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ACTION NEEDED: Two letters to IP, should be sent by September the 10th
by Mirjana Tasić Sept. 6, 2018

Sept. 6, 2018

Dear GP members, Please find the link to proposed response letters to IP. First letter is the summary what we have done with different code points proposed for inclusion and exclusion as IP reaction to our first Report submitted at the beginning of June, 2018. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1JCljrbBc0QW8xiA22RLhyZP3vZKd6yMPU35GCb2… Second letter is the Response to IP letter with subj: “Diacritics below a security risk?”. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MHSRol829bhBdxBXpdmYe0uxm-NwJ-EQb3gbOGI… In the later I have added in the table some letters proposed by Michael. Both document can be edited. Please give your comments and suggestions till Saturday, September the 7th. Regards Mirjana

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ACTION NEEDED-PLEASE READ AND COMMENT: Response to IP letter on : Diacritics below a security risk?
by Mirjana Tasić Sept. 6, 2018

Sept. 6, 2018

Dear GP members, I shall remove the comment about small letters turned e and schwa from proposed letters. We need IP to give us some feedback now, I do not want to open old issues which are somehow resolved.. Our response could be like this: The Latin GP appreciates the additional input received on August 29, 2018 titled “Diacritics below a security risk?”. In its feedback, IP makes a case for potential security risks when certain diacritics below (e.g. dot and line below) are used in a domain name. The risk is not always apparent, but it reveals itself when the diacritic below is obscured by an underline, which is the typical formatting feature of hyperlinks. The IP asserts “Of all diacritics, diacritics below can be difficult to distinguish or be prone to clipping”. Security risks deserve a place in our analysis, so Latin GP is committed to explicitly discuss this matter, resolve whether they constitute a security risk to the Root Zone and decide a solution vis-à-vis the LGR. On a related note, the Latin GP would like to get additional clarification regarding some of IP’s statements from the August 29 email: “It can be argued users have no working understanding of typography and would not reliably interpret small gaps or bulges in the underline as being related to an unfamiliar code point”. “The IP would like to encourage the Latin GP […] to explicitly examine [the diacritics below] example and other cases like it, where code points can become indistinguishable in common usage scenarios for IDNs”. Some GP members would imply that IP is welcoming visual similarity or confusability as a criterion for variant definition (e.g. letters with diacritics acute and grave could be deemed indistinguishable, therefore variants). Other members don’t agree with that reasoning. In this context, the Latin GP wants to confirm that prior guidance from IP (below), which we find consistent with the LGR Procedure, is not at odds with the August 29 email. LGR Procedure: “Finally, in investigating the possible variant relations, Generation Panels should ignore cases where the relation is based exclusively on aspects of visual similarity.” October 18, 2017: Principles for repertoire and variants – Feedback from IP “In the context of the Root Zone, the Procedure is quite clear in that it considers simple similarity of appearance to be outside the scope of the Root Zone LGR.”... “Having the Root Zone exhibit fundamentally different design decisions with respect to variants than those found on the second level would have to be justified by strong arguments based on factors special to the Root Zone.” March 22, 2017: Latin GP Proposal: IP Feedback “The kinds of variants to be defined in the Root Zone LGR are limited to homoglyphs, which are characters essentially identical appearance by design, instead of merely similar appearance.” It may be helpful in clarifying matters if the IP could address a few actual examples for us. We are all clear that o and ỗ 006F and 1ED7 are sufficiently different to not even be confusable. Please consider following cases. Where in between does the threshold for variants lie: Case no Code point 1 Glyph 1 Glyph 2 Code point 2 Variants or "merely visually similar" or confusable or something else 1. 0131 ı ɩ 0269 2. 00E1 ă ǎ 01CE 3. 006A j į 012F 4. 00FC ü ű 0171 5. 006C m rn 0072 + 006D 6. 006B k ƙ 0199 7. 0070 p þ 00FE 8. 0064 d ɗ 0257 9. 00F5 õ ō 014D 10. 0069 i ı 0131 FYI, Case no 10 in the previous table, an experiment with a couple dozen native speakers of English found them unable to spot occurrences of the latter. Even when told that there was a variation on the letter I somewhere in the text. P.S. As may be obvious, the Latin GP is going to find it difficult to respond to the IP's query about whether various letters with a diacritic below are variants. And until we are clear on what the IP's purpose is in designating some kinds of similarity variants and others not, it will be impossible to respond to the Why? part of the query. Regards Mirjana From: "Tan Tanaka, Dennis" <dtantanaka(a)verisign.com> Date: Monday, September 3, 2018 at 16:55 To: Mirjana Tasić <Mirjana.Tasic(a)rnids.rs>, Latin GP <latingp(a)icann.org> Subject: Re: Re: [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk? Example 1 is moot. Our panel have already received IP’s opinion on this case (small letters turned e and schwa): these two code points ought to be variants because they are homoglyphs. -Dennis From: Latingp <latingp-bounces(a)icann.org> on behalf of Mirjana Tasić <Mirjana.Tasic(a)rnids.rs> Date: Monday, September 3, 2018 at 9:34 AM To: "latingp(a)icann.org" <latingp(a)icann.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk? Dear GP members, I have compiled two texts submitted by Denis and Bill as the response to the IP letter from August 29. Please find the proposal below. All comments and corrections are the most welcome. Regards Mirjana The Latin GP appreciates the additional input received on August 29, 2018 titled “Diacritics below a security risk?”. In its feedback, IP makes a case for potential security risks when certain diacritics below (e.g. dot and line below) are used in a domain name. The risk is not always apparent, but it reveals itself when the diacritic below is obscured by an underline, which is the typical formatting feature of hyperlinks. The IP asserts “Of all diacritics, diacritics below can be difficult to distinguish or be prone to clipping”. Security risks deserve a place in our analysis, so Latin GP is committed to explicitly discuss this matter, resolve whether they constitute a security risk to the Root Zone and decide a solution vis-à-vis the LGR. On a related note, the Latin GP would like to get additional clarification regarding some of IP’s statements from the August 29 email: “It can be argued users have no working understanding of typography and would not reliably interpret small gaps or bulges in the underline as being related to an unfamiliar code point”. “The IP would like to encourage the Latin GP […] to explicitly examine [the diacritics below] example and other cases like it, where code points can become indistinguishable in common usage scenarios for IDNs”. Some GP members would imply that IP is welcoming visual similarity or confusability as a criterion for variant definition (e.g. letters with diacritics acute and grave could be deemed indistinguishable, therefore variants). Other members don’t agree with that reasoning. In this context, the Latin GP wants to confirm that prior guidance from IP (below), which we find consistent with the LGR Procedure, is not at odds with the August 29 email. LGR Procedure: “Finally, in investigating the possible variant relations, Generation Panels should ignore cases where the relation is based exclusively on aspects of visual similarity.” October 18, 2017: Principles for repertoire and variants – Feedback from IP “In the context of the Root Zone, the Procedure is quite clear in that it considers simple similarity of appearance to be outside the scope of the Root Zone LGR.”... “Having the Root Zone exhibit fundamentally different design decisions with respect to variants than those found on the second level would have to be justified by strong arguments based on factors special to the Root Zone.” March 22, 2017: Latin GP Proposal: IP Feedback “The kinds of variants to be defined in the Root Zone LGR are limited to homoglyphs, which are characters essentially identical appearance by design, instead of merely similar appearance.” It may be helpful in clarifying matters if the IP could address a few actual examples for us. We are all clear that o and ỗ 006F and 1ED7 are sufficiently different to not even be confuseable. Example 1. Letters ə and ǝ 0259 and 01DD are pixel for pixel identical. It should be noted, we have been presented with an argument that even they are not variants. The explanation given by some members of IP was that these two letters are not variants because their uppercase versions are different. Example 2: Please consider following cases. Where in between does the threshold for variants lie: Case no Code point 1 Glyph 1 Glyph 2 Code point 2 Variants or "merely visually similar"? or something else 1. 0131 ı ɩ 0269 2. 00E1 ă ǎ 01CE 3. 006A j į 012F 4. 00FC ü ű 0171 5. 006C m rn 0072 + 006D 6. 006B k ƙ 0199 7. 0070 p þ 00FE 8. 0064 d ɗ 0257 9. 00F5 õ ō 014D 10. 0069 i ı 0131 FYI, Case no 10 in the previous table, an experiment with a couple dozen native speakers of English found them unable to spot occurrences of the latter. Even when told that there was a variation on the letter I somewhere in the text. P.S. As may be obvious, the Latin GP is going to find it difficult to respond to the IP's query about whether various letters with a diacritic below are variants. And until we are clear on what the IP's purpose is in designating some kinds of similarity variants and others not, it will be impossible to respond to the Why? part of the query. Od: Latingp <latingp-bounces(a)icann.org> U ime Bill Jouris Poslato: Saturday, September 1, 2018 10:16 Za: latingp(a)icann.org Tema: Re: [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk? I would like to suggest that we expand on Dennis' draft a bit. Perhaps with the following text added. ************************************************************************************************************************* It may be helpful in clarifying matters if the IP could address a few actual examples for us. We are all clear that o and ỗ 006F and 1ED7 are sufficiently different to not even be confuseable. On the other hand ə and ǝ 0259 and 01DD are pixel for pixel identical. (It should be noted, we have been presented with an argument that even they are not variants.) So, where in between does the threshold for variants lie: ı and ɩ 0131 and 0269 The difference is on the order of that between different fonts. Variants or "merely visually similar"? ă and ǎ 00E1 and 01CE The difference is small enough that, at normal (12 point) type size, the eye cannot distinguish. Variants or "merely visually similar"? j and į 006A and 012F Outside the fraction of a percent of users who have encountered the latter previously, it wouldn't occur to anyone that the latter was anything except a letter J. Variants or "merely visually similar"? ü and ű 00FC and 0171 Variants or "merely visually similar"? m and rn 006C and 0072 plus 006D Variants or "merely visually similar"? k and ƙ 006B and 0199 Variants or "merely visually similar"? p and þ 0070 and 00FE Variants or "merely visually similar"? d and ɗ 0064 and 0257 Variants or "merely visually similar"? õ and ō 00F5 and 014D Variants or "merely visually similar"? i and ı 0069 and 0131 FYI, an experiment with a couple dozen native speakers of English found them unable to spot occurrences of the latter. Even when told that there was a variation on the letter I somewhere in the text. Variants or "merely visually similar"? P.S. As may be obvious, the Latin GP is going to find it difficult to respond to the IP's query about whether various letters with a diacritic below are variants. And until we are clear on what the IP's purpose is in designating some kinds of similarity variants and others not, it will be impossible to respond to the Why? part of the query. ********************************************************************************************************************************** Bill Jouris Inside Products bill.jouris(a)insidethestack.com<mailto:bill.jouris@insidethestack.com> 831-659-8360 925-855-9512 (direct) ________________________________ From: "Tan Tanaka, Dennis via Latingp" <latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp@icann.org>> To: "latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp@icann.org>" <latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp@icann.org>> Sent: Friday, August 31, 2018 1:43 PM Subject: Re: [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk? Mirjana, et al Below is a proposed response to IP From: Latin GP To: IP The Latin GP appreciates the additional input received on August 29, 2018 titled “Diacritics below a security risk?”. In its feedback, IP makes a case for potential security risks when certain diacritics below (e.g. dot and line below) are used in a domain name. The risk is not always apparent, but it reveals itself when the diacritic below is obscured by an underline, which is the typical formatting feature of hyperlinks. The IP asserts “Of all diacritics, diacritics below can be difficult to distinguish or be prone to clipping”. Security risks deserve a place in our analysis, so Latin GP is committed to explicitly discuss this matter, resolve whether they constitute a security risk to the Root Zone and decide a solution vis-à-vis the LGR. On a related note, the Latin GP would like to get additional clarification regarding some of IP’s statements from the August 29 email: “It can be argued users have no working understanding of typography and would not reliably interpret small gaps or bulges in the underline as being related to an unfamiliar code point”. “The IP would like to encourage the Latin GP […] to explicitly examine [the diacritics below] example and other cases like it, where code points can become indistinguishable in common usage scenarios for IDNs”. Some GP members would imply that IP is welcoming visual similarity or confusability as a criterion for variant definition (e.g. letters with diacritics acute and grave could be deemed indistinguishable, therefore variants). Other members don’t agree with that reasoning. In this context, the Latin GP wants to confirm that prior guidance from IP (below), which we find consistent with the LGR Procedure, is not at odds with the August 29 email. LGR Procedure: “Finally, in investigating the possible variant relations, Generation Panels should ignore cases where the relation is based exclusively on aspects of visual similarity.” October 18, 2017: Principles for repertoire and variants – Feedback from IP “In the context of the Root Zone, the Procedure is quite clear in that it considers simple similarity of appearance to be outside the scope of the Root Zone LGR.”... “Having the Root Zone exhibit fundamentally different design decisions with respect to variants than those found on the second level would have to be justified by strong arguments based on factors special to the Root Zone.” March 22, 2017: Latin GP Proposal: IP Feedback “The kinds of variants to be defined in the Root Zone LGR are limited to homoglyphs, which are characters essentially identical appearance by design, instead of merely similar appearance.” Sincerely, Latin GP From: Latingp <latingp-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Sarmad Hussain <sarmad.hussain(a)icann.org<mailto:sarmad.hussain@icann.org>> Date: Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 2:58 AM To: Latin GP <latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp@icann.org>> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk? Dear Latin GP members Kindly find below some feedback from IP for your consideration. Regards Sarmad TO: LatinGP FROM: IP There are recent and widely published examples of phishing attacks using Latin IDNs in which the key features involved were diacritics below the letter. Here is an example: [cid:part1.E6E9F88C.32B00687@ix.netcom.com] Of all diacritics, diacritics below can be difficult to distinguish or be prone to clipping -- there is less space below the baseline than between the typical lowercase glyph and the top of the line. The example given above shows a further interaction with URL underlining - and not all display engines actually do as nice a job interrupting the underline as in the screen shot above. For example, here is how one system will render this (using a designated UI font - Segoe UI): [cid:part2.59964F92.16B1BC0B@ix.netcom.com] Note, this code point (U+1E33) is in the MSR as is (U+1E35 LATIN SMALL K WITH LINE BELOW). [cid:part3.99B9649E.C3C335FC@ix.netcom.com] The second example contains U+1E35 -- while the effect does not show equally at all type sizes, from 12pt and below the LINE BELOW is reliably hidden. Here are the two examples at 10pt [cid:part4.B43CE3FD.8C84EACF@ix.netcom.com] The issue is not limited to "K". We see "B", "D", "L" and "N" with both DOT and LINE BELOW and "M" and "H" with DOT BELOW, all on the same page in the MSR. It can be argued users have no working understanding of typography and would not reliably interpret small gaps or bulges in the underline as being related to an unfamiliar code point. This appears to make all diacritics below security-sensitive, however, the initial determination belongs to the relevant GPs. Note by the way that the Devanagari LGR treats sequences containing NUKTA (a dot below) as variants in at least some cases and recent community comments for that script are calling for more variant sequences. However, while the feature is graphically analog (dot below), each script works differently and there is no single a-priori solution. The IP would like to encourage the LatinGP (and any other GP facing cases like this) to explicitly examine this example and other cases like it, where code points can become indistinguishable in common usage scenarios for IDNs, and formally conclude whether and how to take these into account when designing their LGR. At this point, the IP would expect the GP to: * explicitly discuss this and other scenarios like it * evaluate whether they constitute a security risk to the Root Zone * come up with a reasoned decision as to whether and how to address them in the design of the Latin GP; and finally * document both the decision and its rationale. In coming to a decision, the GP may resolve: 1) to make them variants 2) to list them for attention as confusable 3) to take no action, because the GP feels that they do not represent a special security risk. As part of the review of the Latin LGR, the IP will look at the background and rationale offered by the Latin GP in coming to its conclusion; note that if the IP feels that the facts considered and rationale documented do not support the conclusion reached by the GP it may raise objections at that time. _______________________________________________ Latingp mailing list Latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:Latingp@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/latingp

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New version 2018-09-10 of the report ready for comments
by Mirjana Tasić Sept. 5, 2018

Sept. 5, 2018

Dear GP members, I have prepared the new version of the Report. Only comments are allowed, because I needed a lot of time to put it in a shape. Please read and comment it in order to correct errors I made. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1cklb8a8qhihXR_KDc1GuIT_17aBVOh4x4-z1yD2… This will be our next report submitted to IP Regards Mirjana

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Re: [Latingp] References for Latin LGR Proposal
by Mirjana Tasić Sept. 4, 2018

Sept. 4, 2018

Dear Pitinan, Thank you for this huge job done. I also suggest that broken references should be removed. I shall do this, if there is no other opinion, during final redaction of Report. Regards Mirjana From: Latin GP <latingp-bounces(a)icann.org> on behalf of Pitinan Kooarmornpatana <pitinan.koo(a)icann.org> Date: Tuesday, September 4, 2018 at 07:55 To: Latin GP <latingp(a)icann.org> Subject: [Latingp] References for Latin LGR Proposal Dear Latin GP Members, Please find attached the information of references for the Latin LGR Proposal. The following points need your attention: 1. [118] is duplicated with [109] (Vietnamese) 2. [162] is a broken link and it is likely to be the same as [106] (Galician) 3. [171] is a broken link and it might have already covered by [115] (West Frisian (Frysk)) 4. [207] is a broken link and it might have already covered by [208] (Italian) Kindly review and let me know how would you like to treat these cases. In my opinion, we probably could remove these references. Regards, Pitinan

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References for Latin LGR Proposal
by Pitinan Kooarmornpatana Sept. 4, 2018

Sept. 4, 2018

Dear Latin GP Members, Please find attached the information of references for the Latin LGR Proposal. The following points need your attention: 1. [118] is duplicated with [109] (Vietnamese) 2. [162] is a broken link and it is likely to be the same as [106] (Galician) 3. [171] is a broken link and it might have already covered by [115] (West Frisian (Frysk)) 4. [207] is a broken link and it might have already covered by [208] (Italian) Kindly review and let me know how would you like to treat these cases. In my opinion, we probably could remove these references. Regards, Pitinan

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Re: [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk?
by Tan Tanaka, Dennis Sept. 3, 2018

Sept. 3, 2018

Example 1 is moot. Our panel have already received IP’s opinion on this case (small letters turned e and schwa): these two code points ought to be variants because they are homoglyphs. -Dennis From: Latingp <latingp-bounces(a)icann.org> on behalf of Mirjana Tasić <Mirjana.Tasic(a)rnids.rs> Date: Monday, September 3, 2018 at 9:34 AM To: "latingp(a)icann.org" <latingp(a)icann.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk? Dear GP members, I have compiled two texts submitted by Denis and Bill as the response to the IP letter from August 29. Please find the proposal below. All comments and corrections are the most welcome. Regards Mirjana The Latin GP appreciates the additional input received on August 29, 2018 titled “Diacritics below a security risk?”. In its feedback, IP makes a case for potential security risks when certain diacritics below (e.g. dot and line below) are used in a domain name. The risk is not always apparent, but it reveals itself when the diacritic below is obscured by an underline, which is the typical formatting feature of hyperlinks. The IP asserts “Of all diacritics, diacritics below can be difficult to distinguish or be prone to clipping”. Security risks deserve a place in our analysis, so Latin GP is committed to explicitly discuss this matter, resolve whether they constitute a security risk to the Root Zone and decide a solution vis-à-vis the LGR. On a related note, the Latin GP would like to get additional clarification regarding some of IP’s statements from the August 29 email: “It can be argued users have no working understanding of typography and would not reliably interpret small gaps or bulges in the underline as being related to an unfamiliar code point”. “The IP would like to encourage the Latin GP […] to explicitly examine [the diacritics below] example and other cases like it, where code points can become indistinguishable in common usage scenarios for IDNs”. Some GP members would imply that IP is welcoming visual similarity or confusability as a criterion for variant definition (e.g. letters with diacritics acute and grave could be deemed indistinguishable, therefore variants). Other members don’t agree with that reasoning. In this context, the Latin GP wants to confirm that prior guidance from IP (below), which we find consistent with the LGR Procedure, is not at odds with the August 29 email. LGR Procedure: “Finally, in investigating the possible variant relations, Generation Panels should ignore cases where the relation is based exclusively on aspects of visual similarity.” October 18, 2017: Principles for repertoire and variants – Feedback from IP “In the context of the Root Zone, the Procedure is quite clear in that it considers simple similarity of appearance to be outside the scope of the Root Zone LGR.”... “Having the Root Zone exhibit fundamentally different design decisions with respect to variants than those found on the second level would have to be justified by strong arguments based on factors special to the Root Zone.” March 22, 2017: Latin GP Proposal: IP Feedback “The kinds of variants to be defined in the Root Zone LGR are limited to homoglyphs, which are characters essentially identical appearance by design, instead of merely similar appearance.” It may be helpful in clarifying matters if the IP could address a few actual examples for us. We are all clear that o and ỗ 006F and 1ED7 are sufficiently different to not even be confuseable. Example 1. Letters ə and ǝ 0259 and 01DD are pixel for pixel identical. It should be noted, we have been presented with an argument that even they are not variants. The explanation given by some members of IP was that these two letters are not variants because their uppercase versions are different. Example 2: Please consider following cases. Where in between does the threshold for variants lie: Case no Code point 1 Glyph 1 Glyph 2 Code point 2 Variants or "merely visually similar"? or something else 1. 0131 ı ɩ 0269 2. 00E1 ă ǎ 01CE 3. 006A j į 012F 4. 00FC ü ű 0171 5. 006C m rn 0072 + 006D 6. 006B k ƙ 0199 7. 0070 p þ 00FE 8. 0064 d ɗ 0257 9. 00F5 õ ō 014D 10. 0069 i ı 0131 FYI, Case no 10 in the previous table, an experiment with a couple dozen native speakers of English found them unable to spot occurrences of the latter. Even when told that there was a variation on the letter I somewhere in the text. P.S. As may be obvious, the Latin GP is going to find it difficult to respond to the IP's query about whether various letters with a diacritic below are variants. And until we are clear on what the IP's purpose is in designating some kinds of similarity variants and others not, it will be impossible to respond to the Why? part of the query. Od: Latingp <latingp-bounces(a)icann.org> U ime Bill Jouris Poslato: Saturday, September 1, 2018 10:16 Za: latingp(a)icann.org Tema: Re: [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk? I would like to suggest that we expand on Dennis' draft a bit. Perhaps with the following text added. ************************************************************************************************************************* It may be helpful in clarifying matters if the IP could address a few actual examples for us. We are all clear that o and ỗ 006F and 1ED7 are sufficiently different to not even be confuseable. On the other hand ə and ǝ 0259 and 01DD are pixel for pixel identical. (It should be noted, we have been presented with an argument that even they are not variants.) So, where in between does the threshold for variants lie: ı and ɩ 0131 and 0269 The difference is on the order of that between different fonts. Variants or "merely visually similar"? ă and ǎ 00E1 and 01CE The difference is small enough that, at normal (12 point) type size, the eye cannot distinguish. Variants or "merely visually similar"? j and į 006A and 012F Outside the fraction of a percent of users who have encountered the latter previously, it wouldn't occur to anyone that the latter was anything except a letter J. Variants or "merely visually similar"? ü and ű 00FC and 0171 Variants or "merely visually similar"? m and rn 006C and 0072 plus 006D Variants or "merely visually similar"? k and ƙ 006B and 0199 Variants or "merely visually similar"? p and þ 0070 and 00FE Variants or "merely visually similar"? d and ɗ 0064 and 0257 Variants or "merely visually similar"? õ and ō 00F5 and 014D Variants or "merely visually similar"? i and ı 0069 and 0131 FYI, an experiment with a couple dozen native speakers of English found them unable to spot occurrences of the latter. Even when told that there was a variation on the letter I somewhere in the text. Variants or "merely visually similar"? P.S. As may be obvious, the Latin GP is going to find it difficult to respond to the IP's query about whether various letters with a diacritic below are variants. And until we are clear on what the IP's purpose is in designating some kinds of similarity variants and others not, it will be impossible to respond to the Why? part of the query. ********************************************************************************************************************************** Bill Jouris Inside Products bill.jouris(a)insidethestack.com<mailto:bill.jouris@insidethestack.com> 831-659-8360 925-855-9512 (direct) ________________________________ From: "Tan Tanaka, Dennis via Latingp" <latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp@icann.org>> To: "latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp@icann.org>" <latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp@icann.org>> Sent: Friday, August 31, 2018 1:43 PM Subject: Re: [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk? Mirjana, et al Below is a proposed response to IP From: Latin GP To: IP The Latin GP appreciates the additional input received on August 29, 2018 titled “Diacritics below a security risk?”. In its feedback, IP makes a case for potential security risks when certain diacritics below (e.g. dot and line below) are used in a domain name. The risk is not always apparent, but it reveals itself when the diacritic below is obscured by an underline, which is the typical formatting feature of hyperlinks. The IP asserts “Of all diacritics, diacritics below can be difficult to distinguish or be prone to clipping”. Security risks deserve a place in our analysis, so Latin GP is committed to explicitly discuss this matter, resolve whether they constitute a security risk to the Root Zone and decide a solution vis-à-vis the LGR. On a related note, the Latin GP would like to get additional clarification regarding some of IP’s statements from the August 29 email: “It can be argued users have no working understanding of typography and would not reliably interpret small gaps or bulges in the underline as being related to an unfamiliar code point”. “The IP would like to encourage the Latin GP […] to explicitly examine [the diacritics below] example and other cases like it, where code points can become indistinguishable in common usage scenarios for IDNs”. Some GP members would imply that IP is welcoming visual similarity or confusability as a criterion for variant definition (e.g. letters with diacritics acute and grave could be deemed indistinguishable, therefore variants). Other members don’t agree with that reasoning. In this context, the Latin GP wants to confirm that prior guidance from IP (below), which we find consistent with the LGR Procedure, is not at odds with the August 29 email. LGR Procedure: “Finally, in investigating the possible variant relations, Generation Panels should ignore cases where the relation is based exclusively on aspects of visual similarity.” October 18, 2017: Principles for repertoire and variants – Feedback from IP “In the context of the Root Zone, the Procedure is quite clear in that it considers simple similarity of appearance to be outside the scope of the Root Zone LGR.”... “Having the Root Zone exhibit fundamentally different design decisions with respect to variants than those found on the second level would have to be justified by strong arguments based on factors special to the Root Zone.” March 22, 2017: Latin GP Proposal: IP Feedback “The kinds of variants to be defined in the Root Zone LGR are limited to homoglyphs, which are characters essentially identical appearance by design, instead of merely similar appearance.” Sincerely, Latin GP From: Latingp <latingp-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Sarmad Hussain <sarmad.hussain(a)icann.org<mailto:sarmad.hussain@icann.org>> Date: Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 2:58 AM To: Latin GP <latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp@icann.org>> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk? Dear Latin GP members Kindly find below some feedback from IP for your consideration. Regards Sarmad TO: LatinGP FROM: IP There are recent and widely published examples of phishing attacks using Latin IDNs in which the key features involved were diacritics below the letter. Here is an example: [cid:part1.E6E9F88C.32B00687@ix.netcom.com] Of all diacritics, diacritics below can be difficult to distinguish or be prone to clipping -- there is less space below the baseline than between the typical lowercase glyph and the top of the line. The example given above shows a further interaction with URL underlining - and not all display engines actually do as nice a job interrupting the underline as in the screen shot above. For example, here is how one system will render this (using a designated UI font - Segoe UI): [cid:part2.59964F92.16B1BC0B@ix.netcom.com] Note, this code point (U+1E33) is in the MSR as is (U+1E35 LATIN SMALL K WITH LINE BELOW). [cid:part3.99B9649E.C3C335FC@ix.netcom.com] The second example contains U+1E35 -- while the effect does not show equally at all type sizes, from 12pt and below the LINE BELOW is reliably hidden. Here are the two examples at 10pt [cid:part4.B43CE3FD.8C84EACF@ix.netcom.com] The issue is not limited to "K". We see "B", "D", "L" and "N" with both DOT and LINE BELOW and "M" and "H" with DOT BELOW, all on the same page in the MSR. It can be argued users have no working understanding of typography and would not reliably interpret small gaps or bulges in the underline as being related to an unfamiliar code point. This appears to make all diacritics below security-sensitive, however, the initial determination belongs to the relevant GPs. Note by the way that the Devanagari LGR treats sequences containing NUKTA (a dot below) as variants in at least some cases and recent community comments for that script are calling for more variant sequences. However, while the feature is graphically analog (dot below), each script works differently and there is no single a-priori solution. The IP would like to encourage the LatinGP (and any other GP facing cases like this) to explicitly examine this example and other cases like it, where code points can become indistinguishable in common usage scenarios for IDNs, and formally conclude whether and how to take these into account when designing their LGR. At this point, the IP would expect the GP to: * explicitly discuss this and other scenarios like it * evaluate whether they constitute a security risk to the Root Zone * come up with a reasoned decision as to whether and how to address them in the design of the Latin GP; and finally * document both the decision and its rationale. In coming to a decision, the GP may resolve: 1) to make them variants 2) to list them for attention as confusable 3) to take no action, because the GP feels that they do not represent a special security risk. As part of the review of the Latin LGR, the IP will look at the background and rationale offered by the Latin GP in coming to its conclusion; note that if the IP feels that the facts considered and rationale documented do not support the conclusion reached by the GP it may raise objections at that time. _______________________________________________ Latingp mailing list Latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:Latingp@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/latingp

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Re: [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk?
by Mirjana Tasić Sept. 3, 2018

Sept. 3, 2018

Dear GP members, I have compiled two texts submitted by Denis and Bill as the response to the IP letter from August 29. Please find the proposal below. All comments and corrections are the most welcome. Regards Mirjana The Latin GP appreciates the additional input received on August 29, 2018 titled “Diacritics below a security risk?”. In its feedback, IP makes a case for potential security risks when certain diacritics below (e.g. dot and line below) are used in a domain name. The risk is not always apparent, but it reveals itself when the diacritic below is obscured by an underline, which is the typical formatting feature of hyperlinks. The IP asserts “Of all diacritics, diacritics below can be difficult to distinguish or be prone to clipping”. Security risks deserve a place in our analysis, so Latin GP is committed to explicitly discuss this matter, resolve whether they constitute a security risk to the Root Zone and decide a solution vis-à-vis the LGR. On a related note, the Latin GP would like to get additional clarification regarding some of IP’s statements from the August 29 email: “It can be argued users have no working understanding of typography and would not reliably interpret small gaps or bulges in the underline as being related to an unfamiliar code point”. “The IP would like to encourage the Latin GP […] to explicitly examine [the diacritics below] example and other cases like it, where code points can become indistinguishable in common usage scenarios for IDNs”. Some GP members would imply that IP is welcoming visual similarity or confusability as a criterion for variant definition (e.g. letters with diacritics acute and grave could be deemed indistinguishable, therefore variants). Other members don’t agree with that reasoning. In this context, the Latin GP wants to confirm that prior guidance from IP (below), which we find consistent with the LGR Procedure, is not at odds with the August 29 email. LGR Procedure: “Finally, in investigating the possible variant relations, Generation Panels should ignore cases where the relation is based exclusively on aspects of visual similarity.” October 18, 2017: Principles for repertoire and variants – Feedback from IP “In the context of the Root Zone, the Procedure is quite clear in that it considers simple similarity of appearance to be outside the scope of the Root Zone LGR.”... “Having the Root Zone exhibit fundamentally different design decisions with respect to variants than those found on the second level would have to be justified by strong arguments based on factors special to the Root Zone.” March 22, 2017: Latin GP Proposal: IP Feedback “The kinds of variants to be defined in the Root Zone LGR are limited to homoglyphs, which are characters essentially identical appearance by design, instead of merely similar appearance.” It may be helpful in clarifying matters if the IP could address a few actual examples for us. We are all clear that o and ỗ 006F and 1ED7 are sufficiently different to not even be confuseable. Example 1. Letters ə and ǝ 0259 and 01DD are pixel for pixel identical. It should be noted, we have been presented with an argument that even they are not variants. The explanation given by some members of IP was that these two letters are not variants because their uppercase versions are different. Example 2: Please consider following cases. Where in between does the threshold for variants lie: Case no Code point 1 Glyph 1 Glyph 2 Code point 2 Variants or "merely visually similar"? or something else 1. 0131 ı ɩ 0269 2. 00E1 ă ǎ 01CE 3. 006A j į 012F 4. 00FC ü ű 0171 5. 006C m rn 0072 + 006D 6. 006B k ƙ 0199 7. 0070 p þ 00FE 8. 0064 d ɗ 0257 9. 00F5 õ ō 014D 10. 0069 i ı 0131 FYI, Case no 10 in the previous table, an experiment with a couple dozen native speakers of English found them unable to spot occurrences of the latter. Even when told that there was a variation on the letter I somewhere in the text. P.S. As may be obvious, the Latin GP is going to find it difficult to respond to the IP's query about whether various letters with a diacritic below are variants. And until we are clear on what the IP's purpose is in designating some kinds of similarity variants and others not, it will be impossible to respond to the Why? part of the query. Od: Latingp <latingp-bounces(a)icann.org> U ime Bill Jouris Poslato: Saturday, September 1, 2018 10:16 Za: latingp(a)icann.org Tema: Re: [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk? I would like to suggest that we expand on Dennis' draft a bit. Perhaps with the following text added. ************************************************************************************************************************* It may be helpful in clarifying matters if the IP could address a few actual examples for us. We are all clear that o and ỗ 006F and 1ED7 are sufficiently different to not even be confuseable. On the other hand ə and ǝ 0259 and 01DD are pixel for pixel identical. (It should be noted, we have been presented with an argument that even they are not variants.) So, where in between does the threshold for variants lie: ı and ɩ 0131 and 0269 The difference is on the order of that between different fonts. Variants or "merely visually similar"? ă and ǎ 00E1 and 01CE The difference is small enough that, at normal (12 point) type size, the eye cannot distinguish. Variants or "merely visually similar"? j and į 006A and 012F Outside the fraction of a percent of users who have encountered the latter previously, it wouldn't occur to anyone that the latter was anything except a letter J. Variants or "merely visually similar"? ü and ű 00FC and 0171 Variants or "merely visually similar"? m and rn 006C and 0072 plus 006D Variants or "merely visually similar"? k and ƙ 006B and 0199 Variants or "merely visually similar"? p and þ 0070 and 00FE Variants or "merely visually similar"? d and ɗ 0064 and 0257 Variants or "merely visually similar"? õ and ō 00F5 and 014D Variants or "merely visually similar"? i and ı 0069 and 0131 FYI, an experiment with a couple dozen native speakers of English found them unable to spot occurrences of the latter. Even when told that there was a variation on the letter I somewhere in the text. Variants or "merely visually similar"? P.S. As may be obvious, the Latin GP is going to find it difficult to respond to the IP's query about whether various letters with a diacritic below are variants. And until we are clear on what the IP's purpose is in designating some kinds of similarity variants and others not, it will be impossible to respond to the Why? part of the query. ********************************************************************************************************************************** Bill Jouris Inside Products bill.jouris(a)insidethestack.com<mailto:bill.jouris@insidethestack.com> 831-659-8360 925-855-9512 (direct) ________________________________ From: "Tan Tanaka, Dennis via Latingp" <latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp@icann.org>> To: "latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp@icann.org>" <latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp@icann.org>> Sent: Friday, August 31, 2018 1:43 PM Subject: Re: [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk? Mirjana, et al Below is a proposed response to IP From: Latin GP To: IP The Latin GP appreciates the additional input received on August 29, 2018 titled “Diacritics below a security risk?”. In its feedback, IP makes a case for potential security risks when certain diacritics below (e.g. dot and line below) are used in a domain name. The risk is not always apparent, but it reveals itself when the diacritic below is obscured by an underline, which is the typical formatting feature of hyperlinks. The IP asserts “Of all diacritics, diacritics below can be difficult to distinguish or be prone to clipping”. Security risks deserve a place in our analysis, so Latin GP is committed to explicitly discuss this matter, resolve whether they constitute a security risk to the Root Zone and decide a solution vis-à-vis the LGR. On a related note, the Latin GP would like to get additional clarification regarding some of IP’s statements from the August 29 email: “It can be argued users have no working understanding of typography and would not reliably interpret small gaps or bulges in the underline as being related to an unfamiliar code point”. “The IP would like to encourage the Latin GP […] to explicitly examine [the diacritics below] example and other cases like it, where code points can become indistinguishable in common usage scenarios for IDNs”. Some GP members would imply that IP is welcoming visual similarity or confusability as a criterion for variant definition (e.g. letters with diacritics acute and grave could be deemed indistinguishable, therefore variants). Other members don’t agree with that reasoning. In this context, the Latin GP wants to confirm that prior guidance from IP (below), which we find consistent with the LGR Procedure, is not at odds with the August 29 email. LGR Procedure: “Finally, in investigating the possible variant relations, Generation Panels should ignore cases where the relation is based exclusively on aspects of visual similarity.” October 18, 2017: Principles for repertoire and variants – Feedback from IP “In the context of the Root Zone, the Procedure is quite clear in that it considers simple similarity of appearance to be outside the scope of the Root Zone LGR.”... “Having the Root Zone exhibit fundamentally different design decisions with respect to variants than those found on the second level would have to be justified by strong arguments based on factors special to the Root Zone.” March 22, 2017: Latin GP Proposal: IP Feedback “The kinds of variants to be defined in the Root Zone LGR are limited to homoglyphs, which are characters essentially identical appearance by design, instead of merely similar appearance.” Sincerely, Latin GP From: Latingp <latingp-bounces(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Sarmad Hussain <sarmad.hussain(a)icann.org<mailto:sarmad.hussain@icann.org>> Date: Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 2:58 AM To: Latin GP <latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:latingp@icann.org>> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk? Dear Latin GP members Kindly find below some feedback from IP for your consideration. Regards Sarmad TO: LatinGP FROM: IP There are recent and widely published examples of phishing attacks using Latin IDNs in which the key features involved were diacritics below the letter. Here is an example: [cid:part1.E6E9F88C.32B00687@ix.netcom.com] Of all diacritics, diacritics below can be difficult to distinguish or be prone to clipping -- there is less space below the baseline than between the typical lowercase glyph and the top of the line. The example given above shows a further interaction with URL underlining - and not all display engines actually do as nice a job interrupting the underline as in the screen shot above. For example, here is how one system will render this (using a designated UI font - Segoe UI): [cid:part2.59964F92.16B1BC0B@ix.netcom.com] Note, this code point (U+1E33) is in the MSR as is (U+1E35 LATIN SMALL K WITH LINE BELOW). [cid:part3.99B9649E.C3C335FC@ix.netcom.com] The second example contains U+1E35 -- while the effect does not show equally at all type sizes, from 12pt and below the LINE BELOW is reliably hidden. Here are the two examples at 10pt [cid:part4.B43CE3FD.8C84EACF@ix.netcom.com] The issue is not limited to "K". We see "B", "D", "L" and "N" with both DOT and LINE BELOW and "M" and "H" with DOT BELOW, all on the same page in the MSR. It can be argued users have no working understanding of typography and would not reliably interpret small gaps or bulges in the underline as being related to an unfamiliar code point. This appears to make all diacritics below security-sensitive, however, the initial determination belongs to the relevant GPs. Note by the way that the Devanagari LGR treats sequences containing NUKTA (a dot below) as variants in at least some cases and recent community comments for that script are calling for more variant sequences. However, while the feature is graphically analog (dot below), each script works differently and there is no single a-priori solution. The IP would like to encourage the LatinGP (and any other GP facing cases like this) to explicitly examine this example and other cases like it, where code points can become indistinguishable in common usage scenarios for IDNs, and formally conclude whether and how to take these into account when designing their LGR. At this point, the IP would expect the GP to: * explicitly discuss this and other scenarios like it * evaluate whether they constitute a security risk to the Root Zone * come up with a reasoned decision as to whether and how to address them in the design of the Latin GP; and finally * document both the decision and its rationale. In coming to a decision, the GP may resolve: 1) to make them variants 2) to list them for attention as confusable 3) to take no action, because the GP feels that they do not represent a special security risk. As part of the review of the Latin LGR, the IP will look at the background and rationale offered by the Latin GP in coming to its conclusion; note that if the IP feels that the facts considered and rationale documented do not support the conclusion reached by the GP it may raise objections at that time. _______________________________________________ Latingp mailing list Latingp(a)icann.org<mailto:Latingp@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/latingp

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Re: [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk?
by Tan Tanaka, Dennis Sept. 1, 2018

Sept. 1, 2018

Mirjana, et al Below is a proposed response to IP From: Latin GP To: IP The Latin GP appreciates the additional input received on August 29, 2018 titled “Diacritics below a security risk?”. In its feedback, IP makes a case for potential security risks when certain diacritics below (e.g. dot and line below) are used in a domain name. The risk is not always apparent, but it reveals itself when the diacritic below is obscured by an underline, which is the typical formatting feature of hyperlinks. The IP asserts “Of all diacritics, diacritics below can be difficult to distinguish or be prone to clipping”. Security risks deserve a place in our analysis, so Latin GP is committed to explicitly discuss this matter, resolve whether they constitute a security risk to the Root Zone and decide a solution vis-à-vis the LGR. On a related note, the Latin GP would like to get additional clarification regarding some of IP’s statements from the August 29 email: “It can be argued users have no working understanding of typography and would not reliably interpret small gaps or bulges in the underline as being related to an unfamiliar code point”. “The IP would like to encourage the Latin GP […] to explicitly examine [the diacritics below] example and other cases like it, where code points can become indistinguishable in common usage scenarios for IDNs”. Some GP members would imply that IP is welcoming visual similarity or confusability as a criterion for variant definition (e.g. letters with diacritics acute and grave could be deemed indistinguishable, therefore variants). Other members don’t agree with that reasoning. In this context, the Latin GP wants to confirm that prior guidance from IP (below), which we find consistent with the LGR Procedure, is not at odds with the August 29 email. LGR Procedure: “Finally, in investigating the possible variant relations, Generation Panels should ignore cases where the relation is based exclusively on aspects of visual similarity.” October 18, 2017: Principles for repertoire and variants – Feedback from IP “In the context of the Root Zone, the Procedure is quite clear in that it considers simple similarity of appearance to be outside the scope of the Root Zone LGR.”... “Having the Root Zone exhibit fundamentally different design decisions with respect to variants than those found on the second level would have to be justified by strong arguments based on factors special to the Root Zone.” March 22, 2017: Latin GP Proposal: IP Feedback “The kinds of variants to be defined in the Root Zone LGR are limited to homoglyphs, which are characters essentially identical appearance by design, instead of merely similar appearance.” Sincerely, Latin GP From: Latingp <latingp-bounces(a)icann.org> on behalf of Sarmad Hussain <sarmad.hussain(a)icann.org> Date: Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 2:58 AM To: Latin GP <latingp(a)icann.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [Latingp] From IP: Diacritics below a security risk? Dear Latin GP members Kindly find below some feedback from IP for your consideration. Regards Sarmad TO: LatinGP FROM: IP There are recent and widely published examples of phishing attacks using Latin IDNs in which the key features involved were diacritics below the letter. Here is an example: [cid:part1.E6E9F88C.32B00687@ix.netcom.com] Of all diacritics, diacritics below can be difficult to distinguish or be prone to clipping -- there is less space below the baseline than between the typical lowercase glyph and the top of the line. The example given above shows a further interaction with URL underlining - and not all display engines actually do as nice a job interrupting the underline as in the screen shot above. For example, here is how one system will render this (using a designated UI font - Segoe UI): [cid:part2.59964F92.16B1BC0B@ix.netcom.com] Note, this code point (U+1E33) is in the MSR as is (U+1E35 LATIN SMALL K WITH LINE BELOW). [cid:part3.99B9649E.C3C335FC@ix.netcom.com] The second example contains U+1E35 -- while the effect does not show equally at all type sizes, from 12pt and below the LINE BELOW is reliably hidden. Here are the two examples at 10pt [cid:part4.B43CE3FD.8C84EACF@ix.netcom.com] The issue is not limited to "K". We see "B", "D", "L" and "N" with both DOT and LINE BELOW and "M" and "H" with DOT BELOW, all on the same page in the MSR. It can be argued users have no working understanding of typography and would not reliably interpret small gaps or bulges in the underline as being related to an unfamiliar code point. This appears to make all diacritics below security-sensitive, however, the initial determination belongs to the relevant GPs. Note by the way that the Devanagari LGR treats sequences containing NUKTA (a dot below) as variants in at least some cases and recent community comments for that script are calling for more variant sequences. However, while the feature is graphically analog (dot below), each script works differently and there is no single a-priori solution. The IP would like to encourage the LatinGP (and any other GP facing cases like this) to explicitly examine this example and other cases like it, where code points can become indistinguishable in common usage scenarios for IDNs, and formally conclude whether and how to take these into account when designing their LGR. At this point, the IP would expect the GP to: * explicitly discuss this and other scenarios like it * evaluate whether they constitute a security risk to the Root Zone * come up with a reasoned decision as to whether and how to address them in the design of the Latin GP; and finally * document both the decision and its rationale. In coming to a decision, the GP may resolve: 1) to make them variants 2) to list them for attention as confusable 3) to take no action, because the GP feels that they do not represent a special security risk. As part of the review of the Latin LGR, the IP will look at the background and rationale offered by the Latin GP in coming to its conclusion; note that if the IP feels that the facts considered and rationale documented do not support the conclusion reached by the GP it may raise objections at that time.

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Re: [Latingp] Section numbering in Final report
by Tan Tanaka, Dennis Aug. 31, 2018

Aug. 31, 2018

I’m looking for the latest version of the draft proposal to incorporate the cross-script variants …. Can someone send the link please? Thank you, Dennis From: Latingp <latingp-bounces(a)icann.org> on behalf of Mirjana Tasić <Mirjana.Tasic(a)rnids.rs> Date: Wednesday, August 22, 2018 at 5:43 AM To: Latin GP <latingp(a)icann.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [Latingp] Section numbering in Final report Dear GP members, During upload of the new version of the report, Google docs used its own logic, and numbered our Table of content as section one. I have corrected this, now sections has right numbers as it is stated in Table of contents. Regards Mirjana

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Latin GP meeting
by Pitinan Kooarmornpatana Aug. 31, 2018

Aug. 31, 2018

Dear Latin GP members , This is a placeholder for the Latin GP meeting on 6 September 2018, 16:00UTC. Regards, Pitinan ---------------------------- Link to Adobe Connect: https://participate.icann.org/idn/ *Upon logging into Adobe Connect, a pop up window will provide you the option to Dial Out to your Phone. Enter your Phone Number* (Remember to change the Country Code if needed). After joining the call, as a courtesy to others and the presenters, please MUTE your phone. This can be done by selecting *6 on your keypad. To UNMUTE select *6 again. If you are Unable to log into Adobe Connect and can only join via phone: https://www.myrcplus.com/cnums.asp?bwebid=8369444&ppc=1064158692&num=1-719-… Participant Passcode: 1064158692

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