February 2016 - Accountability-Cross-Community

CCWG-Accountability Delivers Report to Chartering Organizations
by Hillary Jett Feb. 23, 2016

Feb. 23, 2016

Original posting: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/ccwg-accountability-delivers-report-to-char… CCWG-Accountability Delivers Report to Chartering Organizations Today, the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) provided its Chartering Organizations with its final supplemental report on Work Stream 1 recommendations. [You can download the full report here] The report is the result of extensive work by the CCWG-Accountability’s 28 members, 175 participants and a team of highly qualified legal advisors since December 2014, which included over 221 calls or meetings, 3 public consultations and more than 13,900 email messages. It represents a carefully crafted balance between key requirements, specific legal advice, and significant compromises by all who participated and includes diligent attention to the input received through the public comment proceedings. While the report is final at this stage, an additional opportunity will be provided for CCWG-Accountability members to revise, retract or add minority statements to the final report. Located in Appendix A, minority statements will be updated and released on 25 February. We will make ourselves available, together with or other key contributors, to the Chartering Organizations before and during the ICANN55 meeting in Marrakech to answer any questions and explain any details of the report. Background documents, slides, recordings and transcripts of recent webinars that explain the details of the report are available here. The CCWG-Accountability leadership team would like to thank everyone for taking part in this historic process to redefine ICANN’s accountability to the multistakeholder community. This work entailed significant time and attention from each of the CCWG-Accountability volunteers and staff who have been dedicated to the development of this report. We look forward to hearing from our Chartering Organizations and are optimistic we will be able to send the approved final supplemental report to the ICANN Board for transmission to NTIA in Marrakech. Thomas, Mathieu, León CCWG-Accountability co-Chairs

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recap and next steps?
by Jordan Carter Feb. 23, 2016

Feb. 23, 2016

Hi all I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along. Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it: - CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both). - if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating. - CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation. - the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply. - some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws - other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice - the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it. - there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion. So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do: - we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified. - we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with. - we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation) - we have to publish the report I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible. I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being: - the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions. I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out. SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do. If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-) best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Understanding of Amended Paragraph 72 of Annex 2
by Burr, Becky Feb. 23, 2016

Feb. 23, 2016

Phil, I believe this is correct. As I said, phrase (2) deals with a corner case. Becky J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Phil Corwin <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>> Date: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 at 2:24 PM To: Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Understanding of Amended Paragraph 72 of Annex 2 Now that the Co-Chairs have just issued their decision on how to proceed, I want to return to a subject that I first raised in the chat room on the call held twelve hours ago. Section 72 of Annex 2 will now read [bracketed text in red to be deleted]: The CCWG-Accountability also recommends that in a situation where the GAC may not participate as a Decisional Participant because the Community Power is proposed to be used to challenge the Board’s implementation of GAC consensus advice and the threshold is set at four in support, the power will still be validly exercised if three are in support and no more than one objects, with the following exception: · Where the power to be exercised is recalling the entire Board for implementing GAC advice, the reduced threshold would apply only [either (1)] after an IRP has found that, in implementing GAC advice, the Board acted inconsistently with the ICANN Bylaws[, or (2) if the IRP is not available to challenge the Board action in question]. If the Empowered Community has brought such an IRP and does not prevail, the Empowered Community may not exercise its power to recall the entire the Board solely on the basis of the matter decided by the IRP. It may, however, exercise that power based on other grounds. As I read the remaining text, the first paragraph establishes the general principle that in any situation where the Empowered Community proposes to challenge the Board’s implementation of GAC consensus advice, using any of the available community powers, the GAC would be barred from being a decisional participant, and that where the threshold for taking action is four SO/Ac votes it would drop to three. I would note in passing that the voting threshold for exercise of a community power is set at four (per items 46-70) for only three community powers: 1. Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget 2. Recall the entire Board of Directors 3. Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process Paragraph 2 then goes on to create an exception for that reduced threshold situation -- applicable only to removal of the Board in its entirety, and not to rejection of an operating plan/budget or a review of IANA functions where the Board has acted pursuant to GAC consensus advice. For Board removal in its entirety the EC would first be required to pursue an IRP – and if the IRP determined that the Board implementation of GAC consensus advice had not violated the Bylaws the reduced voting threshold would not apply, and the matter could not be further pursued unless there were other, non-Bylaws grounds for pursuing it. In the latter instance (non-Bylaws ground), the threshold for full Board removal would be four votes (unanimity of all SOs and ACs other than the GAC, which would remain non-decisional). Are we agreed on that view so far? Now here is where it gets interesting, in regard to matters of Board implementation of GAC consensus advice about which the community was aggrieved, and regardless of whether such implementation involved an alleged Bylaws violation and was therefore subject to an IRP --- If the community sought to exercise power 4a contained at section 55 – “Remove an individual Board Director nominated by an SO or AC (and appointed by the Empowered Community)” – none of the above in para 72 would be relevant because the majority of the nominating SO/AC could do that on its own by an internal 3Ž4 majority vote after inviting and considering comments from all SOs/ACs (noting that it’s not entirely clear whether the GAC would be barred from commenting, although it’s of little relevance since the electing SO/AC is in no way bound by the opinions of the others). That removal could include the Chairman of the Board if he/she was the nominee of a particular SO or AC. If the community sought to exercise power 4b contained at section 58 – “Remove an individual Board Director nominated by the Nominating Committee (and appointed by the Empowered Community)” – the lowered threshold requirement in para 72 would not be relevant because the required threshold support is “Three support, and no more than one objection”, and the GAC would be barred as a decisional participant if the challenge pertained to the Board member voting to implement GAC consensus advice. Again, this power is available to remove the Chair if he/she was a NomCom appointee (Note: I have checked the ICANN Bylaws and any Board member other the President/CEO, regardless of how they were placed on the Board, can be elected to the Chair or Vice Chair position). Putting this all together, even after the CCWG’s Co-Chairs decision to proceed with striking clause 2 of the second paragraph of section 72, the Empowered Community could still remove the Board Chairman and Vice Chair (and sequentially chosen replacement Chairs and Vice Chairs, if they failed to lead the Board to reverse its decision implementing GAC advice), and could remove one or more additional members of the Board, whether placed on the Board by an SO/AC or by the NomCom, so long as such actions were taken individually and not collectively. And the community, if the aggrieved view was sufficiently widespread, could collectively remove (and then replace) sufficient numbers of Board members to compel a reversal of the implementation of GAC consensus advice. Indeed, there is no limitation placed on the number of Board members who may be removed via community powers 4a and 4b so long as each is a discrete assertion of those powers pertaining to a particular Board member. If I am correct on this interpretation then, the removal of clause 2 may not be all that significant. If anyone believes that my interpretation of any or all of this is incorrect – especially Board or GAC members – I would urge them to voice disagreement now. I would also welcome expressions of support for this interpretation. If you have read this far, thanks. Best to all, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey

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Poll tally
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 23, 2016

Feb. 23, 2016

For those interested, I did a breakdown of the poll results. For each poll, the numbers are Total, Members, Participants, Others Remove #2 Support (poll 3): 38, 10, 23, 5 Remove #2 Object (poll 1): 11, 2, 9, 0 Send Proposal As Is Support (poll 4): 14, 2, 12, 0 Send Proposal As Is Object (poll 2): 30, 8, 18, 4 This was based on the lists distributed by Grace plus Kavouss added to poll 2. Alan

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Updated Proposal Documents Available for Review
by Hillary Jett Feb. 23, 2016

Feb. 23, 2016

Hello all, As requested by the co-Chairs, staff has made available the updated Core Proposal, Annexes and Appendices as they were prepared after comments received from the 17 February posting in anticipation of a 19 February distribution of the proposal to the Chartering Organizations. They can be found on the wiki here (https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw) These documents are not final, however have been made available for preliminary review. Any discussions on the list from 19 February to now are not reflected. Thanks, Hillary -- Hillary Jett Communications Coordinator Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Mobile: +1 (202) 674-3403 Email: hillary.jett(a)icann.org

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report and next steps
by Thomas Rickert Feb. 23, 2016

Feb. 23, 2016

Dear CCWG-Accountability, We wanted to inform you that the revisions have been made from the comments that have been received from the lawyers, several community members, and from the 16 February call. These have been incorporated into the sections that were noted. The graphics are being revised and will be placed in the final version of the text per the suggestions that have been submitted to date. The revised sections have been posted at https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw <https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw> for your final review. We have also posted a documents that tracks all the comments — and subsequent changes made — between the 12 February and 17 February documents. The schedule presented on the 16 February call that we are following to conclude our current work on Work Stream 1 has been updated. 12 Feb — Report sent by 22:00 UTC to the CCWG Leadership Team and CCWG Legal Counsel for review with all materials posted on the Wiki (https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw <https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw>) for everyone to view. 15 Feb — Report updated (if needed) to incorporate edits from CCWG Leadership Team and Legal. 17 Feb— Report sent to CCWG for 48-hour review (and posted on the Wiki at https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw <https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw>). To ensure that all comments from our CCWG Leadership Team and Legal counsel were accurately incorporated for the full group review period, distribution to the CCWG was updated to 17 Feb. To maintain the 48-hour review period, all subsequent proposal finalization dates have been extended one day. All other dates have been retained. 18 Feb at 17:00 UTC – Minority statements due for incorporation into Final Report. 19 Feb – Final Report sent to Chartering Organizations for consideration and approval. Once the Final Report is in the hands of your organizations, these are the expected dates for the final steps, as we discussed on the Transition Program Facilitation <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/transition-facilitation-2015-09-23-en> call this past Tuesday: 25 Feb – CWG-Stewardship sign-off letter delivered to Chartering Organizations, then to ICG. By 9 Mar at the latest – Sign-off on Final Report by Chartering Organizations at ICANN55 in Marrakech (in time for the Board to consider). 10 Mar – Public Board Meeting and hand over from ICANN Board to NTIA. Based on the updated schedule, minority statements must be submitted no later than 18 February at 17:00 UTC to allow for the final supplemental proposal to be produced and ready for distribution to the Chartering Organizations on 19 February. If you have any questions about our timeline or suggestions for our process, please let us know how we can assist. Sincerely, Mathieu, León and Thomas CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs

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A message from the Co-Chairs
by León Felipe Sánchez Ambía Feb. 22, 2016

Feb. 22, 2016

Dear all, As you are aware, we intended to publish our Final Report today (19 February 2016) for Chartering Organization consideration. We are ready to do so, except for one issue where we would like to consider options as a full group. There is, still, ongoing discussion on the issue of thresholds for Board removal in Recommendation #2, which raised concerns in our report after we came to a compromise on Board consideration of GAC Advice (Recommendation #11). Since then, we have tried to propose compromise text that would be acceptable by different groups (c.f. the 12 February and 17 February drafts, posted at https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw <https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw>). We received comments on this issue, and in some cases, minority statements, from members and participants in the ALAC, GAC, GNSO, and the Board. Earlier today, ICANN Chairman, Steve Crocker, posted a note, apparently on behalf of the Icann Board, outlining Board concerns with the latest attempt at compromise text proposed on 17 February: http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-February/… <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-February/…>. While these last minute interventions are deeply disappointing for those of us who worked extremely hard, within the group and within their respective communities, to build bridges and promote compromise, our main target and duty remains to achieve a stable level of consensus, respecting the bottom-up, multistakeholder nature of the process. It is fortunate that the Board provided this input before we published the report, since it enables us to assess the potential consequences of a Board disagreement later in the process. We believe this issue must be discussed before sending our Final Report to Chartering Organizations. At the very least, we would like the opportunity to discuss a way forward and process as full group on next Tuesday’s CCWG-Accountability call at 06:00 UTC. There are many options and directions the group can take at this stage, each with different implications and considerations, and these options should be discussed as a group. Until the Tuesday call, let’s keep open channels of communication on our mailing list and work towards a solution. We will also reach out to the Chartering Organizations to inform them of the change in our schedule. As co-chairs, we renew our call upon every Member, upon every Participant, our call upon community leaders especially in the ICANN Board, in the GNSO and in the GAC to step away from confronting each other, to engage constructively and recognize each other’s value to the multistakeholder model. If you believe that the multistakeholder model can deliver, now is the time to act accordingly. Thank you, Thomas, León, Mathieu CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs

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CCWG ACCT Proposed Agenda - Call #85 - Tuesday, 23 February @ 06:00 UTC
by Brenda Brewer Feb. 22, 2016

Feb. 22, 2016

Dear All, In preparation for your call #85 <https://community.icann.org/x/QAOAAw> - Tuesday, 23 February 2016 at 06:00 - 08:00 UTC (time converter <http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/fixedtime.html?msg=CCWG+ACCT+Meeting&… ah=2> ), see below a proposed agenda: 1. Welcome, Roll call, SoI 2. Substantive discussion on way forward 3. AOB Adobe Connect: https://icann.adobeconnect.com/accountability/ <https://icann.adobeconnect.com/accountability/> Thank you! Kind regards, Brenda

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further responses to ICANN
by Burr, Becky Feb. 22, 2016

Feb. 22, 2016

My further responses inline Dear Becky Thank you very much for your replies. However, I feel we should separate intentions from facts in such replies and/or clarifications. In this regard, although only 0.1% (in your estimation) of the instances the carve-out would apply are those where the Board decision is consistent with the Bylaws, the fact is that the carve-out rule makes no such distinction, correct? Correct, that distinction is not made in the context of any of the community powers and was not made in the GAC carve-out context until the Board’s recent intervention. As to the participation of any other SO and AC on both tracks, I kindly asked to confirm a fact (that any other SO or AC may fully participate, with the only exception pf the GAC). I infer that you are confirming it, right? Yes, I think that’s perfectly obvious Jorge. (Reasons for doing so are something different and have been discussed and no full agreement found to date if I dare say so.) thanks again and regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet Am 22.02.2016 um 14:54 schrieb Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz><mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>>: J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz>

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it
by Burr, Becky Feb. 22, 2016

Feb. 22, 2016

Responses in line J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>" <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> Date: Monday, February 22, 2016 at 8:13 AM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> Cc: "steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>" <steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>>, "icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>" <icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it Dear Kavouss, dear Becky Thanks so much! >From the responses I received, it seems that the carve-out applies generally whenever there is a Board decision to implement GAC Advice, even when that Board decision is deemed by the IRP to be perfectly consistent with ICANN Bylaws. Hence, we should be clear that there is no relation between the carve-out and the consistency with the Bylaws, right? Reasons for bringing such a challenge can be purely based on different interests, right? No, the carve out reflects the principle that we have discussed at great length. The GAC should not have the authority BOTH to force the Board to the negotiating table at any time over any issues and to block community challenge of the results of those Board/GAC negotiations. The status of GAC Advice differentiates it from any other kind of advice. I suspect that 99.9% of the time that challenge will involve an alleged bylaws violations, but maybe not. It is just a rule that excludes the GAC from (a decisional role in) any community decision where a Board decision to implement GAC Advice is at stake. Correct, it bars the GAC from participating as a decision-maker in a discussion of a decision to use one of the community powers in that situation. A further question: if such a Board decision is based both on a SO recommendation, an ALAC advice and a GAC Advice, the only entity to be excluded from a community process would be the GAC, right? But the other SO and AC would participate on both tracks, correct? I’ve provided my views on this several times Jorge. Please refer to my email about why GAC Advice is different from a PDP. As to the threshold question: it merely has to do with the Board recall, but does not affect any of the mentioned characteristics of the carve-out, correct? The Boards concern is only about lowering the threshold to 3 in the context of Board recall. Thanks very much for any further guidance Best Jorge Von: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] Gesendet: Montag, 22. Februar 2016 14:00 An: Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>; kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> Cc: steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>; icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it Jorge- The carve out would apply but you would need 4 SO/AC s to recall the Board. Becky J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc./Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office:+1.202.533.2932 Mobile:+1.202.352.6367 /neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>" <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> Date: Monday, February 22, 2016 at 6:44 AM To: Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> Cc: "steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>" <steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>>, "icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>" <icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it Dear Kavouss Thanks for the clarification. Hence, do I understand correctly that the carve-out (exclusion of GAC as decisional participant) applies also if the Board decision to implement GAC Advice has been found by the IRP to be perfectly consistent with the Bylaws? Thanks for your guidance Regards Jorge Von: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Gesendet: Montag, 22. Februar 2016 12:41 An: Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> Cc: Mueller, Milton L <milton(a)gatech.edu<mailto:milton@gatech.edu>>; Steve Crocker <steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>>; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>; Icann-board ICANN <icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it Dear Jorge, You are right The carve out applies to all cases either in application of IRP or in the absence of IRP For the first Board's agreed with reduced threshold from 4 to 3 for Board's Spill For the second the Board wishes that the 4 SO/AC threshold applies . Some people in the community like me fully supportting the Board's views. Some others are against This is one of the issue that must be resolved tomorrow Regards Kavouss 2016-02-22 12:25 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>: Dear all >From this email by Milton it seems that some (as Milton) are understanding that the carve-out only would apply if the Board decision to implement GAC Advice is found (by the IRP I guess) to be inconsistent with the Bylaws. I have been away for one week, but I feel that the carve-out was meant to apply generally to situations where there is Board implementation of GAC Advice... Could someone kindly clarify the status? Best regards Jorge -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Im Auftrag von Mueller, Milton L Gesendet: Sonntag, 21. Februar 2016 23:34 An: Steve Crocker <steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>>; Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: Icann-board ICANN <icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it Steve I think Andrew got the issue exactly right. I do not see how your answer even engages with his argument, which is that nearly all of the community has agreed that when board actions are challenged for being out of mission by following GAC advice, that the GAC should not be in a position to rule on that. Claiming that the GAC does not have "extraordinary power" does not answer Andrew's argument. Whether the GAC has extraordinary power or not, if it advises you (the board) to do something that the rest of the community thinks is outside of the bounds of the bylaws (which it has a demonstrated tendency to do) the GAC should not be a decisional member of the empowered community that decides whether we get to challenge that action. >From that premise on, it is all arithmetic, as Andrew showed: > > This is a choice entirely within the GAC's power. It must choose. > > If it chooses to be board-advisor-GAC, then it is in effect choosing > > that it prefers that mode of operation to being part of the wider > > Empowered Community mechanism. In effect, a GAC choice can reduce > > the possible actors in the Empowered Community to four. Otherwise, > > the GAC is in a position to insist on advice it gave being > > considered first by the board, and then that the GAC can also > > participate in the judgement of the Board's actions. That's the > > very "two bites" problem that we were trying to solve. I believe > > that in most organizations (including many governments), it would be > > regarded as surprising that a participant in the to-be-judged action also gets to be one of the judges. You have not refuted this, as I said before you have not even engaged with this. This increases my suspicion that the board's position is based on a political calculus, not on good governance or accountability criteria. Further, it is clear from the reaction you have gotten that the board is not proposing a "friendly amendment." In these rules of procedure, a friendly amendment has to be accepted by the group that proposed it, and clearly it is not. I am deeply disturbed by the board upsetting a consensual compromise, and a very difficult one, for the third time in this process. I wonder if you have any appreciation of the potential costs of this, particularly when it involves an issue as sensitive as the role of national governments in ICANN. Dr. Milton L. Mueller Professor, School of Public Policy Georgia Institute of Technology _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…>

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