October 2015 - Accountability-Cross-Community

individual SO/AC elected Board member removal
by Chris Disspain Oct. 20, 2015

Oct. 20, 2015

Here’s what the breakout group reached consensus on. A petition for removal would arise in the relevant SO/AC The SO/AC would organise a briefing call to establish whether there is sufficient support within the SO/AC to move to the next step. A clear reasoning/rationale must be provided and the Director given a chance to respond. Sufficient support threshold is simple majority. This call should be open to all to attend but is a discussion of the SO/AC. If there is a simple majority to proceed then the SO/AC would convene a Community Forum for the discussion to proceed. The forum can be light weight and very possibly not face to face. It is open to all. A clear reasoning/rationale must be provided and the Director given a chance to respond. Immediately after the Community Forum, the relevant SO/AC sends every other SO/AC a request for comment on the removal. The other SO/ACs provide written comments. The relevant SO/AC then makes a decision. Removal of the Director requires a 75% majority in the relevant SO/AC. The relevant SO/AC must publish the results and an explanation if the Director is removed. Cheers, Chris

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Decision making versus comply with the law
by Bruce Tonkin Oct. 20, 2015

Oct. 20, 2015

Just to reiterate my comments. (1) Obeying the law - the Board must obey the law - whether it is national laws or our bylaws - we have an IRP process for the community to use if we break our bylaws - the outcome of the IRP will be binding, and will be enforceable in court - which again comes back to obeying the law (2) Decision making - we have a shared decision making process in the bylaws - the SOs and cross-community working groups make policy recommendations to the Board - the board can make a decision by 2/3 majority to reject such recommendations - which hasn't happened since ICANN started 16 years ago - for bylaws changes and separation etc - both the Board and the community must decide - if you don't think the Board makes good decisions then - elect/appoint better directors - every year you have the opportunity to replace 1/3 of directors - with both the designator and member models you can remove individual board members and the whole board at any time Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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PTI Separation Hypothetical
by Aikman-Scalese, Anne Oct. 20, 2015

Oct. 20, 2015

Using the PTI separation process, policy recommendation from GNSO and Numbers is to separate PTI and place in an SA in Paris. GAC consensus advice to the Board is against separation. Over 2/3 of Board agrees with the GAC and takes GAC advice. What happens under each of the two models and on the Staircase? How do the specifics of the PTI process interact with the Staircase? Anne Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Tablet ________________________________ This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. If the reader of this message or an attachment is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message or attachment to the intended recipient you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the sender. The information transmitted in this message and any attachments may be privileged, is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the intended recipients, and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-2521.

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Stress Test 18: relevant comments from US Congressional staff during Sunday session in Dublin
by Steve DelBianco Oct. 20, 2015

Oct. 20, 2015

On Sunday afternoon ICANN hosted a discussion on the IANA Stewardship Transition. (link<https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/sun-transition-perspectives>) In the first section, Ira Magaziner, the Chief Internet Policy Advisor for U.S. President Bill Clinton spoke about the challenges of the global Internet community in finalizing the transition. The second portion of this session had four senior staff members of the U.S. Congress talk about the transition from a Capitol Hill perspective. Below is the scribe feed from Congressional views relevant to our Dublin discussions of Stress Test 18 >>JEFFREY FARRAH: CHAIRMAN THUNE HAS BEEN INVOLVED AND UP TO DATE ON THIS PROCESS THROUGHOUT, AND GIVING THE TIMING OF WHAT'S GOING ON WITH THE TRANSITION AND THE DISCUSSIONS. HE FELT LIKE THIS WAS AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO AGAIN STATE WHAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE OUT OF A TRANSITION….. YOU MENTIONED IN 2014 HE AND SENATOR RUBIO WEIGHED IN ON SPECIFIC REFORMS AND IT WAS AT THAT TIME THAT HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO SEE IT IN THE BYLAWS THAT ONLY GAC ADVICE BY CONSENSUS WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD. THAT IS CERTAINLY SOMETHING THAT WE'LL BE ACTIVELY WATCHING THOSE PROCEEDINGS. >>DAVID REDL: WE'RE REALLY HOPING TO SEE A RIGOROUS ANALYSIS OF WHATEVER PROPOSAL IS PUT IN FRONT OF NTIA. I WOULD AGAIN REITERATE WHAT JEFF SAID ABOUT THE ROLE OF CONSENSUS IN THE GAC, IF WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A MULTISTAKEHOLDER SYSTEM, THEN WE HAVE TO ACTUALLY BE TALKING ABOUT A MULTISTAKEHOLDER SYSTEM WHERE ONLY THOSE GROUPS THAT HAVE PRODUCED CONSENSUS ARE ABLE TO BRING SOMETHING UP. THAT'S A VERY IMPORTANT ASPECT FOR US AS WELL. >>DAVID GOLDMAN: JUST TO FOLLOW UP ON THE POINT ABOUT CONSENSUS, THAT'S COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH THE POSITIONS THAT THE DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS IN THE HOUSE HAVE TAKEN SO FAR. >>DAVID REDL: THE THINGS THAT OUR BOSSES HAVE RAISED IN HEARINGS ARE BEING ADDRESSED. YOU KNOW A LOT OF THE STRESS TESTS THAT ARE BEING DONE AS A PART OF THIS PROCESS WERE THINGS THAT WERE RAISED IN HEARINGS AT ENERGY AND COMMERCE AND SENATE COMMERCE. — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.703.615.6206

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Suggestion to enshrine BUMP in the Articles
by James Gannon Oct. 19, 2015

Oct. 19, 2015

I want to actually put forward the serious suggestion of adding a reference to the bottom up multistakeholder process (BUMP) into the Articles. Avis spoke about this at the CCWG meeting today. I note Holly said in the chat: Avri, you could do it as an Articles provision that is part of the defined purpose for which ICANN is organised. -James Gannon

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This is the separation process
by Bruce Tonkin Oct. 19, 2015

Oct. 19, 2015

This is the separation process from the CWG proposal: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=53779816#_ftn57 "The selection of a new operator to perform the IANA Naming Functions or other separation process will be subject to approval by the ICANN Board, and a community mechanism derived from the CCWG-Accountability process. [62] A determination by the ICANN Board to not approve a recommendation by the SCWG that had been supported by a supermajority of the ccNSO and GNSO Councils will need to follow the same supermajority thresholds and consultation procedures as ICANN Board rejection (by a supermajority vote) of a PDP recommendation that is supported by a supermajority of the GNSO."

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Decision-making - paper
by Alice Jansen Oct. 19, 2015

Oct. 19, 2015

Dear all, Please find attached a copy of the draft decision-making paper that is currently being discussed. This is also available on the wiki at - https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/56143663/Dublin%20breakout… Thanks Best regards Alice

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Rationale for Stress Test 18
by Roelof Meijer Oct. 19, 2015

Oct. 19, 2015

Steve, all, First of all, Steve, as others in this thread have already remarked: you do not make it clear enough that whichever way the GAC has arrived at its advice to the board, the board can still reject the advice without consequences. Beginning of this year, when we started this discussion, I have on multiple occasions argued against ST18. And I am still against this bylaw change. My main reasons: 1. Leave it to the GAC. We’re trying to interfere with how they arrive at their advice or at least how ICANN should deal with it. It’s an internal affair, we woudn’t like the GAC involving itself with ccNSO/gNSO/ALAC matters either. 2. Like I said above: the board can always reject GAC advice. And it is even easier to do so for the board if the GAC itself is divided and the (majority of the rest of the) community supports such a rejection 3. #2 is presently already the case. If the powers the CCWG identified are implemented to whatever mechanism we decide on, the new “enhanced accountability ICANN” has even more safeguards: if the boards wants to follow “split-GAC” or consensus GAC advice that community doesn’t want, there are the powers to stop that. So getting ST18 is not important, the noise it creates (through a display of distrust in the GAC and meddling in their affairs) is a problem though. 4. In practice, the bylaw change may well give any government (of significant size and influence, e.g. the US) a veto option of any advice that the board would really have to take serious. I do not think that is to the advantage of the community Best, Roelof Meijer From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco(a)netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> Date: zaterdag 17 oktober 2015 17:51 To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Rationale for Stress Test 18 In GAC session today, some said they did not understand why we needed Stress Test 18. In case it has been lost in all the email traffic, I want to explain the rationale for the Stress Test and for the bylaws change. I am at your service to discuss any time that you like. Best, Steve Stress Test 18 was among the plausible scenarios that could test how and whether the ICANN community could challenge actions taken by the ICANN corporation. The rationale to develop this stress test involves two factors: First, ICANN community members were aware that some GAC members had expressed a desire to change the GAC’s historical method of using consensus for its decision-making, where “consensus is understood to mean the practice of adopting decisions by general agreement in the absence of any formal objection”. Moreover, it would take only a simple majority of GAC members to change its decision-making methods to a lesser standard, such as majority voting. Second, the CCWG realized that ICANN’s present bylaws obligate the board to seek “a mutually acceptable solution” if it decided not to follow GAC advice. That level of required deference is unique to the GAC and not required for advice from other AC and SOs. More important, the board’s obligation to seek a mutually acceptable solution applies to all GAC advice, even if that advice were not supported by GAC consensus, and even if that advice were opposed by a significant minority of GAC members. For these reasons, CCWG added Stress Test 18 to the draft proposal, and the stress test working party concluded that existing accountability measures were not adequate to let the community hold the ICANN board accountable for its actions if the board were obliged to seek a negotiated solution with the GAC. In order to address Stress Test 18, CCWG proposed an amendment to ICANN bylaws regarding the board’s obligations with respect to GAC advice. The amendment would preserve the requirement for ICANN’s board to seek a mutually acceptable solution, but only for GAC advice that was supported by consensus among GAC members. The rationale for proposing this bylaws amendment in response to Stress Test 18 is two-fold. First, CCWG wants to reserve ICANN’s board’s obligation to negotiate with the GAC for only that advice which is supported by a consensus of governments. GAC advice that is opposed by a significant minority of governments should not trigger the board’s obligation to enter bi-lateral negotiations with the GAC on a matter that affects the global Internet community. A negotiation between ICANN board and GAC should be reserved for resolving differences between ICANN and governments – not to resolve differences among governments themselves. Second, the proposed bylaws change would provide a strong incentive for the GAC to continue seeking consensus for the advice it provides to ICANN, which is the practice presently used by the GAC. While the GAC could at any time change its decision-making methods, this bylaws change would continue to elevate the influence of GAC advice that was supported by consensus of GAC members. Similar incentives for consensus policy and advice are already present in the ICANN bylaws, which require supermajority support for policy recommendations coming from GNSO and ccNSO. The rationale above is meant to explain why Stress Test 18 was developed, and to explain why CCWG proposes a bylaws amendment to preserve ICANN board’s obligation to seek a mutually acceptable solution when GAC advice is supported by consensus. — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.703.615.6206

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Individual board member removal - comments/questions
by Seun Ojedeji Oct. 19, 2015

Oct. 19, 2015

Hello Co-Chairs, Based on your request, below are the comments/questions I intend to make earlier during the engagement session. - Considering that some SO/AC are technically designators at the moment confirms that we currently run multiple designator. Will the individual board removal process be largely dependent on whether the CCWG decide towards multiple or sole designator model? - Can I assume the non-voting members are excluded from this? - I think CCWG should be considering how the different(imbalance) removal process could impact on how ICANN board behaves. Cheers! Sent from my Asus Zenfone2 Kindly excuse brevity and typos.

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Discussing the statutory rights that we will lose in designator model
by farzaneh badii Oct. 19, 2015

Oct. 19, 2015

Hi In another thread Ed Morris suggested to discuss the rights that we will lose in designator model. I would like to support this suggestion and ask to discuss this issue. Here is his request: On 19 October 2015 at 11:07, Edward Morris <egmorris1(a)toast.net> wrote: > All, > > > If this leadership decides to move away from membership I suggest, nee > demand, that EVERY statutory right that comes with membership that we will > lose with designator be: > > 1) listed, > > 2) analysed by the CCWG counsel and > > 3) fully debated by the CCWG membership. > > I recognise that many in this community do not understand the statutory > components of membership. I do and I like most of them. Others should have > the same opportunity to fully know about and evaluate the the statutory > rights before they are thrown away. > > Thank you -- Farzaneh

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