments on the > CWG proposal. As part of those we will be putting forward an alternative > proposal. That proposal is below and also attached as a word document. I > would welcome and very much appreciate input and feedback from ccTLD > colleagues on our draft alternative. Like the CWG one, there is more work > to do on it and detail to be filled in but I think it stands as a viable > way forward that might, as a whole, be more palatable to some ccTLDs than > the CWG proposal. Of course I could be wrong. I've been wrong before, once > or twice. > > > IMPORTANT - As you know, I'm on the ICANN Board. The below proposal and > the comments auDA will make on the CWG proposal come from auDA. The > proposal has nothing to do with the ICANN Board and has not been discussed > with the ICANN Board. > > > > Cheers, > > Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer > .au Domain Administration Ltd > T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 > E: ceo(a)auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au > auDA - Australia's Domain Name Administrator > > > > auDA's Alternative Proposal to CWG Transition Plan > > Assumptions: > > 1. In a limited number of circumstances (such as 'gross incompetence' or > 'material breach') there should be an option for the IANA function to be > transferred from ICANN to another operator - The Nuclear Option. > > 2. There should be an enhancing of the current functional separation of > the IANA function from the rest of ICANN - Functional Separation. > > 3. There should be a TLD registry operator centric standing committee to > liaise with and oversee the IANA functions operator on administrative and > service level functions - The Customer Standing Committee. > > 4. There should be an independent, binding arbitration mechanism to handle > certain disputes - Appeals. > > 5. There should be a separate review body to review any ccTLD revocation > and delegation (formally referred to as re-delegation) - The ccTLD Review > Body > > Note - there is a further assumption that the ICANN Accountability working > group will deal with ICANN wide accountability recommendations (for example > a Board spill mechanism) and that such matters are best dealt with there. > It is clear that any fully formed transition proposal from the CWG has to > be inextricably linked to the work of that Accountability WG and therefore > the timing of the work of the groups needs to become aligned. > > > Proposal: > > 1. The Nuclear Option - Where the IANA functions operator is grossly > negligent or incompetent or in material breach of its obligations under > agreed service level commitments or performance indicators, it needs to be > possible for the IANA function to be moved to a new operator. > > This could be achieved by the creation of a 'Golden Bylaw', similar to the > corporate concept of a golden share ( > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_share) The Golden Bylaw would give > the TLD registry operators the right, in certain circumstances, to require > ICANN to put the IANA function out to re-bid. The Golden Bylaw would set > out at least: > > a) the requirements to trigger the re-bid process - FOR EXAMPLE a vote of > over 75% of ccTLD registry operators and 75% of gTLD registry operators > > b) what would need to happen to trigger the TLD registry operator's vote - > FOR EXAMPLE a petition by more than 15% of TLD registry operators > > c) the composition of a Re-Bid Committee that would oversee the vote and > the subsequent re-bid and decide who the successful bidder was. The Re-Bid > Committee could, FOR EXAMPLE, comprise of 20 registry operators (split > between ccTLDs and gTLDS) plus a representative from each of the GAC, ALAC, > SSAC and RSSAC > > d) the basis upon which the Golden Bylaw itself could be changed - FOR > EXAMPLE only by a vote of over 75% of ccTLD registry operators and 75% of > gTLD registry operators > > e) the other aspects of this proposal set out below. > > 2. Functional Separation - The current levels of functional separation of > the IANA function from the rest of ICANN can be enhanced as part of the > transition in a number of ways including: > > a) the IANA department having its own discrete budget > > b) the IANA department having its own legal advisors and independent legal > advice. > > 3. Customer Standing Committee - This committee would provide the > day-to-day liaison between the IANA functions operator and the TLD registry > operators. It could be made up of an equal number of ccTLD and gTLD > registry operators plus a representative from each of the GAC, ALAC, SSAC > and RSSAC. It would perform, at least, the following tasks: > > a) work with the IANA functions operator to agree service levels and > performance indicators > > b) review and re-negotiate the service levels and performance indicators > at agreed intervals > > c) receive reports on and monitor the IANA functions operator's > performance with respect to the service levels and the performance > indicators > > d) conduct a regular IANA functions operator budget review. > > 4. Appeals - To deal with disputes that arise in respect to matters > covered by 3 above there should be a binding arbitration mechanism > utilising the services of an independent arbitration organisation. > > 5. The ccTLD Review Body - The ccTLD community needs to work to come to > consensus on the review body contemplated by the Framework of > Interpretation WG. Whilst it may not be essential that this work is done by > the time of the transition, it is essential that the appeals mechanism set > out in 4 above is clearly understood to not be that ccTLD Review Body. > > > > _______________________________________________ > ccTLDcommunity mailing list > ccTLDcommunity(a)cctld-managers.org > http://www.lists.cctld-managers.org/mailman/listinfo/cctldcommunity > > To unsubscribe please send a blank email to > ccTLDcommunity-unsubscribe(a)lists.cctld-managers.org > -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter *To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential.*

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [] [CCWG-Accountability] Membership thoughts
by Seun Ojedeji Jan. 22, 2015

Jan. 22, 2015

+1 as i also think a membership approach could be problematic, i should however note that the NRO/ASO like structure model suggested is not necessarily a membership scenario, whether that fixes any accountability is another issue, and perhaps such model will be best/better discussed within the CWG setting (especially if there is need to consider an alternate to contract co) Regards On Thu, Jan 22, 2015 at 12:21 PM, Tijani BEN JEMAA < tijani.benjemaa(a)fmai.org.tn> wrote: > Dear all, > > > > Avri is right. We can’t propose a membership organization without setting > very clear and objective rules that make it fair and sustainable, without > loosing the multi-stakeholder dimension and the public interest. The > biggest danger would be the capture. Too complex…. > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > *Tijani BEN JEMAA* > > Executive Director > > Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (*FMAI*) > > Phone: + 216 41 649 605 > > Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 > > Fax: + 216 70 853 376 > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > > > > *De :* accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto: > accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org] *De la part de* Avri > Doria > *Envoyé :* mercredi 21 janvier 2015 09:51 > *À :* accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > *Objet :* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [] [CCWG-Accountability] Membership thoughts > > > > Hi, > > Denic has a reasonable basis for membership. > > I cannot understand what reasonable form that membership would take for > ICANN. And as Robin's notes shows, it may not be necessary to achieve our > goals. > > We talked about SOAC [or their chairs], for example, are they all equal > in represenation and voting weight, or do we need to negotiate some other > form of balance? And what if new SOAC were to be created by the Board? > What about the GAC, can a government entitiy join a California membership > corporation? And if not based on SOAC, then what. Would it cost to join, > and would that appropriate? If it did cost would that leave civil sociey > behind? If it thee was not some sort of control would one sector or region > predominate? Would we need to force a balance. Could governments join? > How would someone maintain membership - is it permanent or does it take a > renewal process. > > And those are just the first questions. Membership sounds like an easy > solution but the complexities are mind boggling. > > avri > > On 21-Jan-15 08:40, Dr Eberhard WLisse wrote: > > Just for the record Nominet barely avoided capture, and by borderline > means... > > > > DENIC has some form of membership (industry). > > > > el > > -- > > Sent from Dr Lisse's iPhone 5s > > > > > On Jan 20, 2015, at 23:27, James M. Bladel <jbladel(a)godaddy.com> wrote: > > Team: > > > > I'd like to associate myself with Greg’s comments (below). We cannot rule > out proposed structures due to their novelty, and anticipated weaknesses > are simply indicators that we need to continue working to improve/flesh out > the idea(s). > > > > In fact, I don’t believe is all that unknown in our industry. Two large > ccTLDs (UK and CA) have some recognized form of membership that > participates in governance and policy development in the TLD. And I am of > the opinion that a well-designed membership structure could be an excellent > safeguard against capture of ICANN by a majority of the Board, or a single > SO/AC. > > > > Thanks to all for a productive meeting in Frankfurt, look forward to > future discussions, and see you in Singapore. > > > > Thanks— > > > > J. > > > > > > > > From: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com> > Date: Tuesday, January 20, 2015 at 20:38 > To: Sivasubramanian M <isolatedn(a)gmail.com> > Cc: Accountability Cross Community < > accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [CCWG-Accountability] Membership thoughts > > > > Siva, > > > > What's your solution? > > > > And how do you think we will be able to avoid unknown territory? I think > we're going into some kind of unknown territory no matter what, since > "known territory" is unsatisfactory (or else we wouldn't be here). > > > > And why do you assume that potential participants will be shut out? Any > system, poorly designed, will have problems. So let's try to design this > well, so it doesn't shut out potential participants. Any grouping of > people or entities is in some ways "prone to be captured." But rather than > shoot down the membership concept in a knee-jerk fashion, try to work > toward resolution, or at least try to create some useful "stress tests." > I'm not saying that a membership organization is the right solution, the > only solution, or even an available solution. Fighting through the issues > won't be quick or pretty, and it may be the end-result doesn't work. But > it's too soon to know. > > > > The only way to avoid everything in your email is to stay in bed. > > > > Greg Shatan > > > > On Tue, Jan 20, 2015 at 2:08 PM, Sivasubramanian M <isolatedn(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > > I am equally concerned. The idea of moving to a membership based system > takes us into an unknown territory. A membership based system shuts out a > section of potential participants due to their inability to meet the > requirement (money or other) for membership, the system is prone to be > captured, and there would be imbalances and unknown dangers. > > > > Sivasubramanain M > > > > Sivasubramanian M <https://www.facebook.com/sivasubramanian.muthusamy> > > > > On Wed, Jan 21, 2015 at 12:08 AM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl(a)gih.com> > wrote: > > Dear Jordan, > > thanks for your looking into this in further detail. > My comment below: > > On 19/01/2015 16:00, Jordan Carter wrote: > > > > It would be straightforward and possible to make e.g. SO and AC chairs > > effective "members" of ICANN (we define our own membership system). It > > would be harder to allow individuals with some standing to join > > stakeholder constituencies of voters and then allocate shares of total > > votes across these in a fair way. It would be possible but mad to have > > a "one member one vote" system where a ccTLD manager had the same say > > as an Internet user. > > Isn't what you're describing ICANN version 1, with thousands of > individual voters? I agree that did not work and will not work today > either. However, I would also really urge caution in turning ICANN into > a purely membership organisation that allocates shares of total votes > according to size of organisational members. I have seen membership > organisations being captured by large players buying out smaller players > - the endgame being $$$ controlling the organisation and *not* the > public interest. > Kind regards, > > Olivier > > -- > Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD > http://www.gih.com/ocl.html > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > > ------------------------------ > <http://www.avast.com/> > > Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel malveillant > parce que la protection Antivirus avast! <http://www.avast.com/> est > active. > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji(a)fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji(a)fuoye.edu.ng>* The key to understanding is humility - my view !

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FW: [CWG-RFP3] RFP3b - an alternative proposal
by Bart Boswinkel Jan. 22, 2015

Jan. 22, 2015

Dear all, At the request of Chris Disspain, the alternative proposal as submitted to CWG Stewardship RFP 3 b sub-working group, Kind regards, Bart From: Chris Disspain <ceo(a)auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> Date: Thursday, January 22, 2015 at 9:36 AM To: Bart Boswinkel <bart.boswinkel(a)icann.org<mailto:bart.boswinkel@icann.org>> Subject: Fwd: [CWG-RFP3] RFP3b - an alternative proposal Bart, Please forward to the cc lists. Cheers, Chris Begin forwarded message:

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Session #1 Day 2 Frankfurt F2F-7:00 UTC Notes
by Brenda Brewer Jan. 21, 2015

Jan. 21, 2015

Dear all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the CCWG ACCT Session 1 Day 2 call on 20 January are available here: https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Session+%231 Notes: Tuesday, 20 January Agenda Item - Consensus building around WS1 requirements Will start discussion with WS1 definition and use that to move forward. Proposed definition (credit goes to Matthew Shears for proposing this definition): Work Stream 1: is focused on mechanisms that 1) enhance ICANN's accountability and must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition, and 2) that provide the community with confidence that any accountability measures that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. The goal is not to create new ICANN accountability but rather to enhance ICANN accountability. Recap on the proposed definition: Will keep the definition in the Charter Insert requirements for WS1 Start with this sentence as we build in the WS1 requirements WS1 Requirements What are the requirements that can replace the US Government? See MindMap "WS1 Requirements" Next Step after the break will be to identify sequence -- a few things that we can operationalize soon with the transition in mind.

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Session #2 Day 2 Frankfurt F2F-9:00 UTC Notes
by Brenda Brewer Jan. 21, 2015

Jan. 21, 2015

Dear all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the CCWG ACCT Session 2 Day 2 call on 20 January are available here: https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Session+%232 Notes: Tuesday, 20 January -- session 2 (starting at 9:30 UTC) Agenda Item - Consensus building around WS1 requirements live edits to MindMap -- edits list the following symbols: - 1 = included in WS! - 2 = included in WS2 - (-) = remove from MindMap To get this list manageable, focus on priorities Narrow things by "what needs to be done" and "what needs to be committed to" in time for the transition Get items (1) implemented and to strive for implementation on the items listed as (2). Use this document, subject to constant review, as the foundation for work moving forward Sebastien Bachollet objected. This list is used as guidance to the work of the group. Next, need to address community composition Recap: The morning sessions may have appeared slow, but we have made significant progress. We've agreed that the list is provisional, that the list should remain flexible (not blocking list), need to have timeline for overall items, and list of mechanisms that should not replace the bottom up process. theses are not decision making processes, but rather accountability mechanisms. The list is the building block upon which we can build our work now. After lunch, we will focus on how we organize this work (called "work parties"?), the scope, and how we address on a global scale.

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Session #3 Day 2 Frankfurt F2F-13:00 UTC Notes
by Brenda Brewer Jan. 21, 2015

Jan. 21, 2015

Dear all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the CCWG ACCT Session 3 Day 2 call on 20 January are available here: https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Session+%233 Notes: Tuesday, 20 January -- session 3 (starting UTC) Discussion about "uber" committee, its structure, function, interaction with the Board. There are two avenues: * One concerns a last resort power. * Second it strengthening the independent review and redress mechanisms and in parallel, each avenue will have different requirements in terms of independence, in terms of operation, how independence is achieved and how they achieve representativeness. --> Could we divide work on these two items? Comment: Don't mix bottom-up policy development and a potential dissatisfaction with implementation of that policy. The mechanism should not undermine the bottom-up policy development process. Structure of work . To deepen cooperation with WA3, ongoing. Definition and scoping document, to be circuited for review shortly. Circulate to the advisors for their review and comment. A short scoping exercise on what is meant by Avenue A and Avenue B: - community empowerment with limited, strictly enumerated, last resort powers (collective) - evolve IRP into independent review & redress (individual decisions) . For Ave A and Ave B, to scope the questions that might be sent for legal advice, about what we want to achieve. Very simplistic example: under CA law, how could a community remove a board member? (must be refined) Candidates as Rapporteurs for: Community empowerment avenue: support from Steve DelBianco and Jordan Carter Review and Redress avenue: Becky Burr Seeking rapporteur for ave 1. Singapore: Two 3 hours CCWG working sessions, Monday 16:00-19:00 and Thursday at 07:00-10:00. Community engagement, Wednesday 10:30-12:00 Colleagues, strongly encouraged to engage with their constituencies to provide feedback on our work, particularly after Singapore on contingencies, definitions, work avenues etc. Test the avenue approach, will the community be satisfied if these approaches were implemented prior to the transition? Enough, too ambitious, not enough?

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Session #4 Day 2 Frankfurt F2F-15:00 UTC Notes
by Brenda Brewer Jan. 21, 2015

Jan. 21, 2015

Dear all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the CCWG ACCT Session 4 Day 2 call on 20 January are available here: https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Session+%234 Notes: Review of CWG questions Budget accountability CCWG proposal only considering up/down vote on annual budget. Not the level of detail suggested by CWG. Not foreseen breaking down budget to the level they seem to be requesting. CCWG supportive of the CWG request for improved transparency on the IANA budget. And CCWG will likely include a budget transparency in recommendations. Accountability (re)delegation Independent appeals panels The mechanism we envisage should cover these requests. Control over ICANN Board Decisions The group will respond to the CWG, draft shared with the list. Work on the problem statement has been completed and can be shared with the expert advisors. Mind-map provides the building blocks for work on accountability mechanisms, and working parties for avenues of work. Subteams allocated to further develop contingencies and further develop stress tests. Work items. Liaise with CWG Work on contingencies, definition of questions Scoping document, finalize and circulate to the list, and to advisors Establishing the two avenue working parties (Jordan Carter to led the community empowerment group) Through review of timelines so we are able to meet commitments by ICANN #53 Including a second F2F between Singapore and Buenos Aires Singapore preparation. Legal advice, urgency high, and need to develop specific questions

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