- Accountability-Cross-Community

WP1 docs coming in ~5 hrs
by Jordan Carter March 20, 2015

March 20, 2015

Hi all I am going to write a wee cover note, on my responsibility as Rapporteur, and circulate it to the list in about five hours. It will set out: - the papers to read from the Wiki (generally it'll be the current version of each paper listed in WP1 docs in the second and third tables - "POWERS" and "MECHANISMS" - that is at https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/WP1+Draft+Documents) - the process we have followed to get to this point - key points that have attracted or that deserve focused attention at Istanbul As a latish paper from me, it has no standing other than a guide to my thinking about where to go. Other WP1 members are more than welcome to share corrections or additions to it when I get it out and about. If I get time on the flight I am about to take, I will also try and do a comparative table of the mechanisms we have listed to make consideration of these easier. thanks Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter *A better world through a better Internet *

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Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for CCWG ACCT WP1 Meeting #5 18 March
by Brenda Brewer March 19, 2015

March 19, 2015

Dear All, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the WP1 Meeting #5 - 18 March will be available here: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52892452 Notes WP1 Meeting #5 18 March 2015 This call is being recorded Chat sessions are being archived and follow the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior: <http://www.icann.org/en/news/in-focus/accountability/expected-standards> http://www.icann.org/en/news/in-focus/accountability/expected-standards These high-level notes are prepared to help you navigate through content of the call and do not substitute in any way the transcript. Review of CCWG meeting and any actions arising If the various mechanisms go forward, what process is there to ensure the time to schedule implementation before the transition or before the submissions to NTIA at start of July. Substantive Content to Review: Matthew Shears: AoC incorporation: AoC incorporation: other articles on the AoC than those in the AoC reviews. Document include comments from members Asks for two new core values in the bylaws. a changed values and changes text in the bylaws AoC Para 23. Decisions made in the public interest and accountable and transparent. The intent behind the text is not explicit, Ask for a new explicit item in the bylaws to clarify this commitment. Further enhancement on consumer trust and choice. Enhanced transparency: performing impact assessments on the impact of ICANN's decisions, with a second paragraph addressing a range of transparency mechanisms. The bylaws do not commit to ICANN remaining a not for profit, the articles do but indirectly, whether there should be direct reference in the bylaws should be discussed Jurisdiction now being discussed at the CCWG level. Some of these issue will move into the amendments being proposed by WP2. Care taken not to allow the Board to use the global public interest as a way to avoid issues, or to give powers to smaller, self-interested groups. community council and powers. Proposed that it may exercise powers when petitioned by 2 or more SO/AC. 3 strawman if removing the board. Malcolm Hutty: 1. Original proposal. community my spill the board. High level of consensus needed to initiate and to execute. Spill the board as a power of last resort. 2. Same mechanism as the original proposal. Same high threshold to spill the board, but lower threshold to initiate process to consider whether to do so. To encourage the board to be more responsive to the community. 3. Different mechanism. Any SO could spill the Board by a vote of 'No Confidence' (if carried by consensus of SO). Would mean Board has to command confidence of each SO Steve DelBianco: Implementation of WS2 requirements. WS1 gave the powers to implement the mechanisms that may be more complex or longer term implementation. Full details of WS2 mechanisms will not be defined in detail ready for implementation. Some will be in a state that will allow ICANN board to commit to their implementation at the time of transition. Others will need continued community work. Keith Drazek: To prevent ICANN imposing obligations. WP1 looking at 4 factors: mission, powers, and restrictions. 5b is a restriction and a non-triggered, In this cased some contracted arrangement would seem to be a possibility, or a bylaws provision that accomplish the same thing. This is a new provision, both staff and board form imposing new obligations on contacted parties and these include obligations that flow down to registrants. These would be obligations outside of PDP or existing processes. Ed Morris: Statutory Delegates. Allows picking and choosing the powers we want. Membership scheme: standards under membership are derived from the statute, we would not be able to set thresholds for example to call for a super majority or very high standard, the standard would come from the statute. Topics for consideration by external legal advice. Jordan Carter Community council, revised adjusted the appointments section. accountability, added bullet to cover removal of a council member. What is the difference between the community council and a permanent CCWG? WP1-7b, creation of permanent CCWG. The difference is in the way in which the way in which such groups are constituted. CCWG: the powers would need to come from the bylaws, rather than an chartered organization which would not be permanent. For a CCWG, appointment would be by each chartering organizations, between 2 and 5 members. Voting arrangements would need to be considered. Concern regarding ICANN regional balance.

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Engagement request from CCWG regarding GAC decision making
by Suzanne Radell March 19, 2015

March 19, 2015

Dear Thomas, Thank you for sharing your thoughts, as well as those of some GAC members, on the issue of the CCWG’s proposed stress test related to GAC advice in your email message of March 16, 2015 to the CCWG co-chairs. As you suggested in your message, we would like to take this opportunity to share the views of the United States government (USG) with colleagues in the GAC and the CCWG on the issue. As a threshold matter, the USG considers the stress test both appropriate and necessary to meet the requirement that the IANA transition should not yield a government-led or an intergovernmental replacement for NTIA’s current stewardship role. While the GAC may not be directly involved in the IANA functions, its role within ICANN as a source of public policy advice that is taken into account by the ICANN Board is relevant to the interrelated process of improving ICANN’s accountability. Improving ICANN’s accountability includes ensuring that ICANN is not susceptible to capture or undue influence by any one party or set of stakeholders, including governments. The USG believes that the stress test developed by the CCWG, which recommends an amendment to ICANN’s Bylaws to make clear that only consensus advice triggers a Bylaw consultation, is compatible and otherwise in line with the first Accountability and Transparency Review Team’s (ATRT 1) recommendations pertaining to the GAC. More specifically, the U.S. considers the provision of consensus-based advice to be the GAC’s primary source of strength and credibility. The GAC has on occasion provided the ICANN Board with “the full range of views expressed by Members”, consistent with Principle 47 of the GAC Operating Principles. In these cases, however, the ICANN Board does not and should not be expected to defer to such views as it does to consensus-based advice. The USG believes that anything less than a consensus approach to the development of GAC public policy advice would diminish the value of GAC deliberations on the development of policy within the ICANN model. Finally, we interpret the proposed stress test as capturing this important distinction in GAC advice, with an appropriate remedy in the form of a Bylaws amendment to reinforce the ICANN community’s expectation that anything less than consensus is not advice that triggers the Bylaw provisions. Nor do we understand the stress test as in any way interfering with the GAC’s internal working methods. Best regards, Suz Suzanne Murray Radell Senior Policy Advisor, NTIA/OIA sradell(a)ntia.doc.gov 202-482-3167 -----Original Message----- From: gac-bounces(a)gac.icann.org [mailto:gac-bounces@gac.icann.org] On Behalf Of Thomas.Schneider(a)bakom.admin.ch Sent: Monday, March 16, 2015 10:57 PM To: Mathieu.Weill(a)afnic.fr; rickert(a)anwaelte.de; leonfelipe(a)sanchez.mx Cc: gac(a)icann.org; adam.peake(a)icann.org Subject: Re: [GAC] Engagement request from CCWG regarding GAC decision making Dear Co-Chairs of the CCWG Accountability, dear Thomas, Leon and Mathieu Thank you for your request for input from the GAC on the prospect of a contingency induced by a potential change in the GAC's decision making procedures. And thank you all for the good exchange we had on the phone last week. Given the short time available, it has not been possible to undertake broad consultations with the whole GAC about this issue. In this situation, I can only give you some feedback based on my own experience as well as exchanges I had with some GAC members in the past days. I hope you will get more feedback from GAC members and observers before, during and after the f2f meeting of the CCWG in Istanbul next week. First of all, I - like many of my colleagues - do not really see a contingency related to the GAC as a body with regard to the CCWG's Work Stream 1 (accountability related to the IANA functions). As we do not recall the GAC having had an role in the IANA stewardship function so far and as one of the conditions put forward by the NTIA is that no other single country or intergovernmental body should take over the IANA stewardship role, it is difficult to see why the GAC's operating principles should have an effect on the IANA stewardship function at all. With regard to the overall accountability of ICANN (WS2), the GAC may indeed have a role in contributing to enhancing ICANN's accountability and to the organisations' checks and balances in the future. However, it should be noted that - unlike the GNSO or the ccNSO - the GAC does not develop or decide about policies, but is - in its role as advisory body of the ICANN board - giving advice to the board on public policy matters. The board can either ask the GAC for advice on an issue or the GAC can advise the board on its own initiative. In both cases, according to the current bylaws, the board is only asked to take GAC advice "duly into account", but is not obliged to follow GAC advice. In case the board decides not to follow GAC advice, the board shall inform the GAC about its reasons for not doing so and will try to find a mutually acceptable solution. If no such solution is found, the board is still free to take its decision without the GAC as a committee having any means to force the board to follow its advice. It is then up to individual GAC members to act according to their "rights and obligations ... with regard to public policy issues falling within their responsibilities". According to its operating principles, the GAC works on "the basis of seeking consensus among its membership". Where consensus is not possible, the chair shall "convey the full range of views expressed by members" to the ICANN board. So, under the current operating principles, the GAC may address advice to the board which is either informing the board about a GAC consensus or about the existence of diverse views among its membership on an issue. Again, the board should then take this advice "duly into account". In the past, there have been several examples where there has been a diversity of views among GAC members on an issue which have been communicated to the board. In the current operating principles, it is not specified how - in the case of diverse views in the GAC on an issue - this diversity should be communicated to the board. In the attempt to enhance accountability of ICANN's processes as well as the accountability of governments to their citizens and the global community, but also to improve ICANN's checks and balances and to avoid any risk of capture by an individual or a small group of governments, it may be useful to enhance transparency about the range and spread of diversity of views among GAC members, so that - before taking a decision - the board is best informed about this diversity and also the whole community is able to see on what basis GAC advice is formulated and that it is able to assess to what extent such advice has been "duly taken into account". I am happy to discuss with you how the GAC can help to contribute to enhancing ICANN's accountability and I am sure that other GAC members (and observers) will contribute to this deliberations as well. I am looking forward to a fruitful and constructive discussion in Istanbul Best regards Thomas Thomas Schneider chair of the GAC -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: Mathieu Weill [mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr] Gesendet: Donnerstag, 5. März 2015 17:43 An: Olga Cavalli; Suzanne Radell; Julia Katja Wolman; brumark(a)telia.com; alice(a)apc.org; Schneider Thomas BAKOM Cc: León Felipe Sánchez Ambía; Thomas Rickert; Adam Peake Betreff: Engagement request from CCWG regarding GAC decision making Dear GAC members of the CCWG Accountability, Dear Thomas, [Cc: CCWG Co-chairs] As you are aware, the CCWG Accountability has identified a number of contingencies and is applying stress tests to its proposals to check how they would mitigate them. Consistent with the principle set out by the NTIA that the transition proposals should not replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution, one of the identified contingency is currently defined as such : Governments in ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee (GAC) amend their operating procedures to change from consensus decisions to majority voting for advice to ICANN’s board. Consequence: Under current bylaws, ICANN must consider and respond to GAC advice, even if that advice were not supported by consensus. [...] While investigating whether the measures currently proposed by the CCWG would provide adequate mitigation, concerns were raised that, despite the ability for the community to veto a Board decision, changes in the GAC decision making rules might infringe on the principle set out by the NTIA. It was proposed within the CCWG that a mitigating measure might be to amend Icann Bylaws so that the provision of article XI 2.1.j of the Bylaws (duly taking into account GAC Advice) would only apply to consensus advice (see current proposal here : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/Accountability%20…) Some similarity could be drawn out from the gNSO policy recommendations Bylaw provisions (Annex A, 9.a) where supermajority votes from the gNSO can only be vetoed by the Board if there is a 2/3 majority to do so. We are aware of the high sensitivity of this question within the GAC as well as with the community. The GAC is also one of the chartering organizations of the CCWG Accountability. Therefore our group wishes to engage with the GAC to identify how we can meet both the NTIA requirements and a solution that is consistent with the GAC expectations. Ideally, we would welcome inputs via GAC appointed members to the CCWG and/or specific discussions between ourselves. Best regards, Thomas Rickert, Leon Felipe Sanchez, Mathieu Weill Co-chairs, CCWG Accountability _______________________________________________ gac mailing list gac(a)gac.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gac

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Fwd: AW: Engagement request from CCWG regarding GAC decision making
by Mathieu Weill March 19, 2015

March 19, 2015

Dear Colleagues, Please find below a response to our request by Thomas Schneider, Chair of the GAC, relating to our stress test #14 (amendment of GAC's operating procedures). Please note that this response is based on his own experience as well as exchanges with some GAC members. I suggest we discuss this in our call later today when we come to the WP-ST update. Best, Mathieu -------- Message transféré -------- Sujet : AW: Engagement request from CCWG regarding GAC decision making Date : Tue, 17 Mar 2015 02:56:55 +0000 De : Thomas.Schneider(a)bakom.admin.ch Pour : Mathieu.Weill(a)afnic.fr, rickert(a)anwaelte.de, leonfelipe(a)sanchez.mx Copie à : adam.peake(a)icann.org, gac(a)icann.org Dear Co-Chairs of the CCWG Accountability, dear Thomas, Leon and Mathieu Thank you for your request for input from the GAC on the prospect of a contingency induced by a potential change in the GAC's decision making procedures. And thank you all for the good exchange we had on the phone last week. Given the short time available, it has not been possible to undertake broad consultations with the whole GAC about this issue. In this situation, I can only give you some feedback based on my own experience as well as exchanges I had with some GAC members in the past days. I hope you will get more feedback from GAC members and observers before, during and after the f2f meeting of the CCWG in Istanbul next week. First of all, I - like many of my colleagues - do not really see a contingency related to the GAC as a body with regard to the CCWG's Work Stream 1 (accountability related to the IANA functions). As we do not recall the GAC having had an role in the IANA stewardship function so far and as one of the conditions put forward by the NTIA is that no other single country or intergovernmental body should take over the IANA stewardship role, it is difficult to see why the GAC's operating principles should have an effect on the IANA stewardship function at all. With regard to the overall accountability of ICANN (WS2), the GAC may indeed have a role in contributing to enhancing ICANN's accountability and to the organisations' checks and balances in the future. However, it should be noted that - unlike the GNSO or the ccNSO - the GAC does not develop or decide about policies, but is - in its role as advisory body of the ICANN board - giving advice to the board on public policy matters. The board can either ask the GAC for advice on an issue or the GAC can advise the board on its own initiative. In both cases, according to the current bylaws, the board is only asked to take GAC advice "duly into account", but is not obliged to follow GAC advice. In case the board decides not to follow GAC advice, the board shall inform the GAC about its reasons for not doing so and will try to find a mutually acceptable solution. If no such solution is found, the board is still free to take its decision without the GAC as a committee having any means to force the board to follow its advice. It is then up to individual GAC members to act according to their "rights and obligations ... with regard to public policy issues falling within their responsibilities". According to its operating principles, the GAC works on "the basis of seeking consensus among its membership". Where consensus is not possible, the chair shall "convey the full range of views expressed by members" to the ICANN board. So, under the current operating principles, the GAC may address advice to the board which is either informing the board about a GAC consensus or about the existence of diverse views among its membership on an issue. Again, the board should then take this advice "duly into account". In the past, there have been several examples where there has been a diversity of views among GAC members on an issue which have been communicated to the board. In the current operating principles, it is not specified how - in the case of diverse views in the GAC on an issue - this diversity should be communicated to the board. In the attempt to enhance accountability of ICANN's processes as well as the accountability of governments to their citizens and the global community, but also to improve ICANN's checks and balances and to avoid any risk of capture by an individual or a small group of governments, it may be useful to enhance transparency about the range and spread of diversity of views among GAC members, so that - before taking a decision - the board is best informed about this diversity and also the whole community is able to see on what basis GAC advice is formulated and that it is able to assess to what extent such advice has been "duly taken into account". I am happy to discuss with you how the GAC can help to contribute to enhancing ICANN's accountability and I am sure that other GAC members (and observers) will contribute to this deliberations as well. I am looking forward to a fruitful and constructive discussion in Istanbul Best regards Thomas Thomas Schneider chair of the GAC -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: Mathieu Weill [mailto:mathieu.weill@afnic.fr] Gesendet: Donnerstag, 5. März 2015 17:43 An: Olga Cavalli; Suzanne Radell; Julia Katja Wolman; brumark(a)telia.com; alice(a)apc.org; Schneider Thomas BAKOM Cc: León Felipe Sánchez Ambía; Thomas Rickert; Adam Peake Betreff: Engagement request from CCWG regarding GAC decision making Dear GAC members of the CCWG Accountability, Dear Thomas, [Cc: CCWG Co-chairs] As you are aware, the CCWG Accountability has identified a number of contingencies and is applying stress tests to its proposals to check how they would mitigate them. Consistent with the principle set out by the NTIA that the transition proposals should not replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution, one of the identified contingency is currently defined as such : Governments in ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee (GAC) amend their operating procedures to change from consensus decisions to majority voting for advice to ICANN’s board. Consequence: Under current bylaws, ICANN must consider and respond to GAC advice, even if that advice were not supported by consensus. [...] While investigating whether the measures currently proposed by the CCWG would provide adequate mitigation, concerns were raised that, despite the ability for the community to veto a Board decision, changes in the GAC decision making rules might infringe on the principle set out by the NTIA. It was proposed within the CCWG that a mitigating measure might be to amend Icann Bylaws so that the provision of article XI 2.1.j of the Bylaws (duly taking into account GAC Advice) would only apply to consensus advice (see current proposal here : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52888421/Accountability%20…) Some similarity could be drawn out from the gNSO policy recommendations Bylaw provisions (Annex A, 9.a) where supermajority votes from the gNSO can only be vetoed by the Board if there is a 2/3 majority to do so. We are aware of the high sensitivity of this question within the GAC as well as with the community. The GAC is also one of the chartering organizations of the CCWG Accountability. Therefore our group wishes to engage with the GAC to identify how we can meet both the NTIA requirements and a solution that is consistent with the GAC expectations. Ideally, we would welcome inputs via GAC appointed members to the CCWG and/or specific discussions between ourselves. Best regards, Thomas Rickert, Leon Felipe Sanchez, Mathieu Weill Co-chairs, CCWG Accountability

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Fwd: [client com] FW: Preparation for Istanbul -- Sidley Response to Questions in Legal Scoping Document
by León Felipe Sánchez Ambía March 19, 2015

March 19, 2015

Dear all, I am forwarding this information from the CWG list as it may contain important information for our work too. Best regards, León Enviado desde mi iPhone Inicio del mensaje reenviado: > De: "Jonathan Robinson" <jrobinson(a)afilias.info> > Fecha: 19 de marzo de 2015, 3:24:34 AM CST > Para: "'Client'" <cwg-client(a)icann.org> > Asunto: [client com] FW: Preparation for Istanbul -- Sidley Response to Questions in Legal Scoping Document > Responder a: jrobinson(a)afilias.info > > All, > > Please see attached for Sidley preliminary draft response which we will pick up with them in the Client Committee meeting today @ 14:00 UTC and thereafter of course in Istanbul. > > Jonathan > > From: Hofheimer, Joshua T. [mailto:jhofheimer@sidley.com] > Sent: 19 March 2015 05:45 > To: 'Jonathan Robinson'; Greg Shatan; Lise Fuhr; Maarten Simon > Subject: Preparation for Istanbul -- Sidley Response to Questions in Legal Scoping Document > > Jonathan, Lise, Maarten and Greg, > > Attached please find Sidley’s preliminary draft response to the CWG Scoping Document Legal Questions. Please note that this is our initial response to the questions, is based on our investigation and diligence to date, and was prepared under tight time constraints so as to be ready for the Istanbul meetings. We tried to follow your questions to the extent possible, but the amount of time or length of response given to a particular topic should not be inferred to represent any endorsement or preference. Rather, this should be viewed as a work in progress that will undergo continued iterations as we gain a deeper understanding of the issues, challenges and priorities presented by the transition. > > We look forward to your feedback and review. Please feel free to forward this document as appropriate. > > Cheers, > Josh > > JOSHUA HOFHEIMER > Partner > Sidley Austin LLP > +1.213.896.6061 (LA direct) > +1.650.565.7561 (PA direct) > +1.323.708.2405 (cell) > jhofheimer(a)sidley.com > www.sidley.com > SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP > > > _______________________________________________ > Cwg-client mailing list > Cwg-client(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client

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Agenda for WP1 meeting #5 - 18 March 2015, 21-23h UTC
by Jordan Carter March 18, 2015

March 18, 2015

Hi all Here is proposed agenda: *1. Review of Agenda* *2. Review of CCWG meeting and any actions arising* *3. Substantive Content to Review:* Note our *progress/status chart* is at https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1DaROrG8fIGVEdwuBv-GBKP3cG8UJGQUPKjF… Note also that *content* should all be available on the Wiki at https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/WP1+Draft+Documents *Powers matters:* - AOC incorporation - Matthew Shears (as just circulated by me) - Removing ICANN Board - Malcolm Hutty (see his previously circulated amendment to Removal of Board template) - Updates on any missing ones as per the chart *Mechanisms matters:* - A - Existing SO/AC structures - Jordan - B - Permanent CCWG - Jordan - C - Statutory Delegates - Edward - D - Statutory Members - Edward - G - Community Council - Jordan *4. Our meeting Sunday 22 March 17:30-1900 local time in Istanbul* *5. Any Other Business* best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter *A better world through a better Internet *

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decision making by the community - tool to play with
by Thomas Rickert March 18, 2015

March 18, 2015

All, the composition of the community council (or whatever we might ultimately call it) is still unclear. Open issues - amongst others - are: - voting vs consensus calls - mandated voting vs non-mandated voting - number of representatives from SOs/ACs - voting thresholds - weighting of votes … As indicated during the call yesterday, we have been working with Berry on a spreadsheet, which you find attached to this e-mail and which allows you to test different scenarios. You can enter the number of representatives per group and their voting behavior and then see how that impacts the outcome of decisions for different voting thresholds. We do know that this is not the silver bullet solution, but it helps to better understand the impact of different approaches. We hope you find this helpful and encourage you to come up with concrete suggestions for the composition of the "community council“. Kind regards, Thomas

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Reconsideration Sub-Group of the CCWG Work Party 2 Review and Redress
by Robin Gross March 18, 2015

March 18, 2015

Hello, This email is to kick-off the discussion for the Reconsideration Sub-Group of the CCWG Work Party 2 Review and Redress Mechanisms. Volunteers so far: Robin Gross, Ed Morris, Chris LaHatte, David McAuley, Carlos Gutierrez (please send a note to <alice.jansen(a)icann.org> to volunteer for this sub-group). This WP2 sub-group should will look specifically at issues to be addressed with respect to improving ICANN's accountability mechanisms involving a reconsideration process of a board or management decision. Specific Task: To review the current rules under which reconsideration occurs, and to propose appropriate changes to those rules to create adequate accountability. Existing "Reconsideration Request" accountability mechanism: See ICANN Bylaws Art. IV, Sec. 2) Board reconsideration of: - One or more staff actions or inactions that contradict established ICANN policy(ies); or - One or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that have been taken or refused to be taken without consideration of material information, except where the party submitting the request could have submitted, but did not submit, the information for the Board's consideration at the time of action or refusal to act; or - One or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that are taken as a result of the Board's reliance on false or inaccurate material information. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Suggestions for Change/Enhancement ICANN's Reconsideration Processes: 1. Mechanism for review of Board or management action in conflict with ICANN Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation. 2. Mechanism to require community (members, AC/SOs, etc.) to require Board to act on, implement, amend, accelerate implementation of, a previously approved ATRT recommendation. 3. Change bylaws for Reconsideration Process: trigger when board acts arbitrarily or capriciously; decisions subject to Independent Review. 4. Reconsideration of staff action/inaction. 5. Broadly expand grounds on which ICANN decisions and operations can be challenged; lower threshold to succeed in a challenge. 6. Reasonable time deadlines and other due process considerations. What else? ------------------ Proposal to address implementation and operational issues including: · Standing · Standard of review · Composition · Selection · Decision-making · Accessibility * Implementation * Due process Work Party 2 Reconsideration mailing list – wp2-reconsideration(a)icann.org – is now active. Public archives may be found at: http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/wp2-reconsideration/ May this sub-group please have a wiki page? Thank you. Please volunteer for this sub-group - especially if you have any experience with ICANN's reconsideration process. Thanks, Robin

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Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for Accountability STRESS TESTS SubTeam - 18 March
by Brenda Brewer March 18, 2015

March 18, 2015

Dear all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the CCWG Accountability STRESS TESTS SubTeam call on 18 March will be available here: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52892161 Action Items ACTION ITEM: Eberhard to circulate a draft on stress test #21 by COB Thursday ACTION ITEM - Steve to split 3 and 4 ACTION ITEM - Steve to check what RZM process is if court order. ACTION ITEM - Sam to refocus problem statement for stress test #19 and refine language by COB Thursday ACTION ITEM: Rephrase stress test #20 ACTION ITEM - Evaluate SO/AC/SGs accountability mechanisms to guard against capture - Add quorum and accountability mechanisms to avoid capture ACTION ITEM - Clarify stress test #23 language (PDP and implementation requirements, anyone can participate in PDP and public comment process, public comment periods on contracting requirements) Notes ST-WP - Call # 2 - 18 March 2015 ST-WP Wiki Page <https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/ST-WP+Draft+Documents> https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/ST-WP+Draft+Documents - ACTION ITEM: Eberhard to circulate a draft on stress test #21 by COB Thursday - ST-WP breakfast meeting on Monday, 23 March at 7:30 Stress test # 3 & 4 - Suggestion to split stress test into two rather than combined (refer to Sam Eisner comment) ACTION ITEM - Steve to split 3 and 4 Stress test #19 Designed to surface role of root zone maintainer (publishing function). Injunction is what would happen in this scenario. If that happens, the community could hold Board and management accountable to execute community approved policy. There is no immunity that goes to the root zone maintainer by virtue of IANA functions contract. Issue being posed is what is the root zone maintainer supposed to do if receives verification to publish root but then competing court order that objects to publication. Ingenuity clause? Can the community find a way to hold Board and management accountable to implementing community-developed policy. Whether or not the root zone maintainer has immunity or not does not change what the stress test is supposed to be about. This stress test could also be compliance driven. Raises issue of foreign jurisdiction and impact on this. ACTION ITEM - Steve to check what RZM process is if court order. Would ICANN be engaged in process to enforce views? What would ICANN's reaction be? What could the community do to influence this reaction? ACTION ITEM - Sam to refocus problem statement for stress test #19 and refine language by COB Thursday Stress Test #20 How can community assert its views - relates to #19 (court order etc). Community should be empowered to ask ICANN to litigate and execute policies - Is it the right accountability mechanism? What if community asks ICANN to litigate but no basis to litigate? Insurability issue - health of organization - business integrity should be considered. Whether or not there may need to be any limits, conditions for this accountability measures may be a question for legal experts. ACTION ITEM: Rephrase stress test #20 Stress test # 10 & # 24 Tied to "golden bylaw" (mission creep). No feedback. Stress Test #12 Tied to supermajority to avoid capture. Look holistically at capture or undue influence. Standing CCWG e.g.: what protections are we building into that to make sure no entity can influence across stakeholder groups? What are the mechanisms in SO/ACs, what mechanisms of responsibility/accountability are there across structures within organization to have protection against capture? Do these need to be checked and reinforced? There is a broader issue. Evaluate In addition to super majority, what constitutes adequate quorum mechanisms within SO/ACs comprising community to guard against capture. ACTION ITEM - Evaluate SO/AC/SGs accountability mechanisms to guard against capture - Add quorum and accountability mechanisms to avoid capture Stress Test #13 How do we prevent purposeful paralysis of ICANN (review redress mechanisms)? We set objective to have review redress more accessible, affordable etc. should the affordability and accessibility be restricted to community? Stress test #16 No feedback. Stress test #18 Relates to government capture. Stress test should stand but further dialogue needed with the GAC. Stress test #22 No feedback. Stress test #23 ACTION ITEM - Clarify stress test #23 language (PDP and implementation requirements, anyone can participate in PDP and public comment process, public comment periods on contracting requirements) Stress test #14 No feedback. Stress test #15 No feedback. Stress test #25 Relates to CWG and ICG. No feedback. V8 will be circulated on Friday (doc, pdf, redline)

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Topics that need to be addressed in Istanbul
by Mathieu Weill March 18, 2015

March 18, 2015

Dear Colleagues, As discussed yesterday during the call, we are actively building an agenda for the Istanbul meeting. The working parties deliverables we discussed yesterday (community powers and mechanisms, independent panel, AoC incorporation, mission & value statement) will certainly take most of our time. We have however identified the need to discuss other questions. Mentioned in the call yesterday were : - (realistic) timeline and next steps for our group - jurisdiction related issues Please consider this email as the "last call" for any important issue or topic you believe our meeting in Istanbul should address. It would of course be much appreciated if you could outline why you think this issue if of particular importance at this point of our work. Thanks for your prompt reply, in any case before the March 20th deadline. Best, -- ***************************** Mathieu WEILL AFNIC - directeur général Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06 mathieu.weill(a)afnic.fr Twitter : @mathieuweill *****************************

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