October 2015 - Accountability-Cross-Community

A path to Dublin and beyond
by Steve DelBianco Oct. 9, 2015

Oct. 9, 2015

Here are my own thoughts on a path to Dublin and beyond. I was thinking about Jonathan Zuck’s suggestion (link<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September…>) that a change to Membership model could be done in Work Stream 2 — if we create lasting leverage for community to enact a change despite board resistance. Then I read Bruce Tonkin's recent post (link<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-October/0…>) describing why our present AC/SO participation falls short of representing the global M-S community, and suggesting this is why the board might not approve a move to Membership at this time. Their posts, along with responses on list, suggest a way we can deliver by Dublin on enforceable accountability enhancements, thereby giving us powers to impose reforms to the AC/SO model after the IANA transition. Consider this: Let’s use the leverage of the IANA transition to get bylaws changes give the current AC/SO community the powers we require, with adequate enforceability. Plus, we ensure those powers are enough to force a future change to ICANN governance structure and/or Membership, if the community comes to consensus around what that new ICANN governance structure look like. That would mean we focus CCWG on finishing details and bylaws language for these enforceable powers exercised by supermajority of ACs and SOs: 1. Power to block a proposed Operating Plan/Strat Plan/Budget 2. Power to approve changes to Fundamental Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation 3. Power to block changes to regular bylaws. 4. Power to appoint and remove individual board directors 5. Power to recall the entire board of directors 6. Mechanism for binding IRP where a panel decision is enforceable in any court recognizing international arbitration results — even if ICANN’s board refused to participate in the binding arbitration. (assuming CCWG lawyers verify this works without activating a Membership model) I think we are close enough to get consensus around the above powers before we leave Dublin. And based on what we’ve heard recently, the board will support the powers described above. But there’s one more we have to add before losing the leverage of this IANA transition: Let’s put into ICANN bylaws a method where the community can show consensus to undertake a review of ICANN's governance structure, either because the powers above aren’t working, or just because the community overwhelmingly wants to review governance. The goal of the Governance Review is to recommend a new governance model that might even include moving to Membership. To Bruce’s point, any proposal emerging from this Governance Review would include assurances that ACs and SOs are representative of global internet users and protected from capture. This same bylaw could describe a process for board acceptance of a consensus proposal emerging from the Governance Review: it would take 2/3 board majority to object to the proposal on the grounds that it is not in the global public interest, triggering a board-community consultation. After consultation, a new community proposal would take 3/4 board majority to object. If the board objected a second time, we would have the power to recall that entire board, or to pursue binding arbitration. Again, these are my personal thoughts about a way forward that is based on what others have said recently. —Steve DelBianco

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Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for WP1 Meeting | 9 October 2015
by Brenda Brewer Oct. 9, 2015

Oct. 9, 2015

Hello all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the WP-1 meeting on 9 October will be available here: https://community.icann.org/x/vKZYAw A copy of the action items and notes may be found below. Thank you. Kind regards, Brenda Action Items * Action (aim for 12 October): Jonathan and Cherine will be working on language for revenue shortfall to include in document for CCWG consideration in Dublin. * Action: Steve to update the document based on the staff-provided information on AOC Review Team composition. Steve will also adjust the language to address Alan's point on selection rather than request. * Action: Alan to confirm that the language in document refects the concern above. * Action: Greg to add reference to Bylaws into the document as part of revision. Notes These high-level notes are designed to help you navigate through content of the call and do not substitute in any way the transcript. 1. Review of Agenda * Last meeting before Dublin ICANN 54 meeting. * Purpose is to review public comments and make sure that the summaries are honest and accurate for the CCWG-Accountability. * We are not here to debate the substantive issues. 2. Second review of comments analysis Please send revised documents to acct-staff(a)icann.org <mailto:acct-staff@icann.org> and wp1(a)icann.org <mailto:wp1@icann.org> to ensure that the documents can be uploaded to AC room. Budget Power (Jonathan Zuck) * Description of document changes since last call (need a solution for #5 Revenue Shortfall) * Action (aim for 12 October): Jonathan and Cherine will be working on language for revenue shortfall to include in document for CCWG consideration in Dublin. Affirmation of Commitments (Steve DelBianco) * Document loaded directly to page 5, item #1 since the rest of the discussion has been addressed on previous calls * The Board wants the discretion to decide which of the recommendations would be implemented. The RySG indicated that they are supportive of this suggestion. * Action: Steve to update the document based on the staff-provided information on AOC Review Team composition. Steve will also adjust the language to address Alan's point on selection rather than request. Community Forum (Matthew Shears) * Same document as last time. * Matthew Shears sent apologies and is not on the call. * Discussion tabled. No comments. Community Mechanism as Sole Member/ The Model (Avri Doria) * Document available to edit here: https://docs.google.com/document/d/12dzqIffVu9z--0UYvEji6KdIa-U3wHcrXS0E9lr… * Concern with few number of AC/SOs that committed to participate ahead of time * Action: Alan to confirm that the language in document refects the concern above. * Clarification on Board comments from Jordan and Alan: 1) yes/no from each SO/AC 2) consensus among SO/AC to exercise powers Recall of ICANN Board (Greg Shatan) * Document available here: https://community.icann.org/x/ZQMnAw under Board Recall - look for version 3 * Page 5 to start discussion on areas of concern. No comments. * Page 6-7 to discuss options for consideration for full CCWG (new additions in purple underline text) * Standards for Board selection are in Bylaws. * Action: Greg to add reference to Bylaws into the document as part of revision. 3. Approach to documenting our work for 12-Oct deadline Suggestion to provide two documents to the CCWG * Doc 1 has a section for each topic we analysed, and presents the areas of agreement / concern / divergence and then the options, all together. * Doc 2 is just the options organised by each section, with some priority attached to the biggest ones to settle in Dublin. We could assess that priority and encourage the CCWG to do so at its call next Tuesday. 4. Any Other Business * Presentation of document detailing compostion of past review teams (needed for AOC analysis). * document available at https://community.icann.org/x/ZQMnAw (under the section INCLUSION OF AOC) * SDB has included all of page 2 of this document into the AOC analysis document. * Discussion on number of participants of 21 vs up to 21. * Plan B notes available at: Call ends 30 min early!

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Agenda - WP1 mtg - 9 Oct 2015 at 1730-1930 UTC
by Robin Gross Oct. 9, 2015

Oct. 9, 2015

Not sure I can make the call tomorrow, so I'll state my position against restrictions to individual director recall rights now. Considering the only public comment calling for limitations on the community's right to recall the individual board members was from the board itself, and the consensus has consistently been for NOT restricting recall rights, but for providing rationales for recalls, I don't understand why we are forced to continue to beat this dead horse. If two public comment periods have not been enough to create anything close to consensus to restrict the community's board recall rights, let's put this issue to bed and focus on the issues where the community is far more divided. Thanks, Robin On Oct 8, 2015, at 1:57 PM, Jordan Carter wrote: > Hi all > > Here is the proposed agenda for our next call: Friday 9 October at 17h30 UTC for up to two hours. > > Could all those proposing documents for this meeting please circulate them ASAP, with an email subject line that identifies what your document is? > > > 1. Review of Agenda > > 2. Second review of comments analysis: > > a) Budget power > b) Affirmation of Commitments > c) Community Forum > d) Community Mechanism as Sole Member / The Model > e) Recall of ICANN Board > > 3. Approach to documenting our work for 12-Oct deadline > > 4. Any Other Business > > > Please advise any further / other agenda items... > > > thanks, > Jordan > > -- > Jordan Carter > > Chief Executive > InternetNZ > > +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) > Email: jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz > Skype: jordancarter > Web: www.internetnz.nz > > A better world through a better Internet > > _______________________________________________ > WP1 mailing list > WP1(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1

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Fwd: [ccnso-members] Fwd: TPP Treaty: Intellectual Property Rights Chapter - 5 October 2015 - domain names (final text)
by Dr Eberhard W Lisse Oct. 9, 2015

Oct. 9, 2015

FYI. el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini Begin forwarded message: > From: Erick Iriarte <eiriarte(a)iriartelaw.com> > Date: 9 October 2015 at 18:15:18 WAST > To: "cctldcommunity(a)cctld-managers.org" <cctldcommunity(a)cctld-managers.org>, "ccnso-members(a)icann.org" <ccnso-members(a)icann.org>, "ccnso-council(a)icann.org" <ccnso-council(a)icann.org> > Subject: [ccnso-members] Fwd: TPP Treaty: Intellectual Property Rights Chapter - 5 October 2015 - domain names (final text) > > FYI > >> Inicio del mensaje reenviado: >> >> De: Erick Iriarte <eiriarte(a)alfa-redi.org> >> Asunto: TPP Treaty: Intellectual Property Rights Chapter - 5 October 2015 - domain names (final text) >> Fecha: 9 de octubre de 2015, 11:12:23 GMT-5 >> Para: LatinoamerICANN <latinoamericann(a)dgroups.org> >> Cc: "ag(a)lactld.org General de LACTLD" <ag(a)lactld.org> >> >> Paises involucrados: >> United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Vietnam, Brunei, Chile >> US, CA, AU, NZ, SG, JP, MX, PE, CL, BN, VN, MY >> >> Nota de Prensa de Wikileaks >> Texto Chapter Propiedad Intelectual: https://wikileaks.org/tpp-ip3/WikiLeaks-TPP-IP-Chapter/WikiLeaks-TPP-IP-Cha… (PDF) >> >> Article QQ.C.12: {Domain Name Cybersquatting} >> >> 1. In connection with each Party’s system for the management of its country-code toplevel domain (ccTLD) domain names, the following shall be available: >> >> (a) an appropriate procedure for the settlement of disputes, based on, or modelled along the same lines as, the principles established in the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, or that is: (i) designed to resolve disputes expeditiously and at low cost, (ii) fair and equitable, (iii) not overly burdensome, and (iv) does not preclude resort to court litigation; and >> >> (b) online public access to a reliable and accurate database of contact information concerning domain-name registrants; >> >> in accordance with each Party’s laws and, where applicable, relevant administrator policies regarding protection of privacy and personal data. >> >> 2. In connection with each Party’s system for the management of ccTLD domain names, appropriate remedies[20], shall be available, at least in cases where a person registers or holds, with a bad faith intent to profit, a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark. >> >> Note [20] >> It is understood that such remedies may but need not include, for example, revocation, cancellation, transfer, damages, or injunctive relief. > >

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Agenda - WP1 mtg - 9 Oct 2015 at 1730-1930 UTC
by Robin Gross Oct. 9, 2015

Oct. 9, 2015

Tijani, Actually, take another look at the CCWG's draft proposal (below). It is very clear in our proposal that only the AC-SO who appoints a director does the removing. Where did you get the idea it was to be a wider-group decision? Best, Robin From p. 58 of CCWG 2nd draft proposal explaining Individual Board removal (relevant text in RED below): 1 The Board is the governing body of ICANN, with main responsibilities that include employing the President and CEO, appointing the Officers, overseeing organizational policies, making decisions on key issues, defining the organization’s strategic and operating plans and holding the staff to account for implementing them. 2 Of ICANN’s sixteen Directors, fifteen are appointed for a fixed three-year term and generally are in office for the whole term that they are appointed for by his or her SO or AC, or by the Nominating Committee. In addition the Board appoints the President and CEO (confirmed each year at the Annual General Meeting), who serves on the Board ex officio (by reason of his or her position as President and CEO). The power to remove individual Directors of the ICANN Board is currently available only to the Board itself (though this will change with the Single Member Model the CCWG-Accountability is proposing[1]), and can be exercised through a 75% vote of the Board. Today there is no limitation[2] on the Board’s power to remove a director specified in the Bylaws. 3 This power would allow for the removal of a Director before his or her fixed term comes to an end, with no rules set as to limitations on such removal or requirements for a particular cause for such removal. It is expected that this power would only be exercised in cases of serious difficulty with a particular Director. 4 For the seven Directors appointed by one of the three SOs or by the At-Large Community), a process led by that organization or subdivision would decide on the Director’s removal. Only the SO or AC that appointed the Director could decide on that director’s removal. For the purposes of such a removal process, SO means the SO or for the case of the GNSO, the GNSO House that has the Bylaw right to appoint a director. 5 The following process applies for removing a Director appointed by an SO or AC: 1. A decision to start consideration of a Director’s removal requires a call to do so, approved by a simple majority in the SO or AC which originally appointed the director. 2. Where such a call to remove a Director meets the required threshold is announced, within fifteen days a meeting of the ICANN Community Forum (see Section 6.3 for the concept) will be convened. At that meeting: a) The Chair of the forum must not be associated with the petitioning SO or AC or with the Director involved; b) Representatives of the appointing/removing SO or AC must explain why they seek the Director’s removal; c) The Director has the opportunity to reply and set out his or her views; and d) Questions and answers can be asked of the appointing/removing SO or AC and of the Director involved by all the other participants in the forum 3. Within fifteen days after the meeting of the forum, the SO or AC which originally appointed the Director makes its decision through its usual process. 4. The threshold to cause the removal of the director is 75% of the votes cast in the SO or AC which originally appointed the Director. 5. If the threshold is met, then, as will be set out in the bylaws, the Community Mechanism as Sole Member automatically implements this decision, and the Director is removed. 6. If no decision is made within fifteen days, the process lapses and the director remains in place. 7. No new call to consider the removal of that same director can be made during the term they are serving on the Board following a vote to remove them failing or no decision being made. [1] If the CCWG-Accountability’s Single Member Model is implemented, the Board could only remove directors for causes specified in the California corporate code – see the memo from 23 April 2015 entitled “Legal Assessment: Executive Summary, Summary Chart and Revised Governance Chart”. For further detail on legal advice provided, see Appendix G. [2] Today there are escalation paths, up to and including removal from the Board, for Board member violations of the Code of Conduct and Conflict of Interest Policies, but the Bylaws do not currently require such a violation to occur prior to Board removal. On Oct 8, 2015, at 11:30 PM, Tijani BENJEMAA wrote: > Robin, > > You are right that in California legislature, it is the right of the Member/designator to recall the appointed director. The CCWG proposal was for a sole member, and it is the right of this sole member to recall the directors, not any SO or AC. The sole member being the community as a whole. > > I think it is useless that I repeat the several reasons for which I believe it is for the benefit of the organization and the global public interest that the recall should be done by the community not a single SO or AC. I will only mention the benefit of treating all the board directors on an equal footing should they be appointed by an SO or AC or by the NomCom. > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Tijani BEN JEMAA > > Executive Director > > Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) > > Phone: +216 98 330 114 > > Fax: +216 70 853 376 > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > >> Le 9 oct. 2015 à 04:47, Robin Gross <robin(a)ipjustice.org> a écrit : >> >> Hi Chris, >> >> The CCWG proposal (with which I agree on this point) provides that the specific SO/AC who appoints a board member has the power to recall (not the community-at-large). That is the accountability tool which the California legislature provided by statute to hold board members accountable -- and it is the norm in most organizations of these types. Restricting such a right would be a rare exception in practice. Are there examples of other nonprofit public benefit organizations who have restricted members / designators rights of board recall in such a way? >> >> Attempts to restrict members / designators rights to recall the board member which they appoint carry a heavy burden of demonstrating why the California legislature got it wrong in creating this accountability tool - and why the vast majority of other organizations who do provide such statutory recall rights have not been destroyed by the power as ICANN claims will happen if this common ordinary power were to exist at ICANN. >> >> Thanks, >> Robin >> >> >> On Oct 8, 2015, at 4:42 PM, Chris Disspain wrote: >> >>> Hi Robin, >>> >>> What’s your position on whether it should be the electing SO/AC that can recall or a wider group? >>> >>> >>> Cheers, >>> >>> Chris >>> >>>> On 9 Oct 2015, at 10:39 , Robin Gross <robin(a)ipjustice.org> wrote: >>>> >>>> Not sure I can make the call tomorrow, so I'll state my position against restrictions to individual director recall rights now. >>>> >>>> Considering the only public comment calling for limitations on the community's right to recall the individual board members was from the board itself, and the consensus has consistently been for NOT restricting recall rights, but for providing rationales for recalls, I don't understand why we are forced to continue to beat this dead horse. If two public comment periods have not been enough to create anything close to consensus to restrict the community's board recall rights, let's put this issue to bed and focus on the issues where the community is far more divided. >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> Robin >>>> >>>> On Oct 8, 2015, at 1:57 PM, Jordan Carter wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi all >>>>> >>>>> Here is the proposed agenda for our next call: Friday 9 October at 17h30 UTC for up to two hours. >>>>> >>>>> Could all those proposing documents for this meeting please circulate them ASAP, with an email subject line that identifies what your document is? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 1. Review of Agenda >>>>> >>>>> 2. Second review of comments analysis: >>>>> >>>>> a) Budget power >>>>> b) Affirmation of Commitments >>>>> c) Community Forum >>>>> d) Community Mechanism as Sole Member / The Model >>>>> e) Recall of ICANN Board >>>>> >>>>> 3. Approach to documenting our work for 12-Oct deadline >>>>> >>>>> 4. Any Other Business >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Please advise any further / other agenda items... >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> thanks, >>>>> Jordan >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Jordan Carter >>>>> >>>>> Chief Executive >>>>> InternetNZ >>>>> >>>>> +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) >>>>> Email: jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz >>>>> Skype: jordancarter >>>>> Web: www.internetnz.nz >>>>> >>>>> A better world through a better Internet >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> WP1 mailing list >>>>> WP1(a)icann.org >>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> WP1 mailing list >>>> WP1(a)icann.org >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/wp1 >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >

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Is it reasonable to avoid new mechanisms?
by Avri Doria Oct. 9, 2015

Oct. 9, 2015

Hi, The Board's critique rests on a notion that the introduction of anything new in the ICANN system will be a destabilizing factor and most be avoided. This ignores the fact that by removing the NTIA backstop we destabilize the current system. It might have been possible to find a new balance (not that the old worked that well given the amount of discontent that existed prior to the CCWG process) by tweaking the system. The early work of the CCWG, however, showed that this was not enough. So we decided to bring back a notion that existed in the early ICANN design, the idea of membership. Membership has always been part of the kit that was available to ICANN in the multistakeholder model. An initial experiment met with some issues and instead of fixing that then, they threw the notion away without exploring possible tweaks to the system. As a result we are living in ICANN 2.0, a system that was imposed in a top down manner and one that was never fully accepted by those at the bottom. Now, albeit in a very different configuration, the CCWG is proposing to establish a community consensus based idea of membership. I believe that this should be given a fair analysis before rejecting it. It is also important to remember that the NTIA requirements were not a prohibition of new mechanisms or structures, but rather evidence that these structure did not increase the current risk, or fact, of capture and that they could be held to account. The Board criticism is important to look at for arguments that show the areas in which the CCWG plan either does not explain its protections against capture and its accountability checks and balances or may have gaps in these areas. If we cannot explain what we propose, or cannot close the gaps, then it becomes time to consider variations on the model or another model altogether. In my opinion, we are not there. avri --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus

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Budget power - two new suggestions
by Jordan Carter Oct. 9, 2015

Oct. 9, 2015

Hi all I've been hearing some concern from the Numbers and Protocols communities regarding how any veto of the IANA Budget might affect their IANA services. The notion that the Names community should through its Community Mechanism or planning process make decisions on that leaves some nervous. So my first suggestion is: *what if we change the decision-maker for a veto/reconsideration of the IANA Functions to a specific group created for that purpose, with representation from the Names, Numbers and Protocols communities*? Leave aside the question of enforceability for the moment and think about the principle. My second suggestion for debate, and I realise this is not going to be everyone's cup of tea, is: if we can make the IANA budget veto/reconsideration workable as per suggestion 1, *could we defer the veto part of the ICANN budget debate for WS2, and simply do the incorporation of enhanced community feedback and challenge along the lines the Board proposed*? Would that meet our requirements (can we get it done after WS1 given other WS1 powers being enforceable)? Would it meet the CWG's requirements? I am in solution mode with this email, hope it is helpful. best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *

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Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for WP4 Meeting | 8 October
by Brenda Brewer Oct. 8, 2015

Oct. 8, 2015

Hello all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the WP-4 meeting on 8 October will be available here: https://community.icann.org/x/QadYAw A copy of the notes may be found below. Thank you. Kind regards, Brenda Action Item Action Item = Staff to look at transcript from the LA meeting regarding the HR issue and distribute to WP4. Notes Google Doc Link: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1qGYKB3d2pjx0iFGj8a8lywgM7WgYqTpis_4-ldk… These high-level notes are designed to help you navigate through content of the call and do not substitute in any way the transcript. . Poll Results . Review analysis document from Neils and Tatiana https://docs.google.com/document/d/1qGYKB3d2pjx0iFGj8a8lywgM7WgYqTpis_4-ldk… Results of survey: * Question 1 - Should there be a reference to a specific document in the Bylaws text regarding human rights proposed by the CCWG (Yes or No)? * Question 2 - If a document reference is included should it be the UDHR (yes or no)? * Question 3 - If not UDHR what other document or documents should be referred to (list)? Results of WP4 Poll Q1 Yes - 5 No - 18 Q2 Yes - 11 No - 12 Q3 None or NA - 13 Not Sure - 3 For Q3 - details International bill of human rights , Regional and Domestic commitments to same. . my read is if one answers 1 and 2 with No then 3 is irrelevant. I note that some others have, however, put in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights for 3 even though they have said no to 1 and 2. . that is be guided by the Guiding Principles on business and human rights . The UDHR is the only instrument that is of sufficient universality. . The UDHR is the only instrument that is of sufficient universality. . UDHR & UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights . UDHR & UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights . UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR . UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR . UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR . UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR . UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR . UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights Tatiana noted full results of the poll should be included in the report. Analysis Document - https://docs.google.com/document/d/1qGYKB3d2pjx0iFGj8a8lywgM7WgYqTpis_4-ldk… Introduction edits by GS supported by authors and participants. Action Item = Staff to look at transcript from the LA meeting regarding the HR issue and distribute to WP4. Introduction is accepted with the exception of the Board comment on HR from the LA meeting. Areas of Consensus WP4 rough consensus is recommended to be moved to the Option section. discussion of process for creating document to match other such documents. Agreed. Areas of Divergence Editing text. Point 2 - GS notes this suggestion may be problematic. Edited. Options for CCWG Consideration Point 2 has similar problems as above. GS has significant concerns. We should not be trying to interpret how Art 4 applies to human rights in this group. Agree to remove the comment under 2. Point 3 - discussion. Wrap up. Agreed to introduction. areas of consensus, areas needing further refinement and Divergence. Need to complete discussion on last two bullets in Options for CCWG Consideration. WP4 will work on the list to complete the document for 12th. Adjourn.

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Fwd: Agenda - WP1 mtg - 9 Oct 2015 at 1730-1930 UTC
by Jordan Carter Oct. 8, 2015

Oct. 8, 2015

Hi all Please see below agenda for hopefully last WP1 meeting before Dublin - as ever, all participants are very welcome. best Jordan ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Jordan Carter <jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz> Date: 9 October 2015 at 09:57 Subject: Agenda - WP1 mtg - 9 Oct 2015 at 1730-1930 UTC To: "wp1(a)icann.org" <wp1(a)icann.org> Hi all Here is the proposed agenda for our next call: Friday 9 October at 17h30 UTC for up to two hours. *Could all those proposing documents for this meeting please circulate them ASAP, with an email subject line that identifies what your document is?* *1. Review of Agenda* *2. Second review of comments analysis:* a) Budget power b) Affirmation of Commitments c) Community Forum d) Community Mechanism as Sole Member / The Model e) Recall of ICANN Board *3. Approach to documenting our work for 12-Oct deadline* *4. Any Other Business* Please advise any further / other agenda items... thanks, Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *

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Chronology of accountability discussions & implications for our work.
by Jordan Carter Oct. 8, 2015

Oct. 8, 2015

Hi all I attach for you a chronology of the accountability debate, starting with ICANN's decision to push towards the NetMundial event in September 2013. My motivation was a personal one - I found myself losing track of the order of events, and I had a discomforting feeling that some of the reasons for us being under significant time pressure now were not of our making. The chronology stands for itself and is fully referenced. It's my hope to have a blog post out about it today if possible. Whatever you think of my observations below, if you find errors in the document, I'd love to hear about them. For our CCWG given where we are, I'd offer a couple of observations inspired by recalling the history: * the opposition of ICANN to a community driven accountability process (from March to October 2014 - CCWG was only chartered in Nov 2014) is the cause of our current time pressure. * the multistakeholder process the CCWG has been following is the only one that can drive to consensus. Development of separate alternative proposals by different players won't work. * critical to success is the ability to synthesise feedback and evolve new models. This CCWG has done that significantly twice - in establishing its First Draft and Second Draft proposals, where it moved from individual memberships to a membership vehicle - while ensuring the proposal is able to deliver on the accountability requirements the community has established. * Efforts to do this a third time are placed at risk by the Board's actions in the past few weeks with its red lines tactic. * it's not possible to synthesise and create new models to resolve differences except in an environment of trust and confidence that the outcome of such a dialogue will be respected. Only one party is obstructing that process - we all know what it is. That party needs to change its behaviour, and publicly commit to doing so as well. Otherwise, the entirety of the CCWG's work is at risk. Food for thought. cheers Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *

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