January 2015 - Accountability-Cross-Community

Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition
by Mathieu Weill Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Dear Tijani, The "new" proposal is in no way meant to be a substitute to the charter definition. The Charter definition, intentionally, left room for interpretation. Therefore the proposal we are now considering intends to provide the CCWG's interpretation and orientation. Indeed, we are delivering on one of the areas of work mentioned in our Charter, which read (section III, deliverables) : > > ·A definition/description of what differentiates a Work Stream 1 issue > from a Work Stream 2 issue > Thus, the question is whether the proposed version is found appropriate to the group in order to qualify what is necessary before the transition happens. I hope this clarifies. Best Mathieu Le 15/01/2015 10:52, Tijani BEN JEMAA a écrit : > > Dear all, > > I read again the new proposed definition of the Work Streams, and I > found it too different from the one in our charter: > > In the charter: > > ·*Work Stream 1*: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability > that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the > IANA Stewardship Transition; > > ·*Work Stream 2*: focused on addressing accountability topics for > which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may > extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition > > The new proposal: > > ·*Work Stream 1*mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed > to, would provide the community with confidence that any > accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's > accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from > the community, even if it were to encounter ICANN management > resistance or if it were against the interest of ICANN as a corporate > entity. > > ·All other consensus items could be in *Work Stream 2*, provided there > are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items > despite resistance from ICANN management and board. > > I don’t believe that we are allowed to change any part of the charter > without going back to the chartering organizations and ask for their > approval. > > On the other hand, the separation of WS 1 and WS 2 was for the purpose > of having the accountability mechanisms necessary before the > transition done in time, and the new definition doesn’t satisfy this > requirement > > I would prefer stay with the charter definition for all those reasons > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > *Tijani BEN JEMAA* > > Executive Director > > Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (*FMAI*) > > Phone: + 216 41 649 605 > > Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 > > Fax: + 216 70 853 376 > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > <http://www.avast.com/> > > Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel > malveillant parce que la protection Antivirus avast! > <http://www.avast.com/> est active. > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill(a)afnic.fr Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************

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Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Dear All, Dear Tijani, I do not understand what do we mean by " New Defintion"Where it comes from ? Are we allowed to modify charter? >From the practical and logical view points, the language used in Charter is quite logical and correct. I therefore have certain difficulties for new suggestion Regards Kavouss 2015-01-15 10:52 GMT+01:00 Tijani BEN JEMAA <tijani.benjemaa(a)fmai.org.tn>: > Dear all, > > > > I read again the new proposed definition of the Work Streams, and I found > it too different from the one in our charter: > > > > In the charter: > > · *Work Stream 1*: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN > accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame > of the IANA Stewardship Transition; > > · *Work Stream 2*: focused on addressing accountability topics for > which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may > extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition > > > > The new proposal: > > · *Work Stream 1* mechanisms are those that, when in place or > committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any > accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability > would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even > if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against > the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. > > · All other consensus items could be in *Work Stream 2*, provided > there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items > despite resistance from ICANN management and board. > > > > I don’t believe that we are allowed to change any part of the charter > without going back to the chartering organizations and ask for their > approval. > > > > On the other hand, the separation of WS 1 and WS 2 was for the purpose of > having the accountability mechanisms necessary before the transition done > in time, and the new definition doesn’t satisfy this requirement > > > > I would prefer stay with the charter definition for all those reasons > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > *Tijani BEN JEMAA* > > Executive Director > > Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (*FMAI*) > > Phone: + 216 41 649 605 > > Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 > > Fax: + 216 70 853 376 > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > <http://www.avast.com/> > > Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel malveillant > parce que la protection Antivirus avast! <http://www.avast.com/> est > active. > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >

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[CCWG-Accountability] Fwd: [CWG-Stewardship] Chart on CWG link with CCWG on Accountability
by Mathieu Weill Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Dear Colleagues, FYI, the co-chairs of the CWG have circulated for consideration within their working group a diagram laying out proposed interactions with our group. We will have an opportunity to discuss this in Frankfurt. Best, Mathieu -------- Message transféré -------- Sujet : [CWG-Stewardship] Chart on CWG link with CCWG on Accountability Date : Wed, 14 Jan 2015 08:56:18 -0000 De : Jonathan Robinson <jrobinson(a)afilias.info> Répondre à : jrobinson(a)afilias.info Organisation : Afilias Pour : cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org All, Please see attached for a draft / proposal for the mechanics and flow of linking the work of this CWG with that of the CCWG on Accountability. As you know, this is a critical area of our work. Accordingly, this chart is provided to facilitate discussion on the subject and to assist us in getting to a common CWG view of the linkage and relationship. Thank-you, Jonathan & Lise Co-chairs

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[CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals
by Mathieu Weill Jan. 14, 2015

Jan. 14, 2015

Dear Colleagues, During our 30th December call, we had extensive discussions regarding what our group would consider work stream 1 or swork stream 2. We concluded with an action item as such : > *ACTION:* Recap of definitions of WS1/WS2 for mailing list and discussion next week. As Co-chairs, we have attempted to summarize the various inputs expressed on the list as well as during the calls on the matter. Below is a recap, including a proposal for discussion, inspired by the WA2 proposal, and which, in our opinion, would be a good candidate to move forward. This is for you review at this stage before we discuss it tomorrow during the weekly call. Comments or alternate will be welcome during the call or later on this thread. I'd like to once again thank Steve del Bianco and the WA2 team for their essential contribution to this key piece of our work. Mathieu ------------------------ Main inputs, comments and positions expressed so far regarding WS1/WS2: > Problem statement from our Charter : >> The concerns raised during these discussions around the transition process indicate that the existing >> ICANN accountability mechanisms do not yet meet stakeholder expectations. Recent statements >> made by various stakeholders suggest that current accountability mechanisms need to be reviewed >> and, if need be, improved, amended, replaced, or supplemented with new mechanisms (see for >> instance ATRT recommendations). Considering that the NTIA has stressed that it is expecting >> community consensus regarding the transition, a failure to meet stakeholder expectations with >> regards to accountability may create a situation where NTIA does not accept the IANA transition >> proposal as meeting its conditions. Thus reviewing ICANN’s accountability mechanisms was >> considered to be crucial for the transition process. > Work stream scopes from our Charter : >> In the discussions around the accountability process, the >> CCWG-Accountability will proceed with two Work Streams: >> >> * *Work Stream 1*: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN >> accountability that must be in place or committed to within the >> time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition; >> * *Work Stream 2*: focused on addressing accountability topics for >> which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation >> may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition. >> >> >> The CCWG-Accountability will allocate issues to Work Stream 1 and >> Work Stream 2. Some issues may span both Work Streams. >> >> Suggested questions to be considered as part of Work Stream 1 >> include, but are not limited to: >> >> * What would be the impact of NTIA’s transition of the IANA >> Functions Contract in ensuring ICANN’s accountability and what >> potential accountability concerns could this cause? >> * What enhancements or reforms are required to be implemented or >> committed to before the NTIA Stewardship Transition? >> o How will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested? >> * What enhancements or reforms must be committed to before the NTIA >> Stewardship Transition, but could be implemented after. >> o If the implementation of enhancements or reforms are to be >> deferred, how can the community be assured they will be >> implemented? >> o How will these enhancements or reforms be stress-tested? >> >> > Work Area 2 proposed definition of WS1/2 : >> WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in >> place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs. >> All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided*there are >> mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items >> despite resistance from Icann management and Board.* > Paul Rosenzweig tentative defintiion of WS0 : >> >> As a result, I think that part of what we should be doing in the >> long run is focusing on the core/critical 3-5 items that are >> absolutely essential to ensuring accountability. In short, I >> think there is actually a sub-category of WS1 (call it*WS0*for >> want of a better term) that would be fundamental red-lines for >> the community. >> >> > Alan Greenberg's concern : >> Needs to demontrate why items in WS1 or WS2 are needed as a consequence of the NTIA transition. > > Comment from Becky Burr : > Understands the community to say there were certain basic > accountability mechanisms that would enable them to feel comfortable > with the IANA transition, these may not be directly related to the > transition itself. What we need from WS1 is the community feels > comfortable that tools are in place to continue the work to create > real and meaningful accountability. ----------------------------------- Proposal submitted for comments (to be presented and initially discussed during tomorrow's call): > WS1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would > provide the community with confidence that any accountability > mechanism that would further enhance Icann's accountability would be > implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it > were to encounter Icann management resistance or if it were against > the interest of Icann as a corporate entity. -- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill(a)afnic.fr Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************

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Re: [CCWG-Accountability] judicial/arbitral function
by Bruce Tonkin Jan. 14, 2015

Jan. 14, 2015

Hello Paul, >> And that, in turn emphasizes why it is necessary as part of the transition to define the Board's/ICANN's scope of authority. A judicial/arbitral function can only resolve disputes and cabin capture/abuse if it has an articulated standard against which to measure the dispute. In the absence of such pre-existing guidance the judiciary/arbiter is simply substituting his/her/its own judgment for the Board and the Community, which is not a good thing. Agreed. The current primary documents that an independent function could base a judgement on is whether ICANN is complying with its bylaws and its Articles of Incorporation. For example the current independent review process identified in the bylaws states : https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#IV 1. ".. ICANN shall have in place a separate process for independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. 2. Any person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or action. In order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board's alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation, and not as a result of third parties acting in line with the Board's action." Also: "Requests for such independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Process Panel ("IRP Panel"), which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The IRP Panel must apply a defined standard of review to the IRP request, focusing on: a. did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?; b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and c. did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?" The Independent Review Process Panel shall have the authority to: "a. summarily dismiss requests brought without standing, lacking in substance, or that are frivolous or vexatious; b. request additional written submissions from the party seeking review, the Board, the Supporting Organizations, or from other parties; c. declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws; and d. recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP; e. consolidate requests for independent review if the facts and circumstances are sufficiently similar; and f. determine the timing for each proceeding." The discussion in recent years is that the output of the Independent Review process is not binding. Ie it is not binding arbitration - simply an independent "review". The bylaws could be updated to better " define the Board's/ICANN's scope of authority", and the Cross Community Working Group could consider what changes are necessary to the current Independent Review mechanism. For example the ability and process to update the bylaws could be updated. Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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Re: [CCWG-Accountability] the term "community"
by Bruce Tonkin Jan. 13, 2015

Jan. 13, 2015

Hello Kavouss, >> I have one question which continued to bother me as everyone refers to "community" >> What is that magic term "community» covers? >> Does it includes or embrace the entire multistakeholders? >> As it was discussed at several occasion, there is a defacto agreement that ,generally speaking multistakeholder composed of Civil Society, Private Sector, Technical Community including academics, Governments I think that is a good question, and probably worth this group considering some definitions around that topic. For me personally, I tend to think of the terms in the following way: "ICANN Community" - this is the group of people that participate in the various ICANN working groups via email, phone, or websites, and attend ICANN meetings. This group is made up of individuals from GNSO constituencies and stakeholder groups, GAC, SSAC, ALAC, RSSAC, ccTLD representatives, RIR representatives etc. In my personal view, it is multi-stakeholder in that it includes people from Civil Society, Private Sector, Technical Community including academics, Governments. In addition to that there is a wider community of people that are members of the various organizations that are in turn members of the various groups that comprise the ICANN community. As an example, I am a member of the Internet Society of Australia (ISOC) which is part of the Asia, Australasia and the Pacific Islands Regional At-Large Organisation (APRALO) which is part of At-large. ISOC in Australia may send a representative to ICANN meetings. A business might be a member of a chamber of commerce or business association, which in turn could be a member of the ICANN business constituency, and that chamber of commerce or business association may send a representative to an ICANN meeting as a member of the ICANN community. I don't have any specific name for this wider group of people and organizations. Then there is term "public" which is used within the term "global public interest". In general, I personally think of the public in this context as Internet users. However you could also consider public in this context to be all the people of the world. Even people that don't directly use the Internet as a communication mechanism are probably affected by it in some way. The fundamental responsibility of the Board of ICANN is to exercise their judgment to act in what they reasonably believe to be the best interests of the global public interest, taking account of the interests of the Internet community as a whole rather than any individual group or interest. Its primary feedback mechanism for determining the global public interest is the "ICANN community" described above. Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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[CCWG-Accountability] CCWG ACCT Meeting #6 Notes, Action Items
by Brenda Brewer Jan. 13, 2015

Jan. 13, 2015

Dear all, The notes and recordings for the CCWG-Accountability Meeting #6 call on 13 January are available on the Wiki here: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51414987 Also here is a summary of the action items: Action: Steve DelBianco within WA2 to capture formulation for the definition. Action: Staff to re-cap who the community is accountable to. Action: Frankfurt for some definition for the basis of further work Action: Colleagues to provide concrete re-wording suggestions on this section before Frankfurt to the list. Action: Provide any suggestions about "purpose" To come to conclusion in Frankfurt. Action: Include time for an update from CWG Action: Expand time allowed for discussion on contingencies Action: Call for volunteers to do present ideas on what a post transition accountability framework might look like. Action: ICG liaisons will clarify if CCWG Accountability is expected to submit proposals on accountability to the ICG process. Agenda and Notes: 1. Welcome & Roll Call & SOI 2. CWG update and high level principles 3. WS1/WS2 recap 4. Definitions / scoping document : Public Interest discussion 5. Contingencies : finalize list 6. Draft agenda for Frankfurt meeting 7. AOB 8. Closing remarks 1. Welcome & Roll Call & SOI * On the call: Alice Munyua, Julia Wolman * No updates to Statement of Interest * Six advisors have been appointed by the PEG. A call between the co-chairs and advisors to get the advisors on-board is scheduled later this week. One advisor, Jan Scholte, will join the F2F in Frankfurt. A search for an international legal expert is ongoing. * Independent legal advice on California law - discussion with ICANN staff ongoing, the action is in progress * Apologies from Olga Cavalli 2. CWG update and high level principles * CCWG high level principles and CWG intense work weekend. 4 CWG calls over the weekend 10-11 January * Updates from CWG members * Avri Doria: CWG reviewed the surveys of members and participants and others to gauge impressions on aspects of the public comments received for all customer standing committee (CSC), MS review team (MRT), the independent appeals panel (IAP) and Contract Co and alternate proposals. * Discussion of various points of agreement and disagreement. * On CSC, MRT and IAP, consensus not agreed but some agreement on how they may be set up. On Contract Co, strong lack of consensus, with one notion of alternate proposals being worked on. * A list of the various accountability issues that came up in the CWG discussion is being drawn up. Hopefully in time for CCWG Frankfurt F2F. And how the accountability requirements may differ for the different proposals. * Do not expect consensus by January 15. * Would have been better if CCWG Accountability were further along. Some catch-up required and alignment of work of the two groups. * Greg Shatan: new sub-group has been formed to look at an "internal to iCANN" solution that does not involve a Contract Co. And the required accountability measures that an internal solution would necessitate.Cheryl Langdon-Orr: suggestion to add possible agenda item for Frankfurt to speak to ongoing work of CWG and new working group RFP3B. 3. WS1/WS2 recap * WS1, mainly about the community prevailing over ICANN * What do we mean by consensus? What is the "community"? Who would the community itself be accountable to? (Russian dolls or balance based on separation of powers) * Balance of different types of powers (judicial, legal, executive). * What happens if some ICANN accountability mechanisms disappear with the transition. * Affect of CWG discussions. * Inventory of WS1 and WS2 items (WA2) is being reformulated. * Question for the group: what would we consider "committed to", in what form the commitment might take. Will require further work. Action: Steve DelBianco within WA2 to capture formulation for the definition. Action: Staff to re-cap who the community is accountable to. Action: Frankfurt for some definition for the basis of further work 4. Definitions / scoping document : Public Interest discussion * Who are the stakeholders in directly affected, indirectly affected, and parties affecting ICANN? * The purpose of ICANN's accountability: (1) compliance purposes, (2) acceptable to achieved certain level of performance. In addition (3) that ICANN should be accountable to comply with relevant legislation. (4) ICANN accountable to ensure its decisions are in the interest of all stakeholders. * Preferred mapping of stakeholder and whether to use NETmundial? * The NETmundial definition is not felt as appropriate for CCWG work. Need to clarify wording in the document. Appropriate categorization of indirectly affected parties and others, particularly the impact on ccTLDs. Action: Colleagues to provide concrete re-wording suggestions on this section before Frankfurt to the list. Action: Provide any suggestions about "purpose" To come to conclusion in Frankfurt. 5. Contingencies : finalize list * Discussion in WA4. Stress tests and whether certain items should be taken off the list if the contingency was felt very unlikely to occur. The Charter does not suggest probability of a contingency - Should we take into account probability of a contingency when including or not in the list? * Importance to understand the likelihood opt something happening, for binary issues or other. Some scenarios seem to re-state the same problem set, e.g around financial issues. Suggestion to discuss what success conditions might look like. * The list is not finite and new items can be added via sub-group WA4. With discussion in Frankfurt. 6. Draft agenda for Frankfurt meeting * Progress on scope * Progress on WS1 and WS2 * Conclude the work on the inventory of current ICANN accountability mechanisms Action: Include time for an update from CWG Action: Expand time allowed for discussion on contingencies * Volunteers to provide what they think as the ideal outcomes, 2/3minutes. 4 or 5 "pitch visions" of that the post transition accountability might look like. Action: Call for volunteers to do present ideas on what a post transition accountability framework might look like. Action: ICG liaisons will clarify if CCWG Accountability is expected to submit proposals on accountability to the ICG process. 7. AOB * Issue of independent legal advice. Ongoing discussion, and the independent expert advisors may also be able to advise. Goal to provide legal advice in Frankfurt. 8. Closing remarks * Please provide feedback on the documents to be discussed in Frankfurt. Comment or Edits. For a full list of upcoming meetings, please see: https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Meetings Best regards, Brenda

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Re: [CCWG-Accountability] definitions of consensus
by Bruce Tonkin Jan. 13, 2015

Jan. 13, 2015

Hello Mathieu, >> I do not know whether Icann has a documented definition of consensus other than that ? Maybe there is within the gNSO for PDP purposes ? In the past the GNSO used the term "Supermajority" to be a 2/3 majority. A supermajority is required before something can become a Consensus Policy. When the GNSO Council was divided into two houses the definition was changed to: "GNSO Supermajority" shall mean: (a) two-thirds (2/3) of the Council members of each House, or (b) three-fourths (3/4) of one House and a majority of the other House." The GAC uses this definition: " The GAC works on the basis of seeking consensus among its membership. Consistent with United Nations practice, consensus is understood to mean the practice of adopting decisions by general agreement in the absence of any formal objection. Where consensus is not possible, the Chair shall convey the full range of views expressed by members to the ICANN Board." Not sure if that helps. Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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Re: [CCWG-Accountability] 6th Meeting CCWG-Accountability – Tuesday 13 January 2015 from 06:00-08:00 UTC
by Julia Katja Wolman Jan. 13, 2015

Jan. 13, 2015

I am sorry for joining the call late. I am not able to join the adobe meeting room but I have now connected through the phone line. Best regards, Julia Wolman Denmark, GAC ________________________________ Fra: ccwg-accountability-notify-bounces(a)icann.org [ccwg-accountability-notify-bounces(a)icann.org] på vegne af Brenda Brewer [brenda.brewer(a)icann.org] Sendt: 13. januar 2015 00:03 Til: ccwg-accountability-notify(a)icann.org Emne: [CCWG-Accountability-Notify] 6th Meeting CCWG-Accountability – Tuesday 13 January 2015 from 06:00-08:00 UTC *please download the .ics file to import into your calendar CCWG-Accountability – Tuesday 13 January 2015 from 06:00-08:00 UTC Time zone converter here<http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/fixedtime.html?msg=CCWG-Accountabilit…> Adobe Connect: https://icann.adobeconnect.com/accountability/ The dial-in details are below - please let me know if you require a dial-out. _______________________________________________________________ Participant passcode: CCWG ACCT For security reasons, the passcode will be required to join the call. _______________________________________________________________ Dial in numbers: COUNTRY Number Toll Free Number ARGENTINA 0800-777-0519 AUSTRALIA ADELAIDE 61-8-8121-4842 1-800-657-260 AUSTRALIA BRISBANE 61-7-3102-0944 1-800-657-260 AUSTRALIA CANBERRA 61-2-6100-1944 1-800-657-260 AUSTRALIA MELBOURNE 61-3-9010-7713 1-800-657-260 AUSTRALIA PERTH 61-8-9467-5223 1-800-657-260 AUSTRALIA SYDNEY 61-2-8205-8129 1-800-657-260 AUSTRIA 43-1-92-81-113 0800-005-259 BELGIUM 32-2-400-9861 0800-3-8795 BRAZIL 0800-7610651 CHILE 1230-020-2863 CHINA CHINA – A 86-400-810-4789 10800-712-1670 CHINA CHINA – B 86-400-810-4789 10800-120-1670 COLOMBIA 01800-9-156474 CZECH REPUBLIC 420-2-25-98-56-64 800-700-177 DENMARK 45-7014-0284 8088-8324 ESTONIA 800-011-1093 FINLAND Land Line 106-33-203 0-800-9-14610 FINLAND Mobile 09-106-33-203 0-800-9-14610 FRANCE LYON 33-4-26-69-12-85 080-511-1496 FRANCE MARSEILLE 33-4-86-06-00-85 080-511-1496 FRANCE PARIS 33-1-70-70-60-72 080-511-1496 GERMANY 49-69-2222-20362 0800-664-4247 GREECE 30-80-1-100-0687 00800-12-7312 HONG KONG 852-3001-3863 800-962-856 HUNGARY 06-800-12755 INDIA 000-800-852-1268 INDONESIA 001-803-011-3982 IRELAND 353-1-246-7646 1800-992-368 ISRAEL 1-80-9216162 ITALY 39-02-3600-6007 800-986-383 JAPAN OSAKA 81-6-7739-4799 0066-33-132439 JAPAN TOKYO 81-3-5539-5191 0066-33-132439 LATVIA 8000-3185 LUXEMBOURG 352-27-000-1364 MALAYSIA 1-800-81-3065 MEXICO 001-866-376-9696 NETHERLANDS 31-20-718-8588 0800-023-4378 NEW ZEALAND 64-9-970-4771 0800-447-722 NORWAY 47-21-590-062 800-15157 PANAMA 001-800-5072065 PERU 0800-53713 PHILIPPINES 63-2-858-3716 POLAND 00-800-1212572 PORTUGAL 8008-14052 RUSSIA 8-10-8002-0144011 SINGAPORE 65-6883-9230 800-120-4663 SLOVAK REPUBLIC 421-2-322-422-25 SOUTH AFRICA 080-09-80414 SOUTH KOREA 82-2-6744-1083 00798-14800-7352 SPAIN 34-91-414-25-33 800-300-053 SWEDEN 46-8-566-19-348 0200-884-622 SWITZERLAND 41-44-580-6398 0800-120-032 TAIWAN 886-2-2795-7379 00801-137-797 THAILAND 001-800-1206-66056 UNITED KINGDOM BIRMINGHAM 44-121-210-9025 0808-238-6029 UNITED KINGDOM GLASGOW 44-141-202-3225 0808-238-6029 UNITED KINGDOM LEEDS 44-113-301-2125 0808-238-6029 UNITED KINGDOM LONDON 44-20-7108-6370 0808-238-6029 UNITED KINGDOM MANCHESTER 44-161-601-1425 0808-238-6029 URUGUAY 000-413-598-3421 USA 1-517-345-9004 866-692-5726 VENEZUELA 0800-1-00-3702

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Re: [CCWG-Accountability] the term "community"
by Eric Brunner-Williams Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Dear Tijani, The first use of a phrase, e.g., "stakeholder" in the context of persistent identifier to resource association over interconnecting datagram networks, by some author, e.g., the organizers and participants of a meeting, is incidental to the scope of the benefits of persistent identifier to resource association over interconnecting datagram networks. The beneficiaries during the hosttables period included government funded research universities, government agencies, and government contractors, and, using similar mechanisms, private and public institutions, including governments, and the first subscriber-based and otherwise unrestricted "public access" providers. Over time both SRI and its data consumers transitioned from hosttables to the DNS, and users of similar mechanisms transitioned to the DNS, and the benefit expanded to include support for persistent identifiers in scripts other then Latin, e.g., Arabic Script, Han Script, Hangul Script, Cyrillic Script, ... Were we to take the notion of "Stakeholder" from any time prior to the addition of support for these scripts to the IANA root zone, users of those scripts could be considered "customers" of the Verisign IDN testbed, but not "stakeholders" in the community which participates in the technical coordination of unique global endpoint identifiers -- the "ICANN community". Even today, as a speaker of minority languages, using extended Latin Script characters, and Scripts not yet present in the IANA root zone, I don't consider my language communities, as communities or institutions, at this point in time, to be "Stakeholders". Ironically, a MENOG mailing dropped into my inbox while reviewing the paragraph above -- ICANN has openings for IDN Program Managers -- in Istanbul and Singapore -- which are unlikely to be competent to address the needs of speakers of the Indigenous Languages of the Americas. Clearly we are not yet "Stakeholders". All this is simply to develop your point that the definition of "stakeholder" were to be static the consequences would be unfortunate, and on a very large scale. Finally, as a friendly nuisance (or nuance), the parents, siblings and extended family members of students have an interest in the schools their school age dependents attend, as do the taxpayers (public schools) and donors (private schools), textbook vendors, lower level schools (student producers) and higher level general and vocational schools (student consumers), as well as the community as a whole. This little bit simply to say it is more than students, teachers and staff that make a school. Sincerely, Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon On 1/12/15 9:59 AM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote: > > Bruce, Kavouss and all, > > Stakeholders were defined for the first time in the World Summit on > Information Society (WSIS) as: > > ·Governments > > ·International Organizations > > ·Private Sector > > ·Civil Society > > Where Academic and Technical community were included in the civil > society. And then, the international organization was dropped and > Civil society was split in 2 parts: Civil Society and Academic and > technical community. > > I don’t think this definition is static and believe that stakeholders > for the WSIS couldn’t be other thing that the 4 listed components > because it was used to make the civil society activists participate in > the room instead of demonstrating outside and having confrontation > with the police. > > In a school, we can define 3 stakeholders: teachers, staff and > students since the interest of each of those components is different. > In ICANN, you have civil society in At-Large and the non commercial > stakeholder group in the GNSO. You may also find them in other SO and > AC. You may find private sector in the GNSO, ccNSO, SSAC, etc. > > Defining the ICANN stakeholders as Civil Society, Governments, Private > sector and technical and academic community is not relevant in my > point of view; they are more At-Large, Registries, Registrars, > business constituency, non commercial stakeholder group, GAC, etc…. > because those group have each its own interest and the > multi-stakeholder model is intended to represent the interest of the > whole community. > > Coming back to the global public interest, it was clearly explained in > the articles to be the *benefit of the* *public and not the private > gain of any person (financial, political, etc.).* > > The publicis everyone, and the global public interest is the common > interest of all this public. > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > *Tijani BEN JEMAA* > > Executive Director > > Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (*FMAI*) > > Phone: + 216 41 649 605 > > Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 > > Fax: + 216 70 853 376 > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -----Message d'origine----- > De : accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org > [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] De la part > de Bruce Tonkin > Envoyé : samedi 10 janvier 2015 12:22 > À : accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > Objet : Re: [CCWG-Accountability] the term "community" > > Hello Kavouss, > > >> I have one question which continued to bother me as everyone > refers to "community" > > >> What is that magic term "community» covers? > > >> Does it includes or embrace the entire multistakeholders? > > >> As it was discussed at several occasion, there is a defacto > agreement that ,generally speaking multistakeholder composed of Civil > Society, Private Sector, Technical Community including academics, > Governments > > I think that is a good question, and probably worth this group > considering some definitions around that topic. > > For me personally, I tend to think of the terms in the following way: > > "ICANN Community" - this is the group of people that participate in > the various ICANN working groups via email, phone, or websites, and > attend ICANN meetings. This group is made up of individuals from > GNSO constituencies and stakeholder groups, GAC, SSAC, ALAC, RSSAC, > ccTLD representatives, RIR representatives etc. In my personal > view, it is multi-stakeholder in that it includes people from Civil > Society, Private Sector, Technical Community including academics, > Governments. > > In addition to that there is a wider community of people that are > members of the various organizations that are in turn members of the > various groups that comprise the ICANN community. As an example, I > am a member of the Internet Society of Australia (ISOC) which is part > of the Asia, Australasia and the Pacific Islands Regional At-Large > Organisation (APRALO) which is part of At-large. ISOC in Australia > may send a representative to ICANN meetings. A business might be > a member of a chamber of commerce or business association, which in > turn could be a member of the ICANN business constituency, and that > chamber of commerce or business association may send a representative > to an ICANN meeting as a member of the ICANN community. I don't have > any specific name for this wider group of people and organizations. > > Then there is term "public" which is used within the term "global > public interest". In general, I personally think of the public in > this context as Internet users. However you could also consider > public in this context to be all the people of the world. Even > people that don't directly use the Internet as a communication > mechanism are probably affected by it in some way. > > The fundamental responsibility of the Board of ICANN is to exercise > their judgment to act in what they reasonably believe to be the best > interests of the global public interest, taking account of the > interests of the Internet community as a whole rather than any > individual group or interest. Its primary feedback mechanism for > determining the global public interest is the "ICANN community" > described above. > > Regards, > > Bruce Tonkin > > _______________________________________________ > > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > <http://www.avast.com/> > > Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel > malveillant parce que la protection Antivirus avast! > <http://www.avast.com/> est active. > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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[CCWG-Accountability] WA4 and next steps
by Thomas Rickert Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Dear all, as you know, WA 4 is working on a list of contingencies that we need to address when working on accountability mechanisms. This work is still in progress and we will surely discuss the individual items on the list in Frankfurt to then make a determination as to whether the list is complete and whether all items that are currently on the list are in scope of our work. While this work is going on, we recommend that either WA4 or other individuals start going through the list of contingencies (as well as contingencies that you think should be on the list, which are not yet there) and start analyzing whether these contingencies are already being taken care of by existing accountability mechanisms or work previously done by ICANN (and its community). Such analysis will help us to better understand whether the list is complete and accurate. The outcome of this analysis can be the following: - A determination is made that the contingency is adequately addressed by an existing mechanism. In this case, we would conclude that no further work needs to be done on this item by this group and write a rationale to explain this. - A determination is made that the contingency is not adequately addressed by an existing mechanism. In this case, we would need to define what is missing and write that as part of our report. As we move on, we will then see what needs there are and analyze those. As an outcome of that analysis, we will potentially need to amend one or multiple existing accountability mechanisms or, where that proves insufficient or not feasible, establish new accountability mechanisms. Ideally, we would be able to cluster additional demand to ensure that we need to make as few changes / inventions as possible by coming up with responses that each cover multiple issues. We will discuss this during tomorrow’s call, but we would like to encourage you to review the current list and pick one or more contingencies that you would volunteer to work on. Thanks, Mathieu, León and Thomas

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Re: [CCWG-Accountability] the term "community"
by Dr Eberhard W Lisse Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Tijani, As much as I can live with a definition of stakeholders, it does not follow that it gives stakeholders any stake, per se, but if so only specific. Just because, for example, governments are stakeholders, it does not follow that they can tell anyone what to do, per se. Stakeholders or better Interested Parties, or Significantly Interested Parties, are not involved with a CURRENT ccTLD Manager (due to the retro-activity implied). We had us 5 years worth of work coming up with the interpretation that during the selection of a NEW ccTLD Manager (by way of creation of a new ccTLD, the next one would be .SS probably, or after revocation) Interested Parties and Significantly Interested Parties have a role to play But in the context of Internet Governance, no stakeholder has ANY input into CURRENT management as long as the current ccTLD Manager does not substantively misbehave. This comes from the safety, stability requirement but also from the requirement to do a competent, honest and equitable job as per RFC1591. It's debatable whether this even applies to preexisting ccTLDs, but as it is easy to not substantively misbehave, it achieved unanimous consent. That does not mean that a particular government may or may not act harshly against a ccTLD Manager, but it does not get into the realm of Accountability, of Internet Governance. greetings, el On 2015-01-12 19:59 , Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote: > Bruce, Kavouss and all, > > > > Stakeholders were defined for the first time in the World Summit > on Information Society (WSIS) as: > > · Governments > > · International Organizations > > · Private Sector > > · Civil Society > > Where Academic and Technical community were included in the civil > society. And then, the international organization was dropped and > Civil society was split in 2 parts: Civil Society and Academic and > technical community. > > > > I don’t think this definition is static and believe that > stakeholders for the WSIS couldn’t be other thing that the 4 > listed components because it was used to make the civil society > activists participate in the room instead of demonstrating outside > and having confrontation with the police. > > > > In a school, we can define 3 stakeholders: teachers, staff and > students since the interest of each of those components is > different. In ICANN, you have civil society in At-Large and the > non commercial stakeholder group in the GNSO. You may also find > them in other SO and AC. You may find private sector in the GNSO, > ccNSO, SSAC, etc. > > Defining the ICANN stakeholders as Civil Society, Governments, > Private sector and technical and academic community is not > relevant in my point of view; they are more At-Large, Registries, > Registrars, business constituency, non commercial stakeholder > group, GAC, etc…. because those group have each its own > interest and the multi-stakeholder model is intended to represent > the interest of the whole community. > > > > Coming back to the global public interest, it was clearly > explained in the articles to be the *benefit of the* *public and > not the private gain of any person (financial, political, etc.).* > > The publicis everyone, and the global public interest is the > common interest of all this public. > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > *Tijani BEN JEMAA* [...]

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Re: [CCWG-Accountability] the term "community"
by Lisse Eberhard Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Dear Co-Chairs, through the co-chairs I find it disrespectful to produce replies that are hard to read by way of (or rather lack of) formatting, lack the use of a spelling checker, and/or, as paragraph 4) are plain incoherent. I find it amusing when in the discourse one side uses arguments that the other did not make did not make to counter arguments that the other side did make, are valid but are not addressed. Though it’s well known negotiations tactics. With regards to the Board being the final arbiter, virtually no one, other than the governments concerned wants governments to run the Internet or have significant input on its management. I have similar concerns, by the way about Big Business dominating ICANN. Whether a (as in one single) state has sovereign rights over the ccTLD corresponding to an ISO string, is heavily debatable in the first place, and even if it were so it would be a bilateral matter between that individual state and that ccTLD. The ccNSO has nothing to do with that whatsoever, and would in any case been barred from making such a policy. I also wish to point out that many governments are fundamentally opposed to what we are trying to achieve here, namely achieving and/or preserving Net Freedom. That governments can use the process to twist it on its head, ie equate ‘control’ with ‘accountability’ is one of these facts in life that we have become accustomed to. I wish to point out that I am not here to increase comfort levels, but with regards to “speaking friendly” it’s content that matters not volume (in the double sense). And I am well known now for many years to write what I mean and mean what I write. greetings, el > On 11 Jan 2015, at 21:07 , Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > Dear Dr. Eberhard > Thank you very much again for your thoughtful reply > There are areas that we agree and areas that we disagree. > Having said that > I have the following Comments : > 1 ,you did indicate that > Quote > > "On the other hand I have noted an enormous volume of contributions > by an ICG liaison who also happens to be a GAC representative of his > country, hardly any of which I can see as originating from or > representing the ICG, so it is not clear who this person is > representing" > Unquote > My reply wouild be that all those so-called enormous volume of contributions > by an ICG liaison who also happens to be a GAC representative of his > country, were submitted AS A PARTICIPANT and NOT AS ICG LIAISON. > If you dear Dr. Eberhard are of the view that I do not have the right or I should not be allowed to contribute as Particpant to the activities of CCWG and remain silent like many other other participants ,While I respect your personal views I do not wish to waste even a minute and arfgue with you . Istead we believe that MEMBERS OR PARTICIPANTS all need to put hand in hand and put their thought together to deal with this veryy important issues that we have before us and not contesting why a participant contribute . > I hope you would agree with me ? Just hope > > 2. You have also mentioned that > Quote > > "And in any case, the current role of governments hardly rates as > lower status, the GAC has more influence than most other > stakeholder. I am sure you have become aware during your tenure, > that GAC Advice has a specific formal status in the Bylaws if I am > not mistaken" > Unquote . > > But the same Bylaw provide that the Board can reject GAC Recommendations just with simple majority. > There was a notion at GAC to upgrade that simple majority with super majority of category 1 ( 2/3 ) ,there are other siupermajorities 3/4 and 4/5. In fact US NOW REQUIRED ICANN TO DECIDE WITH SUPER MAJORITY OF CATEGORIES 2 OR 3. > However, the request of GAC approved by the Board but after public comments it was rehjected . > I do not wish to say who were those individual who opposed to that 2/3 the so-called strong position of GAC is at merci of simple majority of the Board still I do not know whther they really represent the Golbal Multistakeholder as they are designated by SO or proposed by Nomom and the Global Multistakeholders has no direct influence on that designation . > > 3. You did also referred to the role of ccTLD managers > Qoute > > "In particular since a ccTLD only has a bilateral relationship with > the IANA Function Manager, each ccTLD for itself, if any, and there > is no and can be no organization, entity or government that can > speak for ccTLDs" > > Unquote > > Sorry to disagree with you totally . > The arrangem,ents and contract between ccTLD manager and IANA is something and the sovereign rights of Member States ( governments ) over their ccTLD is other thing > As you may know well there are givernments that do not abide with any ICANN on their ccTLDs .Out of 206 ( almost couzntries or dépendent territories about 70 countries do not have any relation with ccNSO . > You may defend your own position which is legitimate but you may allow others to defend their position as they deem appropriate .If a simple relation between ccTLD mANGER AND iana fully and adequately address and observe the entirte vast and complex issue of ccTLD then we do not need these SO on Naming because whatever they comeup would be useless as the contract bet ween ccTLD manager in IANA Manager is totally independent of all thes > I do not know what we are talking about ? > There are legal gap between what you determined as the objectives. purposes, scope of activities of CCtzld manager and IANA Manager and the ccTLD itself. > 4. I wish to clarify the following > I am not defending that Goverments should have an exclusive role on the matter but they must be abale to play their role in a multistakehoder inclussive approach or model > What you declared is ,if I understand it correctly that > > Qoute > > "and there is no and can be no organization, entity or government that can > speak for ccTLDs". > > Unquote > That is a surprising and strage opinion with which I am not comfortable ( the most soft disagreement as you seems to speak friendly) > Have nice Sunday Evening > Kavouss > […]

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[CCWG-Accountability] Agenda for CCWG Meeting on 13 January at 6:00 UTC
by Grace Abuhamad Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Dear all, Here is the proposed agenda for our next call on Tuesday, 13 January at 06:00 UTC. The call details will follow shortly. 1. Welcome & Roll Call & SOI (5') 2. CWG update and high level principles (15') 3. WS1/WS2 recap (20') 4. Definitions / scoping document : PI discussion (20') 5. Contingencies : finalize list (20') 6. Draft agenda for Frankfurt meeting (15') 7. AOB (5') 8. Closing remarks (5') Best, Grace

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[CCWG-Accountability] Regarding Non-profit and public-benefit legal structure
by Bruce Tonkin Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Hello Phil, >> I would envisage the Board having to be compliance with all Corporate Governance Codes specific to Companies Law in the country of incorporation, subject to a community consensus override. But what is its corporate status - not for profit or for profit - as different codes would apply ? The legal status of ICANN is as specified in its articles of incorporation: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/articles-2012-02-25-en "This Corporation is a non-profit public benefit corporation and is not organized for the private gain of any person. It is organized under the California Non-profit Public Benefit Corporation Law for charitable and public purposes. The Corporation is organized, and will be operated, exclusively for charitable, educational, and scientific purposes within the meaning of § 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code"), or the corresponding provision of any future United States tax code. Any reference in these Articles to the Code shall include the corresponding provisions of any further United States tax code." Also from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-benefit_nonprofit_corporation "A public-benefit non-profit corporation is a type of non-profit corporation chartered by a state government, and organized primarily or exclusively for social, educational, recreational or charitable purposes by like-minded citizens. Public-benefit nonprofit corporations are distinct in the law from mutual-benefit nonprofit corporations in that they are organized for the general public benefit, rather than for the interest of its members." I believe it was deliberately set up as public benefit rather than a member organization - to avoid the situation where the members become limited to say gTLD registries and registrars and hence it ends up operating primarily for the benefit of the domain name registration industry. Any move away from a public-benefit corporation to a membership corporation - would need to carefully consider how to ensure that the members are reflective of the broader Internet community and don't become limited to a few members as interest in "ICANN" drops over time. I.e. a failure scenario of membership organisation is what happens to the membership base over time and how it can be protected from capture. I have seen some membership based ccTLDs get into problems when their membership becomes dominated by domain name investors for example. Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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Re: [CCWG-Accountability] [Area 3] Comments on accountabilty
by Dr Eberhard W Lisse Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Dear Co-Chairs, can we please arrange for an open format such as PDF? el On 2015-01-12 13:03 , Kavouss Arasteh wrote: > Dear Mathieu > Dear All > Please find attached my comments on the document provided by mathieu on > accountabilty > Regards > Kavouss [...] -- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) el(a)lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 \ / Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/

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[CCWG-Accountability] Regarding role of Board directors
by Bruce Tonkin Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Hello Steve, >> ICANN Bylaws Article 6 Section 7 defines the duty of directors to ICANN the Corporation: >> Directors shall serve as individuals who have the duty to act in what they reasonably believe are the best interests of ICANN and not as representatives of the entity that selected them, their employers, or any other organizations or constituencies. I have often heard you refer to that specific clause in the bylaws over the past year. I think it is worth understanding it a little more. I personally believe that the intent of putting this clause in the bylaws is that several Board members are appointed to the Board from a specific stakeholder group, and this makes it clear that Board members need to act on behalf of all stakeholders not just the stakeholder group that appointed them. So from my perspective it is a higher level of accountability than simply being accountable to the group that appointed them. We certainly make that clear as new directors join the Board. The clause does not mean that somehow a Board director is now accountable to the staff in the organization rather than the "ICANN community". For those appointed to the Board by the nominating committee - I think it is already clear to them that they represent stakeholders as a whole, as they go through a rigorous interview process in front of the whole nominating committee. In my experience as Board director, Boards in general operate on behalf of their stakeholders - these stakeholders could be the general public, shareholders, or members. Under its articles of incorporation, ICANN is structured to act on behalf of the global public interest - i.e. the general public. In addition to acting on behalf of stakeholders, a board is also accountable to govern an organization in accordance with the law. This to me is the "corporate" obligation that you often refer. This includes ensuring that the organization can meet its financial commitments, ensure the staff have a safe workplace, ensure there are financial controls to stop fraud, ensure the organization complies with any contracts it has entered into etc. Directors of ICANN can be held personally liable under law if they are negligent. After the ATRT1 review, a set of governance guidelines were established to make this clearer: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/guidelines-2012-05-15-en From the section on the role of directors: "The fundamental responsibility of Directors (as defined below) is to exercise their business judgment to act in what they reasonably believe to be the best interests of ICANN and in the global public interest, taking account of the interests of the Internet community as a whole rather than any individual group or interest" "It is the duty of the Board to oversee management's performance to ensure that ICANN operates in an effective, efficient and ethical manner. The Board will also be responsible for overseeing the development of ICANN's short, medium and long-term strategic plans, ensuring that they will result in sustainable outcomes, and taking account of the critical interdependencies of financial, human, natural, manufactured, social and intellectual capitals." "Some of the Board's key responsibilities are to ensure that ICANN's ethics are managed effectively, that ICANN as a whole (as well as individual Board and staff members) operates pursuant to the highest ethical standards, that ICANN complies with applicable laws, and that ICANN considers adherence to best practices in all areas of operation." The bylaws could certainly be enhanced to incorporate the notion in the Governance Guidelines that Board directors are accountable to the Internet community as a whole. Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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[CCWG-Accountability] Prior work on Accountability structures in 2012
by Bruce Tonkin Jan. 11, 2015

Jan. 11, 2015

Hello All, From the ATRT1 review, the Board created the Accountability Structures Expert panel (ASEP) to recommend improvements to the current accountability structures. I have attached their final report from: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/report-26oct12-en.pdf from October 2012. It may be of some use to this group. Some points I picked out from their recommendations: The Four Es: • Enhancing effectiveness of structures • Efficiency in process • Allowing expeditious resolution • Enhancing community’s ease of access to accountability structures “The Board must always act with objectivity and fairness in the best interests of ICANN, but in doing so take account of the legitimate needs, interests and expectations of stakeholders material to the issue being decided. Staff must act in same manner." Create stability through building of precedent Where possible, reduce burden and costs to those accessing structures Accountability structures should not preclude any party from filing suit against ICANN in court of competent jurisdiction Regards, Bruce

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Re: [CCWG-Accountability] how Board members are appointed
by Bruce Tonkin Jan. 10, 2015

Jan. 10, 2015

Hello Kavouss, Just providing some answers to questions posed over the last week or so. >> Which community and Under Which Legal representation and using Which criteria designate the Board Members ? From the bylaws, the Board is appointed by: a. Eight voting members selected by the Nominating Committee established by Article VII of these Bylaws. These seats on the Board of Directors are referred to in these Bylaws as Seats 1 through 8. The voting members of the Nominating Committee itself comprises of people appointed as follows: Five voting delegates selected by the At-Large Advisory Committee One delegate from the Registries Stakeholder Group; One delegate from the Registrars Stakeholder Group; Two delegates from the Business Constituency, one representing small business users and one representing large business users; One delegate from the Internet Service Providers Constituency; One delegate from the Intellectual Property Constituency; and One delegate from consumer and civil society groups, selected by the Non-Commercial Users Constituency. One voting delegate each selected by the ccNSO, ASO and IETF b. Two voting members selected by the Address Supporting Organization c. Two voting members selected by the Country-Code Names Supporting Organization d. Two voting members selected by the Generic Names Supporting Organization e. One voting member selected by the At-Large Community f. The President ex officio, who shall be a voting member. Ultimately the legitimacy of this selection model comes down to the level of membership in the underlying groups. For example business users from around the world can join the business constituency. They in turn can particulate in elections to appoint people to the GNSO Council and the nominating committee, which in turn appoint ICANN directors. The limitation of course is that only a small percentage of the possible business users in the world are sufficiently interested in domain names and IP addresses to join the business constituency, and probably only a percentage of the members actually vote in elections to appoint people to the GNSO Council or Nominating Committee. Groups that have a higher interest in ICANN (e.g. gTLD registrar or gTLD registry) tend to have a higher level of participating in the ICANN Stakeholder Groups and participate in voting. >> using Which criteria The general criteria for selection Board members is: ICANN Directors shall be: 1. Accomplished persons of integrity, objectivity, and intelligence, with reputations for sound judgment and open minds, and a demonstrated capacity for thoughtful group decision-making; 2. Persons with an understanding of ICANN's mission and the potential impact of ICANN decisions on the global Internet community, and committed to the success of ICANN; 3. Persons who will produce the broadest cultural and geographic diversity on the Board consistent with meeting the other criteria set forth in this Section; 4. Persons who, in the aggregate, have personal familiarity with the operation of gTLD registries and registrars; with ccTLD registries; with IP address registries; with Internet technical standards and protocols; with policy-development procedures, legal traditions, and the public interest; and with the broad range of business, individual, academic, and non-commercial users of the Internet; and 5. Persons who are able to work and communicate in written and spoken English. The additional criteria is: 1. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, no official of a national government or a multinational entity established by treaty or other agreement between national governments may serve as a Director. As used herein, the term "official" means a person (i) who holds an elective governmental office or (ii) who is employed by such government or multinational entity and whose primary function with such government or entity is to develop or influence governmental or public policies. 2. No person who serves in any capacity (including as a liaison) on any Supporting Organization Council shall simultaneously serve as a Director or liaison to the Board. If such a person accepts a nomination to be considered for selection by the Supporting Organization Council or the At-Large Community to be a Director, the person shall not, following such nomination, participate in any discussion of, or vote by, the Supporting Organization Council or the committee designated by the At-Large Community relating to the selection of Directors by the Council or Community, until the Council or committee(s) designated by the At-Large Community has selected the full complement of Directors it is responsible for selecting. In the event that a person serving in any capacity on a Supporting Organization Council accepts a nomination to be considered for selection as a Director, the constituency group or other group or entity that selected the person may select a replacement for purposes of the Council's selection process. In the event that a person serving in any capacity on the At-Large Advisory Committee accepts a nomination to be considered for selection by the At-Large Community as a Director, the Regional At-Large Organization or other group or entity that selected the person may select a replacement for purposes of the Community's selection process. 3. Persons serving in any capacity on the Nominating Committee shall be ineligible for selection to positions on the Board as provided by Article VII, Section 8. >> Do you believe that the current designation fully respecting the notion of inclusiveness and full democracy? It is democratic in the sense that there is a mechanism for all parties that are interested in ICANN's mission to join a group that aligns with their interests. However exactly how to accomplish this is probably not obvious due to the complex array of structures that make up the ICANN community. Once joining a group they can participate in elections of officials which in turn participate in appointing ICANN Board members. See: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/beginners-guides-2012-03-06-en for the current beginner's guides for how to participate in ICANN. As mentioned earlier, the limitation is in the level of participation of members in the underlying bodies, and the level of geographic diversity of members. Over the last few years ICANN has sought to broaden participation through the Fellowship program: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/fellowships-2012-02-25-en Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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[CCWG-Accountability] Announcement about High Level Statements on ICANN Website
by Grace Abuhamad Jan. 9, 2015

Jan. 9, 2015

Dear all, The High Level Statements from the CCWG have been published in an announcement on the ICANN website: https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2015-01-09-en Co-Chairs of CCWG-Accountability Publish High Level Statements <https://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=300&winname=addthis&pub=ra-52fcc7eb 243d6d89&source=tbx32-300&lng=en-US&s=linkedin&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.icann.o rg%2Fnews%2Fannouncement-2-2015-01-09-en&title=Co-Chairs%20of%20CCWG-Account ability%20Publish%20High%20Level%20Statements%20-%20ICANN&ate=AT-ra-52fcc7eb 243d6d89/-/-/54b053b88fecfffd/2&frommenu=1&uid=54b053b852141fea&ct=1&tt=0&ca ptcha_provider=nucaptcha> <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2015-01-09-en#> <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2015-01-09-en#> <https://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=300&winname=addthis&pub=ra-52fcc7eb2 43d6d89&source=tbx32-300&lng=en-US&s=sinaweibo&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.icann.o rg%2Fnews%2Fannouncement-2-2015-01-09-en&title=Co-Chairs%20of%20CCWG-Account ability%20Publish%20High%20Level%20Statements%20-%20ICANN&ate=AT-ra-52fcc7eb 243d6d89/-/-/54b053b88fecfffd/3&frommenu=1&uid=54b053b8bb24e0e2&ct=1&tt=0&ca ptcha_provider=nucaptcha> <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2015-01-09-en#> <https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2015-01-09-en#> On behalf of the Cross Community Working Group (CCWG) Accountability, the co-chairs Thomas Rickert (GNSO), León Sanchez Ambia (ALAC) and Mathieu Weill (ccNSO) are pleased to announce that the CCWG has prepared a set of high level statements <https://community.icann.org/x/3pAQAw> that might be valuable to all groups or individuals working on proposals as part of the NTIA IANA Functions' Stewardship Transition Process. The CCWG is aware and conscious of the interdependency and interlinkage of the IANA Stewardship Transition and Enhancing ICANN Accountability Processes, in particular with what has been called Work Stream 1 and appreciates the sense of urgency. Although the CCWG works as expeditiously as possible on the tasks it has been chartered with, it is not feasible to publish concrete results of the group in January. Nonetheless, the CCWG has chosen to publish the high level statements as a preliminary assessment of the situation and is cognizant that this preliminary assessment might be subject to change because of: * Changes to the proposals under discussion as part of the IANA Stewardship Transition Process, in particular the Interim Proposal <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cwg-naming-transition-01dec14-e n.pdf> published by the CWG-Stewardship on 1 December 2014; and * Changes due to other external and internal factors, such as evolving deliberations of the CWG itself. Background CCWG The CCWG began its work late November 2014 with regular weekly virtual meetings and will have its first (intersessional) face-to face meeting on 19 and 20 January 2015 in Frankfurt, Germany. The CCWG was chartered by ALAC, ccNSO, GAC, GNSO and NRO acting as ASO and includes over 150 participants and members <https://community.icann.org/x/IIMHAw> appointed by the chartering organizations, Advisors <https://community.icann.org/x/54cQAw> appointed by the Public Experts Group (PEG), and 3 liaisons. Additional information, including transcripts and recordings of the discussions are available at: https://community.icann.org/x/ogDxAg

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[CCWG-Accountability] WS4 Initial Scenarios
by Eric Brunner-Williams Jan. 9, 2015

Jan. 9, 2015

Colleagues, Attached please find an initial set of scenarios, in two pages, in .pdf and .docx formats. Feedback via email please, either to me directly (ebw(a)abenaki.wabanaki.net) or to the WS4 sublist (ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org) Thanks in advance, Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon

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[CCWG-Accountability] Fwd: High Level Statements
by Thomas Rickert Jan. 8, 2015

Jan. 8, 2015

All, please find below the note we sent to the co-chairs of the CWG. Thank you for your contributions to this. Kind regards, Thomas Rickert > Anfang der weitergeleiteten Nachricht: > > Betreff: High Level Statements > Von: Thomas Rickert <rickert(a)anwaelte.de> > Datum: 8. Januar 2015 18:07:04 MEZ > Kopie: Mathieu Weill <Mathieu.Weill(a)afnic.fr>, León Felipe Sánchez Ambía <leonfelipe(a)sanchez.mx> > An: Lise Fuhr <lise.fuhr(a)difo.dk>, Jonathan Robinson <jrobinson(a)afilias.info> > > Dear Lise and Jonathan, > > the Cross Community Working Group on Naming Related Functions (CWG-Stewardship) and the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) are regularly liaising and co-ordinating their work as both work areas are interdependent and interlinked. The co-chairs of both groups have agreed that it would be valuable for the CWG-Stewardship to provide the CCWG-Accountability with a list of issues it has identified during its deliberations where the work of both group overlaps. Subsequently, the following items from the proposal published on Dec. 1st, 2014 have been identified: > > · Section 3.3 – “Independent Review of Board Actions – the CWG-Stewardship may propose that this becomes binding under certain circumstances directly related to IANA; no other changes proposed”. If this were to be included in the final proposal implementation would require a change to the ICANN Bylaws regarding the IRP. > > · Section 3.4.3.2 - Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests. This is still under consideration by the CWG-Stewardship but would be a replacement for the authorization function for all changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database currently performed by the NTIA. The replacement mechanism would have gTLD requests for delegations and re-delegations authorized by an independent third party and its decision on these matters would be binding on ICANN/IANA. This would probably require modifications to the ICANN Bylaws. > > · Section 3.4.3.3 - Independent Appeals Panel – The CWG-Stewardship is proposing that an independent review panel be set up to deal with contested changes to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database. Although discussions are still ongoing as to the specifics of such a proposal it is generally agreed that such a mechanism should be part of the final proposal and that its decisions would be binding. As such this would also require changes to the ICANN Bylaws. > > > > Additionally, the CCWG-Accountability has been advised that "ICANN-only“ proposals currently considered might have significant input on the Accountability mechanisms required. > > > Finally, the CWG-Stewardship pointed out that feedback would ideally be received early enough to be taken into account when finalizing the proposal to be submitted to the ICG. > > While the CCWG-Accountability appreciates the sense of urgency and works as expeditiously as possible on the tasks it has been chartered with, it is not feasible to publish a work results of the group in January. > > Nonetheless, the CCWG-Accountability has chosen to publish high level statements as a preliminary assessment of the situation. > > However, the CCWG-Accountability is cognizant that any preliminary assessment might be subject to change because of > > - changes made to the proposal published by the CWG-Sterwardship on Dec.1st, 2014 > - other proposals and > - changes due to other external and internal factors, such as evolving deliberations of our group. > > The below high level statements might be valuable to all groups or individuals working on proposals to be submitted to the ICG, which is why they are not only a response to the CWG-Stewardship, but published as a status update by the CCWG-Accountability. > > 1. The CCWG-Accountability noted that a significant number of contributions during the two Public Comments on Enhancing ICANN Accountability called for the implementation of independent mechanisms enabling to review and, when appropriate, redress, decisions from the ICANN Board of Directors. It was often noted that these mechanisms should be in place or committed to before the IANA Stewardship Transition takes place. The CCWG-Accountability is therefore considering addressing this need in its Work Stream 1 (WS1). Unless the CWG-Stewardship specifies otherwise, Board decisions that are directly related to IANA Functions could be added to the remit of such independent mechanisms for the review and redress of decisions of the ICANN Board of Directors, which the CCWG-Accountability may address in Work Stream 1. Other issues that were brought up by many and could qualify for being in the remit of such mechanism were decisions broadening or altering ICANN’s mandate as well as recalling one or multiple ICANN Board members. Please note that the legal nature, composition, and specific mandate of this mechanism are yet to be determined. > > 2. The CCWG-Accountability acknowledges the expectation for certain internal and / or external review and / or appeals processes to be implemented or committed to prior to the transition and will consider these as part of its work. > > 3. Further, we would like to assure you that the CCWG-Accountability output will adhere to the following considerations; > > · Any proposal will address the concern on to whom should ICANN be held accountable. > > · Any proposal will address the concern on what should ICANN be held accountable for. > > · Any proposal will address the concern on how ICANN or its Board of Directors should be held accountable. > > We hope this broad but clear roadmap helps the CWG complement their work and that we continue to work on a coordinated fashion. > > Please note that these statements reflect the current status of deliberations of the CCWG-Accountability and might be subject to change for the reasons mentioned above and further input from the community. > > > > Kind regards, > > Mathieu Weill, León Sánchez and Thomas Rickert > > Co-Chars of the CCWG-Accountability >

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Re: [CCWG-Accountability] judicial/arbitral function
by David W. Maher Jan. 8, 2015

Jan. 8, 2015

It should be noted that until April 2013, the standard of review was: ³Requests for such independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Panel ("IRP"), which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.² In April 2013, the Board changed the standard of review. The change was criticized by the Registry Stakeholder Group (and possibly others) on the grounds that it seriously narrowed the standard, with the effect of protecting the Board from an independent review of the Board's actions to determine whether they were consistent with the Articles and Bylaws. David David W. Maher Senior Vice President Law & Policy Public Interest Registry 312 375 4849 On 1/8/15 4:54 AM, "Bruce Tonkin" <Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au> wrote: >Hello Paul, > >>> And that, in turn emphasizes why it is necessary as part of the >>>transition to define the Board's/ICANN's scope of authority. A >>>judicial/arbitral function can only resolve disputes and cabin >>>capture/abuse if it has an articulated standard against which to >>>measure the dispute. In the absence of such pre-existing guidance the >>>judiciary/arbiter is simply substituting his/her/its own judgment for >>>the Board and the Community, which is not a good thing. > >Agreed. The current primary documents that an independent function >could base a judgement on is whether ICANN is complying with its bylaws >and its Articles of Incorporation. > >For example the current independent review process identified in the >bylaws states : > > https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#IV > > > >1. ".. ICANN shall have in place a separate process for independent >third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be >inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. > >2. Any person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board >that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation >or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or >action. In order to be materially affected, the person must suffer >injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board's >alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation, and not >as a result of third parties acting in line with the Board's action." > >Also: > >"Requests for such independent review shall be referred to an Independent >Review Process Panel ("IRP Panel"), which shall be charged with comparing >contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and >Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with >the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The IRP >Panel must apply a defined standard of review to the IRP request, >focusing on: > > a. did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its >decision?; > > b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable >amount of facts in front of them?; and > > c. did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the >decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?" > >The Independent Review Process Panel shall have the authority to: > >"a. summarily dismiss requests brought without standing, lacking in >substance, or that are frivolous or vexatious; > >b. request additional written submissions from the party seeking review, >the Board, the Supporting Organizations, or from other parties; > >c. declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent >with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws; and > >d. recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the >Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and >acts upon the opinion of the IRP; > >e. consolidate requests for independent review if the facts and >circumstances are sufficiently similar; and > >f. determine the timing for each proceeding." > > >The discussion in recent years is that the output of the Independent >Review process is not binding. Ie it is not binding arbitration - >simply an independent "review". > > >The bylaws could be updated to better " define the Board's/ICANN's scope >of authority", and the Cross Community Working Group could consider what >changes are necessary to the current Independent Review mechanism. For >example the ability and process to update the bylaws could be updated. > > >Regards, >Bruce Tonkin > > > > > > > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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[CCWG-Accountability] High Level Statement for CWG-Stewardship
by Grace Abuhamad Jan. 8, 2015

Jan. 8, 2015

Hi all, Attached is the High Level Statement discussed on the call. The chairs plan to submit at 15:00 UTC. Please provide your comments. Best, Grace From: Brenda Brewer <brenda.brewer(a)icann.org> Date: Tuesday, January 6, 2015 3:24 PM To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] CCWG ACCT call details 06 Jan 12:00 UTC Dear all, The notes and Adobe Connect recordings and transcript (soon) for the CCWG ACCT Call on 06 January are available here: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51414985 · Action Item: Co-Chairs will recap WS1 and WS2 items on mailing list and review for approval at next meeting · Action Item: Colleagues to provide comments on the list in response to the document. Proposed edits are welcome. Goal to develop a common view on scoping. Will be an agenda item for the next call and the Frankfurt meeting. Public interest issues, ccTLD concerns and other issues to be identified. · Action Item: The statement will be published on the CCWG list for further comment. The next call is on Tuesday, 13 January 2015 at 06:00 UTC. Best, Brenda

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[CCWG-Accountability] travel support for liaisons
by Thomas Rickert Jan. 7, 2015

Jan. 7, 2015

Dear all, In addition to travel support for the members of the CCWG-Accountability, ICANN will offer support to the three liaisons in the CCWG: Kavouss Arasteh and Keith Drazek, who are the ICG-designated liaisons, and Avri Doria, who is the ATRT Expert. While these three liaisons are participants, they play an essential role in the work of the CCWG, representing related processes that affect, and will be affected, by the output of the CCWG. For these reasons, it is important to support their in-person attendance at the Frankfurt meeting, should they be able to attend. Best, León, Mathieu, and Thomas

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