November 2015 - Bc-gnso - lists.icann.org

FILED: BC comment on Prelim Issue Report for PDP to review all RPMs
by Steve DelBianco 30 Nov '15

30 Nov '15

Attached and here<http://www.bizconst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/BC-comment-on-Prelim-Iss…> are the comments we just filed on the Preliminary Issue Report on a GNSO Policy Development Process to Review All Rights Protection Mechanisms in All gTLDs. We are grateful to Phil Corwin for doing an initial draft and for accommodating sections and suggestions by others, incl. Mahmoud Lattouf, Chris Wilson, Jay Chapman, Cecilia Smith, and Denise Michel. This comment has very specific suggestions, drawing upon the BC’s prior work and continued concern about protecting businesses and their customers from fraud and abuse enabled by the DNS. We will have opportunities to build on this excellent work as this PDP moves to the next stage. —Steve

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FILED: BC comment on Procedure for Whois Conflicts With Privacy Law
by Steve DelBianco 17 Nov '15

17 Nov '15

Today we filed our comment on the IAG Initial Report and Proposed Revisions to the ICANN Procedure for Whois Conflicts With Privacy Law. (link<http://www.bizconst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/BC-Comment-on-WHOIS-conf…> and attached) Thanks to Cheryl Miller and Ellen Blackler for drafting. And thanks to Marie Pattullo and Denise Michel for edits. This was approved in accordance with our charter.

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RE: [bc-gnso] Re: CCWG-Accountability Issues Formal Update on Progress Made In and After ICANN54 in Dublin
by Phil Corwin 16 Nov '15

16 Nov '15

I agree. It's a disservice to the general public to stick to what is effectively a 21-day comment periods if the GNSO and other Chartering Organizations are unlikely to take final positions until sometime in January at the earliest. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey ________________________________ From: owner-bc-gnso(a)icann.org [owner-bc-gnso(a)icann.org] on behalf of Denise Michel [denisemichel(a)fb.com] Sent: Monday, November 16, 2015 4:37 PM To: BC List Subject: Re: [bc-gnso] Re: CCWG-Accountability Issues Formal Update on Progress Made In and After ICANN54 in Dublin We support modestly extending the entire comment process (see my Nov. 11 email, inserted below), and if there's broad support for this, we think it should be "officially" communicated as a request to the CCWG. Changing the public schedule at this point would be preferable to leaving the short public comment period in place and having S0s/ACs act when they act. Thanks. Denise Denise Michel Domain Name System Strategy & Management Facebook denisemichel(a)fb.com<mailto:denisemichel@fb.com> (650) 785-6597 From: Denise Michel <denisemichel(a)fb.com<mailto:denisemichel@fb.com>> Date: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 at 3:12 PM To: Phil Corwin <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>>, "bc-private icann.org (bc-private(a)icann.org<mailto:bc-private@icann.org>)" <bc-private(a)icann.org<mailto:bc-private@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [Bc-private] FW: [CCWG-ACCT] Public Comment Timeline Concerns -- RE: CCWG - Executive Summary Thank you for sharing this, Phil. Susan and I agree with your position. The schedule does not leave enough time for BC>CSG/NCPH>Council analysis, public comment consideration, discussion and consensus building on the details of this critical proposal. In addition to unduly rushing substantive community review, I'm concerned that the schedule also leaves ICANN vulnerable to charges of skirting the bottom-up process and accountability commitments. I think it would be ideal if the GNSO Council communicated the need for an extension to the CCWG-Accountability co-Chairs (and cc'd the Board and other SOs & ACs). Absent that, perhaps a NCPH or CSG request could be issued? From: <owner-bc-gnso(a)icann.org<mailto:owner-bc-gnso@icann.org>> on behalf of Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco(a)netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> Date: Monday, November 16, 2015 at 12:56 PM To: Phil Corwin <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>>, BC List <bc-gnso(a)icann.org<mailto:bc-gnso@icann.org>> Subject: [bc-gnso] Re: CCWG-Accountability Issues Formal Update on Progress Made In and After ICANN54 in Dublin The CCWG co-chairs are still planning to end the “public comment" period 21-Dec. But the 6 Chartering Organizations have to get their resolution(s) on each/all of the CCWG recommendations. Some chartering Orgs (like GNSO) are probably not going to approve resolutions by 21-Dec. During public comment period, the BC would be drafting text for our Councilors to submit to GNSO Council for its resolution(s). The BC could also submit a written comment based on that same text. But what really matters is approval of the Chartering Orgs. We cannot force GAC, GNSO, ccNSO to approve complex resolutions if their schedule of calls and procedures needs more time. I have just re-iterated this to CCWG co-chairs today. We should bring it up again on the CCWG call tomorrow. —Steve From: Phil Corwin <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>> Date: Monday, November 16, 2015 at 3:15 PM To: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco(a)netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>>, BC List <bc-gnso(a)icann.org<mailto:bc-gnso@icann.org>> Subject: RE: CCWG-Accountability Issues Formal Update on Progress Made In and After ICANN54 in Dublin Steve: I have expressed my concerns on the CCWG and Council lists, as have others, that starting the public comment period from the issuance of this Update (downgraded from the previously promised Executive Summary) is unwise, and that it should start running from November 30 assuming that the 3rd draft Proposal is issued then. Therefore, the comment period ending on December 21 is insufficient at only 21 days -- I have expressed my view that it should run until at least December 30, and others want it to go until Friday. January 8th. We are not talking about a big delay here but from 9 to 18 additional days to review and comment upon the details of a major revision in approach toward accountability. I'd welcome your thoughts and those of other BC members, as Council may be weighing in on this as well. best, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey ________________________________ From:owner-bc-gnso@icann.org<mailto:owner-bc-gnso@icann.org> [owner-bc-gnso(a)icann.org<mailto:owner-bc-gnso@icann.org>] on behalf of Steve DelBianco [sdelbianco(a)netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>] Sent: Monday, November 16, 2015 1:57 AM To: BC List Subject: [bc-gnso] CCWG-Accountability Issues Formal Update on Progress Made In and After ICANN54 in Dublin CCWG today published an overview of where our accountability proposal has been adjusted since the Dublin meeting. See Link<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.icann.org_news_blo…> and below for explanation. Attached is the brief (relatively speaking) document, at just 36 pages! —Steve CCWG-Accountability Issues Formal Update on Progress Made In and After ICANN54 in Dublin This is a brief and preliminary overview of the proposal for improving ICANN's accountability developed by the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) over the past year. It includes a very high-level summary of the main changes being proposed by the community and outlines what will be described in the full proposal. This 36-page document is designed to update the community on recent progress in and after ICANN54 in Dublin and raise awareness of the proposed enhancements to ICANN's accountability as a more detailed proposal is finalized. While this formal update reflects the current consensus positions of the group, there are outstanding elements that remain to be finalized. These finishing details are highlighted in the document, and will be confirmed and detailed in the Third Draft Proposal. Download the Formal Update here.<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.icann.org_en_syste…> The full Third Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations will be shared with the public on 30 November 2015, which will include further explanation and detail about the accountability improvements outlined in this document. It will also explain why the changes have been suggested, how the community arrived at these recommendations and the options considered and ultimately rejected in development of the proposal. We welcome feedback on this document, and encourage all interested stakeholders to view the full proposal for any outstanding questions or concerns. Summary ________________________________ Over the last year, a working group of ICANN community members has been developing a set of proposed enhancements to ICANN's accountability to the global Internet community. This effort is integral to the transition of the United States' stewardship of the IANA functions to the global Internet community, reflecting the ICANN community's conclusion that improvements to ICANN's accountability were necessary in the absence of the accountability backstop that the historical contractual relationship with the United States government provided. The accountability improvements set out in this document are not designed to change ICANN's multistakeholder model, the bottom-up nature of policy development nor significantly alter ICANN's day-to-day operations. The main elements of the proposal are outlined below. Together with ICANN's existing structures and groups, these accountability enhancements will ensure ICANN remains accountable to the global Internet community. * A revised Mission statement for the ICANN Bylaws that sets out what ICANN does. This Mission statement clarifies but does not change ICANN's historic mission * An enhanced Independent Review Process and redress process with a broader scope and the power to ensure ICANN stays within its revised Mission * New specific powers for the ICANN community that can be enforced when the usual methods of discussion and dialogue have not effectively built consensus including the powers to: * Reject ICANN Budgets, Operating Plans or Strategic Plans * Reject changes to ICANN's Bylaws * Approve changes to new Fundamental Bylaws (see below) * Remove an individual ICANN Director from the Board * Recall the entire ICANN Board * An additional new power that gives the community a say in decisions about the IANA Function Reviews and any separation of the IANA Names Functions * All of these community powers can only be exercised after extensive community discussions and debates through processes of engagement and escalation. The process of escalation provides many opportunities for the resolution of disagreements between the parties before formal action is required. The accountability elements outlined above will be supported through: * Additions to the ICANN Bylaws to create an Empowered Community that is based on a simple legal vehicle that will act on the instructions of ICANN stakeholder groups to exercise the Community Powers. The Empowered Community is granted the status of a Designator (a recognized role in law) and has the standing to enforce the Community Powers if needed. * Core elements of ICANN's governing documents (the Articles and Bylaws) being categorized asFundamental Bylaws that can only be changed with agreement between the ICANN community and the ICANN Board. In addition, further proposed changes include: * A recognition of ICANN's respect for Human Rights * Incorporation of ICANN's commitments under the 2009 Affirmation of Commitments with the United States Department of Commerce into the Bylaws, where appropriate * Improved accountability and diversity for ICANN's Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees * A commitment to discuss additional accountability improvements and broader accountability enhancements in 2016, following implementation of this core set of accountability improvements To develop these recommendations to improve ICANN's accountability, the Working Group: * Relied on suggestions and proposals generated inside the Working Group and by the broader Internet multistakeholder community * Conducted public comment periods to gather feedback on earlier drafts and discussed iterations of its recommendations across the world at ICANN meetings and through online webinars * Rigorously "stress tested" ICANN's current and proposed accountability mechanisms to test their strength against problematic scenarios the organization could potentially face * Engaged two external law firms to ensure the legal reliability of the proposed accountability enhancements * Made the minimum enhancements to ICANN's accountability necessary to meet the baseline requirements of the community, as required for the IANA Stewardship Transition * Met the requirements of the group that developed the IANA Stewardship Transition proposal for the Domain Names community * Met the requirements of the U.S. National Telecommunications and Information Agency for theIANA Stewardship Transition We look forward to your thoughts and feedback on our Third Draft Proposal on Enhancing ICANN Accountability. ________________________________ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=CwMGaQ&c=…> Version: 2015.0.6140 / Virus Database: 4450/10889 - Release Date: 10/25/15 Internal Virus Database is out of date. ________________________________ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com<http://www.avg.com> Version: 2015.0.6140 / Virus Database: 4450/10889 - Release Date: 10/25/15 Internal Virus Database is out of date.

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CCWG-Accountability Issues Formal Update on Progress Made In and After ICANN54 in Dublin
by Steve DelBianco 16 Nov '15

16 Nov '15

CCWG today published an overview of where our accountability proposal has been adjusted since the Dublin meeting. See Link<https://www.icann.org/news/blog/ccwg-accountability-issues-formal-update-on…> and below for explanation. Attached is the brief (relatively speaking) document, at just 36 pages! —Steve CCWG-Accountability Issues Formal Update on Progress Made In and After ICANN54 in Dublin This is a brief and preliminary overview of the proposal for improving ICANN's accountability developed by the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) over the past year. It includes a very high-level summary of the main changes being proposed by the community and outlines what will be described in the full proposal. This 36-page document is designed to update the community on recent progress in and after ICANN54 in Dublin and raise awareness of the proposed enhancements to ICANN's accountability as a more detailed proposal is finalized. While this formal update reflects the current consensus positions of the group, there are outstanding elements that remain to be finalized. These finishing details are highlighted in the document, and will be confirmed and detailed in the Third Draft Proposal. Download the Formal Update here.<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cwg-draft-2-proposal-work-strea…> The full Third Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations will be shared with the public on 30 November 2015, which will include further explanation and detail about the accountability improvements outlined in this document. It will also explain why the changes have been suggested, how the community arrived at these recommendations and the options considered and ultimately rejected in development of the proposal. We welcome feedback on this document, and encourage all interested stakeholders to view the full proposal for any outstanding questions or concerns. Summary ________________________________ Over the last year, a working group of ICANN community members has been developing a set of proposed enhancements to ICANN's accountability to the global Internet community. This effort is integral to the transition of the United States' stewardship of the IANA functions to the global Internet community, reflecting the ICANN community's conclusion that improvements to ICANN's accountability were necessary in the absence of the accountability backstop that the historical contractual relationship with the United States government provided. The accountability improvements set out in this document are not designed to change ICANN's multistakeholder model, the bottom-up nature of policy development nor significantly alter ICANN's day-to-day operations. The main elements of the proposal are outlined below. Together with ICANN's existing structures and groups, these accountability enhancements will ensure ICANN remains accountable to the global Internet community. * A revised Mission statement for the ICANN Bylaws that sets out what ICANN does. This Mission statement clarifies but does not change ICANN's historic mission * An enhanced Independent Review Process and redress process with a broader scope and the power to ensure ICANN stays within its revised Mission * New specific powers for the ICANN community that can be enforced when the usual methods of discussion and dialogue have not effectively built consensus including the powers to: * Reject ICANN Budgets, Operating Plans or Strategic Plans * Reject changes to ICANN's Bylaws * Approve changes to new Fundamental Bylaws (see below) * Remove an individual ICANN Director from the Board * Recall the entire ICANN Board * An additional new power that gives the community a say in decisions about the IANA Function Reviews and any separation of the IANA Names Functions * All of these community powers can only be exercised after extensive community discussions and debates through processes of engagement and escalation. The process of escalation provides many opportunities for the resolution of disagreements between the parties before formal action is required. The accountability elements outlined above will be supported through: * Additions to the ICANN Bylaws to create an Empowered Community that is based on a simple legal vehicle that will act on the instructions of ICANN stakeholder groups to exercise the Community Powers. The Empowered Community is granted the status of a Designator (a recognized role in law) and has the standing to enforce the Community Powers if needed. * Core elements of ICANN's governing documents (the Articles and Bylaws) being categorized asFundamental Bylaws that can only be changed with agreement between the ICANN community and the ICANN Board. In addition, further proposed changes include: * A recognition of ICANN's respect for Human Rights * Incorporation of ICANN's commitments under the 2009 Affirmation of Commitments with the United States Department of Commerce into the Bylaws, where appropriate * Improved accountability and diversity for ICANN's Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees * A commitment to discuss additional accountability improvements and broader accountability enhancements in 2016, following implementation of this core set of accountability improvements To develop these recommendations to improve ICANN's accountability, the Working Group: * Relied on suggestions and proposals generated inside the Working Group and by the broader Internet multistakeholder community * Conducted public comment periods to gather feedback on earlier drafts and discussed iterations of its recommendations across the world at ICANN meetings and through online webinars * Rigorously "stress tested" ICANN's current and proposed accountability mechanisms to test their strength against problematic scenarios the organization could potentially face * Engaged two external law firms to ensure the legal reliability of the proposed accountability enhancements * Made the minimum enhancements to ICANN's accountability necessary to meet the baseline requirements of the community, as required for the IANA Stewardship Transition * Met the requirements of the group that developed the IANA Stewardship Transition proposal for the Domain Names community * Met the requirements of the U.S. National Telecommunications and Information Agency for theIANA Stewardship Transition We look forward to your thoughts and feedback on our Third Draft Proposal on Enhancing ICANN Accountability.

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FILED: comment on New gTLD Auction Proceeds Discussion Paper
by Steve DelBianco 09 Nov '15

09 Nov '15

Over the weekend the BC filed the attached comment on ICANN’s New gTLD Auction Proceeds Discussion Paper. Thanks to drafters Phil Corwin and Angie Graves, and with edits by Aparna Sridhar

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FILED: BC comment on Phase 1 Assessment of Competitive Effects of the new gTLD Program
by Steve DelBianco 07 Nov '15

07 Nov '15

Thanks to Chris Wilson and Cecilia Smith for drafting our comment on Phase 1 Assessment of the Competitive Effects Associated with the new gTLD Program (attached and below) The Business Constituency (BC) appreciates the opportunity to comment on Phase 1 Assessment of the Competitive Effects Associated with the new gTLD Program. Background: The “Phase 1 Assessment” of the Competitive Effects Associated with the new gTLD Program establishes the baseline of the marketplace for domain names both prior to and the initial months following the New gTLD Program. A subsequent “Phase 2 Assessment” will assess the extent to which the New gTLD Program has affected competition in the marketplace in the coming year. In the Phase 1 Assessment Report, pricing and registration volume data from a sample of legacy gTLDs, new gTLDs and ccTLDs were considered in this report. The report includes several major analyses of pricing, including in the wholesale and retail markets, as well as Sunrise period pricing. On average, the wholesale price of a new gTLDs is higher than that of a legacy gTLDs, which could be largely due to the price restrictions placed upon legacy TLDs. There is greater wholesale price dispersion among new gTLDs. Requests for current and historical data were sent the all 54 registrars in the original sample, yet only 6 registrars (all from the Asia Pacific region), provided some form of historical data. These responsive registrars accounted for only 14% of registration volume of new gTLDs being sampled and did not provide any regional geographic variation. As a result, some pricing information was collected from publicly-available websites such as the registrars’ websites. BC Comments: This Phase I report is a helpful beginning to a much-needed comprehensive analysis of the domain name market in the wake of the expansion of gTLDs. As the report indicates and the BC agrees, a competitive effects analysis of the new gTLD Program is not feasible at this time as the analysis lacked a rich set of data to review. More thorough analysis is needed and requires detailed transaction-level data from registries, registrars, resellers, and other market-makers. The BC is hopeful that such information will be provided, taking into consideration the confidentially and proprietary nature of the information. Additional data points should be added to capture additional fees by registries and registrars beyond the wholesale, retail, and Sunrise period pricing. For example, the Donuts Registry offers an “Early Access Program” (EAP), which allows consumers to purchase a domain prior to general availability with tiered fees. These one-time fees can typically reach over $10,000 in additional to the registration fees. Premium pricing is another fee that is added on to the cost of a domain registration fee. These fees are not always publicly available and are at the discretion of the registry operators and can be in addition to the EAP and registration fees. There would be great value in charting the percentage of cost and registration made during the Sunrise period again general availability to evaluate if the increases in this report are due largely to defensive registrations by trademark holders. As noted by the Analysis Group who produced this report, when a firm engages in price competition, typically consumers tend to benefit from lowering prices. Understanding that there are multiple factors that affect pricing and competition, the above would provide greater insight in the next phase. This comment was drafted by Chris Wilson and Cecilia Smith, and was approved in accord with the BC Charter.

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