November 2015 - Accountability-Cross-Community

proposed language for Mission statement on contract enforcement
by Burr, Becky Nov. 3, 2015

Nov. 3, 2015

In Dublin we discussed, both in our working meetings and over two brown bag lunches, an approach to addressing concerns about the Mission Statement prohibition on regulation of services that use the Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. The following language (in blue) is proposed to address this concern: ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate to achieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not regulate services that use the Internet's unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide. In service of its Mission, ICANN shall have the ability to enforce agreements with contracted parties, subject to established means of community input on those agreements and reasonable checks and balances on its ability to impose obligations exceeding ICANN’s Mission on registries and registrars. What we discussed (over the lunches) as a reasonable check and balance (in addition to existing mechanisms such as public comment, etc.) is a new mechanism whereby registries and registrars are permitted to sign RAs and RAAs subject to a public reservation that they intend to challenge one or more specified provisions of such agreements on the grounds that the provision(s) would exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission. This mechanism will need to be developed. J. Beckwith Burr Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Homework from WP1 call on Fri 30-Oct
by Alan Greenberg Nov. 3, 2015

Nov. 3, 2015

Greg, I don't have the docs at hand, but my recollection is that AC/SO are allowed to make a decision according to their own rules. In the case of the ALAC, for an issue as substantive as using one of the powers, unless the result was clearly unanimous with all members participating, we would vote. Indeed opinions could vary, but if there is even a feeling that the current method of "majority) (I vaguely recall it might be either of two counts) is in sufficient, then it certainly should be a discussion that the GNSO Council should have, and I don't recall such an issue being formally raised. Alan At 02/11/2015 11:45 PM, Greg Shatan wrote: >âAlan, > >If the decision-making methodology specifies >that the SO/ACs need to each make their >decisions through a consensus process, the GNSO >Council voting process would not seem to qualify. > >As to whether the current system is "deemed >quite satisfactory," opinions can certainly differ. > >Greg â > >On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 4:32 PM, Alan Greenberg ><<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>alan.greenberg(a)mcgill.ca> wrote: >Greg, I have to disagree with you on several counts. > >The GNSO voting mechanisms were indeed designed >to make decisions based on a majority or >supermajority. The current two-house voting >thresholds were designed to emulate the simpler >vote-counting in the last incarnation of the >GNSO (I was one of the people who agonized over >how to emulate those earlier simpler rules). >Perhaps the current rule for "majority" is no >satisfactory and needs to be changed, but if so, >that is a decision that the GNSO can make. > >The GNSO uses a "majority" to decide to accept >or reject new rules, and it has been used for a >host of other types of decisions over the years. > >The methodology is deemed quite satisfactory to >make decision related to the management of >policy. But it is also what will be used in >deciding if the GNSO will creation or support a >petition for the new powers. And it will be the >methodology used to decide to remove a GNSO director. > >The GNSO is not unique in having multiple positions amongst its members. > >I could go on... > >Alan > > > >At 01/11/2015 07:51 PM, Greg Shatan wrote: >I have continuing concerns at the overall level >(this does not describe a consensus process) and >specifically as regards the view of the GNSO >(the GNSO does not have a process for consensus >decision making; the process fails to recognize >that the GNSO is an organization for gTLD >policy-making (and the GNSO Council is a policy >management body), and that for any other purpose >the groups participating in the GNSO represent >discrete stakeholder communities). Nothing I've >read or heard has resolved these concerns. > >However, whether we view this as a consensus >process or a proto-voting process, I'm still >grappling with the "weighting" issue (which in >turn leads to the "fractional" or "splitting" issue). > >In order to visualize the relative weights under >3 different scenarios, I prepared 3 pie charts, >which I've put in the attached document. (Note >that this reflects my concern that the >stakeholder communities participating in the >GNSO should be viewed separately for purposes >other then gTLD policy-making. Note also that >I've assumed that any "ccNSO" participation >would need to take into account non-ccNSO >ccTLDs, so I've reflected that in the pie chart >labeling.) Apologies for some "rounding errors" >(literally); but these do not affect the >substance. Use these charts as you see >fit.... I'm happy to revise, or prepare other charts, if need be. > >Greg > >

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Transparency recap (Was: Contribution on Transparency Reforms for CCWG)
by Mathieu Weill Nov. 3, 2015

Nov. 3, 2015

Dear Colleagues, First of all many thanks to all of you who have been working hard on this issue. We are well aware of your efforts to find an approach that would be acceptable to all on this question. Regarding transparency discussions, I would like to remind everyone of the content and conclusions of our discussions on Transparency in the Sole Designator model while we were in Dublin. - Our lawyers have confirmed that the same level of transparency could be achieved in the Sole Designator model as with the Sole Member, by adding a specific provision to the Bylaws enabling the Sole Designator to inspect Ican’s accounting books and records. - In response to a concern raised by Sam Eisner about public disclosure of such documents, we discussed how we could use the same type of provision that we had agreed on for the AoC reviews as a safeguard (see below the relevant extract from the AoC section, provided by Steve del Bianco) - There was a debate about whether or not extra provisions for transparency were needed in Work stream 1, considering that we have agreement that the topic is on the WS2 agenda. There was no formal conclusion. Thomas did conclude by saying “So that’s one action item for our group to set up a subteam to define the exact language and extent to which a transparency is required.” In terms of way forward, given the input we have received, I believe the question is whether transparency provisions, beyond the records inspection rights, fit with our agreed definition of Work stream 1, and whether the level of consensus on the extra provisions at this stage is sufficient. I would note that, with the group’s input, our WS2 initiative would already be well advanced. It might be possible to launch it very soon after we have submitted our WS1 recommendations if that is the path we take. Best, Mathieu For your reference : Full transcript --> https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/56143884/Transcript%20CCWG… Slide-deck --> https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/56143884/CCWG-Accountabili… <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/56143884/CCWG-Accountabili…> &modificationDate=1445444965000&api=v2 page 75 of AoC reviews as part of WS1. Confidential Disclosure to Review Teams: To facilitate transparency and openness regarding ICANN's deliberations and operations, the Review Teams, or a subset thereof, shall have access to ICANN internal information and documents. If ICANN refuses to reveal documents or information requested by the Review Team, ICANN must provide a justification to the Review Team. If the Review Team is not satisfied with ICANN’s justification, it can appeal to the Ombudsman and/or the ICANN Board for a ruling on the disclosure request. For documents and information that ICANN does disclose to the Review Team, ICANN may designate certain documents and information as not for disclosure by the Review Team, either in its report or otherwise. If the Review Team is not satisfied with ICANN’s designation of non-disclosable documents or information, it can appeal to the Ombudsman and/or the ICANN Board for a ruling on the non-disclosure designation. A confidential disclosure framework shall be published by ICANN. The confidential disclosure framework shall describe the process by which documents and information are classified, including a description of the levels of classification that documents or information may be subject to, and the classes of persons who may access such documents and information. The confidential disclosure framework shall describe the process by which a Review Team may request access to documents and information that are designated as classified or restricted access. The confidential disclosure framework shall also describe the provisions of any non-disclosure agreement that members of a Review Team may be asked to sign. The confidential disclosure framework must provide a mechanism to escalate and/or appeal the refusal to release documents and information to duly recognized Review Teams. De : accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] De la part de Kieren McCarthy Envoyé : jeudi 29 octobre 2015 15:58 À : Padmini Cc : accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org Objet : Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Contribution on Transparency Reforms for CCWG I have to agree with Padmini on this one re: DIDP and being "able to refer the requestor to documents already publicly available". The information provided is often tangential to what has actually been asked for. In quite a few cases it is so far removed from the query that it is almost obnoxious. I don't know why Board members have such a blind spot about how the staff behaves to those outside the corporation. And I'm still waiting to hear a Board member - any Board member - announce that they have decided to look into the staff's bylaw-breaking behavior in the .africa application. If I was on the Board and I heard that the entire process was being jeopardized by staff wrongly interfering in the process (and then lying about doing so), I'd make sure the community knew I was doing my job and insist on some kind of internal review of what happened and what could be done to make sure it didn't happen again. But instead we get silence and fantasy responses like these ones from Bruce about how the DIDP works and the effectiveness of ICANN's financial reporting systems. Kieren On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 5:41 AM, Padmini <pdmnbaruah(a)gmail.com> wrote: Dear Bruce, As someone who has spent some time combing through the different responses that ICANN files to the various DIDP requests, my findings are slightly different, and have been posted earlier. While ICANN does link one to an innumerable array of documents that are publicly available, many times, there is little or no connection between the information one seeks and the publicly available documents that are provided. For instance, I have asked a few questions on registrar/registry audits, specifically seeking individual contracted party audit reports in cases where there have been breaches or discrepancies. However, the response contains a large number of links explaining ICANN's three-year-audit process in great detail, and at the end has a rejection of my actual request on the basis of certain of their extremely vast and broad grounds for non-disclosure. I like to refer to this as ICANN's tendency towards documentary obfuscation where they aren't actually giving you the information that you need, but are drowning you in documents anyway. That 66 is a figure that we might need to scrutinise closer in terms of how effective those disclosures actually have been. Warm Regards Padmini Programme Associate, Internet Governance Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore, India Padmini Baruah V Year, B.A.LL.B. (Hons.) NLSIU, Bangalore On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 12:16 PM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au> wrote: Hello Greg, >> 6333. The accounting books and records and minutes of proceedings of the members and the board and committees of the board shall be open to inspection upon the written demand on the corporation of any member at any reasonable time, for a purpose reasonably related to such person's interests as a member. The minutes are basically published today. The only minutes apparently that are not posted are compensation committee minutes – but even then we could at least note the items discussed without necessarily disclosing some personal information. With regard to financials– we are already moving towards the same standards as publicly listed companies in the USA. We now provide quarterly financial reporting, and a quarterly call where the community can question the CEO and the CFO on the income and expenditure. It would not be normal to provide people with access to the raw accounting system (in this case Great Plains) – which would include information on payments to all staff etc. We do use an external auditor to validate our financials and processes once per year. If there is a community concern about a particular financial matter (e.g concern about whether procurement policies were being followed) – then I think it would be more appropriate if the single legal entity that represents the community powers has the right to appoint an external auditor to validate any particular process or numbers and report back to the community. Audit firms have the appropriate skills to analyse financial accounting records and also have appropriate procedures in place for confidentiality. I think we should be focussing on improving the processes we already have. I advocated moving to quarterly financial reporting, and I have certainly been a strong advocate of making things as public as possible, and welcome suggestions for improving our processes. Regards, Bruce Tonkin _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for CCWG ACCT Meeting #65 - 3 November
by Brenda Brewer Nov. 3, 2015

Nov. 3, 2015

Hello all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the CCWG ACCT meeting #65 - 03 November will be available here: https://community.icann.org/x/xbJYAw A copy of the notes and action items may be found below. Thank you. Kind regards, Brenda Action Items ACTION ITEM - Andrew to provide rationale around IAB's suggestion. ACTION ITEM - Becky to consider inserting Greg's language ("in service of its mission") and Kavouss' refinement edits ("ICANN shall act in accordance with Bylaws and article of incorporation to achieve its mission"). ACTION ITEM: Change "6310-3 and 6330-8" to 6333. ACTION ITEM: Lawyers to check proposed Bylaw language. ACTION ITEM: All should reach out to SO/ACs to report progress and ensure we have timely feedback. Notes These high-level notes are designed to help you navigate through content of the call and do not substitute in any way the transcript. Mission, Core Values & Commitments IAB IAB proposal raised concerns regarding provisions in the mission statement and suggested three edits. Concern is largely related to changing coordinating to supporting. For CCWG, issues of timing. Can we make an adjustment at this stage to address concern. Is there a word between coordinating and supporting that people would be comfortable with? It is a significant change. Is this required for the transition to happen? It could be undertaken under Work Stream 2. Feedback: - Concerns with coordinate but bitter concerns with chapeau i.e. changing to "collaborates ... of Internet". It is a bigger focus. It should be accurate description. - IAB raised question in ICG. Sensitive issue. We need to import minimal changes to meet requirements. On 1) "coordinate and support where necessary" - remaining unchanged. On 2) Domain name including associated root zone - remaining unchanged. 3) coordinate and support where necessary" - remaining unchanged. - Purpose of this revision is that on any part that needs more clarity it needs to be reflected accurately. Language suggested in IAB proposal would describe role of ICANN in a more accurate way. Like Becky's suggested language that refines and add clarity. - Fail to understsand why we are dealing with this. Community taking advantage of change and pressure of time. Stop conversation and move to Work Stream 2, if needed. - It is a serious problem for IAB. Second comment period highlighted that it is a critical issue. Proposal creates significant accountability measures that are founded on mission statement. Mission includes things ICANN does not do. It is IETF's legitimate purpose. We propose language that outlines ICANN's role as understand it to be. ICANN has a policy by virtue of contract but no role in rest of DNS. In addition it is going to be made fundamental Bylaw which is also a concern. Find a way to circumscribe ICANN's role. It is a serious problem for our real work on Internet. We need to make sure mission statement is limited to what ICANN really is. There are registries ICANN does not operate and there is some that it does. - While current mission is accurate for names, it is too broad for numbers and protocole parameters. Why do we unified scope? CONCLUSION - Continue discussion offline. Use Becky's suggestion as reference model. Base discussions with requirements. ACTION ITEM - Andrew to provide rationale around IAB's suggestion. Contracting issue In Dublin, we came out with consensus that ICANN should have clear ability to enforce his contracts with recognition that ICANN could use last minute imposition to bypass consensus policy development. This is language to be given to lawyers. Notion would be that contracts are enforceable. Language intended to capture degree of consensus. Feedback: - In accordance with? What is reasonably appropriate? - Proposed language does not capture discussion in Dublin. Delete exceeding ICANN's mission and add "in service of its mission" ACTION ITEM - Becky to consider inserting Greg's language ("in service of its mission") and Kavouss' refinement edits ("ICANN shall act in accordance with Bylaws and article of incorporation to achieve its mission"). Transparency proposal In Dublin we discussed the need to ensure provisions related to transparency inherent to membership model would be addressed in designator model i..e right of inspection. Documentary disclosure has been on table as part of WS2. Update DIDP policies within two years. Transparency of interaction with gov. Feedback: - There is an undue influence of governments on policy decisions. Purpose is last bullet point is to know whether there is governments' undue influence. It would also help address mission creep. - In Second Draft Proposal, we have AoC provision for document disclosure. It is already part of Work Stream 1. - Do we have bandwidth to deal with this now? Does that mean we don't trust WS2 to deal with significant issues? Major concern that any contract between government and ICANN could be larger than intended. - What is needed beyond what is currently report in quarterly financial report? - There is a recognition that DIDP policy as currently implemented ACTION ITEM: Change "6310-3 and 6330-8" to 6333. - Bullet point 3 would give assurance against government capture. It needs to be Work Stream 1. - Find a credible way to have WS2 happen. - Transparency as WS1 is slowing us down. We need to have in WS2. CONCLUSION: Bullets point 1 and 2 will be WS1. Bullet points 3 and 4 will be Work Stream 2. Decision-Making We need a clear way forward. We need a rationale for why making change in model. Call for objections on summary of recommendations Sebastien Bachollet objects to a). Feedback: - When rough consensus is achieved but still objections, those who have consensus should look into whether objections are meaningful in a way that would require reconsideration. - Concerns with including GAC. We don't know if they are going to participate. You need to proceed with two scenarios (1 with 4 - 1 with 5) --> Stick with 5 as recommended. All get to participate in adhoc system. - We may require support but not objection. CONCLUSION: We consider these recommendations and third table as basis for our third report. They will be used as basis for drafting going further. Human Rights Proposed Bylaw text that suggest running by lawyers. Transitional Bylaw gives timeframe to develop framework of interpretation. Feedback: - NTIA has said that more you leave to future the less confidence we have is what we are approving is a package. - Succinct framework on p3-4 that will be fleshed out in WS2. It provides enough meat on bones to satisfy Strickling test. - Bylaw language should be run by lawyers ACTION ITEM: Lawyers to check proposed Bylaw language. CONCLUSION: We will have lawyers check Bylaw. This is our reference model moving forward. A.O.B Samantha Dickinson has joined writers Team. We should have materials to review next week. ACTION ITEM: All should reach out to SO/ACs to report progress and ensure we have timely feedback.

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Fwd: WP4 Deliverable: Elaborating an ICANN Commitment to Human RIghts
by Greg Shatan Nov. 3, 2015

Nov. 3, 2015

All, In preparation for tonight's call in a couple of hours, I have attached the draft deliverable from WP4 regarding the proposed Human Rights bylaw, in Word and PDF form. It is my understanding that this will be discussed on the call. See you all on the call! Greg Shatan

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Volume 11: An Update on IANA Stewardship Discussions
by Grace Abuhamad Nov. 3, 2015

Nov. 3, 2015

Original link:https://www.icann.org/news/blog/volume-11-an-update-on-iana-stewardship -discussions Volume 11: An Update on IANA Stewardship Discussions <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/volume-11-an-update-on-iana-stewardship-di scussions#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/volume-11-an-update-on-iana-stewardship-dis cussions#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/volume-11-an-update-on-iana-stewardship-dis cussions#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/volume-11-an-update-on-iana-stewardship-dis cussions#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/volume-11-an-update-on-iana-stewardship-dis cussions#> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/volume-11-an-update-on-iana-stewardship-dis cussions#> Following ICANN54, the IANA Stewardship Transition is now a step closer The ICG and CCWG-Accountability met in Dublin during ICANN54 <https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54> to continue work on their proposals in wake of the feedback received during the two public comment periods that ended in September. The ICG was successful in completing its Consolidated IANA Stewardship Proposal and is now awaiting the finalization of the CCWG-Accountability¹s Work Stream 1 Recommendations. When CCWG-Accountability finalizes its Work Stream 1 recommendations, and the CWG-Stewardship confirms that the recommendations meet its requirements, the ICGcan consider its proposal complete and begin the process of submitting it to the NTIA. Consolidated IANA Stewardship Proposal Taking into account an analysis of the public comments <https://www.dropbox.com/s/j07zo4malyc2sx6/Public%20Comment%20Summary%20-%20 23Oct15-f2f%20edits-clean.docx?dl=0> received during the public comment period <https://www.ianacg.org/calls-for-input/combined-proposal-public-comment-per iod/> that ended on 8 September 2015, and after a number of working sessions <https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule-table?combine=ICG> duringICANN54 <https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54> in Dublin, the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG <http://www.ianacg.org/> ) has announced <https://www.ianacg.org/icg-completes-its-work-and-awaits-conclusion-of-ccwg -on-enhancing-icann-accountability/> that it has finalized its proposal <http://www.ianacg.org/icg-files/documents/IANA-transition-proposal-v9.pdf> . However, before the ICG sends the proposal to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/> ) via the ICANN Board, it will first confirm with the Cross Community Working Group to Develop an IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal on Naming Related Functions (CWG-Stewardship <https://community.icann.org/display/gnsocwgdtstwrdshp/CWG+to+Develop+an+IAN A+Stewardship+Transition+Proposal+on+Naming+Related+Functions> ) that its accountability requirements have been met by Work Stream 1 recommendations currently being finalized by the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability <https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhancing+ICANN+A ccountability> ).TheICG has decided to keep its mailing lists active until 30 September 2016 to enable the community to continue to contact them, if needed. It is also seeking feedback from the threeIANA operational communities (names, numbers and protocol parameters) to see if they would like ICG to play a role during the implementation of the IANA Stewardship Transition. The ICGwill not hold any more face-to-face meetings and will only hold conference calls on an as-needed basis. There are still some implementation details to be finalized for the transition, including the issue of the IANA trademark and intellectual property rights (IPR). The CWG-Stewardship will work with the two other operational communities to find a solution to the IPR issue that meets the needs of all three communities. CCWG-Accountability Work Stream 1 Recommendations Following the 12 September end of the public comment period <https://www.icann.org/public-comments/ccwg-accountability-2015-08-03-en> for the 2nd Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ccwg-draft-2-proposal-work-stre am-1-recs-03aug15-en.pdf> , the CCWG-Accountability held a face-to-face meeting <https://www.icann.org/public-comments/ccwg-accountability-2015-08-03-en> , 25-26 September, in Los Angeles, and a number of working sessions <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56134263> in Dublin during ICANN54. As a result of its work to incorporate the feedback from the community, including feedback from the ICANN Board, the CCWG-Accountability made a number of adjustments and refinements to its draft recommendations. As a result of the adjustments, the CCWG-Accountability has decided to send the revised recommendations for a third public comment period. The third comment period will have a two-stage approach so the community can begin reviewing the materials as soon as possible. This is to enable the report on Work Stream 1 recommendations to be finalized and sent to the ICANN Board by mid January 2016, ensuring there are minimal effects on the timeline of the IANA Stewardship Transition. Key dates 15 Nov 2015 A high-level overview of Work Stream 1 Recommendations and a summary of changes from the 2nd Draft Proposal to be: 1. Released for a 35-day public comment period 2. Sent to the CCWG-Accountability¹s Chartering Organizations for their feedback 30 Nov 2015 Full third draft report on Work Stream 1 Recommendations released for 20 days of consultation Early Jan 2016 Amended report submitted to Chartering Organizations Mid Jan 2016 Potential face-to-face meeting for Chartering Organizations, if needed, to decide whether to support the report Mid Jan 2016 CCWG-Accountability to submit final report to the ICANN Board, enabling theICG to also submit its final report For more information on the amendments that the CCWG-Accountability decided to pursue in Dublin, see the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability ICANN54 co-Chairs' Statement <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/Cross%20Community%20Working%20Group%20on%20 Enhancing%20ICANN%20Accountability%20ICANN54%20co-Chairs'%20Statement> . IANA Stewardship Transition in the news 27 Oct 2015Governments v. ICANN: The Last Battle Before the IANA Transition <http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/10/27/governments-v-icann-the-last-battle-b efore-the-iana-transition/> , Council on Foreign Relations [EN] 23 Oct 2015ICANN and IANA: Making the right not a rash decision <https://www.aei.org/publication/icann-and-iana-making-the-right-not-a-rash- decision/> , American Enterprise Institute [EN] 13 Oct 2015Perché 40 mila ore di lavoro non sono bastate a trovare un accordo sul futuro di Internet senza la guida USA <http://www.chefuturo.it/2015/10/accordo-futuro-internet-usa/> , CheFuturo! [IT] 29 Sep 2015IANA-Aufgabe durch USA weiter unter Zeitdruck: Auf Messers Schneide <http://www.heise.de/netze/meldung/IANA-Aufgabe-durch-USA-weiter-unter-Zeitd ruck-Auf-Messers-Schneide-2832298.html> , Heise [DE] You can play a role in IANA¹s future Anyone can participate in discussions about the future of IANA's stewardship and ICANNaccountability. For information on joining CCWG-Accountability, contact accountability-staff(a)icann.org <mailto:accountability-staff@icann.org> . Compiled on behalf of ICANN by Samantha Dickinson | 2 November 2015

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Homework from WP1 call on Fri 30-Oct
by Alan Greenberg Nov. 3, 2015

Nov. 3, 2015

Greg, I have to disagree with you on several counts. The GNSO voting mechanisms were indeed designed to make decisions based on a majority or supermajority. The current two-house voting thresholds were designed to emulate the simpler vote-counting in the last incarnation of the GNSO (I was one of the people who agonized over how to emulate those earlier simpler rules). Perhaps the current rule for "majority" is no satisfactory and needs to be changed, but if so, that is a decision that the GNSO can make. The GNSO uses a "majority" to decide to accept or reject new rules, and it has been used for a host of other types of decisions over the years. The methodology is deemed quite satisfactory to make decision related to the management of policy. But it is also what will be used in deciding if the GNSO will creation or support a petition for the new powers. And it will be the methodology used to decide to remove a GNSO director. The GNSO is not unique in having multiple positions amongst its members. I could go on... Alan At 01/11/2015 07:51 PM, Greg Shatan wrote: >I have continuing concerns at the overall level (this does not >describe a consensus process) and specifically as regards the view >of the GNSO (the GNSO does not have a process for consensus decision >making; the process fails to recognize that the GNSO is an >organization for gTLD policy-making (and the GNSO Council is a >policy management body), and that for any other purpose the groups >participating in the GNSO represent discrete stakeholder >communities). Nothing I've read or heard has resolved these concerns. > >However, whether we view this as a consensus process or a >proto-voting process, I'm still grappling with the "weighting" issue >(which in turn leads to the "fractional" or "splitting" issue). > >In order to visualize the relative weights under 3 different >scenarios, I prepared 3 pie charts, which I've put in the attached >document. (Note that this reflects my concern that the stakeholder >communities participating in the GNSO should be viewed separately >for purposes other then gTLD policy-making. Note also that I've >assumed that any "ccNSO" participation would need to take into >account non-ccNSO ccTLDs, so I've reflected that in the pie chart >labeling.) Apologies for some "rounding errors" (literally); but >these do not affect the substance. Use these charts as you see >fit.... I'm happy to revise, or prepare other charts, if need be. > >Greg

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AGENDA - Call #65
by Alice Jansen Nov. 3, 2015

Nov. 3, 2015

Dear all, In anticipation of your call #65<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56144581> - Tuesday, 3 November from 06:00-08:00 UTC (time converter<http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/fixedtime.html?msg=CCWG+ACCT+Meeting&…>), please find below a proposed agenda: 1. Welcome, Roll-call, SoI 2. Mission, Core Values, Commitments (incl. IAB request and transparency) 3. Decision-Making 4. Human Rights 5. A.O.B Thank you, Kind regards Alice

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Decision-making in the community mechanism - update for CCWG
by Jordan Carter Nov. 3, 2015

Nov. 3, 2015

Dear all Work Party 1 has been discussing at some length the innovations developed in Dublin about community decision-making - particularly, the operation of decisions in the Community Mechanism that have to happen following the various dialogue and discussion phases. Over the past two calls in the last week, we've discussed some of the details, and I have the following recommendations for the CCWG arising from that. Each recommendation has some info about it noted below, and at the end of this email are some relevant attachments. *WP1 members - if I have made errors in the summary, please let us all know.* Overall, WP1 has agreed with the change to the broad approach into what might be called the "Dublin Approach". There are some specifics that are important: *a) on split or single decisions within each SO or AC* *WP1 recommends to the CCWG that each SO or AC should come to a decision by means of its own processes, and that "split" decisions or delegating decisions to sub-units will not be available.* This is a recommendation from WP1 to the CCWG and was largely consensus of the group on the call on 2 November. It is a change from the Second Draft Proposal but is consistent with what was discussed in Dublin. GNSO participants in WP1 have expressed concerns with this. It would be complex to allow split decisions in a consensus model. *b) on participating SOs and ACs* *Decision rights for the exercise of community powers be granted to the GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, ALAC and GAC. SSAC and RSSAC will be able to advise the other SOs or ACs through the Community Forum. Each SO or AC has the right to participate or not participate in any decision, with their choice not affecting the thresholds established for the exercise of community powers.* WP1 discussed but did not formally lodge it as a recommendation per se. We took a temperature check of the Adobe room and there were [thirteen in favour, four against] the recommendation. SSAC have made it clear they do not contemplate decisional rights. RSSAC we are awaiting input. GAC - GAC wishes to protect the right to opt in. There was a discussion about how to provide opt in or otherwise. My advice as rapporteur is that we should include all SOs or ACs as able to participate unless they indicate they do not wish to. This will allow them to decide (by their own consensus processes) at each stage of each decision whether to express support or objection to the exercise of a community power, but means that non-decision won't count either as objection or support. *c) on the distribution of influence between SOs and ACs* *Each of the five SOs and ACs with decision rights have an equality of voice/influence in decisions to exercise community powers.* Again, WP1 discussed but did not formally lodge this as a recommendation. We took a temperature check and this again showed [thirteen in favour, four against] the recommendation. Some WP1 participants continue to argue for the view that SOs should have relatively more influence than ACs. It is difficult to establish how to weigh such a difference in the context of each SO or AC by consensus offering a view in support of or objecting to the use of a power. *d) on decision thresholds in the community mechanism* *WP1 recommends to the CCWG that the levels of agreement among SOs and ACs in support of exercising a power, and the limits to levels of opposition, be agreed as those set out in the paper from Steve DelBianco updated by Jordan Carter and discussed at this meeting.* This recommendation from WP1 was broadly agreed as consistent with the previous temperature checks and the first recommendation. No temperature check was held. Two concerns were raised in discussion (see the table as attachment A to this email - you can ignore the last column based on recommendation in a) above). 1) with five SOs or ACs participating, and with GAG not having decided whether to participate, whether a threshold of four SOs/ACs by consensus supporting the use of a power was too high a threshold. It would essentially require unanimity among the three SOs and ALAC. (This threshold is proposed for Budget veto, approval of changes to fundamental bylaws, recall of the ICANN Board and decisions re IANA Functions separation for names.) 2) for the power to recall the entire ICANN Board, whether one objecting SO or AC should prevent that power being used. (The broad view was no, it should not - consistent with our principled position that no single SO or AC should be able to prevent the use of any of the community powers.) *Papers* Please find the following attached: A - the consensus measure table related to item d) above. B - the "Dublin Approach" background paper C - the breakout report, including the decision table D - the public comments report on the community mechanism Cheers, Jordan WP1 Rapporteur CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [IAB] Please review regarding IAB comments on Mission Statement
by Andrew Sullivan Nov. 2, 2015

Nov. 2, 2015

Hi, I've trimmed some of the cc:s because I'm not really sure why the original was copied all over. On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 07:08:34PM -0400, Seth Johnson wrote: > The real question relates to context in the transition though: where are > core registries and protocol parameters coordinated, if that function is > removed from ICANN? They are co-ordinated exactly where they have been at least since the founding of ICANN: at the IETF. The IETF makes the decisions about the protocol parameters registries. ICANN, in its role as IANA, records those decisions. The ICANN role in this case is basically clerical. The IETF has been perfectly clear about this all the way through the entire process. So has ICANN: that's what the MoU between ICANN and the IETF (and IAB) says. I suppose it would be possible to construct an argument that ICANN had this "co-ordination" function when there was still a Protocol Supporting Organization, but since the PSO went away rather a long time ago, that argument is no longer available in any case. (I happen not to accept that argument anyway, but since it doesn't ramify I don't think it's worth exploring in detail.) Best regards, A (speaking for myself) -- Andrew Sullivan ajs(a)anvilwalrusden.com

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