February 2016 - Accountability-Cross-Community

ICANN Board comments - Recommendation 3 - Fundamental Bylaws
by Bruce Tonkin March 16, 2016

March 16, 2016

Hello All, On the Fundamental Bylaws (Recommendation 3), the Board has the following comment following the first reading: The Board is supportive of the changes reflected in the document after the first reading. The Board notes that while it is supportive of the inspection right being reflected as a Fundamental Bylaw, the inspection right should be noted as a right of the community, and not of the Sole Designator, to align with the Board's comments on Recommendation 1. Regards, Bruce Tonkin ICANN Board Liaison to the CCWG

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Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue
by Drazek, Keith March 4, 2016

March 4, 2016

Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I'm submitting the following on behalf of the undersigned members/participants from the GNSO: --------------------------------------------- Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs, We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request for clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the Empowered Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional participants is less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2 regarding this possibility is ambiguous: "The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN's SOs and ACs agree to be decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be adjusted. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs." In our view, there is no question that the thresholds must be adjusted if there are fewer than five decisional participants. We have acknowledged repeatedly and operated under the assumption that there should not be a requirement of unanimous support for the Empowered Community to exercise its powers. Yet, if there are less than five decisional participants, unless the thresholds are adjusted it would require unanimous support for the Empowered Community to: * Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget; * Recall the entire Board of Directors; and * Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process. These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to the Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary purpose of the CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the Board has noted in its own formal comments, "Leaving this issue for future consideration raises the potential for renegotiation of the community thresholds. This potential for renegotiation adds a level of instability and a lack of predictability." Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over thresholds in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally different. There is a great distinction between an SO or AC choosing to not participate, and an SO or AC being blocked from participation in a specific instance, as was the case in the case of the GAC carve-out. We were willing to accept a unanimous threshold for Board recall in the unique circumstances of the GAC carve-out, where the GAC was blocked from participation, but we believe firmly that if any SO or AC elects, whether through a conscious decision or an inability to decide, to not participate, then the non-unanimity principle must be upheld. However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC carve-out, this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to resolve this matter now (and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to the official transfer of the proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when it could have significant negative ramifications on the transition through a failure to resolve it during the implementation phase. Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1 and Annex 2 be edited to replace "may" with "shall" and add an additional explanatory clause: "The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN's SOs and ACs agree to be decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support shall be adjusted to prevent the need for unanimous support among the decisional Participants to exercise any of the seven Community powers. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs." Signed, Phil Corwin Steve DelBianco Keith Drazek James Gannon Robin Gross Ed Morris Brett Schaefer Greg Shatan Matthew Shears

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The Currently Re-Finalized Proposal as Hardcopy
by Dr Eberhard W Lisse March 2, 2016

March 2, 2016

Dear Co-Chairs. can you please arrange that the participants and members coming to Marrakesh find a single pages (back empty) hardcopy of the Proposal on their desk at Friday's F2F? Does not have to be bound, but if it is in a ring binder please make it available in A4 and corresponding 2 Ring Binder (the famous Leitz Ordner) and Letter/3 Ring Binder (US). Or at least for those who would like one. If it's bound why not put it into the ICANN goodie bag? el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini 4

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Analysis of the Reconsideration Request Process
by Padmini Feb. 29, 2016

Feb. 29, 2016

Dear all, In the post enclosed below, I have detailed out our experiences, at the Centre for Internet and Society, with ICANN’s Reconsideration Process. In trying to understand this rather fascinating process, I attempted to make a statistical analysis of the 144 Reconsideration Requests that ICANN has received/responded to (As of February 29, 2016). These have included grievances ranging from unfulfilled DIDP requests to issues with timely provision of minutes, to issues with the gTLD programme. The kind of numbers that that this tabular analysis threw up were fairly disturbing: 1. The Reconsideration Committee/Board Governance Committee has* denied 118 of the 144 requests* – an incredible 81.9% 2. Of the 144 requests, *6 were withdrawn* by the requester before ICANN responded. 3. I was *unable to find publicly available responses to 8 out of 144 requests*, one dating back up to 2000, and the most recent ones, presumably still being processed, from 2016. 4. For only *12 out of 144* – a mere 8.3%, either the Committee has responded favourably, or the action against which reconsideration was sought has itself been remedied. 5. The Committee does not seem to have a single uniform time binding its processing of the requests – the number of days that it takes for there to be a proper response has ranged from 7 days to over a 100 days. 89 of the 144 requests have taken more than 30 days to process, and there has not always been an attempt towards a proper explanation for the same. This is quite contradictory to the wording of the By-Laws, which holds that the Committee should attempt to make a recommendation within 30 days. (See Article IV, Section 2 of the Bylaws) The table may be viewed here - https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1p_sATPBLr264JQC82f8CtPqfA8qdLSN_ySj… I have enclosed my post as well as my charts for the same. Any comments and feedback would be welcome! [image: Inline image 1][image: Inline image 2] Regards Padmini Baruah Programme Associate, Internet Governance Centre for Internet and Society

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Volume 13: An Update on IANA Stewardship Discussions
by Hillary Jett Feb. 29, 2016

Feb. 29, 2016

Hi Jorge, The language was updated over the weekend after being noticed by the co-Chairs and Rapporteurs. A change made as a result of concerns expressed by some members of the GAC and the ICANN Board regarding the applicability of the “carve out” (Annex 1) to recalling the Board if an IRP challenge to the Board’s implementation of GAC consensus advice was not available. Initially, the Supplemental Proposal recommended that if the Empowered Community could not challenge the Board’s implementation of GAC consensus advice via the IRP that the lower threshold of the “carve out” would still apply for recalling the Board. The final version of the Supplemental Proposal does not include the possibility of using the lower threshold of the “carve out” to recall the ICANN Board should the community not be able to challenge the Board’s implementation of GAC consensus advice via the IRP. The change is reflected in the blog posting here: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/volume-13-an-update-on-iana-stewardship-dis… Best, Hillary From: "Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch" <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch> Date: Monday, February 29, 2016 at 3:17 AM To: Hillary Jett <hillary.jett(a)icann.org>, CCWG-Accountability <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> Subject: AW: Volume 13: An Update on IANA Stewardship Discussions Dear Hillary This para is a bit misleading, isn’t it? · A change made as a result of concerns expressed by some members of the GAC and by theICANN Board regarding whether or not the GAC could be a member of the Empowered Community when invoking an Independent Review Process triggered by the Board acting on GACadvice. Initially, the Supplemental Proposal recommended not including the GAC as a part of the Empowered Community in such circumstances (on the CCWG-Accountability list, this was termed the “carve out” of the GAC); the final version removes this constraint. Or have we missed something (i.e. the carve-out being removed)? Best Jorge Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Im Auftrag von Hillary Jett Gesendet: Freitag, 26. Februar 2016 22:30 An: CCWG-Accountability <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> Betreff: [CCWG-ACCT] Volume 13: An Update on IANA Stewardship Discussions Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/volume-13-an-update-on-iana-stewardship-dis… Volume 13: An Update on IANA Stewardship Discussions Transition another step closer as accountability proposal is sent to Chartering Organizations · The final CCWG-Accountability proposal for accountability enhancements that must be in place or committed to within the timeframe of the IANA Stewardship Transition has been sent to its six Chartering Organizations for adoption. · The CWG-Stewardship is finalizing a letter confirming that the CCWG-Accountability proposal meets all of their requirements. · The ICG will finalize their proposal for transmission to the ICANN Board and NTIA upon receiving confirmation from the CWG-Stewardship. CCWG-Accountability proposal On 23 February, the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) forwarded its Final Supplemental Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations for the approval of its six Chartering Organizations (GNSO, ALAC, ccNSO, GAC, ASO, SSAC). The Final Supplemental Proposal incorporates: · Feedback received during the public comment period on the Third Draft Proposal. · Further development of the recommendations by the CCWG-Accountability members and participants to resolve the sometimes-conflicting issues raised by community feedback. · A change made as a result of concerns expressed by some members of the GAC and by theICANN Board regarding whether or not the GAC could be a member of the Empowered Community when invoking an Independent Review Process triggered by the Board acting on GACadvice. Initially, the Supplemental Proposal recommended not including the GAC as a part of the Empowered Community in such circumstances (on the CCWG-Accountability list, this was termed the “carve out” of the GAC); the final version removes this constraint. Final approval of CCWG-Accountability’s Work Stream 1 recommendations triggers the next phase in theIANA Stewardship Transition – the transmission of both the transition and accountability proposals to theNTIA by way of the ICANN Board of Directors. The transmission is expected to take place during or immediately following the Public ICANN Board Meeting on 10 March. Timeline 1 March 2016IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG) teleconference (12:00-13:00 UTC) to discuss finalization of its proposal based on confirmation by CWG-Stewardship that the CCWG-Accountability supplemental report meets all of their requirements. 9 March 2016Deadline for CCWG-Accountability Chartering Organizations to indicate their support for the Supplemental Draft proposal. Pending approval by all Chartering Organizations, CCWG-Accountability Chairs to forward the proposal to the ICANN Board of Directors. 10 March 2016 ICANN Board considers the Supplemental Proposal at its Public Board Meeting at ICANN55. ICANN Board forwards the Final Supplemental Proposal to NTIA, together with the Proposal to Transition the Stewardship of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions from the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to the Global Multistakeholder Community. When the NTIA receives the proposals, it will review the contents to ensure that the proposals meet thecriteria published by the NTIA on 14 March 2014. NTIA will also inform U.S. Congress about the status of the proposals. NTIA’s contract with ICANN expires on 30 September 2016 but NTIA has the authority to extend the contract if needed. IANA Stewardship Transition and Accountability discussions at ICANN55 DateTimeSessionRoom 5 Mar12:45-15:00GNSO: CCWG-Accountability DiscussionDiamant 14:30-16:00GAC: IANA Transition and ICANN Accountability: OverviewCristal 17:00-18:00GAC: Position as a Chartering Organisation for CCWG AccountabilityCristal 6 Mar08:30-12:30GAC: Position as a Chartering Organisation for CCWG-AccountabilityCristal 11:15-11:45GNSO: Update on CWG-Stewardship ImplementationDiamant 11:45-13:00GNSO: Update on CCWG-AccountabilityDiamant 7 Mar10:15-11:30High-Level Governmental Meeting: IANA Stewardship Transition OutcomesCristal 10:30-11:45IANA Stewardship Transition ImplementationAtlas 11:45-13:15High-Level Governmental Meeting: Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governments role in the new ICANN frameworkCristal 13:30-15:00CCWG-Accountability Engagement SessionAtlas 8 Mar11:00-12:30ccNSO: IANA Stewardship Transition ProcessRoseraie 12:00-12:30GAC: Position as a Chartering Organisation for CCWG-AccountabilityCristal 14:30-15:30GAC: Position as a Chartering Organisation for CCWG-AccountabilityCristal 16:00-18:00GAC: Finalize GAC Position as a Chartering Organization for CCWG-AccountabilityCristal 9 Mar13:30-15:30GNSO Council meetingToubkal 13:30-18:00ccNSO: IANA Stewardship Transition Process and ccNSO Council MeetingOliveraie 10 Mar16:00-17:30ICANN Public Board MeetingAtlas Note: The CCWG-Accountability will meet in Marrakech during ICANN55, but at this point, the main focus of the CCWG’s work in Marrakech is planning Work Stream 2 activities. Work Stream 2 focuses on accountability topics that extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition. IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal The IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG) has requested confirmation that the CCWG-Accountability Supplemental Draft Proposal meets all of the requirements of the Cross Community Working Group to Develop an IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal on Naming Related Functions (CWG-Stewardship). The CWG-Stewardship held a teleconference on 25 February to discuss its response to the CCWG-Accountability Chartering Organizations and the ICG regarding whether the Supplemental Proposal meets all of the CWG-Stewardship’s requirements. The draft letter of confirmation is here. When the ICG receives confirmation from the CWG-Stewardship, the ICG will finalize the Proposal to Transition the Stewardship of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions from the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to the Global Multistakeholder Community for delivery to the ICANN Board to transmit to NTIA. To do this, theICG will hold a teleconference on March 1. IANA Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) A group consisting of representatives from the three IANA operational communities has been finalizing details on how IANA IPR should be managed after the transition has occurred. IANA IPR consists of three IANA trademarks (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, IANA and the IANAlogo) and their registrations as well as three IANA-related domain names (iana.org, iana.net, andiana.com) These discussions are still underway. To follow recent developments you can follow the mailing list, iana-ipr, which is publicly archived here. Compiled on behalf of ICANN by Samantha Dickinson 26 February 2016

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TR: Confirmation that the CCWG-Accountability Supplemental Final Proposal meets the requirements of the CWG-Stewardship
by Mathieu Weill Feb. 29, 2016

Feb. 29, 2016

Dear Colleagues, It is good to be back and find out that you have made great progress during the last week, as illustrated by the attached correspondence from the CWG Stewardship chairs, who confirm that our Supplemental Final proposal meets their requirements. Best Mathieu De : Jonathan Robinson [mailto:jrobinson@afilias.info] Envoyé : lundi 29 février 2016 11:19 À : 'Grace Abuhamad'; 'Mathieu Weill'; 'Thomas Rickert'; 'León Felipe Sánchez Ambía'; 'Patrik Fältström'; byron.holland(a)cira.ca; thomas.schneider(a)bakom.admin.ch; jbladel(a)godaddy.com; alan.greenberg(a)mcgill.ca Cc : 'Lise Fuhr'; 'Robert Hoggarth'; 'Heidi Ullrich'; 'Marika Konings'; 'Bart Boswinkel'; 'Steve Sheng'; glen.gery(a)icann.org; 'Olof Nordling' Objet : Confirmation that the CCWG-Accountability Supplemental Final Proposal meets the requirements of the CWG-Stewardship Importance : Haute Dear CCWG-Accountability members, participants, and co-chairs, Confirmation that the CCWG-Accountability Supplemental Final Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations meets the requirements of the CWG-Stewardship Final Transition Proposal We write in response to your groups recent publication of the Supplemental Final Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations (the Final Proposal). We have prepared this in our capacities as co-chairs of the Cross Community Working Group to Develop an IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal on Naming Related Functions (CWG-Stewardship). Please see our full response attached to this email. The CWG-Stewardship final transition proposal submitted for approval to the chartering organizations on 11 June 2015 is significantly dependent and expressly conditioned on the implementation of ICANN-level accountability mechanisms by the CCWG-Accountability. Specifically, as recognized in the Final Proposal, the CWG-Stewardship Final Transition Proposal sets forth ICANN accountability requirements regarding Community Empowerment Mechanism, IANA Functions Budget, IANA Function Reviews, Customer Standing Committee (CSC), Separation Process, Appeals Mechanism, and Post-Transition IANA (PTI), as well as Fundamental Bylaws. This document is and should be viewed as an element of the agreed-upon working methods of the CWG-Stewardship and the CCWG-Accountability. Thank you for resolving each of the issues raised in our comment letter relating to your groups publication of its third draft proposal (the Third Draft Proposal) and for all your hard work in reaching consensus. As you know, we rely on your work and our trust in the work of your group is vital in permitting us to focus on the essential aspects of our work on the stewardship transition. In summary, we confirm that the Final Proposal meets the requirements of the CWG-Stewardship final transition proposal. Congratulations on your Final Proposal and thank-you again all for your collaboration and cooperation throughout this extended period of intense work. Yours sincerely, Lise Fuhr & Jonathan Robinson Co-Chairs, CWG-Stewardship

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Volume 13: An Update on IANA Stewardship Discussions
by Hillary Jett Feb. 29, 2016

Feb. 29, 2016

Original link: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/volume-13-an-update-on-iana-stewardship-dis… Volume 13: An Update on IANA Stewardship Discussions Transition another step closer as accountability proposal is sent to Chartering Organizations The final CCWG-Accountability proposal for accountability enhancements that must be in place or committed to within the timeframe of the IANA Stewardship Transition has been sent to its six Chartering Organizations for adoption. The CWG-Stewardship is finalizing a letter confirming that the CCWG-Accountability proposal meets all of their requirements. The ICG will finalize their proposal for transmission to the ICANN Board and NTIA upon receiving confirmation from the CWG-Stewardship. CCWG-Accountability proposal On 23 February, the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) forwarded its Final Supplemental Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations for the approval of its six Chartering Organizations (GNSO, ALAC, ccNSO, GAC, ASO, SSAC). The Final Supplemental Proposal incorporates: Feedback received during the public comment period on the Third Draft Proposal. Further development of the recommendations by the CCWG-Accountability members and participants to resolve the sometimes-conflicting issues raised by community feedback. A change made as a result of concerns expressed by some members of the GAC and by theICANN Board regarding whether or not the GAC could be a member of the Empowered Community when invoking an Independent Review Process triggered by the Board acting on GACadvice. Initially, the Supplemental Proposal recommended not including the GAC as a part of the Empowered Community in such circumstances (on the CCWG-Accountability list, this was termed the “carve out” of the GAC); the final version removes this constraint. Final approval of CCWG-Accountability’s Work Stream 1 recommendations triggers the next phase in theIANA Stewardship Transition – the transmission of both the transition and accountability proposals to theNTIA by way of the ICANN Board of Directors. The transmission is expected to take place during or immediately following the Public ICANN Board Meeting on 10 March. Timeline 1 March 2016IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG) teleconference (12:00-13:00 UTC) to discuss finalization of its proposal based on confirmation by CWG-Stewardship that the CCWG-Accountability supplemental report meets all of their requirements. 9 March 2016 Deadline for CCWG-Accountability Chartering Organizations to indicate their support for the Supplemental Draft proposal. Pending approval by all Chartering Organizations, CCWG-Accountability Chairs to forward the proposal to the ICANN Board of Directors. 10 March 2016ICANN Board considers the Supplemental Proposal at its Public Board Meeting at ICANN55.ICANN Board forwards the Final Supplemental Proposal to NTIA, together with the Proposal to Transition the Stewardship of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions from the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to the Global Multistakeholder Community. When the NTIA receives the proposals, it will review the contents to ensure that the proposals meet thecriteria published by the NTIA on 14 March 2014. NTIA will also inform U.S. Congress about the status of the proposals. NTIA’s contract with ICANN expires on 30 September 2016 but NTIA has the authority to extend the contract if needed. IANA Stewardship Transition and Accountability discussions at ICANN55 DateTimeSessionRoom 5 Mar 12:45-15:00GNSO: CCWG-Accountability Discussion Diamant 14:30-16:00GAC: IANA Transition and ICANN Accountability: Overview Cristal 17:00-18:00GAC: Position as a Chartering Organisation for CCWG Accountability Cristal 6 Mar 08:30-12:30GAC: Position as a Chartering Organisation for CCWG-Accountability Cristal 11:15-11:45GNSO: Update on CWG-Stewardship Implementation Diamant 11:45-13:00GNSO: Update on CCWG-Accountability Diamant 7 Mar 10:15-11:30High-Level Governmental Meeting: IANA Stewardship Transition Outcomes Cristal 10:30-11:45IANA Stewardship Transition Implementation Atlas 11:45-13:15High-Level Governmental Meeting: Enhancing ICANN Accountability and Governments role in the new ICANN framework Cristal 13:30-15:00CCWG-Accountability Engagement Session Atlas 8 Mar 11:00-12:30ccNSO: IANA Stewardship Transition Process Roseraie 12:00-12:30GAC: Position as a Chartering Organisation for CCWG-Accountability Cristal 14:30-15:30GAC: Position as a Chartering Organisation for CCWG-Accountability Cristal 16:00-18:00GAC: Finalize GAC Position as a Chartering Organization for CCWG-Accountability Cristal 9 Mar 13:30-15:30GNSO Council meeting Toubkal 13:30-18:00ccNSO: IANA Stewardship Transition Process and ccNSO Council Meeting Oliveraie 10 Mar 16:00-17:30ICANN Public Board Meeting Atlas Note: The CCWG-Accountability will meet in Marrakech during ICANN55, but at this point, the main focus of the CCWG’s work in Marrakech is planning Work Stream 2 activities. Work Stream 2 focuses on accountability topics that extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition. IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal The IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG) has requested confirmation that the CCWG-Accountability Supplemental Draft Proposal meets all of the requirements of the Cross Community Working Group to Develop an IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal on Naming Related Functions (CWG-Stewardship). The CWG-Stewardship held a teleconference on 25 February to discuss its response to the CCWG-Accountability Chartering Organizations and the ICG regarding whether the Supplemental Proposal meets all of the CWG-Stewardship’s requirements. The draft letter of confirmation is here. When the ICG receives confirmation from the CWG-Stewardship, the ICG will finalize the Proposal to Transition the Stewardship of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions from the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to the Global Multistakeholder Community for delivery to the ICANN Board to transmit to NTIA. To do this, theICG will hold a teleconference on March 1. IANA Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) A group consisting of representatives from the three IANA operational communities has been finalizing details on how IANA IPR should be managed after the transition has occurred. IANA IPR consists of three IANA trademarks (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, IANA and the IANAlogo) and their registrations as well as three IANA-related domain names (iana.org, iana.net, andiana.com) These discussions are still underway. To follow recent developments you can follow the mailing list, iana-ipr, which is publicly archived here. Compiled on behalf of ICANN by Samantha Dickinson 26 February 2016

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Fwd: CCWG Final report for your consideration
by León Felipe Sánchez Ambía Feb. 26, 2016

Feb. 26, 2016

Dear all, I am forwarding the transmittal letter sent to the Chairs of our Chartering Organizations for your knowledge. Best regards, León > Inicio del mensaje reenviado: > > De: León Felipe Sánchez Ambía <leonfelipe(a)sanchez.mx> > Asunto: CCWG Final report for your consideration > Fecha: 23 de febrero de 2016, 5:20:42 p.m. GMT-6 > Para: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel(a)godaddy.com>, Thomas Schneider <Thomas.Schneider(a)bakom.admin.ch>, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg(a)mcgill.ca>, Tripti Sinha <tsinha(a)umd.edu>, Brad Verd <bverd(a)verisign.com>, Byron Holland <byron.holland(a)cira.ca>, Patrik Fältström <paf(a)frobbit.se>, Lise Fuhr <fuhr(a)etno.eu>, Jonathan Robinson <jrobinson(a)afilias.info> > Cc: gnso.secretariat(a)gnso.icann.org, Olof Nordling <olof.nordling(a)icann.org>, Julia Charvolen <julia.charvolen(a)icann.org>, Tom Dale <tom(a)acig.com.au>, Staff <staff(a)atlarge.icann.org>, Carlos Reyes <carlos.reyes(a)icann.org>, "Kimberly Carlson (kimberly.carlson(a)icann.org)" <kimberly.carlson(a)icann.org>, Bart Boswinkel <bart.boswinkel(a)icann.org>, Julie Hedlund <julie.hedlund(a)icann.org>, Grace Abuhamad <grace.abuhamad(a)icann.org>, David Olive <david.olive(a)icann.org>, Theresa Swinehart <theresa.swinehart(a)icann.org>, ACCT-Staff <acct-staff(a)icann.org>, Steve Crocker <steve.crocker(a)icann.org>, Fadi Chehadé <fadi.chehade(a)icann.org> > > Dear Chartering Organizations, > > The Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) is pleased to provide its Chartering Organizations with its report on Work Stream 1 recommendations. You can download the full report here: https://community.icann.org/x/8w2AAw <https://community.icann.org/x/8w2AAw>. > > As per the CCWG-Accountability’s Charter, we now seek your approval to submit this final report to the ICANN Board and ask you to consider this approval in accordance with your respective SO or AC rules and procedures by 9 March 2016 to meet the overall timing requirements, which would allow the IANA Stewardship Transition (as a whole) to proceed. > > The report is the result of extensive work by the CCWG-Accountability’s 28 members, 175 participants and a team of highly qualified legal advisors since December 2014, which included over 221 calls or meetings, 3 public consultations and more than 13,900 email messages. It represents a carefully crafted balance between key requirements, specific legal advice, and significant compromises by all who participated and includes diligent attention to the input received through the Public Comment proceedings. > > The final proposal has received the consensus support of the CCWG-Accountability with five minority statements from members recorded for Chartering Organization consideration (see Appendix A). Please note that we are publishing our report today with the minority statements delivered by the original 19 February deadline, but we have given our members a final opportunity to revise, retract or add minority statements based on our compromise reached this morning. We will send you a revised Appendix A on 25 February. > > As noted in the CCWG-Accountability report, the group worked to meet both NTIA requirements for the overall IANA Stewardship Transition (Annex 14), and the CWG-Stewardship dependencies for the naming community on ICANN accountability enhancements (Annex 13). The co-chairs of the CWG-Stewardship and the CCWG-Accountability have coordinated their efforts. The CWG-Stewardship will deliver a letter to you confirming that its dependencies have been met, thus allowing the IANA Stewardship Transition proposal to move forward. > > We will make ourselves together with or other key contributors available to you before and during the ICANN 55 meeting in Marrakech to answer any questions you may have and explain any details of the report. For your information, further background documents as well as the slides, recordings and transcripts of recent webinars explain the details of the final proposal are available here: https://community.icann.org/x/ogDxAg <https://community.icann.org/x/ogDxAg>. > > Should you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact us. > Thank you very much for your continued support. > > Thomas Rickert, Mathieu Weill and Leon Sanchez > CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs >

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Review/withdrawal of minority views
by León Felipe Sánchez Ambía Feb. 24, 2016

Feb. 24, 2016

Dear all, As we finalize the report for transmittal to Chartering Organizations, we want to offer the five members who submitted minority statements (Eberhard, Olga, Robin, Izumi and Tijani) an opportunity to revise (or retract) those statements, and for any other members to submit statements, if they would like to do so. The process for this will be as follows: Members have 48h (starting from receipt of this email) to submit any revisions, retractions, or new minority statements. We will publish the full report today, including the 19 February version of Appendix A. However, we will note in our transmittal letter to Chartering Organizations that a revised Appendix A will follow in 48h. After the 48h period (approximately at 2100 UTC on 25 February), we will update and recirculate the 25 February version of Appendix A to Chartering Organizations. To be clear, we will accept revisions to, or retractions of, existing minority statements, and new minority statements from SO/AC appointed members. We will keep to one statement per member. Thank you, Leon and Thomas (Mathieu is on leave)

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Principles for CCWGs -- Public Comment
by Grace Abuhamad Feb. 24, 2016

Feb. 24, 2016

Dear CWG-Stewardship and CCWG-Accountability members, participants, and observers, I¹m writing to request your expert feedback for the public comment on the draft framework principles for cross community working groups: https://www.icann.org/public-comments/ccwg-framework-principles-draft-2016-0 2-22-en. I¹ve attached the draft to the email for your convenience. Why you? You are the experts. You are the past, the present, and the future of cross community working groups at ICANN. You have survived one (or both) of the big IANA Stewardship Transition working groups over the past two years, and you probably (I hope!) have a lot to reflect upon and share. What¹s the point? There are no agreed community-wide guidelines on the use of CCWGs, but they are such an awesome form of multistakeholder policymaking that the ICANN community is increasingly reliant on CCWGs for their policy efforts. The CCWG-Principles has taken on the task of developing a uniform framework of principles intended to guide the formation, initiation, operations and closure of future CCWGs. How much time do I have? The public comment period opened on Monday this week. You have 39 days left, until 23 April at 23:59 UTC. You could jot down some thoughts during your long plane rides to/from Marrakech, or even as you observe the action during the sessions! The email to which your comments may be sent is: <comments-ccwg-framework-principles-22feb16(a)icann.org>. If you have any questions, please contact Mary Wong (cc¹ed here). I am passionate about this work because we¹ve innovated and learned so much from the IANA Stewardship Transition working groups, and I have had the privilege and opportunity to work with both groups from their formation. I am keen to see where the outcome of this public comment period takes us next, and I very much hope that you will take pride in designing that path forward. Grace

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thank you
by Thomas Rickert Feb. 24, 2016

Feb. 24, 2016

A big thank you to all of you who sent encouraging messages of thanks and support to us! We really do appreciate this feedback. Your co-chairs León, Mathieu and Thomas --- rickert.net

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FW: Politico Morning Tech on Fadi v. Cruz/Secretary Pritzker on Appropriations Freeze
by Phil Corwin Feb. 24, 2016

Feb. 24, 2016

FYI--The news items below are today's Politico Morning Tech. Sen. Cruz's response to CEO Chehade's answers to the letter sent to him on February 4th by three US Senators is rather predictable. In my personal opinion the CEO had an opportunity to close out this matter by providing focused responses to the letter's nine questions. Instead, he chose to respond in a narrative fashion that did not address several of the questions, so continuation of the dispute was predictable. To date, Sen. Cruz has not been reported to bring up the IANA transition in his campaign for the Republican Presidential nomination. Depending on what occurs in next Tuesday's "Super Tuesday" round of multiple state primaries, he may elect to suspend his campaign and drop out of the race; if and when he does so, he would have a lot more time to spend on Senate business -- within a US Senate that is likely to be even more divided due to it being a Presidential election year, as well as the standoff regarding replacement of deceased Supreme Court Justice Scalia.. As for the report on Secretary Pritzker's remarks at the House Appropriations Committee, another report I saw on this did not characterize her response as ducking the effectiveness of the current appropriations language barring NTIA from facilitating the transition, which remains in effect until September 30th. Rather, in response to rep. Culberson's statement that he was not supportive of the IANA transition, the publication reported: Pritzker replied that her department hasn't received the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority transition plan yet, but any plan will be led by a multistakeholder group from the Internet community, not by governments. She said her department will conduct a "rigorous review" of the plan and a number of issues will be considered. They include resiliency of the domain name system, needs of the global customers, ensuring an open and free Internet and enhancing the multistakeholder model, she said. In any event, at the State of the Net Conference held in January 2015, NTIA head Larry Strickling was quite definitive about the effect of the transition freeze, stating (http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150127_ntia_cromnibus_bars_iana_transition_… ): The act does restrict NTIA from using appropriated dollars to relinquish our stewardship during fiscal year 2015 with respect to Internet domain name system functions. We take that seriously. Accordingly, we will not use appropriated funds to terminate the IANA functions contract with ICANN prior to the contract's current expiration date of September 30, 2015. Nor will we use appropriated dollars to amend the cooperative agreement with Verisign to eliminate NTIA's role in approving changes to the authoritative root zone file prior to September 30. On these points, there is no ambiguity.... I want to reiterate again that there is no hard and fast deadline for this transition. September 2015 has been a target date because that is when the base period of our contract with ICANN expires. But this should not be seen as a deadline. If the community needs more time, we have the ability to extend the IANA functions contract for up to four years. It is up to the community to determine a timeline that works best for stakeholders as they develop a proposal that meets NTIA's conditions, but also works. The language of the FY 16 transition freeze is identical in effect to the language he commented on above. Now there is some wiggle room in his remarks in that NTIA might claim down the line that the transition requires no use of appropriated funds. Or the White House might intervene and, in his final days in office, President Obama could sign an Executive Order mandating the transition, although it would be subject to the immediate possibility of a lawsuit and court injunction as has occurred with some of his other EOs. All of this is a reminder that completion of the transition requires affirmative steps by the US Government and is subject to US politics. CRUZ CALLS OUT CHEHADE ON CHINA - Republican presidential contender Sen. Ted Cruz isn't happy with outgoing ICANN CEO Fadi Chehade's explanation of his Internet governance work in China. The pair exchanged letters earlier this month about Chehade's plans to work with the Chinese government's World Internet Conference advisory board. On Tuesday evening, Cruz issued a statement challenging Chehade's version of events and calling on him to recuse himself from ICANN's work with China. "While Chehade continues to state that his first meeting won't take place until later this year, the Xinhua News Agency, the official press agency of the People's Republic of China, reported on December 17, 2015 that, 'The advisory committee held its first meeting on the sidelines of the second World Internet Conference,'" Cruz said. "Chehade should recuse himself from all ICANN decisions that could impact the Chinese government, which include all negotiations and discussions pertaining to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority transition." - ICYMI: PRITZKER SIDESTEPS IANA TRANSITION QUESTION: Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker evaded a volley from the House Appropriations Subcommittee Tuesday about whether the 2015 government spending law blocks the Obama administration from moving forward with its plan to give up oversight of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Nancy reports. That question has been hotly debated, and subcommittee chairman John Culberson asserted that lawmakers have blocked the move for this year. Pritzker would only say her department would "work very closely" with lawmakers on the issue. "I understand the language that's been put in the appropriations [bills], and so what we're going to do is receive a plan and then we'll talk with you about it," she said. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey ________________________________ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com<http://www.avg.com> Version: 2016.0.7303 / Virus Database: 4533/11679 - Release Date: 02/22/16

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Regarding what happens if fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be Decisional Participants in the Empowered Community
by Bruce Tonkin Feb. 24, 2016

Feb. 24, 2016

Hello All, In response to the question from Brett Schaefer: >> I would hope that we could get explicit clarification and commitment from the Board that, if the GAC cannot decide or chooses not to become a decisional participant, that the Board would support lowering the thresholds for exercising all EC powers to avoid the requirement for SOAC unanimous support to exercise those powers. The Board supports the language in the report, at Page 72 of Annex 2: “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be Decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be adjusted. Thresholds would also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs.” The Board’s earlier comment on this issue from Page 5 of our 14 December 2015 Comments to the Third Draft Proposal from the CCWG is as follows: "B. Board Comments and Supporting Rationale on Further Defining Thresholds The thresholds as set out in the Proposal (Pages 22-23) seem well defined for the design of ICANN today. The Board would not support lowering of any of these thresholds because these community powers represent the voice of the ICANN community. A reduction of the threshold could risk that a decision does not reflect the community’s will. While the thresholds seem well defined for the design of ICANN today, the Board recommends further defining the thresholds for exercising community powers in the event that the number of SOs or ACs change. Leaving this issue for future consideration raises the potential for renegotiation of the community thresholds. This potential for renegotiation adds a level of instability and a lack of predictability. As a result, the Board recommends (1) clarifying that the thresholds identified in the Proposal are based on the current structure; and (2) identifying the percentages that will be applied in the event that there is a change in the number of SOs or ACs in the future." When we previously discussed this with the CCWG, we understood from Page 72 of Annex 2 that the CCWG does not want to set percentages and has agreed to revisit the thresholds if the number of participants change. We will further discuss this issue when it becomes clear who the future participants will be, and whether fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be Decisional Participants in the Empowered Community. Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Regarding what happens if fewer than five o f ICANNâs SOs and ACs agree to be Decisional Participants in the Empowered Community
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 24, 2016

Feb. 24, 2016

The Bylaws governing such thresholds are part of the Empowered Community creation and thus Fundamental Bylaws. They will require the approval of the Empowered Community to change. Alan At 24/02/2016 12:55 AM, Seun Ojedeji wrote: >That's fine Jordan, but just to be clear, such >change(reduction/increase in threshold as >applicable) will only occur when the community >come together to agree again right? i.e the >current CCWG proposal does not say if the >"empowered community" becomes 4, then the >thresholds automatically reduces. I hope that is >not what you are communicating. > >Regards >On 24 Feb 2016 06:22, "Jordan Carter" ><<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz> wrote: >Seun, all, > >If there are 4 decisional SOs/ACs instead of 5, >then the thresholds all need to change. > >The ones that currently have a threshold of 4 would then require unanimity. > >That would be totally unacceptable. It is not >consistent with our work to date or with our >report. The report specifically notes that a >change from 5 eligible decisional participants >leads to threshold changes for this very reason. > >Best >Jordan > >On Wednesday, 24 February 2016, Seun Ojedeji ><<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>seun.ojedeji(a)gmail.com> wrote: > >I believe this makes sense and can be noted >during implementation. However, IMO a reduction >of participating SO/AC in the "empowered >community" from 5 to 4 should not cause any need >for change since none of the exercise of >community powers requires more than a threshold >4 and considering that 4 still represents over >50%(4/7) of the ICANN community we should be >fine. So the current threshold proposed from >paragraph 25 to 47 on Annex 2 could still be >maintained (ofcourse without any reduction) > >However anything that goes below 4, I expect >would make the model impractical and require a complete overhaul. > >Regards >On 24 Feb 2016 04:39, "Bruce Tonkin" <Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au> wrote: >Hello All, > >In response to the question from Brett Schaefer: > > >> I would hope that we could get explicit > clarification and commitment from the Board > that, if the GAC cannot decide or chooses not > to become a decisional participant, that the > Board would support lowering the thresholds for > exercising all EC powers to avoid the > requirement for SOAC unanimous support to exercise those powers. > >The Board supports the language in the report, at Page 72 of Annex 2: > >âThe thresholds presented in this document >were determined based on this assessment. If >fewer than five of ICANNâs SOs and ACs agree >to be Decisional Participants, these thresholds >for consensus support may be >adjusted. Thresholds would also have to be >adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs.â > > >The Boardâs earlier comment on this issue from >Page 5 of our 14 December 2015 Comments to the >Third Draft Proposal from the CCWG is as follows: > >"B. Board Comments and Supporting Rationale on Further Defining Thresholds > >The thresholds as set out in the Proposal (Pages >22-23) seem well defined for the design of ICANN >today. The Board would not support lowering of >any of these thresholds because these community >powers represent the voice of the ICANN >community. A reduction of the threshold could >risk that a decision does not reflect the communityâs will. > >While the thresholds seem well defined for the >design of ICANN today, the Board recommends >further defining the thresholds for exercising >community powers in the event that the number of >SOs or ACs change. Leaving this issue for >future consideration raises the potential for >renegotiation of the community >thresholds. This potential for renegotiation >adds a level of instability and a lack of >predictability. As a result, the Board >recommends (1) clarifying that the thresholds >identified in the Proposal are based on the >current structure; and (2) identifying the >percentages that will be applied in the event >that there is a change in the number of SOs or ACs in the future." > >When we previously discussed this with the CCWG, >we understood from Page 72 of Annex 2 that the >CCWG does not want to set percentages and has >agreed to revisit the thresholds if the number of participants change. > >We will further discuss this issue when it >becomes clear who the future participants will >be, and whether fewer than five of ICANNâs SOs >and ACs agree to be Decisional Participants in the Empowered Community. > >Regards, >Bruce Tonkin > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > >-- >Jordan Carter >Chief Executive, InternetNZ > ><tel:%2B64-21-442-649>+64-21-442-649 | ><mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz > >Sent on the run, apologies for brevity > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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FW: ICYMI: RELEASE: Sen. Cruz: ICANN CEO Fadi Chehade Is Misleading the United States Senate
by Paul Rosenzweig Feb. 24, 2016

Feb. 24, 2016

Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl e&id=19&Itemid=9> Link to my PGP Key From: Novack, Phil (Cruz) On Behalf Of Press, Cruz (Cruz) Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 6:25 PM Subject: RELEASE: Sen. Cruz: ICANN CEO Fadi Chehade Is Misleading the United States Senate UNITED STATES SENATE Sen. Ted Cruz Press Office FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Cruz Press Office: 202-228-7561 Rachael Slobodien <mailto:rachael_slobodien@cruz.senate.gov> rachael_slobodien(a)cruz.senate.gov Phil Novack: <mailto:phil_novack@cruz.senate.gov> phil_novack(a)cruz.senate.gov February 23, 2015 Sen. Cruz: ICANN CEO Fadi Chehade Is Misleading the United States Senate Chehade should recuse himself from all ICANN decisions that could impact the Chinese government WASHINGTON, D.C. - U.S. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) issued the following statement today regarding a letter that Cruz, Sen. James Lankford (R-Okla.), and Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) received from Fadi Chehade, CEO of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) on Friday. Chehade's <http://cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/Letters/20160219_ICANN_CEOLetter.pdf > letter was in reply to one that <http://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2588> Cruz, Lankford, and Lee sent on February 4 raising serious concerns and requesting information regarding Mr. Chehade's involvement with the World Internet Conference, which is organized by the Chinese government, a regime notorious for its censorship of the Internet and criminalization of online speech. "Either the World Internet Conference and the People's Republic of China have misreported the events that took place during their own conference or Fadi Chehade isn't being completely honest with the United States Senate," said Sen. Cruz. "While Chehade continues to state that his first meeting won't take place until later this year, the Xinhua News Agency, the official press agency of the People's Republic of China, reported on December 17, 2015 that, 'The advisory committee held its first meeting on the sidelines of the second World Internet Conference in Wuzhen of east China's Zhejiang Province. Jack Ma, founder of China's Internet giant Alibaba, and Fadi Chehade, president and CEO of ICANN, act as co-chairman of the advisory committee.' It should also be noted that Chehade has admitted that he has entered into an arrangement while still serving as the CEO of ICANN and performing under a contract with the United States government, through which his future travel costs to the Chinese government's state-sponsored World Internet Conference will be compensated. Travel compensation from the Chinese government can be a form of personal conflict of interest, which could impair Chehade's ability to act impartially and in the best interest of the government when performing under the contract. As such, Chehade should recuse himself from all ICANN decisions that could impact the Chinese government, which include all negotiations and discussions pertaining to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) transition." ###

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poll result and next steps
by Thomas Rickert Feb. 24, 2016

Feb. 24, 2016

All, Several of you have raised questions and concerns about the process used for coming to a conclusion on the language in Annex 2. We have explained why we have given the CCWG the opportunity to express views on the various inputs that we received, reflect on the potential consequences and discuss a way forward. For those interested in the details, we would kindly refer you to the recording and transcript <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=58721088>. The fact is that concerns with the language in Annex 2 have not only been expressed by the Board, so we would urge everyone to consult the publicly archived mailing list as well as the mp3 and transcript of the call earlier today. We understand and share the view that work in the CCWG has been, and still is, exhausting and not as straightforward or predictable as one would hope. However, work in this CCWG is not like work on projects in a commercial environment – the journey to consensus is painful, lengthy and, yes, it takes detours. Stumbling forward characterizes the multi-stakeholder model and has been part of our work for the past 14 months. I guess we would all have hoped that there are no bumps during the last mile, but that is just how our group functions at times. We would like to congratulate and thank all of you for expressing your views on this matter. Hearing all views, particularly those that are controversial, adds to the credibility of the product of our work because this allowed all colleagues on the calls to make an informed decision on how to proceed. On the call, we suggested looking at two alternatives, both of which have been thoroughly discussed. We then proceeded to polling and allowed everyone on the call to chime in. There has been a debate on the list subsequently about who could participate in the poll and who could not. You will remember that we clarified that, while everyone could join the poll, an analysis of the results would be conducted after the call. Yet, we wanted to collect all "raw data" at the time of the call. We have now taken a look at the outcome of the poll and confirm that - focusing on members and participants only and focusing on members in particular - we have broad support for removal of the language in (2). A statistical analysis can be found below in this e-mail. As such, the updated Paragraph 72 language is: The CCWG-Accountability also recommends that in a situation where the GAC may not participate as a Decisional Participant because the Community Power is proposed to be used to challenge the Board’s implementation of GAC consensus advice and the threshold is set at four in support, the power will still be validly exercised if three are in support and no more than one objects, with the following exception: Where the power to be exercised is recalling the entire Board for implementing GAC advice, the reduced threshold would apply only either after an IRP has found that, in implementing GAC advice, the Board acted inconsistently with the ICANN Bylaws, or (1) if the IRP is not available to challenge the Board action in question. If the Empowered Community has brought such an IRP and does not prevail, the Empowered Community may not exercise its power to recall the entire the Board solely on the basis of the matter decided by the IRP. It may, however, exercise that power based on other grounds. The discussion has shown that parts of the group have opted for this way forward after thorough discussion of all consequences of what we had in our report. Some of you might be disappointed with this, but please remember that we always aimed to be as inclusive as possible and to work as consensus-driven as possible while coming to closure as quickly as feasible. That is the co-Chairs' mandate. Today, the CCWG had the opportunity to choose the option to ship the report in its 19 February draft version. It was in the CCWG's hands to ignore the issue that was raised by the Board and supported by others. The CCWG has chosen to take a different approach and the co-Chairs certainly cannot ignore the CCWG's wishes. One final point: Some on the email list have asked questions about decision thresholds if the number of decisional participants in the Empowered Community changes from the expected five SOs/ACs. We draw your attention to the text in Paragraphs 73 and 74 of Annex 2 in the 19 February draft. This text explicitly notes that any change in the number of decisional participants would lead to a reconsideration of the thresholds. A simple understanding of this is that if the number of decisional participants falls, so will the required level of support for those powers that today require 4 SOs/ACs to support their use. This is not changed by the decisions made today about para 72. We will now proceed and send the finalized report, without (2), to the Chartering Organizations for approval. Thank you, Thomas for León and Mathieu (who is on leave) Results of polling from February 23rd 2016 call of the CCWG-Accountability Analysis on the 4 questions with 56 casting votes from the CCWG call of February 23rd: · Members o ALAC – all 5 present o ASO – 2 of 4 present o ccNSO – 3 of 5 present o GAC – 4 of 5 present o gNSO – 5 OF 5 present o SSAC – none of 2 present o Total present 19 of 26 or 70% · Poll #1 – Who objects to removing the 2nd bullet in Paragraph 72 (in red on the slide), (“If the IRP is not available to challenge the Board action in question”)? o 11 of 56 = 20% total o 2 of 19 Members = 11%, 2 of 26 = 8% · Poll #2 – Who objects to sending the report forward (to Chartering Organizations) as it is currently, (i.e. the 19 February version with the full text in Paragraph 72)? o 30 of 56 = 54% total o 8 of 19 Members = 42%, 8 of 26 = 32% · Poll #3 – Who supports removing the language in the 2nd bullet in Paragraph 72 (in red on the slide), (“If the IRP is not available to challenge the Board action in question”)? o 38 of 56 = 68% total o 11 of 19 Members = 58%, 11 of 26 = 42% · Poll #4 – Who supports sending the report to Chartering Organizations as it is currently, (i.e. the 19 February version with the full text in Paragraph 72)? o 14 of 56 = 25% total o 2 of 19 Members = 11%, 2 of 26 = 8%

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Confusion and my position
by Burr, Becky Feb. 24, 2016

Feb. 24, 2016

People are very confused about timing and facts here. The entire paragraph that contains (1) and (2) was put in at roughly the same time (Feb 15/16), based on the same discussions. The last stable consensus we had prior to that was the top of paragraph 72, which reads something like: The CCWG-Accountability also recommends that in a situation where the GAC may not participate as a Decisional Participant because the Community Power is proposed to be used to challenge the Board’s implementation of GAC consensus advice and the threshold is set at four in support, the power will still be validly exercised if three are in support and no more than one objects. The “with one exception” and language that follows was put in in response to the Board intervention of 13 February. I have very mixed feelings about this. Personally, I feel that the folks opposing removal of (2) have the more principled argument, looking across the entire history of this process, the special status of GAC Advice, and considering the change from single member to sole designator, and the increased importance of Board spill that results. That said, I also feel that an IRP will always be a better option for dealing with a single issue, that pattern and practice violations that lead to a loss of confidence will not arise in the context of GAC Advice exclusively, and so the removal of phrase (2) creates a corner case that is so remote that I am extremely reluctant to have our work founder on this theoretical rock. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: <Schaefer>, Brett <Brett.Schaefer(a)heritage.org<mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>> Date: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 at 9:04 AM To: Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer(a)sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>>, Eberhard Lisse <el(a)lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Poll results Roelof, Of course, the opposite could apply just as easily. We had consensus on the issue until the Board intervention – after that part of the comment period was closed – and we do not have a consensus to remove that language as requested by the Board. My read from the comments on the e-mail and the chat is that some, perhaps much, of the support for removing the language is based not on the merits of the Board’s argument (since they really made no substantive argument), but on the desire to conclude this process as quickly as possible and the fear denying the Board would extend this debate. Best, Brett ________________________________ BrettSchaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__heritage.org_&d=CwMGaQ&…> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Roelof Meijer Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 8:49 AM To: el(a)lisse.na<mailto:el@lisse.na>; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Poll results Where it leaves us, I think is clear. We just follow our common practice: if we have no (rough) consensus on inserting a particular clause or solution in our proposal, we do not put it in. Item (2) was inserted a few weeks ago, we do not have anything close to rough consensus to support that. So it should be taken out. Best, Roelof On 23-02-16 12:39, "accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org on behalf of Dr Eberhard W Lisse<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%20on%0bbehalf%20of%20Dr%20Eberhard%20W%20Lisse>" <accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org on behalf of el(a)lisse.na<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%20on%20behalf%20of%0bel@lisse.na>> wrote: >Grace, > >thank you. > >Dear Co-Chairs, > >As mentioned in the chat I had to leave after one hour (of which 22 >were taken by a summary, for which I expected an Executive Summary of >2 minutes or less, by the way) as I have to work for a living. > >Just for the record, sending it to the SOs is not the same as >supporting it, hence your careful language reflects my proxy with the >exception of Poll 4 where he only polled as participant but should >have also polled my member proxy in favor of submitting as is. > >That said, it is disturbing that 11 Board members and even staff >participated in the poll. > >Never mind the expected outcome from the ACs. > >It is however clear that we do NOT have Consensus as required by our >Charter. > >So, where does this leave us? > >el > > >On 2016-02-23 12:26, Grace Abuhamad wrote: >> Dear all, >> >> >> >> To ensure full transparency around the polling, the staff have >> reviewed the recording for the call and crosschecked the results. >> The Adobe Connect recording is available here for your viewing as >> well: https://icann.adobeconnect.com/p2ner13u4kd/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__icann.adobeconnect.com…>. >> >> >> >> Please note that the instructions regarding participation in the polls >> were as follows: >> >> · Anyone on the call was invited to participate in the poll >> (members & participants). >> >> · To participate, participants in the Adobe Connect room used >> either a red or green tick to respond to the poll question. >> >> · Those on audio-only could express their position over the phone. >> >> · After the polls, analysis would be conducted to assess >> participation from CCWG members (for the purposes of these results, the >> members¹ names are in bold font). >> >> >> >> The Chairs conducted four polls in a group that varied between 85-90 >> participants. The text used as the basis for the polls is Paragraph >> 72 of the CCWG report (see attached slide for the text as well as >> the 2^nd bullet highlighted in red). The first two poll questions >> were based on objections and the second two poll questions were >> based on expressions of support. >> >> >> *Summary of results: * >> >> >> >> · 11 objections to removing the 2^nd bullet in Paragraph 72 (in red >> on the slide) >> >> o (2 CCWG member objections) >> >> >> >> · 27 objections to sending the report forward as it is currently, >> with the full text in Paragraph 72 >> >> o (8 CCWG member objections, including all ALAC members) >> >> >> >> · 36 support removing the language in the 2^nd bullet in Paragraph >> 72 (in red on the slide) >> >> o (10 CCWG members supporting) >> >> >> >> · 14 support sending the report forward as it is currently, with >> the full text in Paragraph 72 >> >> o (2 CCWG members supporting) >> >> >> *Detailed results: * >> >> >> >> *Poll #1* Who objects to removing the 2^nd bullet in Paragraph 72 (in >> red on the slide), (³If the IRP is not available to challenge the Board >> action in question²)? >> >> >> >> 1. Brett Schaefer (NCSG Participant) >> >> 2. Edward Morris (NCSG Participant) >> >> 3. Farzaneh Badii (NCSG Participant) >> >> 4. James Gannon (NCSG Participant) >> >> 5. Malcolm Hutty (ISPCP Participant) >> >> 6. Milton Mueller (NCSG Participant) >> >> 7. Paul Rosenzweig (NCSG Participant) >> >> 8. *Robin Gross*(NCSG Member) >> >> 9. Stephen Deerhake (ccNSO Participant) >> >> 10.Tatiana Tropina (NCSG Participant) >> >> 11.*Eberhard Lisse*(ccNSO Member) >> >> >> >> *Poll #2* Who objects to sending the report forward (to Chartering >> Organizations) as it is currently, (i.e. the 19 February version with >> the full text in Paragraph 72)? >> >> >> >> 1. *Alan Greenberg*(ALAC Member) >> >> 2. Asha Hemrajani (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 3. Cherine Chalaby (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 4. *Cheryl Langdon-Orr*(ALAC Member) >> >> 5. Chris Disspain (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 6. David McAuley (GNSO Participant) >> >> 7. Fadi Chehade (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 8. George Sadowsky (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 9. Jorge Cancio (GAC Participant) >> >> 10.*Julia Wolman*(GAC Member) >> >> 11.Keith Drazek (RySG Participant) >> >> 12.*Leon Sanchez*(ALAC Member) >> >> 13.Lito Ibarra (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 14.Louisewies Van del Laan (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 15.Markus Kummer (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 16.*Olga Cavalli*(GAC Member) >> >> 17.Olivier Crepin-Leblond (ALAC Participant) >> >> 18.Pedro da Silva (GAC Participant) >> >> 19.Rafael Perez Galindo (GAC Participant) >> >> 20.Rinalia Abdul Rahim (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 21.*Roelof Meijer*(ccNSO Member) >> >> 22.Ron da Silva (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 23.Samantha Eisner (ICANN Staff Liaison) >> >> 24.Seun Ojedeji (ALAC Participant) >> >> 25.Steve Crocker (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 26.*Sebastien Bachollet*(ALAC Member) >> >> 27.Stephen Deerhake (ccNSO Participant) >> >> 28.Tarek Kamel (ICANN Staff Participant) >> >> 29.*Tijani Ben Jemaa*(ALAC Member) >> >> >> >> *Poll #3* Who supports removing the language in the 2^nd bullet in >> Paragraph 72 (in red on the slide), (³If the IRP is not available to >> challenge the Board action in question²)? >> >> >> >> 1. *Alan**Greenberg* (ALAC Member) >> >> 2. Annaliese Williams (GAC Participant) >> >> 3. Asha Hemrajani (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 4. Avri Doria (NCSG Participant) >> >> 5. Cherine Chalaby (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 6. *Cheryl Langdon-Orr*(ALAC Member) >> >> 7. Chris Disspain (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 8. David McAuley (GNSO Participant) >> >> 9. Fadi Chehade (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 10.Finn Petersen (GAC Participant) >> >> 11.George Sadowsky (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 12.Greg Shatan (IPC Participant) >> >> 13.*James Bladel*(RrSG Member) >> >> 14.*Julia**Wolman* (GAC Member) >> >> 15.Kavouss Arasteh (GAC Participant) >> >> 16.Keith Drazek (RySG Participant) >> >> 17.*Leon**Sanchez* (ALAC Member) >> >> 18.Lito Ibarra (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 19.Louisewies Van del Laan (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 20.Mark Carvell (GAC Participant) >> >> 21.Markus Kummer (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 22.Mary Uduma (ccNSO Participant) >> >> 23.Niels Ten Oever (Participant) >> >> 30.*Olga**Cavalli* (GAC Member) >> >> 24.Olivier Crepin-Leblond (ALAC Participant) >> >> 25.Paul Szyndler (ccNSO Participant) >> >> 26.Pedro da Silva (GAC Participant) >> >> 31.Rafael Perez Galindo (GAC Participant) >> >> 27.Rinalia Abdul Rahim (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 28.*Roelof**Meijer* (ccNSO Member) >> >> 29.Ron da Silva (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 30.Sabine Meyer (GAC Participant) >> >> 31.Seun Ojedeji (ALAC Participant) >> >> 32.Steve Crocker (ICANN Board Participant) >> >> 33.*Steve DelBianco*(CSG Member) >> >> 34.*Sebastien**Bachollet* (ALAC Member) >> >> 35.Tarek Kamel (ICANN Staff) >> >> 36.*Tijani**Ben Jemaa* (ALAC Member) >> >> >> >> *Poll #4* Who supports sending the report to Chartering Organizations >> as it is currently, (i.e. the 19 February version with the full text in >> Paragraph 72)? >> >> >> >> 1. Aarti Bhavana (NCSG Participant) >> >> 2. Brett Schaefer (NCSG Participant) >> >> 3. Edward Morris (NCSG Participant) >> >> 4. Farzaneh Badii (NCSG Participant) >> >> 5. James Gannon (NCSG Participant) >> >> 6. *Jordan Carter*(ccNSO Member) >> >> 7. Martin Boyle (ccNSO Participant) >> >> 8. Matthew Shears (NCSG Participant) >> >> 9. Malcolm Hutty (ISPCP Participant) >> >> 10.Milton Mueller (NCSG Participant) >> >> 11.Paul Rosenzweig (NCSG Participant) >> >> 12.*Robin**Gross* (NCSG Member) >> >> 13.Stephen Deerhake (ccNSO Participant) >> >> 14.Tatiana Tropina (NCSG Participant) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> >> > >-- >Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (Saar) >el(a)lisse.NA<mailto:el@lisse.NA> / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) >PO Box 8421 \ / >Bachbrecht, Namibia ;____/ >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> > _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…>

10 15

Poll results
by Grace Abuhamad Feb. 24, 2016

Feb. 24, 2016

Dear all, To ensure full transparency around the polling, the staff have reviewed the recording for the call and crosschecked the results. The Adobe Connect recording is available here for your viewing as well: https://icann.adobeconnect.com/p2ner13u4kd/ <https://icann.adobeconnect.com/p2ner13u4kd/> . Please note that the instructions regarding participation in the polls were as follows: · Anyone on the call was invited to participate in the poll (members & participants). · To participate, participants in the Adobe Connect room used either a red or green tick to respond to the poll question. · Those on audio-only could express their position over the phone. · After the polls, analysis would be conducted to assess participation from CCWG members (for the purposes of these results, the members¹ names are in bold font). The Chairs conducted four polls in a group that varied between 85-90 participants. The text used as the basis for the polls is Paragraph 72 of the CCWG report (see attached slide for the text as well as the 2nd bullet highlighted in red). The first two poll questions were based on objections and the second two poll questions were based on expressions of support. Summary of results: · 11 objections to removing the 2nd bullet in Paragraph 72 (in red on the slide) o (2 CCWG member objections) · 27 objections to sending the report forward as it is currently, with the full text in Paragraph 72 o (8 CCWG member objections, including all ALAC members) · 36 support removing the language in the 2nd bullet in Paragraph 72 (in red on the slide) o (10 CCWG members supporting) · 14 support sending the report forward as it is currently, with the full text in Paragraph 72 o (2 CCWG members supporting) Detailed results: Poll #1 Who objects to removing the 2nd bullet in Paragraph 72 (in red on the slide), (³If the IRP is not available to challenge the Board action in question²)? 1. Brett Schaefer (NCSG Participant) 2. Edward Morris (NCSG Participant) 3. Farzaneh Badii (NCSG Participant) 4. James Gannon (NCSG Participant) 5. Malcolm Hutty (ISPCP Participant) 6. Milton Mueller (NCSG Participant) 7. Paul Rosenzweig (NCSG Participant) 8. Robin Gross (NCSG Member) 9. Stephen Deerhake (ccNSO Participant) 10. Tatiana Tropina (NCSG Participant) 11. Eberhard Lisse (ccNSO Member) Poll #2 Who objects to sending the report forward (to Chartering Organizations) as it is currently, (i.e. the 19 February version with the full text in Paragraph 72)? 1. Alan Greenberg (ALAC Member) 2. Asha Hemrajani (ICANN Board Participant) 3. Cherine Chalaby (ICANN Board Participant) 4. Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC Member) 5. Chris Disspain (ICANN Board Participant) 6. David McAuley (GNSO Participant) 7. Fadi Chehade (ICANN Board Participant) 8. George Sadowsky (ICANN Board Participant) 9. Jorge Cancio (GAC Participant) 10. Julia Wolman (GAC Member) 11. Keith Drazek (RySG Participant) 12. Leon Sanchez (ALAC Member) 13. Lito Ibarra (ICANN Board Participant) 14. Louisewies Van del Laan (ICANN Board Participant) 15. Markus Kummer (ICANN Board Participant) 16. Olga Cavalli (GAC Member) 17. Olivier Crepin-Leblond (ALAC Participant) 18. Pedro da Silva (GAC Participant) 19. Rafael Perez Galindo (GAC Participant) 20. Rinalia Abdul Rahim (ICANN Board Participant) 21. Roelof Meijer (ccNSO Member) 22. Ron da Silva (ICANN Board Participant) 23. Samantha Eisner (ICANN Staff Liaison) 24. Seun Ojedeji (ALAC Participant) 25. Steve Crocker (ICANN Board Participant) 26. Sebastien Bachollet (ALAC Member) 27. Stephen Deerhake (ccNSO Participant) 28. Tarek Kamel (ICANN Staff Participant) 29. Tijani Ben Jemaa (ALAC Member) Poll #3 Who supports removing the language in the 2nd bullet in Paragraph 72 (in red on the slide), (³If the IRP is not available to challenge the Board action in question²)? 1. Alan Greenberg (ALAC Member) 2. Annaliese Williams (GAC Participant) 3. Asha Hemrajani (ICANN Board Participant) 4. Avri Doria (NCSG Participant) 5. Cherine Chalaby (ICANN Board Participant) 6. Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC Member) 7. Chris Disspain (ICANN Board Participant) 8. David McAuley (GNSO Participant) 9. Fadi Chehade (ICANN Board Participant) 10. Finn Petersen (GAC Participant) 11. George Sadowsky (ICANN Board Participant) 12. Greg Shatan (IPC Participant) 13. James Bladel (RrSG Member) 14. Julia Wolman (GAC Member) 15. Kavouss Arasteh (GAC Participant) 16. Keith Drazek (RySG Participant) 17. Leon Sanchez (ALAC Member) 18. Lito Ibarra (ICANN Board Participant) 19. Louisewies Van del Laan (ICANN Board Participant) 20. Mark Carvell (GAC Participant) 21. Markus Kummer (ICANN Board Participant) 22. Mary Uduma (ccNSO Participant) 23. Niels Ten Oever (Participant) 30. Olga Cavalli (GAC Member) 24. Olivier Crepin-Leblond (ALAC Participant) 25. Paul Szyndler (ccNSO Participant) 26. Pedro da Silva (GAC Participant) 31. Rafael Perez Galindo (GAC Participant) 27. Rinalia Abdul Rahim (ICANN Board Participant) 28. Roelof Meijer (ccNSO Member) 29. Ron da Silva (ICANN Board Participant) 30. Sabine Meyer (GAC Participant) 31. Seun Ojedeji (ALAC Participant) 32. Steve Crocker (ICANN Board Participant) 33. Steve DelBianco (CSG Member) 34. Sebastien Bachollet (ALAC Member) 35. Tarek Kamel (ICANN Staff) 36. Tijani Ben Jemaa (ALAC Member) Poll #4 Who supports sending the report to Chartering Organizations as it is currently, (i.e. the 19 February version with the full text in Paragraph 72)? 1. Aarti Bhavana (NCSG Participant) 2. Brett Schaefer (NCSG Participant) 3. Edward Morris (NCSG Participant) 4. Farzaneh Badii (NCSG Participant) 5. James Gannon (NCSG Participant) 6. Jordan Carter (ccNSO Member) 7. Martin Boyle (ccNSO Participant) 8. Matthew Shears (NCSG Participant) 9. Malcolm Hutty (ISPCP Participant) 10. Milton Mueller (NCSG Participant) 11. Paul Rosenzweig (NCSG Participant) 12. Robin Gross (NCSG Member) 13. Stephen Deerhake (ccNSO Participant) 14. Tatiana Tropina (NCSG Participant)

26 76

Understanding of Amended Paragraph 72 of Annex 2
by Phil Corwin Feb. 24, 2016

Feb. 24, 2016

Now that the Co-Chairs have just issued their decision on how to proceed, I want to return to a subject that I first raised in the chat room on the call held twelve hours ago. Section 72 of Annex 2 will now read [bracketed text in red to be deleted]: The CCWG-Accountability also recommends that in a situation where the GAC may not participate as a Decisional Participant because the Community Power is proposed to be used to challenge the Board's implementation of GAC consensus advice and the threshold is set at four in support, the power will still be validly exercised if three are in support and no more than one objects, with the following exception: · Where the power to be exercised is recalling the entire Board for implementing GAC advice, the reduced threshold would apply only [either (1)] after an IRP has found that, in implementing GAC advice, the Board acted inconsistently with the ICANN Bylaws[, or (2) if the IRP is not available to challenge the Board action in question]. If the Empowered Community has brought such an IRP and does not prevail, the Empowered Community may not exercise its power to recall the entire the Board solely on the basis of the matter decided by the IRP. It may, however, exercise that power based on other grounds. As I read the remaining text, the first paragraph establishes the general principle that in any situation where the Empowered Community proposes to challenge the Board's implementation of GAC consensus advice, using any of the available community powers, the GAC would be barred from being a decisional participant, and that where the threshold for taking action is four SO/Ac votes it would drop to three. I would note in passing that the voting threshold for exercise of a community power is set at four (per items 46-70) for only three community powers: 1. Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget 2. Recall the entire Board of Directors 3. Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process Paragraph 2 then goes on to create an exception for that reduced threshold situation -- applicable only to removal of the Board in its entirety, and not to rejection of an operating plan/budget or a review of IANA functions where the Board has acted pursuant to GAC consensus advice. For Board removal in its entirety the EC would first be required to pursue an IRP - and if the IRP determined that the Board implementation of GAC consensus advice had not violated the Bylaws the reduced voting threshold would not apply, and the matter could not be further pursued unless there were other, non-Bylaws grounds for pursuing it. In the latter instance (non-Bylaws ground), the threshold for full Board removal would be four votes (unanimity of all SOs and ACs other than the GAC, which would remain non-decisional). Are we agreed on that view so far? Now here is where it gets interesting, in regard to matters of Board implementation of GAC consensus advice about which the community was aggrieved, and regardless of whether such implementation involved an alleged Bylaws violation and was therefore subject to an IRP --- If the community sought to exercise power 4a contained at section 55 - "Remove an individual Board Director nominated by an SO or AC (and appointed by the Empowered Community)" - none of the above in para 72 would be relevant because the majority of the nominating SO/AC could do that on its own by an internal ¾ majority vote after inviting and considering comments from all SOs/ACs (noting that it's not entirely clear whether the GAC would be barred from commenting, although it's of little relevance since the electing SO/AC is in no way bound by the opinions of the others). That removal could include the Chairman of the Board if he/she was the nominee of a particular SO or AC. If the community sought to exercise power 4b contained at section 58 - "Remove an individual Board Director nominated by the Nominating Committee (and appointed by the Empowered Community)" - the lowered threshold requirement in para 72 would not be relevant because the required threshold support is "Three support, and no more than one objection", and the GAC would be barred as a decisional participant if the challenge pertained to the Board member voting to implement GAC consensus advice. Again, this power is available to remove the Chair if he/she was a NomCom appointee (Note: I have checked the ICANN Bylaws and any Board member other the President/CEO, regardless of how they were placed on the Board, can be elected to the Chair or Vice Chair position). Putting this all together, even after the CCWG's Co-Chairs decision to proceed with striking clause 2 of the second paragraph of section 72, the Empowered Community could still remove the Board Chairman and Vice Chair (and sequentially chosen replacement Chairs and Vice Chairs, if they failed to lead the Board to reverse its decision implementing GAC advice), and could remove one or more additional members of the Board, whether placed on the Board by an SO/AC or by the NomCom, so long as such actions were taken individually and not collectively. And the community, if the aggrieved view was sufficiently widespread, could collectively remove (and then replace) sufficient numbers of Board members to compel a reversal of the implementation of GAC consensus advice. Indeed, there is no limitation placed on the number of Board members who may be removed via community powers 4a and 4b so long as each is a discrete assertion of those powers pertaining to a particular Board member. If I am correct on this interpretation then, the removal of clause 2 may not be all that significant. If anyone believes that my interpretation of any or all of this is incorrect - especially Board or GAC members - I would urge them to voice disagreement now. I would also welcome expressions of support for this interpretation. If you have read this far, thanks. Best to all, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey

5 8

Re: [CCWG-ACCT] what the Board is objecting to here -
by Fadi Chehade Feb. 23, 2016

Feb. 23, 2016

Alan, that is my understanding as well. There is a solution to this dialog that can maintain the fundamental balance of the multistakeholder model When the IRP rules that the Board has violated the Bylaws/Articles in accepting GAC advice, the threshold can be 3. When there is no IRP ruling, or no allegation that the Board has violated the Bylaws, keep the threshold at the same level that it was set in the prior versions of the report – 4. Fadi From: Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg(a)mcgill.ca<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>> Date: Friday, February 19, 2016 at 2:17 PM To: Jordan Carter <jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>>, Samantha Eisner <samantha.eisner(a)icann.org<mailto:samantha.eisner@icann.org>> Cc: Thomas Rickert <thomas(a)rickert.net<mailto:thomas@rickert.net>>, "accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] what the Board is objecting to here - The Supplemental Proposal says that the threshold CAN be reduced to three under two conditions: (1) after an IRP has found that, in implementing GAC advice, the Board acted inconsistently with the ICANN Bylaws, or (2) if the IRP is not available to challenge the Board action in question. My recollection is that the Board proposed only (1). Becky (and/or perhaps others) proposed (2), but I do not recall it being accepted by the Board or by the CCWG as a whole. Alan At 19/02/2016 04:38 PM, Jordan Carter wrote: Ok. If Steve Crocker could also confirm that his understanding is the same, that would be very helpful. On the overall point - the board has already made its view on that question clear. Steve's email doesn't reference the GPI test that is the only basis the Board has set out to object to ccwg proposals, and which it has invoked prior. The intervention thus has two effects. It is a source of uncertainty, because it isn't clear. And it is a source of delay, because the intent and the group's response to it has to be clarified. Once again, we face a further delay thanks to the way the ICANN board has chosen to behave. I guess I wish I could say I was surprised, or disappointed - but that's long gone. I'm just confused: what is the end game here? If anyone knows, please feel free to share. Jordan On Saturday, 20 February 2016, Samantha Eisner < Samantha.Eisner(a)icann.org<mailto:Samantha.Eisner@icann.org>> wrote: Hi Becky - There was another thread on this from Alan, but wanted to confirm in this thread too that this is the correct understanding of the Boardâ€™s concern. Thanks, Sam From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of "Burr, Becky" <Becky.Burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>> Date: Friday, February 19, 2016 at 10:55 AM To: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>>, 'Phil Corwin' <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>>, 'Greg Shatan' <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>, 'Kavouss Arasteh' <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> Cc: 'Thomas Rickert' <thomas(a)rickert.net<mailto:thomas@rickert.net>>, "accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] what the Board is objecting to here - Just for the sake of absolute precision, I think the Boardâ€™s point is that the carve out – and hence the 3 SO/AC threshold â€€“ could apply where an IRP determines that the Boardâ€™s actions in response to GAC Advice contravene the Bylaws. I think what worries the Board is that the notion that the Board could be recalled by 3 SO/AC combination for action that DOES NOT contravene the Bylaws. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc./Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office:+1.202.533.2932 Mobile:+1.202.352.6367 /neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>> Date: Friday, February 19, 2016 at 1:15 PM To: 'Phil Corwin' <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>>, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> Cc: 'Thomas Rickert' <thomas(a)rickert.net<mailto:thomas@rickert.net>>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue +1 Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.redbranchconsulting…> [[]]<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.rsaconference.com_e…> From: Phil Corwin [ mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com] Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 12:52 PM To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>; Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> Cc: Thomas Rickert <thomas(a)rickert.net<mailto:thomas@rickert.net>>; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue Greg: Assuming that the new Board position is indeed a response to a minority position of a few GAC members, I am in full agreement that it â€œshould serve as a warning to us allâ€. Indeed, it emphasizes exactly why the GAC should not be able to block the communityâ€™s ability to hold the Board accountable for implementing GAC consensus advice that the community feels is outside the scope of the Bylaws or Mission Statement. Best. Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [ mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 12:38 PM To: Kavouss Arasteh Cc: accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>; Thomas Rickert Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue It is alarming that a few GAC members could seek to undo a carefully balanced compromise. And even more alarming that those few GAC members could so quickly trigger a Board intervention. The carve-out is balanced against the concerns of other stakeholders with regard to (i) the proposed supermajority threshold for Board rejection of GAC advice and (ii) the GAC's overall role as a decisional participant in the Empowered Community, rather than its traditional advisory capacity. The carve-out itself underwent a compromise, requiring the Community to go through an IRP before exercising the power of Board recall. When one pulls on one end of a compromise, the other end tends to move as well. Do other stakeholders need to send countervailing warnings? Will the Board respond as quickly? Do we want to find out? I think this extraordinary response to a minority report should serve as a warning to us all. Greg On Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 12:22 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: Please kindly confirm and acknowledge recipt of wanrning message Regards Kavouss 2016-02-19 18:10 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>: Dear Co-chairs You have seen the concerns of 11 Governments which would certainly be echoed by other gouvernements soon. This is an ALARMING SITUATION , If there is no consensus means there is no consensus , We could not favour one community in disfavouring another one. Perhaps it was hoped that the people could join the consensus but it does not come up as such If a mistake has occurred we should repair it . Howmany times we have changed our concept from Voluntry Model to Sole member from Sole Member to Sole designator . THE ISSUE IS CRITICAL Pls do not rush to publish the report as being sent to the chartering organization just hold on for few more days untill your 26 feb. calls Try to find out some solution including going back to the initial stage of REC. 11 without no carve-out and with two options of simple majority and 2/3 theshold and rediscuss that. You can not ignor the growing concerns of several governments and would certainly be further grown up soon Regards Kavouss _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=CwMFaQ&c=…> Version: 2016.0.7303 / Virus Database: 4530/11623 - Release Date: 02/14/16 -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive, InternetNZ +64-21-442-649 | jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Sent on the run, apologies for brevity Content-Type: image/png; name="image001.png" Content-Disposition: inline; filename="image001.png" Content-ID: <image001.png(a)01D16B17.90D93970<mailto:image001.png@01D16B17.90D93970>> X-Attachment-Id: 8ad2965fd910ef78_0.1 _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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CCWG-Accountability Delivers Report to Chartering Organizations
by Hillary Jett Feb. 23, 2016

Feb. 23, 2016

Original posting: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/ccwg-accountability-delivers-report-to-char… CCWG-Accountability Delivers Report to Chartering Organizations Today, the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) provided its Chartering Organizations with its final supplemental report on Work Stream 1 recommendations. [You can download the full report here] The report is the result of extensive work by the CCWG-Accountability’s 28 members, 175 participants and a team of highly qualified legal advisors since December 2014, which included over 221 calls or meetings, 3 public consultations and more than 13,900 email messages. It represents a carefully crafted balance between key requirements, specific legal advice, and significant compromises by all who participated and includes diligent attention to the input received through the public comment proceedings. While the report is final at this stage, an additional opportunity will be provided for CCWG-Accountability members to revise, retract or add minority statements to the final report. Located in Appendix A, minority statements will be updated and released on 25 February. We will make ourselves available, together with or other key contributors, to the Chartering Organizations before and during the ICANN55 meeting in Marrakech to answer any questions and explain any details of the report. Background documents, slides, recordings and transcripts of recent webinars that explain the details of the report are available here. The CCWG-Accountability leadership team would like to thank everyone for taking part in this historic process to redefine ICANN’s accountability to the multistakeholder community. This work entailed significant time and attention from each of the CCWG-Accountability volunteers and staff who have been dedicated to the development of this report. We look forward to hearing from our Chartering Organizations and are optimistic we will be able to send the approved final supplemental report to the ICANN Board for transmission to NTIA in Marrakech. Thomas, Mathieu, León CCWG-Accountability co-Chairs

1 0

recap and next steps?
by Jordan Carter Feb. 23, 2016

Feb. 23, 2016

Hi all I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed but trying to help the discussion along. Here's the background that has caused the current extension of debate, as I understand it: - CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. (In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both). - if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four other SOs and ACs participating. - CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation. - the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 SOs/ACs should apply. - some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the Board has breached the mission / bylaws - other participants think it's broader than that and applies whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice - the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower threshold where an IRP finds against it. - there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually decided in this, which is driving the discussion. So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do: - we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified. - we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that the Board isn't happy with. - we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation) - we have to publish the report I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible. I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this issue. Here's why I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being: - the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement - the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment If I thought this was an important issue which would have a significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting non-negotiable positions. I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a conclusion on that, and get the report out. SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front of us and come to a decision about what to do. If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you find yourself a ditch? :-) best Jordan -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Understanding of Amended Paragraph 72 of Annex 2
by Burr, Becky Feb. 23, 2016

Feb. 23, 2016

Phil, I believe this is correct. As I said, phrase (2) deals with a corner case. Becky J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Phil Corwin <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>> Date: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 at 2:24 PM To: Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Understanding of Amended Paragraph 72 of Annex 2 Now that the Co-Chairs have just issued their decision on how to proceed, I want to return to a subject that I first raised in the chat room on the call held twelve hours ago. Section 72 of Annex 2 will now read [bracketed text in red to be deleted]: The CCWG-Accountability also recommends that in a situation where the GAC may not participate as a Decisional Participant because the Community Power is proposed to be used to challenge the Board’s implementation of GAC consensus advice and the threshold is set at four in support, the power will still be validly exercised if three are in support and no more than one objects, with the following exception: · Where the power to be exercised is recalling the entire Board for implementing GAC advice, the reduced threshold would apply only [either (1)] after an IRP has found that, in implementing GAC advice, the Board acted inconsistently with the ICANN Bylaws[, or (2) if the IRP is not available to challenge the Board action in question]. If the Empowered Community has brought such an IRP and does not prevail, the Empowered Community may not exercise its power to recall the entire the Board solely on the basis of the matter decided by the IRP. It may, however, exercise that power based on other grounds. As I read the remaining text, the first paragraph establishes the general principle that in any situation where the Empowered Community proposes to challenge the Board’s implementation of GAC consensus advice, using any of the available community powers, the GAC would be barred from being a decisional participant, and that where the threshold for taking action is four SO/Ac votes it would drop to three. I would note in passing that the voting threshold for exercise of a community power is set at four (per items 46-70) for only three community powers: 1. Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget 2. Recall the entire Board of Directors 3. Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process Paragraph 2 then goes on to create an exception for that reduced threshold situation -- applicable only to removal of the Board in its entirety, and not to rejection of an operating plan/budget or a review of IANA functions where the Board has acted pursuant to GAC consensus advice. For Board removal in its entirety the EC would first be required to pursue an IRP – and if the IRP determined that the Board implementation of GAC consensus advice had not violated the Bylaws the reduced voting threshold would not apply, and the matter could not be further pursued unless there were other, non-Bylaws grounds for pursuing it. In the latter instance (non-Bylaws ground), the threshold for full Board removal would be four votes (unanimity of all SOs and ACs other than the GAC, which would remain non-decisional). Are we agreed on that view so far? Now here is where it gets interesting, in regard to matters of Board implementation of GAC consensus advice about which the community was aggrieved, and regardless of whether such implementation involved an alleged Bylaws violation and was therefore subject to an IRP --- If the community sought to exercise power 4a contained at section 55 – “Remove an individual Board Director nominated by an SO or AC (and appointed by the Empowered Community)” – none of the above in para 72 would be relevant because the majority of the nominating SO/AC could do that on its own by an internal 3Ž4 majority vote after inviting and considering comments from all SOs/ACs (noting that it’s not entirely clear whether the GAC would be barred from commenting, although it’s of little relevance since the electing SO/AC is in no way bound by the opinions of the others). That removal could include the Chairman of the Board if he/she was the nominee of a particular SO or AC. If the community sought to exercise power 4b contained at section 58 – “Remove an individual Board Director nominated by the Nominating Committee (and appointed by the Empowered Community)” – the lowered threshold requirement in para 72 would not be relevant because the required threshold support is “Three support, and no more than one objection”, and the GAC would be barred as a decisional participant if the challenge pertained to the Board member voting to implement GAC consensus advice. Again, this power is available to remove the Chair if he/she was a NomCom appointee (Note: I have checked the ICANN Bylaws and any Board member other the President/CEO, regardless of how they were placed on the Board, can be elected to the Chair or Vice Chair position). Putting this all together, even after the CCWG’s Co-Chairs decision to proceed with striking clause 2 of the second paragraph of section 72, the Empowered Community could still remove the Board Chairman and Vice Chair (and sequentially chosen replacement Chairs and Vice Chairs, if they failed to lead the Board to reverse its decision implementing GAC advice), and could remove one or more additional members of the Board, whether placed on the Board by an SO/AC or by the NomCom, so long as such actions were taken individually and not collectively. And the community, if the aggrieved view was sufficiently widespread, could collectively remove (and then replace) sufficient numbers of Board members to compel a reversal of the implementation of GAC consensus advice. Indeed, there is no limitation placed on the number of Board members who may be removed via community powers 4a and 4b so long as each is a discrete assertion of those powers pertaining to a particular Board member. If I am correct on this interpretation then, the removal of clause 2 may not be all that significant. If anyone believes that my interpretation of any or all of this is incorrect – especially Board or GAC members – I would urge them to voice disagreement now. I would also welcome expressions of support for this interpretation. If you have read this far, thanks. Best to all, Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey

3 2

Poll tally
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 23, 2016

Feb. 23, 2016

For those interested, I did a breakdown of the poll results. For each poll, the numbers are Total, Members, Participants, Others Remove #2 Support (poll 3): 38, 10, 23, 5 Remove #2 Object (poll 1): 11, 2, 9, 0 Send Proposal As Is Support (poll 4): 14, 2, 12, 0 Send Proposal As Is Object (poll 2): 30, 8, 18, 4 This was based on the lists distributed by Grace plus Kavouss added to poll 2. Alan

1 0

Updated Proposal Documents Available for Review
by Hillary Jett Feb. 23, 2016

Feb. 23, 2016

Hello all, As requested by the co-Chairs, staff has made available the updated Core Proposal, Annexes and Appendices as they were prepared after comments received from the 17 February posting in anticipation of a 19 February distribution of the proposal to the Chartering Organizations. They can be found on the wiki here (https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw) These documents are not final, however have been made available for preliminary review. Any discussions on the list from 19 February to now are not reflected. Thanks, Hillary -- Hillary Jett Communications Coordinator Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Mobile: +1 (202) 674-3403 Email: hillary.jett(a)icann.org

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report and next steps
by Thomas Rickert Feb. 23, 2016

Feb. 23, 2016

Dear CCWG-Accountability, We wanted to inform you that the revisions have been made from the comments that have been received from the lawyers, several community members, and from the 16 February call. These have been incorporated into the sections that were noted. The graphics are being revised and will be placed in the final version of the text per the suggestions that have been submitted to date. The revised sections have been posted at https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw <https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw> for your final review. We have also posted a documents that tracks all the comments — and subsequent changes made — between the 12 February and 17 February documents. The schedule presented on the 16 February call that we are following to conclude our current work on Work Stream 1 has been updated. 12 Feb — Report sent by 22:00 UTC to the CCWG Leadership Team and CCWG Legal Counsel for review with all materials posted on the Wiki (https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw <https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw>) for everyone to view. 15 Feb — Report updated (if needed) to incorporate edits from CCWG Leadership Team and Legal. 17 Feb— Report sent to CCWG for 48-hour review (and posted on the Wiki at https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw <https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw>). To ensure that all comments from our CCWG Leadership Team and Legal counsel were accurately incorporated for the full group review period, distribution to the CCWG was updated to 17 Feb. To maintain the 48-hour review period, all subsequent proposal finalization dates have been extended one day. All other dates have been retained. 18 Feb at 17:00 UTC – Minority statements due for incorporation into Final Report. 19 Feb – Final Report sent to Chartering Organizations for consideration and approval. Once the Final Report is in the hands of your organizations, these are the expected dates for the final steps, as we discussed on the Transition Program Facilitation <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/transition-facilitation-2015-09-23-en> call this past Tuesday: 25 Feb – CWG-Stewardship sign-off letter delivered to Chartering Organizations, then to ICG. By 9 Mar at the latest – Sign-off on Final Report by Chartering Organizations at ICANN55 in Marrakech (in time for the Board to consider). 10 Mar – Public Board Meeting and hand over from ICANN Board to NTIA. Based on the updated schedule, minority statements must be submitted no later than 18 February at 17:00 UTC to allow for the final supplemental proposal to be produced and ready for distribution to the Chartering Organizations on 19 February. If you have any questions about our timeline or suggestions for our process, please let us know how we can assist. Sincerely, Mathieu, León and Thomas CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs

10 23

A message from the Co-Chairs
by León Felipe Sánchez Ambía Feb. 22, 2016

Feb. 22, 2016

Dear all, As you are aware, we intended to publish our Final Report today (19 February 2016) for Chartering Organization consideration. We are ready to do so, except for one issue where we would like to consider options as a full group. There is, still, ongoing discussion on the issue of thresholds for Board removal in Recommendation #2, which raised concerns in our report after we came to a compromise on Board consideration of GAC Advice (Recommendation #11). Since then, we have tried to propose compromise text that would be acceptable by different groups (c.f. the 12 February and 17 February drafts, posted at https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw <https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw>). We received comments on this issue, and in some cases, minority statements, from members and participants in the ALAC, GAC, GNSO, and the Board. Earlier today, ICANN Chairman, Steve Crocker, posted a note, apparently on behalf of the Icann Board, outlining Board concerns with the latest attempt at compromise text proposed on 17 February: http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-February/… <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-February/…>. While these last minute interventions are deeply disappointing for those of us who worked extremely hard, within the group and within their respective communities, to build bridges and promote compromise, our main target and duty remains to achieve a stable level of consensus, respecting the bottom-up, multistakeholder nature of the process. It is fortunate that the Board provided this input before we published the report, since it enables us to assess the potential consequences of a Board disagreement later in the process. We believe this issue must be discussed before sending our Final Report to Chartering Organizations. At the very least, we would like the opportunity to discuss a way forward and process as full group on next Tuesday’s CCWG-Accountability call at 06:00 UTC. There are many options and directions the group can take at this stage, each with different implications and considerations, and these options should be discussed as a group. Until the Tuesday call, let’s keep open channels of communication on our mailing list and work towards a solution. We will also reach out to the Chartering Organizations to inform them of the change in our schedule. As co-chairs, we renew our call upon every Member, upon every Participant, our call upon community leaders especially in the ICANN Board, in the GNSO and in the GAC to step away from confronting each other, to engage constructively and recognize each other’s value to the multistakeholder model. If you believe that the multistakeholder model can deliver, now is the time to act accordingly. Thank you, Thomas, León, Mathieu CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs

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CCWG ACCT Proposed Agenda - Call #85 - Tuesday, 23 February @ 06:00 UTC
by Brenda Brewer Feb. 22, 2016

Feb. 22, 2016

Dear All, In preparation for your call #85 <https://community.icann.org/x/QAOAAw> - Tuesday, 23 February 2016 at 06:00 - 08:00 UTC (time converter <http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/fixedtime.html?msg=CCWG+ACCT+Meeting&… ah=2> ), see below a proposed agenda: 1. Welcome, Roll call, SoI 2. Substantive discussion on way forward 3. AOB Adobe Connect: https://icann.adobeconnect.com/accountability/ <https://icann.adobeconnect.com/accountability/> Thank you! Kind regards, Brenda

4 5

further responses to ICANN
by Burr, Becky Feb. 22, 2016

Feb. 22, 2016

My further responses inline Dear Becky Thank you very much for your replies. However, I feel we should separate intentions from facts in such replies and/or clarifications. In this regard, although only 0.1% (in your estimation) of the instances the carve-out would apply are those where the Board decision is consistent with the Bylaws, the fact is that the carve-out rule makes no such distinction, correct? Correct, that distinction is not made in the context of any of the community powers and was not made in the GAC carve-out context until the Board’s recent intervention. As to the participation of any other SO and AC on both tracks, I kindly asked to confirm a fact (that any other SO or AC may fully participate, with the only exception pf the GAC). I infer that you are confirming it, right? Yes, I think that’s perfectly obvious Jorge. (Reasons for doing so are something different and have been discussed and no full agreement found to date if I dare say so.) thanks again and regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet Am 22.02.2016 um 14:54 schrieb Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz><mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz>>: J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz>

2 1

Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it
by Burr, Becky Feb. 22, 2016

Feb. 22, 2016

Responses in line J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>" <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> Date: Monday, February 22, 2016 at 8:13 AM To: Becky Burr <becky.burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz>>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> Cc: "steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>" <steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>>, "icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>" <icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: AW: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it Dear Kavouss, dear Becky Thanks so much! >From the responses I received, it seems that the carve-out applies generally whenever there is a Board decision to implement GAC Advice, even when that Board decision is deemed by the IRP to be perfectly consistent with ICANN Bylaws. Hence, we should be clear that there is no relation between the carve-out and the consistency with the Bylaws, right? Reasons for bringing such a challenge can be purely based on different interests, right? No, the carve out reflects the principle that we have discussed at great length. The GAC should not have the authority BOTH to force the Board to the negotiating table at any time over any issues and to block community challenge of the results of those Board/GAC negotiations. The status of GAC Advice differentiates it from any other kind of advice. I suspect that 99.9% of the time that challenge will involve an alleged bylaws violations, but maybe not. It is just a rule that excludes the GAC from (a decisional role in) any community decision where a Board decision to implement GAC Advice is at stake. Correct, it bars the GAC from participating as a decision-maker in a discussion of a decision to use one of the community powers in that situation. A further question: if such a Board decision is based both on a SO recommendation, an ALAC advice and a GAC Advice, the only entity to be excluded from a community process would be the GAC, right? But the other SO and AC would participate on both tracks, correct? I’ve provided my views on this several times Jorge. Please refer to my email about why GAC Advice is different from a PDP. As to the threshold question: it merely has to do with the Board recall, but does not affect any of the mentioned characteristics of the carve-out, correct? The Boards concern is only about lowering the threshold to 3 in the context of Board recall. Thanks very much for any further guidance Best Jorge Von: Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] Gesendet: Montag, 22. Februar 2016 14:00 An: Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>; kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> Cc: steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>; icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it Jorge- The carve out would apply but you would need 4 SO/AC s to recall the Board. Becky J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc./Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office:+1.202.533.2932 Mobile:+1.202.352.6367 /neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: "Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>" <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> Date: Monday, February 22, 2016 at 6:44 AM To: Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> Cc: "steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>" <steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>>, "icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>" <icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it Dear Kavouss Thanks for the clarification. Hence, do I understand correctly that the carve-out (exclusion of GAC as decisional participant) applies also if the Board decision to implement GAC Advice has been found by the IRP to be perfectly consistent with the Bylaws? Thanks for your guidance Regards Jorge Von: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Gesendet: Montag, 22. Februar 2016 12:41 An: Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> Cc: Mueller, Milton L <milton(a)gatech.edu<mailto:milton@gatech.edu>>; Steve Crocker <steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>>; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>; Icann-board ICANN <icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it Dear Jorge, You are right The carve out applies to all cases either in application of IRP or in the absence of IRP For the first Board's agreed with reduced threshold from 4 to 3 for Board's Spill For the second the Board wishes that the 4 SO/AC threshold applies . Some people in the community like me fully supportting the Board's views. Some others are against This is one of the issue that must be resolved tomorrow Regards Kavouss 2016-02-22 12:25 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>: Dear all >From this email by Milton it seems that some (as Milton) are understanding that the carve-out only would apply if the Board decision to implement GAC Advice is found (by the IRP I guess) to be inconsistent with the Bylaws. I have been away for one week, but I feel that the carve-out was meant to apply generally to situations where there is Board implementation of GAC Advice... Could someone kindly clarify the status? Best regards Jorge -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Im Auftrag von Mueller, Milton L Gesendet: Sonntag, 21. Februar 2016 23:34 An: Steve Crocker <steve.crocker(a)icann.org<mailto:steve.crocker@icann.org>>; Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Cc: Icann-board ICANN <icann-board(a)icann.org<mailto:icann-board@icann.org>> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it Steve I think Andrew got the issue exactly right. I do not see how your answer even engages with his argument, which is that nearly all of the community has agreed that when board actions are challenged for being out of mission by following GAC advice, that the GAC should not be in a position to rule on that. Claiming that the GAC does not have "extraordinary power" does not answer Andrew's argument. Whether the GAC has extraordinary power or not, if it advises you (the board) to do something that the rest of the community thinks is outside of the bounds of the bylaws (which it has a demonstrated tendency to do) the GAC should not be a decisional member of the empowered community that decides whether we get to challenge that action. >From that premise on, it is all arithmetic, as Andrew showed: > > This is a choice entirely within the GAC's power. It must choose. > > If it chooses to be board-advisor-GAC, then it is in effect choosing > > that it prefers that mode of operation to being part of the wider > > Empowered Community mechanism. In effect, a GAC choice can reduce > > the possible actors in the Empowered Community to four. Otherwise, > > the GAC is in a position to insist on advice it gave being > > considered first by the board, and then that the GAC can also > > participate in the judgement of the Board's actions. That's the > > very "two bites" problem that we were trying to solve. I believe > > that in most organizations (including many governments), it would be > > regarded as surprising that a participant in the to-be-judged action also gets to be one of the judges. You have not refuted this, as I said before you have not even engaged with this. This increases my suspicion that the board's position is based on a political calculus, not on good governance or accountability criteria. Further, it is clear from the reaction you have gotten that the board is not proposing a "friendly amendment." In these rules of procedure, a friendly amendment has to be accepted by the group that proposed it, and clearly it is not. I am deeply disturbed by the board upsetting a consensual compromise, and a very difficult one, for the third time in this process. I wonder if you have any appreciation of the potential costs of this, particularly when it involves an issue as sensitive as the role of national governments in ICANN. Dr. Milton L. Mueller Professor, School of Public Policy Georgia Institute of Technology _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…>

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it
by Kavouss Arasteh Feb. 22, 2016

Feb. 22, 2016

Dear Jorge, WAIT FOR BECKIE'S REPLY. 2016-02-22 14:37 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>: > Beckie > You are the architect of IRP > You are the artchitect of Carve-out > What you mentioned does need clarification > What you said is inconsistant with Rec.2 > Please clarify which option of Rec.2 you referring? > TRegards > Kavouss > > 2016-02-22 14:13 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch>: > >> Dear Kavouss, dear Becky >> >> >> >> Thanks so much! >> >> >> >> From the responses I received, it seems that the carve-out applies >> generally whenever there is a Board decision to implement GAC Advice, even >> when that Board decision is deemed by the IRP to be perfectly consistent >> with ICANN Bylaws. >> >> >> >> Hence, we should be clear that there is no relation between the carve-out >> and the consistency with the Bylaws, right? Reasons for bringing such a >> challenge can be purely based on different interests, right? >> >> >> >> It is just a rule that excludes the GAC from (a decisional role in) any >> community decision where a Board decision to implement GAC Advice is at >> stake. >> >> >> >> A further question: if such a Board decision is based both on a SO >> recommendation, an ALAC advice and a GAC Advice, the only entity to be >> excluded from a community process would be the GAC, right? But the other SO >> and AC would participate on both tracks, correct? >> >> >> >> As to the threshold question: it merely has to do with the Board recall, >> but does not affect any of the mentioned characteristics of the carve-out, >> correct? >> >> >> >> Thanks very much for any further guidance >> >> >> >> Best >> >> >> >> Jorge >> >> >> >> >> >> *Von:* Burr, Becky [mailto:Becky.Burr@neustar.biz] >> *Gesendet:* Montag, 22. Februar 2016 14:00 >> *An:* Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch>; >> kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com >> *Cc:* steve.crocker(a)icann.org; icann-board(a)icann.org; >> accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org >> >> *Betreff:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it >> >> >> >> Jorge- >> >> >> >> The carve out would apply but you would need 4 SO/AC s to recall the >> Board. >> >> >> >> Becky >> >> >> >> *J. Beckwith Burr* >> *Neustar, Inc.* / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >> 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 >> *Office:* +1.202.533.2932 *Mobile:* +1.202.352.6367 */* *neustar.biz* >> <http://www.neustar.biz> >> >> >> >> *From: *"Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch" <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch> >> *Date: *Monday, February 22, 2016 at 6:44 AM >> *To: *Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> >> *Cc: *"steve.crocker(a)icann.org" <steve.crocker(a)icann.org>, " >> icann-board(a)icann.org" <icann-board(a)icann.org>, Accountability Community >> <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> >> *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it >> >> >> >> Dear Kavouss >> >> >> >> Thanks for the clarification. >> >> >> >> Hence, do I understand correctly that the carve-out (exclusion of GAC as >> decisional participant) applies also if the Board decision to implement GAC >> Advice has been found by the IRP to be perfectly consistent with the Bylaws? >> >> >> >> Thanks for your guidance >> >> >> >> Regards >> >> >> >> Jorge >> >> >> >> *Von:* Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com >> <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>] >> *Gesendet:* Montag, 22. Februar 2016 12:41 >> *An:* Cancio Jorge BAKOM <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch> >> *Cc:* Mueller, Milton L <milton(a)gatech.edu>; Steve Crocker < >> steve.crocker(a)icann.org>; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org; >> Icann-board ICANN <icann-board(a)icann.org> >> *Betreff:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it >> >> >> >> Dear Jorge, >> >> You are right >> >> The carve out applies to all cases either in application of IRP or in the >> absence of IRP >> >> For the first Board's agreed with reduced threshold from 4 to 3 for >> Board's Spill >> >> For the second the Board wishes that the 4 SO/AC threshold applies . >> >> Some people in the community like me fully supportting the Board's views. >> >> Some others are against >> >> This is one of the issue that must be resolved tomorrow >> >> Regards >> >> Kavouss >> >> >> >> 2016-02-22 12:25 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio(a)bakom.admin.ch>: >> >> Dear all >> >> >> >> From this email by Milton it seems that some (as Milton) are >> understanding that the carve-out only would apply if the Board decision to >> implement GAC Advice is found (by the IRP I guess) to be inconsistent with >> the Bylaws. >> >> >> >> I have been away for one week, but I feel that the carve-out was meant to >> apply *generally* to situations where there is Board implementation of >> GAC Advice... >> >> >> >> Could someone kindly clarify the status? >> >> >> >> Best regards >> >> >> >> Jorge >> >> >> >> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- >> Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto: >> accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org] Im Auftrag von >> Mueller, Milton L >> Gesendet: Sonntag, 21. Februar 2016 23:34 >> An: Steve Crocker <steve.crocker(a)icann.org>; Accountability Community < >> accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> >> Cc: Icann-board ICANN <icann-board(a)icann.org> >> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] The GAC made me do it >> >> >> >> Steve >> >> I think Andrew got the issue exactly right. I do not see how your answer >> even engages with his argument, which is that nearly all of the community >> has agreed that when board actions are challenged for being out of mission >> by following GAC advice, that the GAC should not be in a position to rule >> on that. >> >> >> >> Claiming that the GAC does not have "extraordinary power" does not answer >> Andrew's argument. Whether the GAC has extraordinary power or not, if it >> advises you (the board) to do something that the rest of the community >> thinks is outside of the bounds of the bylaws (which it has a demonstrated >> tendency to do) the GAC should not be a decisional member of the empowered >> community that decides whether we get to challenge that action. >> >> >> >> From that premise on, it is all arithmetic, as Andrew showed: >> >> >> >> > > This is a choice entirely within the GAC's power. It must choose. >> >> > > If it chooses to be board-advisor-GAC, then it is in effect choosing >> >> > > that it prefers that mode of operation to being part of the wider >> >> > > Empowered Community mechanism. In effect, a GAC choice can reduce >> >> > > the possible actors in the Empowered Community to four. Otherwise, >> >> > > the GAC is in a position to insist on advice it gave being >> >> > > considered first by the board, and then that the GAC can also >> >> > > participate in the judgement of the Board's actions. That's the >> >> > > very "two bites" problem that we were trying to solve. I believe >> >> > > that in most organizations (including many governments), it would be >> >> > > regarded as surprising that a participant in the to-be-judged action >> also gets to be one of the judges. >> >> >> >> You have not refuted this, as I said before you have not even engaged >> with this. >> >> This increases my suspicion that the board's position is based on a >> political calculus, not on good governance or accountability criteria. >> >> >> >> Further, it is clear from the reaction you have gotten that the board is >> not proposing a "friendly amendment." In these rules of procedure, a >> friendly amendment has to be accepted by the group that proposed it, and >> clearly it is not. >> >> >> >> I am deeply disturbed by the board upsetting a consensual compromise, and >> a very difficult one, for the third time in this process. I wonder if you >> have any appreciation of the potential costs of this, particularly when it >> involves an issue as sensitive as the role of national governments in >> ICANN. >> >> >> >> Dr. Milton L. Mueller >> >> Professor, School of Public Policy >> >> Georgia Institute of Technology >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> >> >> >> > >

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A message from the Co-Chairs
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 22, 2016

Feb. 22, 2016

Dear Kavouss, I have a question about the following statement. At 21/02/2016 04:12 PM, Kavouss Arasteh wrote: > * In future only a full Consensus Advice in the absence of any > formal objection would be considered by the Board which is quite > different from existing situation . This make it very probable that > as of the date of the transition coming in to force , NO MORE GAC > ADVICE WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE Board due to the > fact that, no matter how much efforts be made by 154 existing GAC > Members, one single Government on any ground as it so wishes > could block that Advice not to become eligible for consideration by > the Board. This is a new working method that enshrining a clear > VETO to null out efforts of the rest of the GAC members in this > regard. This is resulted from the proposed ST18 The current GAC Principle 47 says that decisions on Advice to the ICANN Board will be made "the practice of adopting decisions by general agreement in the absence of any formal objection". The current Proposal recommendation 11 says that the Board requires 60% to reject GAC Advice developed with "the practice of adopting decisions by general agreement in the absence of any formal objection". Perhaps I am missing something, but why do you say that going forward using this requirement which increases the Board rejection threshold from 50%+1 to 60% but otherwise uses the same words as are in force today, will make it impossible for the Board to consider GAC Advice? Certainly the GAC has developed Advice before and the Board has acted on it. Alan

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Board position re the GAC carve out
by Steve Crocker Feb. 21, 2016

Feb. 21, 2016

CCWG Colleagues, The Board has a serious and continued concern about the issues being raised that may result in the reduction of the GAC’s ability to participate in community decision making. This is most noticeable in the question of thresholds for board removal, however this is not an issue about removal or even thresholds, it is one part of the community being (or perceiving that it is being) sidelined. The Board’s concerns with this issue are not about Board removal, but about maintaining the balanced multistakeholder model. The Board is against any changes to the long established equilibrium and fairness among the different stakeholders within ICANN. The Board has long supported a threshold of four participants for Board removal in the ultimate escalation method proposed by the CCWG. Selecting one portion of the ICANN community and removing them from the equation - just through the ability to say that the community is unhappy with the acceptance of GAC advice that is within ICANN’s bylaws - raises significant concerns about how the multistakeholder model, and the ultimate stability of ICANN as an organization, can be maintained. This carved out exception undercuts the established role of governments within the multi stakeholder process, and could introduce new issues with the acceptance of ICANN’s model undermining the work of the CCWG. We understand that there are concerns with this path from within other parts of ICANN community, including members of the GAC and ALAC. The best course, in our opinion, would be a careful and objective discussion of the whole matter of how advice from ALL parties is appropriately considered within ICANN. If there is a graceful way to remove this matter from the immediate pressure of the deadline of submitting this proposal and make it a priority matter for either the implementation phase or Work Stream 2, we think there will be a solution which is genuinely good for everyone. We encourage you to share the CCWG’s proposal with the Chartering Organizations while the dialog on this outstanding point continues. Thank you, Steve Crocker Chair, ICANN Board of Directors

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps?
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 21, 2016

Feb. 21, 2016

Phil, let's be honest. If we had adopted a membership model, it is the same cats that we would be herding to exercise membership powers. Alan At 21/02/2016 12:24 PM, Phil Corwin wrote: >"... so what conclusions can be drawn from the fact that we can't >even hold the Board to the same rules that we have established for >ourselves in this process?" > >The same conclusion that can be drawn from the fact that "we" folded >on the Member model in Dublin when the Board protested, rather than >insisting that ICANN's single member community have the same >statutory powers as any other California non-profit corporation. > >Don't get me wrong. The accountability powers in the current >proposal are far more robust than what we have at present. But >getting the level of community cohesion to exercise the more >powerful ones will be like herding cats. > >Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal >Virtualaw LLC >1155 F Street, NW >Suite 1050 >Washington, DC 20004 >202-559-8597/Direct >202-559-8750/Fax >202-255-6172/cell > >Twitter: @VlawDC > >"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey > > >-----Original Message----- >From: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org >[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf >Of Schaefer, Brett >Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 6:59 AM >To: Jordan Carter >Cc: Accountability Cross Community >Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] recap and next steps? > >Jordan, > >This is a good summary. > >I am offended at how the Board has abused its power in this process >by violating process, procedure and timelines to push its agenda. > >I would ask one additional question. Our entire proposal is focused >on how to make ICANN accountable to the community, so what >conclusions can be drawn from the fact that we can't even hold the >Board to the same rules that we have established for ourselves in this process? > >Best, > >Brett > > >________________________________ >Brett Schaefer >Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory >Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for >National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation >214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE >Washington, DC 20002 >202-608-6097 >heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> > >On Feb 20, 2016, at 10:28 PM, Jordan Carter ><jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote: > >Hi all > >I'm trying for a recap / reset in this message, not sure I succeed >but trying to help the discussion along. > >Here's the background that has caused the current extension of >debate, as I understand it: > >- CCWG incorporated the idea that a decisional participant with a >special role (GAC's advisory role that requires due deference by the >Board, unique among ACs) should not be a decision-maker in applying >accountability powers in relation to the consequences of that role. >(In other words, GAC can choose - either consensus advice, or the >ability to decide on accountability powers re its views - but not both). > >- if GAC is excluded from decisions, there would likely be four >other SOs and ACs participating. > >- CCWG developed a principle that the use of community powers should >not require unanimity for their use, so a proposal was made that the >threshold for the Board Removal power should lower to 3 in such a situation. > >- the debate since has been about when that lower threshold of 3 >SOs/ACs should apply. > > - some participants think it's only if an IRP holds that the > Board has breached the mission / bylaws > > - other participants think it's broader than that and applies > whenever the cause is related to Board responses to GAC advice > >- the Board has repeatedly said that it does not want the "no >unanimity" principle to apply, but is willing to accept the lower >threshold where an IRP finds against it. > >- there seems to be disagreement about what the CCWG actually >decided in this, which is driving the discussion. > > >So here is what I think are some basics that we have to do: > >- we have to reach clarity about what precisely we have decided, and >if there were any gaps in that, they need to be specified. > >- we have to decide what to do if that clarity exposes alternatives >that haven't been decided between - that may include a position that >the Board isn't happy with. > >- we have to choose alternative that can drive the widest possible >consensus within the group (unlike Steve Crocker's email, I don't >think that a decision on this can be pushed to implementation) > >- we have to publish the report > >I'm not a spokesperson for the leadership team but I can say that >I'll be doing what I can with the co-chairs and other rapporteurs to >help make sure that the options are as clear as they can be for our >meeting on Tuesday -- so that the chances of confusion are as low as possible. > >I've said before that I don't mind where the group finalises on this >issue. Here's why > >I do not think it's likely that the community is going to use the >new accountability powers to disagree with Board implementation of >matters that include GAC advice in the future. There are a number >of reasons why I hold that view, two key ones being: > >- the improving transparency of GAC advice and particularly the >GNSO/GAC engagement and the Board/GAC engagement >- the existence of the new accountability framework, which makes it >less likely the Board will go against strong community sentiment > >If I thought this was an important issue which would have a >significant impact on our package, and that it was a life or death >matter to resolve one way or the other, I would be very offended by >the way this has played out in the past few days. But because the >stakes are so low on the substance, I am *very* happy to fall into >consensus with whatever direction the group wants to go, and I *do >not* see this as an issue where *anyone* should be adopting >non-negotiable positions. > >I don't expect that everyone will agree with me that this simply >isn't that important an issue, but I really hope that as a CCWG, we >can put this matter into perspective. The CCWG has to come to a >conclusion on that, and get the report out. > > >SO -- hopefully on Tuesday we can work through the options in front >of us and come to a decision about what to do. > >If any party gets to the point on this issue that they feel like >dying in the ditch is worth it, well may I humbly suggest that you >find yourself a ditch? :-) > > >best >Jordan > >-- >Jordan Carter > >Chief Executive >InternetNZ - your voice for the Open Internet > >+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) >Email: jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> >Skype: jordancarter >Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> > > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >----- >No virus found in this message. >Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >Version: 2016.0.7303 / Virus Database: 4530/11623 - Release Date: 02/14/16 >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A message from the Co-Chairs
by Kavouss Arasteh Feb. 21, 2016

Feb. 21, 2016

Dear All, The simplest and most straight forward was to resolve the issue; address/ meet the Boards Concerns is that in no way and Under any circumstances, the Spill of the Board should be decided by less than 4SO/ AC. That was the golden ruilehat everybody agreed before this so-called CARVE_OUT being proposed generating considerable disagreements and disputes Imagine that all we have done to bring ther Board on CCWG SIDE would be compromised if the Bioard tables a SERIOUS CONCERNS /disagreement on reduction on the Number os SO/AC from 4 to 3 ,no matter Under what circumnstances. Retention 4 SO(AC for Spill over of the Board may decrease the concerns of Carve-out to a greater extent Regards Kavouss 2016-02-20 5:08 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>: > Yes Thanks > IT WAS A MISTAKE > RrEGARDS > kavouss > > 2016-02-20 4:50 GMT+01:00 Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com>: > >> The next call is on 23 February at 0600 UTC. >> >> >> On Friday, February 19, 2016, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Dear Co-Chairs >>> >>> Here it is 0340UTC and I am still following all exchanged e-mails. >>> >>> Some of them promising and some other disappointing >>> >>> The Co-Chairs decision to hold on the forwarding the final report till >>> the issue of threshold is resolved is the most WISE and the most >>> appropriate decision. >>> >>> I fully support it . >>> >>> Good luck for CCWG call on 26 Feb. >>> >>> Regards >>> >>> Kavouss >>> >>> 2016-02-20 1:19 GMT+01:00 León Felipe Sánchez Ambía < >>> leonfelipe(a)sanchez.mx>: >>> >>>> Dear all, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> As you are aware, we intended to publish our Final Report today (19 >>>> February 2016) for Chartering Organization consideration. We are ready to >>>> do so, except for one issue where we would like to consider options as a >>>> full group. >>>> >>>> There is, still, ongoing discussion on the issue of thresholds for >>>> Board removal in Recommendation #2, which raised concerns in our report >>>> after we came to a compromise on Board consideration of GAC Advice >>>> (Recommendation #11). Since then, we have tried to propose compromise text >>>> that would be acceptable by different groups (c.f. the 12 February and 17 >>>> February drafts, posted at https://community.icann.org/x/iw2AAw) >>>> >>>> We received comments on this issue, and in some cases, minority >>>> statements, from members and participants in the ALAC, GAC, GNSO, and the >>>> Board. Earlier today, ICANN Chairman, Steve Crocker, posted a note, >>>> apparently on behalf of the Icann Board, outlining Board concerns with the >>>> latest attempt at compromise text proposed on 17 February: >>>> http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2016-February/…. >>>> >>>> >>>> While these last minute interventions are deeply disappointing for >>>> those of us who worked extremely hard, within the group and within their >>>> respective communities, to build bridges and promote compromise, our main >>>> target and duty remains to achieve a stable level of consensus, respecting >>>> the bottom-up, multistakeholder nature of the process. >>>> >>>> It is fortunate that the Board provided this input before we published >>>> the report, since it enables us to assess the potential consequences of a >>>> Board disagreement later in the process. >>>> >>>> We believe this issue must be discussed before sending our Final Report >>>> to Chartering Organizations. At the very least, we would like the >>>> opportunity to discuss a way forward and process as full group on next >>>> Tuesday’s CCWG-Accountability call at 06:00 UTC. There are many options and >>>> directions the group can take at this stage, each with different >>>> implications and considerations, and these options should be discussed as a >>>> group. >>>> >>>> Until the Tuesday call, let’s keep open channels of communication on >>>> our mailing list and work towards a solution. We will also reach out to the >>>> Chartering Organizations to inform them of the change in our schedule. >>>> >>>> As co-chairs, we renew our call upon every Member, upon every >>>> Participant, our call upon community leaders especially in the ICANN Board, >>>> in the GNSO and in the GAC to step away from confronting each other, to >>>> engage constructively and recognize each other’s value to the >>>> multistakeholder model. If you believe that the multistakeholder model can >>>> deliver, now is the time to act accordingly. >>>> >>>> Thank you, >>>> >>>> >>>> Thomas, León, Mathieu >>>> >>>> *CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>>> >>>> >>> >

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] what the Board is objecting to here -
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 20, 2016

Feb. 20, 2016

The Supplemental Proposal says that the threshold CAN be reduced to three under two conditions: (1) after an IRP has found that, in implementing GAC advice, the Board acted inconsistently with the ICANN Bylaws, or (2) if the IRP is not available to challenge the Board action in question. My recollection is that the Board proposed only (1). Becky (and/or perhaps others) proposed (2), but I do not recall it being accepted by the Board or by the CCWG as a whole. Alan At 19/02/2016 04:38 PM, Jordan Carter wrote: >Ok. If Steve Crocker could also confirm that his >understanding is the same, that would be very helpful. > > >On the overall point - the board has already >made its view on that question clear. Steve's >email doesn't reference the GPI test that is the >only basis the Board has set out to object to >ccwg proposals, and which it has invoked prior. > >The intervention thus has two effects. It is a >source of uncertainty, because it isn't clear. >And it is a source of delay, because the intent >and the group's response to it has to be clarified. > >Once again, we face a further delay thanks to >the way the ICANN board has chosen to behave. I >guess I wish I could say I was surprised, or >disappointed - but that's long gone. I'm just >confused: what is the end game here? > >If anyone knows, please feel free to share. > >Jordan > >On Saturday, 20 February 2016, Samantha Eisner ><<mailto:Samantha.Eisner@icann.org>Samantha.Eisner(a)icann.org> wrote: >Hi Becky - > >There was another thread on this from Alan, but >wanted to confirm in this thread too that this >is the correct understanding of the Boardâs concern. > >Thanks, >Sam > >From: ><accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org> >on behalf of "Burr, Becky" <Becky.Burr(a)neustar.biz> >Date: Friday, February 19, 2016 at 10:55 AM >To: Paul Rosenzweig ><paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com>, 'Phil >Corwin' <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com>, 'Greg Shatan' ><gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com>, 'Kavouss Arasteh' <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> >Cc: 'Thomas Rickert' <thomas(a)rickert.net>, >"accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org" ><accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> >Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] what the Board is objecting to here - > >Just for the sake of absolute precision, I think >the Boardâs point is that the carve out and >hence the 3 SO/AC threshold â could apply >where an IRP determines that the Boardâs >actions in response to GAC Advice contravene the >Bylaws. I think what worries the Board is that >the notion that the Board could be recalled by 3 >SO/AC combination for action that DOES NOT contravene the Bylaws. > >J. Beckwith Burr >Neustar, Inc./Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 >Office:+1.202.533.2932 Mobile:+1.202.352.6367 >/<http://www.neustar.biz>neustar.biz > >From: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com> >Date: Friday, February 19, 2016 at 1:15 PM >To: 'Phil Corwin' <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com>, Greg Shatan ><gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> >Cc: 'Thomas Rickert' <thomas(a)rickert.net>, >Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> >Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue > >+1 > > > >Paul Rosenzweig > >paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > >O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > >M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > >VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 > >Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 > ><https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.redbranchconsulting…>Link >to my PGP Key > ><https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.rsaconference.com_e…> >[] > > > > >From: Phil Corwin [mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com] >Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 12:52 PM >To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com>; >Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> >Cc: Thomas Rickert <thomas(a)rickert.net>; >accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org >Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue > > > >Greg: > > > >Assuming that the new Board position is indeed a >response to a minority position of a few GAC >members, I am in full agreement that it >âshould serve as a warning to us allâ. > > > >Indeed, it emphasizes exactly why the GAC should >not be able to block the communityâs ability >to hold the Board accountable for implementing >GAC consensus advice that the community feels is >outside the scope of the Bylaws or Mission Statement. > > > >Best. Philip > > > >Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal > >Virtualaw LLC > >1155 F Street, NW > >Suite 1050 > >Washington, DC 20004 > >202-559-8597/Direct > >202-559-8750/Fax > >202-255-6172/cell > > > >Twitter: @VlawDC > > > >"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey > > > >From:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org >[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] >On Behalf Of Greg Shatan >Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 12:38 PM >To: Kavouss Arasteh >Cc: accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org; Thomas Rickert >Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue > > > >It is alarming that a few GAC members could seek >to undo a carefully balanced compromise. And >even more alarming that those few GAC members >could so quickly trigger a Board intervention. > > > >The carve-out is balanced against the concerns >of other stakeholders with regard to (i) the >proposed supermajority threshold for Board >rejection of GAC advice and (ii) the GAC's >overall role as a decisional participant in the >Empowered Community, rather than its traditional >advisory capacity. The carve-out itself >underwent a compromise, requiring the Community >to go through an IRP before exercising the power of Board recall. > > > >When one pulls on one end of a compromise, the >other end tends to move as well. > > > >Do other stakeholders need to send >countervailing warnings? Will the Board respond >as quickly? Do we want to find out? > > > >I think this extraordinary response to a >minority report should serve as a warning to us all. > > > >Greg > > > > > > > >On Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 12:22 PM, Kavouss >Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> wrote: > >Please kindly confirm and acknowledge recipt of wanrning message > >Regards > >Kavouss > > > >2016-02-19 18:10 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>: > >Dear Co-chairs > >You have seen the concerns of 11 Governments >which would certainly be echoed by other gouvernements soon. > >This is an ALARMING SITUATION , > >If there is no consensus means there is no consensus , > >We could not favour one community in disfavouring another one. > >Perhaps it was hoped that the people could join >the consensus but it does not come up as such > >If a mistake has occurred we should repair it . > >Howmany times we have changed our concept from >Voluntry Model to Sole member from Sole Member to Sole designator . > >THE ISSUE IS CRITICAL > >Pls do not rush to publish the report as being >sent to the chartering organization just hold on >for few more days untill your 26 feb. calls > >Try to find out some solution including going >back to the initial stage of REC. 11 without no >carve-out and with two options of simple >majority and 2/3 theshold and rediscuss that. > >You can not ignor the growing concerns of >several governments and would certainly be further grown up soon > >Regards > >Kavouss > > > > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org ><https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > >No virus found in this message. >Checked by AVG - ><https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=CwMFaQ&c=…>www.avg.com >Version: 2016.0.7303 / Virus Database: 4530/11623 - Release Date: 02/14/16 > > > >-- >Jordan Carter >Chief Executive, InternetNZ > >+64-21-442-649 | <mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz > >Sent on the run, apologies for brevity >Content-Type: image/png; name="image001.png" >Content-Disposition: inline; filename="image001.png" >Content-ID: <image001.png(a)01D16B17.90D93970> >X-Attachment-Id: 8ad2965fd910ef78_0.1 > > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

4 7

GAC Processes
by epilisse＠gmail.com Feb. 20, 2016

Feb. 20, 2016

Becky, Jordan please remind me, did we encourage the GAC in any way to be transparent in their advice to the Board (requiring special attention)? Or is Consensus our only requirement? el

2 2

what the Board is objecting to here -
by Burr, Becky Feb. 20, 2016

Feb. 20, 2016

Just for the sake of absolute precision, I think the Board’s point is that the carve out – and hence the 3 SO/AC threshold – could apply where an IRP determines that the Board’s actions in response to GAC Advice contravene the Bylaws. I think what worries the Board is that the notion that the Board could be recalled by 3 SO/AC combination for action that DOES NOT contravene the Bylaws. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz> From: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>> Date: Friday, February 19, 2016 at 1:15 PM To: 'Phil Corwin' <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>>, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> Cc: 'Thomas Rickert' <thomas(a)rickert.net<mailto:thomas@rickert.net>>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue +1 Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.redbranchconsulting…> [cid:image001.png@01D16B17.90D93970]<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.rsaconference.com_e…> From: Phil Corwin [mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com] Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 12:52 PM To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>; Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> Cc: Thomas Rickert <thomas(a)rickert.net<mailto:thomas@rickert.net>>; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue Greg: Assuming that the new Board position is indeed a response to a minority position of a few GAC members, I am in full agreement that it “should serve as a warning to us all”. Indeed, it emphasizes exactly why the GAC should not be able to block the community’s ability to hold the Board accountable for implementing GAC consensus advice that the community feels is outside the scope of the Bylaws or Mission Statement. Best. Philip Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 12:38 PM To: Kavouss Arasteh Cc: accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>; Thomas Rickert Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue It is alarming that a few GAC members could seek to undo a carefully balanced compromise. And even more alarming that those few GAC members could so quickly trigger a Board intervention. The carve-out is balanced against the concerns of other stakeholders with regard to (i) the proposed supermajority threshold for Board rejection of GAC advice and (ii) the GAC's overall role as a decisional participant in the Empowered Community, rather than its traditional advisory capacity. The carve-out itself underwent a compromise, requiring the Community to go through an IRP before exercising the power of Board recall. When one pulls on one end of a compromise, the other end tends to move as well. Do other stakeholders need to send countervailing warnings? Will the Board respond as quickly? Do we want to find out? I think this extraordinary response to a minority report should serve as a warning to us all. Greg On Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 12:22 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: Please kindly confirm and acknowledge recipt of wanrning message Regards Kavouss 2016-02-19 18:10 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>: Dear Co-chairs You have seen the concerns of 11 Governments which would certainly be echoed by other gouvernements soon. This is an ALARMING SITUATION , If there is no consensus means there is no consensus , We could not favour one community in disfavouring another one. Perhaps it was hoped that the people could join the consensus but it does not come up as such If a mistake has occurred we should repair it . Howmany times we have changed our concept from Voluntry Model to Sole member from Sole Member to Sole designator . THE ISSUE IS CRITICAL Pls do not rush to publish the report as being sent to the chartering organization just hold on for few more days untill your 26 feb. calls Try to find out some solution including going back to the initial stage of REC. 11 without no carve-out and with two options of simple majority and 2/3 theshold and rediscuss that. You can not ignor the growing concerns of several governments and would certainly be further grown up soon Regards Kavouss _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> ________________________________ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avg.com&d=CwMFaQ&c=…> Version: 2016.0.7303 / Virus Database: 4530/11623 - Release Date: 02/14/16

10 15

Carve-out issue
by Kavouss Arasteh Feb. 20, 2016

Feb. 20, 2016

Dear Co-chairs You have seen the concerns of 11 Governments which would certainly be echoed by other gouvernements soon. This is an ALARMING SITUATION , If there is no consensus means there is no consensus , We could not favour one community in disfavouring another one. Perhaps it was hoped that the people could join the consensus but it does not come up as such If a mistake has occurred we should repair it . Howmany times we have changed our concept from Voluntry Model to Sole member from Sole Member to Sole designator . THE ISSUE IS CRITICAL Pls do not rush to publish the report as being sent to the chartering organization just hold on for few more days untill your 26 feb. calls Try to find out some solution including going back to the initial stage of REC. 11 without no carve-out and with two options of simple majority and 2/3 theshold and rediscuss that. You can not ignor the growing concerns of several governments and would certainly be further grown up soon Regards Kavouss

11 19

Comments on the Supplemental
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 19, 2016

Feb. 19, 2016

My comments on the Supplemental Proposal Core Proposal, top of page 21; Annex 2, page 13: My recollection was that the threshold reduction was to be allowed only in case (1) and that in case (2), four would still be required (requiring unanimity of the remaining four to remove the Board). I am moderately sure that although (2) was suggested by Becky, it was never agreed to by the Board or the CCWG as a whole. Core proposal, page 30, item 3: Typo - For THE avoidance Core proposal, page 30, item 3; Annex 5, page 10, item 3: This was supposed to also cover contract renewal where the clauses in question were unchanged from the previous contract. The current wording says until "the expiration date" implying renewals are not covered. Core proposal, page 48: Perhaps nitpicking, but presumably the Bylaw should read "at least 60%" since precisely 60% is not what was envisioned. Annex 04, paragraph 120: I note that the requests from the ALAC to soften the term "ensure" have not been acted upon. No rules can "ensure"- they can only be designed to meet the objective and cannot prevent circumstances that might alter the outcome. The ALAC suggested the wording "SOs, ACs, and the Nominating Committee will develop processes designed to replace Interim Board members within 120 days." Annex 09: There are several references to the RT selection being made by the Chairs of the "participating" SOs and ACs. Two issues: 1) I don't recall any discussion limiting the selectors to other than the full 7 AC/SOs. Presuming a limitation was formally decided upon, where is "participating" defined? Is it the "Decisional Participants" in the empowered community? If so, that defined term should be used. Or some other definition provided. Annex 09, page 5: I have pointed out many times that based on prior review teams, the size of 21 is inflated. There is *NO* justification for claiming it is "based on composition of prior Review Teams". Prior review teams averaged 11.8 AC/SO members and never exceeded 13. ** END OF COMMENTS **

1 0

Re: [CCWG-ACCT] what the Board is objecting to here -
by Seun Ojedeji Feb. 19, 2016

Feb. 19, 2016

On 19 Feb 2016 8:42 p.m., "Burr, Becky" <Becky.Burr(a)neustar.biz> wrote: > > But I also respect the views of those who say that the ability to spill the Board – which is after all the real and ultimate enforcement measure in the sole designator model – becomes meaningless in the limited context where the proposed carve out would apply. > SO: May I know how it becomes meaningless exactly? > We can complain about a few loud voices, but perhaps it would be better if we all tried to listen harder. > SO: I agree, but I for instance have written a couple of post explaining my concern (including doing you a couple of PM as well, just to avoid flooding the list). I am however yet to read any rationale that makes spilling the board with 3 SO/AC the right thing to do when/if board acted within the bylaw or article. Regards > Becky > > J. Beckwith Burr > Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer > 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 > Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / neustar.biz > > > From: Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji(a)gmail.com> > Date: Friday, February 19, 2016 at 2:30 PM > To: Becky Burr <becky.burr(a)neustar.biz> > Cc: Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>, Paul Rosenzweig < paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com>, Greg Shatan < gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com>, Thomas Rickert <thomas(a)rickert.net>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org>, Phil Corwin <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] what the Board is objecting to here - > > Hi Becky, > > FWIW, what you indicate below has been the understanding since the concern was raised by Bruce. Steve has also just reiterate the view as well. > However, let it be on record that others(including myself) have always raised similar concern, which even predates Bruce's comment. > > I have no idea what the goal of some in this process is anymore. If indeed the goal is to have an all inclusive and balanced MS that keeps the board accountable, then I don't think it should be difficult for anyone to be convinced that having 3 out of 7 SO/AC(yes because ICANN has more than 7 *distinct* community by structure) spill the entire board of an organisation like ICANN is not the right thing to do. > > It's so painful that a few participants in the CCWG have become quite vocal in this process in a manner that tends towards intimidating others. It is my hope that the co-chairs will be careful to identify distinct views among the pool of traffic. > > Regards > > On 19 Feb 2016 7:56 p.m., "Burr, Becky" <Becky.Burr(a)neustar.biz> wrote: >> >> Just for the sake of absolute precision, I think the Board’s point is that the carve out – and hence the 3 SO/AC threshold – could apply where an IRP determines that the Board’s actions in response to GAC Advice contravene the Bylaws. I think what worries the Board is that the notion that the Board could be recalled by 3 SO/AC combination for action that DOES NOT contravene the Bylaws. >> >> J. Beckwith Burr >> Neustar, Inc./Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer >> >> 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 >> >> Office:+1.202.533.2932 Mobile:+1.202.352.6367/neustar.biz >> >> >> From: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com> >> Date: Friday, February 19, 2016 at 1:15 PM >> To: 'Phil Corwin' <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com>, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> >> Cc: 'Thomas Rickert' <thomas(a)rickert.net>, Accountability Community < accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> >> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue >> >> +1 >> >> >> >> Paul Rosenzweig >> >> paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com >> >> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 >> >> M: +1 (202) 329-9650 >> >> VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 >> >> Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 >> >> Link to my PGP Key >> >> >> >> From: Phil Corwin [mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com] >> Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 12:52 PM >> To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com>; Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> >> Cc: Thomas Rickert <thomas(a)rickert.net>; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org >> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue >> >> >> >> Greg: >> >> >> >> Assuming that the new Board position is indeed a response to a minority position of a few GAC members, I am in full agreement that it “should serve as a warning to us all”. >> >> >> >> Indeed, it emphasizes exactly why the GAC should not be able to block the community’s ability to hold the Board accountable for implementing GAC consensus advice that the community feels is outside the scope of the Bylaws or Mission Statement. >> >> >> >> Best. Philip >> >> >> >> Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal >> >> Virtualaw LLC >> >> 1155 F Street, NW >> >> Suite 1050 >> >> Washington, DC 20004 >> >> 202-559-8597/Direct >> >> 202-559-8750/Fax >> >> 202-255-6172/cell >> >> >> >> Twitter: @VlawDC >> >> >> >> "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey >> >> >> >> From:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org] On Behalf Of Greg Shatan >> Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 12:38 PM >> To: Kavouss Arasteh >> Cc: accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org; Thomas Rickert >> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue >> >> >> >> It is alarming that a few GAC members could seek to undo a carefully balanced compromise. And even more alarming that those few GAC members could so quickly trigger a Board intervention. >> >> >> >> The carve-out is balanced against the concerns of other stakeholders with regard to (i) the proposed supermajority threshold for Board rejection of GAC advice and (ii) the GAC's overall role as a decisional participant in the Empowered Community, rather than its traditional advisory capacity. The carve-out itself underwent a compromise, requiring the Community to go through an IRP before exercising the power of Board recall. >> >> >> >> When one pulls on one end of a compromise, the other end tends to move as well. >> >> >> >> Do other stakeholders need to send countervailing warnings? Will the Board respond as quickly? Do we want to find out? >> >> >> >> I think this extraordinary response to a minority report should serve as a warning to us all. >> >> >> >> Greg >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 12:22 PM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Please kindly confirm and acknowledge recipt of wanrning message >> >> Regards >> >> Kavouss >> >> >> >> 2016-02-19 18:10 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>: >> >> Dear Co-chairs >> >> You have seen the concerns of 11 Governments which would certainly be echoed by other gouvernements soon. >> >> This is an ALARMING SITUATION , >> >> If there is no consensus means there is no consensus , >> >> We could not favour one community in disfavouring another one. >> >> Perhaps it was hoped that the people could join the consensus but it does not come up as such >> >> If a mistake has occurred we should repair it . >> >> Howmany times we have changed our concept from Voluntry Model to Sole member from Sole Member to Sole designator . >> >> THE ISSUE IS CRITICAL >> >> Pls do not rush to publish the report as being sent to the chartering organization just hold on for few more days untill your 26 feb. calls >> >> Try to find out some solution including going back to the initial stage of REC. 11 without no carve-out and with two options of simple majority and 2/3 theshold and rediscuss that. >> >> You can not ignor the growing concerns of several governments and would certainly be further grown up soon >> >> Regards >> >> Kavouss >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> >> >> >> ________________________________ >> >> No virus found in this message. >> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >> Version: 2016.0.7303 / Virus Database: 4530/11623 - Release Date: 02/14/16 >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >>

1 0

ALAC position on current discussion - carve-out and Board reaction
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 19, 2016

Feb. 19, 2016

This is not a formal statement of the ALAC which has not had the opportunity to act on the current discussions, but is the position of the advisory group that has been formulating the positions previously ratified by the ALAC. There are those within the group that have expressed concern with ANY reduction from 4 to remove the Board (as evidenced by the minority statement submitted by Tijani). There are also some who have expressed an overall concern with the entire "GAC Carve-out". Those views notwithstanding, the majority of participants in the group supported the carve-out along with the restrictions specified by the Board and incorporated into the current supplemental proposal as an acceptable compromise. Based on Sam Eisner's recent intervention, that is still the proposal on the table. Neither the ALAC nor the advisory group has discussed Steve's final proposal, but I suspect we would also agree to defer specification of some of these details to implementation, if a way could be found to word and ensure that commitment. Alan

1 0

Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Objections/Minority Opinion vs Finalarity
by epilisse＠gmail.com Feb. 19, 2016

Feb. 19, 2016

In case my new mail program on the iPhone messed with the Sender/From/Reply-To line, apologies for any double quote. el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad 4 mini On 19 Feb 2016, 21:33 +0200, ondohotola(a)icloud.com, wrote: > I appears this Wg intends to redefine the concept of "Final" (Proposal). > > If we unfinal the proposal I would need to upfinal my Minority Opinion and would like to place this on record in addition to my expected objection against this not unexpexted lack of co-leadership. > > It is clear, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that we need Public Comment after the Proposal will have been refinalized. > > greetings, el > > -- > Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad 4 mini

1 0

Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 19, 2016

Feb. 19, 2016

I support diplomacy. But in this case, I am being asked to have the ALAC support some modification in the proposal. I can accept that and we might even agree. But I need to understand what modification it is. Ultimately we will need to ratify (or not) specific wording. Alan At 19/02/2016 01:39 PM, Kavouss Arasteh wrote: >Dear Alan, >Steve is not only a highly expert in technical >matter and management but is also a diplomat. >Please kindly read ihis comments without any attempt to decomposite it. >I do not believe Steve make such decomposite action >Regards >Kavouss > >2016-02-19 19:32 GMT+01:00 James Gannon ><<mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net>james(a)cyberinvasion.net>: >In that case we miss all our timelines and might >as well just throw everything that we have >worked for out the window. This is a tactic, and >one which we must reject and move forward as planned. > >-jg > >From: Kavouss Arasteh ><<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> >Date: Friday 19 February 2016 at 6:30 p.m. >To: James Gannon <<mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net>james(a)cyberinvasion.net> >Cc: Phil Corwin ><<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>psc(a)vlaw-dc.com>, >Thomas Rickert ><<mailto:thomas@rickert.net>thomas(a)rickert.net>, >"<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org" ><<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > >Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue > >Dear All, >Have we ever received a consensus objection or >some form of wholesome proposal reflecting the >full breath of membership of the other >constituencies I think we need to reflect and forward correctly . >Who knows till end of ICANN 55 howmany objections will be tableed? >Regards >Kavouss > > >2016-02-19 19:23 GMT+01:00 Schaefer, Brett ><<mailto:Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org>Brett.Schaefer(a)heritage.org>: > >I feel like Iâm in the movie Ground Hog Day >and every day is a 1 am ICANN call. > > > >From:<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> >accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org >[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] >On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh >Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 1:17 PM >To: Phil Corwin >Cc: Thomas Rickert; ><mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > >Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue > > > >Dear All, > >There is big difference between providing the >rights for GAC as decisional making entity and to exercise those rights > >GAC has not decided on whether they wish to exercise that right or not, > >Supermajority and reconsideration of rejected >Recommendation of other constituencies and >rejection of GAC Advice should have the same threshold > >If ONE GETS THE BENEF OF 2/3 MAJORITY the other >should ALSO have the same. BENEFIT > >If GAC advice could be rejected by the Board >with simple Majority the Recommendation of other >entities SHOULD also be rejected by simple majority. > >If the Board gets into negotiation with GAC >after it has rejected its advice, they also get >into negotiation with other constituencies if >their Recommendations were rejected . > >Currently there is a full imbalance between the >PDP Recommendations treatments and GAC advice > >The PDP Recommendations developed by >supermajority in some constituencies or by >so-called SOFT CONSENSUS could only be rejected >by the Board with 2/3 MAJORITY BUT GAC advice >,normally decided by consensus could only be rejected by SIMPLE MAJORITY > >This is unfair. > >However, after rejection with such an imbalance >criteria both cases could be negotiated by Board and the two constituencies. > >I do not agree with the argument submitted with >the risk that those people submitting such >argument may disserve the ethic of >correspondence and going out of the limit and not observing mutual respect > >Kavouss > > > >2016-02-19 18:51 GMT+01:00 Phil Corwin ><<mailto:psc@vlaw-dc.com>psc(a)vlaw-dc.com>: > >Greg: > > > >Assuming that the new Board position is indeed a >response to a minority position of a few GAC >members, I am in full agreement that it >âshould serve as a warning to us allâ. > > > >Indeed, it emphasizes exactly why the GAC should >not be able to block the communityâs ability >to hold the Board accountable for implementing >GAC consensus advice that the community feels is >outside the scope of the Bylaws or Mission Statement. > > > >Best. Philip > > > >Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal > >Virtualaw LLC > >1155 F Street, NW > >Suite 1050 > >Washington, DC 20004 > ><tel:202-559-8597>202-559-8597/Direct > ><tel:202-559-8750>202-559-8750/Fax > ><tel:202-255-6172>202-255-6172/cell > > > >Twitter: @VlawDC > > > >"Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey > > > >From:<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> >accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org >[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] >On Behalf Of Greg Shatan >Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 12:38 PM >To: Kavouss Arasteh >Cc: ><mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org; >Thomas Rickert >Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue > > > >It is alarming that a few GAC members could seek >to undo a carefully balanced compromise. And >even more alarming that those few GAC members >could so quickly trigger a Board intervention. > > > >The carve-out is balanced against the concerns >of other stakeholders with regard to (i) the >proposed supermajority threshold for Board >rejection of GAC advice and (ii) the GAC's >overall role as a decisional participant in the >Empowered Community, rather than its traditional >advisory capacity. The carve-out itself >underwent a compromise, requiring the Community >to go through an IRP before exercising the power of Board recall. > > > >When one pulls on one end of a compromise, the >other end tends to move as well. > > > >Do other stakeholders need to send >countervailing warnings? Will the Board respond >as quickly? Do we want to find out? > > > >I think this extraordinary response to a >minority report should serve as a warning to us all. > > > >Greg > > > > > > > >On Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 12:22 PM, Kavouss >Arasteh <<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> wrote: > >Please kindly confirm and acknowledge recipt of wanrning message > >Regards > >Kavouss > > > >2016-02-19 18:10 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh ><<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>: > >Dear Co-chairs > >You have seen the concerns of 11 Governments >which would certainly be echoed by other gouvernements soon. > >This is an ALARMING SITUATION , > >If there is no consensus means there is no consensus , > >We could not favour one community in disfavouring another one. > >Perhaps it was hoped that the people could join >the consensus but it does not come up as such > >If a mistake has occurred we should repair it . > >Howmany times we have changed our concept from >Voluntry Model to Sole member from Sole Member to Sole designator . > >THE ISSUE IS CRITICAL > >Pls do not rush to publish the report as being >sent to the chartering organization just hold on >for few more days untill your 26 feb. calls > >Try to find out some solution including going >back to the initial stage of REC. 11 without no >carve-out and with two options of simple >majority and 2/3 theshold and rediscuss that. > >You can not ignor the growing concerns of >several governments and would certainly be further grown up soon > >Regards > >Kavouss > > > > > >---------- >BrettSchaefer >Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs >Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis >Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy >The Heritage Foundation >214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE >Washington, DC 20002 ><tel:202-608-6097>202-608-6097 ><http://heritage.org/>heritage.org > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list ><mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > >No virus found in this message. >Checked by AVG - <http://www.avg.com>www.avg.com >Version: 2016.0.7303 / Virus Database: 4530/11623 - Release Date: 02/14/16 > > > > > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Carve-out issue
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 19, 2016

Feb. 19, 2016

I need some clarity from the Board. I can read Steve's message in two ways. 1. They are sticking to their previous statement which I understood to mean accepting the "carve-out", but not the reduction in the threshhold to remove the Board. That stays at 4 (and requires unanimity) unless there is a successful IRP). 2. They are now withdrawing their previous position and rejecting the carve-out excluding the GAC from participating in Community Powers exercised in response to Board action/inaction over GAC advice. Steve? Alan At 19/02/2016 12:37 PM, Greg Shatan wrote: >It is alarming that a few GAC members could seek to undo a carefully >balanced compromise. And even more alarming that those few GAC >members could so quickly trigger a Board intervention. > >The carve-out is balanced against the concerns of other stakeholders >with regard to (i) the proposed supermajority threshold for Board >rejection of GAC advice and (ii) the GAC's overall role as a >decisional participant in the Empowered Community, rather than its >traditional advisory capacity. The carve-out itself underwent a >compromise, requiring the Community to go through an IRP before >exercising the power of Board recall. > >When one pulls on one end of a compromise, the other end tends to >move as well. > >Do other stakeholders need to send countervailing warnings? Will >the Board respond as quickly? Do we want to find out? > >I think this extraordinary response to a minority report should >serve as a warning to us all. > >Greg > > > >On Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 12:22 PM, Kavouss Arasteh ><<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> wrote: >Please kindly confirm and acknowledge recipt of wanrning message >Regards >Kavouss > >2016-02-19 18:10 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh ><<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>: >Dear Co-chairs >You have seen the concerns of 11 Governments which would certainly >be echoed by other gouvernements soon. >This is an ALARMING SITUATION , >If there is no consensus means there is no consensus , >We could not favour one community in disfavouring another one. >Perhaps it was hoped that the people could join the consensus but it >does not come up as such >If a mistake has occurred we should repair it . >Howmany times we have changed our concept from Voluntry Model to >Sole member from Sole Member to Sole designator . >THE ISSUE IS CRITICAL >Pls do not rush to publish the report as being sent to the >chartering organization just hold on for few more days untill your >26 feb. calls >Try to find out some solution including going back to the initial >stage of REC. 11 without no carve-out and with two options of simple >majority and 2/3 theshold and rediscuss that. >You can not ignor the growing concerns of several governments and >would certainly be further grown up soon >Regards >Kavouss > > > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list ><mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > >_______________________________________________ >Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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FW: Minority statement from Tijani Ben Jemaa
by Grace Abuhamad Feb. 19, 2016

Feb. 19, 2016

Dear all, Please see attached a minority statement from ALAC Member Tijani Ben Jemaa. One document is a statement on Rec 2 and the other document is a statement on Rec 6. I have attached PDF versions of both for your convenience. Thank you, Grace From: Tijani BEN JEMAA <tijani.benjemaa(a)topnet.tn> Date: Thursday, February 18, 2016 at 7:16 AM To: Grace Abuhamad <grace.abuhamad(a)icann.org> Cc: ACCT-Staff <acct-staff(a)icann.org> Subject: Minority statement Dear Grace, Please find here after my minority statement

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Board comments on Board removal in the context of GAC advice
by Bruce Tonkin Feb. 19, 2016

Feb. 19, 2016

Hello All, To reiterate the Board's position in the case of the carve out compromise involving GAC advice, the Board can agree to reducing the threshold for Board removal to three SOs or ACs, with no more than one objecting, when there was an IRP finding against the Board regarding the acceptance of GAC advice. For all other attempts to remove the full ICANN Board, the Board does not support lowering the threshold below four SOs or ACs, with no more than one objecting. . The power to spill the Board would remain available as contemplated within the CCWG's third draft proposal. For the avoidance of doubt, if the Board accepts GAC advice within the limitations of ICANN's mission and bylaws, an IRP panel confirms that is the case, and the community simply dislikes the GAC advice - then the threshold of 4 SOs and ACs continues to apply. If the GAC is excluded from participating then this would mean that the ccNSO, GNSO, ASO and ALAC would need to agree that the Board should be removed. Our view is that past cases relating to disagreement on GAC advice have been focussed on concerns that ICANN is exceeding its mission or is not following its processes. The IRP is the most appropriate vehicle to resolve disputes in this area. In general the Board consults widely with the whole community before accepting the advice from any one part of the community. We think a situation where the community broadly disagrees with an action the Board has taken that is within the mission and bylaws is likely to be extremely rare, and the threshold of 4 SOs and ACs is still appropriate in that scenario if the community simply dislikes the Board's decision. Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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Re: [CCWG-ACCT] CCWG ACCT Proposed Agenda - Call #82 - Tuesday, 2 February @ 06:00 UTC
by Alan Greenberg Feb. 18, 2016

Feb. 18, 2016

Given that: - we are back to one meeting per week; - there was a perception that if we wanted to approve by Marrakech, we needed to finalize everything by the end of next week; could I ask for an item at the end of this agenda summarizing what issues still remain outstanding? Alan At 31/01/2016 11:10 PM, Brenda Brewer wrote: >Dear all, >In preparation for your call ><https://community.icann.org/x/4wh1Aw>#82 >Tuesday, 2 February 2016 at 06:00 08:00 UTC >(<http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/fixedtime.html?msg=CCWG+ACCT+Meeting&…>time >converter), see below a proposed agenda: >Agenda for CCWG ACCT Meeting #82 (Tuesday 2 February at 06:00 UTC) >1. Opening Remarks >2. Final readings on Recommendations that required CWG-Stewardship feedback: >· Recommendation #4a --Budget >· Recommendation #4c -- Community IRP & Separation Process >· Recommendation #7 -- Scope of IRP. >3. [Provisional]: Final reading on Recommendation #9 -- AOC Reviews >4. [Provisional]: Final reading Recommendation >#4b -- Board removal liability mitigation >5. 4th Reading on Recommendation #5 -- Mission >6. 3rd Reading on Recommendation #11 -- GAC Advice >7. Timeline & Communication >8. AOB >9. Closing >Adobe Connect: ><https://icann.adobeconnect.com/accountability/>https://icann.adobeconnect.com/accountability/ > > >Thank you! >Kind regards, >Brenda

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Updated Minority Statement for the CCWG-Accountability Supplemental Final Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations
by Olga Cavalli Feb. 18, 2016

Feb. 18, 2016

Dear Co-chairs, As a member of the CCWG on Accountability appointed by the GAC, and on behalf of the governments of: Argentina Brazil Chile France Paraguay Peru Portugal Uruguay Venezuela I am submitting an updated verision of the Minority Statement which I sent yesterday. Please consider the document attached to this email as the new updated version, which replaces the previous one. I have also attached a pdf version. Please confirm the reception of this message and its attached documents. If you have any doubts please let me know. Best regards Olga Cavalli Argentina GAC Representative GAC Vicechair

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Minority Statement of Individual Member Robin Gross
by Robin Gross Feb. 18, 2016

Feb. 18, 2016

Dear Thomas, Leon, and Mathieu, As promised, attached please find my minority statement to the report on the issue of GAC over-empowerment and marginalization of the SOs. Please include this minority statement in the final report. Thank you. Best, Robin

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